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Between Beijing and Washington: Israel's Technology Transfers to China
Abstract
Technological ties between Israel and China have always been a central and constant element of their relationship. Defense contracts played a leading role here but were also responsible for the severe crisis that erupted between the countries in the early 2000s after Israel, capitulating to US pressure, backed off from its commitment to provide China with military technologies. This not only forced Israel to sever its defense relations with China but also made US-Israel relations a principal factor in the Sino-Israeli connection and imposed tight constraints on Israel's technology transfers to China generally. For Israel, this placed the dilemma of commercial versus political and national security interests at the forefront, since technology connections allowed it to promote its economic, political, and strategic causes through China. Indeed, while technology ties between the states have not stopped entirely—they have shifted to the civilian sphere—technology transfers to China are subject to heavy limitations, and Israel's export control mechanism faces greater challenges to screen them. As China's economic and political influence is ever increasing, Israel's cautious approach to technology transfers to China may be expected to come under mounting pressure.
http://journals.rienner.com/doi/abs/10.5555/1598-2408-13.3.503
... сотрудничество в сфере оборонных технологий столкнулось с препятствием, ставшим на определенном этапе непреодолимым. Как пишет Йорам Эврон (Yoram Evron) [3], «Технологические связи между странами спровоцировали крупномасштабный кризис, его апогеем стало вынужденное расторжение в 2000 г. соглашения по поставке Китаю воздушной системы раннего предупреждения и управления «Фалькон» (Phalcon Airborne Early Warning and Control system) изза давления США. Вследствие усиливающихся противоречий между США и КНР эта сделка вкупе с согласием Израиля в 2005 г. произвести сервисные работы (или усовершенствование согласно американским обвинениям) на нескольких беспилотных летательных аппаратах "Гарпия" (Harpy unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), которые были ранее проданы Китаю, вынудили Соединенные Штаты использовать свои рычаги влияния на Израиль, чтобы блокировать передачу израильских технологий Китаю…». ...
Israel was the first state in the Middle East to recognize the independence of the PRC, but full-fl edged diplomatic relations between the two countries were established only in 1992. Since the beginning of the 1980s, the interaction between the two countries has been in the nature of military-technical cooperation, and in the 1990s it acquired a new dimension. After the confl ict between the United States and Israel in the late 1990s and early 2000s, due to the alleged transfer by Israel to the PRC of technical means created on the basis of American technologies, military-technical cooperation between China and Israel stopped. Nevertheless, the cooperation continues to develop. The PRC is beginning to actively invest in high-tech Israeli companies, as well as attract Israeli investors to national innovation (technology) parks in China, which corresponds to the long-term goals of the PRC in the fi eld of scientifi c and technological development. In addition, the two countries are currently dynamically cooperating in the fi eld of infrastructure investments, which not only improves Israel’s logistics potential, but also creates facilities that in the future will become an integral part of the global Chinese project "One Belt and One Road".
... Работы российских специалистов по проблематике израильско-китайских и израильско-индийских отношений немногочисленны и не освещают влияние США [Кашин 2017; Морозов, Микаелян 2018; Марьясис 2018]. Отдельно фактор США рассматривался в нескольких трудах специалистов, занимающихся израильско-китайскими и израильскоиндийскими отношениями [Kumaraswamy 2005;Evron 2013;Blarel 2017]. ...
