Article

From Group Identity to Political Cohesion and Commitment

Authors:
To read the full-text of this research, you can request a copy directly from the author.

No full-text available

Request Full-text Paper PDF

To read the full-text of this research,
you can request a copy directly from the author.

... According to Tajfel (1981), national identity is an individual feeling of belonging to a social group (Tajfel, 1981). Therefore, national identity refers to a thermometer of the feeling of attachment to a national group or a cognitive awareness (Huddy, 2013;Huddy et al., 2007). ...
... In times of perceived threats, previously benign group identities can morph into more adversarial forms characterized by hostility towards outsiders. As a result, during periods of perceived national vulnerability, native citizens tend to display a heightened and more positively charged national identity among fellow compatriots, concurrently exhibiting less favourable dispositions towards foreigners (Huddy, 2013(Huddy, , 2016Mummendey et al., 2001;Sniderman et al., 2004). ...
... Scholars suggest that the perceived threat to a nation's integrity and cultural heritage can wield considerable influence as a national threat, giving rise to heightened antagonism and bolstering endorsement of xenophobic governmental measures (Huddy, 2013). This notion is corroborated by Sniderman et al. (2004), who present compelling empirical support. ...
Article
Full-text available
The academic literature showed an increasing interest in studying the link between national identity and anti-immigrant sentiment. This work is based on ten countries from the International Social Survey Program (ISSP) dataset for two different waves: 2003 and 2013. The paper aims to analyse the influence of the three facets of national identity (nationalism, political patriotism, and cultural patriotism) and other socioeconomic traits on attitudes towards immigrants (ATI). Untried methods in social science based on the fuzzy-hybrid analysis (FHA) and the fuzzy clustering are used first to analyse citizens according to their levels of openness towards immigrants, nationalism, cultural patriotism, and political patriotism. Then, the ordered probit model is applied to thoroughly examine the intricate relationships connecting the three facets of national identity and individual sociodemographic characteristics with ATI. The results show that the national identity and cultural patriotism constructs negatively influence ATI, while political patriotism positively influences ATI. In addition, country, political orientation, age, religion, economic situation, gender, place of birth, principal status, and education are crucial factors that explain ATI.
... Gender identity includes the way people de ne themselves personally with respect to gender (Wood & Eagly, 2015), the way that they attach to their gender group socially, and, most importantly, the way that they view their gender group as having political importance (e.g., Gurin, 1985). People might be particularly likely to adopt gender-based self-categorization when gender is salient and/or situationally relevant (Huddy, 2013). ...
... According to this model, as women (or any group) perceive injustice to their group, women's identi cation with other women as a politically important group emerges as a powerful predictor of collective action. The subjective group identi cation that women feel toward each other, combined with shared grievances that they attribute to a bad system, constitute a set of feminist beliefs (Gurin, 1985;Huddy, 2013;Simon & Klandermans, 2001), where feminist identity can be de ned as "the politicized version of a female identity" (Huddy & Willmann, 2021, p. 6). The #MeToo movement provides an example of the politicization of gender identity. ...
... Conceptualizing gender in terms of group membership and identity also improves insight into political participation and activism (Huddy, 2013;Simon & Klandermans, 2001). Feminists and women who feel personally connected to political events were more likely to participate politically (Duncan, 1999;Duncan & Stewart, 2007). ...
Article
This volume contains 30 chapters that provide an up-to-date account of key topics and areas of research in political psychology. In general, the chapters apply what is known about human psychology to the study of politics. Chapters draw on theory and research on biopsychology, neuroscience, personality, psychopathology, evolutionary psychology, social psychology, developmental psychology, cognitive psychology, and intergroup relations. Some chapters address the political psychology of political elites—their personality, motives, beliefs, and leadership styles, and their judgments, decisions, and actions in domestic policy, foreign policy, international conflict, and conflict resolution. Other chapters deal with the dynamics of mass political behavior: voting, collective action, the influence of political communications, political socialization and civic education, group-based political behavior, social justice, and the political incorporation of immigrants. Research discussed in the volume is fueled by a mix of age-old questions and recent world events.
... Gender identity includes the way people de ne themselves personally with respect to gender (Wood & Eagly, 2015), the way that they attach to their gender group socially, and, most importantly, the way that they view their gender group as having political importance (e.g., Gurin, 1985). People might be particularly likely to adopt gender-based self-categorization when gender is salient and/or situationally relevant (Huddy, 2013). ...
... According to this model, as women (or any group) perceive injustice to their group, women's identi cation with other women as a politically important group emerges as a powerful predictor of collective action. The subjective group identi cation that women feel toward each other, combined with shared grievances that they attribute to a bad system, constitute a set of feminist beliefs (Gurin, 1985;Huddy, 2013;Simon & Klandermans, 2001), where feminist identity can be de ned as "the politicized version of a female identity" (Huddy & Willmann, 2021, p. 6). The #MeToo movement provides an example of the politicization of gender identity. ...
... Conceptualizing gender in terms of group membership and identity also improves insight into political participation and activism (Huddy, 2013;Simon & Klandermans, 2001). Feminists and women who feel personally connected to political events were more likely to participate politically (Duncan, 1999;Duncan & Stewart, 2007). ...
Chapter
This volume contains 30 chapters that provide an up-to-date account of key topics and areas of research in political psychology. In general, the chapters apply what is known about human psychology to the study of politics. Chapters draw on theory and research on biopsychology, neuroscience, personality, psychopathology, evolutionary psychology, social psychology, developmental psychology, cognitive psychology, and intergroup relations. Some chapters address the political psychology of political elites—their personality, motives, beliefs, and leadership styles, and their judgments, decisions, and actions in domestic policy, foreign policy, international conflict, and conflict resolution. Other chapters deal with the dynamics of mass political behavior: voting, collective action, the influence of political communications, political socialization and civic education, group-based political behavior, social justice, and the political incorporation of immigrants. Research discussed in the volume is fueled by a mix of age-old questions and recent world events.
... Ethnicity, religion (and religiosity), and education all correlate strongly with voting behavior. These demographic categories are identities that help inform an individual's "self-concept" (Huddy, 2013;739). Achen and Bartels (2016: ch. ...
... Members who are attached to the group feel anger when their group is threatened and joy when their group is successful. Not all groups to which individuals belong inspire such attachments, and not all identity groups take on a political valence (Huddy, 2013). But some identities do become politicized and many people also adopt partisan identities. ...
Article
Full-text available
The work of Vernon Smith and his collaborators that has come to be associated with the label “humanomics” offers both substantive and methodological amendments to economic theory. On the substantive level, humanomics offers a theory of human agency that is distinct from both neoclassical and behavioral economics. On the methodological level, humanomics cautions against blindly importing assumptions useful to economic theorists into the minds of the individuals whose behavior we seek to explain. Substantively, we argue that expressive voting is best understood as what political scientists call identity voting. Most voters do not have underlying policy preferences to which politicians cater. Rather, they have social identities that are constituted by synchronized moral sentiments. We apply both amendments to the public choice theory of voting, synthesizing empirical evidence showing that identity trumps issues. We argue that the public choice attachment to issue voting illustrates some of the methodological pitfalls that Smith identifies.
... As a multinational and multicultural country, Canada is comprised of multiple distinct national and cultural groups, including English and French Canadians, Indigenous Peoples and longstanding and more recent immigrants, and the observed salience of many of these identities has led to the foregrounding of these groups and their dynamics in examinations of social identity in Canada (Lalonde et al., 2016). Social identity theory suggests that the cohesion of these groups may be shaped, at least in part, by perceptions of threat to the in-group by out-groups (Brewer, 2007;Huddy, 2013). For example, Québécois identity is heavily shaped by Francophone Quebecers' perceptions of threat to their identity, attributed to forces such as the dominance of the English language, declining birthrates among French Canadians and immigration (Lalonde et al., 2016;Turgeon and Bilodeau, 2014). ...
... More broadly speaking, social identity implies more than just objective group membership; it involves the integration of that group into one's identity or sense of self (Tajfel and Turner, 1979;Tajfel, 1981), and stark political and policy divisions among groups may be present-based, for example, in material concernseven where these groups do not constitute salient social identities for their members (Huddy, 2013). Thus, while we have substantial evidence of group divisions in political behaviour in Canada-studies show Canadians are politically divided along a number of group lines, including province and region, urban-rural geography and education (these divisions are discussed in detail below)-we cannot deduce from the presence of these divides that they are rooted in a deeper sense of group identity. ...
Article
Full-text available
Recent political developments in established democracies have renewed attention to the politics of identity. Some commentators have expressed concern that polities are fracturing along increasingly narrow social identity lines, in the process, losing their ability to build solidarity around shared commitments such as redistribution. This article takes stock of the strength of Canadian social identities and their consequences for redistributive preferences. It asks: first, which group memberships form the basis of Canadians’ perceptions of shared identity, and second, do these group memberships shape preferences for redistribution? This study answers these questions using two conjoint experiments that assess respondents’ perceptions of commonality and support for redistributing to hypothetical Canadians who vary on multiple dimensions of identity and need. Findings support that Canadians perceive greater shared identity with some of their groups (their social class) over others (their region or ascriptive identity), but that they overwhelmingly prioritize redistributing toward those who need it over those with whom they share group memberships.
... Others insist that mere membership of a social group is not sufficient but that a positive identification with the group is necessary for a representational link to exist (e.g. Huddy, 2013;Bejarano et al., 2021). The existence and nature of a unified group identity among disabled people remains contested (e.g. ...
... Future research should examine how the political context, for example the extent to which a group is under threat by policies or other societal forces (cf. Huddy, 2013), as well as politicians' own representative claims can shape which identities citizens seek out in their representatives. The role of political parties needs to be considered here as well; given that disabled candidates are stereotyped as left-wing, disability identity might be considered less salient among right-wing politicians. ...
Article
Full-text available
Studies have shown that citizens from minoritized groups, including women and people of color, tend to feel better represented by politicians who share their identity, often translating into electoral support. Is this also the case for disabled people, one of the largest yet often ignored minority groups in our societies? Analyses of data from a conjoint survey experiment with 6,000 respondents in the UK and US show that disabled people indeed feel better represented by disabled candidates. This representational link does not require a sense of group identity and is only partly explained by perceptions of shared policy preferences. The study also reveals that non-disabled people feel better represented by non-disabled candidates. The findings highlight the relevance of disability as a political identity, bolstering calls for more disabled people in politics, and might help explain the disability gaps in political trust and participation.
... On the other hand, national identity is a subjective or internalized sense of belonging to the nation (Huddy and Khatib 2007;Huddy 2013). National identity describes attachment to one's nation that excludes foreign counterparts. ...
... For example, among individuals that strongly associate their selves with their nation, the nature of that attachment can range from a purely inward-looking sense of love that does not entail a sense of dominance over others (e.g., an analogy often drawn here is one of families and childrenlove for one's children does not involve a sense of dislike for others' children; in this sense it is purely inward-looking). This kind of separation has been noted by researchers as certainly plausible, as national identity is an attachment to one's country with no necessary implication for how one feels towards other countries (Huddy 2013;Mummendey, Klink, and Brown 2001;Sniderman, Hagendoorn, and Prior 2004). In other words, while national identity can generate a sense of liking for co-nationals, this does not necessitate hatred or prejudice toward outsiders (Hopkins 2001;Huddy and Del Ponte 2019). ...
