Counter-terrorism in Somalia: How External Interference Helped to Produce Militant Islamism

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Counter-terrorism in Somalia: How external interference helped to
produce militant Islamism
By Markus Virgil Hoehne
Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology, Halle/Saale, Germany
Introduction*
Somalia has made international headlines for almost two decades, first as a place of civil
war characterized by clan warfare and humanitarian catastrophe, then as a failed state,
and finally as a potential safe haven for Islamist terrorists.1 Contrary to the assumption
about ‘black holes’ and ungoverned spaces voiced by politicians and some academics, the
Harmony Project has shown that the absence of a government in Somalia did not
automatically provide fertile ground for Al Qaeda terrorism.2 Things began to change,
however, in 2006. In that year, the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) unexpectedly took
control of Mogadishu and much of southern and central Somalia. The UIC was
overthrown a few months later by an Ethiopian military intervention supported by some
internal players and the U.S. Since then, militant Islamism has gained further momentum
in the country. Currently, ‘extremist’ groups, such as Al Shabaab and Hizbul Islam, are
fighting a transitional government under the ‘moderate’ president Sheikh Sharif Sheikh
Ahmed, who in 2006 had been a head of the UIC, which was then considered a ‘Taliban-
like’ regime by much of the West.3 This alone should suffice to caution us against
ascribing any objective meanings to such terms as ‘extremists’ and ‘moderates’, even if
empirically such a distinction may make sense in certain cases and at particular moments
in time.4
In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, local and regional actors, including Somali
warlords and Ethiopia quickly appropriated the newly introduced ‘anti-terrorism’ rhetoric
in order to attract resources and support.5 Still, at the local level the civil war in Somalia
continued to be primarily over the question of who controls which parts of the country
(and the related resources, such as ports, junctions, and road-blocks) or even ‘the state’.

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Only since 2006, as I argue here, has the warfare in Somalia gained an ‘ideological’
quality pitting radical Islamists and their global networks against forces of an
increasingly militant West and its allies.
A brief digression on the term Islamist is necessary here. The term refers to actors
that combine strict adherence to the written sources of Islam, including the Koran,
Hadith, and authoritative commentaries, with ‘Islamic activism’, that is, ‘the active
assertion and promotion of beliefs, prescriptions, laws, or policies that are held to be
Islamic in character’.6 Islamism covers social reform movements as well as militant or
‘jihadi’ groups.7 There are national Islamists as well as global jihadists.8 Possibly the
only common goal of all Islamists is to erect Islamic states – and in the long run, a new
Caliphate – in which the divine law (shari’a) rules, but the strategies for achieving this
aim differ tremendously.9
Among most Somalis, who traditionally adhere to Sufism, the branch of radical
Islam preached by Al Qaeda was genuinely unpopular. Even among the small group of
local Islamists, the reform movements were the majority, and militants failed to gain
popular support until recently. This is in contrast to the dominant external perception of
the situation in Somalia that has been brilliantly criticized by Marchal.10 Between 2006
and 2009, however, external interference intensified. In reaction to the above-mentioned
military intervention of Ethiopia and U.S. counter-terrorism, Al Qaeda launched its ‘e-
jihad’ (electronic jihad) in Somalia by referring to the country in media addresses
disseminated via television and the Internet and calling upon dedicated jihadists to aid the
Somali mujahediin.11 This virtual involvement has gained material substance with the rise
of the Somali extremist group Al Shabaab. What initially, in 2005, was a handful of
unpopular hardcore militants has by 2009 become the dominant military force in southern
and central Somalia. In May 2008, Al Shabaab’s new leader openly pledged support for
Osama Bin Laden. The strategies of the group resemble those of Al Qaeda cells in other
parts of the world (suicide bombings and remote-controlled explosives, beheadings of
opponents, and so forth), and foreign fighters and volunteers from the Somali diaspora
have joined the ranks of the movement. Thus, the Manichean perspective of the
(perennial) struggle of ‘good’ against ‘evil’, which is variously assigned to ‘Islam’
against ‘the West’ or the other way round, has manifested in Somalia.12 Much like in

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other settings where the U.S.-led war on terror reigns and Al Qaeda got involved,
propaganda and violence are used to forge binaries that ‘distort rather than illuminate the
political landscape’.13
This paper first provides some background on Islamism in Somalia. Subsequently
it outlines in detail the events of 2006 and introduces the main factions and actors. In this
way, the heterogeneity of the ‘Islamist camp’ in Somalia is revealed. The text then
follows up on the impact of U.S. and Al Qaeda politics on Somalia until the fall of 2009
and shows how external interventions produced ‘new’ extremists and moderates. It
finally proposes that the current (civil) war in Somalia has its roots in the global
ideological confrontation between the U.S. and Al Qaeda and their respective local allies.
Background: Islamism in Somalia
Political Islam in Somalia goes back to the 1970s. Islamism had been suppressed under
the government of Mohamed Siyad Barre (1969–1991).14 Only after the fall of his regime
in January 1991 did Islamists in Somalia have a chance to become politically and also
militarily active. The first, and for many years only, important militant Islamist group
was Al Itihad Al Islam (AIAI). It was founded in the early 1980s as a loose umbrella
organization for Somalia’s Islamists, who were at that time all in hiding. It entered the
civil war by capturing the port town of Kismayo in early 1991. When the forces of the
United Somali Congress (USC) under the warlord Mohamed Farah Aideed of the
Hawiye/Habr Gedir clan advanced against the strategically important town a few months
later, AIAI sought to forge an alliance with the local Darood militias against the USC.
AIAI did not succeed and subsequently was crushingly defeated and had to vacate
Kismayo. The event was significant in two regards: First, it initiated a series of military
defeats of AIAI at the hands of warlord militias. Two important factors limiting the
power of the Islamist forces were clan tensions within AIAI and the lack of popular
support. Second, before the clash over Kismayo, Aideed had sent Colonel Hassan Dahir
Aweys, also of the Hawiye/Habr Gedir clan (but a different sub-clan), as head of a
delegation to the Islamists in order to negotiate a peaceful handover.15 Colonel Aweys

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changed sides on that occasion. He did not return to the USC and had to escape Kismayo
together with AIAI.16 As Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys, he became and remains today one
of Somalia’s most influential Islamist leaders.
Throughout the 1990s, AIAI tried to gain a foothold in various parts of Somalia. It
fought in the northeast against the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) under
Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf over the control of the lucrative port of Boosaasso. After being
routed by the SSDF, the remnants of the AIAI troops turned to the southwest, where they
established control over the town of Luuq and some other places in the Geedo region,
close to the Somali-Ethiopian border. Some also went to the far south and took over the
area around Ras Kambooni, near the Kenyan border. Other members of the movement
decided to leave the armed struggle and engage in civilian social projects, such as Islamic
development aid, orphanages, and schools. In particular, the northern Somali Al Itihad
under Sheikh Ali Warsame, a resident of Bura’o town (in what had become Somaliland
after its unilateral secession in May 1991), turned to non-violent politics.
Within the southern Somali Al Itihad, a schism occurred. Sheikh Hassan Dahir
Aweys had become the military leader of AIAI in the mid-1990s. Together with Hassan
Abdullahi Turki he continued violent campaigns in western Somalia and the Somali
region of Ethiopia, where they engaged Ethiopian troops. Sheikh Mohamed Ise headed a
splinter group of AIAI that changed its name to Al Itisam.17 Al Itisam was concentrated in
Mogadishu, where it refrained from military activities, although it was ideologically more
radical and consistent than Al Itihad, which comprised both Salafi and non-Salafi
members.18 All the leading Somali Islamists, however, continued to be in contact with
one another, and most of them appeared again later in connection with the UIC.
Parallel to the activities of AIAI, but not always directly related to these, Islamic
courts were established in Mogadishu and parts of southern Somalia. The first courts
were set up in northern Mogadishu in 1994, which then was controlled by the warlord Ali
Mahdi Mohamed (Hawiye/Abgal), under the chairmanship of Sheikh Ali Dheere (from
the same clan). The courts functioned in accordance with the wishes of the warlord, who
benefitted from the basic security (against petty criminals) provided by the courts in his
area. When Sheikh Ali Dheere tried to establish the courts as financially independent and
politically active institutions, Ali Mahdi forcibly disbanded them. Shari’a courts were

