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Abstract
In recent years, Islamophobia has become a useful tool for right-wing parties to mobilize electors in many European nation-states. The general xenophobic campaigns of the 1980s have given way to Islamophobia as a specific expression of racism. It is not only the new incarnations of right-wing populist parties that are making use of Islamophobic populism, but also right-wing extremist parties, whose traditions hark back to fascist or Nazi parties. This development appears unsurprising, as Islamophobia has somehow become a kind of ‘accepted racism’, found not only on the margins of European societies but also at the centre. Another interesting concomitant shift is the attempt by such parties to gain wider acceptance in mainstream societies by distancing themselves from a former antisemitic profile. While the main focus on an exclusive identity politics in the frame of nation-states previously divided the far right and complicated transnational cooperation, a shared Islamophobia has the potential to be a common ground for strengthening the transnational links of right-wing parties. This shift from antisemitism to Islamophobia goes beyond European borders and enables Europe's far right to connect to Israeli parties and the far right in the United States. Hafez's article explores this thesis by analysing the European Alliance for Freedom, a pan-European alliance of far-right members of the European parliament that has brought various formerly antagonistic parties together through a common anti-Muslim programme, and is trying to become a formal European parliamentary fraction in the wake of its victory in the European elections in May 2014.
... To date, some of the main issues regarding Islamophobia concern its lack of visibility, the denial of its existence, and the denial that it constitutes a "type of racism". This is not a minor issue, as reducing Islamophobia to a non-racist form of discrimination diminishes the significance of its existence, thus enabling others to perceive it as being a "tolerable" form of discrimination (Hafez 2014). Additionally, as indicated by Modood (2018), if Islamophobia is not considered a type of racism, it removes legitimacy from Muslim involvement with anti-racist equality initiatives, as it is argued that they are "not a racial group". ...
... In terms of the most recurrent themes and topics found in the publications posted by the party, our findings coincide with the findings of specialist studies on the subject (Hafez 2014;Rydgren 2017;Kallis 2018;Casals 2019;Mudde 2019;Wodak 2021); no major differences can be identified with respect to other European contexts and/or countries, although there are some specificities that we will assess. In the abovementioned case study, Vox's narratives exhibit a reductive understanding of Islam and/or Muslims, portraying them as a threat, in terms of security (40.7% of the units of meaning in the sample were of this type) and in terms of culture (32.4%). ...
... This is based on monitoring engagement levels. This has enabled us to see how-in the case study conducted-these publications have prompted such significant polarization, and that in the publications that replicated the racist and Islamophobic formula, there were also strategies of denial of racism in general, and more specifically Islamophobia, trying to normalize it as part of "common sense", and therefore as something acceptable (Hafez 2014). This makes us consider the concerning radicalization of the Islamophobic racist discourse on social networks, based on the case study undertaken, as a reality that may be the prelude to the normalization of racism (Wodak 2021) and Islamophobia in the context examined. ...
This paper analyzes the discourse concerning Islam and Muslims by assessing the extreme right-wing party, Vox, on Twitter. In addition, this paper examines the incidence (impact and reactions) of this party on the users of this social network. The objectives of this study are as follows: to identify themes and topics concerning this discourse; to analyze how the discourse is articulated and represented; and to understand the impact of this discourse by measuring the engagement of the most viral publications. To do so, we observed the publications posted by the party via its official account throughout 2022. The research methodology was based on qualitative and quantitative content analysis, and the publications themselves were monitored to ascertain the level of engagement. The results of this study clearly show that Vox created Islamophobic narratives; thus, Islam and Muslims are explicit targets of Vox’s hate speech. Their rhetoric referred to security threats and threats to national identity, with the recurrent use of the idea that there is a “danger of Islamization” in Spain. The party uses disinformation and hoaxes, and users respond in a polarized way. The results of this study alert us to the worrying levels of radicalization and the normalization of Islamophobic racist discourse in the examined context.
... These types of events that draw attention to the Muslim population have acted as a trigger for intolerance toward this community, unleashing Islamophobic attacks and misinformation campaigns. In fact, there are numerous studies that showed a predominance of negative frames of Islam, frequently representing Muslims (both natives and immigrants from North Africa and the Middle East) as a threat to security (identifying them as terrorists, criminals, thieves, and/or rapists), an economic burden, or a symbolic threat to the cultural and religious identity of Western countries (such as Spain) (e.g., Amores et al. , 2020Greenwood and Thomson 2020;Hafez 2014;Kallis 2018;Lenette and Cleland 2016;Valdez-Apolo et al. 2019;Wodak 2021). One of the discursive strategies most used by media and politicians who spread Islamophobic discourses, often replicated by users on social media such as Twitter, is to associate the Muslim community with immigration, more specifically with illegal immigration. ...
... Regarding the characteristics of the most negative topics found, they seemed to contain messages of rejection of the Muslim community, especially for two main reasons, identifying it as a realistic threat to the public and individual security of Spanish citizens (frequently representing Muslims as terrorists, criminals, murderers, rapists, or thieves), and as a symbolic threat to the cultural and religious identity of Spain and Western Europe, by extension. These are the same negative frames that had already been previously defined and identified in the way immigrants are generally represented in news media and social media (e.g., Amores and Arcila-Calderón 2019; Greenwood and Thomson 2020;Hafez 2014;Kallis 2018;Wodak 2021). In short, on the basis of these supposed threats, messages of support for conservative political parties and demands for anti-immigration measures also formed part of these more negative topics. ...
Social media, especially Twitter, has become a platform where hate, toxic, intolerant, and discriminatory speech is increasingly spread. These messages are aimed at different vulnerable social groups, due to some of their differentiating characteristics with respect to the dominant one, whether they are phenotypic, religious, cultural, gender, sexual, etc. Of all these minorities, one of the most affected is the Muslim community, especially since the beginning of the Mediterranean refugee crisis, during which migration from the Middle East and North Africa increased considerably. Spain does not escape this reality as, given its proximity to Morocco, it is one of the main destinations for migrants from North Africa. In this context, there are already several studies focused on specifically investigating Islamophobic speech disseminated on social platforms, normally focused on specific cases. However, there are still no studies focused on analyzing the entire conversation around Islam and the Muslim community that takes place on Twitter and in a southern European country such as Spain, aiming to identify the latent sentiments and the main underlying topics and their characteristics, which would help to relativize and dimension the relevance of Islamophobic messages, as well as to analyze them from a more solid base. The main objective of the present study is to identify the most frequent words, the main underlying topics, and the latent sentiments that predominate in the general conversation about Islam and the Muslim community on Twitter in Spain and in Spanish during the last 8 years. To do this, 190,320 messages that included keywords related to Muslim culture and religion were collected and analyzed using computational techniques. The findings show that the most frequent words in these messages were mostly descriptive and not derogatory, and the predominant latent topics were mostly neutral and informative, although two of them could be considered reliable indicators of Islamophobic rejection. Similarly, while the overall average sentiment in this conversation trended negatively, neutral and positive messages were more prevalent. However, in the negative messages, the sentiment was considerably more pronounced.
... B. in Estland, Slowenien, und der Slowakei) bis hin zur alleinigen Regierungsverantwortung (z. B. Polen und Ungarn) reicht -legt nahe, dass sich die Instrumentalisierung antimuslimischer Ressentiments europaweit zu einer Dividende bringenden politischen Ressource entwickelt hat (Betz 2016;Hafez 2014;Kallis 2018;Öztürk und Pickel 2019;Pickel und Yendell 2018;Zúquete 2008 Als rechtspopulistisch behandeln wir Parteien, die die "dünne Ideologie" des Populismus mit einer nativistischen und völkischen "Wirtsideologie" kombinieren. Kern ihrer populistischen Ausrichtung ist die Vorstellung, dass die Gesellschaft in zwei antagonistische Gruppen -das "Volk" und "korrupte Eliten" -gespalten ist und dass die Zielsetzungen der Politik, dem volonté générale folgen sollten (Mudde und Rovira Kaltwasser 2017, S. 5). ...
... Hinzu kommen wiederkehrende Debatten um eine misslungene Integration von Europas Muslim*innen, die pauschalisierend als intolerant, dogmatisch, homophob, misogyn oder antisemitisch und somit als kulturelle Bedrohung dargestellt werden (Benz 2017;Brubaker 2017;Kallis 2018;Said 1978). Auch weil es für diese regressiven Tendenzen in bestimmten Milieus muslimischer Communities durchaus reale Anhaltspunkte gibt (Koopmans 2015;Röder 2018;Röder und Mühlau 2014), sind diese pauschalisierenden -zum Teil rassistisch konnotierten -Sprechweisen über Muslim*innen gesellschaftlich wenig tabuisiert (Hafez 2014). ...
