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Devroe, E., Ponsaers, P. (2013). “Reforming the Belgian police system between central and local”, In Fyfe, N.R., Terpstra, J., Tops, P. (Eds.), Centralizing forces? Comparative perspectives on contemporary police reform in northern and western Europe, The Hague: Boom Legal Publishers/Eleven, 77-98.

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Abstract

This chapter discusses the most significant reform of the Belgian police system that occurred by law in 1998 3 . The actual implementation of the act dates from the beginning of 2001. The reform includes regrouping of the three regular police forces that existed previously. This involved the municipal police, the Gendarmerie, and the judicial police at the public prosecutor's office. These three police forces were rearranged into 'a single, integrated police force, structured on two levels'. In this chapter we will not limit ourselves to a purely formal discussion of this intervention. In the first paragraph we go back to the origin and significance of the three police forces that were grouped for the reform. The second paragraph goes into the reform and its background, and also how it worked out and how it continues to operate. We close in the third paragraph with an evaluation of the reform, which is discussed now, and also whether or not it is considered necessary to introduce new reform. Origin and significance of the Belgian system prior to the 1998 reform
1
Reforming the Belgian police system between central and local
Elke Devroe
1
, Paul Ponsaers
2
This chapter discusses the most significant reform of the Belgian police system that occurred by law in
1998
3
. The actual implementation of the act dates from the beginning of 2001. The reform includes
regrouping of the three regular police forces that existed previously. This involved the municipal
police, the Gendarmerie, and the judicial police at the public prosecutor’s office. These three police
forces were rearranged into ‘a single, integrated police force, structured on two levels’.
In this chapter we will not limit ourselves to a purely formal discussion of this intervention. In the first
paragraph we go back to the origin and significance of the three police forces that were grouped for
the reform. The second paragraph goes into the reform and its background, and also how it worked out
and how it continues to operate. We close in the third paragraph with an evaluation of the reform,
which is discussed now, and also whether or not it is considered necessary to introduce new reform.
Origin and significance of the Belgian system prior to the 1998 reform
From 1985 the Belgian police system came in for severe criticism from the public (Ponsaers & De
Kimpe, 2001). A series of major incidents took place after which the police appeared to react extremely
inadequately, resulting in the force coming under very heavy pressure. A bombing campaign was started
by the extreme left terrorist group called Cellules Communistes Combattantes (CCC) that continued from
then on at a high level of intensity, but there were also the protracted raids on department stores and
supermarkets that had fatal consequences, and were attributed to the so-called Bende van Nijvel (Dupont
& Ponsaers, 1988). That same year, 39 people were killed during the European football championships at
the Heizel Stadium in Brussels.
Criticism of policing increased even further as one by one these dramatic events took place, with the
police being seen to react inadequately each time. The political reaction from the Christian-Democrat
and liberal majority can only be described as panicky, repressive, incoherent and largely lacking in
any form of inspiration. In due course, the country became steeped in an atmosphere of crisis and
scandal, with the police ending up in a manifest crisis over their legitimacy. We should also state that the
Dutroux affair occurred later in 1996 (see later), and resulted in an unavoidable ‘bursting of the dykes’
that made the reform of 1998 a necessity.
Municipal police
The origin of the Belgian municipal police goes back to 1795 when the French occupiers set up the
municipalities, thereby giving short shrift to the existing land divisions that went back to the Ancien
Régime. Therefore the municipalities go back further than Belgium itself. All the municipalities
became independent in 1800 and continued to exist from the independence of Belgium in 1830. This is
how the 2,776 municipalities were created, from big to very small. On 1 January 1977, a large-scale,
municipal merger was carried out, whereby initially 589 municipalities were left over (Van Outrive,
Cartuyvels & Ponsaers, 1991). The Flemish Region has 308 municipalities, the Brussels-Capital
Region has 19, and the Walloon Region has 262.
In principle, each of these municipalities had their own municipal police force prior to the reform of
1998. In some of the more rural locations this involved a rural police force, in other cases it involved
1
Associate Professor of Criminology at the Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology, master of Criminal Justice,
University of Leiden, the Netherlands.
2
Senior Professor Emeritus at Ghent University, Research Unit Social Analysis of Security.
3
Act dated 07-12-1998 for the organisation of an integrated police service structured on two levels, B.S 05-01-1999 (WGP).
2
a more robust police force similar to those found in the towns and cities. At the time of the reform
there were 255 police forces of the rural type, employing a total of 935 officers. This amounted to
scarcely 5% of the total effective municipal police force. In other words: the rural forces were
extremely small, and in some cases they consisted of just one or two rural constables, while the city
police forces were of a much greater size with a total of 17,810 officers.
From a historical point of view, the municipal police forces that were run by the local mayors, were
pretty much neglected. The mayors basically controlled them and wanted to hang on to them. The
badly needed resources that would allow the municipal forces grow to become professional police
forces were simply not available (Ponsaers, 1992). Operation of the municipal police forces was
implemented by way of the Municipalities Act, which stipulated that police officers were in fact
municipal personnel and therefore financed by the individual municipalities. The operating range of
the municipal police was limited to the area of each municipality. Police training in the provincial
police training colleges left a lot to be desired. In principle the municipal police force was authorised
to carry out both administrative and judicial tasks. However, the reality was that only 88 of the 589
police forces had a crime squad at their disposal prior to the great reform of 1998 being implemented
(Boon, Kaminski, Brion, & Cappelle, 1991).
Gendarmerie
The Gendarmerie was a legacy from the period when France occupied Belgium (1794-1815) and
should also be seen as a truly Napoleonic inheritance (Van Outrive, Cartuyvels & Ponsaers, 1992).
The Dutch occupiers (1815-1830) maintained the Gendarmerie, albeit under a different name
(Maréchaussée). With independence in 1830, the Constitution stated that ‘the structure and authority
of the Gendarmerie will be regulated by law’. The act covering the Gendarmerie did not arrive until
1957, more than 125 years after independence was declared. Demilitarisation of the police force came
about in 1992, being a precondition for the reform of 1998. Throughout the history of Belgium, the
Gendarmerie had increasingly become the pre-eminent force for keeping public order. It is indeed
remarkable that the force has increased in size over time in relation to this responsibility. Public order
incidents are arising this was the standard answer given each time by the national, later federal
government when assigning new officers (Ponsaers, 1992).
