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The current state of play in the theory and philosophy of history: The Roth-Ankersmit controversy and beyond
استهدف البحث الوقوف على مدى فاعلية تصميم برنامج قائم على فلسفة التاريخ باتجاهاتها المختلفة فى تنمية مهارت التفسير التاريخي، والاتجاه نحو التاريخ؛ لدى طلاب الفرقة الثانية شُعبة التاريخ بكلية التربية – جامعة الإسكندرية؛ ولتحقيق هذا الهدف اتبعت الباحثة المنهجين: الوصفي، وشبه التجريبي ذو المجموعة الواحدة، وبدأت إجراءات البحث بالتوصل إلى إطار نظري للبحث عن: (مهارات التفسير التاريخي، والاتجاه نحو التاريخ، وفلسفة التاريخ)، ثم إعداد أدوات البحث وهى: (قائمة: أبعاد التفسير التاريخي ومهاراته الفرعية، وقائمة أبعاد الاتجاه نحو التاريخ، ومحاوره الفرعية، واختبار: مهارات التفسير التاريخي، ومقياس: الاتجاه نحو التاريخ)، وتطبيقها على عينة البحث المؤلفة من 35 طالب معلم بالفرقة الثانية شُعبة التاريخ، وبإستخدام المتوسطات الحسابية واختبار (ت)، وحساب مربع إيتا (µ2)، تم التوصل إلى عدة نتائج للبحث أهمها: (تصميم البرنامج المقترح القائم على فلسفة التاريخ، وأثره في تنمية مهارات التفسير التاريخي، والاتجاه نحو التاريخ). ثم التوصل إلى مجموعة من التوصيات، والبحوث المقترحة.
This Element argues for a broad and inclusive understanding of the 'theory and philosophy of history', a goal that has proven elusive. Different intellectual traditions have competing, often incompatible definitions of what could or should count as proper 'theory/philosophy of history'. By expanding on the traditional versions of the 'history of the theory and philosophy of history' and including contexts from the Global South, particularly Latin America, the author hopes to offer a broader, more inclusive perspective on the theoretical reflections about history.
What are current tendencies in historical theory, judging by the inaugural conference (2013) of the International Network for Theory of History? In this article, I note two tendencies: an interest in history beyond the academy and a desire to overcome the theoretical polarization that has characterized the field in past decades. Subsequently, I argue that these tendencies can be seen as reflecting a single research agenda, which, in turn, can be described in terms of ‘relations to the past.’ I unpack this notion, borrowed from Mark Day, in some detail, explain what sort of questions it helps address, and offer two examples from in and outside the historical discipline. If I am right in arguing that this research agenda captures much of what is currently being offered under the flag of historical theory, then historical theory seems on its way to become a field of expertise on the ways in which both historians and others relate to the past.
Doubtless no one has written more over the last three decades on certain themes in the philosophy of history than has Frank Ankersmit. However, almost no one but Ankersmit still imagines there to be a need for a ‘philosophy of history’ as he conceives of it, i.e., one where ‘history’ names a sui generis form of knowledge, and so ‘philosophy of history’ as designating a subject matter that needs to articulate its own special principles of representation, experience, truth, meaning, and reference. Ankersmit has struggled over time to formulate a satisfactory answer, in short, to questions of his own making. Lacking has been a sustained examination of contemporary philosophy of language that actually establishes a need for a philosophy of history of the sort Ankersmit looks to provide. But Ankersmit's Meaning, Truth, and Reference in Historical Representation proposes to remedy that lack. With respect to the general issues at stake, exegetical disputes would be entirely beside the point if Ankersmit's philosophy could be cogently rationalized by just ignoring what he says about analytic philosophy of language. However, Ankersmit's philosophical rationale for his account of historical representation presupposes his particular reading. Without it, his philosophical defense of historicism vanishes, as does any motivation for taking seriously his project. Thus, examining the plausibility of his understanding of analytic philosophy of language becomes of decisive importance, and this review does so in some detail.
This paper examines how Hayden White and specifically Frank Ankersmit have attempted to develop the representationalist account of historiography. It is notable that both reject the copy theory of representation, but nevertheless commit to the idea that historiography produces representations. I argue that it would have been more advantageous to go yet one step further and reject representationalist language altogether on the level of narratives, as this implies that one is representing a given object in one's language in some sense. Narratives and other synthesizing expressions, such as colligatory notions, do not have such objects or references in the past itself, and therefore, it would be more appropriate to talk about constructed 'presentations.' In the end, I outline a non-representationalist alternative, according to which historiography is a form of discursive and argumentative practice.
