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December 2008 | 29
Taiwan Journal of Democracy, Volume 4, No.2: 29-45
“Neighborhood Effects” of Democratization in Europe
Dirk Berg-Schlosser
Abstract
External factors have received relatively little attention in the broad
democratization literature. This essay examines specic “neighborhood”
effects in the transitions to democracy in three phases in Europe concerning,
rst, Southern Europe, then Central and Eastern Europe, and, nally, the more
recent “color” revolutions. It distinguishes between immediate neighborhood
and “contagion” effects, both on the general population and elite levels,
overall European Union attractiveness and specic EU support, and the more
general international “climate.” Some neighborhood effects may be positive
in supporting democratic transitions and consolidation, whereas others may
be negative, as, for example, was the case with regard to Russia during the
“Orange Revolution” in Ukraine. It can be shown that distinct patterns of such
factors existed during the various phases of these European transitions. In
conclusion, some general lessons are drawn from this analysis.
Key words: Democratic transition, consolidation, external factors,
neighborhood effects.
Dirk Berg-Schlosser is Professor in the Institute of Political Science at Philipps University,
Marburg, Germany. <bergschl@staff.uni-marburg.de>
1 Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991). The
“periodization” has, however, been disputed by others; see, for example, Renske Doorenspleet,
“Reassessing the Three Waves of Democratization,” World Politics 52, no. 3 (2000): 384-406, and
Dirk Berg-Schlosser, “Long Waves and Conjunctures of Democratization,” in Democratization
in a Globalized World, ed. Christian Haerpfer, Ronald Inglehart, Christian Welzel, and Patrick
Bernhagen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming). In particular, it has been questioned
whether these developments can really be attributed to some underlying common cause or
whether developments in the 1970s in Southern Europe, in the 1980s in Latin America, and after
1989-1990 in Central and Eastern Europe were not, in fact, quite distinct phenomena.
The last “wave” of democratization, to use Huntington’s term,1 has arrived
in Europe in three distinct phases. The rst occurred with the breakdown of
the authoritarian regimes in Portugal, Spain, and Greece in the 1970s. The
30 | Taiwan Journal of Democracy, Volume 4, No.2
2 There are no clear-cut geographical, cultural, or political denitions for the use of these terms. See,
for instance, Judy Batt, “Introduction: Dening Central and Eastern Europe,” in Developments in
Central and East European Politics 4, ed. Stephen White, Judy Batt, and Paul G. Lewis (London:
Palgrave MacMillan, 2007), 1-19. For practical purposes, we restrict the term here to those cases
where an effective democratization occurred in the early 1990s, but exclude dubious cases such
as Russia and the new states in former Yugoslavia.
3 Only a few more outstanding contributions can be mentioned here. See, for example, Guillermo
O’Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, Laurence Whitehead, eds., Transitions from Authoritarian
Rule: Prospects for Democracy (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), Juan
J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern
Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1996); Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation (Baltimore, MD:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999); and Wolfgang Merkel, Systemtransformation: Eine
Einführung in die Theorie und Empirie der Transformationsforschung [System transformation:
An introduction to the theory and practice of transformation research] (Opladen, Germany: Leske
+ Budrich, 1999). A succinct overview can also be found in Gerardo L. Munck, “Democracy
Studies: Agendas, Findings, Challenges,” in Democratization: The State of the Art, ed. Dirk
Berg-Schlosser (Leverkusen, Germany: Budrich, 2007), 45-68.
4 See, for example, the discussions by Herbert Kitschelt, “Accounting for Post-Communist
Regime Diversity: What Counts as a Good Cause?” in Transformative Paths in Central and
Eastern Europe, ed. Radoslaw Markowski and Edmund Wnuk-Lipinski (Warsaw, Poland:
Instytut Studiów Politycznych Polskiej Akademii Nauk, 2001), 11-46, and Laurence Whitehead,
“Twenty-rst Century Democratizations: Experience vs. Scholarship,” in Democratization: The
State of the Art, ed. Dirk Berg-Schlosser (Opladen, Germany: Budrich, 2007), 111-132.
5 O’Donnell, Schmitter, Whitehead, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy,
19.
6 See, for example, Geoffrey Pridham, Democratization in Eastern Europe: Domestic and
International Perspectives (London: Routledge, 1994), and Laurence Whitehead, The
International Dimensions of Democratization (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).