This was indisputably about a police force with authority over the entire Belgian country, contrary to the
municipal police. In that sense we were talking about an actual state police force. This military
organisation had five levels: (1) The General HQ (national territory), (2) the areas (the five areas of the
courts of appeal), (3) the territorial groups (the 10 provinces), later on (4) the districts were added (the 27
judicial districts), and (5) the brigades (202 in total that served an average of three municipalities each).
Mobile groups were linked to each area. Those were units that could move out from their operational
bases (mostly barracks) to places where there was unrest. Provincial traffic units that mainly supervised
the national and provincial roads were linked to the territorial groups, while the brigades with “Special
Investigative Powers” (BOBs) were linked to the districts in 1957, and were mainly used for fighting
crime. It was only then that the Gendarmerie began to pay attention to judicial matters. Prior to this the
force was concerned mainly with maintaining law and order.
Shortly before the reform of 1998 was implemented, the Gendarmerie carried out an internal
reorganisation of its force (Ponsaers & De Kimpe, 2001). This led to two of the five levels being
abolished, namely the area and territorial groups. This intervention had the effect of levelling off the
hierarchical pyramid structure of the organisation, thereby making the system less bureaucratic.
The judicial police at the public prosecutor’s office
While both the above-mentioned police forces came into being prior to Belgian independence, this was
not the case with the judicial police at the public prosecutor’s office (GPP). From 1870 on the magistracy
started to complain about the limited effect with which the municipal police and the Gendarmerie carried
3
out their judicial functions. On the one hand this was because the Gendarmerie concentrated principally
on maintaining law and order, and on the other hand because the municipal police forces were frequently
overburdened with all sorts of municipal and administrative tasks. The discussion regarding setting up
the force dragged on for a long time and it was not until 1919, shortly after the end of WWI, that a
“judicial police at the public prosecutor’s office’ was set up (Van Outrive, L. et al, 1991).
It concerned a police force that had authority over the entire country that was engaged exclusively in
judicial matters. It was obvious that setting up an autonomous, criminal police force was partly inspired
by the fear that expanding such activities within the existing police forces would create a judicial police
force that was politically controlled. The GPP was conceived as a strong, reactive force in the service of
the magistracy of the public prosecutor’s office. This force acted as the second line by doing further
investigation of the initial charges that had been prepared by both of the other forces, and was carried
out under the guidance and supervision of the public prosecutor's office (Ponsaers, 1992).
The judicial police was from the very beginning the ‘little brother of all the police forces and was
substantially numerically inferior to the municipal and Gendarmerie forces and had a rather stable
capacity of 1.500 members. The GPP was arranged into 27 brigades (Devroe & Ponsaers, 2012). Each
of the brigades operated in the territory of the 27 judicial districts. A Commissariat-general was set up
centrally to coordinate the brigades. Over the passage of time the brigades added on various phenomenon-
oriented specialisations including types of criminality that arose in the areas of economics, finance and
taxation. The GPP came under the budget of the Federal Department of Justice.
The relationship between the different police forces prior to the reform
Contrary to other European countries, it is striking that no clear, geographical or functional division of
tasks between the above-mentioned police forces was ever set up. This resulted in creating a atmosphere
of competition between the three forces. We describe below three areas of tension.
Relationship between the municipal police and the Gendarmerie
The municipal police and the Gendarmerie kept each other in a remarkable state of equilibrium locally. It
was noteworthy that a geographical division of tasks emerged between both police forces. Wherever the
municipal police were in a strong position, we encountered a weak Gendarmerie, and vice versa
(Bruggeman, Devroe & Easton, 2010). The relationship between both forces appeared strong on
communicative issues (Ponsaers & Trepant, 1996). Moreover, it was noticeable that the municipal police
was well entrenched in the urban areas, while the Gendarmerie was more active in the rural areas.
Contrary to the legal relationship between the previous municipal police and the Gendarmerie in the
Netherlands, this relationship in Belgium had no legal basis, but arose instead out of historical
developments.
In this respect it should be pointed out that there were more large and medium-large sized towns in
Flanders (the northern part of the country) than in Wallonia (the southern part of the country). This
resulted in the federal government having to invest more proportionally in the Gendarmerie in the south of
the country than in the north where the police system was to a great extent financed by the municipalities.
The more Belgium converted into a federal state with increasing autonomy for the municipalities and
regions, the more problematic this imbalance became.
The municipal police and the Gendarmerie still kept each the equilibrium between them, but in a different
way. The municipal police really acted like a municipal administration in the smaller municipalities. This
meant that these forces paid less attention towards providing permanent services outside normal office
hours and weekends. This way of operating paved the way in each municipality for the presence of local
antennas of the Gendarmerie, specifically the brigades. Gendarmerie brigades provided a permanent
safety net in municipalities where the municipal police closed the commissioner’s office in the evenings.
It goes without saying that this situation lead to jealously arising in both forces. In essence this jealousy
4
could be attributed to the significant overlap of authority and tasks between both forces, while they
were actually each firmly embedded in totally different structures (Vandevoorde, Vaerewyck, Enhus,
Ponsaers (2003).
What’s more, with the implementation of an internal reorganisation at the Gendarmerie and the levelling
of the pyramid structure, the Gendarmerie explicitly started to move towards a more community-oriented
operation. The internal reorganisation helped to guarantee a local police force in the neighbourhoods,
something that was considered by the municipal police as its own exclusive areas of operation. The
impression was given that competition was growing between these two police forces where winning
favour with the citizens was at stake.