Dieser Beitrag liefert eine vergleichende Analyse der jüngsten Welle der European Values Study und beleuchtet den Zusammenhang von antimuslimischen Ressentiments und der Unterstützung für rechtspopulistische Parteien. Hierbei zeigt sich, dass (a) ablehnende Haltungen gegenüber Muslim*innen eine Identifikation mit rechtspopulistischen Parteien begünstigen, (b) dass sich dieser Individualzusammenhang zu einem paneuropäischen Phänomen entwickelt hat, welcher losgelöst von der An- oder Abwesenheit von Muslim*innen operieren kann und (c), dass die Prävalenz eines antimuslimischen Gesellschaftsklimas den machtpolitischen Aufstieg rechtspopulistischer Parteien begünstigt hat. Da das „Feindbild Islam“ besonders gut in Gesellschaften gedeihen kann, in denen kaum Muslim*innen leben, konnten Osteuropas Rechtspopulist*innen sogar paradoxerweise von der Abwesenheit von Muslim*innen profitieren. Getragen von einem nationalistischen Grundkonsens in der Gesellschaft sind Rechtspopulist*innen in Osteuropa in Machtpositionen gelangt und verstehen es geschickt die Elitenschelte auf die Europäische Union und internationale Akteure umzulenken. Gepflegt wird das Zerrbild einer internationalen Elite, die die Einwanderung von Muslim*innen orchestriert und vorantreibt und gegen die das Volk durch die rechtspopulistischen Regierungen geschützt werden muss. Muslim*innenfeindschaft entfaltet somit mehr und mehr ein antidemokratisches Potenzial und begünstigt die Abwendung von der liberalen Demokratie.
... "The secret Islamization of the West." Structure, consequences, and the social, political, and psychological mechanisms of Islamophobia in Germany Introduction Islamophobia has become a major social issue both in Europe and in the United States (Bleich, 2011;Hafez, 2014;Helbling, 2012;Strabac & Listhaug, 2008). Through different research vehicles and global polling studies, Gallup has collected a great deal of data detailing public opinion about various aspects of respect, treatment, and tolerance with respect to Muslims worldwide. ...
... Islamophobic attitudes and statements have emerged as a strategy for right-wing populist parties and movements to gain popularity among the population throughout Europe (de Nève, 2013;Goodwin, Cutts, & Janta-Lipinski, 2014;Hafez, 2014;Freedomhouse, 2016 Therefore, in this paper, I take the proposed Islamophobia construct and analyze the effects of it on out-group discrimination on the micro and meso levels. Out-group discrimination (see Table 2) is defined as the endorsement of institutional out-group discrimination (e.g., Muslims who do not integrate themselves should be expelled from Germany) as propagated by rightwing political parties in several European countries. ...
Islamophobia has become a major social issue both in Europe and in the United States (Bleich, 2011; Hafez, 2014; Helbling, 2012; Strabac & Listhaug, 2008). Through different research vehicles and global polling studies, Gallup has collected a great deal of data detailing public opinion about various aspects of respect, treatment, and tolerance with respect to Muslims worldwide. The data show that Islamophobia has increased in frequency and prevalence during the past decade (Gallup World, 2013). Germany is no exception in this regard (Decker, Kiess & Brähler, 2016). Accordingly, hostile and violent actions against Muslims and Islamic facilities have increased in several European countries (Brauns, 2012; The Guardian, 2016). Nevertheless, systematic empirical studies addressing Islamophobia in Germany are scarcely found (de Nève, 2013). Yet the empirical analysis of Islamophobia is crucial for practical and theoretical purposes. In-depth knowledge of the extent, forms, and possible causes of Islamophobia is essential for developing countermeasures to mitigate the negative consequences.
The overall aim of my PhD study is to contribute to ongoing academic discussions surrounding the topic of Islamophobia from social and political psychology perspectives. As a whole, the research project aims at systematically analyzing the structure, consequences, and some social, political, and psychological mechanisms of Islamophobia in Germany. Broadly speaking, my research addresses overarching questions such as: What is Islamophobia? What are the social, political, and psychological underpinnings that best explain it? And why care about it? Several key issues, including the definition, dimensionality, measurement, operationalization, contributing factors, consequences, and comparability of Islamophobia, are addressed in the four individual papers.
... Recent work on political parties and political geography supports the theory of local change framed as a greater threat leading to increased RRP support. Hafez (2014) and Hafez and Heinisch (2018) find that RRPs have recently sought more mainstream support across Europe by relying on an "anti-Muslim" political agenda. Specifically, they argue that a shared support for Islamaphobic policies has connected disparate RRPs across Europe. ...
European political parties, particularly radical right parties (RRPs), increasingly use religious symbols during elections. Despite the prevalence of these symbols, evidence on the association between religion and far-right vote share is mixed. We compare two leading arguments explaining the relationship between religion and RRPs. We hypothesize that the number of religious buildings, identifiable as Islamic or Catholic, will be associated with higher RRP support. We test this as a most likely crucial case using results from the French 2017 presidential election. Controlling for other demographic factors, more Catholic buildings in a commune are associated with a decrease in votes for the Front Nationale ( FN ). An increase in the number of mosques in non-urban communes is associated with increased support for FN . We argue these findings are evidence that RRPs use religious symbolism to draw on nativist or anti-Islamic support rather than traditional religious support.
... According to Kováts (2018), the feminist faction that disparages "gender ideology" feeds into the success of the populist radical right, by appealing to its conservative values on gender-related matters. Gender is also instrumentalised by the populist radical right to mainstream themselves (Spierings 2020), by creating a form of "accepted racism (Hafez 2014), as evidenced in the case of femonationalism, i.e. the use of Western values-like women's freedoms and rights -to legitimise Islamophobic stances (Mudde 2019;Walia 2021). Femonationalism grew stronger in Europe after events that catalysed fear of Muslims, such as the sadly numerous terror attacks between 2015-2017 in Belgium, France, and the United Kingdom; the harassment of a group of women in 2015 in Germany (Havertz 2021); and the increase in the number of immigrants disembarking on Italian shores in recent years (Walia 2021). ...
2022 was a momentous year for female leaders in the populist radical right: in the Italian general elections, Giorgia Meloni at the helm of Fratelli d’Italia (FdI), and in the French presidential elections Marine Le Pen at the helm of Rassemblement National (RN) scored meaningful electoral results, despite different outcomes. This paper investigates the ways in which female populist radical right party leaders present themselves as female leaders as well as they frame gender-related questions. Theoretically, we innovatively rework the existing concepts of hegemonic femininity and of ‘strongmen’ to create the concept of ‘strongwomen’. Methodologically, we use qualitative discourse analysis of the TikTok and Twitter accounts of the two female leaders.
... Related to immigration is social policy, whose central demand is to address "welfare abuse" and to regulate labour market mobility for the benefit of "one's own people" (Bale 2008). Schumacher and Van Kersbergen (2016) point out that such demands have a "back to the nation-state" function that is also central to identity, cultural, and religious politics (Hafez 2014). ...
... In the year 1999, the Council of Europe called on its member states to participate in the "Europe, a Common Heritage" campaign to raise public awareness of the value of European heritage [39]. The German Society for Industrial Culture proposed a pan-European network concept to support the campaign, which the State of North Rhine-Westphalia accepted [40]. The ERIH received EU funds from the EU Interreg II C Northwest Europe Program [41]. ...
Industrial heritage serves as a poignant testament to the historical narrative of industrial civilization. The European Route of Industrial Heritage (ERIH) is a pan-European network that connects industrial sites and museums to enhance public awareness of the significance of the industrial heritage sector and to promote sustainable development practices in urban areas through collaboration and cooperation between these sites. The ERIH is crucial in promoting economic, cultural, and social values associated with industrial heritage and creating opportunities for tourism and education in Europe. Taking the ERIH as the research object, the nearest-neighbor index, kernel density, geographic detector, and other methods are used in this study to explore the spatial distribution characteristics and influencing factors of European industrial heritage. The results of this study have implications for urban and regional planning endeavors aimed at advancing sustainable urban development. Furthermore, they contribute to cultivating a sense of place and identity by identifying and preserving industrial heritage institutions while fostering social cohesion and community identity practices. The results show that (1) the spatial distribution of European industrial heritage presents a cohesive distribution, and the spatial distribution is uneven; (2) the spatial distribution of European industrial heritage forms “dual cores, dual centers, one belt, three zones and multiple scattered points”—the center of gravity shows a trend of “first north and then east” and the north–south movement is relatively small; and (3) a combination of natural and social factors shape the spatial distribution of industrial heritage. Natural conditions, such as altitude, topography, and hydrological characteristics, influence the distribution patterns of industrial heritage sites. Meanwhile, human factors, including infrastructure level, cultural tourism potential, and social development, play a pivotal role in determining spatial distribution patterns. Among these factors, the socio-economic level exhibits the strongest influence, with an explanatory power of 0.763. The results of this study can contribute to the conservation and tourism practices regarding industrial heritage sites, thus promoting sustainable urban development practices.
... This does not, however, mean that all non-Swedes are seen as outgroups by the Swedish far right. In fact, transnational far-right networks have been found to unite in their common hostility towards the supposed threat of Islam (Bangstad, 2022;Hafez, 2014). ...
