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GEORGIA & RUSSIA:
THE “UNKNOWN” PRELUDE TO THE “FIVE DAY WAR” 227
GEORGIA & RUSSIA:
THE “UNKNOWN” PRELUDE TO THE “FIVE DAY WAR”
COMMENT BY
Martin Malek∗
∗∗
∗
Abstract
The Russian Armed Forces not only expelled invading Georgian troops from the
separatist region South Ossetia, but they also entered Abkhazia and marched deep
into Georgia proper over the course of the “five day war” in August 2008. The
following report analyses Russia’s military preparations since spring 2008, an
aspect hitherto almost unknown among politicians, the media and the public in
Western Europe and North America. They included the shooting down of a Georgian
drone by Russian fighter jets over Abkhazia, a massive increase of Russian
“peacekeeping troops” along the Georgian-Abkhaz armistice line, the deployment of
Russian railway troops to Abkhazia and the “Kavkaz 2008” military exercises.
These developments occurred against the backdrop of political events, such as
demands made by the Russian State Duma to recognise South Ossetia and Abkhazia
as independent states, Russia’s decision to withdraw from the CIS economic
embargo against Abkhazia and NATO’s refusal to offer membership to Georgia.
Keywords: Russia, Georgia, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, preparations to war
Introduction
At midnight on August 7-8, 2008 Georgian armed forces advanced to Tskhinvali, the capital
of South Ossetia. Georgia’s leadership therefore revealed its intention to forcefully
reintegrate South Ossetia which since the beginning of the 1990s had not been under the
control of the government in Tbilisi. The Russian Armed Forces immediately launched a
military operation in South Ossetia, Abkhazia and other parts of Georgia, which was aimed
at more than just securing the position of the separatists and damaging Georgian military
potential. Numerous statements from senior officials in politics and the military, as well as
in media coverage, left no doubt that Russia sought to prevent Georgia’s restoration of its
territorial integrity, humiliate President Mikheil Saakashvili, intimidate the entire Georgian
nation and damage Georgia’s economy and civilian infrastructure, thereby undermining its
relevance as a gas and oil transit country. Furthermore, Russia intended to send a strong
signal to the US, NATO and the EU with the subtext not to “meddle in” regions belonging
to the former Soviet Union, because Moscow officially considers them as “zone of vital
interests”.
∗ Dr. Martin Malek is a (civilian) researcher and CIS-area specialist at the Institute for Peace Support and
Conflict Management of the National Defense Academy in Vienna, Austria.
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GEORGIA & RUSSIA:
THE “UNKNOWN” PRELUDE TO THE “FIVE DAY WAR” 228
The August 2008 crisis in South Ossetia took many policymakers and journalists from
Western Europe and North America by surprise. Obviously, many heard about this desolate
and barely populated area for the first time. In many cases, speculations, assumptions and
prejudices replaced well-substantiated information regarding the background of the crisis.
Many politicians, media outlets and “experts” asked the question “who started the war” –
Russia or Georgia? Influential voices from Western Europe and North America blamed both
sides equally for escalating the conflict and committing war crimes, whilst others made
“Saakashvili and his supporters in Washington” responsible for the war.
At the same time, Russia’s military preparation over the last few months did not receive
much attention. The debate appears even more astonishing, considering the fact that clearly
Russia launched a military incursion into Georgian territory, not vice versa.
Russian Preparations
On March 6, 2008 the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced its decision to
unilaterally withdraw from the economic sanctions imposed by the presidents of the member
states of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) against Abkhazia in 1996.
However, this was merely a symbolic action, since Moscow had never implemented these
sanctions. Abkhazia, in fact, was already economically tied to Russia: its currency is the
Russian Rouble, not the Georgian Lari. On March 11, 2008 Kommersant, Russia’s
prominent daily newspaper not controlled by the Kremlin, said that “the gradual recognition
of Abkhazia and South Ossetia is being prepared in Moscow”.1 Ten days later the State
Duma, the lower house of the Russian Parliament, overwhelmingly passed a resolution
which, referring to Kosovo and its secession from Serbia, asked the President and the
Government to “investigate the usefulness of the recognition of independence of Abkhazia
and South Ossetia”.2
NATO, under pressure from Germany and France, denied Georgia a Membership Action
Plan (MAP) during its summit in Bucharest at the beginning of April 2008. By this, the
Kremlin, according to the Russian journalist Yulia Latynina, “understood of having received
a blank cheque”.3 On April 16 outgoing President Vladimir Putin advised the government to
strengthen Russia’s relations with Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the realms of trade, social
policy, science, culture and information policy. Even though both separatist regions,
according to international law, are de jure part of Georgia, they were elevated to almost the
same status held by Russia’s own regions. Kommersant commented that Putin aims to annex
Abkhazia and South Ossetia.4 In its statement the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
1 Olga Allenova, “Russia Armed with Rebel Republics. For the NATO summit next month,” Kommersant
Online, March 11, 2008, http://www.kommersant.com/p865374/NATO_breakaway_republics/ (accessed
April 14, 2009).
