In our recent paper “Pulling Back the Curtain on Heritability Studies: Biosocial Criminology in the Postgenomic Era,” we scrutinized heritability studies in criminology (Burt & Simons 2014). Drawing on recent advances in the life sciences, and echoing the calls of prominent scholars, we called for an end to heritability studies in criminology and recognition of the dubious nature of existing heritability estimates. We argued that heritability studies are futile for two reasons: (1) heritability studies suffer from serious methodological flaws with the overall effect of making estimates inaccurate and biased toward inflated heritability and deflated shared environmental influences, and, more importantly, (2) the conceptual biological model on which heritability studies depend—that of identifiably separate effects of genes vs. the environment on phenotype variance—is unsound. As we discussed, profound scientific advances over the past decade, most clearly manifest in epigenetics, demonstrate that genes and environments are enmeshed in a bidirectional, interactional relationship that defies any attempt to demarcate separate contributions to phenotype variance. Thus, heritability studies attempt the impossible. In this short rejoinder , we address Barnes et al. ’ s response to our piece. We attempt to clarify our arguments and correct misinterpretations or misunderstandings, including the misguided idea that the unsound (conceptual) biological model can be mitigated or refuted with statistics or algebra, and conclude by reiterating that biosocial criminology needs to move beyond heritability studies and the outdated, false gene-centric conceptual framework.