Relationship between the Gendarmerie and the judicial police
The brief historical sketch given above already outlines the growing competition between the
Gendarmerie and the GPP. While the Gendarmerie had already existed since Belgian independence and
had never actually been deeply involved in criminal matters, the GPP was set up following long
discussions in Parliament in 1919, to act as an independent force whose objective was to carry out more
objective investigations. Therefore it is difficult to understand why the same legislature set up a
competitive force in 1957 without any reservations with respect to the Gendarmerie, called the brigades
with “Special Investigative Powers” (BOBs). Once again it concerned two forces with very similar
authority and tasks, which were operational over the national territory. In fact it was precisely these
circumstances that sowed the seeds for reform of 1998 (Bruggeman, Devroe & Easton, 2012).
Moreover, both these national police forces (Gendarmerie and GPP) competed to ingratiate themselves
with the municipal police, by feeding a judicial database whenever it arose. Both these national forces had
a central database where they recorded their own information, and with their information management
systems, both forces competed with each other simultaneously for the endorsement of the 589 municipal
police forces. This resulted in around 25% of the municipal police forces being linked to the Gendarmerie
database, and 25% being linked to the one belonging to the GPP (Beullens, Devroe &Ponsaers, 1996).
The remaining 50% of the municipal police forces did not record their data in any type of central database
at all. The consequence of this was a two-headed judicial information management situation that was
extremely competitive, but remained remarkably incomplete.
In the run up to the reform of 1998, the Gendarmerie was increasingly developing policies and a vision
for a proactive detective force aimed at a phenomenon approach (Ponsaers & De Kimpe, 2001). The
Gendarmerie increasingly distanced itself from this file-driven approach, and so the force scanned its
surroundings with a view to developing a proactive policy. This way of operating really went against the
grain as far as the GPP was concerned. Because of the public prosecutor's office, the force was very
reliant on the delivery of instructions, while at the end of the day, with its proactive work, the
Gendarmerie was operating more and more outside this controlling relationship. The GPP increasingly
felt that the Gendarmerie was profiling itself with its exclusive investigative work and applying working
methods that it was unable to develop in view of the tutelage of the public prosecutors’ offices.
Attempts to pacify the relationships between the various police forces
The problematic relationships between the three police forces prior to the reform emerges from the above.
The federal government made attempts to remedy the situation at different stages.
In ’94 the General Police Support Unit was set up. One of the conclusions already given in the
government plan of ’90 was that the fight against crime and public safety could no longer be carried out
efficiently as long as no overall and coherent policy for policing was made available, and as long as the
various police forces remained in competition with each other, sometimes with overlapping tasks and the
duplication of manpower and resources. A shared coordinating structure for the three general police forces
5
was the result of setting up the General Police Support Department. It was essentially about improving
cooperation and coordination between the three general police forces, and not a merger.
In 1994 the then socialist minister of Home Affairs issued a Royal Decree for the so-called minimum
security standards”. This decree laid down the criteria and conditions for determining (for each
municipality) the minimum number of police officers that a local force must have. The Royal Decree
respected “municipal autonomy” by allowing municipalities to make additional investments in
community policing. Although a minimum limit of capacity had to be respected if they wanted to be
eligible for specific federal financial concessions. In the same year and in an extension of the Royal
Decree for minimum standards, a comprehensive municipal community policingmemorandum was
added. In a new Royal Decree the concept was defined while taking into account, (1) achieving the
specified minimum security standard, and (2) realization and maintenance of a permanent 24/24
intervention force, either independently, or in cooperation with other municipal police forces. Forces that
were able to offer “comprehensive community policing” would be eligible for additional federal finance.
This system was called “inter-municipal cooperation” and it is clear with this system of communicating
issues between the Gendarmerie and the municipal police (c.f. supra), that the government was attempting
to make a breakthrough.
An evaluation of the inter-municipal cooperation was implemented by the legislature that same year. It
emerged that 83% of the municipal police capacity was involved in such collaborations. However this still
did not take away the fact that around 250 local forces were not participating in this voluntary exercise.
Moreover, it emerged that those municipalities who did participate in helping to develop the security
policy, took their efforts a stage further and consequently ended up with even higher scores, and
simultaneously it emerged that those who paid little attention or had no time to participate, were more
liable to have lower scores. It therefore appeared that the risk of divergent evolution was a reality. It also
had to be determined whether the Gendarmerie delivered disproportionate efforts in these lower scoring
municipalities, which with respect to budget was no longer justifiable from a federal point of view.
In 1995 and 1996 the Christian-Democratic/Socialist government took a different approach and the so-
called inter-policing zones (IPZs) were set up. In the meantime it became clear that the final solution
did not lie in more intensive cooperation between only the municipal police forces. With the
organisation of the IPZs, the territorial limits were described within which the three general police
forces (Gendarmerie, municipal and GPP) together chose to guarantee the entire community policing.
In other words, it involved a consortium of different police forces without police leaders losing
plurality for the various constituent elements of the consortium. The introduction of the IPZs also
coincided with the first official announcement of the aims for working in a socially targeted manner.
Once again the federal government set up a subsidy scheme for the forces that wanted to participate
voluntarily in the IPZ operation.
In order to avoid impacting on the “municipal autonomy” principle, the municipal councils had to
formally submit the entry of their municipality into the scheme and receive approval of their IPZ by
the Minister of Home Affairs. In the so-called Security Charter, an allocation of tasks had to be drawn
up regarding the organisation of the work among the police forces and had to be given in an annual
evaluation of the charter. In order for things to work properly, the supra-municipal IPZs submitted the
working agreements that had been made between the local mayors. At the time of the evaluation of the
IPZ operation, it was announced that the IPZ concept “was a stage in the gradual reorganisation of the
police system”. It is clear that the government wanted the IPZ operation to evolve into a gradual
reformation of the entire system. By the time of the intermediate roundup of 1997, it emerged that 202
IPZs could be defined that redeployed 529 of the 570 municipalities (92.8%) (Anciaux, Muylle &
Ponsaers, 1998).