The article analyses the US influence on Israeli policy towards both China and India. The United States has had and still has a significant influence on the dynamics of Israeli-Chinese and Israeli-Indian relations. The relevance of the issue stems from the growing importance of China and India in the world affairs amid rising tensions between the US and China that are spilling into a trade war. The article aims to explore the US influence on Israels policy in Asia. It examines the way how the Israeli leadership has adapted to Washingtons influence while promoting its strategic cooperation with China and India. The study comprises historical method, comparative analysis and historical-systematic analysis. The author comes to the following conclusions. First, Washingtons influence on Sino-Israeli relations has gone through five development stages: the first stage (1971-1989): implicit US support for the development of Sino-Israeli relations; the second stage (1990-1998): American criticism of military and technical cooperation between Israel and China; the third stage (1999-2005): Washingtons shift from criticism to pressure policy in order to prevent the Israeli leadership from military cooperation with China; the fourth stage (2006-2016): Israels acceptance of US demands and refusal to supply arms to Beijing (with Tel Aviv focusing on the development of trade and economic relations with China); the fifth stage (2017 - present): U.S. criticism of Israeli-Chinese economic cooperation amid worsening contacts between Beijing and Washington. The Israeli government is trying to meet Washingtons demands as well as preserve its strategic economic relations with Beijing. Second, the US factor, on the contrary, contributed to normalization of Indian-Israeli relations, having a positive impact on the development of trade, economic and military cooperation between Tel Aviv and New Delhi. Third, the US actions can be explained by an attempt to preserve its national interests. At the same time, the author stresses that the US influence on Israels policy in Asia complies with Washingtons regional priorities set forth in the 2017 US National Security Strategy.
... While the projects are purely academic, some of them, for example, in nanotechnology, new materials, and satellite technology, can be of military relevance. 88 In September 2013, Tel Aviv University (TAU) and Tsinghua University signed a memorandum of understanding to establish the XIN ('new' in Mandarin Chinese) Centre. It should become one of the largest academic R&D centres in both countries, develop strategic cooperation in research and teaching, and will also serve as an international centre for scientific and technological innovation for research both in the early stages and projects that can be prepared for market. ...
In recent years, with the cessation of defense relations, Israel and China have sought to expand their diplomatic and economic relations, mainly in the field of industrial research and development, large-scale academic cooperation, and investment. The expansion of cooperation between the two countries is mainly due to the status of Israel as a start-up country, which can satisfy China’s technological needs and help it modernise many of its industries. Beijing also sees Israel as a strategic outpost in its regional interests—a small but vital stopover under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), connecting the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea through the Gulf of Suez, as a land bridge connecting trade and energy routes from the Far East through Africa to the Middle East and further to Europe on profitable trade routes by land and sea. The construction of a railway line from Eilat to Ashdod connecting the Red and Mediterranean Seas, as well as the construction of a new port in Ashdod, will provide a safe alternative route to the Suez Canal. Israel’s well-secured human capital, a developed economy, a high-tech foundation, a stable public and state business environment have further enhanced the country’s attractiveness as a key element of BRI.
... Такие эксклюзивные условия сотрудничества создают и ограничения для Израиля. Например, из-за опасений Вашингтона китайско-израильское сотрудничество в области безопасности претерпело кризис еще в начале 2000-х годов, когда Китай по совокупным объемам закупок вооружений из ГИ с 1990 по 2001 г. достиг 3-го места после ЮАР и США [35,36]. Также с заключением действующего Меморандума о взаимопонимании в 2016 г. ...