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also established in Beledweyne town, in the Hiiran region, and some other locations, in
cooperation with local faction leaders. Islamic courts emerged in southern Mogadishu
only after Mohamed Farah Aideed, the dominant warlord who once had allied briefly
with the AIAI but was generally closer to ‘traditional’ Sufi Islam, died in 1996.19 From
the beginning, the courts there were independent of faction leaders and enjoyed the strong
backing of sub-clan elders and the local business community.20 In this context, Islamists
‘began to perform some of the functions normally conducted by the government. The
Islamic Courts became particularly important as they began to establish islands of
security in Mogadishu.’21
The courts in Mogadishu and the surrounding areas were not necessarily extremist
in their orientation. They were certainly all religiously conservative and issued sentences
in accordance with the shari’a. Not all, however, took recourse to extreme punishment
such as amputations. All courts had to respect the wishes of their respective clans and
sub-clans, usually expressed by the clan and sub-clan elders, and to carefully avoid
interfering in inter-clan politics that could easily escalate into feuds. Thus, a court militia
could not apprehend criminals not belonging to the descent group of the court members.22
Nonetheless, some courts came under the influence of militant Islamists. Sheikh Hassan
Dahir Aweys, the AIAI military leader, established himself as a leading figure in the
Ifkahalane court in southern Mogadishu; he was related to this court through patrilineal
descent.
In 2000, a number of courts in Mogadishu came together and created a joint
council. The aim was to be able to conduct coordinated militia operations against
(alleged) criminals. (The council also served as a vehicle for the political ambitions of
some leaders, such as Aweys, who was its Secretary General.) As a result of this
cooperation, the influence of the Islamic courts extended throughout Mogadishu and its
surroundings. Still, the International Crisis Group observed: ‘Few people shared the
courts’ puritanical religious views but they were popular for their ability to provide
security.’23 In the same year, 2000, at an internationally supported peace conference in
Djibouti, the Transitional National Government (TNG) was installed as the new Somali
government. Under President Abdiqasim Salad Hassan (Hawiye/Habr Gedir), the TNG
was particularly sympathetic toward the non-violent Islamist groups in the country,

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including the shari’a courts, parts of Al Itihad, and a group called Al Islah, which was
politically and socially active but distanced itself from militancy.24 The TNG began to
integrate the existing courts, including the judges and the militias, into its justice system.
In this way, it undermined the independence of the courts. Finally, the TNG demanded
that all judges take exams in order to guarantee basic legal standards. Many of the
existing court judges perceived this as a humiliation, and some also feared that they
might fail. So many quit the government positions.25
In 2004, the Supreme Council of Islamic Courts, which in 2006 became known as
the UIC, was founded as the new umbrella organization of the shari’a courts in
Mogadishu. Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed was elected chairman of the council.26 He had
previously been associated with the group Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama’a (ASWJ) and had
worked in the judicial system and as an aide to the local faction leader Mohamed
Dheere.27 The courts pooled their military hardware and established a joint militia force
of about 400 men. Meanwhile, the TNG had collapsed, and the new international attempt
to establish the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) as its successor at a peace and
reconciliation conference in Eldoret and then Mbagathi (Kenya) had not yet come to
fruition. Therefore, the courts’ newly joint militias constituted the strongest force in
Mogadishu, and the political weight of the umbrella organization grew. Nonetheless, the
organization was internally quite diverse, and it brought together moderates, who were
not interested in pursuing political aims violently, as well as extremists. Only a minority
of the ten or eleven courts that joined forces in 2004 were extremist and militant.28 The
first indicator of a revolution within the movement was the appointment of Aadan Hashi
Ayro, a young militant close to Sheikh Hassan Daahir Aweys, as commander of the
militia of the Ifkahalane court in 2005, without protest from the other courts. Just months
before, Ayro and his followers had made international headlines for desecrating a
colonial-era Italian (Christian) cemetery in Mogadishu.29 Ayro soon became the leader of
the courts’ ‘youth organization’, a group combining a small number of extremely radical
and militant elements, known as Al Shabaab.30
The development of political and militant Islam did not take place in a vacuum.
External actors had a strong influence on the course of events and the dynamics in
Somalia. Contacts between international Islamists, Al Qaeda specialists, and Somali

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radicals have existed since the early 1990s. On several occasions, Sheikh Hassan Dahir
Aweys has traveled to Sudan, where Hassan Al Turabi, the Sudanese Islamist leader,
paved the way for the hosting (between 1992 and 1996) of Osama Bin Laden and his
followers. Mohamed Atef, a high-ranking Al Qaeda official, visited Somalia in 1992,
probably in order to forge an Islamist alliance in Somalia and throughout the Horn of
Africa; this project failed.31 Other Al Qaeda specialists were also deployed to Somalia in
the early 1990s to establish an operational base for the group, but they did not succeed in
turning ‘stateless’ Somalia into a safe haven and a training and operations ground for
their network. Recent analyses suggest that Al Qaeda faced problems similar to those
faced by the UN and U.S. humanitarian and military intervention in Somalia (1992–
1995): they were partly distrusted as ‘foreigners’ who adhered to a version of Islam that
was not popular in Somalia, they ran into problems with always changing clan and sub-
clan alliances, they were limited by the weak infrastructure of the country, they lacked
security, they were exposed to external interventions since no government could uphold
Somalia’s sovereignty, and they were at risk of being ‘sold’ by petty criminals and others
in Somalia to the enemy (the U.S.).32 Nonetheless, some terrorist attacks in Ethiopia,
Kenya, and Tanzania (between 1996 and 2002) have been carried out by using Somalia
as a ‘corridor’ into the region and for smuggling in weapons and personnel, and some
terrorists hid in Somalia after their attacks. Clearly, a number of Somali extremists were
trained in Somalia by foreign fighters, and some Somalis went to Afghanistan in the
1990s and early 2000s in order to receive training and gain combat experience at the
Taliban’s side. Still, Somalia did not become a safe haven for Al Qaeda, and terrorist
training facilities were extremely limited and quickly dismantled after the 9/11 attacks for
fear of U.S. reprisals. UN missions to southern Somalia in the fall of 2001 concluded that
no training camps or fundamentalist activities could be identified.33 In sum, Somalia was
never a major field of Al Qaeda activities in the 1990s.34
Ethiopia got involved in the Somali conflict early on. Throughout the 1990s it
militarily intervened several times against AIAI, which Addis Ababa perceived as a
threat. AIAI operated in the Somali region of eastern Ethiopia (the so-called Ogaden
region), where it sought to bring Islamist and nationalist forces among the marginalized
Ethiopian Somali population together against the oppressive state. When the conflict

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between Eritrea and Ethiopia erupted in 1998, each government supported various
guerilla groups against the other. In this context, AIAI profited from the support of
Asmara. This resulted in a ‘simmering proxy war between Ethiopia and Eritrea for
influence in and control of southern Somalia.’35 Following the 9/11 attacks, after
Washington had decided to refrain from direct military involvement in Somalia, Ethiopia
and the U.S. engaged in a ‘dirty war’ in Mogadishu by hiring warlords and their troops in
order to snatch or assassinate Somali and foreign terrorist suspects hiding in the city. This
interference in particular changed the nature of the low-intensity civil war that had been
smoldering in Mogadishu for a decade. A ‘series of assassinations and kidnappings of
religious figures between 2002 and 2005 that were thought to have been ordered by the
Americans and Ethiopians and carried out by the factions’ increased the popularity of the
Islamists and of anti-American sentiments.36 Extremist Islamic groups also engaged in
assassinations of ‘unbelievers’ (in Somaliland, but also in southern Somalia, foreign aid
workers and journalists were targeted) and Somali opponents.37
The late 2004 installation in Kenya of the TFG triggered hostile reactions in
Mogadishu and elsewhere in the country. First, the newly elected president of Somalia,
Abdullahi Yusuf, a former warlord and president of Puntland (1998–2004), called for the
deployment of foreign troops in (southern) Somalia immediately after his inauguration.
This clearly sent the message ‘home’ that he did not believe in peaceful negotiations.
Second, the TFG cabinet was filled with warlords who did not have a reputation of caring
much for the people. Third, for some Hawiye in Mogadishu, Abdullahi Yusuf, as a
member of the Darood/Majeerteen clan, represented a ‘clan enemy’. Fourth, Abdullahi
Yusuf had the reputation of being a staunch ‘anti-Islamist’. His troops had defeated AIAI
in northeastern Somalia in 1992, killing hundreds of Islamists. Sheikh Hassan Dahir
Aweys and other senior Somali Islamists were therefore connected to Yusuf through old
enmity.38
To sum up, militant Islamism in Somalia developed in the context of state
collapse and civil war beginning in 1991. Up until 2005, the ‘Islamist camp’ was
characterized by the heterogeneity of its actors and their orientations. Within groups such
as AIAI and the courts, influential individuals held different views, for instance regarding
the appropriateness of the use of violence. This led to schisms and uneasy alliances of