Reform of the Belgian system itself
The run up to the fundamental reorganisation
6
The notorious child abductor and murderer Marc Dutroux was arrested on 13 August 1996. It
emerged that the police had lost a lot of valuable time during the investigation. The Dutroux case
seriously affected public opinion and again great pressure was put upon the politicians. The increasing
loss of legitimacy of the Belgian government was manifestly clear regarding the mistrust of the police
and justice system and the apparent impotence in the ability to turn this perception around. Dutroux’s
escape from the court building at Neufchâteau for a short period proved to be the straw that broke the
camel’s back. Despite the fact that he was spotted a short time later in woods in the south of the
country by a forest ranger and immediately rearrested, the public feeling remained that something
definitely had to be done. The so-called “white movement” came into being, originally out of
sympathy for Detroux's victims, but at a later stage as a protest movement against the inefficiency of
the police and justice system. Various demonstrations were held in Brussels and attended by hundreds
of thousands of citizens. The then ministers of Home Affairs (Socialist) and Justice (Christian
Democrat), as well as the commandant of the Gendarmerie all resigned. The Dutroux scandal seemed
to create a real need, a window of opportunity for fundamental reform. A parliamentary commission of
enquiry was set up (Devroe, 2012). Perhaps the reform would not have been set up so quickly and
been so significant and comprehensive were it was not for the Dutroux case.
Following on from these events, the Cabinet decided in December 1996 to set up a “Commission for a
more efficient policing structure”, the so-called expert commission. The original assignment of the
commission was as follows: “…This commission will investigate various possibilities for modernising
the federal police forces at both functional and structural levels with respect to their administrative
and judicial tasks". Followed by a significant closing line: “In essence it will not alter the structure of
the municipal police.” The government was too reticent to put in motion extensive reforms, mainly
because it was afraid of integrating the municipal police with the reform, thereby creating a
'blindfolded' federal force (Gendarmerie) that would no longer have powers over local developments.
The Dutroux parliamentary commission of enquiry lodged its report
4
, while the above-mentioned
expert commission started its task. They made a number of recommendations with respect to the
structure of the police system. The parliamentary commission of enquiry proposed the following aims:
an integrated community police force structured on two levels, i.e. a federal level and a supra-local
level. At federal level, the commission talked about the integration of the three general police forces
into a single police structure. At supra-local level, the geographical entity of the local level should
match the existing IPZs. However, the municipal autonomy and the central role of the local mayors
with respect to the police was (provisionally) left untouched. This was no coincidence. Many
parliamentarians were also the local mayors, the combination of both mandates is permitted in
Belgium. It was these local mayors who put up a fiery defence in Parliament of their local grip on the
police.
The government transferred the parliamentary commission of enquiry report to the expert commission.
The government shared the recommendations of the parliamentary commission of enquiry by
endorsing it and therefore agreed with “an integrated community police force structured on two
levels”. They requested the expert commission to propose specific provisos for implementing the
recommendations. The qualification regarding not including the municipal police in the reform was no
longer included in the new terms of reference. The resistance had been broken. The government did
not want to go against the grain of the parliamentary commission of enquiry that had build up a good
standing in the eyes of the public.
The proposition from the expert commission was issued in June ’97 (Huybrechts et al, 1997). The
commission was of the opinion that the integrated police structure would neither form a monolithic,
unified police force with complete centralisation of authority and responsibilities, nor the creation of
numerous independent supra-local forces. The commission suggested the appointment of a single
4
Report of the parliamentary committee of enquiry in the Dutroux-Nihoul case, 1996-1997.
7
police chief who would be in charge of and responsible for the complete integrated police structure.
However, not all the power and responsibilities should be concentrated in the hands of a single person.
Containment of these powers was provided so that erosion of the municipal autonomy or the powers of
the judicial authority would be avoided. The integrated police structure would consist of two policy
levels, whereby the most important emphasis would lie on both the supra-local (IZPs) and the federal
levels. An intermediate level was also provided, located at the level of the judicial region. This
intermediate level was however not considered as a policy level, and it was here that operational
coordination and matching between both policy levels had to be realized, but the level was not
involved in the format of the compulsory strategic plans that had to be drawn up. This was reserved
for the federal (National Security Plan) and the local (Zoned Security Plan) levels. The expert
commission expressly stated in its report the need for creating IPZs close to the municipal territory.
These IZPs should be answerable to specific criteria and among other things, group together a
maximum of 3 to 4 municipalities. The creation of zones would not longer be of a voluntary nature
and must lead to the complete coverage of the land area, albeit that this created the possibility for
negotiations between the local mayors involved prior to the final boundaries of the zones being
delineated.
Just a few days after the expert commission had issued its report, the Senate Commission for Domestic
Affairs in turn issued theirs. The commission stated briefly that starting out with the needs of the people
must be the basic principle of the new organisation of the police forces. This basic principle actually
fitted in with a clear form of community policing”. Shortly after the parliamentary recess at the start of
October ’97, the government eventually ended up with its proposal for reform with respect to Parliament.
The new integrated police force, structured on two levels
The so-called “Octopus Agreement” dated 23 May 1998 gave rise to the “Integrated Police Force on
Two Levels Act” (WG) of 7 December 1998 (Ponsaers, 2002). This involved not only the structure,
but it also thoroughly transformed the relationship with the authorities and furthermore, the manner in
which policing policy was implemented was given a facelift (Ponsaers & De Krimpe, 2001). The
police reform went together with an extensive regulatory framework within the areas of the law and
regulations. Ultimately nothing was written into the act with respect to Community Policing (COP),
and the COP was only cited in the Explanatory Memorandum of the act. It was two years after the
introduction of the act that COP (late) was explicitly introduced as the official vision. Therefore it lay
provisionally as a structural change in the act.
Since the introduction of the act, Belgium has had two types of police: A local police force and a
federal police force. The local and federal police forces together make up the integrated police.
Approximately 47,000 men and women are employed by the police
5
. Of that, approximately 39,000
are operation police officers. There are also approximately 8,000 employees without police powers
who mainly work in administrative and logistic support functions (the so-called Calog personnel).
Within the framework of integrated community policing, there are 'functional links between the two
police levels’ that are provided for by law. With respect to financing, the federal police are integrally
financed nationally, while the local police are financed from the local police budgets.