second, and most forceful one, happened in Central and Eastern Europe2
after 1989 and 1990, and the third, which only has been a trickle so far, has
been the “Orange Revolutions” in Ukraine, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan during
the last few years. There has been an enormous amount of literature on these
and similar developments elsewhere.3 Whereas a wide variety of factors has
been considered as possible explanations and there certainly is no simple
monocausal one,4 the emphasis for the largest part has been on domestic factors
and internal developments. As Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe Schmitter
put it (with regard to Southern Europe and Latin America), “Domestic factors
play a dominant role in the transition ... there is no transition whose beginning
is not the consequence
-
direct or indirect
-
of important divisions within the
authoritarian regimes themselves.”5
By contrast, the external and international dimensions have received
relatively less attention.6 In this essay, I will therefore focus on some specic
aspects of the international dimension which can be termed “neighborhood
effects.” Thus, the essay emphasizes some historically and geographically
contingent factors, rather than attempting a more universal explanation. Some
further distinctions, however, are in order. First of all, “neighborhood” also is a
December 2008 | 31
relative term. It does not necessarily imply having common borders; instead it
can mean sharing some historical and cultural proximity and being involved in
some common processes and interactions. Second, there often can be unintended
regional diffusion and “contagion” effects at the society level, as stimulated by
trade, tourism, or international media, in contrast to explicit policies by major
neighboring regimes or international actors, such as the European Union or,
on an even wider scale, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund,
the United Nations, and so on, which are directed toward political elites.
Third, such effects can be positive in the sense of promoting and enhancing
further democratization, but also they can attempt to prevent, contravene, or
slow down such developments, as for example, Russia’s position on the recent
“Orange Revolutions” has demonstrated. Finally, a distinction must be made
between factors affecting the breakdown of previous authoritarian regimes and
the initial phase of transition to democracy, and longer-term inuences after
some kind of democratic regime has been established, concerning its further
prospects of stabilization, “consolidation,” and enhancing the overall quality7
of the new political order.
A more general methodological problem in this respect must also be
mentioned. It is often very difcult, if not impossible, to clearly identify and
distinguish internal independent developments in certain cases from patterns
of interactions and learning from and imitating others. This is the familiar
“Galton’s problem” in comparative analysis, referring to the well-known
British statistician, Sir Francis Galton, who posed the question, “It would be
extremely desirable for the sake of those who wish to study the evidence for
Dr. Tylor’s conclusions that full information should be given as to the degree
to which the customs of the tribes and races compared are independent. It
might be that some of the tribes had derived from a common source, so that
they were duplicate copies of the same original.”8 With this remark, Galton
commented upon Sir Edward Tylor’s presentation at the Royal Anthropological
Institute in London in 1889 on his ndings concerning bivariate correlations
between selected characteristics of a variety of ethnic groups in Africa that
were investigated by him.9 Since then, the problem whether a phenomenon can
be considered to have had its own independent origins or must be attributed to
intercultural diffusion effects has become known as “Galton’s problem.”10
7 These terms will be further discussed below.
8 Edward B. Tylor, “On a Method of Investigating the Development of Institutions Applied to the
Laws of Marriage and Descent,” Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 18 (1889): 270.
9 Ibid.
10 See also, for example, Adam Przeworski and Henry Teune, The Logic of Comparative Social
Inquiry (New York: Wiley, 1970), 51, and Robert Wirsing, “Die Konzeptualisierung von Galtons
Problem im interkulturellen Vergleich: Forschungsgeschichte und neuere Lösungsansätze” [The
conceptualization of Galton’s Problem in intercultural comparisons: History and new solutions]
Zeitschrift für Ethnologie [Journal of Ethnology] 114 (1989): 75-87.
32 | Taiwan Journal of Democracy, Volume 4, No.2
In the following, I will rst discuss some of the possible neighborhood
effects during the rst phase of transitions in Southern Europe in the 1970s.
A second section will then be concerned with the major upheavals in Central
and Eastern Europe, again focusing on their interactions and major regional
inuences. The third part then turns to the more recent developments of the
“Orange Revolutions” and their specic neighborhood situation. Finally, the
concluding section will attempt to compare these developments with regard to
their respective neighborhood patterns and to draw some lessons from these
experiences, which will also enable us to develop some further perspectives.
Southern Europe
Portugal
“The third wave of democratization in the modern world began, implausibly
and unwittingly, at twenty-ve minutes after midnight, Thursday, April 25,
1974, in Lisbon, Portugal, when a radio station played the song ‘Grandola Vila
Morena.’ ”11 With these lines, Samuel Huntington began his account of the
“Carnation Revolution,” which eventually led to the country’s democratization
and membership in the European Union. The junta of junior- and middle-
rank ofcers who took over power from Caetano’s (and previously Salazar’s)
“corporatist-authoritarian” regime,12 originally wanted to establish some kind
of socialist system, but was committed to convene a Constituent Assembly,
devising a new constitution, and to hold free elections. This situation had
been triggered by the increasing hardships and loss of lives created by the
wars of independence in Portugal’s African colonies, in particular, Angola
and Mozambique, which constitutionally were regarded as part of the mother
country. This was a special, de facto external effect, which did not apply in the
other cases to be considered below.
In the protracted transition phase which ensued, several other external
forces were at work. One was the support by the Soviet Union for the new
regime and its socialist orientation, including support for the still largely
Stalinist and orthodox Communist Party, chaired by Alvaro Cunhal. This was
strongly opposed by the United States, which apparently even considered some
direct intervention under Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, a position which
was mitigated, however, by the “softer” approach of a number of European
states and the European Community. Thus, at this stage, the overall Cold War
situation still prevailed.