Article
Full-text available
Research has found that affirming national identity can encourage the public’s trust toward a foreign adversary. On the other hand, aggressor states have attempted to recategorize identity by promoting a superordinate identity that includes both aggressor and defender states. In comparison with national identity affirmation, we test how effective emphasis of a common identity might be in the context of Russia-Ukraine and evaluate the scope conditions under which such a strategy may backfire. We propose that the effectiveness of the two identity affirmation approaches should differ across people with varying levels of national chauvinism. We expect that high-in-chauvinism individuals will experience more worldview-conflict when exposed to promotion of superordinate identity. Experimental findings on Ukrainians’ trust toward Russia in 2020 suggest a policy that emphasizes a common identity can backfire among highly chauvinistic Ukrainians in the Western region. This indicates that recategorizing one’s nation as a member of a larger group may fuel resistance among individuals with a sense of nationalistic superiority. By contrast, highlighting Ukrainian national identity boosted trust toward Russia even among the more chauvinistic respondents in the Southeastern region. This study helps identify the scope conditions of identity affirmation as a way to increase trust in international relations.
... The mechanism related to realistic interest theories, in turn, centres on protecting shared material interests (Bobo, 1983;Huddy, 2013). Such migration-related interests include, for instance, access to public welfare or employment, where discrimination can provide distinct threats to the individual or group material interests. ...
... The effect of discrimination can have different directions depending on individual-level explanations or the type of discrimination one faces. Drawing further on social identity theories, an individual can choose to leave their social group for another when the value of the group is threatened, but the possibility to do so and thus strive for a more highly valued group membership depends, to some extent, on external labelling; you may have difficulties leaving the group if others perceive you as being part of the group, for instance, due to skin colour or cultural practices (Huddy, 2013;Tajfel and Turner, 1979). Consequently, a symbolic threat could theoretically increase feelings of national belonging among some immigrant groups as a way of signalling assimilation with the native majority identity, but decrease feelings of national belonging to the host community among those immigrants where appearance or cultural background is more distinct from the native majority, since the possibility to leave the targeted group is limited. ...
Article
Full-text available
How are immigrants’ feelings of inclusion and trust in political institutions affected by interactions with the host society? In a field dominated by observational correlation studies, I use a survey experiment in two national contexts to test how perceptions of discrimination and expressions of pro-immigrant support influence non-Western immigrants’ political trust and national belonging. Following standard experimental procedures to test the hypotheses, I attempt to prime perceptions of group discrimination by asking questions about unfair treatment. Expressions of pro-immigrant support are, in turn, primed with facts about public and institutional support for immigrants’ rights. The results from the survey experiment are in line with expectations from prior work in some subgroups and underline the importance of equal treatment to achieve social cohesion. They also paint a rather complex picture of discrimination and its psychological impact. These findings have substantial implications for our understanding of host societies’ roles in immigrant inclusion.
... Such transformation is not an easy task. It needs social transformation in many economic, social, and political phenomena (Huddy, 2013). This means that the exercises of politics in society should not mainly depend on the identity of individual or group but should be on rational judgment. ...
... Different empirical studies have been conducted, and the results show that socio-political practices like democracy, justice, freedom, instability, violence, wars, and succession are mainly affected by identity politics (Alumona & Azom, 2018;Béland, 2017;Gergen, 1997;Moss & Tronvoll, 2015;Oyero et al., 2017;Yunespour, 2011). According to Huddy (2013), identity politics is the identification attributed to politically relevant groups. This group includes political groups, ethnic groups, and pressure groups. ...
Article
Full-text available
Zanzibar has had a long unsettled political history from its colonial era to radicalized post-colonial politics. The core source of such politics is the cosmopolitan nature of the isles whereby races and identities reside on the island for a long time. Such nature made the political and social groups categorized and differentiated from others through identity. As a result, the struggle for the owner and ruler of the island becomes a high concern among the groups in the society. This situation resulted in turbulent politics for many years with violence, killings, and hostility. In 2010, Zanzibar inters in the negotiation to solve the political problem that marred the island for a long time. The Government of National Unity (GNU) which involves the sharing of power between the first and second winners was agreed upon as the structure of the leadership style of Zanzibar. This was done through referendum and constitution amendment. As political identity theory reveals that; political elites use identity groups for their political benefits. They organized and influence their political activities through the identity they are familiar with. So, in solving such an identity politics problem, the identity tragedy must be transformed and accommodated the rational politics. This paper seeks to examine the extent to which power-sharing transforms identity-based politics and is accommodated in Zanzibar. The study was conducted in three districts to represent Zanzibar. Both qualitative and quantitative data were collected from five in-depth interviews and two hundreds and eight seven questionnaires respectively. The in-depth interviews involved the GNU's current and former top leaders, members of the Cabinets, and political activists. The questionnaire involves the citizens from districts Mjini, Micheweni, and Kusini. The study found that to some extent the power-sharing successes in reducing the exercises of identity politics in Zanzibar. Three angles have been justifying that reduction. First is the existence and increase of political trust in society to large extent. The second one is the equal treatment of all identity groups, races, and regions by government institutions and society. The Last one is the exercises of political activities without the influence of historical and identity political narrations. This study pinpoints two important aspects of transformational identity politics through power-sharing. The first one is the role of leadership in transforming the mindset and bringing people together. The second one is social change due to generations' natural changes and opportunities. The study concludes that power-sharing can be the source of identity transformation from worst uses to recognition in the society. This will happen only if the power-sharing institution is set to consider the potentiality of mutual recognition of self and respecting social, cultural, and ideological differences in society.
... 72 Strong group identifiers, for example, react more angrily to group threat. Thus, "strong American patriots reacted with greater anger towards terrorists in the lead-up to the Iraq war." 73 And third, specific emotions predict specific action tendencies, such as attacking in anger and apologizing in guilt. 74 While general prejudice toward a group predicts attitudes toward policies regarding the group, "specific emotional reactions toward the relevant group tended to predict policy attitudes above and beyond general prejudice toward the group." ...
... Notably, identification with a social group does not require objective group membership, that is, membership based on a set of clear rules or features (Huddy, 2013). Rather, people can self-identify with a group even if they do not meet normative criteria for group inclusion. ...
Article
Full-text available
In this article, we consider the potential associations between feminist identity and willingness to adopt vaccine-related COVID-19 mitigation efforts. Recognizing that individuals’ pandemic experiences were highly gendered and that the costs of the pandemic were distributed asymmetrically between men and women, we theorize that individuals espousing a commitment to feminist ideals were more likely to adopt behaviors intended to mitigate disease risk during the pandemic. We empirically validate our hypotheses by analyzing data from a large, nationally representative multi-wave survey of US respondents deployed in early 2022. The results of these analyses suggest that feminist identity is associated with beliefs and behaviors relating to a range of COVID-19 vaccination mitigation efforts. Notably, this relationship holds for both women and men, highlighting the role of identity independent of sex. Thus, identity-based public health policies might be one means to overcome public skepticism during future pandemics.
... 11 Plausibly, respondents may have found our treatments more affectively compelling if the virus were perceived as posing a more urgent existential threat. On the other hand, by 2021 there was a much greater volume of factual information about the vulnerability of social minorities to COVID-19, and this information was widely disseminated by 10 For a discussion of the relationship between subjective identification and emotional reactivity to group threats, see Huddy (2013). 11 A more detailed description of the status of COVID-19 in Wales at the time of fielding is available in the Online Appendix. ...
Article
Full-text available
This study explores the impact of vulnerability appeals during the COVID-19 pandemic using a nationally representative, preregistered survey experiment ( N = 4,087) conducted in mid-2021. We explore whether providing citizens with information about the vulnerability of ethnic minority and disabled citizens to COVID-19 fosters empathy and increased support for behavioral restrictions. We observe minimal statistically significant or substantive effects, although the presence of subtle effects cannot be entirely ruled out. We identify some limited indications that individuals with disabilities exhibit increased support for restrictions when exposed to information about the vulnerability of disabled people to COVID-19, but these effects are inconsistent. Therefore, our findings provide limited evidence to confirm or rule out that using vulnerability appeals alone is effective for influencing public attitudes toward behavioral restrictions. The findings point toward avenues for future research, including a closer examination of heterogeneous responses to public health messaging among population subgroups.
... That claim is fairly close to the theory of political identity. As the political version of social identity (Huddy, 2002(Huddy, , 2013, political identity has three components: cognitive, evaluative, and emotional unity (Tajfel, 1972). Political identity is based not only on common knowledge and values but also on the positive emotions that link one to the political community. ...
Book
This book explores how to identify and understand moral emotions—shame, guilt, pride, and hubris—in political messages and news media. Recognizing these emotions is crucial for assessing morality's role in public discourse, particularly as moral debates have deepened public divides on issues like abortion, migration, LGBTQ+ rights, and freedom of speech. These debates fuel political struggles between groups with different social values and moral intuitions, especially during election campaigns where moral conflicts are used to distinguish opposing forces. In these moral conflicts, each ideological camp seeks to affirm its legitimacy while questioning its opponents' reputations. Thus, understanding morality is vital for those interested in contemporary public discourses in divided nations. This book stimulates discussion on emotion-based morality, moral language, and discursive moral regulation in politics. It offers innovative analytical frameworks to study how political communication contributes to public moralization. The book combines descriptive, explorative, and comparative approaches to summarize findings from mixed-method analyses (qualitative and quantitative, textual and visual, content and survey) of moral emotional messages and media portrayals of prime minister candidates during Hungary's 2022 General Election Campaigns. Hungary serves as an illustrative case due to increasing concerns about the moral status of its political elite and extreme hostility between political blocs, leading to polarized views on governance. This book will be of interest to academics specializing in empirical moral studies and investigating public discussions in contentious and polarized societies.
... That said, this literature indicates two scope conditions for the success of group-based appeals. 2 Firstly, voters must identify with the group targeted by the appeal, and the appeal must make this identity salient and imbue it with political meaning (Huddy 2013). Secondly, group members need to see themselves in conflict with the out-group of the appeal and harbour resentment against this out-group. ...
Article
Full-text available
Group-based identities are an important basis of political competition. Politicians consciously appeal to specific social groups, and these group-based appeals often improve the evaluation of parties and candidates. Studying place-based appeals, we advance the understanding of this strategy by distinguishing between dominant and subordinate social groups. Using two survey experiments in Germany and England, we show that group appeals improve candidate evaluation among subordinate (rural) voters. By contrast, appeals to the dominant (urban) group trigger a negative reaction. While urban citizens’ weaker local identities and lower place-based resentment partly explain this asymmetry, they mainly dislike group-based appeals because of their antagonistic nature. If the same policies are framed as benefiting urban and rural dwellers alike, candidate evaluation improves. Thus, people on the dominant side of a group divide reject a framing of politics as antagonistically structured by this divide, even if they identify with the dominant group.
... Research has also found that strong ideologues demonstrate more perceptual bias in policy evaluations (Devine, 2015;Mason, 2018). A strong ideology also generates increased defensiveness in the face of group threats (Huddy, 2013). For instance, Huddy et al. (2015) showed that group-based threats conveyed in electoral settings generated strong emotions and led to increased political engagement, particularly among strongly ideologues. ...
Article
Full-text available
For corporations engaged in corporate social advocacy (CSA), establishing legitimacy among publics is challenging when they take stands along clear ideological lines on controversial issues. This study examined two questions: (1) how would the congruence between individuals' political ideologies and corporations' CSA stances influence perceived CSA legitimacy; and (2) how would individuals' political ideology strength moderate this relationship? A computational analysis was conducted to examine individual-level ideological congruence and perceived CSA legitimacy in six real-world CSA events. Pairing sentiment analysis with a self-trained model for individual ideology detection, this study cross-analyzed naturalistic data generated by 5181 ordinary users involved in the CSA events on Twitter. It was found that individuals' perceptions of corporations involved in CSA were highly dependent on the extent to which their own political ideologies were congruent with the corpora-tions' CSA stances. Also, the influence of ideological congruence was amplified among individuals with stronger political ideologies. However, CSA legitimacy perceptions can be highly situational, with individual events potentially yielding varied results depending on factors such as the issue's socio-historical context. This study overall demonstrates the important role that individual-level political factors can play in influencing publics' CSA legitimacy perceptions. This study also highlights the feasibility of using cutting-edge computational methods in assessing publics' voices on social media as a source of CSA legitimacy.