This reform was the first fundamental police reform in the history of the Belgian police (Bruggeman,
2001). The police organisation actually started at the federal police on 1 January 2001, with the local
police starting one year later. Nevertheless, there remains a number of outstanding issues, such as the
long expected financing act that still has not come into being.
At both levels - federal and local - the forces have a substantial measure of autonomy, although that
does not take away from the fact that they together must ensure integrated community policing”. It is
noticeable that the WGP has not given further specification to the allocation of tasks between the
5
Morphology of the police forces, CGL, www.infozone.be last consulted on 13 July 2012.
8
federal and local police forces. The act states that the local police provides basic community policing
at local level, and that they should fill some of the roles carried out by the federal police. The federal
police will therefore - bearing in mind the principles of subsidiarity and speciality - take care of the
special assignments from the administrative and judicial police, as well as specific support
assignments for the local police forces and the police authorities.
Also when these two levels are dependent on different authorities (Ponsaers, 2002). In order to realize
this rather difficult aim, the act lays down the functional connections between these two levels.
Responsibilities for operational, integrated community policing lies at the feet of the ministers of
Home Affairs and Justice. Moreover, there are two advisory bodies (federal police council and the
local mayors police council) and an advisory commission (permanent commission of local police,
where all police chiefs are represented by 16 of their number who have been selected), who must also
contribute towards the coordination and cohesion of the divided system.
Initial criticism
There was initially much criticism about the progress of the reform. It was considered to be radical,
although simultaneously also seen as being too quick, sloppy and badly thought-out. Prior to the new
police system coming into operation, there was already much criticism from many sides that
concerned both the content and processes. People pointed to the impracticality of a large proportion of
the smaller forces, the weak position of the coordinating managers at intermediate level and the
illogical organisation of many of the advisory bodies. There was doubt as to whether the conditions
existed for realizing such a significant reorganisation: “But comments such as these were wasted on
the minister involved: they remained firmly resolved in implementing the contents of the “Octopus
Agreement”, according to Fijnaut (2004).
Problems that arose after 2001 with the specific realization of the aims of the police reform, for the
main part could often be put down to the laborious consultations. Critics stressed that the efforts made
for the structural changes were very unilateral and that too little attention was given to the cultural
factors such as integration, business cultures, a shared vision of community policing, leadership and
training. Fijnaut (2003) stated that the Belgian police was ‘critically ill’. He observed later on, as a
reaction to the evaluation that the editor of Orde van de Dag had made: “The reorganisation cannot
easily be called a success, but it is not completely negative on all issues. In a limited number of
respects the new system works adequately” (Easton, Enhus, Ponsaers, & Van de Sompel, 2003).
Enhus and Ponsaers ascertained: ”Just under four years after very significant police reform, there are
still significant problems” (Enhus & Ponsaers, 2005).
This criticism was contested principally by De Ruyver (2002), who said that “the famous concept of
an integrated police force structured on two levels, did not land on the table completely out of the
blue”. According to him, the operation of the local police changed incredibly quickly in the meantime
and was in general experienced as being positive. More than 70% of the citizens who had had contact
with the local police forces were (very) satisfied, mainly because of the availability and accessibility,
but also because of the attitude and behaviour of the police.
A clear majority of citizens (80%) were of the opinion that the local police forces provided (very)
good service (Van den Bogaerde & Van den Steen, 2005). But in 2005 the federal police did not
achieve the desired (same) levels according to De Ruyver (2005). The federal police remained in
doubt and had misgivings about whether to expand support services to local policing zones and the
intermediate level, or expand its own federal operational functions, or expand the strategic think-tanks,
etc. In other words, the federal police took too long to position itself clearly within the wide area of
activity, which in many cases led to unwieldy bureaucracy and top-heaviness.
Evaluation after 10 years reform
9
In June 2008 the federal policing body received an order from the minister of Home Affairs to
evaluate the police reforms after 10 years. The order was mainly future-oriented. The evaluation was
principally based on a number of hearings from policy actors. However it was noticeable that the
academic community were not involved (Ponsaers, 2010b). Nonetheless, the academics mixed in with
the public debate uninvited (Bruggeman, Devroe & Easton, 2009; Bisschop, L., Devroe, E., Easton,
M., Ponsaers, P., Verhage, A., 2010).
Lines of force in the evaluation
The reform of the system was significant according to the report. The local police went from 621
police forces to 195 police zones. Octopus appeared to work in practice. The line separating the former
police forces appeared to have become extremely blurred in the meantime. There appeared to be
increasing satisfaction from the public. The local mayors and the judicial authorities spoke in general
about high levels of satisfaction regarding the operation of the reformed police. The evaluation also
concluded that the basic structure did not have to be curbed. The reform of the police system, based on
Octopus, had progressed further and is more successful than the reform of the justice system. This led
to a tensions appearing in the chain.
The reform is structurally more successful and has gone further than is the case at a cultural level.
There is a reasonably good exchange between the components of the integrated police force and the
flow of information has clearly improved. The general level of manpower seems to be sufficient to
implement the packages of tasks at an acceptable level. There is a shared concept regarding the vision
of which community policing has to be ensured (COP) and regarding the mission and the values of all
the police forces.
Just as it happens elsewhere in Belgium, the police reform was carried out in rounds. Recently a
number of modifications have been introduced (including a reduction in the number of general
directives from the federal police). There is currently little desire to introduce new, drastic reform of
the police system again. However the reorganisation has not solved the problem of the authority itself
(top heavy organisation).
Among academics there is relative consensus regarding the lines of force given in the evaluation
(Bruggeman & Ponsaers, 2009). Nonetheless warnings are increasingly being issued with respect to a
number of issues (Ponsaers, 2010a).
Recently, new polarisation between local and federal levels has been observed. This polarisation
demands greater alertness and additional efforts towards integration. There is a growing internal gap
being observed between the policy level and the policing work floor, which threatens to lead to
increasing demotivation and professional cynicism from the police field workers.