The article examines the evolution of U.S.–Israel special relations in order to estimate the scale and longevity of Trump’s policies effects towards Israel. By the start of the 2016 presidential electoral campaign, the state of bilateral relations had been frequently considered as damaged due to the decisions of the Obama administration to engage in negotiations with Iran and to abstain from vetoing the U.N. Security Council Resolution 2334. Contrary to that, Donald Trump was consistent in his absolutely anticritical and pro-Israel positions, realizing all his initial promises regarding the Jewish state. By the end of his first term, he significantly shifted the well-established framework of the American traditional policies towards Israel. This raises a question on whether such dynamics might become a pattern in U.S. – Israel relations, and what might be the prospects for these relations being seriously determined by the U.S. internal polarization. The study covers the dynamics in key areas that define the strategic structure of the U.S.–Israel partnership. The first part of the article addresses the trends in bilateral and international relations that originated in the late 19th century and eventually led to the establishment of allied relations. Those trends are: a gradual rise of mutual importance in foreign policy strategies of both states; institutionalization and strengthening of pro-Israeli political forces in the United States. Both trends impeded a crisis in bilateral relations after the end of the Cold War. The second part concludes that since 1967, both states refer to each other as key strategic allies with common values, and that the range of their cooperation was framed in a specific spectrum of topics, most of which were Israeli-centered. The third part analyses the activity of the main pro-Israeli lobby groups in their support or opposition to the U.S. electoral campaigns and Congress legislature, and the views of the American public towards Israel. The authors find that the U.S. polarizations trends also affected the views in the lobby, but it never reflected upon the final legislature process, which is mostly pro-Israel. The fourth part addresses the asymmetrical nature of bilateral cooperation in trade, security and in the bodies of the United Nations. Finally, the fifth part of the article covers the policies of Obama and Trump administrations and the attitudes towards them of the main political forces in Israel and the United States. Those attitudes reflect the formation of two camps in both countries with polar incompatible views on the key issues of bilateral relations. The authors conclude that due to the structural asymmetry of the U.S. – Israel relations, their dynamics will be mostly defined by the changes in the grand strategy and the polarization of the United States. Nevertheless, the complexity and a large number of influential groups interested in maintaining the exceptional level of cooperation will prevent from undermining the structural foundations of the U.S.–Israel special relations in the foreseeable future.
... 26 21 Katz and Bohbot, 2017. 22 Evron, 2013. 23 P. R. Kumaraswamy, "Israel-China Relations and the Phalcon Controversy," Middle East Policy, Vol. 12, No. 2, 2005. ...
... Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, Israeli high-tech transfers to China are limited because of the US restrictions, not just regarding the export of military technology to China but also dual-use technologies in which Beijing is very much interested (Shichor, 2014). Although military relations were the forerunner to China-Israel relations in the late 1970s, they are also the cause of the worst crisis between the countries (Evron, 2013). Washington's sensitivity and the export restrictions have limited Israel's defense and dual-use technology transfers to China. ...
Since the establishment of diplomatic ties between China and Israel in 1992, their relations have warmed up and developed rapidly in diverse areas. This study offers a new theoretical framework, strategic hedging behavior, for analyzing Sino-Israel relations, in order to understand the nature and scope of the hedging relationship between China and Israel. What impact will China’s hedging relationship with Israel have on Washington’s dominance in the Middle East region? The study asserts that this relationship is limited to economics and technology, and China’s relations with Israel cannot replace Israel’s strategic and special relationship with the US. However, the future of the hedging relationship countries is highly sensitive to the evolution of US–China relations in the Middle East and other areas.
... Overlooking American opposition to its military ties with China, Israel undertook the work and this time the US reaction was extremely sharp: beside its demand from Israel to confiscate the UAVs and dismiss the defense ministry officials who had approved the maintenance work, it forced Israel to amend its export control law and mechanism as well as to consult with itand actually get its approvalprior to the transfer of any military or dual-use product or technology to China. 16 This development aborted the Sino-Israeli defense connections, but also affected economic relations; afraid of irritating Washington once again, Israel self-imposed stringent limitations on the export of technologies to China. These measures caused a wholesale transformation in Israel's approach to technological relations with Chinamilitary and civilian alike. ...
Exploring Sino-Israeli economic relations comprehensively for the first time, this article suggests that this connection allowed the two states to overcome the defence crises that the relationship experienced in the early 2000s. After 2010, as China resolved to enhance relations with Israel, economic ties continued to fulfil a prominent role. Nevertheless, achievements have been mixed. Apparently, investments of Chinese firms in Israel and construction of infrastructure projects in Israel by Chinese corporations are the most successful activities, but they arouse mixed responses in Israel and may have political implications yet to be clarified.