11 Huntington, The Third Wave, 3.
12 O’Donnell, Schmitter, Whitehead, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for
Democracy, and António Costa Pinto, “Dealing with the Legacy of Authoritarianism: Political
Purges and Radical Right Movements in Portugal’s Transition to Democracy, 1974-1980,” in
Modern Europe after Fascism
-
1943-1980s, ed. Stein Ugelvik Larsen (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1998), 1679-1718.
December 2008 | 33
The elections to the Constituent Assembly in 1975 and the subsequent
parliamentary elections in 1976 produced clear majorities of the democratic
forces, including center-left (“Socialist,” PS), center-right (“Social Democratic,”
PSD), and conservative (“Democratic Social Center,” CDS) parties.13 Leftist
forces in the military where held in check by Colonel Eanes, who represented
more moderate elements, and who was elected as Portugal’s rst president
under the new regime in 1976. The parliamentary elections had been won by
the Socialist Party (36.7 percent), chaired by Mario Soares, who became the
rst democratically elected prime minister. In the meantime, democratically
oriented civil society groups had also received support from outside. Among
others, the German Social Democratic Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation had been
particularly instrumental in supporting the PS and its leader, Mario Soares.14
A constitutional revision in 1982, which established the civil control of
the military, then laid the groundwork for further democratic consolidation.
This was greatly enhanced by the prospect of becoming a full member of the
European Community, which was accomplished in 1985. From then onward,
Portugal has been a fully democratic and increasingly prosperous country.
Greece
(Re)democratization in Greece occurred when the military regime, established
by Colonel George Papadopoulus in 1967, was unable to respond to the Turkish
invasion of Cyprus in July 1974. Previous promises of “enosis” (reunication
with the Greek-speaking part of the population on the island) turned out to
be hollow. This, indeed, again was a very special (indirect) neighborhood
effect. The social basis of the junta had been very narrow anyhow, and it was
relatively easy for conservative party leader Constantine Karamanlis to take
over power as acting prime minister, with the support of some senior military
ofcers. This was followed by parliamentary elections in December 1974,
which conrmed Karamanlis’s position, and a referendum that abolished the
monarchy implicated with the authoritarian regime.
The European Community, which had reacted with sanctions after the
coup, now supported the transition and the new regime, and Greece was
admitted as a full member to the Community in 1981. At the same time, the
relatively strong Communist Party, which had fought a long civil war after
World War II, had split into a still Moscow-leaning (KKE) and a more Euro-
communist wing, along the lines of Berlinguer’s PCI in Italy. Thus, this foreign
inuence also had weakened considerably. With the electoral victory of the
13 For a brief account of the period, see, for example, Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic
Transition and Consolidation, 116-129.
14 See also, Rainer Eisfeld, “Portugal and Western Europe,” in Portugal in the 1980’s: Dilemmas
of Democratic Consolidation, ed. Kenneth Maxwell (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986), 29-
62.
34 | Taiwan Journal of Democracy, Volume 4, No.2
(socialist) opposition party PASOK in 1981, led by veteran politician Andreas
Papandreou, Greek democracy (with some remaining weaknesses) could be
considered to have become consolidated.15
Spain
Among the cases considered here, Spain experienced the most protracted
transition, which became the paradigm for a “transicion pactada,” as later
followed by some of the Latin American countries.16 This involved an
agreement between the “moderates” in the government camp, as personied
by Prime Minister Suarez after Franco’s death in 1975, and the “moderates”
on the opposition side, led by Socialist Party (PSOE) leader Felipe Gonzales,
but also joined later by Communist Party leader Santiago Carillo. It was, to
the largest extent, an internal settlement, even though PSOE also had received
some clandestine support from the German Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation. It also
can be argued that, after the return to the monarchy, the moderating role of
King Juan Carlos was somewhat inuenced by the unsuccessful experience of
his Greek counterpart. The attractiveness of the European Community and the
rewards offered by its membership certainly also played a role, even though
democracy in Spain can be considered to have become fully consolidated
before she became an EC member in 1986.17
Central and Eastern Europe
General Background
In contrast to the democratic transitions in Southern Europe, where, by and
large, domestic factors prevailed, the situation in Central and Eastern Europe
was, from the beginning, determined by the dominant position of the Soviet
Union, which had occupied most of the territories after World War II. Leaders
in Moscow created a system of communist-ruled “satellite” states, which were
rmly integrated into the centrally planned economic system of the Comecon
and the military alliance of the Warsaw Pact. Only Yugoslavia, which went its
own way under Tito after 1948, and the remote and isolated Albania, which
split with Moscow after 1961 (and sought Chinese support instead), were
exceptions to this pattern. When internal social unrest because of economic
and political grievances threatened to shed this external dominance, as in the
15 For a detailed account see, for example, Richard Gunther, Nikiforos P. Diamandouros, and Hans-
Jürgen Puhle, eds., The Politics of Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe in Comparative
Perspective (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), chap. 11, and Linz and
Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, 130.