This paper analyses how immigrants are understood by Swedish alternative media and the role that Islamophobia plays, if at all, in these representations. What is remarkable is that although all articles were sampled explicitly to discuss Ukraine, the analysis showed that Muslim immigrants figured with unexpected frequency throughout. The value of these two immigrant groups were antagonistically contrasted through arguments of alleged differences in culture and geographical origin, perceived legitimacy as asylum seekers, and in terms gratitude and supposed level of threat to Swedish society. With this, the unity that is formed around Islamophobia trumps any nationalist views of the Swedish nation state as particularly superior or white and the social and economic consequences which are usually believed to be at risk due to immigration. By extension, the war in Ukraine is articulated as a matter of whiteness and works to exploit war for strengthening the transnational far right.
... The expression of Islamophobic tropes is not in itself anything new. In fact, the use of these by the US far right identified in the sample largely echoes the tropes which have been identified within and across national settings in Europe (Hafez, 2014;Horsti, 2017;Merrill & Åkerlund, 2018;Sakki & Pettersson, 2016). Even though the US has a unique composition of, and history in relation to, immigrants, and ethnic, and religious minorities, not the least compared to a European country like Swedenfor instance comparably fewer asylum seekers from Muslim countries, and around one eight the number of Muslim residents as Sweden (Budiman, 2020;Finnsiö, 2019;Mohamed, 2021;Statistics Sweden, 2022)this is not evident in how Muslims are portrayed by the US far right. ...
This paper analyses how Sweden has come to be imagined and represented on the websites of US far right organisations since the start of the so-called ‘migration crisis’ of 2015. It focused specifically on when Sweden is discussed by the US far right and in relation to what events, and what values and associations are attributed to Sweden. The analysis showed that news events were not reported on by US far-right organisations as they took place in Sweden but instead appropriated and accentuated when they could be used to make certain points directed at the audiences of these organisations. Furthermore, the findings showed that the texts tended to focus on scaremongering about Muslim immigrants and Islam in ways that highly resembled those of the European far right. The paper discusses how such framing helps the international far right form a coherent narrative and all-applicable template for the problems of Muslims facing the Western world. Finally, the analysis showed how Sweden is positioned in a complex juxtaposition: as something both good and bad; superior while also inferior; a great nationalist role model but also a warning example, and how Swedish whiteness plays a central role in these depictions.
... Such narration drove the emergence of right-wing populisms with their negative stereotypical campaigns and proposed policies such as banning Muslims immigration and the construction of Mosque (Schmuck, Matthes, & Paul, 2017). This is apparent through right-wing political parties in Europe (Betz, 2013;Hafez, 2014), UK and Australia (Hogan & Haltinner, 2015) and in the US (Schmuck et al., 2017). ...
Reports show most religious groups in the United States, especially Christian evangelicals, are showing more affiliation to the Republican political party. Nonetheless, members of the Democratic political party are also weaving faith into their rhetoric. A citizen’s affiliation with a political party can change over time, and political affiliation might influence behavior. This study compares and contrasts individuals affiliated with political parties and those who are not on their: (1) decision-making process purchasing everyday products, (2) relationship with God, (3) and ethical and sustainable behaviors. Using Pew Research data (n=3,278), this study compares and contrasts individuals affiliated with political parties and those who are not on their decision-making process in purchasing everyday products, relationship with God, and ethical and sustainable behaviors. Despite significant differences between political parties, most of them have thanked God for something and almost half of them have asked God for help and guidance. The results show people in the U.S. with various party affiliations are somewhat religious and spiritual. The notion that only Republicans will be guided by religious beliefs is misguided. Almost half of Democrats in this study show strong religious values. The paper makes several contributions to this area of study. First, similarities and differences between individuals affiliated with political parties are determined. Second, myths about stigma toward a particular political party are debunked, and finally, insights for religious and political leaders on their followers’ behavior are provided.
... In this, they closely reflect the famous clash of civilizations thesis of Samuel Huntington" (Ryan 2022, p. 212). One of the most important political leaders, who in a long term fundamentally changed the strategy of Europe's far-right political parties (Hafez 2014), was the far-right Dutch politician Pym Fortuyn, who had repeatedly referred to himself as the "Huntington of Dutch politics" (Ryan 2022, p. 211). For Ryan, Christianism is "an identitarian movement that considers Christianity as a civilizational marker of a pure people counterposed against an outside threat (most particularly Islam)" (Ryan 2022, p. 211). ...
This article begins with a discussion of the notion of ‘Islam’ as used in the post-9/11 era. Rather than assuming that there is one specific notion of religion, the author problematizes the relationship between religion and politics in the aftermath of 9/11. From the perspectives of Islamophobia studies and international relations studies, the article looks specifically at how Islam was given an agency of its own, which also created a fertile ground for reframing the religion of Islam as being not a religion, but a political ideology, thus operating, unlike other religions, primarily in the field of politics. The article discusses the theory of the clash of civilizations as presented by political scientist Samuel P. Huntington against the backdrop of succeeding policies, such as the proclamations of the War on Terror by President George Bush related to the ideological void that was left after the fall of the Soviet Union, which ultimately marked the entrance into a new era in the making of global politics. The author argues that the increasing debates about Islam following the violent attacks on 9/11 led to a religionizing of political events that subsequently dereligionized religion and depoliticized the notion of politics.
... They refer to the heritage of the intellectual concept of the Abendland to make exclusionary constructions of Europe as an ethno-culturally defined, geographically fixed space prevail over cosmopolitan concepts of Europe as a political union and form of citizenship. As such, they share important ideational similarities with far-right actors in other European countries and organisational contexts, who have also integrated pro-European stances into their typically exclusivist and sovereignist ideologies (Brubaker, 2017;Caiani and Weisskircher, 2021;Hafez, 2014;Lorimer, 2021;Nissen, 2020). ...
Against the backdrop of multiple European crises and the end of the ‘liberal consensus’ on European integration, this article explores the increasing politicisation of ‘Europe’ by the populist far right. As a case study, it focuses on how key far-right actors in Germany deploy a term from the country’s intellectual history, namely the notion of the Abendland (‘Occident’), to construct ‘Europe’ and ‘European civilisation’ according to an exclusionary and populist political agenda. Drawing from the toolboxes of conceptual history and ethnography, the interpretive analysis traces the long-term semiotic shifts of the concepts of Abendland and ‘Europe’ in the context of post-war democratisation, European integration and social liberalisation. Applying a rhetorical lens to original empirical material, the article explains how contemporary far-right players strategically ‘redescribe’ the Abendland to mobilise it in the struggle over the meaning of ‘Europe’.
... Im Gegensatz zum kruden, offen kommunizierten Rassismus der neuen Rechten in den 1960er und 1970er Jahren ist es gegenwärtig möglich, mit antimuslimischen Ressentiments nicht nur den "lunatic fringe", sondern den gesellschaftlichen Mainstream anzusprechen (Kallis 2018: 58-60). Einige Autoren gehen deshalb soweit, die Feindseligkeit gegenüber Muslim*innen als eine "akzeptierte" Form des Rassismus zu bezeichnen (Hafez 2014 Adorno et al. 1950, Allport 1971. ...
The presence of Islam in Europe is accompanied by contradictory dynamics. While on the one hand institutions are gradually accommodating Muslim demands and vice versa, on the other hand tendencies of Islamist and anti-Muslim radicalisation are reinforcing each other. In addition to analyses of institutionalisation processes that entail modes of a new normality, this volume offers contributions on political Islam, anti-Muslim policies as well as on social negotiations on conflict and integration. Finally, scholarly and literary reflections are examined with regard to their normative underpinnings. The volume brings together contributions from sociologists, Islamic scholars and literary scholars. With contributions by Asligüel Aysel, Sana Chavoshian, Aletta Diefenbach, Lena Dreier, Johannes Ebner, Özkan Ezli, Anja Frank, Lisa Harms, Jörg Hüttermann, Sarah Kaboğan, Ines Michalowski, Olaf Müller, Cemal Öztürk, Gert Pickel, Detlef Pollack, Anna Felicitas Scholz, Reinhard Schulze, Mustafa Şen, Levent Tezcan and Monika Wohlrab-Sahr.
... Strengthening aversion to Islam not only allows for mobilization, but also encourages transcending national particularisms, cooperation between parties and, especially, extreme rightwing movements. Moreover, in the case of many extreme right-wing parties, Islamophobic slogans were part of a de-diabolization strategy, enabling them to throw off the stigmatizing odium of anti-Semitism (Ekman, 2015;Hafez, 2014). Islamophobia, understood as multidimensional prejudice and aversion to Islam and Muslim people, has many features in common with populism. ...
Populism as a socio-political phenomenon can be studied from many perspectives.