Full text: http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/AExhTAnXuY3ZvuFPB3sj/full
... 31 Concurrently, China's economic, scientific, and to some degree even military relations with Israel continued developing. 32 Not surprisingly then, China's interest in playing a role in this conflict was mostly limited to the symbolic dimension, as it seemingly strove to limit its actual involvement there. Thus, in 1991, it evinced interest in being part of the Peace process, initiated then at the Madrid Conference -the first attempt to achieve a comprehensive solution to the Israeli-Arab conflict, and offered a five-point peace proposal for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. ...
Since the early 2010s, there have been mounting calls in China to intensify its role in the Middle East. But seeing the region as highly turbulent, Beijing seems to restrain its political involvement there. So what role does China actually strive for in the Middle East? To answer this question, the article first presents China’s discourse on its future role in the region; next, it analyzes China’s involvement in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict and the Syrian civil war, focusing on three diplomatic initiatives it has made concerning these issues. The argument here is that China strives to be part of major processes in the Middle East and attempts to advance its values and interests there, but in a unique pattern of big-power involvement in the region, it tries to achieve this without intensive investment of political, economic, and military resources.
Access: http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0047117815619664
Çin Halk Cumhuriyeti (ÇHC) Başkanı Xi Jinping’in 2013 yılında Kazakistan’a yaptığı ziyarette duyurduğu Kuşak ve Yol girişimi Çin dış politikasının merkezine oturmuş durumdadır. İsrail ise Kuşak ve Yol girişimi için Mısır’a alternatif oluşturacak şekilde Kızıldeniz’i Akdeniz’e bağlayan merkez ülke konumundadır. Günümüzde bu proje kapsamında Çin’in İsrail’de birçok altyapı inşaatları ve ortak olma ya da satın alma yoluyla sahip olduğu firmalar bulunmaktadır. Bunun yanı sıra son dönemlerde Doğu Akdeniz’de keşfedilen doğal gaz rezervleri ile Çin’in Orta Doğu’daki enerji ithalatını çeşitlendirmesi açısından da İsrail, Çin için ayrı bir öneme sahiptir. Ancak daha da önemlisi, İsrail’in ileri teknolojiye sahip olmasıdır. Çin, ekonomik gelişimini teknoloji ile desteklemenin yanı sıra askeri teknolojisini geliştirmek istemektedir. İsrail açısından ise yükselen güç Çin ile iyi ilişkiler geliştirmek hem ekonomik anlamda hem de politik anlamda İsrail’in Batı’ya olan bağımlılığını azaltması açısından büyük önem arz etmektedir. Bu sebeplerden dolayı, Çin-İsrail ilişkileri geçmişte hiç olmadığı kadar iyi konumdadır. Çin-İsrail ilişkilerinin bu durumu, İsrail’in Orta Doğu’da hamisi konumundaki ABD’yi rahatsız etmekte olmalı ki, ABD geçmişte de olduğu gibi günümüzde de Kuşak ve Yol girişimi kapsamında Çin’in İsrail’de yürüttüğü projelere itirazları tekrar iki ülke arasındaki ilişkilerin geleceğinin sorgulanmasına sebep oldu. Bu çalışmada iki ülkenin kuruldukları tarihten itibaren ABD ve Arap ülkelerinin Çin-İsrail ilişkilerindeki olumsuz etkileri tarihsel bir perspektiften ele alınıp incelenecektir.
In the first decade or so of official ties between Israel and China, the cooperation between the two was largely in the field of military technology until this avenue was blocked by the U.S. in 2000–2005. Netanyahu’s visit to Beijing in 2013 marked a restart of intensive bilateral cooperation, this time in civilian sphere: science and technology, China’s infrastructure projects and increasing Chinese investment in Israel. Yet after a few years of newly burgeoning bilateral ties, the American factor intervened again. With the outbreak of the US–China trade war, the Trump administration dramatically increased its pressure on Israel to cease meaningful cooperation with China or at least to considerably downscale it. The article analyses the focal points of US pressure (up to the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemics) and explores the difficulty of Israel and China in maintaining mutually beneficent ties in the age of aggravating US–China competition. Speaking from China’s perspective, the article points at the weakness of Chinese soft power as one of the major hurdles in expanding China’s ties with Israel.
