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Do dogs follow behavioral cues from an unreliable human?

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Abstract

Dogs are known to consistently follow human pointing gestures. In this study, we asked whether dogs "automatically" do this or whether they flexibly adjust their behavior depending upon the reliability of the pointer, demonstrated in an immediately preceding event. We tested pet dogs in a version of the object choice task in which a piece of food was hidden in one of the two containers. In Experiment 1, Phase 1, an experimenter pointed at the baited container; the second container was empty. In Phase 2, after showing the contents of both containers to the dogs, the experimenter pointed at the empty container. In Phase 3, the procedure was exactly as in Phase 1. We compared the dogs' responses to the experimenter's pointing gestures in Phases 1 and 3. Most dogs followed pointing in Phase 1, but many fewer did so in Phase 3. In Experiment 2, dogs followed a new experimenter's pointing in Phase 3 following replication of procedures of Phases 1 and 2 in Experiment 1. This ruled out the possibility that dogs simply lost motivation to participate in the task in later phases. These results suggest that not only dogs are highly skilled at understanding human pointing gestures, but also they make inferences about the reliability of a human who presents cues and consequently modify their behavior flexibly depending on the inference.
ORIGINAL PAPER
Do dogs follow behavioral cues from an unreliable human?
Akiko Takaoka Tomomi Maeda
Yusuke Hori Kazuo Fujita
Received: 9 January 2014 / Revised: 10 October 2014 / Accepted: 20 October 2014 / Published online: 28 October 2014
ÓSpringer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014
Abstract Dogs are known to consistently follow human
pointing gestures. In this study, we asked whether dogs
‘automatically’’ do this or whether they flexibly adjust
their behavior depending upon the reliability of the pointer,
demonstrated in an immediately preceding event. We tes-
ted pet dogs in a version of the object choice task in which
a piece of food was hidden in one of the two containers. In
Experiment 1, Phase 1, an experimenter pointed at the
baited container; the second container was empty. In Phase
2, after showing the contents of both containers to the dogs,
the experimenter pointed at the empty container. In Phase
3, the procedure was exactly as in Phase 1. We compared
the dogs’ responses to the experimenter’s pointing gestures
in Phases 1 and 3. Most dogs followed pointing in Phase 1,
but many fewer did so in Phase 3. In Experiment 2, dogs
followed a new experimenter’s pointing in Phase 3 fol-
lowing replication of procedures of Phases 1 and 2 in
Experiment 1. This ruled out the possibility that dogs
simply lost motivation to participate in the task in later
phases. These results suggest that not only dogs are highly
skilled at understanding human pointing gestures, but also
they make inferences about the reliability of a human who
presents cues and consequently modify their behavior
flexibly depending on the inference.
Keywords Dog Dog–human interaction Selective
trust Pointing Object choice task
Introduction
In the last two decades, a large body of research has
established that dogs (Canis familiaris) show sophisticated
social cognitive abilities in interspecific interactions with
humans (Hare and Tomasello 2005; Reid 2009; Udell and
Wynne 2008; Takaoka 2009). Dogs can exploit a range of
behavioral cues from humans, with some of their abilities
paralleling social cognitive skills of humans (e.g., Adachi
et al. 2007; Hare and Tomasello 2005; Takaoka et al.
2013). For example, Adachi et al. (2007) reported that dogs
looked longer at visual images of people when these ima-
ges did not match the voice of someone calling them,
suggesting that dogs have cross-modal representations of
particular humans. Using the same expectancy-violation
paradigm, Takaoka et al. (2013) demonstrated that dogs
categorize human gender using visual and auditory
information.
Several experiments suggest that domestic dogs are
particularly sensitive to human pointing gestures (Bra
¨uer
et al. 2006; Hare and Tomasello 1999; Miklo
´si et al. 1998).
In several of these studies, the so-called object choice task
was used to test sensitivity to human communicative ges-
tures. In this task, a human experimenter first hides a
reward in one of the two identical containers out of view of
the subject. The experimenter then provides the subject
with a cue such as orienting, leaning, or pointing toward
the baited container, and the subject is allowed to make a
choice. Dogs can use various human gestures including
pointing, gazing, bowing, nodding, and eye glance to find
hidden rewards.