2 Zayavlenie Gosudarstvennoy Dumy No.245-5GD – O politike Rossiyskoy Federacii v otnoshenii Abkhazii,
Yuzhnoy Osetii i Pridnestrovya [Declaration of the State Duma No. 245-5GD – About the policy of the
Russian Federation vis-à-vis Abkhazia, South Ossetia and the Dnestr region], May 21, 2008,
http://www.pnp.ru/chapters/rights/rights_6094.html (accessed April 14, 2009).
3 Juliya Latynina, “’Samoe vazhnoe – byla li kolonna tankov?’ Kak nachinalas rossiysko-gruzinskaya voyna“
[‘The most important thing – was there a column of tanks?’. How the Russian-Georgian War Started], Novaya
gazeta, no. 36, September 2, 2008, 8.
4 Vladimir Solovyovv, “Priznatelnye prikazaniya. Vladimir Putin nametil kurs na integratsiyu Abkhazii i
Yuzhnoy Osetii v sostav Rossii.” [Thankful Orders. Vladimir Putin Outlines a Track to the Integration of
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THE “UNKNOWN” PRELUDE TO THE “FIVE DAY WAR” 229
showed no concern at all about Georgia’s rights and anxieties and justified Putin’s actions
on the grounds of “protecting the interests of the Abkhaz and South Ossetian population and
its Russian citizens”.5
On April 20 a Russian MiG-29 jet fighter shot down an unarmed Georgian drone over
Abkhazia.6 The apparent aim of this operation was to prevent the observation of Russia’s
military preparations on the territory of Abkhazia. Only a few days later, Moscow increased
the number of “CIS peacekeepers” in the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict zone from 2,000 to
3,000 – without permission from Tbilisi, which subsequently protested but without any
success. The “peacekeepers” had been stationed in Abkhazia since 1994, though without
any UN mandate, and were comprised exclusively of Russian troops. In fact, they had
always acted as “border troops” of “independent Abkhazia”. On May 31 Russia, again
without Tbilisi’s consent, sent railway troops into Abkhazia. Officially, the 400 soldiers
were on a “humanitarian mission”. But much of the repaired infrastructure was subsequently
used by 10,000 Russian soldiers during its invasion in western Georgia in August.
In mid-July 2008 the Russian Armed Forces launched the military exercise “Kavkaz-2008”
near the Georgian border. According to Russian media reports, 8,000 soldiers, 30 fixed-
wing aircrafts and helicopters and 700 vehicles rehearsed “scenarios of a military operation
in Abkhazia and South Ossetia”7 The main force involved was the 58th Army which also
played a key role during the Russian invasion into Georgia. “Kavkaz-2008” officially ended
on August 2, only a few days before the outbreak of the war; yet the 58th Army remained on
high alert.8 At the same time, the Railway Troops completed their work in Abkhazia.
Since August 2, pro-Russian South Ossetian separatist forces had been shelling several
ethnic Georgian villages inside South Ossetia. On August 5 a tripartite monitoring group,
which included Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) observers and
representatives of Russian peacekeeping forces in the region, issued a report. This
document, signed by the commander of the Russian “peacekeepers” in the region General
Marat Kulakhmetov, stated that there was evidence of attacks against several ethnic
Georgian villages. It also claimed that South Ossetian separatists were using heavy weapons
against the Georgian villages, which was prohibited by a 1992 ceasefire agreement.9
Abkhazia and South Ossetia], Kommersant, April 17, 2008, http://kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?DocsID=883332
(accessed April 13, 2009).
5 Civil Georgia, “Russian Foreign Ministry’s Statement on Putin’s Instruction to Boost Ties with Abkhazia and
South Ossetia,” Civil Georgia, April 16, 2008, http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=17593 (accessed April
30, 2009).
6 The MiG-29 took off from the Gudauta military base in Abkhazia which, according to repeated Russian
claims, was “closed” several years ago.
7 Aleksandr Gabuev, Georgij Dvali, “Moskva i Tbilisi obmenyalis ucheniyami” [Moscow and Tbilisi Trade
Exercises], Kommersant, July 17, 2008, 6.
8 Margarete Klein, “Militärische Implikationen des Georgienkrieges. Zustand und Reformbedarf der russischen
Streitkräfte” [Military Implications of the War in Georgia. State and Need For Reforms in the Russian Armed
Forces]. SWP-Aktuell, 74, October 2008, 2.
9 Eka Tsamalashvili, Brian Whitmore, “Eyewitness Accounts Confirm Shelling Of Georgian Villages.”
RFE/RL, November 14, 2008, http://www.rferl.org/articleprintview/1349256.html (accessed April 14, 2009).