Quine's post-positivism was, mainly, an attack on the dogmatism of foundationalist philosophy of language and science claiming to offer an apriorist account of knowledge and of the relation between language and the world. In opposition to this dogmatism Quine's post-positivism required the philosopher of language and science to respect and be open to how in the practice of science knowledge may emerge. Roth's review of my book exemplifies how Quine's anti-dogmatism could become a dogma itself. Basically, by the refusal to recognize the immense variety in the practices of science and, consequently, that each science has its own. In Roth's case this unwillingness resulted in the projection of the practice of the sciences on that of history and the humanities. This compelled him to (unwittingly) embrace the dogma of the Unity of Science. This is how Quine's most recommendable anti-dogmatism could turn into dogmatism.
Two chief problems of the theory of knowledge are the question of meaning and the question of verification. The first question asks under what conditions a sentence has meaning, in the sense of cognitive, factual meaning. The second one asks how we get to know something, how we can find out whether a given sentence is true or false. The second question presupposes the first one. Obviously we must understand a sentence, i.e. we must know its meaning, before we can try to find out whether it is true or not. But, from the point of view of empiricism, there is a still closer connection between the two problems. In a certain sense, there is only one answer to the two questions. If we knew what it would be for a given sentence to be found true then we would know what its meaning is. And if for two sentences the conditions under which we would have to take them as true are the same, then they have the same meaning. Thus the meaning of a sentence is in a certain sense identical with the way we determine its truth or falsehood; and a sentence has meaning only if such a determination is possible.
The topic of "Rorty and history" is, at first sight, not a very promising one. Rorty never discussed any of the great historians from the past and the present, such as Gibbon, Ranke, Burckhardt, Huizinga, Meinecke, or Braudel.1 He was even less interested in philosophy of history and considered this discipline to be devoid of interest and significance.2 He never commented on the work of Hayden White—the most influential contemporary philosopher of history—though he must have been quite well aware of its existence3 and of how close it came to his own scholarly interests.4
Next, it is true that Rorty wrote quite a lot on political philosophy, philosophy of culture, and literary theory, all of them fields that are not too remote from the professional interests of historians and philosophers of history. But he never felt attracted to the typically historical aspects of politics, culture, and literary theory. It was Rawls whom he chose for his main guide in political philosophy—hence, the political philosopher who, with his notorious "veil of ignorance," had removed in one fell swoop all things historical from the political philosopher's agenda. Next, Derrida was Rorty's hero for the domains of culture and literary theory. And, again, Derrida's "fetishization of the text" left no room whatsoever for the historian's traditional concerns. In sum, history, historical awareness, historians, and historical thought never scored high on the list of Rorty's professional interests.5
However, there is one signal exception to Rorty's indifference towards "history." And this is Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature—his first book, and the one that made him famous. Upon publication he became an intellectual celebrity almost overnight and none of his later works ever had such a tremendous impact again.6
"History" is very prominently present in this book. Rorty attacked in it the core business of contemporary philosophy of language—epistemology. He argued that epistemology resulted from an improper demarcation of philosophy from science by seventeenth-century philosophers such as Descartes and Locke. So epistemology was the intellectual offspring of some (unfortunate) historical contingency and one that can only be accounted for historically. Had the historical facts about European intellectual history from Descartes to Kant been just a little bit different, philosophers would have ended up doing other and probably better things than presently is the case. Rorty's use of the weapon of historical contextualization was all the more effective since he proved himself to be an absolutely brilliant historian of philosophy. Moreover, throughout his book, Rorty took Thomas S. Kuhn's recommendation to heart, that when reading the work of an important thinker, we should preferably look for the apparent absurdities in the text and then ask ourselves how a sensible person could have written them.7 This is pure historicism, of course. Think of the old historicist demand that the historian must come to a "Verstehen" of what may, at first sight, seem strange and unfamiliar to us in the doings and saying of our ancestors.
But even more important is that a most powerful philosophy of history can be detected in the book. Rorty already implied as much himself by having the message of the book culminate in its last two chapters on Hans Georg Gadamer's hermeneutics. The suggestion clearly is that if one follows the history of Western thought since Descartes and extrapolates from there to the future (as Rorty tentatively did himself in these two last chapters), it will be hermeneutics, hence a philosophy of history, that we shall end up with. Moreover, the book offered already some tantalizing insights into what this new philosophy of history might look like: it would, minimally, apply the technical sophistication of analytical philosophy of language to the problems traditionally investigated in philosophy of history.
So philosophers of history (such as myself) eagerly awaited Rorty's next book in the expectation that this would fulfil the promises of the end of PMN. But, alas, when Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity finally came out in 1989, it was clear that Rorty had abandoned the project he had suggested at the end of PMN. No sequel to that...
Holism. A Shopper's Guide Holism: A Consumer Update
- Fodor
- Ernest Jerry
- Lepore
Fodor, Jerry, and Ernest Lepore. 1992. Holism. A Shopper's Guide. Oxford: Blackwell. J.-M. Kuukkanen Fodor, Jerry, and Ernest Lepore, eds. 1993. Holism: A Consumer Update. Amsterdam: Rodopi.