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convenience. Furthermore, all Islamist groups had to consider the genealogical factor
involved in the Somali civil war. Despite their aim to transcend ‘clan’ and establish an
Islamic state, they had to cooperate with clan and sub-clan elders and warlords and their
militias. Until 2005, militant Islamists did not enjoy popular support in Somalia. They
also were not very well connected internationally. This increasingly changed with the
external military intervention of Ethiopia and the U.S. and the establishment of the TFG
under Abdullahi Yusuf, who gained international recognition while lacking legitimacy in
most parts of Somalia (apart from Puntland, his ‘clan-homeland’ in northeastern
Somalia). In particular, the joint Ethiopian and U.S. counter-terrorism strategy after 9/11
contributed to the radicalization of a small group of dedicated jihadists, which provided
the nucleus for the later unfolding of extremist violence in Somalia.
The rise of the UIC and Al Shabaab and the beginning of the current phase of global
confrontation in Somalia
The U.S. decided in early 2006 to employ an alliance of Mogadishu warlords to snatch
several Al Qaeda operatives who had taken refuge in Somalia and, more generally, to
keep the Islamists in check.39 The warlords leading the Alliance for Restoration of Peace
and Counter-Terrorism (ARPCT) wanted to take back control over lucrative ports and
businesses in the city that had been successively taken over by Islamists and their
sympathizers. In February 2006, fighting between the ARPCT and the courts erupted.
The latter joined forces and became internationally known under the name Union of
Islamic Courts (UIC), even if, locally, people continued to speak simply of ‘the courts’
(makhkamadaha in Somali).40 Between February and June 2006, hundreds of civilians
were killed in the crossfire and shelling, and thousands fled the city. By the end of June
the courts had won. It was the first time in fifteen years that one force was in control of
the whole of Mogadishu.
External observers were taken by surprise. Initially, at least in the academic
community, positive evaluations of the peacefulness and political stability of Mogadishu
under the new rulers dominated.41 Also, many Somalis in Somalia and in the diaspora

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were positively surprised. Menkhaus stated: ‘Tens of thousands of diaspora members
flew back to Somalia, some just to visit, others to offer their services to the ICU [UIC].
For many, the impulse to support and join the ICU [UIC] was driven as much by a sense
of renewed nationalist pride than by a commitment to political Islam of any sort’.42 As
leading figures, Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed and Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys gained
worldwide publicity. The first was presented as the ‘moderate’ face of the movement,
while the second represented the ‘hard-liners’. Things were, however, a bit more
complicated, as I will outline below.
The UIC quickly expanded its rule over much of southern and central Somalia
and soon challenged the TFG, which was confined to the town of Baydhabo, about 250
kilometers northwest of Mogadishu.43 The Ethiopians rushed to the aid of the TFG.
Officially, only advisors and no Ethiopian troops were sent. In August, however, credible
reports of massive Ethiopian troop movements in and around Baydhabo appeared. Eritrea
helped the courts with advisors, arms, and allegedly also some troops. Under the auspices
of the League of Arab States, peace talks between the TFG and the UIC were held in
Khartoum between June and August 2006 but fell apart in October of that year.44 This
failure was related to the increasing influence of extremist elements in the UIC. In
September 2006, Al Shabaab, under Ayro, and the Ras Kambooni Brigades, under
Hassan Turki, cooperated in the capture of Kismayo. This was a significant event since it
was the first military takeover of a place by troops under the UIC umbrella. Before that,
the UIC had expanded peacefully upon ‘invitation’ of the local populations in southern
and central Somalia, who appreciated the stability and (Islamic) justice provided by the
courts. The Kismayo operation served the cause of UIC critics, who argued that the
courts had a militant, expansionist, and even jihadist agenda.45
The situation was complicated further when in July 2006 Osama Bin Laden issued
a message urging Somalis to build an Islamic state and back the courts in their fight
against the TFG. Bin Laden threatened that Al Qaeda would fight foreign troops if they
intervened in Somalia in support of the TFG. In September, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Al
Qaeda’s number two, called on Somalis to oppose the TFG and expel the ‘Zionist-
Crusader presence’ from the Horn of Africa.46 These messages pointed to the
instrumentalization of the situation in Somalia by Al Qaeda leaders in order to legitimate

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their global struggle, threaten their enemies, and generate support.47 Hogan observed with
regard to Somalia and the Horn in 2006 that the Al Qaeda leadership ‘has clearly
articulated an effort to incorporate a new and more distant geographical area.’48 This
verbal support did not yet indicate any significant involvement of Al Qaeda on the
ground or a willingness to get militarily engaged on a greater scale.
The TFG leadership also was not interested in a compromise. (Sharif Hassan
Sheikh Aden, the speaker of the parliament, was dismissed after he went to Mogadishu in
November 2006 and negotiated with the UIC on his own initiative.) Ethiopia and the
TFG accused the UIC of hosting international terrorists connected to Al Qaeda. Jendayi
Frazer, then U.S. assistant secretary for African affairs, accepted these claims. On 14
December 2006, she announced that the UIC was controlled by Al Qaeda. This happened
at a time when European Commissioner Louis Michel was in Somalia to mend relations
between the opponents.49 Thus, EC and U.S. perceptions of the situation differed; yet,
this did not matter much since the U.S.- and Ethiopian-driven war machinery was already
in place. Certainly, the UIC had contributed to this terrorist discourse with undiplomatic
statements by some of its leaders about a ‘jihad’ and its refusal to allow any international
observers to visit Mogadishu to verify or reject claims about Al Qaeda terrorists there.50
Additionally, the extremist elements could not be suppressed; to the contrary, their
strategy to sabotage any compromise through violence worked out.
The UIC as a heterogeneous body51
The following factions played a role in the UIC in 2006:
i) Various shari’a courts: In Mogadishu alone, circa fourteen shari’a courts
existed in 2006. Most were responsible for a particular neighborhood and tied to a
certain clan or sub-clan (mainly the Hawiye clan-family, but also Darood and
some so-called minority groups). Only some of the courts in the UIC were
actually aligned with extremism. The majority were not very interested in the
jihadi political and military agenda and concentrated mainly on security in their
own areas.

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ii) Al Shabaab: Harakat Al-Shabaab, which translates ‘Youth Movement’, began
as the ‘youth’ organization of the Islamic courts. Founded in 2004 or 2005, it
served as the armed wing of the UIC. In early 2006, Al-Shabaab fielded about 400
men, a force considered to have increased to about 2,000 just prior to the
Ethiopian invasion in December 2006.52
iii) Al Itihad Al Islam (Islamic Unity): As described above, AIAI was by far the
largest armed Islamist organization in Somalia in the early 1990s. It is important
to remember that AIAI was a quite heterogeneous movement, ridden with
ideological and clan differences. After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the U.S.
designated AIAI a terrorist organization. Subsequently, most of its members
preferred to keep a low profile and to melt back into the wider society. Many
remained active in the social sphere and ran Islamic NGOs, orphanages, and
schools. Al Itihad can be considered the ‘mother’ of contemporary Islamist
organizations in Somalia.
iv) Majuma Ulema: A group of Somali religious leaders (Ulema) set up a small
militia force immediately after the fall of Siyad Barre in January 1991 in order to
provide security in certain neighborhoods of the capital and assist some
embryonic shari’a courts. The declared purpose of Majuma was to protect the
proper understanding and practice of Islam and establish a Somali government
based on the shari’a. In the early 1990s, Majuma became involved in a variety of
peace initiatives. Although Majuma has maintained a distance from politics, its
Islamist orientation is manifest in its support of Mogadishu’s shari’a courts.
v) Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama’a (ASWJ): ASWJ originated in 1991 as an offshoot of
Majuma, in response to a request for cooperation from warlord Mohamed Farah
Aideed. While some Majuma leaders refused to get involved in warlord politics,
others felt a need to act in order to defend ‘traditional’ Somali Islamic practices
from foreign, and especially Salafi/Wahabi, encroachment.53 ASWJ eventually
lost influence in warlord politics but has remained active as an umbrella group for

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politically motivated sheikhs from the Sufi brotherhoods. This movement
involves considerable opportunism and has been described as a ‘conservative
force that presents itself as moderate’.54
The following were the key individual players in the UIC in 2006:
i) Haji Abukar Omar Adaani, a businessman from the Hawiye/Abgal/Warsangeeli
sub-clan, over the years had become a financier of the shari’a courts. It was his
long-standing business rivalry with Bashir Rage, another businessman from the
same sub-clan, over the control of the El Ma’an port in Mogadishu that ignited the
Islamic courts battle with the warlord alliance in Mogadishu in early 2006.55 It has
to be stressed that for many businessmen in Mogadishu, cooperation with the
Islamic courts and Islamists was simply the best way to secure their businesses
and pursue their economic interests. Not all businessmen supporting the courts
were Islamists themselves.56
ii) As introduced earlier, Hassan Dahir Aweys (Hawiye/Habr Gedir/Ayr/Ayaanle)
was a colonel in the Somali army who participated in the Ogaden war between
Somalia and Ethiopia (1977–1978). Under Siyad Barre, he went to jail several
times after 1979 for his Islamist views. He joined AIAI and became a military
leader of the movement in the 1990s. He was also involved in the setting up of
shari’a courts, finally emerging as leader of the UIC with Sheikh Sharif Sheikh
Ahmed. In mid-2006, he was named chairman of the Shura of the UIC. Aweys
had been put on the U.S. list of terrorists in 2001 for being AIAI’s military leader.
In a rare interview with Western media, Aweys defended himself and Al Itihad by
arguing: ‘I don’t know anything that al Itihaad al Islamiya [sic] did to America.’
He maintained that AIAI’s focus was on Ethiopia. In the same interview, Aweys
confirmed that one of his main aims was the integration of the Somalis in the
Ogaden region (today, Region 5) of Ethiopia into Somalia.57