There is also a growing aversion to management concepts that appear to be too abstract. It is clear that
police officers on the work floor explicitly require a range of clearly described methods for dealing
with situations from which they can select when confronted with specific problems (Gunther Moor,
Peters, Ponsaers, Shapland, & Van Stokkom, 2009). In this, they want to be guided by the COP vision,
but request emphatically for the acknowledgement of a validated and negotiated space of their own for
dealing with issues. In the extension of this, it is repeatedly noticed in academic circles that COP has
entered policing policy circuits, although the vision is still seen to be too rigid. COP appears for many
police researchers to be an excellent basis to continue developing and to go even deeper, but without
having to go back to the foundations each time. While for police policy makers, it would appear to
have been elevated to a static standard of reference. Therefore, in the meantime, it is time to enrich the
COP cornerstones with new, additional insights (Van Branteghem, Van de Sompel, Ponsaers, &
Boekaert, 2007).
Points for consideration and improvement
10
The fact that the police reform has in general been seen as a success does not mean that the current
policing operations are good in their entirety, or have been given a pass mark for every issue,
according to the policing body. In the report mentioned it repeatedly demonstrates that it is necessary
to monitor individual fundamental balances and to maintain the equilibrium in police operations. This
mainly involves balance between: central control and uniformity on the one hand, and local autonomy
on the other, a preventative management strategy and a judicial repressive approach, operational
strength and democratic control and justification, a generalised approach and sufficient opportunity for
specialisation. Some of the issues remain problematic.
Control, authority and consultative bodies and implementing plans
The new control, authority and consultative bodies and working with long-term plans has ensured a
more systematic, phenomenon and results oriented thinking and acting. Consultation between the
administrative and judicial authorities and senior official of the police force is structured better and has
led to greater cohesion. There is now more openness and willingness to work together with different
partners. More control autonomy for local police has led to taking greater responsibilities. Quality
management and endeavouring to achieve efficiency were included as permanent concerns in the
organisation and running of the forces.
Senior officials
The chief of police and other senior functionaries in general operate well, according to the federal
police advisory body. Nonetheless there is still the need for improved training for senior officers in
preparation of taking up specific functions. There is mainly demand for support coaching initiatives.
The institute for leadership that is still to be set up must help police chiefs in their jobs and support
them in practising their functions. The Federal Policing Body has argued for the urgent reintroduction
of the initial restriction for mandate holders of a maximum of two consecutive terms of office in the
same function.
Excellent community policing
The federal policing body decides that joint community policing concepts exist, also the way in which
community policing should be provided, and the mission and values of all the police forces. The
“excellent community policing” concept that has still to be endorsed officially is an initiative for a
more integrated approach to community policing, information controlled community policing and
organisational developments. Effort is still required to take this initiative further.
Police capacity, HRM and culture
The general manpower appears in its totality to be sufficient to carry out the current tasks at an
acceptable level. The capacity of the local police has grown, certainly when taking into account
operational staff and administration and logistics personnel. The capacity of the federal police force
remains under pressure. The problem is naturally who should provide the capacity for a system of
communicating issues. The Federal Policing Body thinks that in the first place solutions must be found
through internal initiatives within the federal police itself, and secondly, through bringing up the actual
strength of the federal police to the maximum permitted level of manpower. Distribution of the
available capacity over the different police components must also be monitored and adjusted where
required.
The police structure
The system comprises of 195 very diverse zones According to many, some of them are too small.
Small police zones have difficulty in achieving the desired uniform quality and breadth of community
policing. Although there is currently little interest in making zone mergers obligatory, which could
affect the complex and sometimes vulnerable relationships between the local and federal police forces.
According to the federal policing body, scale corrections at the local police must remain limited to
supporting only those zones that voluntarily strive for scale correction. The federal police can strive
for further simplification and rationalisation.
11
Status
Bringing into line the various, original statuses from the different police forces resulted in additional
costs because of levelling upwards. This resulted in an “expensive police force”. The federal policing
body is of the opinion that over the long term every effort must be made towards introducing modern
personnel regulations, as well as a number of urgent status changes. The disciplinary regulations must
be simplified and initiatives are needed to improve levels of essential knowledge and for supporting
disciplinary authorities.
Finance, logistics & ICT
The Federal Policing Body warned that the federal government must not continue dealing with the
federal police in a step-motherly manner because of budgetary reasons, nor scale back donations for
the local police. If the federal police has sufficient means at its disposal, then the quantity and the
quality of the services can be kept up and where necessary, increased to the satisfaction of the
recipients of those services. The local authorities indicated problems regarding the municipal financing
of the local police, but these are not such that intervention by the federal government is necessary. A
legally based financial mechanism is urgently required for the local police. ICT remains a problem and
there is urgent need for a clear, sober strategy for upgrading and making it more customer-oriented and
also better integration of ICT applications for both the federal and local police forces.
Bureaucracy
The federal policing body demands that a lot more effort should be put into working more efficiently:
Continual awareness of combating bureaucracy making procedures and working methods as efficient
as possible, if necessary by changing the law or regulations the burden of planning and reporting
must be made as succinct and effective as possible. This all applies to assignments of both an
administrative and judicial nature. Many business processes within the police are undergoing thorough
evaluation and change.
Integrated working
It has been ascertained that there are problems with working together. This sometimes occurs between
the zones, although more often it concerns cooperation between local and federal police forces. The
functional (non-hierarchical) relationships between both components of the integrated police are not,
or just vaguely set down in law. There are reasonably good exchanges between the components of the
integrated police and the flow of information has greatly improved partly thanks to cooperation within
the district information crossroads
6
. The more institutionalised consultations between local and
federal police must be better able to guarantee reciprocal support between the various police forces.
Criminal investigation
Thanks to the merger of police forces, both the federal and local criminal investigation departments
have been strengthened and become more efficient. The criminal investigation management system is
a good policy instrument and deserves more attention. Monitoring and updating the specialised
investigation capacity must be fully supported by everybody. There should be a flexible and efficient
solution found for the operational capacity with respect to terrorism and made available to the federal
police.