... Our account simply does not need such entities. Such parsimony in social ontology is associated with work on collective intentionality (Bratman, 1992;Gilbert, 1990;Searle, 1990) but for reasons we will return to, we instead want to emphasize the role of collectivized self-perception in collective agency that has been identified by political and social psychologists as a crucial element to large-scale mobilization (Brewer, 1991;Fisher et al., 2013;Huddy, 2013). ...
... For instance, a Democrat who is pro-immigration is more prototypical than a Democrat who is anti-immigration; a Democrat who enjoys eating vegetarian food is more prototypical than a Democrat who eats wild game they hunted themselves; and a Democrat who listens to R&B music (e.g., Beyoncé) is more prototypical than one who listens to country music. Prototypicality can also be signaled through one's rank in the group-specifically, leaders of political parties tend to be seen as prototypical of their party (Huddy, 2013;Mughan, 2000). Political leaders are typically chosen or elected to represent the interests, values, and goals of members of their political party. ...
Article
Full-text available
A fast-growing body of research finds that receptiveness to opposing political views carries reputational benefits. A different body of research finds that opposing political views and the people who hold them are seen as repugnant. How could it be that people receptive to opposing political ideas are viewed positively when the political opponents they are receptive to are seen negatively? In seven main (N = 5,286) and nine supplemental studies (N = 3,983 participants in online studies; N = 124,493 observations in field data), we reconcile this tension by arguing that the identity of the person one is receptive to determines whether receptiveness carries reputational benefits or costs. When the information source belongs to the opposing party, receptiveness to opposing political views often carries reputational costs. We find these reputational costs across both strong and weak signals of receptiveness, eight different political and social issues, and multiple types of prototypical out-party sources. We argue that these costs arise because members of the opposing party are frequently stereotyped as immoral, and thus receptiveness to their ideas is seen negatively. As a boundary condition, we find that the costs of receptiveness are pronounced for sources who are prototypical of the out-party and attenuate (or even reverse) for sources who are nonprototypical. These findings resolve a seeming contradiction between two distinct literatures in psychology, contribute to a rapidly expanding literature on the interpersonal consequences of receptiveness, and lay the groundwork for understanding novel barriers to, and ultimately solutions for, the lack of cross-party openness and political polarization.
... We theorize that partisans can be persuaded to support prosocial behaviors and attitudes through messaging that invokes interrelated components of Americans' partisan identities: antipathy toward members of the out-party (so-called "negative partisanship" (Abramowitz and Webster 2018)) and, relatedly, a strong emotional aversion to the prospect of losing elections to that out-party (Huddy, Mason, and Aarøe 2015). We therefore hypothesize that partisans may increase vaccine openness if the COVID-19 vaccine is framed as a means of protecting the inparty from electoral defeat to the out-party in upcoming national electionsi.e., protecting the group from a viable threat to its status in the political realm (Huddy 2013). With Republicans being disproportionately skeptical of vaccines and also disproportionately impacted by COVID-19 in terms of their physical health (Wood and Brumfiel 2021), it is plausible that the asymmetric impact of COVID-19 across partisan lines has affected, and will continue to affect, electoral margins (Wood and Brumfiel 2021). ...
Article
Full-text available
Attitudinal differences among partisan identifiers are commonplace in the American political landscape. As a prominent example, group identities such as Republican party identification increasingly inform attitudes against vaccination. What kinds of frames can counter this powerful influence of partisanship on citizens’ attitudes? Recent research suggests that, in some cases, leveraging – rather than circumventing – partisan motivations may serve to reduce attitudinal differences, including differences in attitudes toward vaccination. We apply this logic to the partisan gap in openness to the COVID-19 vaccine specifically. Using this important issue as a test case, we theorize that partisans’ psychological aversion to electoral loss presents a unique opportunity for the deployment of framing messages designed to increase vaccine openness. We therefore analyze the effects of a “Shot to Win” (STW) message, which frames vaccination as a means of ensuring that a party’s members remain healthy enough to vote and defeat the opposing party in upcoming elections. Results of a pre-registered survey experiment provide evidence that STW messaging increases Republican identifiers’ openness to COVID-19 vaccination across a variety of attitudinal and behavioral outcomes. More broadly, these results exemplify how partisan identity might be effectively leveraged in service of the public interest.
... This perspective is not entirely novel. Popular understandings of parties as defenders of specific social groups rather than custodians of particular ideological traditions have long been acknowledged (Butler and Stokes 1974;Campbell et al. 1960), and such theories have resurged in recent years (Huddy 2013), especially within the USA where associations of 'Democrat' or 'Republican' with particular ethnoreligious identities are deeply ingrained (Achen and Bartels 2017). Put simply, awareness of the 'sort of people' that each party tends to help is often more widespread than accurate knowledge of politicians' stances, ideology, and policies (Achen and Bartels 2017;Butler and Stokes 1974, 336-7;Campbell et al. 1960;Smith 2019), and assessments of the links between parties and social groups seem to help shape political identities (Ahler and Sood 2018). ...
Article
Full-text available
Like much of the European centre-left, Britain's Labour Party has struggled to appeal to its former core working class support base in recent years. However, this is largely a failure to connect with the ‘white working class’ (WWC) specifically, whereas support among ethnic minorities remains robust. We hypothesise that Labour could be experiencing a ‘trade-off’, whereby efforts to cater to minorities harm its perceived ability to represent WWC interests. We test this thesis by examining whether WWC voters are more likely to view minority and working class representation in zero-sum terms and shun Labour when they associate the party with minority interests. We show that the WWC are somewhat less likely to view working class and ethnic minority representation as strongly correlated, and Labour's perceived ability to represent minorities is negatively associated with WWC support. This is not (primarily) about ethnocentrism. Instead, we suggest that ‘relative political deprivation’ is crucial.
... The importance of social identities to political attitudes and behaviors is uncontested (Huddy, 2013). They predict in-group preferences and can also foster hostility and discrimination toward outgroups, for example. ...
Article
Full-text available
Social identities, such as identification with the nation, are regarded as core variables in explanations of political attitudes and behaviors. In these accounts, increases in the importance of an identity such as “Englishness” are often seen to be accompanied by decreases in the importance of other, more inclusive, identities such as “British” or “European.” At the same time, increases in exclusive national identities like “Englishness” present challenges to democratic states because they are associated with preferences such as support for Brexit and intolerance of outgroups. Yet we know comparatively little about the relative importance to individuals of different social identities, the extent of changes in the strength of those social identities with contextual shifts, the interrelationships between different social identities, and the influences on different social identities. In this paper, we address each of these questions using a five-wave online panel study administered over two years of the COVID-19 pandemic in England from 2020 to 2022, in which we asked about the importance of eight identities—Europeanness, Britishness, Englishness, the local area, gender, age, race/ethnicity, and social class. We show that national identity is consistently less important to individuals than the social identities of gender and age, though more important than race/ethnicity and social class. We also show that there were general increases in identification with almost all these groups during COVID. We consider why and discuss the implications for our understanding of increases in the strength of national identity as a challenge to democratic states.
... Because of the above, researching how various affective communities are exposed to information sources in hybrid media environments (Chadwick, 2013) becomes essential. This involves exploring how "identification with politically relevant groups, including political parties and national, ethnic, linguistic, or gender groups" (Huddy, 2013) influences the consumption of information, making it an imperative undertaking in communication studies. ...
Article
Full-text available
This paper is the first review of selective exposure studies in Spain, offering comprehensive insights into the diverse findings and analytical strategies employed over almost three decades by studies that explore the politically oriented media consumption of Spanish audiences. The article divides the evolution of this research line in Spain into two main phases –an initial phase (1995-2016) and a consolidation phase (2017-present)– according to the methodological approaches used during each period. Despite the challenges posed by working with secondary data and the lack of experimental designs, we note a robust initiation of this research line in Spain, accompanied by increasing methodological sophistication and diversification and a substantial accumulation of evidence on how Spanish audiences selectively consume like-minded news media. The paper also identifies the blind spots of selective exposure research in Spain, such as the scarcity of primary data sources, which overlooks phenomena such as online selective exposure and selective avoidance, the need to supplement multivariate analyses with other techniques that allow the direction of causal influence between variables to be established, and the significance of assessing the role of public media as facilitators or inhibitors of cross-cutting exposure. Resumen Este trabajo es la primera revisión de los estudios sobre exposición selectiva en España, ocupándose de exponer los diversos hallazgos y estrategias de análisis utilizadas a lo largo de casi tres décadas por aquellos trabajos que exploran el consumo de medios políticamente orientado de las audiencias españolas. El artículo propone dividir el desarrollo de esta línea de investigación en España en dos grandes fases –una de arranque (1995-2016) y otra de consolidación (2017-actualidad)– a tenor de las aproximaciones metodológicas empleadas en cada período. A pesar de las rigideces derivadas de trabajar con datos secundarios y de la ausencia de diseños experimentales, se constata el sólido arranque de esta línea de investigación en España, la creciente sofisticación y diversificación metodológica y una acumulación considerable de evidencia sobre cómo las audiencias españolas se exponen selectivamente a medios ideológicamente afines. El trabajo identifica también los puntos ciegos de la investigación de la exposición selectiva en España, tales como la escasez de fuentes primarias de datos, la desatención de fenómenos como la exposición selectiva online y la evitación selectiva, la necesidad de complementar los análisis multivariantes con otras técnicas que permitan establecer la dirección de la influencia causal entre las variables, y, finalmente, la pertinencia de evaluar el papel de los medios públicos como facilitadores o inhibidores de la exposición transversal.
... Research has shown that people's identification with certain social groups can influence their political preferences and voting behavior. Studies have highlighted the impact of social identities such as race, ethnicity, gender, and social class on voting decisions (Huddy 2013;Plutzer and Zipp 1996). Individuals often align their voting choices with the interests and perspectives associated with their racial and ethnic identities. ...
Article
Full-text available
The voting decisions of a population are vital in forming the political structure of a country. Recognizing what influences voters’ selections is key for politicians, candidates, and those crafting policy. This article offers an examination of different factors that shape voting choices within the American populace. Through a comprehensive synthesis and analysis of various studies, this review seeks to give an understanding of the principal elements that drive voter conduct. Additionally, it looks at what these factors mean for democracy and proposes possible directions for continued research.
... With respect to partisanship, Feldman (2003) argues that political attitudes can serve as a shorthand for individuals' underlying values, making political party affiliation a socially-salient membership signifier for communities of practice. Passionate members of national partisan groups often make decisions based on emotional grounds, Huddy (2013) argues, further giving politicians the power to steer political identity of a party through language. As a result, politicians help define and shape a community's values, granting them a degree of power that not all public speakers possess. ...