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iii) Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed (Hawiye/Abgal) had been a secondary school
teacher and had spent some time in Sudan or Libya. As discussed previously, in
the early 1990s, he joined Majuma and/or ASWJ. He was involved with several
shari’a courts in the early 2000s and was close to the businessman Abukar Omar
Adaani. In 2004, he was elected chairman of the Supreme Council of Islamic
Courts, which in 2006 became known as the UIC. As UIC chairman, Sheikh
Sharif made contradictory statements in 2006. On the one hand, he presented
himself as moderate and committed the Islamic courts to democratic process and
good relations with the international community. On the other hand, he at times
called the U.S. an enemy of Islam and vowed to fight until the entire country was
under the courts’ authority.58 In October 2006, it was Sheikh Sharif who appeared
in combat fatigues brandishing an AK47 while declaring jihad against Ethiopia
and any foreign troops on Somali soil.59
iv) Hassan Abdullahi Turki belongs to the Darood/Ogadeen clan. He was an early
member of AIAI. Around 1993, an AIAI splinter group and a shari’a court were
established under Turki’s leadership in the coastal village of Ras Kambooni in
southern Somalia. Turki commanded a force of about 200 militiamen, mainly
from his own sub-clan, which controlled the Ras Kambooni area. Turki is a
militant and was reportedly responsible for assassinations of political opponents
and at least one foreigner in southern Somalia.
v) Adan Hashi Ayro belonged to the Hawiye/Habr Gedir/Ayr sub-clan. He fought
with AIAI in northeastern Somalia in the 1990s and continued fighting in the
Ogaden region of Ethiopia and also in Mogadishu. He then went to Afghanistan
for military training. In Afghanistan he allegedly had contact with Al Qaeda and
Taliban officials. Beginning in about 2003 he gained attention as the leader of a
still nameless, very ruthless independent Somali jihadi network that has been
linked to the murders of four foreign aid workers (in Somaliland) and over a
dozen Somalis believed to be part of counter-terrorism operations. In 2005, he

15
became the leader of Al Shabaab and held that position until he was killed by a
U.S. airstrike in May 2008.
vi) Ahmed Abdi Godane (Isaaq/Arab) is a native of northwestern Somalia/
Somaliland. He reportedly worked for the remittance company Barakaat in the
town of Bura’o in the 1990s. Godane had received military training in
Afghanistan and joined the ranks of international jihadists. He was allegedly
involved with Adan Hashi Ayro in the killings of a number of foreign nationals in
Somaliland in 2003 and 2004. In mid-2006, he became secretary general of the
Executive Council of the UIC.
vii) Ibrahim Al Afghani (Isaaq/Sa’ad Muuse), from Somaliland by clan, is
reported to have fought in Kashmir and Afghanistan before becoming an AIAI
commander. He later joined Al Shabaab and became a leader in that group for
members of the Isaaq and Harti clans. Al Afghani was accused (with Ayro and
Godane) of involvement in the murders of foreigners in Somaliland.
viii) Yusuf Mohamed Indhoadde, a Hawiye/Habr Gedir/Ayr warlord, ruled in the
early 2000s in Merka town in the Lower Shabelle region, where he had managed
a system of shari’a courts. In 2006, he turned to the UIC and became the courts’
overall chief of security. In December 2006, he invited international Islamist
combatants to come to Somalia to take part in a jihad against the enemy.60
ix) Mukhtar Robow is a militant Islamist who by descent belongs to the
Rahanweyn/Leysan clan residing predominantly in central-southern Somalia
(Bakool region). He allegedly engaged in the training of Somali militants in the
1990s. He traveled to Afghanistan in 2001, where he fought with Taliban/Al
Qaeda forces. Robow returned to Somalia in 2003 and became the deputy
minister of defense for the UIC in 2006 before taking the position of spokesman
and deputy commander of Al Shabaab.61

16
x) Sheikh Ali Warsame (Isaaq/Habr Je’lo) was educated in Sudan and had been a
conservative religious scholar. He got involved with AIAI in the early 1980s and
was its military leader from 1993 until around 1995. After a series of defeats, he
turned to a non-violent strategy, quit the AIAI leadership, and went back to
Bura’o (Somaliland), where his patrilineal relatives reside. In 2006, he and some
other clerics in Somaliland were suspected by local authorities of being connected
to the UIC in Mogadishu.
The relationships between the various groups and individuals connected to the
UIC were complex and not free of tensions. The UIC in 2006 clearly was a
heterogeneous body combining seasoned Islamists who pursued a mainly national agenda
and dedicated (and sometimes quite young) ‘global’ jihadists who were close to the
Taliban and/or Al Qaeda. Some of the UIC leaders had a history of militant Islamism,
while others had previously followed a non-violent path. Some were ideologically
oriented toward Salafism or Wahabism, while others adhered to conservative but, in
comparison, rather ‘traditional’ Somali interpretations of Islam. Possibly their only
common aim in early 2006 was to get rid of the warlords and their militias and establish
an Islamic state in Somalia. By then, this was actually in accordance with the positions of
many people in southern Somalia who wished for peace and order and saw Islam as the
last refuge against crime, social dissolution, opportunistic warlords, the indifferent
position of much of the world, and the destructive interference of Ethiopia and the U.S. It
is worth noting that the UIC came to power at a moment when the factional system
championed by the warlords and their external allies (Ethiopia, Eritrea, the U.S., and
others) had been exhausted. In a way, Islamism seemed to be the ‘natural’ path to take.62
Of course, which direction within political Islam would guide the way was yet unclear in
early 2006.
Inner-UIC dynamics in 2006
Sheikh Sharif led the Executive Committee of the UIC, which in June 2006 comprised
some twenty members. Some were certainly radical jihadists, such as Ahmed Abdi
Godane, who was then the secretary general of the committee. The ‘encroachment’ of the

17
extremists may have been related to the influence of Hassan Dahir Aweys, who was the
head of the advisory committee the Shura, which had more than ninety members.
Nonetheless, Marchal maintains that it was unclear which of the two bodies had the final
say, what the decision-making procedures were, and who had the mandate to do what.63
The political structure of the UIC in mid-2006 was rife with ambiguities. Decisions were
often made by field commanders, who had varying respect for Sheikh Sharif and Sheikh
Hassan Dahir Aweys. ‘Simply accepting fait accompli rather than debating decisions
became a common occurrence [within the UIC].’64
The capture of Kismayo in September 2006 and the failure of the negotiations
between UIC and TFG sponsored by the Arab League one month later were decisive
victories for the extremists within the courts movement. These were mainly ‘successes’
for Al Shabaab, which in the second half of 2006 emerged as the only faction with a clear
profile. Its members had jihadi credentials, some of its leaders had been trained and
fought in Afghanistan, and there existed relationships between individual Al Shabaab
figures, such as Adan Hashi Ayro, Mukhtar Robow, and Ahmed Abdi Godane, and Al
Qaeda. Otherwise, in the rest of the UIC, disagreements between leading figures were the
norm, not the exception.65
Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys had been a mentor certainly to Ayro and possibly to
other extremists. He also had wider Islamist connections. However, it is doubtful that he
was very closely connected to Al Qaeda or even wished to be. Aweys clearly followed a
Somali nationalist agenda, and his main interests were focused on fighting Ethiopia and
other foreign troops interfering in Somalia and establishing a strong and united Somalia
under Islamic rule. He pursued this aim throughout the 1990s and the early 2000s with
consistent militancy but at the same time also engaged in the establishment of basic local
security and justice through shari’a courts. In the second half of 2006, it seemed that
Aweys increasingly lost control over Ayro and Al Shabaab. There is not a general
consensus about the relationship between these two key Islamists.
Sheikh Sharif’s position in 2006 did not become fully clear. As outlined above,
his statements as UIC chairman were contradictory. In mid-2006, the ICG confirmed that
the UIC leadership, including Sheikh Sharif, ‘has been casually dismissive about credible
allegations of jihadi violence and the presence of foreign al-Qaeda [sic] operatives in

18
Mogadishu safe houses reportedly operated by some of its top figures. Sheikh Sharif has
repeatedly portrayed these concerns as “propaganda” and claimed the U.S. has been
misled by warlords exploiting the war on terror.’66 In comparison with other UIC leaders,
however, Sheikh Sharif was mainly perceived as moderate, and certainly he was
interested in finding a solution to the political crisis in the second half of 2006 through
negotiations rather than violence. He was also the only Islamist leader who, after the
defeat of the UIC by Ethiopian and TFG troops in late 2006 and after his surrender to
Kenyan authorities in early 2007, publicly apologized for the mistakes of the UIC
administration.67
To sum up, it is clear that from mid-2006 onward, Al Shabaab and related
extremists acted increasingly independent from the leadership of the UIC. Their
operations alienated Western and other observers and created divisions within the UIC as
well as resistance among the Somali people, who ‘began to protest the drastic rise in
taxes in October 2006, the ban on qaat [qaad] that punished the thousands of people who
earned their living in its trade, and the normative coercion that had young militia
members with limited religious knowledge humiliating anyone in the street who did not
seem sufficiently pious.’68 For moderates in the courts the dilemma became that the jihadi
tactic of assassination, which helped eliminate potential opposition to the courts in
Mogadishu in 2005, could be used against them. This put the UIC leadership in a difficult
situation in mid-2006, when faced with international demands to ‘marginalize the
radicals’.69 The immediateness of the danger for the two UIC heads, Sheikh Sharif and
Aweys, was stressed by Marchal, who argued that ‘[r]elationships between al-Shabaab
[sic] and the other trends within the ICU [UIC] had gone from bad to worse in the weeks
before the Ethiopian military intervention. Although denied by the two leaders, close
relatives or friends mentioned that there had been several assassination attempts against
Sheikh Shariif and Hasan Daahir orchestrated by Al Shabaab members at that time.’70
Finally, a certain degree of opportunism among the leading figures of the UIC has to be
taken into account. Former warlords, such as Yusuf Mohamed Indhoadde, their militias,
and influential businessmen joined when it seemed that the UIC was ‘the movement to be
with’. Nonetheless, behind the Islamist facade they followed their own economic and
political interests related to clan and other connections. Sheikh Sharif himself had