16 Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, 130-138.
17 Richard Gunther, “Spain: The Very Model of the Modern Elite Settlement,” in Elites and
Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe, ed. John Higley and Richard
Gunther (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 38-80.
December 2008 | 35
German Democratic Republic (GDR) in 1953, Poland and Hungary in 1956,
and Czechoslovakia in 1968, these attempts were forcefully put down by the
Red Army and the allied bloc members. This “Brezhnev doctrine” of limited
sovereignty of East European states, as it was formulated after the events in
Czechoslovakia, remained in force until Gorbachev rose to presidential power
in 1985.
In the meantime, however, other factors had been at work that weakened
the regimes in power. On the one hand, the highly centralized planned
economies and the division of production within the Comecon turned out to be
increasingly cumbersome and ineffective, leading to widespread dissatisfaction
with the standard of living in large segments of the populations and many acute
shortages of essential consumer goods. This was exacerbated by the oil crises
of the 1970s, which had an impact on energy prices in Eastern Europe, partly
compensated by an increasing state indebtedness toward Western countries
and international nancial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) and the World Bank. On the other hand, the international politics of the
Cold War had gone through a period of détente, which in part was facilitated
by Willy Brandt’s “Ostpolitik” toward West Germany’s eastern neighbors and
a number of important bilateral and multilateral treaties signed in its wake.
Most important among these, in the longer run, was the Helsinki Accord of the
newly founded Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)
in 1975. This included, at rst at least on paper, a guarantee of basic human
and political rights by all signatory states. These rights increasingly were
claimed by dissident movements in a number of countries, such as Charter 77
in Czechoslovakia, Solidarnosz in Poland, and, later, dissident groups in East
Germany that were focused on ecological, pacist, and general human rights
issues.18
For these reasons, the strictly administered economies and tight communist
rule began to be “softened” somewhat in a number of countries. Hungary,
in particular, allowed for a more market- and consumer-oriented form of
“Goulash communism,” and some political liberalization. In Poland, which
had remained the most “pluralist” of all Eastern Bloc countries because of the
persistent strong role of the Catholic Church, an uncollectivized peasantry, and
strong nationalist (and anti-Russian!) sentiments, the Solidarnosz movement
of the increasingly dissatised shipyard workers in Danzig, coal miners, and
so on, became the rallying force for the opposition. This could be contained
only by the declaration of a state of emergency and the taking over of power
by General Jaruzelski in 1981, in order to prevent direct Soviet intervention.
Elsewhere, however, as in Czechoslovakia, the GDR, and Romania, edgling
opposition forces continued to encounter strong repressive measures.
18 See also Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, 113.
36 | Taiwan Journal of Democracy, Volume 4, No.2
Gorbachev and his advisors had realized some of the causes of the economic
decline and the enormous costs of maintaining military supremacy in the East
and an “equilibrium of terror” in the Cold War vis-à-vis the West. Therefore,
they propagated both economic and (some) political reforms (perestroika
and glasnost) and nally abandoned the Brezhnev doctrine. In Hungary, this
allowed for the formation of the rst non-communist political organization
since 1956, the Hungarian Democratic Forum, in 1987. Within the Communist
Party, long-time party leader, Janos Kadar, was removed in 1988, and other
hardliners were sidelined. In the spring and summer of 1989, massive street
demonstrations by the opposition led to the formation of a “Roundtable” and
effective agreements initiating a transition toward an open multiparty system.
Similarly, in Poland, after renewed strikes and broad social unrest, Roundtable
negotiations in early 1989 led to a compromise legalizing Solidarnosz and to
elections in June, which were clearly won by the opposition. In August 1989,
Tadeusz Mazowiecki, a Solidarnosz activist, became the rst non-communist
head of government.
Immediate “Neighborhood” Effects
Whereas these developments still were dependent on the “grand” situation of
international politics and internal changes made possible by the Gorbachev
reforms, the real turning point came with the subsequent events in the GDR, the
opening of the Berlin Wall on the eve of November 9, 1989. This was followed
by a series of immediate “demonstration” and “neighborhood” effects, with
all Eastern regimes falling like dominoes within a few weeks (the dates of
these events are provided in table 1 in chronological order, indicating some
immediate neighborhood reactions).
The ongoing changes in Hungary had led to an opening of its border
with Austria. This became an important escape route for East Germans who
had been permitted to travel to Hungary, but not outside the Eastern Bloc.
Demonstrations, initiated by weekly Monday prayers in Leipzig, and general
social unrest increased in the GDR. Many more now demanded to be able
to travel abroad and to enjoy basic civil liberties. Thousands ed to the
West German embassies in Budapest and Prague, and, after some intense
negotiations with the GDR leadership, were nally permitted to travel to the
West. Gorbachev personally had indicated his disapproval of the stubborn
“gerontocratic” leadership under Erich Honecker, who had to step down.