Thesis
Full-text available
I examine Peninsular Spanish politicians’ use of performative style, a sociolinguistic variable permitting identity formation, using a sociophonetic approach. While all speakers style-shift between prestige and non-prestige variants, politicians in particular use language both to reflect social position and to appeal to voters. Using quantitative and qualitative methodologies, I examine variation in Andalusian and Madrid Spanish, determine how style-shifting occurs at the individual level, and consider how Andalusian voters perceive political speech. Using a composite approaches, I determine that speakers’ use of linguistic resources differs by political affiliation and gender. Stage one of the analysis tracks how 32 peninsular politicians produce ten regional phenomena associated with Andalusian Spanish. While geographic and linguistic factors condition variation, additional social factors including speaker gender, political party, interlocutor gender, and age also explain variation. In Stage two, politicians were examined using Lectal Focusing in Interaction, tracking regional variation and style-shifting over time. Liberal politicians used moments of regional peaks as a means of emphasizing working-class solidarity, while conservatives used regionalisms more performatively to convey southern and friendly indexical meaning. Finally, the perceptual instrument in stage three showed how Seville listeners applied different criteria to community and political speech, evaluating regional variants positively, and associating them with female liberal and male conservative voices. The composite results suggest the rising populism in Spain is leading to a change, whereby conservative voices produce more Andalusian features than liberals, and young listeners associate regional speech with the political right. Meanwhile, female politicians navigate a web of indexical meaning, avoiding the stigma of overly vernacular speech while using regionalisms to craft unique identity. While there is an automaticity to the unmarked register of political speech that follows pre-established norms and expectations, politicians can also agentively sidestep them at times to perform identity work. This finding deepens our understanding of political discourse and Andalusian Spanish, presenting a methodology for in-depth examination of a speech community. This dissertation offers a means of generalizing beyond geographical and linguistic contexts, offering insight into stance accumulation and the connection between perception and production. (Also available through open-access at https://scholarworks.iu.edu/dspace/handle/2022/29362)
... Thus, a political identity can be defined as a social identity based on a common political view or one that has clearly become political through the norms of a political group that governs the views and actions of its members. From this perspective, the political identity paves the way to expand group-based political solidarity and cohesion (see Huddy, 2013) that can be shaped by race, colonialism, different economic class, and so on (Ramon, 2017). ...
Article
Full-text available
This paper examines the relationship between the political and ethno-national identity of Kurdish university students in Iranian Kurdistan, also known as Eastern Kurdistan or Rojhelat. It aims to investigate the ways in which the Kurdish identity contributes to and influences the formation of political identity among these students within the legal and political context of Rojhelat. The findings reveal a significant correlation between the Kurdish identity and the political identity of the students. However, despite the strong presence of Kurdish identity in the social sphere of Rojhelat, it remains largely invisible in the official or legal-political sphere of Iran. The paper argues that the existence of a non-democratic political regime in Iran, which has prioritized Farsi and Shiite identities, has imposed limitations and restrictions on the visibility and representation of other identities, including the Kurdish ethno-national identity, in the legal and political domains.
... The theoretic framework we develop to interpret our experimental results draws on insights from two literatures on the psychology of interminority relations. The first body of work we consult is social identity theory (SIT) and its offshoots (Turner et al., 1987;Huddy, 2001Huddy, , 2013. According to this broad literature, the categorization of individuals into ingroups and outgroups generally devolves into the expression of ingroup favoritism: an attitudinal and behavioral bias toward one's category or ingroup (Tajfel et al., 1971). ...
Article
Full-text available
Research suggests that solidarity between people of color (PoC) is triggered when a marginalized ingroup believes they are discriminated similarly to another outgroup. This evidence has primarily focused on Asian Americans, Latinos, and Middle Eastern people, who are systematically discriminated against as foreigners. Yet evidence remains absent on Black people, who are systematically discriminated against as inferior, but not as foreign. Using a pair of pre-registered experiments with Black and Latino adults (N = 2060), we manipulated a shared sense of discrimination as inferior (“second class citizenship”). This treatment measurably increased Black solidarity with PoC, which then significantly boosted their support for pro-Latino policies (e.g., less Border Patrol agents along US-Mexico border). This pattern was reciprocated by Latinos, whose heightened solidarity with PoC increased their support for pro-Black initiatives (e.g., endorsing #BlackLivesMatter). Sensitivity analyses further establish this pathway’s viability. We discuss the implications for more effective coalition-building among racially minoritized groups in US politics.
... This expectation is consistent with extant theorizing. For instance, Huddy (2013) notes that out-group hostility is especially likely to arise when a group is threatened (Brewer & Caporael, 2006) and that (perceived) threat activates the link between in-group identity and out-group hostility (Brewer, 2007). Recent work shows that partisans are more likely to develop a negative partisan identity if their party is portrayed as losing (Bankert, 2021). ...
Article
Full-text available
Americans view their in-party members positively and out-party members negatively. It remains unclear, however, whether in-party affinity (i.e., positive partisanship) or out-party animosity (i.e., negative partisanship) more strongly influences political attitudes and behaviors. Unlike past work, which relies on survey self-reports or experimental designs among ordinary citizens, this pre-registered project examines actual social media expressions of an exhaustive list of American politicians as well as citizens’ engagement with these posts. Relying on 1,195,844 tweets sent by 564 political elites (i.e., members of US House and Senate, Presidential and Vice-Presidential nominees from 2000 to 2020, and members of the Trump Cabinet) and machine learning to reliably classify the tone of the tweets, we show that elite expressions online are driven by positive partisanship more than negative partisanship. Although politicians post many tweets negative toward the out-party, they post more tweets positive toward their in-party. However, more ideologically extreme politicians and those in the opposition (i.e., the Democrats) are more negative toward the out-party than those ideologically moderate and whose party is in power. Furthermore, examining how Twitter users react to these posts, we find that negative partisanship plays a greater role in online engagement: users are more likely to like and share politicians’ tweets negative toward the out-party than tweets positive toward the in-party. This project has important theoretical and democratic implications, and extends the use of trace data and computational methods in political behavior.
... 2) Ideological criterion: it is necessary to take into account the ideological component (erst, the state ideology must be formulated, which reflects the images of the past, present and future of the country, the "ultimate goal" must be determined, the achievement of which is directed to the state policy, the ideals of the development of a democratic state must be formulated, etc.) in the process the formation of a fundamental type of political identity (Devine, 2011). 3) Legal criterion: the formed system of legal and democratic norms in the state, which is enshrined in the Constitution and fundamental laws, should contribute to the development of democratic values and the education of the political identity of citizens, to ensure the level of legitimacy of state institutions and the process of identification of citizens, to spread of uniform rules of behavior and coexistence in society due to the conditions of the valid political and democratic regime (Hogg & Reid, 2006;Huddy, 2013). The legal norms are required to outline the primary principles of regulation of the political life of the population, which would contribute to the consolidation of society and full law enforcement, whilst also required to comply with the basic norms and criteria of international law, and in case of violation or non-fulfillment of laws, an appropriate system of sanctions must be implemented. ...
Article
Full-text available
The problem of historical memory as a factor of uniting the past, present and future, consolidating modern Ukrainian society, and ensuring political stability is relevant in our time. The purpose of the study is to define the regularity of the state of development of democratic values as a basis for the consolidation of modern Ukrainian society based on the reports "Democracy Index", "Democracy Perception Index" and "Freedom in the World" by means of regression analysis. Research methods: comparative analysis; systematization; regression analysis; generalization. The results. After conducting a regression analysis, it was defined that the value of the coefficient of determination testifies to this. The 88% regression model reflects the direct dependence of the state of development of the democratic regime in Ukraine on the state of the electoral process and pluralism and civil liberties. The study showed that the full-scale invasion of the Russian Federation had a positive effect on the consolidation of modern Ukrainian society. According to the survey, 77% of Ukrainians claim that things in Ukraine are going in the right direction, 80% are proud of their country, 64% of respondents believe that friendly relations between Ukrainians and Russians cannot be restored. 56% of respondents believe that the main goal of the Russian invasion is the destruction of the Ukrainian people.
Chapter
This chapter presents how the losers of the 2022 elections helped the supporters process the failure emotionally. The public communication by the leading politicians, the friendly media, public intellectuals, and experts is analysed according to the image reparation strategies defined in public relations literature by William Benoit. The results show that the communicators preferred the following strategies: shifting blame, referring to defeasibility, promising corrective action, and expressing mortification. Some actors used the strategy of denial based on separating their own party from the camp as a whole. As during the campaign previously, the fierce criticism against the political right proved to be the most recurrent theme in processing of the defeat.
Article
A tanulmány azt mutatja be, hogyan dolgozta fel az ellenzéki összefogás politikai közösségének a nyilvánosságban megjelenő része a választási kudarcot. A pártokból, politikusokból, médiából, szakértőkből és közírókból állónak definiált tábor vereségkommunikációját a public relations irodalmában definiált egyik imázshelyreállító stratégiaarzenál alapján írjuk le. Eredményeink szerint az alkalmazható kommunikációs irányok közül a megszólalók elsősorban a következő stratégiákat alkalmazták: áthárítás, kivitelezhetetlenségre hivatkozás, korrigáló cselekvés és beismerés-bocsánatkérés. Meglepő, ugyanakkor végül is érthető módon bizonyos kommunikátorok a vereség tagadásával is próbálkoztak, jóllehet ilyenkor a saját szervezetet elválasztották a tábor egészétől. Ahogyan a kampány során, a kudarc feldolgozásakor is a jobboldal éles bírálata volt a leginkább közös motívum.
Article
Full-text available
The conflict between the Perso‐Shiite state and its opposition, especially Kurdish political organizations in Iran/Eastern Kurdistan, and their subsequent suppression, has led to the migration of many Kurds since the early 1980s. This exodus has affected their political identification. Here, changes toward nationality and citizenship in the attitude of the first‐generation Kurdish immigrants with a leftist political background living in Germany, The Netherlands, Sweden and France will be analyzed. From the perspective of the relationship between individual and political organization, state and society/community, it seeks to uncover that how these migrants think about different collective political identities, how their views have changed, and which collective social identity has had most impact on shaping their political view. Following a qualitative approach, data were collected through in‐depth semi‐structured and focus group interviews. The findings show that the interviewees within the extra‐organizational Kurdish convergence in Europe have tried to reidentify themselves politically by moving away from the political climate of Iran, while Kurdishness shapes their view on nationality and citizenship. Although the European states officially recognize them as Iranian nationals, they themselves see this as an imposed citizenship. In their current situation, many of them, while emphasizing their Kurdish nationality and wishing for Kurdistani citizenship, prefer to be recognized only as citizens of European countries and not be attributed to Iran.
Article
Full-text available
This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the cc by 4.0 license. Kurdish Studies Journal 2 (2024) 62-90 Abstract This article examines the tendency towards political individualism and its impact among first-generation political immigrants with a leftist political background from Iran/Eastern Kurdistan (Rojhelat) living in Western Europe, from the perspective of individuals' political identity in terms of relations with political organizations and their ideological stance. Following a qualitative approach, data was collected through semi-structured in-depth and focus group interviews with members and ex-members of political parties. The findings show that, as a result of leaving Iran's political climate as well as Kurdish political organizations, and with the influence of a new political culture, many interviewees have adopted individualized politics based on their own opinions and self-interest. The immigrants have found a multi-dimensional political view that simultaneously pays attention to the ethno-national, class, and gender issues of Kurdish society.