Dogs’ responsiveness to human communicative cues
appears very strong; they will even try to use misleading
signals given by humans. Szetei et al. (2003) showed that
in a two-alternative object choice task, dogs chose an
A. Takaoka (&)T. Maeda Y. Hori K. Fujita
Department of Psychology, Graduate School of Letters,
Kyoto University, Sakyo, Kyoto 606-8501, Japan
e-mail: takaoka.akk@gmail.com
123
Anim Cogn (2015) 18:475–483
DOI 10.1007/s10071-014-0816-2
empty container indicated by the experimenter even after
they saw or sniffed the baited container. In a related study,
Prato-Previde et al. (2008) showed that dogs tended to
choose a plate containing a smaller quantity of food if their
owners misled them by showing a strong preference for
that plate rather than another with a much larger quantity of
food. Even a stranger can mislead dogs in this way (Mar-
shall-Pescini et al. 2011b).
Although dogs respond positively to human communi-
cative gestures, they do not follow pointing gestures
automatically. Petter et al. (2009) found that, after inten-
sive training, dogs learned to approach a cooperative
human who always pointed at a baited container (honest
pointing) more often than a deceptive human who always
pointed at an empty container (dishonest pointing). Kundey
et al. (2010) expanded Petter et al.’s (2009) study using
three kinds of gestures: static pointing, momentary point-
ing, and standing behind a container. They found that dogs
had difficulty inhibiting approach directed by static point-
ing in comparison with the other gestures. Kundey et al.
(2010) further explored whether additional training would
improve dogs’ ability to inhibit following dishonest static
pointing. Dogs did learn to do this, but only if the reward
was visible at choice.
Although the above results suggest that dogs have dif-
ficulty inhibiting approaching a location indicated by
misleading pointing, it is not clear how dogs evaluate the
human who provides misleading pointing gestures. Prior
deceptive behavior by a particular person is an important
clue to that individual’s future trustworthiness (Vanderbilt
et al. 2011). Kundey et al. (2010) did not include a con-
dition in which the experimenter provided correct infor-
mation after providing incorrect information. That is to say,
in Petter et al. (2009), dogs may have interpreted the dis-
honest pointing as a simple discriminative cue to avoid that
container. Another possibility is that they inferred some-
thing about the behavioral or personal characteristics of the
misleading pointer. However, little work has been done on
dogs’ judgments of particular people’s traits, and whether
they can use this information flexibly when subsequently
responding toward those people.
Human children monitor the past accuracy of infor-
mants and use this information when they decide which
informant to trust (Corriveau and Harris 2009; Harris and
Corriveau 2011). They prefer to accept information from
someone who has proved accurate rather than someone
who has made errors when naming objects (Koenig et al.
2004). Gaze-following behavior is also influenced by
children’s previous experience with the looker; they
follow the gaze of a reliable looker more than that of an
unreliable looker (Chow et al. 2008). This tendency to
trust some informants more than others is called
‘selective trust.’
Human infants begin to understand and produce point-
ing at an early stage in their first year of life (Behne et al.
2012). Pointing is such a conventional communicative
gesture that young children have difficulty interpreting it in
a novel, unconventional way. Couillard and Woodward
(1999) investigated young children’s ability to comprehend
deceptive pointing. An experimenter provided a misleading
cue about the location of a reward by pointing at the
container including no reward. Children were found to
have difficulty rejecting the deceptive advice. In Vanderbilt
et al. (2011), children first observed the pointer helping
finders locate a hidden reward (helper trial) or tricking
finders into looking for the reward in a wrong location
(tricker trial). In the choice test that followed, 5-year-olds
trusted the helper’s advice more often than the tricker’s,
suggesting that young children inferred whether the pointer
was reliable or not from observing his/her behaviors, and
used this knowledge to predict the pointer’s future behav-
ior. In the same study, 3- and 4-year-olds showed poorer
performance than 5-year-olds, suggesting that selective
trust develops over time.
At present, we know little about whether dogs can track
the reliability of a person and use the information to adjust
their behavior flexibly. Marshall-Pescini et al. (2011a)
reported that dogs distinguished between generous and
selfish actors after observing their food-related interactions
with a beggar. When the beggar tapped the generous actor
on the arm, the latter gave a small piece of cereal to the
beggar, whereas the selfish actor refused to do so. When
dogs were then allowed to move freely, they preferentially
approached the generous actor. This study may suggest that
dogs evaluate characteristics of actors from third-party
interactions, but a simple association between the generous
donor and the reward cannot be ruled out. In Kundey et al.