But the general turmoil could no longer be contained, and during the night of
November 9, the closely guarded checkpoints at the Berlin Wall were nally
opened.
All this was broadly reported by the international media and in the other
East European countries. Immediately afterward, massive demonstrations
and demands for sweeping reforms followed in the other communist states.
Some ruling parties, as in Bulgaria, attempted to contain these forces by some
internal changes, and long-time party leader Todor Zhivkov was replaced by
December 2008 | 37
the more “moderate” Retur Mladenov. This could not, however, appease the
opposition, which had been organized in a new Union of Democratic Forces
and demanded more comprehensive changes. Roundtable talks in January
1990 then led to the complete dismantling of the regime and the rst pluralist
elections on October 19, 1990.
Similarly, in Prague a week after the fall of the Berlin Wall, big and
increasingly intensied demonstrations started. These, too, could not be
contained any longer, and within two weeks, the Communist Party leadership
under hardliner Gustav Husak resigned. The Czech opposition organized itself
as the Civic Forum, involving former Charter 77 activists such as Vaclav
Havel. In the Slovak part of the country, a parallel organization, Public against
Violence, was formed. In the end, Vaclav Havel was elected president on
December 29, 1989.
The tough and “sultanistic”19 regime of the Ceausescus in Romania also
Table 1. Time of Major Events Leading to Transition
Country Date or Period Effect of Transition
Lithuania June 3, 1988 October 25, 1992, parliamentary elections
Estonia June 17, 1988 September 1992, rst parliamentary elections
Slovenia Jan. 22, 1989 December 6, 1992, rst presidential and
parliamentary elections
Hungary February 1989 March 25 and April 8, 1990, rst parliamentary
elections
Poland Spring 1989 December 9, 1990, election of Lech Wałęsa as
president
Georgia April 9, 1989 May 26, 1991, election of Swiad Gamsachurdia as
rst president
Latvia Aug. 23, 1989 June 5-6, 1993, rst parliamentary elections
GDR Nov. 9, 1989 March 18, 1990, rst parliamentary elections
Bulgaria Nov.10,1989 October 19, 1990, rst parliamentary elections
Czechoslovakia Nov. 17,1989 December 29, 1990, election of Václav Havel as
president
Romania Dec. 16,1989 May 20, 1990, election of Ion Iliescu as president
Croatia April 1990 August 2, 1992, rst parliamentary and presidential
elections
Macedonia Sept. 8, 1991 October/November 1994, rst parliamentary
elections
19 For brief accounts of this period see, for example, ibid., chap. 15, 235-254, and Mark Pittaway
“From Communist to Post-Communist Politics,” in Developments in Central and East European
Politics 4, ed. Stephen White, Judy Batt, and Paul G. Lewis (Durham, NC: Duke University
Press, 2007), 20-36.
38 | Taiwan Journal of Democracy, Volume 4, No.2
came to a most dramatic end in December. Widespread strikes and revolts,
rst emanating from the city of Timisoara in the west of the country with a
strong Hungarian diaspora, led to an internal party coup and put former Vice
President Ion Iliescu into ofce. Nicolae and Elena Ceausescu were publicly
executed on Christmas Day, 1989. The following elections on May 20, 1990,
conrmed this “captured revolution.”20 Only in 1996, when for the rst time
opposition forces won the elections, did an effective change of power occur.
Longer-term Changes
Other parts of the larger Eastern and Southeastern European region did not
remain untouched either. In contrast to countries where previous statehood had
been relatively secure or where a peaceful separation of the major regions was
achieved, as in Czechoslovakia in 1993, attempts to achieve self-determination
and democratization led to a more violent break-up of the multi-ethnic and
multireligious states of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union.
In 1990, each of the six republics within the Socialist Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia held multiparty elections. In Catholic Slovenia and Croatia,
governments were formed which favored independence, whereas in Serbia
and Montenegro, communist leader Slobodan Milosevic maintained his grip.
When Slovenia and Croatia ofcially declared independence in June 1991, a
short secession war ensued, but the center was no longer able to enforce its
control. In September 1991, the Republic of Macedonia followed suit, this
time without resistance from Belgrade. In other parts, however, in particular,
in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, protracted and very bloody civil wars
erupted, challenging the domination by Serbia. This led to external military
intervention by the United Nations and NATO and to a very tense situation and
complicated attempts of settling these conicts up to the present day.21
This special situation cannot be considered here in any more detail. It has
led, however, to a strong involvement of the European Union in this region and,
as in the other East European cases, to full membership of Slovenia in the EU
in 2004 and possibly also Croatia in the near future. In 1992, isolated Albania
also experienced a regime change following the rst democratic elections.
Milosevic’s authoritarian rule nally also came to an end in 2000, after his
regime had been severely weakened by the lost wars and public discontent,
leading to the “bulldozer revolution” that could no longer be contained by
nationalist slogans alone.