Article
Full-text available
Bitcoin is regarded as a remarkable achievement of the Fourth Industrial Revolution and ranks among the most intricate technological and financial creations. It has long been the focus of attention of investors who are looking for a safe-haven asset. The purpose of this study is to check whether Bitcoin plays the role of a safe-haven asset (hedge). To achieve this, the impact of economic and political uncertainty (EPU) on the return and variation of Bitcoin is investigated. It is being analyzed whether, in comparison with the development of EPU, the returns and variations of Bitcoin show characteristics typical of safe-haven assets or those of ordinary speculative assets. As EPU levels elevate, it is anticipated that safe-haven assets like gold will see a rise in both their returns and variation, whereas typical speculative assets will experience heightened variation and diminished returns. The study uses ordinary linear regression and quantile regression models that cover data for the period between February 2013 and July 2023. These models play a crucial role in ascertaining if Bitcoin functions as a safe-haven asset during turbulent times and if it holds the capacity to serve as a hedge against economic uncertainty. The results of the study are of paramount importance for investors, as they help them decide whether to include Bitcoin in their portfolios for diversification and protection of their capital during unstable economic conditions.
Chapter
Can we be good partisans without demonizing our political opponents? Using insights from political science and social psychology, this book argues for the distinction between positive and negative partisanship. As such, strong support for a political party does not have to be accompanied by the vilification of the opposing party and its members. Utilizing data from five different countries, Bankert demonstrates that positive and negative partisanship are independent concepts with distinct consequences for political behavior, including citizens' political participation and their commitment to democratic norms and values. The book concludes with the hopeful message that partisanship is an essential pillar of representative and liberal democracy.
Article
Актуальність. Феномен «соціальна згуртованість» залишається в переліку актуальних проблем суспільного розвитку майже всіх країн світу. Забезпечення та посилення соціальної згуртованості стали важливими цілями в суспільному дискурсі, ухваленні політичних рішень, а також в академічній роботі. Зростання інтересу до соціальної згуртованості в Україні зумовлюється сприйняттям загроз, пов'язаних з війною, яка спричинила дестабілізацію соціальної ситуації в різних сферах суспільного життя, що, безперечно, вплинуло на соціальну згуртованість. Особливої актуальності набуває питання сприяння соціальній згуртованості суспільства не лише під час війни, а й у повоєнний період. Мета: проаналізувати характер та еволюцію досліджень соціальної згуртованості; з’ясувати базові розбіжності в її визначеннях під кутом зору формування простору відповідної проблематики та означення її психологічних вимірів. Методологія. Стаття є оглядовою і спирається на теоретичні узагальнення. В основу роботи покладено метод психологічного реконструювання як теоретичного дослідження змістової і структурної архітектоніки конструкта «соціальна згуртованість», що процедурно сприяє виокремленню формально-логічних і змістових ознак досліджуваного феномену. Результати. Здійснено реконструкцію змістової і структурної архітектоніки конструкта «соціальна згуртованість», представлених у межах різних академічних досліджень. Встановлено, що попри значні розбіжності в тлумаченні соціальної згуртованості є певний консенсус щодо визначення цього поняття. Насамперед це стосується спільного розуміння, що соціальна згуртованість – це багатовимірний конструкт, який можна вимірювати на кількох (мікро-, мезо- і макро-) рівнях. Наразі практично всі дослідники дотримуються думки, що соціальна згуртованість, хоч і перебуває під впливом індивідуальної поведінки та ставлень, є атрибутом, який описує соціальні сутності, а не окремих людей. Соціальну згуртованість концептуалізовано як груповий атрибут, який визначається обсягом і силою взаємних позитивних настановлень між людьми в групі. З’ясовано, що окремі аспекти соціальної згуртованості емпірично пов'язані з моделями соціальної взаємодії та співпраці, а також зауважено зв'язок концепцій соціальної згуртованості із психологічними конструкціями стійкості та вразливості. Виокремлено психологічні виміри соціальної згуртованості: соціальне залучення, довіра, відчуття належності та соціальна взаємодія. Перспективи подальших досліджень полягають у проведенні якісних досліджень, які контекстуалізують соціальну згуртованість, що сприятиме розробленню психологічних засад згуртованості суспільства та розробленню програм підвищення якості соціальної згуртованості.
Chapter
This chapter reviews the literature on the intersection between prejudice and politics, focused largely on prejudice and politics in the United States. The first two sections of the chapter spell out the meaning of “race” and then “prejudice.” The next section reviews what we have learned recently about the decline of biological racism, the meaning and measurement of modern racism, and the growing interest in the political relevance of implicit racism. The following section, and the heart of the chapter, summarizes evidence on the part played by prejudice in shaping the political lives of Americans on consequential matters. The final section considers, in light of recent events in the United States (and elsewhere in the developed world), the prospects for democracy in a society divided by race.
Chapter
This chapter grapples with the political psychology of minority status by focusing on the attitudes and actions expressed by groups who are subordinated based on race, gender, sexual orientation, or other stigmatized attributes. We call on political psychologists to develop more unified theories that study the growing array of subordinated groups, with the goal of isolating the psychological mechanisms behind their politics . We model one response to this call by drawing on social identity theory and its offshoots to illuminate some of the cognitive and affective roots of minority status and its implications for inter- and intra-group behavior in politics. We discuss the micro-foundations of minority group formation, the structural roots of minority status, and, most critically, the connections between minority status and political attitudes and behavior. We conclude by discussing three broad areas where scholars can use these insights to (re)invigorate debates in studies of minority group politics.
Chapter
This chapter presents a literature review expanding research on political socialization to development of political attitudes and behavior over the full life course . The fundamental question is the extent to which, and under what conditions, early experiences leave predispositions that dominate later experiences. It first addresses development of political attitudes and behavior in the preadult years, and then traces development through the adult years. Four models are contrasted: persistence , impressionable years (including generational and collective memory effects), lifelong openness, and effects unique to particular life stages. It makes a case for the persistence and impressionable years models as explanations for adult party identification and racial attitudes .
Article
Full-text available
Tulisan ini dilatar belakangi oleh maraknya pencitraan dan identitas politik yang dilakukanoleh para politikus untuk memenangkan suara rakyat. Oleh karena itu, untuk mendapatkangambaran yang komprehensif tentang permasalahan tersebut, maka, metode yangdigunakan adalah literature review atau tinjauan pustaka. Penelitian kepustakaan ataukajian literatur (literature review, literature research) merupakan penelitian yang mengkajiatau meninjau secara kritis pengetahuan, gagasan, atau temuan yang terdapat di dalamtubuh literatur berorientasi akademik (academic-oriented literature), serta merumuskankontribusi teoritis dan metodologisnya untuk topik tertentu. Dalam mengatasi isu pencitraandan identitas politik, diperlukan upaya untuk membangun pemahaman yang lebih baiktentang isu-isu politik dan menciptakan ruang untuk dialog antara kelompok-kelompok yangberbeda identitas politiknya Dengan demikian, akan didapat pembuktian bahwa pentingbagi para politisi dan partai politik untuk membangun citra diri yang kredibel dan terpercayadi mata masyarakat, dengan tetap memperhatikan faktor-faktor yang mempengaruhiidentitas politik dan pencitraan di Indonesia.
Chapter
This handbook is currently in development, with individual articles publishing online in advance of print publication. At this time, we cannot add information about unpublished articles in this handbook, however the table of contents will continue to grow as additional articles pass through the review process and are added to the site. Please note that the online publication date for this handbook is the date that the first article in the title was published online. For more information, please read the site FAQs.
Article
Full-text available
В этой работе мы представляем результаты измерения и анализа динамики мотивации участников протеста против объявленных результатов президентских выборов в Республике Беларусь в 2020 г. Кампания рассматривается на всем протяжении ее активного развития: с августа по декабрь. Опираясь на достижения социальной психологии протестных движений, мы разработали авторскую методику анализа сообщений в социальных медиа. Она предполагает соотнесение наиболее популярных (набравших наибольшее число репостов) постов с тремя ключевыми мотивациями (антецедентами) протестного участия: гневом, идентификацией с протестным движением и верой в его успех. Такое соотнесение осуществлено посредством формализованной кодировочной процедуры с участием 12 независимо работавших кодировщиков. Полученные динамические ряды, соответствующие выраженности каждого из антецедентов в последовательные моменты времени, мы сравниваем с развитием уличной протестной активности. Для измерения последней мы также предлагаем авторскую методику расчета индекса явки, или T-индекса (turnout index, T-index). В качестве базового временно́го периода – и для мотивации, и для уличного протеста – выступает одна неделя; всего проанализировано 18 недель. Ключевой результат состоит в том, что наиболее тесную связь с динамикой уличной активности имеет динамика веры в успех протестного движения. Для обоих процессов наблюдается значительный рост в первые недели протестной кампании, за которым следует постепенное затухание. Антецедент “гнев” сохраняется в целом на постоянном уровне, а антецедент “протестная идентичность” имеет скорее положительную либо n-образную динамику.
Chapter
In this chapter, after defining the main concepts (including populism and pop music), we shall discuss some analytical guidelines (at the macro, meso and micro levels) in order to explore the likely connection between popular music and populist politics. We shall also consider some main hypotheses (of the connection) from the literature on political mobilization and social movements (and protest music and/or music in politics) as well as research on parties and political communication, within which this research on the connection between popular music and populist politics is based. In addition to this, we will examine insights from cultural studies and sociology, which will help us to elucidate on the reception side. We will look specifically too at the influence of the political, cultural and ‘music market’ opportunities in the Italian national context where populist groups operate, the music that is listened to and the characteristics (material and symbolic resources) of the different types of populist organizations. Additionally, we will discuss the role of popular music as a space of affordance (of political engagement), emotions and political participation, music as a collective ritual and celebrity politics. We shall continue the chapter by describing the research methods and empirical material (sources) on which this book is based, and we will conclude with an overview of the content of the volume.
Article
Full-text available
Two studies (N = 126, N = 114) of African Americans supported a model predicting that more racially segregated life contexts are associated with feelings of acceptance by other in-group members and, to a lesser extent, rejection by out-group members. In-group acceptance and out-group rejection in turn influenced identification with the in-group, which was a strong predictor of psychological well-being. Alternative models were not supported. Results suggest that environments that are segregated offer in-group support and acceptance, thereby protecting self-esteem against possible perils of rejection by a powerful out-group. Findings suggest that the improvement of intergroup relations should not be at the expense of intragroup relations.
Article
Full-text available
In two separate studies with Israeli and with German sudents, we examined whether 1) the usual intergroup biases predicted by social identity theory characterize relations between these groups, 2) perceived value similarity is related negatively to intergroup antagonism, as suggested by belief congruence theory, and 3) particular value stereotypes are associated with intergroup antagonism, as predicted by a dehumanization approach. Given the historical context of relations between Jews and Germans, we hypothesized that Israeli respondents show the typical ingroup bias in social motives toward German students, but that German respondents do not show ingroup bias toward Israelis. Hypotheses derived from the three theories were generally confirmed in a study of the antagonism/altruism of social motives that 119 Israeli students thought typical Israeli and German education students would express toward each other in an allocation task. The hypotheses received partial support in a parallel study of 117 German students, which also included a social distance measure. Strikingly, German respondents thought German students would reverse the usual ingroup bias and would show favoritism to the Israeli outgroup.