Taking a political communication perspective, we can define populism as “a set of
characteristics or elements of messages that have their roots in, or at least relate
to, the aims, motivations and attitudes of political actors, the media or citizens”
(Reinemann et al., 2017, p. 14). In this sense, populism is a discourse practice
(Laclau, 2005), communication style (de Vreese et al., 2018), or “a communication
frame that appeals to and identifies with the people and pretends to speak in their
name” (Jagers and Walgrave, 2007, p. 322), and in particular “a communication
framework which includes references to the people, identification with the people
and aspirations to speak for the people” (Jagers and Walgrave, 2007, p. 322). A similar definition is proposed by M. Rooduijn (2014, p. 3), according to whom populism
is “a characteristic of a specific message rather than a characteristic of an actor sending the message.”
... 11 Eylül saldırılarının artından yükselişe geçen İslamofobi, 2008 Ekonomik Krizi, DAEŞ'in ortaya çıkması ve meydana gelen Paris, Londra ve Brüksel saldırıları gibi terör olayları, Kuzey Afrika ve Orta Doğu ülkelerinde yaşanan iç savaşların ardından Avrupa ülkelerine yönelik gerçekleşen mülteci akını ile birlikte aşırı sağ söylemlerin İslamofobik ideolojiyi yaymalarına olanak tanımıştır. Bu bağlamda aşırı sağ aktörler İslamofobiyi seçmenleri hareket geçirmek için kullanışlı bir araç hâline getirmektedir (Hafez, 2014). Nitekim AB tarafından üye ülkelerin vatandaşlarının endişelerinin yer aldığı Eurobarometre anketinin verileri incelendiğinde AB vatandaşlarının en çok endişe duyduğu alanların başında 2014 yılına kadar ekonomi, işsizlik, kamu finansmanları gibi konular gelirken bu tarihten itibarense göç ve terör konuları AB vatandaşlarının ana endişelerinin listesinde üst sıralarda yer almaktadır (Standard Eurobarometer 92. ...
Bu çalışmada çevrim içi nefretin en çok görüldüğü alanların başında gelen İslamofobik nefret söyleminin, uzun bir süredir dijital dünyadaki mizahı domine etmekte olan, Türkiye’de yaygın adıyla ‘caps’ olarak kullanılan ‘internet mem’leri aracılığıyla hangi türlerde gerçekleştiği ve Müslümanların, İslamofobik memlerdeki temsili ele alınmıştır. Nitel bir araştırma yöntemi olan tematik analiz yöntemiyle İslamofobik memler, tema ve alt temalara ayırılmış ve memler üzerinden İslamofobik nefret söyleminin çevrim içi mecradaki temsilinin doğası keşfedilmeye çalışılmıştır. İslamofobik içeriklerden oluşturulan veri setinden elde edilen çıktılara göre öncelikle ofansif metin ve zararsız görsel içeren memler, zararsız metin ve ofansif görsel içeren memler ve hem ofansif metin hem de ofansif görsel içeren memler olmak üzere içeriklerin bir kategorisi oluşturulmuş ve veri setindeki memlerin kodlanmasının ardından ortaya ‘Şiddet’, Cinsiyetçilik’, ‘Tek Tipleştirme’ ve ’İnsan dışılaştırma’dan oluşan ana temalar çıkartılmıştır. Medya ve aşırı sağ tarafından ‘Terör’ ve ‘Şiddet’ üzerinden Müslümanlara kalıp yargılar biçilmesi yeni bir olgu değildir. Ancak ofansif ve kara mizah ögeleri barındıran memlerin, Müslümanları insan dışılaştıran yaklaşımları İslamofobinin boyutunun herhangi bir nefret dolu davranışı engelleme mekanizmasının olmadığı bir ortamda nerelere varabileceğini göstermektedir.
... Besides anti-immigration, such religiously inflected divisions underpin other common policy positions such as objecting to Turkey's accession to the EU and endorsement for Israel in the Middle East, both of which are understood as halting Islamic expansion and influence (Hafez 2014). The latter policy is linked to these parties' apparent move away from their resolutely antisemitic roots to philosemitism, where Jews are now figured as part of the European civilization-characterized interchangeably as a Christian or Judeo-Christian one-inasmuch as they too are fellow victims of Islam. ...
Why and in what ways do far-right discourses engage with religion in geographies where religious belief, practice, and public influence are particularly low? This article examines religion’s salience in the rhetoric of leading right-wing populist parties in eight European countries: the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Switzerland, Austria, Sweden, Denmark, and Norway. Based on a qualitative content analysis of various documents such as party programmes, websites, election manifestos, reports, and speeches of their leadership, the article offers insight into the functions that Christianist discourses serve for anti-immigration stances. The findings are threefold: first, they confirm previous research suggesting that while these parties embrace Christianity as a national/civilizational heritage and identity, they are also careful to avoid references to actual belief or practice. Second, the data suggests, their secularized take on Christianity rests not simply on the omission of theological content, but also on the active framing Christianity itself as an inherently secular and progressive religion conducive to democracy. Third, and finally, they starkly contrast this notion of Christianity with Islam, believed to be incompatible due to its alleged backward and violent qualities. Emphasizing religio-cultural hierarchies—rather than ethno-racial ones—plays an indispensable role in presenting a more palatable form of boundary-making against immigrants, and helps these parties mainstream by giving their nativist cause a liberal and enlightened aura. Preliminary comparisons with traditional conservative parties, moreover, reveal that while some of the latter partially embraced a similar nativism, variations remain across countries.
... Islamophobia exists across the political spectrum, but this form of racism has been all the rage for the far right (Bakali, 2019;Hafez, 2014;Kallis, 2018;). There is no scholarly consensus on what the far right is, so it is useful to broadly define it as all of those individuals, groups, movements, parties, and governments that support an extreme form of nationalism, often accompanied by a critique of democracy, equality and pluralism, a rejection of the 'other', defined in varying ways, and advocacy for radical modes of action, including the justification or use of violence as a way of transforming the prevailing social order. ...
Background: To contribute to research on the transnational far right, Islamophobia, and social media platforms, this article interrogates the far right’s practice of using Twitter to produce and circulate a #removekebab hashtag.
Analysis: The accounts behind the words and images of 100 #removekebab tweets are analyzed to show how they communicate the transnational far right’s hateful Islamophobic discourse.
Conclusion and implications: The far right’s #removekebab tweets dehumanize Muslims, tacitly call for genocide against Muslims, and rationalize this violence by stereotyping Muslims as a collective threat to the West.
... Related to immigration and integration policies are social policies where the central claim is about taking action against 'welfare abuse' and regulating labour market mobility for the benefit of one's 'own people' (Bale, 2010). Schumacher and van Kersbergen (2014) suggest that such claims serve a 'back to the nation-state' function which is also central to the politics of identity, culture and religion (Hafez, 2014). Analytically, we would therefore expect to find both the centre right and far right to emphasize identity politics equally strongly and present the 'risk of Islam' as a serious threat to national sovereignty. ...
... Drittens bietet das gemeinsame Feindbild des Islam rechtspopulistischen Parteien die Möglichkeit zur europäischen Vernetzung über ethno-nationalistische Grenzen hinweg (Zúquete 2008: 332). Dies betrifft sowohl eine ideologische Europäisierung der Rechten, die den Schutz Europas vor der ›Islamisierung‹ ins Zentrum ihrer Agitation stellt, als auch die Bildung politischer Bündnisse auf Parteiebene und Koordinierungsstrukturen, etwa im europäischen Parlament (Hafez 2014). Viertens ermöglichte die Besetzung der ›Islam-Themen‹ im Kontext gesellschaftlich weit verbreiteter antimuslimischer Tendenzen es rechtspopulistischen Parteien, sich als legitime und respektable Kräfte der ›Mitte‹ zu etablieren; umgekehrt übernehmen konservative, liberale und sozialdemokratische Parteien zunehmend rechte Positionen in der ›Islamfrage‹ (Ansari/Hafez 2012). ...
... According to Brubaker (2017), these political movements have even shifted from nationalism to "civilisationism" as they portray Islam as not just a national threat, but as a threat to Western civilisation. It is therefore unsurprising that protests against mosquesparticularly those with minaretshave played an important mobilising role in European far right nationalism (Hafez, 2014). ...
Growth in racial, ethnic, and religious minority populations in western societies has coincided with the growing success of nativist and radical right political parties. A leading target for nativist politicians has been Islamic religious symbols, particularly mosques. But does the presence of mosques within citizens’ milieux influence their political behaviour? To explore this question, we draw on longitudinal survey data from the Netherlands augmented by a web-scraped list of Dutch mosques to investigate the influence of local context – both architectural context in the form of spatial proximity to mosques and local demographic context in the form of visible diversity – on support for the Party for Freedom (PVV), a radical right, nativist political party. Our analyses reveal that while proximity to a mosque increases support for the radical right, proximity to a mosque with a minaret exerts a stronger effect. Also, closer proximity to a mosque with a minaret and greater local diversity amplify the differences in party support between the left and right. These findings allow us to better understand the impact of symbolic cultural threat on voting for nativist parties.