19
maneuvered quite a bit in 2006 before he clearly distanced himself from militancy and
extremism in early 2007. Aweys possibly tried to hold the courts movement together and
therefore granted influence to the jihadists, even if he as a nationalist did not share their
global vision.
The U.S. position on the UIC in 2006
During a joint hearing before the U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on Africa,
Global Human Rights, and International Operations in June 2006, John Prendergast, a
longtime Africa specialist, who at one point was an advisor to the U.S. government,
confirmed that Washington paid the warlords about US$100,000–150,000 a month in
2005 and in the first half of 2006, ‘and we encouraged them to come together in the
larger terrorism alliance.’71 The latter strategy proved disastrous: ‘U.S. counter-terrorism
efforts meant to contain foreign al-Qaeda [sic] operatives have accelerated the expansion
of jihadi Islamist forces and produced the largest potential safe haven for al-Qaeda in
Africa.’72 In the same hearing, Jendayi Frazer stressed that the U.S. was concerned about
the emergence of a jihadist Islamist state in Somalia.73 John Prendergast maintained that
the U.S. should ‘engage with all elements of the Islamic Courts, but particularly the
Courts Executive Committee which is headed by Sheikh Sharif.’74 He asserted that
Sheikh Sharif and his associates were moderates and a channel of communication for the
U.S.75 Ted Dagne, an African affairs specialist at the Congressional Research Service,
admitted that the Bush administration knew little about the UIC.76
While there was a lack of clarity about the nature of the UIC, Ethiopia and the
TFG under Abdullahi Yusuf decided that the Somali Islamists were ‘terrorists’ and a
threat to regional and potentially international security. The Bush administration accepted
this position, which was, in the eyes of many Somalis and most external observers, based
less on facts and more on the parochial self-interest of Ethiopia and the TFG.77
Preparations for a full-scale military intervention were underway by late November 2006,
and UN Resolution 1725 (6 December 2006), authorizing a military mission to Somalia
(of the states of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development and the African Union)
to protect the TFG (among other tasks), paved the way.

20
Menkhaus points out that ‘the Ethiopian offensive was not, as has sometimes been
falsely portrayed, an instance of the U.S. subcontracting the war of terror to a regional
ally.’ He emphasizes that ‘Ethiopia pursued its own interests and would have acted with
or without U.S. approval.’78 Nonetheless, ‘the U.S. did provide diplomatic, intelligence,
and possibly other support to the Ethiopian government in this operation.’79
In sum, U.S. policy on Somalia in 2006 suffered from insufficient knowledge
about the UIC (apart from sketchy impressions of some of the most ‘nasty’ Somali
Islamists, such as Aweys, Ayro, and Turki).80 The U.S. also did not have a
comprehensive plan for Somalia. The TFG leaders and Ethiopia took advantage of this
lack of knowledge and planning to connect their Somali adversaries with Al Qaeda and
thus appropriate the international discourse on Islamic terrorism for their own ends.
This paper has made clear that 2006 was a decisive year regarding the dynamics
of Islamism and violence in Somalia. A decade or so of ‘low intensity war’ (involving
primarily local but also some regional actors) had ended, and a new phase of global
confrontation had begun.81 The latter was indicated by the engagement of the U.S. and
Ethiopia (a regional ‘empire’) with regard to the payment of warlords in Mogadishu to
act against local Islamists. The means provided to these figures went directly into the war
between the warlord alliance and the courts, which triggered the coming to power of the
UIC. Things came to a head when Ethiopian troops with U.S. backing (and the consent of
the ‘rest of the world’) intervened militarily in Somalia. In response, Al Qaeda’s e-jihad
unfolded, UIC leaders called for jihad, and some foreign fighters rushed to support their
‘brothers’ in Somalia. This decisively internationalized the fighting in Somalia and turned
it into a confrontation in which global ideological differences between ‘Islam’ and ‘the
West’ were played out.
Military counter-terrorism and the forging of new ‘moderates’ and ‘extremists’
In December 2006, about 14,000 Ethiopian troops with tanks and air support ousted the
UIC from all its positions in southern Somalia. This invasion installed the TFG in
Mogadishu. Soon, the new rulers were confronted by a complex insurgency of Islamist

21
and Hawiye militias in southern Somalia. The U.S. politically supported the Ethiopian
and TFG war inside Somalia. In January 2007, U.S. forces conducted two air strikes
against alleged terrorists in the country. An African Union ‘peacekeeping’ mission called
AMISOM was deployed in early 2007. This, however, did not change the overall
violence of the situation. To the contrary, the AMISOM troops, which were all from
Uganda and Burundi, were soon perceived as foreigners biased in favor of the TFG and
came under attack by the insurgents.82 Between January 2007 and December 2008, this
war left more than 10,000 people dead and many more wounded, and more than a million
residents temporarily fled Mogadishu. Gross human rights violations were committed by
all parties to the conflict.83
Things began to change slowly at the diplomatic level in the first half of 2008.
Nuur Hassan Hussein had been elected the new prime minister of the TFG. He was
interested in dialogue with the Islamists. Already in September 2007, the Alliance for the
Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS) had been founded in Asmara, Eritrea. It comprised
former UIC members and others opposed to the TFG under Abdullahi Yusuf. Its
chairman became Sheikh Sharif, who in the course of 2008 entered into dialogue with
Nuur Hassan Hussein. This process was facilitated by Special Representative of the UN
Secretary General Ahmedou Ould Abdallah. Simultaneously, the U.S. continued selective
operations against alleged terrorists on Somali soil. In March 2008, Al Shabaab was
designated a terrorist group by the Bush administration. One month later Adan Hashi
Farah Ayro, the group’s leader, was killed together with dozens of other (mostly
unrelated) people in a U.S. air strike against a village in central Somalia.84 Following
Ayro’s death, Ahmed Abdi Godane took over the leadership of Al Shabaab and signaled
the movement’s shift into the ranks of the global jihadists by opening with greetings to
Osama bin Laden in a 4 June 2008 communiqué.
Diplomatic efforts at the UN level and the continued counter-terrorism activities
of the U.S. served to split the Asmara-based opposition. Washington was clearly not
prepared to talk to Somali extremists or people or groups perceived as such. This
indirectly led also to the isolation of Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys, who sat in Asmara and
was a prominent figure in the ARS but was rather skeptical about the negotiation process
led by Sheikh Sharif and Nuur Hassan Hussein under the auspices of the UN. Aweys

22
allegedly was in close contact with Adan Hashi Ayro, who operated on the ground in
Somalia. However, it is unclear if Aweys was really supporting Al Shabaab or just felt
marginalized and tried to enhance his political weight by countering Sheikh Sharif’s
efforts, which militant Islamists must have perceived as the final surrender of the UIC to
the UN and the TFG. Negotiations between the TFG and the ARS took place in Djibouti
(since Eritrea positioned itself against this initiative), and an agreement was reached there
on 9 June 2008. The central provisions of this Djibouti Communiqué were the cessation
of hostilities between the government and the opposition, the joint request to the UN
Security Council to deploy an international stabilization force, the withdrawal of the
Ethiopian troops from Somalia, the dissolution of the ARS, the provision of humanitarian
access, and the establishment of a Joint Security Committee.85 This agreement strongly
reflected the positions of the TFG, whereas the ARS representatives in Djibouti had
demanded as a first step the withdrawal of the Ethiopian troops. The remaining ARS
leaders in Asmara, particularly Aweys, plus the militant groups in Somalia condemned
the agreement. The ARS effectively split over the agreement into Asmara and Djibouti
factions. The U.S. supported the agreement.86 The agreement led to the decision of the
Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP) in November 2008 to double the number of
parliamentary seats to 550 in order to establish a government of national unity and
integrate members of the (moderate) Islamist factions.
The Djibouti agreement had outmaneuvered not only Aweys and some Islamist
hard-liners but also President Abdullahi Yusuf of the TFG, who had always preferred a
military victory over a settlement through negotiations. His calculations were based on
continued Ethiopian engagement on the ground. But the Djibouti agreement foresaw the
end of the Ethiopian intervention. Addis Ababa was willing to pull its troops out of
Somalia after two years of bloody campaigns, many losses, and growing international
criticism. In December 2008, Abdullahi Yusuf resigned his position. In January 2009, the
Ethiopian withdrawal was complete. Al Shabaab, which by then had grown into the
dominant military force in southern Somalia and under its new leader, Abdi Ahmed
Godane, had officially associated itself with Al Qaeda, took over most of the positions
vacated by the Ethiopians. In January 2009, the Somali parliament convened in Djibouti.
In a rather non-transparent process, new MPs were chosen to fill the 275 additional seats