The other multi-ethnic state breaking up during this period was the Soviet
Union. Here, the three Baltic republics had a special position. They had
20 For the use of this term, see Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and
Consolidation, 51.
21 More detailed accounts can be found in ibid., chap. 18.
December 2008 | 39
become independent states after World War I and had experienced a period of
democratic rule until the early 1930s. After interims of internal authoritarian
rule, they were occupied by the Soviet Union in 1940 and became integral
parts of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). They were also the
most westward parts, with continuing links across the Baltic Sea and enjoying
a relatively prosperous situation as compared to most other parts of the Soviet
Union. In all three republics, strong ethnic-cultural sentiments prevailed toward
Russian domination, but also toward strong internal Russian minorities (in
Estonia and Latvia, more than 30 percent), most of whom had immigrated after
1940. “Nationalist” and democratic reform elements thus largely coincided.
In Estonia, such convergence led to the formation of an Estonian Popular
Front as early as 1987. Democratic opposition forces and moderate (ethnic
Estonian) members of the Communist Party found a common ground and
won the elections in 1990, still under the roof of the Soviet Union, which
under Gorbachev no longer was opposed to such reform strategies. In Latvia,
a similar development took place, even though the hard-line communist forces
still maintained a greater inuence. A coup attempt of pro-Russian elements
in August 1991 failed, however. In Lithuania (with a Russian minority of less
than 10 percent), nationalist forces, including post-communist organizations
and personalities, prevailed from the very beginning. They chose to confront
the Soviet leadership under Gorbachev openly, which led to a brief armed
conict. In March 1990, Lithuania declared its independence. When, after the
tumultuous events in Moscow in August 1991, Gorbachev resigned and the
Soviet Union was formally dissolved into its fteen constituent republics (the
Community of Independent States, or CIS), Estonia and Latvia also achieved
full independence. All three Baltic states then rapidly sought support from
their Scandinavian neighbors and the European Union, becoming full EU and
NATO members in 2004.
The Eastern and Southeastern Periphery
In this way, practically all the relevant dominoes in Eastern and Southeastern
Europe had fallen, with the exception of the still unresolved complicated
situations in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, both remaining more or less
under EU and UN tutelage. The geographically more distant CIS states proved,
however, to be much more resistant to substantive democratic changes. But
even remaining under mostly authoritarian rule, at least formal elections
were held in most of them, presenting an opportunity for opposition forces
to express their discontent. Even though on many occasions these elections
were largely fraudulent, increased international attention and monitoring
made cheating more difcult and led to massive protests by newly organized
opposition groups.
40 | Taiwan Journal of Democracy, Volume 4, No.2
Georgia
In Georgia, where former Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnaze had
become president, the post-communist regime was faced both with attempts
of regional secession in South Ossetia and Abkhazia and a growing internal
opposition demanding more democratic rights and free and fair elections.
Having lost all major internal and external support, Shevardnaze quickly
resigned, facing the “Rose Revolution” in 2003. His successor, Mikheil
Saakashvili, easily won the following elections, turning to support by the EU
and the United States with the hope for eventual EU and NATO membership.
In the meantime, however, the international “climate,” which had been so
favorable toward democratization in the 1990s as “the only (legitimate) game
in town,”22 had changed signicantly. The attacks of September 11, 2001,
by the Islamist terrorist organization Al-Qaeda on the World Trade Center
in New York and the Pentagon had brought another violent antidemocratic
force to the fore, which, at least in countries with sizeable Muslim populations,
could muster some support. They distracted world attention and redirected
U.S. foreign policy toward ghting this new enemy (even in places such as
Iraq, where previously Al-Qaeda did not have any signicant support). The
succession from ailing President Boris Yeltzin to Vladimir Putin in 1998, and
the stabilizing economic and political situation in the Russian Federation,
favored by strongly rising oil and gas prices for this major export-country,
also had led to a reassertion of Russia’s international role, paying particular
attention to its “close neighborhood,” where some of the adjacent states were
heavily dependent on energy imports from Russia.
Ukraine
When in Ukraine, again after fraudulent elections, massive protests erupted
in December 2004 in the “Orange Revolution,” the situation had become
more complicated. The leader of the opposition, Viktor Yushenko, managed to
secure a victory in a rerun of the second round of the presidential elections over
his chief opponent, Viktor Yanukovich, who had his power base in the eastern
parts of the country and who was strongly supported by Moscow. Russia also
raised oil prices and threatened to cut supplies entirely. The internal situation
still remains tense and complicated, and even though the 2007 parliamentary
elections were termed “free and fair” by outside observers, Ukraine’s
democracy is far from being consolidated. The country remains torn between
aspirations to become an EU and possibly NATO member, as expressed by the
new leadership, and strong pressures to keep a nonaligned (or pro-Russian)
position by its eastern neighbor.
22 Giuseppe DiPalma, To Craft Democracies: An Essay on Democratic Transitions (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1990).