Article
Full-text available
The question addressed is, when do disadvantaged-group members accept their situation, take individual action, or attempt to instigate collective action? Ss attempted to move from a low-status group into an advantaged, high-status group and were asked to respond to their subsequent rejection. Ss who believed that the high-status group was open to members of their group endorsed acceptance and individual actions. When access to the high-status group was restricted, even to the point of being almost closed (tokenism), Ss still preferred individual action. Disruptive forms of collective action were only favored by Ss who were told that the high-status group was completely closed to members of their group. Ss who believed they were near to gaining entry into the high-status group favored individual protest, while Ss distant from entry were more likely to accept their position. The theoretical and societal implications of these findings are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Article
Full-text available
This paper reports on the results of a split-ballot experiment conducted in 1987 to test alternative versions of the decennial census long form. Two forms were randomly assigned and self-administered in group sessions involving a total of 515 respondents. The order of race and Hispanic origin items was experimentally manipulated. The standard long form asks race, then Hispanic origin. The experimental form reversed the order of the items in order to reduce perceived redundancy, and to create a more restricted frame of reference for the race item. The objectives of the context manipulation were (1) to reduce item nonresponse for the Hispanic origin item, and (2) to reduce reporting of "Other race" by Hispanics in the race item. Objective (1) was met. Objective (2) was met for Hispanics born in a U. S. State, but not for immigrants. The results are interpreted as reflecting a process of acculturation which affects how Hispanic respondents apply U. S. racial categories "White" and "Black" in the census.
Article
Full-text available
Patriotism is an important predictor of political attitudes and preferences. Nevertheless, the complexity of patriotism remains unresolved, especially as it pertains to blind and symbolic patriotism. Symbolic patriotism represents a relatively abstract, affective attachment to the nation and its core values. Blind patriotism, in contrast, is more concrete, indexing uncritical support for national policies and practices. While the concepts appear analytically distinct, their political consequences are often similar, leading one to question whether the distinction is real. The results offer some support for maintaining conceptual differences between blind and symbolic patriotism.
Article
Full-text available
The authors introduce a framework for organizing conceptualizations of social identity along four dimensions: perception of the intergroup context, in-group attraction, interdependency beliefs, and depersonalization. The authors suggest that the extent to which each dimension is evoked or assessed will have an impact on the consequences attributed to social identity. Two studies test hypotheses derived from the framework and investigate the psychometric properties of several scales. In Study 1, participants completed four social identity scales, two group cohesion scales, and a measure of allocentrism. Interscale commonalities were tested through a secondary factor analysis, and the scales and secondary factors were used to predict in-group pride and intergroup bias. Study 2 included additional predictors (interdependency, conflict, competition) and outcome measures (in-group and out-group evaluations, perceived group homogeneity, and the twenty statements test). Consistent with predictions, two types of social identity were empirically extracted and were differentially related to the outcome measures. Theoretical and empirical implications are discussed.
Article
Full-text available
Social identity theory (SIT) proposes that disadvantaged group members take collective action only when intergroup boundaries are believed to be impermeable and in-group status is perceived as illegitimate and unstable. In North America, the actual permeability of intergroup boundaries is often ambiguous, and decisions to take collective action are made against a dominant ideology of individual mobility. This research used the context of tokenism-highly restricted boundary permeability-to reflect this social reality and to test the impact of referent informational influence and information from a salient out-group on endorsement of collective action. In Experiment 1, information from an in-group member describing tokenism as illegitimate and demonstrating a norm of anger increased interest in collective action. In Experiment 2, messages from the advantaged out-group focusing attention on collective injustice also increased interest in collective behavior. Findings support SIT; while highlighting the impact of socially relevant influences on interest in collective action.
Article
Full-text available
Intergroup threat is regarded as a cause of negative outgroup attitudes; however, little research has attempted to examine ways of reducing intergroup threat. Two studies examine the effectiveness of a superordinate identity for reducing intergroup threat. It was predicted that when two groups were aware of a shared identity, intergroup threat would be lowered and attitudes would become more positive. In Study 1, perceptions of common identities among Black and White students were related to decreases in intergroup threat and increases in positive outgroup attitudes. In Study 2, when their shared identity as Americans was made salient, Democrats and Republicans experienced less threat and more positive outgroup attitudes compared to when political party identities alone were salient. In both studies, intergroup threat acted as a mediator of the relationship between common identity and outgroup attitudes, suggesting that a common identity increases positive outgroup attitudes by first reducing intergroup threat.
Article
Full-text available
In line with social identity theory (SIT), minimal group paradigm (MGP) studies have shown that high in-group identifiers discriminate more than low in-group identifiers. But why do some people identify more to their ad hoc group in the MGP? One week prior to a MGP study, 121 undergraduates completed scales assessing their ethnocentrism, authoritarianism, and personal need for structure. In Phase 2, the same participants took part in a MGP study in which us-them categorization was either assigned randomly or was chosen. Participants who chose their group membership identified more with their own group and discriminated more than respondents randomly assigned to their group. Path analysis showed that ethnocentrism and perception of control over group ascription predicted degree of in-group identification, which in turn, was positively related to discriminatory behavior.
Article
Full-text available
Internet newsgroups allow individuals to interact with others in a relatively anonymous fashion and thereby provide individuals with concealable stigmatized identities a place to belong not otherwise available. Thus, membership in these groups should become an important part of identity. Study 1 found that members of newsgroups dealing with marginalized–concealable identities modified their newsgroup behavior on the basis of reactions of other members, unlike members of marginalized–conspicuous or mainstream newsgroups. This increase in identity importance from newsgroup participation was shown in both Study 2 (marginalized sexual identities) and Study 3 (marginalized ideological identities) to lead to greater self-acceptance, as well as coming out about the secret identity to family and friends. Results supported the view that Internet groups obey general principles of social group functioning and have real-life consequences for the individual. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Article
Full-text available
Social identity theory, intergroup emotions theory (IET), and related approaches offer the potential to understand the social psychological aspects of collective behavior such as movements that protest against or argue for war. Social identification, however, tends to be a weak predictor of collective action intentions. We argue that in order to understand the fault lines of collective action it is useful to consider identification with opinion-based groups. We illustrate this in relation to support for and opposition to the war on terror (WoT) in Australia. Comparing predictions based on IET with those based on opinion-based group identification, we found limited support for the sets of connections hypothesized by IET. Alternatively, social identification with pro- and anti-WoT opinion-based groups was a strong predictor of different emotional reactions and associated action intentions. In particular, highly identified supporters of the WoT were angry at terrorists, and this anger in turn predicted offensive action tendencies against the terrorists. Stronger yet were the emotional reactions of anger at the government reported by highly identified opponents of the WoT, which strongly predicted anti-war protest action intentions. The results point to the utility of the opinion-based group concept for understanding the collective, yet contested, aspects of political support for war and peace in contemporary society. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Article
Full-text available
Three experiments examined 5 hypotheses of social identity theory ( H. Tajfel & J. C. Turner, 1979 ) concerning social mobility and social creativity strategies and how permeability of group boundaries affects strategy use. As predicted, members of negatively distinctive in-groups distanced themselves psychologically from the in-group (social mobility), rated the distinguishing dimension as less undesirable (social creativity), and rated the in-group more favorably on other dimensions (social creativity) than did members of nondistinctive in-groups. Also as predicted, social creativity strategies were more likely to be used when group boundaries were impermeable rather than permeable. Permeability effects on social mobility strategies were more complex than predicted. Additional findings shed light on relationships among identity-enhancement strategies and on how dimensions are chosen to flatter a negatively distinctive in-group. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Article
Full-text available
The earliest political behavior researchers documented the powerful effects of group attachments and other socioeconomic factors on vote choice and partisan identification in the 1940s and 1950s (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954; Campbell et al. 1960). Yet, research interest in the group-based origins of political behavior has waxed and waned in the intervening decades (Huddy 2003). The existence of both an African-American and female frontrunner for the Democratic presidential nomination in 2008 provides an opportunity to consider the contemporary electoral consequences of in-group loyalties and out-group antipathies. We take advantage of select survey and poll data collected during the 2008 Democratic primaries to evaluate the power of gender and race as both positive and negative influences on voter calculus in an election in which the two major candidates were differentiated less by their issue positions and beliefs than by their skin color and gender. © 2009, The Women and Politics Research Section of the American Political Science Association. All rights reserved.
Article
Full-text available
A significant body of research points to the central role of identity in creating and maintaining conflict. However, less research has focused on the protective role of social identity in such situations. Using a survey sample of 3,000 participants, 2,000 of whom were resident in a conflict-affected region (Northern Ireland) and 1,000 in a region more distally affected (the Border counties of the Republic of Ireland) the potential moderating and mediating impact of national identification on the relationship between direct and indirect experience of political violence and psychological well-being is examined. Findings indicate that national identification mediates the impact of direct political violence on well-being in Northern Ireland. This relationship is strongest where preferred nationality is relevant to the social division underlying the conflict. Those more distally affected, resident in the Republic of Ireland, did not evidence this pattern of relationships. Discussion of results focuses on the potential positive and negative implications of these findings for personal and societal well-being, respectively. Un corps de recherches significatif pointe le rôle central de l'identité dans la création et le maintien d'un conflit. Toutefois, un nombre de recherches moins important s'est focalisé sur le rôle protecteur de l'identité sociale dans de telles situations. En utilisant un échantillon de 3,000 sujets, 2,000 résidant dans une the anonymous reviewers for comments on early drafts of this paper.
Article
Full-text available
Interest in the concept of identity has grown exponentially within both the humanities and social sciences, but the discussion of identity has had less impact than might be expected on the quantitative study of political behavior in general and on political psychology more specifically. One of the approaches that holds the most promise for political psychologists is social identity theory, as reflected in the thinking of Henri Tajfel, John Turner, and colleagues. Although the theory addresses the kinds of problems of interest to political psychologists, it has had limited impact on political psychology because of social identity theorists' disinclination to examine the sources of social identity in a real world complicated by history and culture. In this review, four key issues are examined that hinder the successful application of social identity theory to political phenomena. These key issues are the existence of identity choice, the subjective meaning of identities, gradations in identity strength, and the considerable stability of many social and political identities.
Article
Full-text available
To many commentators and social scientists, Americans’ stances on political issues are to an important extent driven by an underlying conservative–liberal ideological dimension. Self-identification as conservative vs. liberal is regarded as a marker of this dimension. However, past research has not thoroughly distinguished between ideological identity (a self-categorization) and ideology (an integrated value system). This research evaluates the thesis that conservative–liberal identity functions as a readiness to adopt beliefs and attitudes about newly politicized issues that one is told are consistent with the socially prescribed meaning of conservatism–liberalism. In Study 1, conservative–liberal identity, measured in 2000, had an independent prospective effect on support for invading Iraq in 2002 and support for the Iraq war in 2004, controlling for substantive ideology, party identity, and demographics. In Study 2, conservative- and liberal-identifiers adopted stances on farm subsidy policy based on randomly varied cues indicating which ideological group supports which stance. This cue-based influence was mediated by adoption of attitude-supportive beliefs. Discussion addresses the joint impact of political discourse and identity-based social influence on the organization of political attitudes. KeywordsConservatism-Liberalism-Ideology-Political attitudes-Identity-Social influence
Article
This book shows how ordinary Americans imagine their communities and the extent to which their communities' boundaries determine who they believe should benefit from the government's resources via redistributive policies. By contributing extensive empirical analyses to a largely theoretical discussion, it highlights the subjective nature of communities while confronting the elusive task of pinning down pictures in people's heads. A deeper understanding of people's definitions of their communities and how they affect feelings of duties and obligations provides a new lens through which to look at diverse societies and the potential for both civic solidarity and humanitarian aid. This book analyzes three different types of communities and more than eight national surveys. Wong finds that the decision to help only those within certain borders and ignore the needs of those outside rests, to a certain extent, on whether and how people translate their sense of community into obligations.
Article
This book explores public opinion about being and becoming American, and its implications for contemporary immigration debates. It focuses on the causes and consequences of two aspects of American identity: how people define being American and whether people think of themselves primarily as American rather than as members of a panethnic or national origin group. Importantly, the book evaluates the claim – made by scholars and pundits alike – that all Americans should prioritize their American identity instead of an ethnic or national origin identity. It finds that national identity within American democracy can be a blessing or a curse. It can enhance participation, trust, and obligation. But it can be a curse when perceptions of deviation lead to threat and resentment. It can also be a curse for minorities who are attached to their American identity but also perceive discrimination. The notion of American identity is a predisposition that the government has good reason to cultivate, but also good reason to approach with caution.