... However, it is difficult to reconcile the cultural modernization account with the fact that several contemporary PRRPs in western Europe, such as the Dutch PVV and the French FN, claim to defend liberal secular values (such as gender equality and homosexuality) against the growing threat of Islam, which is portrayed as a political and totalitarian ideology that is incompatible with the 'Judeo-Christian' western culture (Hafez, 2014). In addition, while the typical PRRP voter from a modernization perspective is older (and therefore has more traditional values) more recent research indicates PRRP support is more often prevalent among younger people (Arzheimer & Carter, 2006;Lucassen & Lubbers, 2012). ...
Research indicates that national nostalgia thrives across the world and is harnessed by populist radical-right parties (PRRPs) to mobilize people for their exclusionary standpoints. While national nostalgia is a timely issue, the topic has only recently started to get attention in social psychology. In this chapter, I investigate the triggers, functions and consequences of national nostalgia for present day group dynamics by integrating social psychological theories on intergroup relations, group-based emotions, and identity motivation with sociological and anthropological work on collective nostalgia and political scientific research on PRRPs. I demonstrate that, on the one hand, national nostalgia can be seen as functional and constructive for native majority members, in the sense that it helps them protect to national identity continuity in times of uncertainty and change. On the other hand, national nostalgia can be seen as a destructive force, as it results in exclusionary understandings of national identity based on historical roots and in anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim sentiments. I demonstrate that the stronger endorsement of this nativist ideology forms an important explanation for why national nostalgia is related to a greater likelihood of PRRP voting in the Netherlands. * E-mail: a.n.smeekes@uu.nl.
... Hafez's article concludes by examining the European Alliance for Freedom, a pan-European alliance of far-right members of the European parliament that has successfully brought various formerly antagonistic parties together through a common anti-Muslim programme. It is trying to become a formal European parliamentary fraction after its victory in European (Hafez, 2014). ...
span lang="IN">Most of the study of Islamophobia, the hatred and fear of Muslims, take the locus in Western countries in which Muslims are a minority group. The present study aims at answering the gap of study. This study specifically discusses the Islamophobia represented in popular culture, in a movie entitled “Mencari Hilal.” Discussion in this paper covers two questions. First, how is the discourse of Islamophobia represented in the film? Second, what is the ideology represented in the film? The present article is based on two arguments. First, Islamophobia does not only happen in Western countries. Instead, the phobia also happens within Muslim communities. Second, the film is a popular cultural text that reflects people's anxiety and desire, as well as expresses important problems that people encounter in history. This study applies Fairclough’s CDA with three levels of analyses, micro, meso, and macro. The discourse of Islamophobia in this movie is presented in more subtle ways, but the potential conflict is obviously represented. The ideology of pluralism is implied in this film to give the space for the audience to think and rethink their religious assumptionKeywords: Ancient tombs; preservation; cultural heritage.</span
... This one item measure acted as a control variable in the study as research has shown that there is an association between conservative political attitudes and Islamophobia (Hafez, 2014). The item asked participants to indicate their political beliefs on a spectrum ranging from extremely liberal to extremely conservative, with higher numbers indicating more political conservatism. ...
Meta‐dehumanization contributes to a vicious cycle of hostility. This study extends the literature by investigating antecedents and outcomes of meta‐dehumanization in the context of Muslim–non‐Muslim relations. Specifically, control over terrorism (COT) and threat were tested as predictors of meta‐dehumanization among non‐Muslim British nationals (N = 313). The results revealed that lower perceptions of COT predicted increased threat, which in turn predicted meta‐dehumanization. Meta‐dehumanization, consequently, predicted Islamophobia via increased dehumanization of Muslim people. The results were significant while controlling for political orientation and intergroup contact. This research highlights the unsettling cycle of meta‐dehumanization and intergroup hostility. Theoretical and practical implications of this research are discussed. Please refer to the Supplementary Material section to find this article's Community and Social Impact Statement.
Am 9. November 2020 hat in Österreich die größte rassistische Polizeioperation seit 1945 stattgefunden. Unter dem Namen »Operation Luxor« wurde eine Woche nach einem gewalttätigen Anschlag in der Wiener Innenstadt eine Razzia gegen ca. 70 Personen und Einrichtungen durchgeführt. Die mehr als eineinhalb Jahre geplante Aktion gegen Anhänger*innen des sogenannten »politischen Islam« ist mittlerweile als rechtswidrig eingestuft worden. Die Beiträger*innen des Bandes setzen sich aus unterschiedlichen Perspektiven kritisch mit der Polizeioperation auseinander. Neben wissenschaftlichen Analysen verschiedener Fachbereiche kommen auch Expert*innen aus der Zivilgesellschaft zu Wort.
Am 9. November 2020 hat in Österreich die größte rassistische Polizeioperation seit 1945 stattgefunden. Unter dem Namen »Operation Luxor« wurde eine Woche nach einem gewalttätigen Anschlag in der Wiener Innenstadt eine Razzia gegen ca. 70 Personen und Einrichtungen durchgeführt. Die mehr als eineinhalb Jahre geplante Aktion gegen Anhänger*innen des sogenannten »politischen Islam« ist mittlerweile als rechtswidrig eingestuft worden. Die Beiträger*innen des Bandes setzen sich aus unterschiedlichen Perspektiven kritisch mit der Polizeioperation auseinander. Neben wissenschaftlichen Analysen verschiedener Fachbereiche kommen auch Expert*innen aus der Zivilgesellschaft zu Wort.
This article focuses on the relationship between nation-making and the emergence of Islamophobia in India. Studies on anti-Muslim violence and Islamophobia in India either tend to dismiss the concept or limit its deployment by identifying it within the actions of Hindu nationalist groups situating their rise as an exception to India’s secular and multicultural trajectory. Premising on the idea that Islamophobia should be understood as the negation of Muslim political subjectivity, this article argues that Hindutva is not an aberration rather it is a continuation of the Indian nation-making project with the Muslim placed as the other of this project. This argument would include factoring in the systemic nature of anti-Muslim violence and social inequality by looking at the Muslim community’s lived socioeconomic experience, and analyzing the commentaries on them.
This article deals with the role that different rationalities of power play in current authoritarian and right-wing populist governance. Referring to Foucauldian power theory, I will argue that power rationalities and practices in current authoritarian and right-wing populist rule are diverse and variable. I intend to show that various aspects of the sovereign, disciplinary, governmental, and pastoral types of power as outlined by Foucault play an important role in contemporary authoritarianism and right-wing populism. Thereby, this article pursues a twofold aim. On the one hand, the Foucauldian discussion of power in authoritarian and populist rationalities and practices should contribute to better understand current phenomena of new authoritarianism and right-wing populism. On the other hand, the following considerations should also provide a more detailed theoretical insight into the relation between, and compatibilities as well as incompatibilities of, the different types of power described by Foucault.
This article aims to examine the genealogy of the discourse of islamogauchisme (sometimes translated as ‘Islamo-leftism’), provide a socio-historical analysis of its political functions in the French culture wars and highlight its relevance to an understanding of transnational, particularly transatlantic, opposition to antiracist and pro-Palestinian politics. The article will also place the islamogauchisme discourse within a deeper history of racialised conspiracy thinking.
Die zentrale Forschungsfrage des RIRA-Projektes lautet: Welche kollektiven Interventionsansätze können bei der Radikalisierung und Co-Radikalisierung Jugendlicher und post-adoleszenter Muslim:innen und Nicht-Muslim:innen identifiziert werden?
Der vorliegende Literaturbericht gibt einen Einblick in die Inhalte, Forschungsfragen und Hypothesen der verschiedenen Teilprojekte und zielt auf eine komprimierte Darstellung des dazu gehörigen Forschungsstandes.
Der Literaturbericht gliedert sich dabei wie folgt:
Das zweite Kapitel richtet das Augenmerk auf die Bedingungen der Radikalisierung.
Ausgehend von diesen Überlegungen widmet sich das dritte Kapitel den möglichen Effekten dieser Radikalisierungsprozesse auf die Demokratie bzw. die demokratische politische Kultur in Deutschland.
Im vierten Kapitel rückt die Präventionspraxis sowie erste Erkenntnisse über geeignete Schulmaterialien in den Fokus.
Ausgehend von diesen Ausführungen werden im fünften und letzten Kapitel einige zentrale Erkenntnisse und verbleibende Forschungslücken skizziert.
What is striking in the twenty years since 9/11 is not only the renewed attention to religion in the Western public sphere but the forms this attention has taken. Suspicion towards Islam has intensified. Narratives in which the West and Islam are conflicting and clashing entities have become entrenched. In Europe, anti-Muslim rhetoric has reached fever-pitch in far-right movements. What has gone largely unnoticed, however, is the Bible-use that can be found in the programmes, protests and proclamations of far-right groups and actors. The British far-right organisation Britain First fosters one example in recent years of such Bible-use. Far from accidental or negligible, I argue that contemporary far-right Bible-use may look banal and even benign, but it masks toxic and violent attitudes to Islam. This Bible-use demonstrates the way references to religion have come to replace overt references to race in the Islamophobic discourse of the far right. In a post-9/11 context, I contend, where forms of Islamophobia take extreme and mainstream form, it is crucial that biblical scholars identify the function the Bible has in stoking divisions and drawing distinctions between a Christian West and an Islamic other.