December 2008 | 41
Kyrgyzstan
The third former Soviet republic where a “color” or “ower” revolution
occurred was Kyrgyzstan. It had declared independence from the Soviet Union
in August 1991, and Askar Akayev won the rst open presidential elections.
His rule became more and more authoritarian, however, and subsequent
elections were largely awed and opposition groups suppressed. When again
in February 2005 parliamentary elections were judged to have fallen “short
of OSCE commitments and other international standards,”23 thousands of
demonstrators took to the streets calling for Akayev’s resignation. He had
to ee abroad, and in the following presidential elections, opposition leader
Kurmanbek Bakiyev crowned this “Tulip Revolution” by his victory. Since
then, again more authoritarian tendencies can be noted. A new constitution,
approved by referendum in 2007, reinforced executive powers. In terms of
foreign relations, the government tried to keep a balance between ties with the
West, allowing the use of a strategic airport for U.S. and NATO forces engaged
in the war in neighboring Afghanistan, and an emerging “authoritarian bloc,”
represented by the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), consisting of
China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Altogether,
democracy, here too, remains far from being consolidated.
With regard to some linkages among these developments, there certainly
was some “diffusion” both at the general population and the elite levels.24 It
has convincingly been argued, however, that domestic factors
-
such as control
over mineral resources including oil and gas and effective party organizations
-
and the overall international situation were more decisive.25 This seems to
have been borne out by most recent events in Georgia, where “old” Cold War
politics highlighting efforts by both the U.S. and Russia to assert their control
over this region have come to the fore again.
Conclusions
This essay deals with the international dimension of democratization processes
during the last three major phases in Europe (and a little bit beyond). These,
however, have to be seen in a differentiated manner. Immediate “neighborhood”
effects of closely adjacent, very similar countries have to be distinguished from
the general (and growing!) role of the European Union and the overall regional
and global aspects of international politics. What have such effects been in all
23 See Freedom House, “Country Report Kyrgyzstan,” 2008, http://www.freedomhouse.org/
template.cfm? page=22&year=2008&country=7427 (accessed September 20, 2008).
24 Lucan Way, “The Real Causes of the Color Revolutions,” Journal of Democracy 19, no. 3
(2008): 55-69.
25 Mark R. Beissinger, “A New Look at Ethnicity and Democratization,” Journal of Democracy
19, no. 3 (2008): 85-97.
42 | Taiwan Journal of Democracy, Volume 4, No.2
the cases considered here? What was the interaction of domestic and external
factors? Has there been an interaction from one phase to another? What are the
lessons to be drawn from these experiences and what are the perspectives for
further democratization in the European periphery?
These are important questions both for empirical democratic theory and
practical politics in the years and decades to come. At this place, they can,
of course, only be answered in a very preliminary manner, and because of
the special focus of this essay, questions concerning the relative weight of
internal and external factors of democratization cannot be answered here.
“Galton’s problem” (see above) thus cannot be resolved here for these cases.
Nevertheless, as our cursory overview has shown, some tentative conclusions
can be drawn.
First of all, during the rst phase concerning the Southern European
countries of Portugal, Greece, and Spain in the 1970s, in the transition period,
domestic factors certainly were overriding. There was, however, some civil
society outside support, a generally favorable climate for democratization, and
only weak countervailing forces in this part of the world. For the (much longer)
period of consolidation, the “pull” of the EC/EU and direct encouragement
and support from West European countries for domestic democratic forces
contributed considerably to the nal success (see also, the rough listing of
factors in table A1 in the appendix).
Secondly, the next phase, involving the Central and East European
countries after 1989-1990, shows quite a different pattern. Here, under the
general umbrella of domination by the Soviet Union and signicant internal
political changes there, immediate “contagion” and “demonstration” (even in
the literal sense of the word!) effects were shown. These chain reactions led to
a true “domino” situation, reaching even beyond the European continent into
Africa and elsewhere. In the consolidating period, EU support also became
very explicit and direct. Support programs such as PHARE (Poland and
Hungary Assistance for Restructuring the Economy) immediately helped in
this process, and the prospect of possible EU membership spurred these efforts
in many ways. The “Copenhagen criteria,” formulated by the EU in 1993, set
demanding thresholds in political, economic, and administrative terms in this
respect (stability of democratic institutions and effective protection of human
rights and the rule of law, a functioning market economy able to withstand
competitive pressures, and the acceptance of the acquis communautaire of EU
rules and regulations). Coming “back to Europe” was attractive for the largest
part of the populations, in terms of shedding Soviet dominance and communist
rule and gaining liberal democratic rights and prospects for economic well-
being and security in the EU and NATO. Not everything went smoothly, of
course, but those countries which have become EU members by now can be
considered to have become (more or less) democratically consolidated. For
some of the former Yugoslav republics, this process is still continuing.