An important feature of Israel's foreign policy in the post-Cold War era has been development of relations with emerging powers, including China. The importance of the economic component in the foreign policy of both countries, China's efforts to achieve the status of a great power, and Israel's strategies to improve its global image and regional position have brought the two countries' relations into a form of comprehensive cooperation in the post-Cold War era. Describing the relations between the two countries in the political, military and economic spheres and acknowledging the impact of China and Israel's behavior patterns on national and regional security of Iran the article seeks to answer the following questions : What are the indicators of the development of China-Israel relations in the post-Cold War era? What are the consequences of these relations for Iran? From this article's point of view, the development of China-Israel relations in all areas has been on an upward trajectory and hence have substantial implications at the national (threatening China-Iran relations in the field of energy and weakening Iran-China military relations and enfeebling Iran's position in the Silk Road project), regional (changing the balance to the detriment of Iran, Iran's containment and normalization of Arab-Israeli relations) and international levels (China's accompanying pressures on Iran, Israel's use of China's capacity in international institutions and efforts to legitimizing and reinforcing the notion of Iran's threat and continuing Iranophobia) for Iran's security.
Its close alliance with the West over the course of seven decades notwithstanding, Israel has embarked on an East-looking orientation during the past several years. Aiming to cultivate multifaceted connections to various Asian countries, the new Israeli approach has striven to enhance the Jewish state’s relationship with the East in the political, military, economic, financial, technological, and cultural spheres. For their part, many Asian states have displayed a keen desire to expand their growing interactions with Israel, smoothing the way for the success of Israel’s East-looking drive.
This study examines Chinese outbound tourists' motivations of visiting Israel, as a highly volatile destination. Employing means-end theory and its associated laddering technique, the study identified 6 means-end patterns (including 14 dominant means-end chains) to illustrate tourists' motivations at three levels of attributes, consequences, and values. Prominent destination attributes that motivated Chinese tourists to visit Israel include the local people (Jews), local culture, history, well-known places, religions, and geographical location, which converge on three end values of life enrichment, self-esteem and achievement. The study contributes to the motivation literature by clarifying Chinese tourist motivations of visiting a highly volatile destination in a means-end value chain structure. Destination marketing implications are provided based on the findings.
Sceptics query China's economic and political ability to realize its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Less attention has been paid to BRI's implications for one of the defining features of China's foreign policy: low engagement in areas beyond its traditional sphere of influence. The Middle East is such a case. Addressing this issue, the article explores the mutual impact of China's low political involvement in the Middle East and BRI's realization. Distinguishing cross-border connectivity projects from other BRI-associated activities, the article examines the challenges to executing BRI-related projects in Israel. It finds that realizing connectivity projects – the essence of the BRI vision – will require China to increase its regional engagement, a shift that it has so far avoided.
Israel faces the classical question of the “trade versus security” dilemma in conducting security relations with China. In the context of such a dilemma, the article provides a new lens to understand the historical development of Sino-Israeli security relations by analyzing certain aspects of Sino-Israeli security relations, namely the trade-off between security and trade concerns, the intertwinement of domestic politics and alliance politics. The historical development of Sino-Israeli security relations verifies the determining role of the US in such a game of three players. Although under US pressure, Israel severed all military transfers to China, the general business relations with China holds a promising future.
This book explores the politics of military procurement in China under the successive leaderships of Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao. It shows how China’s political and military leaders have sought to adjust military procurement policy to meet China's strategic objectives, to relate it to non-military needs, to strike a balance between the import of weapons and indigenous production, and to determine the connections between hardware and other components of military power. Exploring in detail five major shifts in the nation’s military procurement, it traces the considerations and negotiations among China's civilian and military leaderships. By doing so, it offers both a conceptual framework and empirical grounds for evaluating the factors that shape China's military procurement directions, as well as their limitations, prospects, and operational implications.