(2011), dogs observed interactions between a recipient and
two demonstrators, who both showed a treat to the recipient
but then either gave it to her or not. Subsequently, when
dogs were allowed to choose one of the demonstrators, they
showed a strong preference for the giver. Again, however,
this preference may result from the association between the
giver and the reward. Furthermore, dogs are likely to have
experienced similar activities with their owners and others
during their daily lives, learning about features of people
who give them food; this may generalize to the generous
demonstrator in experimental situations.
In contrast, most studies on children’s selective trust
have been conducted within less familiar contexts,
including word learning (Harris and Corriveau 2011; Ko-
enig et al. 2004) and comprehension of deceptive pointing
(Heyman et al. 2013; Vanderbilt et al. 2011). In Harris and
Corriveau (2011), the unreliable informant named the
familiar object incorrectly, for example, by saying ‘‘That’s
a cup’’ when presented with a ball. In Vanderbilt et al.
476 Anim Cogn (2015) 18:475–483
123
(2011), the unreliable pointer provided young children with
misleading pointing to an empty container.
Misleading pointing should be an unfamiliar gesture for
dogs, because dog owners normally point toward locations
they want the dog to look at or approach. No research has
examined how dogs evaluate humans who provide mis-
leading cues. Furthermore, it is unclear whether dogs can
infer how reliable someone is based on their own direct
interactions with that person, and generalize the knowledge
to predict the person’s subsequent behavior. To this end, we
investigated how dogs would react to honest pointing ges-
tures after observing the same human pointing misleadingly
in an object choice task. We tested dogs in three phases.
Phase 1 was a regular object choice task in which an
experimenter pointed at the correct (baited) container. In
Phase 2, the same experimenter deliberately pointed at the
empty container after explicitly showing the dogs which
container was baited. Phase 3 was identical to Phase 1. Our
question was whether dogs would again respond positively
to the pointing gesture even after they observed misleading
pointing in Phase 2. If dogs judge someone as unreliable
after receiving a misleading cue, they might transfer this
evaluation to a subsequent situation, in which case they
should be less likely to follow the same experimenter’s
pointing in Phase 3 than in Phase 1. Alternatively, if dogs do
not use their experience in this way, or if they simply do not
draw inferences about the reliability of the experimenter,
they should continue to follow the experimenter’s pointing
gestures even after receiving inaccurate information.
Experiment 1
Experiment 1 tested the basic proposition that dogs would
cease to follow the points of an informant who proved
untrustworthy.
Methods
Subjects
Thirty-four pet dogs (mean =4.32 years, SD =3.28, 10
males and 24 females) and their owners participated. The
subjects included 2 Airedale terriers, 1 Border collie, 5
Chihuahuas, 1 Golden retriever, 2 Miniature dachshunds,
11 Pomeranians, 1 Shetland sheepdog, 2 Toy poodles, 1
Wire-haired fox terrier, 3 Japanese spitzes, and 5 Mongrels.
Their participation was voluntary. The owners were given a
detailed explanation of the test procedure before signing an
informed consent form. The owners remained blind to the
study’s purpose to exclude Clever Hans effects, and they
were forbidden from pointing or making related gestures
throughout the experiment.
Apparatus
Two identical plastic opaque containers were used. Each
dog’s favorite food, such as dog biscuit or jerky, was used
as a reward. To control olfactory cues, we hid a piece of the
same food on the underside of the bottom of each con-
tainer; this food was not visible to the dog.
Procedure
We used a two-alternative object choice task. The proce-
dure consisted of pre-training and three test phases. The
experiment took place in Kyoto University Kokoro labo-
ratory room, an unfamiliar location for the dogs.
Pre-training
Preliminary training served to accustom the dog to the
experimental situation. Two containers were positioned
upside down, 1 m apart from each other. An experimenter
sat approximately 30 cm back from and equidistant from
the containers. The owner was instructed to restrain the dog
lightly at about 1.5 m from the containers by holding the
dog’s leash or harness. The experimenter called the dog’s
name and visibly hid a piece of food under one of the
containers. The experimenter then lifted both containers
simultaneously and said ‘‘OK, let him/her go,’’ to ask the
owner to release the dog. The trial was repeated up to four
times (two trials with the reward at each side) until the dog
came up to the baited container without hesitation.
Test
Phase 1 Neither dog nor owner observed the baiting pro-
cess: The owner covered the dog’s eyes with his/her hand
or the dog and the owner faced away during the process.