Thirdly, the more feeble “Color Revolutions” again deviate from this
December 2008 | 43
pattern. Here, geopolitical and, possibly, social-cultural factors seem to
prevail. The (relative) remoteness from the European center, the reassertion of
Russia’s inuence over “CIS”-countries, and a generally much less favorable
international climate returning to great power politics in a multipolar world
have made these transitions more turbulent and shaky. They also have been too
recent to be considered “consolidated” in any way. Nevertheless, some longer-
term factors concerning better international communications, international
civil society support, critical election observations, and similar inuences
can be observed. EU membership, however, if at all, remains a very remote
prospect.
As far as interactions among these three phases are concerned, in contrast
to Huntington’s arguments, no direct linkages between the rst and the second
phase could be found. The second and the third phases, of course, are more
closely interlinked both in terms of comparable domestic conditions and the
(changing) roles of the major neighboring powers, the EU and Russia.
A more formal analysis with the help of qualitative comparative analysis
(QCA)26 supports these ndings. All transitions after the rst phase, with
the exception of the Eastern “forerunners” of Poland and Hungary, show
strong “contagion” and immediate neighborhood effects. Further democratic
consolidation then was facilitated by strong EU support, lack of external
opposing forces, and a favorable international climate. This was the case for
all present EU members (including Croatia, as probably the next in line).
Conversely, the new states in former Yugoslavia and the CIS countries, which
have not become members of the EU, cannot be considered to have been
consolidated. They are facing a more difcult international climate and, for
some of them, direct opposition from Moscow concerning further orientation
toward the West.
Among the lessons to be drawn from these experiences are much lower
expectations concerning further democratization in Europe’s periphery. There
certainly still is some attractiveness and, in the “electoral democracies,”
obvious electoral fraud and general dissatisfaction with the economic situation
as well as with widespread political corruption and ineffectiveness may lead to
further protests and “color” movements. A majority of CIS and Central Asian
countries may, however, “stabilize” under more authoritarian conditions and
an international environment in which nondemocratic powers such as Russia
and China have again asserted themselves. Only renewed major shocks there
or incremental democratic changes leading to a change in the foreign policies
of the “big neighbors” could lead to more favorable conditions for further
democratization in this region. This, however, is, of course, purely speculative
and much beyond the scope of this essay.
26 Benoit Rihoux and Charles C. Ragin, eds., Congurational Comparative Methods: Qualitative
Comparative Analysis (QCA) and Related Techniques (London: Sage Publications, 2008).
44 | Taiwan Journal of Democracy, Volume 4, No.2
Appendix
Table A1. Overview of External Factors
Contagion
from
immediate
neighbors
(general
population)
Support
for
democratic
forces
(“elites”)
EC/EU
attractiveness
Direct
EU
support
Opposing
external
forces
International
“climate”
Portugal
Transition:
Consolidation:
no
yes
strong
strong
no
yes
no
yes
weak
(SU)
no
ambivalent
favorable
Greece
Transition:
Consolidation:
no
no
strong
strong
no
yes
no
yes
no
no
favorable
favorable
Spain
Transition:
Consolidation:
yes
yes
strong
strong
yes
yes
no
yes
no
no
favorable
favorable
Hungary
Transition:
Consolidation:
no
yes
weak
strong
no
yes
no
yes
no
no
favorable
favorable
Poland
Transition:
Consolidation:
no
yes
weak
strong
no
yes
no
yes
no
no
favorable
favorable
GDR
Transition: yes strong no no no favorable
Czechoslovakia
Transition:
Consolidation:
yes
yes
strong
strong
yes
yes
no
yes
no
no
favorable
favorable
Bulgaria
Transition:
Consolidation:
yes
yes
weak
strong
no
yes
no
yes
no
no
favorable
favorable
Romania
Transition:
Consolidation:
yes
yes
weak
strong
no
yes
no
yes
no
no
favorable
favorable
Slovenia
Transition:
Consolidation:
yes
yes
strong
strong
yes
yes
no
yes
yes
no
favorable
favorable
Croatia
Transition:
Consolidation:
yes
yes
strong
strong
yes
yes
no
yes
yes
no
favorable
favorable
Macedonia
Transition:
Consolidation:
yes
yes
strong
strong
yes
yes
no
yes
no
no
favorable
favorable
December 2008 | 45
Contagion
from
immediate
neighbors
(general
population)
Support
for
democratic
forces
(“elites”)
EC/EU
attractiveness
Direct
EU
support
Opposing
external
forces
International
“climate”
Serbia
Transition: yes strong yes no yes favorable
Estonia
Transition:
Consolidation:
yes
yes
strong
strong
no
yes
no
yes
yes
no
favorable
favorable
Latvia
Transition:
Consolidation:
yes
yes
strong
strong
no
yes
no
yes
yes
no
favorable
favorable
Lithuania
Transition:
Consolidation:
yes
yes
strong
strong
no
yes
no
yes
yes
no
favorable
favorable
Georgia yes strong yes no yes less
favorable
Ukraine yes strong yes no yes less
favorable
Kyrgyzstan yes strong no no yes less
favorable
46 | Taiwan Journal of Democracy, Volume 4, No.2