In Europe, in tandem with growing social anxiety regarding the so-called threat of Islamization, right-wing, populist parties have increasingly positioned themselves against Muslims and Islam to the point of becoming anti-Islam parties. This paper deconstructs Islamophobic discourses of the Freedom Party of Austria, the League, and the Alternative for Germany through narrative policy analysis and shows that they are built upon a similar narrative of a villain, victim, and hero. Muslims are depicted as villains that pose a threat to Europe, while national and European cultures are presented as victims, threatened by Islamic practices which are cast as irrational, dominant, and violence-prone. The depiction of Muslims as villains and European culture and society as victims gives these parties an opportunity to create a “hero” character for themselves. By presenting proposals, such as bans on Islamic practices, these parties narratively construct themselves as heroes determined to save their countries and European culture. Disregarding the heterogeneity of Muslims and Islamic traditions as well as the contribution of Muslim scientists and philosophers, these parties depict a simplistic picture of the world in which they appropriate for themselves the role of protector. Character construction in Islamophobic discourses raises important questions about multiculturalism, tolerance, and religious freedom in Europe.
Islamophobia is not just a fear of people ascribing to the religion of Islam, if that was the case simple religious conversions would erase hatred. In the world of surging Alt-Right movements, Islamophobia embodies racism, anti-migrant xenophobia, and orientalism. This article explores Alt-Right groups in the US and Europe, traces their ideological gurus, deconstructs political speeches, reports of rightwing think tanks to understand how Islamophobia is a process of disembodiment. Inspired by Bourdieu’s habitus, and feminist work on embodiment/disembodiment, this article argues that the Muslim narrative thoroughly disembodies the Muslim body. Disembodiment is annihilation before corporeal death ensues, the Muslim does not get to mark her corporeal and intellectual existence. Disembodiment nullifies the Muslim’s life, she is only valuable in death, because disembodiment reclaims her death as a vanquished terrorist, as a murdered jihadi, or a bombed city where weapons of mass destruction or uranium may have existed.
Antisemitism and Islamophobia are two old racisms which target the Other within Western discourse. This chapter will highlight the importance of understanding both of these discriminations as intertwined, connected, and dynamically reflecting social and political events. Secondly, the chapter will discuss how features and history of both of these phenomena impact modern current events of discrimination. Antiracist professionals must be equipped with knowledge of both of these forms of racism and be ready to implement concrete solutions, in order to understand the barriers their Jewish and Muslim clients, students, colleagues, and patients face.
This study investigates the role of populism in the growing prominence of the far-right and will address a research gap by specifically focusing on the Australian context – a national setting often overlooked in this field of study. A fresh approach is taken that seeks to understand the new far-right landscape in in terms of discourse, messaging and appeals, rather than trying to group together people and parties. This lens will be used to establish how three components of framing and disseminating far-right discourse have been crucial in the contemporary popularisation of far-right appeals. Firstly, the use of populism to mobilise the ethno-cultural majority who are feeling threatened and hostile due to historical, political and contextual factors. The fluid and pragmatic changing of discourses will then be identified as a decisive strategy in appealing to a wider audience, with specific consideration given to the far-right’s utilisation of Islamophobic messaging. The final component is the evolution and widespread dissemination of far-right messaging. It will be argued that the populist far-right have transformed and achieved mainstream success because these three components have come together at this time in history and provided a great deal of strength to the operation of the far-right.
Since 2001, the ‘Islamic threat’ has become increasingly prominent in debates on migration policy, religious affairs and security at the federal level in Switzerland. Supported by the far right-wing parties, the paradigm of the Islamic threat reveals how Islamophobia is gendered and affects Muslim women and men differently. By analysing debates between the Federal Council and Swiss Parliament, this article shows how the Islamic threat shaped the border politics of the Swiss Nation between 2001 and 2015. It reveals how the ruling elite justified the socio-spatial exclusion of Muslims living in a Muslim-minority context. As consequence of the success of the far right-wing Swiss People's Party (SVP), legal measures have increased with regard to security, protection of Swiss culture and women's rights, and exclusion of Muslims from the boundaries of the Swiss nation.
The films Citizen Kane and Forrest Gump are employed to show the impact of framing a story on knowledge formation. It advances from Saussure to argue the intervention of the political in explaining the varying of meanings. The chapter presents a genealogy of Critical Muslim studies. It outlines how Critical Muslim Studies diverges from Islamic Critical Theory, Critical Muslim Theory and Critical Muslim of Ziauddin Sardar. The benefits outlined of applying Critical Muslim Studies. A new term, scotoma, is introduced to account for the lack of the colonised narrative in Eurocentrism. The employment of ‘problematisation’ is promoted as applied by Foucault.
With the persistence of Islamophobia, it considers counter-Islamophobia strategies adopt anti-racist approaches but to go beyond calling for tolerance, respect and equality. It asses the value of education, legal definition, apology, civil rights movement, multiculturalism and other approaches in countering discrimination. It calls upon anti-Islamophobia activists to counter Britishness that resists Muslimness being part of its symbol. A decolonial counter-Islamophobia approach challenging the postcolonial symbolic representation of racist Britishness is outlined. This demands the deflection of differences between cultures to unculture, the national symbolic myth. The counter-Islamophobia strategy advances a project for liberating the reformulation of imperial Britishness that promotes a post-racist rather than a post-race society.
Islamophobia has gained common currency but raises intense debate about its relevance in describing discrimination against Muslims. The chapter interrogates the discussion around the term Islamophobia. The need for a definition of Islamophobia and how to formulate a definition. Three other themes common in the study of the Islamophobia paradigm are also discussed: Has the Muslim-British always been antagonistic? Is Islamophobia a reserve of the far-right? How to account for the global nature of Islamophobia.
Online radical Islam is a topic widely studied by scholars and notoriously discussed among nonexperts as well (Awan, 2007, Von Behr et al. 2013, Gray and Head 2009). Because of its intrinsic characteristics (i.e. accessibility, anonymity, or users’ identity dissimulation), the internet has always been a useful tool for propagandists of Islamic fundamentalism (Fighel, 2007; Stenersen, 2008; Koehler, 2014). However, in the last decade, studies have questioned the real importance and magnitude of Islamic radicalization online (Gill et al., 2017). In fact, while scholars were focused on observing digital Islamic radicalization, a galaxy of new forms of extremism was growing online (Silva et al., 2017; Roversi, 2008) that no longer made Islam an exceptional case study. Today, Muslim people are one of the groups most aggressively targeted by extremist, intolerant, violent, and radical discourses (Elahi & Khan, 2017; Amnesty International, 2019). Anti-Muslim hate speech has spread online throughout Europe and the United States, reinforced by the propaganda and political discourse of populist right-wing parties (Hafez, 2014; Bakali 2016). This paper introduces some large-scale action-research projects developed in Europe and Italy in the last three years (2016–2019) and aims to reconstruct the most updated Islamophobia state of the art in terms of numbers, characteristics, and phenomenology from the offline to the online context.
Immigration has historically been of low salience in Central and Eastern Europe. Yet, the region has consistently higher levels of ethnocentrism than the rest of Europe. Scholars argue that the East's limited politicization of immigration is due to its status as a region of emigration and the presence of ethnic minority “others”. I argue that this is changing. The politicization of the European refugee crisis by domestic elites has begun to refocus the sociocultural dimension on the immigration issue. Using structural equation models, I compare European Values Study data from 2008 and 2017 across 10 East European EU member states. I find evidence that traditionalist attitudes are more strongly related to anti‐immigration attitudes since the crisis, particularly for those who are interested in politics. Further, immigration attitudes are polarizing across the GAL‐TAN dimension and by education. Hence, immigration is bolstering a pre‐existing, socially structured divide around both nationalist and traditionalist values. This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved
Bu çalışmada, kültürel ırkçılık ve İslamofobi’nin 1980 sonrası dönemde Avrupa’daki aşırı sağ partilerin ideolojik ana çerçevesinde önemli bir yere sahip olduğu ileri sürülmektedir. Aşırı sağın ideolojik profilinde kültürel ırkçılığın ve İslamofobi’nin öne çıkması, İkinci Dünya Savaşı sonrası dönemde biyolojik ırkçılık ve antisemitizmin kötü şöhretli ve aşırılık yanlısı imajıyla yakından ilgilidir. Holokost sonrasında modern antisemitizm döneminin kapanmasıyla birlikte Yahudiliğin Avrupa açısından taşıdığı anlam büyük bir değişime uğramıştır. Sömürgeciliğin sona ermesiyle eski sömürge topraklarından Avrupa’ya yönelen göçler, göç meselesini aşırı sağ partilerin ana gündem maddesi haline getirmiştir. Aşırı sağın yerlici ideolojisi, İslam'ı ve Müslümanları kimliği, değerleri, alışkanlıkları ve diğer birçok özelliği sebebiyle ötekileştirilen hedef haline getirmiştir. Yerlicilik, göçmenlerin kültürel farklılığına ve yerli çoğunlukların değerlerine yabancı oluşuna vurgu yapmaktadır. İslam’ın arkaik, gayri medeni ve otoriter özelliklerinden dolayı liberal demokratik değerleri özümseyen ve içselleştiren Batı’nın kültürel yapısıyla uyumsuzluk gösterdiği ileri sürülmektedir. On dokuzuncu yüzyılın sonundan İkinci Dünya Savaşı’nın bitimine kadar olan süreci kapsayan modern antisemitizm döneminde Batı medeniyetine düşmanlık, kültürel uyumsuzluk, ataerkillik gibi olumsuz özelliklerin Yahudilere atfedildiği görülmektedir. Bu çerçevede, çalışmada aşırı sağ partilerin ideolojisinde antisemitizmden İslamofobi’ye geçiş tartışması, modern antisemitizm dönemiyle günümüzün İslamofobi’si arasındaki benzerlikler üzerinden incelenmektedir.