They were allowed to see the containers once baiting was
completed. The experimenter asked the owner to close his/
her eyes during the next pointing cue to avoid any Clever
Hans effect. The experimenter called the subject’s name to
draw its attention. As the dog watched, the experimenter
extended her arm with her index finger extended to about
5 cm from the baited container (momentary proximal
pointing) three times. The experimenter continued looking
at the dog’s face during pointing. After the pointing ges-
ture, the experimenter placed her hands on her lap, bent her
head to look down centrally between the containers, and
said ‘‘OK, let him/her go,’’ to ask the owner to release the
dog. The experimenter maintained her position until the
dog chose. The experimenter upturned the first container
the dog approached to within 10 cm and gave the reward to
the dog if it was there. If the dog chose the unbaited
container, the experimenter repeatedly showed the dog that
Anim Cogn (2015) 18:475–483 477
123
it was empty. The dog was allowed to choose only one
container. The procedure was then repeated with the baited
location reversed; this second trial completed Phase 1.
Phase 2 The procedure was identical to Phase 1 except
for the following: First, the dog was shown the content of
both containers (food or nothing). After baiting one con-
tainer, the experimenter called the dog’s name to get its
attention and lifted both containers simultaneously to
deliberately show which container had the food. The
experimenter continued this, sometimes by tapping the
containers until she confirmed that the dog visually
checked both containers. Second, the experimenter then
pointed at the unbaited container, instead of the baited one.
Thus, the dog would find the food only by choosing the
container not pointed at by the experimenter. Another trial
was then conducted with the baited location
counterbalanced.
Phase 3 The procedure was identical to Phase 1. Two
trials were run with the baited location counterbalanced.
Thus, six test trials in total were given to each dog. No
side was baited more than twice consecutively. We asked
whether dogs would follow the experimenter’s pointing
gesture even after the misleading pointing by the experi-
menter in Phase 2. If a dog failed to choose a container
within 30 s, a ‘‘no choice’’ response was recorded and the
next trial started. All trials were videotaped for later ana-
lysis (30 frames/s).
Data analysis
We initially coded dogs’ choices during the test trials.
Because the choices were unambiguous, the same experi-
menter subsequently confirmed the choices from videotape.
Within-observer reliability was 100 %. For each phase, we
categorized dogs that twice chose the container pointed to
by the experimenter as ‘‘Obedient choosers’’. Dogs show-
ing any other choice pattern—following the pointing cue in
zero trials or one trial only—were recorded as ‘‘Non-obe-
dient choosers’’. We calculated the numbers of ‘‘Obedient
choosers’’ and ‘‘Non-obedient choosers’’, and used bino-
mial tests to determine whether the proportion of Obedient
choosers was above chance, which was .25, in each phase.
We also used a McNemar test to examine whether a sig-
nificant proportion of Obedient choosers in Phase 1 swit-
ched to Non-obedient choosers in Phase 3, analyzing data
from only those dogs that completed both trials of Phase 2.
We measured latency from a frame-by-frame analysis of
the video recordings, defining latency as from the moment
the dog was released until it made a choice. A second
observer, blind to the purpose of the study, scored a ran-
domly selected sample of trials (20 %). Pearson’s corre-
lation between the two observers’ scores was high
(r=0.92). We used one-way repeated-measures ANOVA
to determine whether latency to choose differed in the three
phases. Only trials in which dogs made a choice were
included in the latency analysis.
To assess behavioral differences in the three phases,
from video recordings we also analyzed gaze alternation,
defined as looking between a person (the experimenter or
the owner) and either container during the choice time. As
relatively few dogs showed gaze alternation, we counted
those dogs that showed the behavior at least once.
All experiments in this paper adhered to the ethical
standards of Kyoto University and were approved by the
Animal Experiment Committee of the Graduate School of
Letters, Kyoto University.
Results
Eight dogs were excluded from the analysis because they
failed to complete pre-training. We analyzed the behavior
of all dogs that completed two trials in each phase.
Latency
In the latency analysis (see Fig. 1a), we excluded three
dogs that made no choice in any trial of Phases 1 or 3. The
ANOVA showed a marginally significant difference in
latency across phases (F
2,44
=3.01, P=.06). Post hoc
pairwise comparison with Bonferroni correction revealed a
significant difference between Phases 2 and 3 (P=.05),
but not between Phases 1 and 2, or 1 and 3. As seen in
Fig. 1a, the results suggest that dogs were generally slower
to make a choice in Phase 3.