23
previously established by the parliament. On 31 January 2009, this enlarged parliament
elected Sheikh Sharif the new president of Somalia. His election was endorsed by the
U.S. and the UN.
The new TFG, however, faced enormous challenges inside southern Somalia.
Islamic extremists belonging to militant groups, such as Al Shabaab and a newly founded
organization called Hizbul Islam, refused to acknowledge Sharif’s government, which
they perceived as corrupted by the international community.87 The military and financial
resources of the new TFG were extremely limited. Much of southern and central Somalia
was controlled by enemy militant Islamists and clan militias. In February 2009, the TFG
moved to Mogadishu. Yet, instead of using the momentum and capitalizing on popular
support inside Somalia, Sheikh Sharif spent much of February and March 2009 outside of
the country, attending various political meetings and holding talks with friendly
governments. Also, the international community was reluctant to release financial and
other support for the new TFG.
In April 2009, Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys returned from Asmara to Mogadishu
and began to organize the militant resistance against Sheikh Sharif’s administration.
Aweys took leadership of Hizbul Islam, which also integrated (under a loose umbrella)
the Ras Kambooni brigades of Hassan Abdullahi Turki. Renewed heavy fighting broke
out in the capital city around 7 May 2009. In the course of one week, more than 100
people (mostly civilians) died and several hundred were injured due to the indiscriminate
use of small arms and heavy weapons. Since then, the fighting between TFG troops
supported by AMISOM forces, on the one hand, and Al Shabaab and Hizbul Islam
fighters, on the other, has continued.88
In June 2009, the U.S. arranged for a shipment of forty tons of arms and
ammunition to the TFG in Mogadishu. (The deal was brokered through the AMISOM
troops on the ground in Mogadishu; Washington asked the Ugandan and Burundi troops
to hand over some of their arms to the TFG and then paid several million U.S. dollars so
that the AU forces could refill their stocks.)89 In August 2009, Hillary Clinton, the U.S.
secretary of state, met with President Sharif in Nairobi and pledged U.S. support for his
government. Clinton’s assistant secretary of state for Africa, Johnnie Carson, announced
ahead of the meeting: ‘We think that the support for Sheikh Sharif and his government

24
offers an opportunity to be able to restore some stability, fight against the Somali Islamic
extremists of Al Shabaab and Hizbul Islam, the two groups that are working against
them.’90 At the meeting, Clinton stated: ‘There is also no doubt that Al Shabaab wants to
obtain control of Somalia to use it as a base from which to influence and even infiltrate
surrounding countries and launch attacks against countries far and near.’ She added:
‘Certainly if Al Shabaab were to obtain a haven in Somalia, which could then attract Al
Qaeda and other terrorist actions, it would be a threat to the United States.’91
To sum up, throughout 2007 and until mid-2008, the U.S. pursued its counter-
terrorism strategy in accordance with the Ethiopian military occupation of Somalia
(which, nonetheless, followed its own rules and directives from Addis Ababa) and
launched several missile strikes against alleged terror suspects in Somalia. While
Washington was not prepared to reach out to the ‘evil’ extremists, it, together with the
UN, Somali Prime Minister Nuur Hassan Hussein, and Sheikh Sharif’s faction of the
ARS, ‘created’ the ‘good’ moderates with whom one could talk.
Sheikh Sharif has ‘learned his lesson’. In early 2009, a statement allegedly issued
by Osama Bin Laden was published calling for international jihadi support of the Islamist
fighters in Somalia. Sheikh Sharif responded by saying: ‘Al Qaeda has never helped
Somalis reach a peaceful solution and has never wanted Somalis to have a government.
Al Qaeda did not teach us the Islamic religion and has not given us any support so I urge
them to leave us alone.’92 When President Sharif met with Clinton in Nairobi he
confirmed that the U.S. support was very important for his administration. Comparing
this with his positions in 2006 shows that not only the U.S. policies but also the positions
of some of Somalia’s leading Islamists have changed.
Very dramatic changes have also happened with regard to Al Shabaab. It has
become what many Somalis and most external observers had always feared, and even
worse. It ‘hardened’ over the years of fighting against the TFG and Ethiopian troops.
Currently, Al Shabaab fields several thousand trained fighters. Its tactics have changed,
from hit-and-run ambushes to sophisticated suicide missions and remote-controlled
bombs that have taken scores of lives (of armed enemies and of civilians). In contrast to
the period from 2006 to 2007, Al Shabaab now also controls and administers territories
and communities. The harsh response to Islamist attacks by the TFG and Ethiopian troops

25
(who simply shelled whole neighborhoods in Mogadishu from where the attacks had been
conducted, killing thousands of civilians and creating hundreds of thousands of refugees)
plus the U.S. missile attacks that killed dozens of innocents added legitimacy to the
Islamist insurgency and even a degree of popularity to Al Shabaab among destitute
youths in Somalia and some diaspora Somalis.93
Arguably, the comparison of the UIC to the Taliban that was popular in 2006 was
not well founded. At that time, there were major discrepancies between the two
movements, such as the absence of much combat experience on the part of the UIC and
the lack of a consistent ideology among the Somali Islamists. Yet, in 2008/09, after two
to three years of insurgency, the militant Somali Islamists, particularly Al Shabaab, in
fact resemble the battle-hardened and ideologically uncompromising Taliban of 1996,
ready to rule a country. In this sense, the anti-Islamist propaganda of 2006 has fulfilled
itself.
Conclusion
This paper traced the most recent dynamics of violence in Somalia back to the year 2006,
which is understood to be the beginning of a new phase of global confrontation in
Somalia that is concentrated on gaining a local victory in the global battle between
militant Islamists and their enemies (the U.S. and allied powers). Thus far, neither side
has won the war, in Somalia or elsewhere.
The events in Somalia in 2006 and afterward were embedded in a brief history of
Islamism in Somalia after state collapse that clearly shows the decisive break in 2005/06.
The ascent to power of the UIC marked the first time in fifteen years that Mogadishu and
much of southern Somalia had been under one rule and mostly peaceful, if only for a few
months. Certainly, the U.S. ‘failed to judge the Union [UIC] for its deeds: the
stabilization and pacification of one of the world’s most lawless areas.’94 The question is,
however, if Washington ever was interested in accurately judging the UIC. It obviously
made some efforts to understand who the Islamist leaders were, yet the decision to
engage in military counter-terrorism and support Ethiopia’s intervention was made before

26
any ‘research’ into the matter had been concluded (or even conducted). Thus, it seems
that Washington’s confidence in its strategy – the war on terrorism – and the perceived
legitimacy of that strategy ruled out real alternatives. The same can be said of the hard-
core Somali jihadists and their idols and supporters among Al Qaeda.
The mutually reinforcing ‘arrogance’ and unwillingness to compromise of the two
extreme poles – the warriors against terrorism and their opponents – led to an
increasingly binary logic of fighting in Somalia after 2006, which, in the form of Al
Shabaab as it developed between 2007 and 2008, in fact produced the clear-cut ‘evil’
enemy the U.S. and its regional and local allies were evoking in 2006. This paper shows
that in 2006 and before, however, the Somali Islamist camp had been so diverse and
heterogeneous that one could hardly identify one group with a consistent ideological and
political agenda. Individuals and groups disagreed more regularly than not, and every
Islamist movement since 1991 had to struggle with the challenges of ‘clanism’
(considering patrilineal descent in politics) and a lack of popular support. This only
changed when global powers got involved, frequently upon the ‘invitation’ of local
actors, even if up until today most Somalis and even some leading Islamists certainly
would have preferred to find their own solutions to their problems. Yet, in an age of
global confrontation, dynamics of violence rarely remain isolated, at least in the hot spots
of resource competition and ideological struggle. In this sense, an exclusive focus on
terrorism and civil war, as proposed by Boulden, is insufficient.95 International counter-
terrorism and other policies have to be taken into account. Schlee recently concluded that
‘the rise of political Islam [in Somalia] is a response to the “war on terror” and therefore
cannot be an element of its justification.’96 This applies not only to Somalia but also to
the wider Horn.97 But Somalia since 2006 is possibly the clearest example of the failure
of U.S. (and Ethiopian) counter-terrorism policy, which actually has produced what it
was supposed to counter. Sociologically speaking, these developments demonstrate the
entrapment of unintended consequences, even for the globally most powerful actors.
* I wish to thank Roland Marchal for extensive discussions on the topic of this paper and Günther Schlee,
Stephen Reyna, and Dereje Feyissa for comments and corrections. I did not always follow their
recommendations though, and any remaining errors are mine.
1 This text is concerned with southern Somalia. The situation in northern Somalia is very different.
Somaliland, in the northwest, declared its independence in 1991. The civil war can be considered ended