This book provides a comprehensive analysis of radical right populism in Germany. It gives an overview of historical developments of the phenomenon and its current appearance. It examines three of the main far-right organizations in Germany: the radical right populist party AfD (Alternative for Germany), Pegida (Patriotic Europeans against the Islamification of the Occident), and the Identitarian Movement. The book investigates the positions of these groups as expressed in programmes, publications, and statements of party leaders and movement activists. It explores their history, ideologies, strategies, and their main activists and representatives, as well as the overlap between the groups. The ideological positions examined include populism, nativism, authoritarianism, volkish nationalism, ethnopluralism, xenophobia, Islamophobia, antisemitism, antifeminism, and Euroscepticism. The analysis shows that these ideological features are sometimes strategically interlinked for effect and used to justify specific political demands such as the stronger regulation of immigration and the exclusion of Muslims. This much-needed volume will be of particular interest to students and researchers of German politics, populism, social movements, party politics, and right-wing extremism.
The reports presented here concern the role of the Internet and social media in processes of self-radicalisation. The term self-radicalisation refers to a type of radicalisation process that designates the radicalising individual as the instigator of the process. The DARE study investigates self-radicalisation specifically in relation to the role of participatory media in the process. In line with the dual focus of the DARE project as a whole, this study is concerned with the role of participatory media in the self-radicalisation of people identifying as supporters of i) radical Islamist and ii) anti-Islam(ist) or wider far right groups.
The findings of this work are presented through an introduction and 7 National Reports covering: Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Netherlands, Norway and the United Kingdom. A cross-national report and a policy brief building on these reports are also available.
Einer Verkäuferin wird gekündigt, weil sie ein muslimisches Kopftuch trägt; zwar ist die Geschäftsleitung nicht islamfeindlich, doch man fürchtet finanzielle Einbußen. Ein Arbeitgeber stellt einen jungen Türken nicht ein, weil er denkt, türkische Männer sind generell nicht teamfähig. Laut einer wissenschaftlichen Untersuchung ist fast jeder dritte Deutsche der Meinung, dass es besser wäre, wenn Muslimen der Zuzug nach Deutschland untersagt würde (siehe den Beitrag von Leibold in diesem Buch). Dies sind keine konstruierten Fälle, sondern belegte Tatsachen, die zeigen, dass Islamfeindlichkeit und Diskriminierung von Muslimen Teil der gesellschaftliche Realität sind.
This book examines the fascinating interplay of party and media behavior to explain one of the most important phenomena in Western Europe: the rise of far-right parties. To account for the divergent electoral fortunes of these parties, the book examines how political parties and the mass media have dealt with growing public concerns over national identity. Mainstream politicians chose to “play the nationalist card,” creating opportunities for the entry of far-right parties into the political system. In some cases, the media gave outsized exposure to such parties, allowing them to capitalize on these opportunities; in other cases, they ignored them, blocking their entry into the political system. Using elite interviews, content analysis, and primary documents to trace identity politics since the 1980s, this book presents an original interpretation of identity politics and media behavior in Austria, Germany, Greece, and France since the 1980s.
This article delineates a number of conceptual-normative, analytical and political concerns, characterized as matters of (1) ‘semantics’, (2) ‘scales’ and (3) ‘solidarities’, in the ways in which we can approach an understanding of the relationships between antisemitism and Islamophobia. As such it takes its cue from Goldberg's (2009) insistence that in addition to comparativist methodologies employed in the study of race and racism, we also need relational methodologies. That is to say that where the former compares and contrasts, the latter also seeks to connect. In so doing, the article harnesses the explanatory power of long-established organizing concepts within the study of race and racism, to explore how racial categories of religious minorities continue to be formed. Taking its cue from the introduction to this special issue (Meer this issue), this article explores what purchase the ideas of ‘cultural racism’ and ‘racialization’ can bring to bear on our conceptualization of each.
It is striking to observe the virtual absence of an established literature on race and racism in the discussion of Islamophobia; something that is only marginally more present in the discussion of antisemitism. This special issue of Ethnic and Racial Studies locates the contemporary study of antisemitism and Islamophobia squarely within the fields of race and racism. As such it problematizes the extent to which discussion of the racialization of these minorities remains unrelated to each other, or is explored in distinct silos as a series of internal debates. By harnessing the explanatory power of long-established organizing concepts within the study of race and racism, this special issue makes a historically informed, theoretical and empirical contribution to aligning these analytical pursuits.
In the 2010 Swedish general elections the nationalist party Sverigedemokraterna (SD) crossed the threshold and entered parliament. The other parties in parliament reacted with strong antagonism; the mainstreaming of the ‘radical right’ had finally come to Sweden. This article analyses the media coverage of the SD following the 2006 elections, when it emerged as a high-profile party in the public arena. The presence of the SD in Swedish politics encourages both SD allies and opponents to emphasize their views on what constitutes social cohesion in Sweden. We see the public debate surrounding the SD as a rhetorical struggle between different nationalist claims.
Nach Jahrhunderten blutiger Kriege, prekärer Machtverhältnisse und der Katastrophe der beiden Weltkriege begann mit dem europäischen
Einigungsprozess eine neue Ära in der Geschichte Europas. Die Gemeinschaft für Kohle und Stahl, der Kern aus dem später die
Europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft, die Europäische Gemeinschaft und die heutige Europäische Union erwuchsen, war eine Antwort
auf die europäische Geschichte in der ersten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts. Europa hatte zwei Weltkriege erlebt, und war durch
den Faschismus und durch Auschwitz, den Tiefstpunkt der Menschheitsgeschichte, tief erschüttert. Während die Reaktion der
internationalen Staatengemeinschaft nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg Revanche, Rache und Unterwerfung war, lautete die Antwort auf
den Zweiten Weltkrieg gänzlich anders: Integration, Kooperation und Versöhnung. Es ist dem Friedensprojekt Europa gelungen
durch die regionale Integration der Staaten Frieden und Wohlstand für die Menschen zu schaffen. Seit dem Römischen Reich hat
Europa keine so lang anhaltende Friedenszeit mehr erlebt. Die Überwindung der Kriegsangst und die offenen Grenzen sind die
Erfüllung eines Menschheitstraums. Von den Anfängen des Einigungsprozesses, über die Grundsteinlegung des gemeinsamen Marktes
in den Römischen Verträgen 1958 bis zum Euro hat die „monetäre Nichtangriffsgemeinschaft“ in hunderten kleiner Schritte einen
atemberaubenden Integrationsgrad herbeigeführt. Die territorialen Machtansprüche von Nationalstaaten wurden besiegt und ethnische,
religiöse und politische Intoleranz durch ökonomische und soziale Integration überwunden. Die Zahl der Mitgliedsländer hat
sich von den sechs Gründungsstaaten Frankreich, Deutschland, Italien und den drei Beneluxländern in mehreren Erweiterungswellen
auf die heutigen 27 Staaten erhöht. Frieden, Freiheit, Demokratie, Wohlstand und soziale Entwicklung wurden nach dem Ende
ihrer Diktaturen nach Spanien, Portugal und Griechenland ausgeweitet, nach dem Ende des Kalten Krieges auch in die ehemaligen
Warschauer-Pakt-Staaten. Die Osterweiterung beendete die künstliche Trennung Europas durch den eisernen Vorhang endgültig
und trägt zur Stabilität in Europa bei. Ein Krieg zwischen den Mitgliedsstaaten der EU ist heute unvorstellbar. Der Binnenmarkt
ist für fast 500 Millionen Menschen in 27 Ländern gelebte Realität. Mit der Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion ist der gemeinsame
Markt die Vorraussetzung für Wachstum, Beschäftigung und die internationale Wettbewerbsfähigkeit Europas in der globalisierten
Wirtschaft. Die gemeinsamen europäischen Werte und Normen auf denen die Europäische Union gegründet ist, sind in vielerlei
Hinsicht eine Antwort auf den chauvinistischen Nationalismus und den Faschismus, auf die Vertreibung und die Völkermorde der
ersten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts. Dem Hass auf Minderheiten, dem Rassenwahn, der Ausgrenzung von Menschen aufgrund von einer
Behinderung oder ihrer Sexualität wurde eine supranationale Werte- und Rechtsgemeinschaft entgegengesetzt, die allen die gleichen
Grundrechte und damit einen Platz in der Gesellschaft garantiert.