Choice
The numbers of Obedient and Non-obedient choosers are
shown in Fig. 2a. Some of the Non-obedient choosers fol-
lowed the experimenter’s pointing in only one of the two
trials. As preliminary analysis revealed no difference
between dogs that chose obediently on trials 1 and 2, we
pooled the trials. In Phase 1, 14 of 24 dogs (58 %) were
Obedient choosers (binomial test: P\.01, chance =.25),
compared to only 6 of 25 dogs (24 %) in Phase 2, (binomial
test: P=.62), and only 2 of 16 dogs (13 %) in Phase 3
(binomial test: P=.94). Thus, the proportion of Obedient
choosers was significantly above chance only in Phase 1.
The difference in the proportion of Obedient choosers and
Non-obedient choosers between Phases 1 and 3 was sig-
nificant (McNemar test: P\.01). These results indicate
that most dogs followed the experimenter’s initially reliable
pointing cue to find the food in Phase 1. However, after
being exposed to misleading pointing by the same experi-
menter in Phase 2, fewer dogs relied on the experimenter’s
pointing in Phase 3, despite it being the only available cue.
478 Anim Cogn (2015) 18:475–483
123
Note that the number of dogs completing each phase
decreased progressively. Two dogs in Phase 1, one dog in
Phase 2, and ten dogs in Phase 3 failed to make a choice
within 30 s (no choice). In Phase 3, six of the ten dogs that
did not choose showed gaze alternation at least once; after
release, they sat equidistant between owner and experi-
menter and alternated gaze among the owner, the experi-
menter, and the containers. No dog showed gaze
alternation in either Phase 1 or Phase 2.
Discussion
This experiment investigated whether dogs would follow an
experimenter’s initially reliable pointing gesture after being
exposed to misleading pointing by the experimenter in Phase
2. Although the procedure in Phases 1 and 3 was identical,
most dogs followed the experimenter’s pointing in the for-
mer, but not the latter. This result suggests that not only can
dogs use human communicative cues to find hidden food, but
also they modify their behavior based on recent experience,
an effect attributable to observing the experimenter’s mis-
leading pointing in Phase 2. In other words, dogs were sen-
sitive to the reliability of the human who gave the cues and
their evaluation influenced their subsequent behavior.
Dogs took longer to make a choice in Phase 3 compared
to earlier phases. This reflects ambivalence about the
experimenter-given cue following misleading cues in
Phase 2. Gaze alternation, observed only in Phase 3, also
suggested hesitation about obeying the experimenter’s
pointing after prior misinformation. Gaze alternation by
dogs has been interpreted as a request for human inter-
vention in the case of being unable to solve a task by
themselves (Miklo
´si et al. 2003). Together, these results
strongly suggest that dogs reacted differently to the
experimenter in Phases 1 and 3.
However, it could be argued that fatigue or diminishing
motivation to participate in the task across phases affected
the dogs’ behavior, especially in view of the fact that their
obedience was not rewarded in Phase 2. We conducted a
second experiment to address this issue.
Experiment 2
The procedure was identical to Experiment 1 except that
first experimenter left the room after Phase 2, to be
replaced by another experimenter who provided the
pointing cue in Phase 3. The prediction was that if the
Fig. 1 Mean latency (±SEM)
to make a choice (aExperiment
1, bExperiment 2)
Fig. 2 Percentage of dogs
which followed the pointing
(aExperiment 1, bExperiment
2). Black represents dogs
following the experimenter’s
pointing in both trials (obedient
chooser). Gray represents dogs
following in one trial. White
represents dogs choosing the
container which the
experimenter did not point to in
both trials
Anim Cogn (2015) 18:475–483 479
123
dogs’ behavioral change in Experiment 1 was because they
made an inference about the reliability of the first experi-
menter, they should follow the pointing gesture by the
novel experimenter as they did in Phase 1. Alternatively, if
dogs had simply lost motivation to participate in the task
across phases, fewer dogs should follow the pointing ges-
ture by the novel experimenter.