27
there, and some basic government structures are in place, although Somaliland is not recognized as an
independent state. Puntland, in the northeast, was established in 1998 as an autonomous regional state. Both
of these northern political entities are geographically distant from but politically involved (to various
degrees) in southern Somalia. Aspects of this involvement will be outlined where necessary but are not the
main subject of this paper.
2 Korteweg listed seven elements of ‘black holes’ that in his opinion would support terrorist engagement
(Korteweg, Rem, 2008: ‘Black holes: On terrorist sanctuaries and government weakness’, Civil Wars
10(1): 60–71). Yet he completely blocked out the fact that the absence of government and the availability
of weapons within a community provide a veritable security risk also to external terrorists. Moreover,
ungoverned spaces and ‘black holes’ can be invaded by the enemies of terrorists as well, with impunity.
These and other factors were clearly presented and analyzed by the Harmony Project/Centre for Combating
Terrorism at West Point, 2007: ‘Al-Qaida’s (Mis)Adventures in the Horn of Africa’
(http://ctc.usama.edu/aqIIasp).
3 Thomson, Alex, 2006: ‘Somalia's Taliban?’ (Channel 4, 6 June,
http://www.channel4.com/news/articles/world/somalias+taliban/165555); Kfir, Isaac, 2008: ‘Islamic
radicalism in East Africa: Is there a cause for concern?’ Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 31(9): 829–55,
842.
4 Moslems who try to go ‘back to the roots’ of Islam and focus on the fundamental sources of their religion,
the Koran and the uncontested traditions of the Prophet Mohamed (Hadith), are fundamentalists in my
view. This does not mean, however, that they would necessarily wish to become politically active or use
violence (Euben, Roxanne L. and Zaman, Qasim, 2009: ‘Introduction’, in: R. L. Euben and Q. Zaman
(eds), Princeton Readings in Islamist Thought: Texts and Contexts from al-Banna to Bin Laden, Princeton:
Princeton University Press, pp. 1–46, 40–46). In this paper, I use ‘extremists’ for those Islamists who are
willing to use violence in order to achieve political aims.
5 Elliot, Ashley and Holzer, Georg-Sebastian, 2009: ‘The invention of “terrorism” in Somalia: Paradigms
and policy in US foreign relations’, South African Journal of International Affairs 16(2): 215–44, 216.
6 International Crisis Group (ICG), 2005: ‘Somalia’s Islamists’ (Africa Report Nr 100, 12 December), p. 1.
7 The adjective ‘jihadi’ is related to ‘jihadism’, which is ‘a neologism derived from the Arabic jihad (to
struggle, to strive) that is frequently used in the press to denote the most violent strands of Islamism’
(Euben and Zaman, ‘Introduction’, p. 3).
8 Kfir, ‘Islamic radicalism in East Africa’, pp. 830–31.
9 Euben and Zaman, ‘Introduction’, pp. 4–5.
10 Marchal, Roland, 2007: ‘Warlordism and terrorism: How to obscure an already confusing crisis? The
case of Somalia’, International Affairs 83(6): 1091–1106.
11 Rogan, Hanna, 2007: ‘Abu Reuter and the E-Jihad: Virtual battlefields from Iraq to the Horn of Africa’,
Culture and Society (Summer/Fall): 89–96, 93.
12 This certainly does not mean that I would follow Huntington’s infamous ‘clash of civilizations’ thesis.
To the contrary, my point here is that the main actors themselves applied such a binary and ‘clashing’ logic,
which serves their mobilization of war allies against each other. This practice is opportunistic and does not
prove any structural global developments allegedly inherent in any overarching ‘cultural’ or ‘religious’
theories.
13 Euben and Zaman, ‘Introduction’, p. 3.
14 Marchal, Roland, 2004: ‘Islamic political dynamics in the Somali civil war,’ in: A. de Waal (ed.),
Islamism and its Enemies in the Horn of Africa, London: Hurst & Company, pp. 114–45.
15 Aweys was genealogically close to Aideed, yet he was also already an Islamist, with ties to AIAI. Aideed
used him as a ‘doubly-related’ middleman, which is a classic Somali tactic in conflict situations (Roland
Marchal, personal communication, 11 November 2009).
16 Le Sage, Andre, 2004: ‘Somalia and the war on terrorism: Political Islamic movements and US counter
terrorism efforts’ (unpublished PhD thesis, Jesus College, Cambridge University), chap. 4; ICG, ‘Somalia’s
Islamists’, pp. 3–5.
17 Le Sage, ‘Somalia and the war on terrorism’, pp. 107–08; Marchal, personal communication.
18 ‘Salafism’ refers to ‘contemporary Muslims who generally eschew the interpretive methods and norms of
the medieval Islamic schools and take as a guide for proper behavior only the word of God, the teachings of
the Prophet Muhammad, and the example set by the pious forbears’ (Euben and Zaman, ‘Introduction’, p.

28
3). The term ‘salafi’ derives from ‘al salaf al salih (the pious forbears), usually understood as the Muslims
of the first generations of Islam’ (Ibid., p. 19).
19 This is a good example of the opportunism involved in the Somali civil war on the sides of warlords and
Islamists: in early 1991, Aideed fought and defeated Al Itihad; in the fall of 1993 he briefly allied with the
movement (at least with some Hawiye/Habr Gedir elements within it) against the U.S. forces in
Mogadishu.
20 Le Sage, ‘Somalia and the war on terrorism’, pp. 141–42.
21 Shinn, David H., 2007: ‘Al Qaeda in East Africa and the Horn’
(http://www.lib.unb.ca/Texts/JCS/Summer07/shinn_al_qaeda.pdf), paragraph 37.
22 Le Sage, ‘Somalia and the war on terrorism’, pp. 135, 141–42.
23 ICG, ‘Somalia’s Islamists’, p. 20.
24 Le Sage, ‘Somalia and the war on terrorism’, pp. 144–45, 151–73.
25 Ibid., pp. 144–45; ICG, ‘Somalia’s Islamists’, p. 20.
26 Marchal emphasized that Sheikh Sharif’s chairmanship had been pushed by Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys,
who, as a member of the Habr Gedir clan, wished to have a member of the Abgal clan as partner in order to
avoid any fissures within the Hawiye clan-family (Marchal, personal communication).
27 ICG, ‘Somalia’s Islamists’, p. 20.
28 Ibid., p. 21.
29 Ibid.; Weber, Anette, 2008: ‘State building in Somalia – Challenges in a zone of crisis’, in: E. M.
Bruchhaus and M. Sommer (eds), Hot Spot Horn of Africa Revisited, Hamburg: Lit Verlag, pp. 14–27, 16.
30 Marchal, Roland, 2009: ‘A tentative assessment of the Somali Harakat Al-Shabaab’, Journal of Eastern
African Studies 3(3): 381–404, 388.
31 Harmony Project/Center for Combating Terrorism, ‘Al-Qaida’s (Mis)Adventures’, pp. 44, 79. For a
slightly different account, see: Le Sage, ‘Somalia and the war on terrorism’, p. 180.
32 Menkhaus, Ken, 2004: ‘Somalia: State collapse and the threat of terrorism’ (Adelphi Paper 364, Oxford),
pp. 71–75; Harmony Project/Center for Combating Terrorism, ‘Al Qaida’s (Mis-)Adventures’.
33 Le Sage, ‘Somalia and the war on terrorism’, p. 111–12.
34 Menkhaus, ‘Somalia: State collapse and the threat of terrorism’, pp. 66–71; Harmony Project/Center for
Combating Terrorism, ‘Al Qaida’s (Mis-)Adventures’, p. 2; Shinn, ‘Al Qaeda in East Africa and the Horn’,
paragraphs 5 and 6.
35 Le Sage, ‘Somalia and the war on terrorism’, p. 106.
36 Marchal, Roland, 2007: ‘Somalia: A new front against terrorism’
(http://hornofafrica.ssrc.org/marchal/printable.html), p. 5.
37 ICG, 2006: ‘Can the Somali crisis be contained?’ (Africa Report Nr 116, 10 August), pp. 10, 17, 19; Red
Team Report, 2007: ‘Somalia: Islamic extremism, clan politics and insurgency’ (March), p. 5.
38 Marchal, personal communication; Hassan, Harun and Barnes, Cedric, 2007: ‘A return to clan-politics
(or worse) in southern Somalia?’ (http://hornofafrica.ssrc.org/Hassan_Barnes/printable.html); Red Team
Report, ‘Somalia: Islamic extremism, clan politics and insurgency’, p. 19.
39 The main targets were two or three foreign jihadists who had allegedly been involved in the U.S.
embassy bombings in Nairobi and Dar-el-salaam in 1998 and who were suspected to be hiding in
Mogadishu.
40 In the media and the academic literature, various names and abbreviations were used, such as United
Islamic Courts (UIC), Islamic Courts Union (ICU), and Council of Islamic Courts (CIC).
41 Inter Africa Group, 2006: ‘Human security in Somalia’s new order’ (briefing paper, October).
42 Menkhaus, Ken, 2009: ‘Violent Islamic extremism: Al-Shabaab recruitment in America’ (hearing before
the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 11 March), pp. 2–3. I
personally heard several stories of ordinary Somali families in the diaspora, for example in the U.K., who
packed their things and returned to Mogadishu in the expectation of a functioning Islamic government and
a finally peaceful home.
43 Inter Africa Group, ‘Human security in Somalia’s new order’; ICG, ‘Can the Somali crisis be
contained?’; Menkhaus, Ken, 2006/07: ‘Governance without government in Somalia: Spoilers, state
building, and the politics of coping’, International Security 31(3): 74–106.
44 ICG, ‘Can the Somali crisis be contained?’ p. 20.
45 Marchal, ‘A tentative assessment of the Somali Harakat Al-Shabaab’, p. 391.
46 Shinn, ‘Al Qaeda in East Africa and the Horn’, paragraph 42.