The apparent resurgence of hostility against Jews has been a prominent theme in recent discussions of Europe. At the same time, the adversities of the Muslim populations on the continent have received increasing attention as well. In this article, I attempt a historical and cultural clarification of the key terms in this debate. I argue against the common impulse to analogize anti-Semitism and Islamophobia. Instead, I offer an analytic framework that locates the two phenomena in different projects of exclusion. Anti-Semitism was invented in the late 19th century to police the ethnically pure nation-state; Islamophobia, by contrast, is a formation of the present, marshaled to safeguard a supranational Europe. Whereas traditional anti-Semitism has run its historical course with the supersession of the nation-state, Islamophobia threatens to become the defining condition of the new Europe.
Die extreme Rechte sieht in populistischen und rassistischen Kampagnen gegen „den Islam“ ein propagandistisches Erfolgsrezept.
War früher in diesen Kreisen die platte Parole „Ausländer raus“ Ausdruck ihres dumpfen Rassismus, so versteckt sich dieser
Rassismus aktuell oftmals hinter populistischen Parolen zur Verteidigung von „deutscher Leitkultur“ und „christlichem Abendland“
gegen „Islamisierung“ und „Moscheebau“.
Identitätsdiskurs und politische Macht: Die rechtspopulistische Mobilisierung von Ethnozentrismus im Spannungsfeld von Opposition und Regierung am Beispiel von FPÖ und SVP
- Oliver Geden
Oliver Geden, 'Identitätsdiskurs und politische Macht: Die rechtspopulistische
Mobilisierung von Ethnozentrismus im Spannungsfeld von Opposition und Regierung
am Beispiel von FPÖ und SVP', in Susanne Frölich-Steffen and Lars Rensmann (eds),
Populisten an der Macht: Populistische Regierungsparteien in West-und Osteuropa (Vienna:
Braumüller Verlag 2005), 69–83.
How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World Random House 1981) Reinhard Schulze, 'Vom Anti- Kommunismus zum Anti-Islamismus: Der Kuwait-Krieg als Fortschreibung des Ost- West-Konflikts
- Edward W Said
- Covering Islam
Edward W. Said, Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the
Rest of the World (New York: Random House 1981); Reinhard Schulze, 'Vom Anti-
Kommunismus zum Anti-Islamismus: Der Kuwait-Krieg als Fortschreibung des Ost-
West-Konflikts', in Norbert Mattes (ed.), Wir sind die Herren und ihr unsere Schuhputzer!
Der Nahe Osten vor und nach dem Golfkrieg (Frankfurt on Main: Dagyeli Verlag 1991),
207–19.
Rechtspopulismus in Westeuropa: Aktuelle Entwicklungen und politische Bedeutung', Österreichische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft
- Hans-Georg Betz
Hans-Georg Betz, 'Rechtspopulismus in Westeuropa: Aktuelle Entwicklungen und
politische Bedeutung', Österreichische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft, no. 3, 2002, 251–
64 (253–6).
From the Far Right to the Mainstream: Islamophbia in Party Politics and the Media
- Raymond Taras
- Xenophobia Islamophobia In Europe
Raymond Taras, Xenophobia and Islamophobia in Europe (Edinburgh: Edinburgh
University Press 2012); Humayun Ansari and Farid Hafez (eds), From the Far Right to
the Mainstream: Islamophbia in Party Politics and the Media (NY and Frankfurt: Campus
Verlag 2012).
Damir Skenderovic. 'Feindbild Muslime-Islamophobie in der radikalen Rechten
- Pim Fortuyn
- Tegen De Islamisering Van Onze Cultuur
Pim Fortuyn, Tegen de islamisering van onze cultuur: Nederlandse identiteit als fundament
(Utrecht: A. W. Bruna 1997). Damir Skenderovic. 'Feindbild Muslime-Islamophobie in
der radikalen Rechten', in Urs Altermatt, Mariano Delgado and Guido Vergauwen
(eds), Der Islam in Europa: Zwischen Weltpolitik und Alltag (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer
Verlag 2006), 79-96 (92).
Yes or no to Islamization?' (blog)
- Diana West
Diana West, 'Yes or no to Islamization?' (blog), 14 September 2008, available on the
Diana West website at http://dianawest.net/Home/tabid/36/EntryId/455/Yes-or-No-to-Islamization.aspx (viewed 10 September 2014).
Wien als Treffpunkt für Europas Rechte: Türkischer EU- Beitritt soll verhindert werden
- Austria Presse
Austria Presse Agentur, 'Wien als Treffpunkt für Europas Rechte: Türkischer EU-
Beitritt soll verhindert werden', 23 October 2010, available on the news.at website at
www.news.at/articles/1042/12/280263/wien-treffpunkt-europas-rechte-tuerkischer-eu-
beitritt (viewed 21 August 2014).
Mölzer am Yasukuni-Schrein', Der Standard
- Saskia Jungnikl
Saskia Jungnikl, 'Mölzer am Yasukuni-Schrein', Der Standard, 20 August 2010.
FPÖ stellt Partnersuche im Europaparlament einFPOe-stellt-Partnersuche-im-Europaparlament- ein
- Andreas Mölzer
Andreas Mölzer, quoted in Austrian Press Agentur, 'FPÖ stellt Partnersuche im
Europaparlament ein', 16 January 2012, available on the Der Standard website at
http://derstandard.at/1326502859934/FPOe-stellt-Partnersuche-im-Europaparlament-
ein (viewed 21 August 2014).
Islamophobe Weltverschwörungstheorien … und wie Obama vom Muslim zum Muslimbruder wurde available online at www.journal-fuer-psychologie.de/index
- Farid
- Hafez
71 Farid Hafez, 'Islamophobe Weltverschwörungstheorien … und wie Obama vom
Muslim zum Muslimbruder wurde', Journal für Psychologie, vol. 21, no. 1, 2013,
available online at www.journal-fuer-psychologie.de/index.php/jfp/article/view/263/
293 (viewed 22 August 2014).
Wilders at Ground Zero: no new Mecca', Radio Netherlands Worldwide
- Willemien Groot
Willemien Groot, 'Wilders at Ground Zero: no new Mecca', Radio Netherlands
Worldwide, 11 September 2010, available at www.rnw.nl/africa/article/wilders-groundzero-no-new-mecca (viewed 23 August 2014).
Europe far right courts Israel in anti-Islam drive', Reuters
- Tom Heneghan
Tom Heneghan, 'Europe far right courts Israel in anti-Islam drive', Reuters, 20
December 2010, available at http://uk.reuters.com/article/2010/12/20/us-europe-islamfar-right-idUSTRE6BJ37120101220 (viewed 23 August 2014).
Die rechtspopulistische Mobilisierung von Ethnozentrismus im Spannungsfeld von Opposition und Regierung am Beispiel von FPÖ und SVP
- Oliver Geden
- Macht Identitätsdiskurs Und Politische
Oliver Geden, 'Identitätsdiskurs und politische Macht: Die rechtspopulistische
Mobilisierung von Ethnozentrismus im Spannungsfeld von Opposition und Regierung
am Beispiel von FPÖ und SVP', in Susanne Frölich-Steffen and Lars Rensmann (eds),
Populisten an der Macht: Populistische Regierungsparteien in West-und Osteuropa (Vienna:
Braumüller Verlag 2005), 69-83.
- Hans-Georg Betz
Hans-Georg Betz, 'Rechtspopulismus in Westeuropa: Aktuelle Entwicklungen und
politische Bedeutung', Österreichische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft, no. 3, 2002, 251-64 (253-6).
Europäische Rechtsextreme besuchten umstrittene Gedenkstätte
- Saskia Jungnikl
- Mölzer Am Yasukuni-Schrein
- Der Standard
Saskia Jungnikl, 'Mölzer am Yasukuni-Schrein', Der Standard, 20 August 2010.
58 'Europäische Rechtsextreme besuchten umstrittene Gedenkstätte', Der Standard, 14
August 2010.
FPÖ stellt Partnersuche im Europaparlament ein
- Andreas Mölzer
Andreas Mölzer, quoted in Austrian Press Agentur, 'FPÖ stellt Partnersuche im
Europaparlament ein', 16 January 2012, available on the Der Standard website at
http://derstandard.at/1326502859934/FPOe-stellt-Partnersuche-im-Europaparlamentein (viewed 21 August 2014).
Islamophobe Weltverschwörungstheorien … und wie Obama vom Muslim zum Muslimbruder wurde
- Farid Hafez
Farid Hafez, 'Islamophobe Weltverschwörungstheorien … und wie Obama vom
Muslim zum Muslimbruder wurde', Journal für Psychologie, vol. 21, no. 1, 2013,
available online at www.journal-fuer-psychologie.de/index.php/jfp/article/view/263/
293 (viewed 22 August 2014).