District police
The district police has been expanded in most zones although it remains a concern in some places. The
number of district inspectors in many cases is insufficient. The quality of district policing must be
greatly improved in many zones, but has been mortgaged by the great variety of assignments
performed and the way it implements other basic functions.
6
These are centres at district level where information coming from various police forces are brought together and checked for
correctness and quality.
12
Maintaining public order
Further optimisation with respect to maintaining public order and equipping a national reserve at the
federal police must be continually revised. It is anticipated that the consequences of the current social
situation and the strategy taken by the police forces regarding ‘negotiated management of public
spaces’
7
, allows the police to deal with most events in an adequate manner. Measures must be taken at
the federal police for creating a stronger reserve force to deal with exceptional and crisis situations
with their own resources. The efforts needed for rationalising and professionalising the many security
and protection assignments also require extra input.
Traffic
There is a need for increasing efforts with respect to traffic safety. The total number of speeding
checks that were proposed through the various policy responsibilities will probably be achieved.
Efforts for maintaining traffic safety (preventative and repressive) must come up to European levels
especially for motorways.
Border control and international cooperation
The border controls must be strengthened where necessary, with specific attention being paid to the
airport and marine police forces. The operational, international cooperation carried out by local and
federal forces requires particular attention, mainly within the framework of future developments at
European level.
Inspection and supervisory services
The federal must police must also completely organise internal supervision. There is an urgent need
for it to be matched better structurally and where possible, be complementary to the various
supervisory services. Regulatory and legal initiatives are required.
Conclusion
The Belgian police reform was more radical that was initially intended. A number scandals
contributed to this and added pressure to such an extent that the reform became urgent and
unavoidable (Ponsaers, 2008). The pressure of public opinion on the political decision making process
was unheard of. In general it can be said that the reform has been a success, although there still remain
many points for improvement.
There is mainly a requirement for more academic support, particularly cooperation with universities,
and initially it should involve expanding the revision of police training (Ponsaers, 2012). There is no
doubt that the restructuring of police training to a higher level of quality is a difficult task (Devroe,
2010).
The big question remains what the level of sustainability is for the reform. Experience from the last
few years has shown us that the system has made progress over a number of issues. The sustainability
of this however, depends mainly on the measure to which the points for improvement are dealt with.
To date, the political reaction to the evaluation report remains inadequate. The question remains as to
whether the conclusions contained in the evaluation report will lead to concrete actions.
One of the central questions remains the size of the local police zones (Boels et al, 2011). Wherever
the Federal Policing Body has a strong inclination to keep things as they are, many reports and
opinions appear that cause even more problems for the structure. There are great differences of
opinions between the zones. Zones that are too small have difficulty in guaranteeing a minimum level
of community policing and whether or not this includes quality specifics for the basic functions must
be permanently monitored. This focuses on the question of the extent to which the police zones can
provide a “minimum level of service” at the same level over the entire area, and also what is the
7
This is a term that was used in the National Security Plan (2012).
13
critical minimum. The question was also asked earlier about whether it might have been better to
create twenty zones instead of the current 195 (Goossens, 2001).
The Standing Police Monitoring Committe
8
(Comité P) is also of the opinion that the debate about the
survivability of the smaller zones should not continually be avoided. From an administrative point of
view the larger zones represent deterioration, but operationally they can lead to improvements. But
opinion remains divided regarding the how and wherefore of the eventual intervention with respect to
the size of the zones (Collier et al, 2005). It appears in every way that the organisation of the six police
zones of the Brussels-Capital Region is an anomaly that must be put right, which may give cause for a
sort of “Brussels Metropolitan Police” to be created, after the example in London and taking in the
entire territory of the region (Van Outrive, 2002).
The Belgian Court of Audit has also attempted to evaluate the critical size of the police zones (Court
of Audit, 2004) and confirmed that the discussion concerning the size of the police zones was attained
in the meantime by way of the dynamic of the inter-zonal (lateral) police collaboration. In practice, the
protocols and agreements exceed the local levels with the federal police units also being included.
There are many zones that solve their problems by making collaborative agreements between the
zones. In this context it is perhaps important to provide extra content to the notion of “police care
regions”. It must be guaranteed that the citizens living and working in both the rural and urban areas
can benefit from similar levels of police force.
Each police zone must also have a minimum operational, administrative and logistic workforce, that
depends on the long-lasting acceptance of similar specific features in each of the zones. Parameters for
determining the scale of the zones must therefore be based on the smallest possible workable scale
size. Voluntary mergers of police zones is now being encouraged and most observers consider that
zone mergers should not be obligatory. The zones that merge voluntarily must therefore be given
assistance in order to become successful.
In conclusion we can state that the overview in this chapter dealing with the history, the reform itself
and its evaluation in Belgium, contains a whole range of items for discussion and further debate, and
offers possible links for comparative studies between the various reformed, national systems.
Researchers wanting to delve deeper, will find out that the Belgian system remains one of the most
locally-based systems within the European context. In that sense it is and will remain an extremely
unique system.
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... Some of these, for example, the Danish (Balvig and Holmberg, 2013a), Dutch (Terpstra and Fyfe, 2015), Finnish (Vuorensyrjä, 2018) and Scottish reforms (Fyfe and Scott, 2013) have been evaluated by independent researchers. Others, for example, the Belgian (Devroe and Ponsaers, 2013), Norwegian (Difi, , 2019 and Swedish reforms (Statskontoret, 2016(Statskontoret, , 2017(Statskontoret, , 2018 have been subjected to some type of governmental evaluation. ...
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The paper provides an overview of recent police reforms in Denmark, Norway and Sweden, including what is known about the results of those reforms. The reform processes in the three countries are quite similar. The number of individual police districts is drastically reduced, strong centralized management is introduced, and reforms are expected to yield additional manpower though rationalization. To date, however, the results do not live up to expectations; reforms are hard realize in the expected time, resources are scarce, local policing is hard to maintain, and police performance and efficiency do not seem to increase. The paper offers two related explanations for the lack of results. First, all three reforms place emphasis on centralizing police management, regardless of the problems they are expected to solve. Second, a staple of Scandinavian police reforms is the quest for viability; police districts must be large enough to handle all eventualities. Even though the concept of viability has changed over the past 50 years, it is still at the core of reform plans. The paper concludes with a discussion about the possibility of ever achieving police viability.