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47 Rogan, ‘Abu Reuter and the E-Jihad’, p. 90.
48 Ibid., p. 92.
49 Marchal, ‘A tentative assessment of the Somali Harakat Al-Shabaab’, p. 392.
50 Marchal, ‘Somalia: A new front against terrorism’; Shinn, ‘Al Qaeda in East Africa and the Horn’,
paragraph 44.
51 The following paragraphs are based on Le Sage, ‘Somalia and the war on terrorism’; Marchal, ‘Somalia:
A new front against terrorism’; Marchal, ‘A tentative assessment of the Somali Harakat Al-Shabaab’;
McGregor, Andrew, 2009: Who’s Who in the Somali Insurgency: A Reference Guide, Washington, DC:
Jamestown Foundation; Red Team Report, ‘Somalia: Islamic extremism, clan politics and insurgency’;
ICG, ‘Somalia’s Islamists’; ICG, ‘Can the Somali crisis be contained?’; and a number of other sources
indicated in the text. It has to be noted that some of the details about the factions and individuals involved
are contested. Information about Somalia’s Islamists is hard to verify. The security situation in southern
Somalia prevents researchers from doing extensive field research. External (non-Moslem and non-Somali)
researchers/observers generally manage to visit only for a few days, if at all, under heavy protection. Even
then, they usually do not reach key Islamist actors. Possibly the only exceptions in this regard are Roland
Marchal and the experts of the ICG, who have good connections on the ground in southern Somalia. Even
they are sometimes accused of being biased.
52 Since 2006 this group has developed further and in 2008/09 became the dominant militant organization
in Somalia. However, in my opinion, Al Shabaab in 2006 and Al Shabaab in 2008/09 must be seen as
distinctly different regarding fighting power, political influence in Somalia, and global jihadi connections.
53 Wahabism goes back to the teachings of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahab. Wahabis ‘prefer to think of themselves
simply as good Muslims or, at best, as Salafis – often adhere to the legal norms of the Hanbali school of
law, though it is the teachings of the foundational texts, irrespective of this or any other school doctrine,
that they profess to follow’ (Euben and Zaman, ‘Introduction’, p. 21).
54 Schlee, Günther, 2008: How Enemies are Made: Towards a Theory of Ethnic and Religious Conflicts,
New York: Berghahn, p. 125.
55 Red Team Report, ‘Somalia: Islamic extremism, clan politics and insurgency’, p. 9.
56 Marchal, personal communication.
57 Norland, Rod, 2006: ‘Heroes, terrorists and Osama’ (interview with Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys),
Newsweek, 22 July.
58 ICG, ‘Can the Somali crisis be contained?’ p.16.
59 Economist, 2006: ‘A holy war in the Horn?’ 6 October.
60 Later on, he changed sides several times and currently (October 2009) is minister of defense of the new
TFG under Sheikh Sharif.
61 Robow was replaced as spokesman of the movement in early 2009, after he had shown preferential
treatment for enemies belonging to his own Rahanweyn clan-family when his forces took over the town of
Baydhabo.
62 Marchal, personal communication.
63 Marchal, ‘Somalia: A new front against terrorism’, p. 8.
64 Ibid.
65 Marchal, ‘A tentative assessment of the Somali Harakat Al-Shabaab’, p. 390.
66 ICG, ‘Can the Somali crisis be contained?’ pp. 15–16.
67 Red Team Report, ‘Somalia: Islamic extremism, clan politics and insurgency’, p. 13.
68 Marchal, ‘Somalia: A new front against terrorism’, pp. 8–9.
69 ICG, ‘Can the Somali crisis be contained?’ p. 16.
70 Marchal, ‘A tentative assessment of the Somali Harakat Al-Shabaab’, p. 396.
71 U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on Africa, Global Human Rights, and International
Operations, 2006: ‘Somalia: Expanding crisis in the Horn of Africa’ (joint hearing, 29 June), p. 61.
72 ICG, ‘Can the Somali crisis be contained?’ p. i.
73 U.S. House of Representatives, ‘Somalia, Expanding crisis in the Horn of Africa’, p. 11.
74 Ibid. p. 33.
75 Ibid. p. 38.
76 Ibid. p. 63.
77 Marchal, ‘Somalia: A new front against terrorism’, p. 8.

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78 The main Ethiopian interest was certainly to crush any irredentist threat in statu nascendi. Also, the
strategic alliance between Asmara and the UIC was a reason to not let things continue in southern Somalia.
79 Menkhaus, ‘Violent Islamic extremism’, p. 3.
80 See Dr. Pham’s deliberations in U.S. House of Representatives, ‘Somalia: Expanding crisis in the Horn
of Africa’, p. 65.
81 A previous phase of global ‘humanitarian’ confrontation took place between 1992 and 1995, when about
30,000 troops under UN and U.S. command intervened in Somalia.
82 Menkhaus, Ken, 2008: ‘Somalia: A country in peril, a policy nightmare’ (ENOUGH Strategy Paper,
September); Hoehne, Somalia Update (2006-2008), pp. 6-7.
83 Human Rights Watch, 2007: ‘Shell-shocked: Civilians under siege in Mogadishu’
(http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/somalia0807webwcover.pdf); Gettleman, Jeffrey, 2007:
‘Somali battles bring charges of war crimes’, New York Times, 6 April; Menkhaus, Ken, 2007: ‘The crisis
in Somalia: Tragedy in five acts’, African Affairs, 106(204): 357–90; Amnesty International, 2008:
‘Routinely targeted: Attacks on civilians in Somalia’; Human Rights Watch, 2008: ‘So much to fear: War
crimes and the devastation of Somalia’.
(http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/somalia1208web.pdf).
84 In total, between January 2007 and mid-2008, at least six air strikes and one missile strike from a ship
were conducted by U.S. forces against targets in Somalia. Most of the strikes killed scores of people but not
the designated targets, that is, terror suspects.
85 UN Secretary General, 2008: ‘Report on the situation in Somalia’, 16 July.
86 U.S. Special Envoy to Somalia, 2008: ‘U.S. Special Envoy Discusses Current Events in Region’ (Ask
America web-chat transcript, 31 July.
http://www.america.gov/st/washfile- English/2008/August/20080801130602eaifas0.1554224.html).
87 Africa Confidential, 2009: ‘The Sheik Sharif show’, Africa Confidential 50(4): 10–12; Menkhaus, Ken,
Prendergast, John, and Thomas-Jensen, Colin, 2009: ‘Beyond piracy: Next steps to stabilize Somalia’
(Enough Project, May).
88 In mid-2009, conflict within the militant Islamist opposition escalated over control of the port town of
Kismayo, resulting in several rounds of fighting in and around the town. This conflict reflects clan tensions
between the sub-units of the two movements; additionally it involves a power struggle between the
opposition leaders, Ahmed Abdi Godane and Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys. In late October 2009, Al
Shabaab seems to have gained the upper hand and certainly remains the most powerful and extremist
faction in Somalia.
89 U.S. Department of State, 2009: Background Briefing on U.S. Assistance to the Somalia Transitional
Federal Government (http://www.africom.mil/getArticle.asp?art=3162&lang=1).
90 Pflanz, Mike, 2009: ‘Hillary Clinton to pledge US support for Somalia again [sic] al-Shabaab terrorists’,
Telegraph, 4 August (http://www.telegraph.co.uk).
91 Skynews, 2009: ‘Clinton pledges US boost for Somali govt’, Skynews, 6 August
(http://news.sky.com/skynews/).
92 Associated Press, 2009, 28 March.
93 Menkhaus, ‘Violent Islamic extremism’, p. 4.
94 Rosen, Jonathan, 2008: ‘Mistaken identity: The Union of Islamic Courts and the failure of the US war on
terror in the Horn of Africa’, Geopolitics in the Middle East 1(1): 7–22, 18.
95 Boulden, Jane, 2009: ‘Terrorism and civil wars’, Civil Wars 11(1): 5–21.
96 Schlee, How Enemies are Made, p. 168.
97 Smidt, Wolbert, 2008: ‘Terrorism and discourses on terror in Ethiopia’, in: Eva-Maria Bruchhaus and
Monika M. Sommer (eds), Hot Spot Horn of Africa Revisited: Approaches to Make Sense of Conflict,
Münster: LIt., pp. 132–45.