Methods
Subjects
Thirty-one pet dogs (mean =4.32 years, SD =2.78, 17
males and 14 females) and their owners participated. The
subjects included 1 Airedale terrier, 1 Border collie, 2
Chihuahuas, 2 Welsh Corgi Penbrokes, 2 Flat-coated
retrievers, 4 Labrador retrievers, 1 Lakeland terrier, 4
Miniature dachshunds, 1 Pitbull terrier, 1 Pomeranian, 1
German Shepherd, 2 Shibas, 1 Toy poodle, 2 White
shepherds, 1 English springer spaniel, 1 West highland
white terrier, 1 Cavalier King Charles spaniel, 1 Sealyham
terrier, and 2 mongrels.
Apparatus and procedure
The apparatus and procedure were identical to those in
Experiment 1, except that the first experimenter left the
experimental room after Phase 2 and another experimenter
of the same gender entered the room. It took about 10 s for
the change. In Phase 3, the second experimenter gave the
pointing gesture in the same way as the first experimenter
in Experiment 1.
Data analysis
Coding of the videos and analyses were the same as in
Experiment 1. Interobserver reliability of the latency
measure based on 20 % of the trials was high (Pearson’s
correlation: r=.96). Additionally, to examine whether
dogs responded differently to the experimenters between
Experiments 1 and 2, we used a Fisher exact test to com-
pare the proportion of the dogs that followed the pointing
in both trials and the dogs that did not in Phases 1 and 3.
For this analysis, we excluded dogs that followed pointing
in only one of the two trials, because these dogs chose the
same side in both trials, possibly reflecting a simple side
bias. Finally, we used a generalized linear mixed model
(GLMM) analysis with a binomial distribution and a logit
link function to examine the effect of different factors on
the dogs’ choices. The dependent variable was choice in
each phase (2: dogs followed pointing in both trials, 1: dogs
followed pointing in 1 trial, 0: dogs never followed
pointing). As fixed factors, we included experiment
(Experiments 1 and 2), phase (Phases 1 and 3), and the
interaction between the two. Each dogs’ identity was
entered as a random factor. To find the best (most parsi-
monious) model with the lowest number of factors, we
input all variables that were likely to affect dogs’ choices
and excluded variables that failed to contribute to decrease
Akaike’s information criterion (AIC) of the model in a
stepwise manner. The analysis was run on R version 3.1.1
using the glmmML function included in the glmmML
package.
Results and discussion
Five dogs were excluded from the analysis because they
were failed to complete pre-training.
Latency
Three dogs that failed to choose in either trial of Phase 3
were excluded from the analysis of latency (Fig. 1b). A
one-way repeated-measures ANOVA revealed no signifi-
cant difference in latency across phases (F
2,44
=1.79,
P=.18), suggesting that dogs showed no hesitation to
follow the second experimenter’s pointing cue despite the
first experimenter providing misleading cues earlier.
Choice
The numbers of Obedient and Non-obedient choosers are
shown in Fig. 2b. Preliminary analysis revealed no differ-
ence between dogs that chose obediently on trials 1 and 2,
so the trials were pooled. In Phase 1, 16 of 26 dogs (62 %)
were Obedient choosers (binomial test: P\.01,
chance =.25), compared to 3 of 23 dogs (13 %) in Phase 2
(binomial test: P=.95), and 7 of 18 dogs (39 %) in Phase
3 (binomial test: P=.13). In Phase 3, relatively more dogs
followed pointing in both trials, but the number of Obe-
dient choosers was significantly above chance only in
Phase 1. However, in contrast to Experiment 1, the pro-
portion of Obedient choosers and Non-obedient choosers
between Phases 1 and 3 was not statistically different
(McNemar test: P=.12). The number of dogs completing
both trials decreased across phases; 0, 3, and 8 dogs failed
to make a choice within 30 s in Phases 1–3, respectively.
However, no dogs showed gaze alternation.
We compared the dogs’ choices between Experiments 1
and 2. The only factor remaining on the best GLMM model
was type of the interaction between experiment and phase.
We presented the effects of the factor in the best model
(Table 1). In Phase 1, Experiment 1, 14 dogs followed
pointing and 1 dog failed, whereas in Phase 1, Experiment
2, 16 dogs followed pointing and 2 dogs failed. Thus, in
Phase 1, the proportion of dogs that followed the pointing
480 Anim Cogn (2015) 18:475–483
123
and the proportion of dogs that failed was not significantly
different between Experiments 1 and 2 (Fisher exact test:
P=1). In contrast, in Phase 3, Experiment 1, 2 dogs
followed the pointing and 5 dogs failed, whereas in Phase
3, Experiment 2, 7 dogs followed the pointing and 1 dog
failed. The proportion of dogs that followed the pointing or
not was significantly different between Experiments 1 and
2 (Fisher exact test: P=.04). These results indicate that
the dogs in Experiment 2 followed the pointing in Phase 3,
in contrast to the dogs in Experiment 1.