Article
Citizens are attentive to economic conditions and reach political evaluations partly on that basis--but how do they do so? Treating the 1984 presidential election as a convenient case and being equipped with survey measures tailored exactly to the issues at hand, we examined three possibilities: that voters care most about their own economic well-being (the pocketbook hypothesis), that they are concerned primarily with the economic well-being of their group (the group hypothesis), or that they are preoccupied with the economic condition of the country (the sociotropic hypothesis). We found that person, group, and nation constitute related but distinct arenas of economic assessments and that, by a wide margin, assessments of national economic well-being mattered most to voters' decisions in 1984. The paper concludes by drawing out the implications of these results for understanding elections and by arguing for a broadened conception of voting based on incumbent performance.
Article
Social identity theory as developed by Tajfel and Turner argues that there are two distinct aspects of the self-concept: personal identity and social identity (in American terminology, collective identity). Although many self-esteem measures are available in the literature, they allfocus on individuals'evaluation of their personal identity, whether in private or interpersonal domains. No scale currently exists that assesses the positivity of one's social, or collective, identity. A scale was constructed to assess individual differences in collective, rather than personal, self-esteem, with four subscales (Membership esteem, Public collective self-esteem, Private collective self-esteem, and Importance to Identity). Evidence for reliability and validity of the scale was provided by three studies, suggesting that the scale can be a useful research tool. Implications for research and social identity theory are discussed.
Article
In ethnically non-neutral states, why do some disadvantaged minorities protest their status, while others acquiesce? Given the difficult circumstances in many cases, why do they not protest more than they do, or turn to violence? This article argues that the key to ethnic protest is the identity that one holds: state-bound identities weaken the grievance– protest relationship. The closer one identifies with the state, the less likely one is to protest, even when significant grievances exist. The case of Israel and its Arab citizens is used to illustrate this relationship. When Arabs identify themselves as more “Israeli,” they are less protest-prone than other Arabs with more anti-establishment identities. This article provides empirical evidence that fostering state-friendly identities may be a desirable goal for many ethnically tense states.
Article
The multidimensionality of patriotic and nationalistic attitudes and their relationship to nuclear policy opinions were investigated. One hundred and ninety-four college students, 24 high school students, and 21 building contractors were administered the 120-item Patriotism/Nationalism Questionnaire. One hundred and sixty-six of the college students were concurrently administered the 18-item Nuclear Policy Questionnaire. An iterated principal factor analysis was performed on the Patriotism/Nationalism Questionnaire and six factors were extracted for Varimax rotation. The results indicated that the factors were interpretable and distinct. Further analyses indicated the predictive validity of the subscales derived from the six factors for the Nuclear Policy Questionnaire, and exploratory analyses of variance examined the effects of selected demographic variables. The findings support the contention that patriotic/nationalistic attitudes entail multiple dimensions, and that they are differentially related to nuclear policy opinions. We conclude that researchers need to be more attentive to this multidimensionality, especially the distinction between patriotism and nationalism.
Article
This article proposes that research has failed to clarify the causal role of group cohesiveness in groupthink because of a failure to distinguish cohesiveness from friendship. To remedy this, a conceptual distinction, based on social identity theory, is drawn between positive regard grounded in interpersonal relations (personal attraction, friendship), and solidarity grounded in group identification (depersonalized social attraction, true group cohesiveness)—Hogg (1992). An experiment compared the roles of friendship and social attraction in groupthink. Four-person discussion groups of friends, or socially attractive or random groups of strangers, made decisions (N=472). Background conditions for groupthink were established, and a wide range of subjective and behavioural measures of friendship, identification/social attraction, and the decision-making process were taken. Analyses isolated effects associated with friendship/personal attraction, from those associated with identification/social attraction. Friendship was found to be weakly and negatively related to symptoms of groupthink, while group identification and social attraction were strongly and, with some exceptions, positively related to symptoms of groupthink. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Article
This article explores the theoretical and methodological problems underlying the relationship between group consciousness and political participation with data from the Center for Political Studies (CPS) 1972 and 1976 National Election Studies. It delineates four conceptual components of group consciousness and examines their relationships with electoral and non-electoral participation among both subordinate and dominant social groups. An interactive model fits both a theory of mobilization and the data far better than a linear, additive model.
Article
In this paper, we focus on a key psychological principle underlying pluralism, subgroup respect, defined as feelings that one's subgroup is recognized, accepted, and valued by members of a common group (e.g. Americans' respect for various ethnic subgroups). Analyzing survey data collected from a large and diverse sample of respondents in two US cities (Oakland, California, and Los Angeles; N = 1,229), we found that subgroup respect was linked to more positive evaluations of America and its ethnic groups, but only among African Americans and Latinos. Among Whites, personal respect (i.e. how Americans feel about the individual) was a better predictor of the assessed attitudes (affect toward Americans, distrust of the justice system, and ingroup favoritism) than subgroup respect. Advocates of pluralism suggest that acknowledgment and regard for valued subgroup identities will have a unifying effect on the social system. The data here, while generally consistent with this perspective, suggests, however, that the unifying influence of subgroup respect is limited to members of ethnic minority groups.
Article
U.S. citizens' reactions to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, were examined, including emotional responses, attributions for the cause of the attacks, and policy recommendations. Participants whose emotional reactions were dominated by anger attributed the attacks to the fanaticism of the terrorists and to poor U.S. security and rejected the idea that U.S. foreign policy played a role in the attacks. They endorsed an aggressive military response and rejected humanitarian efforts. Participants whose emotional reactions were dominated by sadness, in contrast, denied that fanaticism and security lapses were to blame, and both sad and fearful participants expressed reservations about a strong military reaction. Path models suggest that the relationship between emotional reactions and policy endorsement was partially mediated by attributions.
Article
Self-categorization theory hypothesizes that group polarization arises from an intragroup process of conformity to a polarized in-group norm (i.e., a norm more extreme than the mean of members' initial opinions but in the same direction). Whether the prototype and the mean coincide depends on whether group responses are moderate or extreme in terms of the comparative social context. A computer simulation (Study 1, N = 1,000 5-person groups) and 2 semi-naturalistic group discussion studies (Study 2, 157 undergraduates assigned to 32 groups; Study 3, 181 university students assigned to 44 groups) were conducted to test this analysis. Results show significant correlational support for the hypothesis that in-group prototypes become more polarized as the group becomes more extreme in the social context. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Article
[examine] the nature of blind and constructive patriotism by examining some of their potential roots and consequences / examine their associations with certain personality characteristics like values and religious orientation / explore expressions of blind and constructive patriotism in 2 interrelated domains: (1) intragroup relations, or individuals' attitudes and behaviors toward their own country, and (2) intergroup relations, or individuals' attitudes and behaviors toward other countries / expand the theory and empirical data / [examine] manifestations of blind and constructive patriotism / discuss historical and empirical evidence that support the viability of this distinction (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Article
This research examines the relationships between racial consciousness or identity, system blame, and religiosity for African Americans, with a particular focus on the effects of church-based education and activism on racial-group consciousness. This is achieved by clarifying religiosity to include both the civic message communicated and the political activism promoted by religious organizations. Data from the 1984 National Black Election Study are used to examine the connections between various demorgraphic factors, religiosity, religious messages, and several measures of racial identity. Findings indicate that two different messages are presented at places of worship: one communicating civic awareness and the other promoting political activity. Greater exposure to the former tends to produce higher levels of racial identity, while exposure to the latter leads to greater perceptions of power imbalance among groups. Such feelings of racial and power imbalance lead to a greater tendency to blame the governmental system for outcome inequities. Finally, these factors seem to operate slightly differently for men and women.
Article
Based on the social identity theory and the need for closure theory, the present study investigates how Hong Kong people's perceptions of social changes after the reunification with China are related to their social identities. A randomly selected sample of 315 Hong Kong residents participated in a telephone survey to report their perceptions of major changes in five social areas, as well as their social identities. A series of logistic regression analyses confirmed, as predicted, that the perceived pace of social change was related to the participants’ preference for a single identity (‘Hongkonger’ or ‘Chinese’) over dual identities (‘Hongkonger and Chinese’, or ‘Chinese and secondarily Hongkonger’) through the mediation of social uncertainty. The results indicate that for individuals with dual social identities, perceptions and evaluations of social change are important factors contributing to social identity preference.
Article
Since the rise of mass politics, the role national identities play in international relations has been debated. Do they produce a popular reservoir easily tapped for war or bestow dignity thereby fostering cooperation and a democratic peace? The evidence for either perspective is thin, beset by different conceptions of identity and few efforts to identify its effects independent of situational factors. Using data drawn from new national surveys in Italy and the United States, we advance a three-dimensional conception of national identity, theoretically connecting the dimensions to conflictive and cooperative dispositions as well as to decisions to cooperate with the United Nations in containing Iran's nuclear proliferation and Sudan's humanitarian crisis in Darfur. Attachment to the nation in Italy and the United States is found to associate with less support for militarist options and more support for international cooperation as liberal nationalists expect. This depends, however, on containing culturally exclusive conceptions of the nation and chauvinism.
Article
This paper reports the results of a meta-analytic integration of the results of 137 tests of the ingroup bias hypothesis. Overall, the ingroup bias effect was highly significant and of moderate magnitude. Several theoretically informative determinants of the ingroup bias effect were established. This ingroup bias effect was significantly stronger when the ingroup was made salient (by virtue of proportionate size and by virtue of reality of the group categorization). A significant interaction between the reality of the group categorization and the relative status of the ingroup revealed a slight decrease in the ingroup bias effect as a function of status in real groups, and a significant increase in the ingroup bias effect as a function of status in artificial groups. Finally, an interaction between item relevance and ingroup status was observed, such that higher status groups exhibited more ingroup bias on more relevant attributes, whereas lower status groups exhibited more ingroup bias on less relevant attributes. Discussion considers the implications of these results for current theory and future research involving the ingroup bias effect.
Article
In contrast to traditional approaches that widely equate group cohesiveness with interpersonal attraction, self-categorization theoryargues that self-categorization depersonalizes perception in terms of the group prototype, and transforms the basis of interindividual attitude (liking) from idiosyncracy into prototypicality. An implication is that while attraction in interpersonal relationships relates to overall similarity, attraction among group members is based on prototypical similarity. To test this idea, subjects (N = 219) participated in an experiment in which they reported their attitude towards an individual who would be their partner, or a fellow group member (of either group ‘Visual’ or group ‘Tactile’) for a subsequent task. Subject-target similarity varied on each of two dimensions: dimension ‘A’ was more prototypical of group ‘Visual’, and dimension ‘F’ of group ‘Tactile’. The independent variables of social orientation (interpersonal, group ‘Visual’, group ‘Tactile’), similarity on dimension A (A ±), and dimension F(F±) were manipulated in a 3 × 2 × 2 design. The three hypotheses tested in this experiment were generally supported. Subjects preferred prototypically similar group members to interpersonal partners, and downgraded prototypically dissisimilar group members (HI). Identification was positively related to target evaluation (H2), more strongly for prototypically similar than dissimilar targets (H3), and the identification-attraction relationship was mediated by perceived prototypical similarity. Group-based effects were independent of perceptions of overall similarity.