... g) The calling-in of the Belgian army for specific monitoring 1 Royal Decree, January 28, 2015. 2 Royal Decree, December 28, 2006 concerning specific limiting measures against certain persons in the struggle against the financing of terrorism. 3 Directive of August 21, 2015. ...
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In 2013, we reported on the reform process in Belgium in Fyfe, Terpstra and Tops Centralizing Forces [1]. On March 22, 2016, Belgium was confronted with the most dramatic act of terrorism in its history. In this article, we sketch the consequences of these events on the police system and to what extent these events have transformed the community-oriented policing (COP) philosophy on which the police reform of 1998 was based.
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The fascination with ancient flora and fauna is a centuries-old phenomenon and is one of the main drivers of fossil crimes. Fossils have been sought by the rich and famous since the advent of colonialism, propelling development in the field of palaeontology but also in how fossils make their way through various, sometimes illegal, corridors to end up in museums and collections across the world. As demand for fossils increased in the nineteenth century, so did commercial avenues for these objects that were being sold not only to private individuals but also to scientific institutions. The most complete and visually impressive fossils in terms of size or uniqueness determine the market value of these fossils with some selling for millions of United States dollars. This has also led to the tampering or forging of fossils by many dealers in an attempt to inflate prices. While fossil crimes have been prevalent for centuries, the legal frameworks within which these crimes can be controlled or stopped are regularly challenged or even circumvented not only due to the lack of enforcements of these regulations but also due to how paleontological objects are classified in the first place as well as other legal loopholes.
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Bár a döntés már 1998-banmegszületett róla, idén 20 éve, 2001. január 1-jénindult útjára a belgiumi rendészeti reform. A társadalmat megrázó, súlyos bűncselekmények kudarcos kezelése miatt legitimációs válságba sodródó rendőrség néhány év alatt visszanyerte a közösség bizalmát. A közösségorientált rendészeti filozófián alapuló egységes nemzeti rendőrség nem csupán a rendészettudomány nemzetközi és hazai művelőinek általános elismerését vívta ki, hanem iránytűként szolgált az ezredforduló Európájának több rendőrségi átalakulása – így a holland, a skót, a svéd vagy az északír rendőrség reformja – számára. Tanulmányom első részében a belga rendészeti törvény, a témában született értékelések, a tudományos szakirodalom, valamint – különösen a jelenlegi helyzet bemutatása során – a belga rendőrség működéséről született újságcikkek feldolgozásával részletesen elemeztem a belga rendészeti reform előzményeit, a reform utáni belga rendőrség felépítését, valamint működése ellenőrzésének rendszerét. A második részben a változásoknak a rendészet pluralizálódását érintő vonatkozásait, valamint a belga rendőrség és a belga rendészeti rendszer értékelését ismertetem a reform első tíz évét követően és napjainkban. Az elemzés során fókuszba helyezem a rendészeti reformokat életre hívó okokat, az egységes nemzeti rendőrség demokratikus működésének biztosítását szolgáló intézkedéseket, a helyi és nemzeti biztonsági érdekek érvényesülését és az ezredforduló rendészeti reformjainak jelenlegi helyzetét. Mindezekből következtetéseket kívánok levonni arra, hogy az ezredforduló idején született rendőrségi reform miként működik a mai biztonsági problémák kezelése során.
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Bár a döntés már 1998-ban megszületett róla, idén 20 éve, 2001. január 1-jén indult útjára a belgiumi rendészeti reform. A társadalmat megrázó, súlyos bűncselekmények kudarcos kezelése miatt legitimációs válságba sodródó rendőrség néhány év alatt visszanyerte a közösség bizalmát. A közösségorientált rendészeti filozófián alapuló egységes nemzeti rendőrség nem csupán a rendészettudomány nemzetközi és hazai művelőinek általános elismerését vívta ki, hanem iránytűként szolgált az ezredforduló Európájának több rendőrségi átalakulása – így a holland, a skót, a svéd vagy az északír rendőrség reformja – számára. Tanulmányom első részében a belga rendészeti törvény, a témában született értékelések, a tudományos szakirodalom, valamint – különösen a jelenlegi helyzet bemutatása során – a belga rendőrség működéséről született újságcikkek feldolgozásával részletesen elemeztem a belga rendészeti reform előzményeit, a reform utáni belga rendőrség felépítését, valamint működése ellenőrzésének rendszerét. A második részben a változásoknak a rendészet pluralizálódását érintő vonatkozásait, valamint a belga rendőrség és a belga rendészeti rendszer értékelését ismertetem a reform első tíz évét követően és napjainkban. Az elemzés során fókuszba helyezem a rendészeti reformokat életre hívó okokat, az egységes nemzeti rendőrség demokratikus működésének biztosítását szolgáló intézkedéseket, a helyi és nemzeti biztonsági érdekek érvényesülését és az ezredforduló rendészeti reformjainak jelenlegi helyzetét. Mindezekből következtetéseket kívánok levonni arra, hogy az ezredforduló idején született rendőrségi reform miként működik a mai biztonsági problémák kezelése során.
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Western Europe has been confronted with several terrorist attacks over the past years. This dissertation investigates what happens after such attacks. Scholars emphasise that terrorism is not just about killing, as terrorists want to capture the attention of the audience. Yet, what these audiences do after attacks has remained understudied. This dissertation looks into the meaning-making process after jihadist attacks in Brussels, Nice, Berlin and Manchester (2016-2017). The study focuses on two core actors groups - the authorities and citizens - and the use of frames, rituals and symbols. Special attention is paid to the first day, the first week and the first anniversary of the attack, for which the author has visited the commemorations. Overall, this dissertation shows how terrorism is not a successful communication strategy. After performing the opening acts, the terrorists are quickly pushed off stage, doomed to stand behind the curtains and watch a different play unfold.