The above results rule out simple lowered motivation for
the task across phases. Dogs used the pointing cue from the
novel experimenter to locate the food. Combined with
those from Experiment 1, these results confirm that not
only can dogs use human communicative cues to find
hidden food, they can also change their behavior adaptively
depending on their preceding experience with cues.
General discussion
This study investigated whether dogs followed human
pointing gestures after observing the human giving them a
misleading cue. In Experiment 1, most dogs followed the
experimenter’s pointing in Phase 1, but the proportion
doing so declined markedly in Phase 3, although the task
was identical. In Experiment 2, dogs used a pointing ges-
ture by a novel experimenter in Phase 3 even after expe-
riencing the first experimenter’s misleading gesture,
suggesting that the reluctance to follow the experimenter’s
pointing in Phase 3 of Experiment 1 was not simply due to
decreased motivation. We believe these results provide
strong support for the finding of Experiment 1.
One possible objection to our conclusion is that dogs
might have learned to avoid the container to which the first
experimenter pointed in Phase 2. However, as there were
only two trials in each phase, it seems unlikely that the
dogs could have learned such a relation between cues and
outcomes. In fact, in Petter et al. (2009), dogs required
many trials to learn to respond differently to a cooperator
and a deceiver. In their study, in cooperator trials, the
experimenter always pointed at the baited container,
whereas in deceiver trials another experimenter always
pointed at an empty container. Although dogs initially
tended to obey cues even when being misled, they
eventually learned to approach the cooperator more often
than the deceiver.
Might the delay to change experimenters in Experiment
2 account for dogs’ responses in Phase 3? We believe it
unlikely that dogs completely lost their memory within that
short time. In support of our view, Fujita et al. (2012)
demonstrated that dogs can maintain information about
particular experiences for more than 10 min, during which
they walked around outside with no expectation of a
memory test that followed (i.e., incidental memory).
Studies in human children suggest another possible
explanation. Pet dogs are often treated as family members,
so infants and dogs share a similar social environment.
Such environmental conditions offer the possibility for the
development of similar behavioral traits (Lakatos et al.
2009). Infants begin to understand others’ pointing at an
early age (Itakura and Tanaka 1998; Lakatos et al. 2009),
and puppies can also use pointing to find hidden food
(Ga
´csi et al. 2009; Hare et al. 2002; Riedel et al. 2008).
Furthermore, young children appraise the reliability of
informants and use this knowledge to decide which infor-
mant to trust subsequently (Corriveau and Harris 2009;
Koenig et al. 2004). Whereas children categorize an
unfamiliar informant as trustworthy by default, this is
reversed if an informant provides the children with incor-
rect information (Vanderbilt et al. 2011). The present study
suggests that dogs engage in a similar form of appraisal.
Dogs readily used the pointing cue in Phase 1, suggesting a
default trust of information provided by a human. This trust
was challenged when the pointer provided the dogs with
incorrect information in Phase 2; in Phase 3, the dogs’
response to the cue by the same experimenter was quite
different, with fewer dogs following the pointing cue. The
facts that dogs took longer to choose in Phase 3 compared
to other phases in Experiment 1 and that gaze alternation
by dogs occurred only in Phase 3 of Experiment 1 further
indicate ambivalence about cues from an experimenter who
previously provided inaccurate information.
This research represents a step forward in understanding
dogs’ ability to infer human traits based on their prior
experience with the humans. Previous studies reported that
dogs had difficulty inhibiting an approach to a location
cued by a misleading point (Kundey et al. 2010; Petter
et al. 2009), but none examined how dogs actually judge
the human who provided the misleading information. Here,
we showed that dogs drew an inference about the reliability
of the misleading human and used this inference to change
their response to the informant.