Article
In a recent article in this journal, Leonie Huddy (2001) asks whether the social identity approach developed by Tajfel, Turner, and their collaborators can “advance the study of identity within political science” (p. 128). She concludes that “various shortcomings and omissions in its research program” (p. 128) hinder the application of the approach to political phenomena. This paper presents a response to Huddy’s evaluation of the social identity approach. Several aspects of her account of social identity work are challenged, especially her suggestion that it ignores subjective aspects of group membership. The interpretation of the minimal group paradigm is discussed in detail, as are issues of identity choice, salience, and variations in identity strength. The treatment of groups as process in social identity theory and self–categorization theory is given particular emphasis.
Article
This article addresses the question of when and for what purpose Muslims will act collectively in the political arena. The impact of religious identity salience, goal framing, and normative constraints on political mobilization was examined in two Muslim communities with different group positions in Dutch society. Both Moroccan–Dutch and Turkish–Dutch Muslims expressed their willingness to take normative or nonnormative political action to promote religious (“defend Islam”), ethnic (“help homeland”), or superordinate group goals (“protect human rights”). When their Muslim identity was made salient, Moroccan Muslims were more ready to take normative action to promote religious goals and also more likely to engage in nonnormative action. In contrast, Turkish Muslims were less willing to take action when their Muslim identity was salient, except for superordinate human rights goals. Our findings caution against simplistic assumptions about all Muslims by contextualizing the ways in which religion plays out in the political arena.
Article
Amidst rising levels of ethnic diversity in the United States, scholars struggle to understand how group consciousness functions among other non-black minority groups such as Asian Americans and Latinos. Most of the literature in this area focuses on the relationship between identity and immigration incorporation or the debate between national origin and panethnicity. We argue that the Asian American community offers an important case study to understand how social context and one's perceived racial position influence an individual's sense of group attachment. Thus, the Asian American case presents new insight beyond the black politics model into how racial identification influences individual political attitudes and behavior. We present findings from a unique embed-ded survey experiment conducted in 2004 that reveals a surprising degree of malleability in Asian American racial group attachment. This is a striking contrast to the findings demonstrated by blacks whose racial identification is relatively more stable over various contexts. We seek to explain these findings by advocating for a more explicit consideration of the structural incentives and costs of adopting racial and ethnic identities by highlighting the significance of U.S. immigration policy and its role in creating group-based stereotypes and racial tropes.
Article
Past research has emphasized two critical economic concerns that appear to generate anti-immigrant sentiment among native citizens: concerns about labor market competition and concerns about the fiscal burden on public services. We provide direct tests of both models of attitude formation using an original survey experiment embedded in a nationwide U.S. survey. The labor market competition model predicts that natives will be most opposed to immigrants who have similar skill levels to their own. We find instead that both low skilled and highly skilled natives strongly prefer highly skilled immigrants over low skilled immigrants, and this preference is not decreasing in natives' skill levels. The fiscal burden model anticipates that rich natives oppose low skilled immigration more than poor natives, and that this gap is larger in states with greater fiscal exposure (in terms of immigrant access to public services). We find instead that rich and poor natives are equally opposed to low skilled immigration, and rich natives are actually less opposed to low skilled immigration in states with more fiscal exposure than they are elsewhere. We do find that poor natives are more opposed to low skilled immigration in states with greater fiscal exposure than elsewhere, suggesting that concerns about access to or overcrowding of public services contributes to anti-immigrant attitudes.
Article
Two perspectives on the nature of the social group and psychological group formation are discussed. The traditional social cohesion approach traces group formation to processes of interpersonal attraction, while the social identity approach defines the group in cognitive terms and considers identification, or self-categorization, to be the mechanism of psychological group formation. On the basis of an experiment by Turner, Sachdev and Hogg (1983) it is hypothesized that interpersonal attraction (positive or negative) is related to group formation only in so far as it enhances intergroup distinctiveness. This hypothesis is experimentally tested in a 2 × 3 (interpersonal liking/disliking per se versus no explicit categorization/random categorization/criterial categorization on the basis of affect) factorial design employing the ‘minimal group’ paradigm. People who like each other and were not explicitly categorized formed a group. This effect was enhanced by criterial categorization but disappeared when categorization was random. Although the results do not support the hypothesis, they are not explicable in social cohesion terms. A social identity explanation is furnished—attraction influences group formation by acting, under certain specifiable conditions, as a cognitive criterion for common category membership. This explanation is located in current theorizing and is proposed as part of a reconceptualization of the relationship between interpersonal attraction and group formation.
Article
Salient self-identities and their impact upon feelings of relative deprivation (RD) and subsequent action intentions were examined. Eight experimental conditions (Personal/Group Salience × Large/Small Intragroup Inequalities × Large/Small Intergroup Inequalities) were created utilizing a role-play design. Significant main effects for both salience and social inequalities were found to influence both RD and action intentions. In accordance with self-categorization theory, when group compared to personal identities were made salient, stronger feelings of group RD and greater likelihood of collective action intentions were reported. Alternatively, when personal compared to group identities were made salient, greater likelihood of individual actions were reported. In accordance with relative deprivation theory, when intergroup inequalities were large compared to small, stronger feelings of group RD and less likelihood of collective action were reported. Alternatively, when intragroup inequalities were large compared to small, stronger feelings of personal RD were reported.
Article
Two studies explored a theoretical distinction between “blind” and “constructive” patriotism. Blind patriotism is defined as an attachment to country characterized by unquestioning positive evaluation, staunch allegiance, and intolerance of criticism. Constructive patriotism is defined as an attachment to country characterized by support for questioning and criticism of current group practices that are intended to result in positive change. Items designed to investigate these dimensions of national attachment were administered to two groups of undergraduates in separate surveys. Measures of the two constructs derived from factor analysis of the responses proved to be reliable and valid. Blind patriotism was positively associated with political disengagement, nationalism, perceptions of foreign threat, perceived importance of symbolic behaviors, and selective exposure to pro-U.S. information. In contrast, constructive patriotism was positively associated with multiple indicators of political involvement, including political efficacy, interest, knowledge, and behavior. The implications of this distinction for theory and research on patriotism are discussed.
Article
Objectives. Considerable evidence suggests that enforcement efforts cannot fully explain the high degree of tax compliance. To resolve this puzzle of tax compliance, several researchers have argued that citizens' attitudes toward paying taxes, defined as tax morale, helps to explain the high degree of tax compliance. However, most studies have treated tax morale as a black box, without discussing which factors shape it. Additionally, the tax compliance literature provides little empirical research that investigates attitudes toward paying taxes in Europe. Methods. Thus, this article is unique in its examination of citizen tax morale within three multicultural European countries, Switzerland, Belgium, and Spain, a choice that allows far more detailed examination of the impact of culture and institutions using data sets from the World Values Survey and the European Values Survey. Results. The results indicate the tendency that cultural and regional differences affect tax morale. Conclusion. The findings suggest that higher legitimacy for political institutions leads to higher tax morale.
Article
Political science has paid a great deal of attention to sources of intergroup conflict, but the discipline has focused less on forces that bring people together and lead them to transcend group boundaries. This study presents evidence that attachment to a shared superordinate identity can improve intergroup relations by reducing the social distance between people of different racial groups. Using a survey experiment, this research shows that making a superordinate identity salient increased support for a tax increase. The effects of the identity salience treatment are compared to a policy particularism treatment in terms of effect size and their interaction with each other. The size and direction of the identity salience effect is affected by the degree of respondents' acceptance of the proffered identity. Implications for social identity theory, racial policy attitudes, and American national identity are discussed.
Article
This article examines conceptions of American national identity by contrasting Americans’ responses to the Pearl Harbor attack in 1941 with their responses to the terrorist attacks in 2001. Examinations of official rhetoric, mass media statements, and public opinion polls after Pearl Harbor and after 9/11 reveal changes as well as continuities in the relationship between conceptions of national identity and responses to experiencing threat in the face of diversity. Lingering ascriptivist views have been awakened by 9/11, yet this narrow image of American identity is being directly challenged by a more inclusive incorporationist tradition. This clash of symbolic conceptions of national identity results in divergence between elite rhetoric and mass opinion, with elites promoting incorporationism and ordinary citizens displaying the reawakening of ascriptivist norms.
Article
The hypothesis was tested that whereas members of a low status group show a physiological threat response when evaluating a performance situation on the basis of the status quo, members of high status groups show a physiological threat response when evaluating a possible change of the status quo. Participants were categorized in minimal groups, after which they performed a task on which group-level feedback was given (group status manipulation). Later on during the experiment, a second round of this task was unexpectedly announced (implying a possible change in the group’s status). In line with expectations, participants in the low status condition showed higher blood pressure directly after the status feedback, whereas participants in the high status condition showed a similar response in anticipation of the second round of the task. Results are discussed in terms of social identity theory, and the physiological assessment of threats to social identity.
Article
While I write this chapter, millions of people in the Darfur province of Sudan have been terrorized off their land; the entire population of Iraq has little idea what the future of their country will be; survivors of hurricane Katrina are dispersed across the United States; people in Britain are anxious about immigration and are toying with the idea of supporting the British National Party; people in a small town in Tasmania wait to hear if members of their community have been found alive in a mine collapse; air travelers the world over have no idea what new security arrangements await them when they get to the airport; and we all wonder about the consequences of further escalation in the price of oil and of the standoff over Iran's uranium enrichment program. The world is an uncertain place, it always has been, and these uncertainties can make it very difficult to predict or plan our lives and to feel sure about the type of people we are.In this chapter, I describe how feelings of uncertainty, particularly about or related to self, motivate people to identify with social groups and to choose new groups with, or configure existing groups to have, certain properties that best reduce, control, or protect from feelings of uncertainty. I consider this uncertainty–identity theory to be a development of the motivational component of social identity theory. It addresses why, when, and how strongly people identify with groups, and why groups may have particular generic properties in certain contexts. Of particular relevance to contemporary postmodern society, uncertainty reduction theory provides an account of zealotry and the cult of the “true believer” in the thrall of ideology and powerful leadership—an account of conditions that may spawn extremism, a silo mentality, and a loss of moral or ethical perspective.In this chapter, I describe uncertainty–identity theory and some conceptual elaborations and applications, review direct and indirect empirical tests, and locate the theory in the context of related ideas and theories in social psychology. I start with a historical sketch of why, when, and how uncertainty–identity theory was developed, then go on to discuss uncertainty reduction as a motivation for human behavior. I then detail the process by which group identification reduces uncertainty and describe a program of studies showing that people who feel uncertain are more likely to identify and identify more strongly with groups. High‐entitativity groups are best equipped to reduce uncertainty through identification—entitativity moderates the uncertainty–identification relation. I discuss this idea and describe research that supports it, and then extend the analysis to deal with extremism and totalistic groups—describing how extreme uncertainty may encourage strong identification (zealotry, fanaticism, being a true believer) with groups that are structured in a totalistic fashion. Again I describe some research supporting this idea.The next section deals with extensions, applications, and implications of uncertainty–identity theory. I discuss the relation between depersonalization and self‐projection processes in uncertainty‐motivated group identification, and then, in a subsection entitled central members, marginal members, leaders, and deviants, I focus on the role of group prototypicality in uncertainty reduction processes. The role of trust, the relation between uncertainty, identity, and ideology, and the role of uncertainty in social mobilization are also discussed. The final section, before concluding comments, discusses other theories, approaches, and topics that deal with constructs related to those discussed by uncertainty–identity theory. Specifically, I discuss uncertainty as a state versus a trait, with a focus on the constructs of need for cognitive closure and uncertainty orientation; the role played by culture in uncertainty; and the relevance of terror management, compensatory conviction, self‐verification, and system justification.