Criticism of Israeli military-technology transfers to China is largely unfounded. The sales actually enjoyed tacit American support when they started in the 1970s (to Taiwan) and 1980s (to China). Washington's recent accusations of illegal transfers of US technologies reflect changed political considerations more than actual facts. Military sales to China have helped mitigate the economic crisis facing Israel's defence-industrial complex, have promoted political and strategic relations between Israel and China, and have had only a limited impact on the Asian balance of power. Israel's arms-export control mechanisms, moreover, have been tightened considerably in recent years, while military transfers to China and Taiwan have drastically declined.
More than 60 years' Sino-Israeli relations experience twists and turns. Republic of China government has helped the Jews and in deed supported the establishment of Jewish state. One year after the founding of State of Israel, the People's Republic of China was established, Israel turned to the new regime, but the Korean War and the Bandung Conference made the relationship between Israel and China become cool and eventually break. The ease of Sino-US relations, Israel-Egypt peace talks and Sino-Vietnam border war provide the opportunity for the development of Sino-Israeli relations again, and Hong Kong became the bridgehead of dual military, economic and political cooperation; the two countries established diplomatic relations in 1992 eventually. Due to the repeated Israel-Arab relations, the American pressure on Israeli arms exports to China and China's internal ethnic separatism, China swifts between Israel and Islam-Arab countries with limited success in the involvement in Middle East peace process. In the current global financial crisis, the international community recognizes the important position of China, Israel needs new China policy which fits the era of international system transformation. ① Dr. Aron SHAI is the Rector of Tel Aviv University and the Shoul N. Eisenberg Professor for East Asian Affairs.
The relations between the Republic of China (ROC), the Zionist founding founders, and the state of Israel can be broken down into five distinct phases: (1) Active support for Zionism from the Balfour December 1917 to August 1945; (2) From September 1945 to the signing of the first Israeli–Arab armistice on Rhodes in February 1949, the ROC abstained on the UN votes leading to Israel's creation and its admission into the world organization; (3) Between February 1949 and September 1950, the ROC recognized Israel, authorized the establishment of an Israeli consulate, and voted for Israeli UN membership. Nevertheless on 1 September 1950 Israel chose to recognize the ROC's rival, the People's Republic of China (PRC); (4) From October 1950 to late January 1992, Israel was diplomatically isolated from both Chinas, though it engaged in an occasional flurry of arms sales to both countries; and (5) On 24 January 1992 the PRC established full diplomatic relations with Israel and Israel has come to enjoy regularized interactions with the ROC.
This book analyzes the development of the Israeli economy in its historical context. It shows how the ideology of the dominant group in the Zionist movement led to the development of agriculture, thus meeting the preconditions for successful industrialization. Remarkable, if uneven, growth has taken place, with increasing allocations for defense. Regional isolation led to the emphasis on high-quality exports for developed markets that has stimulated the technological base. Israel has benefited from mass immigration and increased access to foreign capital, factors that have transformed the economy. The book includes chapters on the development of the Jewish community in Palestine during the British Mandate; macroeconomic developments and economic policy; globalization and high technology; defense; the economics of the Arab minority; Israeli settlements and relations with the Palestinians; and the role of religion. It concludes with an examination of the socioeconomic divisions that have widened as the economy has grown.
In the last decade, few countries have figured prominently as cases of late-late developers that achieved worldwide success with their Information Technology (IT) industries. This paper focuses on the Israeli case and argues that uniquely in that group, and in contradiction to the model proposed by late development theories, Israel's competitive advantage in the IT industries, is in Research and Development (R&D). The paper's main arguments are that (a) the declared aim of Israel's industrial policy has been to develop a "science-based" industrial system similar to what we see in Israel today; (b) however, these policies, focused on diffusion and not on creation of capabilities, were successful only because of the existence of an already sophisticated and extensive R&D capability in the universities – markedly different from other Newly Industrialized Countries. Looking at the present the paper concludes that the same operational model that led Israel's IT industry to success might now be undermining its future growth.
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