Young children make inferences about reliability not
only from direct interactions (Chow et al. 2008) but also
from observations of the third-party interaction (Vanderbilt
et al. 2011). In Vanderbilt et al. (2011), children watched a
video in which a reliable informant pointed at a correct
Table 1 GLMM parameter estimate in Experiment 1 and
Experiment 2
Fixed factors Coefficient SE zP
Intercept 1.21 .34 3.53 \.001
Interaction (experiment, phase) 1.08 .69 1.56 .12
Anim Cogn (2015) 18:475–483 481
123
container to help a finder to locate a hidden reward, but an
unreliable informant pointed at an empty container to trick
a finder into looking for a reward there. After watching the
video, more 5-year-olds trusted pointing by the reliable
informant than the other. Marshall-Pescini et al. (2011a)
showed that dogs preferred a generous donor over a selfish
donor after observing their food-sharing interaction with a
beggar. However, as noted in the Introduction, we cannot
exclude the possibility that dogs may have learned the
features of a person who is willing to give them food in
daily interactions. Nitzschner et al. (2012) designed a task
that did not involve food. In their second experiment, dogs
witnessed two interactions as a bystander. The ‘‘nice’
experimenter behaved in a friendly manner with another
dog, but the ‘‘ignoring’’ experimenter walked through the
experimental area without interacting with another dog.
After the observation, the subjects showed no preference
for the nice experimenter, suggesting that dogs may not use
indirect experiences to evaluate humans. Failure to use the
third-party interactions may be because the human–dog
encounter was not strong enough to keep the dog’s atten-
tion. More studies are needed on dogs’ evaluations of third-
party interactions.
A final interesting question concerns the extent to which
dogs generalize the reliability of an informant. In the
present study, the same communicative gesture was used
across the three phases. Would dogs use their inference
about the reliability of an informant in different situations?
In obedience training, dogs might refuse to obey com-
mands given by someone who previously gave misleading
information. It would also be interesting to study the
duration of selective trust in particular individuals. This
could be tested by postponing Phase 3 for several hours, or
even days.
In sum, we have shown that although dogs readily fol-
low pointing by an unfamiliar person to locate hidden food,
they change their behavior if they recently experience
misleading pointing by that person. The results suggest that
dogs, like human children, make inferences about the
reliability of an informant from her prior behavior and
generalize this inference to predict the person’s behavior in
the future situations. Thus, dogs have problem-solving
skills that are functionally similar to those observed in
human children. To adapt to human society, dogs would
benefit from the ability to monitor people’s reliability to
predict their future behaviors.
Acknowledgments This study was supported by Grant-in-for JSPS
Research Fellows No. 225877 to Akiko Takaoka, Grant-in-Aid for
Scientific Research Nos. 2022004 and 25240020 to Kazuo Fujita, and
MEXT Global COE program, D-07 to Kyoto University. All of the
experiments were conducted after collecting informed consent from
the dogs’ owners. We thank all of the dogs and dog owners who
volunteered for this study. We also wish to thank James R. Anderson
for his valuable comments. We also thank Sho Otaki for his help in
the statistical analyses. We also thank the anonymous reviewers for
their helpful comments on an earlier version of this manuscript.
Conflict of interest We declare no conflict of interest regarding this
study.
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This study explored whether infants aged 12 months already recognize the communicative function of pointing gestures. Infants participated in a task requiring them to comprehend an adult's informative pointing gesture to the location of a hidden toy. They mostly succeeded in this task, which required them to infer that the adult was attempting to direct their attention to a location for a reason - because she wanted them to know that a toy was hidden there. Many of the infants also reversed roles and produced appropriate pointing gestures for the adult in this same game, and indeed there was a correlation such that comprehenders were for the most part producers. These findings indicate that by 12 months of age infants are beginning to show a bidirectional understanding of communicative pointing.
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In two experimental studies, we observed whether dogs rely on olfactory and/or visual information about the hiding place for food in a two-choice test. However, for some dogs direct olfactory (smelling the food) or visual (observing of the food being hidden) experience has been contradicted by human pointing (a well-known communicative gesture for the dog) to the 'incorrect' hiding place. We have found that dogs were able to use both olfactory and visual cues efficiently to choose above chance in a choice situation when there was no human cueing. However, in other experimental groups the dogs tended to choose the bowl pointed at by the human. This change in their behavior was more pronounced if they had only olfactory information about the location of the food. In contrast, if they had seen where the food was placed, dogs were more reluctant to follow the pointing gesture, but even so their performance worsened compared to the case in which they saw only the bowl baited. These results give further support for the hypothesis that dogs regard the pointing gesture as being a communicative act about the placing of the food, but they do not rely on this gesture blindly and they can modify their behavior based on visual experience related directly to the hiding of the food. Further, contrary to general expectations dogs rely in this situation, only to some degree on olfactory cues.