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On August 6 a pro-Kremlin Russian daily newspaper came out with the headline: “Don
Cossacks prepare to fight in South Ossetia”.10 And the next day, state-run (and de facto
Kremlin-controlled) television channel Rossiya showed Abkhaz separatist leader Sergei
Bagapsh stating at a meeting of the Abkhaz National Security Council: “I have spoken to
the President of South Ossetia. It [situation] has more or less stabilized now. A battalion
from the North Caucasus District has entered the area.”11
According to official Russian statements, its Armed Forces merely launched “counter-
attacks” to “protect Russian citizens in South Ossetia” on August 8. This, however, was
challenged by reports in the Russian newspaper Permskie novosti on August 15: it
interviewed soldiers from the 58th Army who served in Georgia but were allowed to leave
the war zone on August 10 at the request of their parents. The newspaper quotes a young
soldier saying, “we have been [in South Ossetia] since August 7. […] Today we went from
Tskhinvali to Vladikavkaz12 to pick up weapons”. The article “Life will go on” in Krasnaya
zvezda (Red Star), the newspaper of the Russian Ministry of Defence, was particularly
traitorous. It cited Captain Denis Sidristy (who was decorated with the Russian Defense
Ministry’s order of bravery for his performance in the war against Georgia) saying that “we
were training near the capital of South Ossetia. [...] On August 7 we received the order to
advance on Tskhinvali. […] We arrived, cantoned, and on August 8 the place was on fire
and many lost their heads.”13 Evidently, Sidristy witnessed the Georgian shelling of
Tskhinvali on the night of August 8, which could happen only from the Southern side of the
Caucasian mountains i.e. already on the territory of Georgia. As a result of the increased
interest in this article, the editorial staff of Krasnaya zvezda removed it from its website,14
and it did not reappear again.15 Sidristy later had to deny his comments in Krasnaya zvezda
by claiming that his unit left for Tskhinvali “a little bit later” than originally alleged.16
Long-term Pre-planning
Even observers unfamiliar with military affairs should comprehend that not even the most
effective military organisation is able to mobilise 25,000 soldiers, 1,200 tanks and dozens of
aircrafts, and deploy them in a mountainous region literally within a few hours. This
consideration leads one to the conclusion that Russia’s military operation against Georgia
had been carefully planned in advance. Modest Kolerov, former head of the Department for
10 Mariya Bondarenko, Ivan Sas, “Shashki nagolo. Donskie kazaki gotovyatsya voevat v Yuzhnoy Osetii”
[Draw the Sword. The Don Cossacks Are Ready to Fight in South Ossetia], Nezavizimaya gazeta, August 8,
2008, http://www.ng.ru/regions/2008-08-06/1_kazaki.html (accessed April 13, 2009).
11 As quoted in: Nikolaus von Twickel, “Moscow Claims Media War Win,” The Moscow Times Online,
November 17, 2008, http://www.themoscowtimes.com/article/600/42/372391.htm (accessed November 17,
2008).
12 The capital of the Russian autonomous republic North Ossetia (Alania).
13 “Soldaty govoryat, chto pribyli v Yuzhnuyu Osetiyu eshche 7 avgusta” [The Soldiers Say That They Arrived
in South Ossetia already on August 7], Polit.ru, September 10, 2008,
http://www.polit.ru/news/2008/09/10/seven.html (accessed 14 April, 2009).
14 “S sayta ‘Krasnoy zvezdy’ udaleno intervyu kapitana Sidristogo o vtorzhenii rossiyskikh voysk v YuO do
napadeniya Gruzii” [The Interview With Captain Sidristy About the Intrusion of Russian Troops into South
Ossetia before the Georgian Attack was removed from the Site of Krasnaya zvezda], NEWSru.com, September
15, 2008, http://www.newsru.com/russia/15sep2008/udaleno_print.html (accessed April 14, 2009).
15 Cf. Krasnaya zvezda, September 11, 2008, http://www.redstar.ru/2008/09/11_09/index.shtml (accessed
April 13, 2009).
16 Ralf Beste et al., “Wettlauf zum Tunnel” [The Footrace to the Tunnel], Der Spiegel, no. 38, 2008, p. 132.
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inter-regional and cultural ties with foreign countries of the President’s Office in Moscow,
admitted to a respectable Russian newspaper that “the Kremlin had a clear plan of actions in
the case of a conflict. The expediency with which the military operation was executed
confirms that”.17 Andrei Illarionov, former economic advisor to Putin and now one of his
most outspoken opponents, took the same line. According to him, the Russian invasion of
Georgia “had been long prepared and successfully executed”.18 Even in Western Europe,
where most of the politicians were very careful “not to alienate Russia,” this point did not
go totally unnoticed. French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner said in an interview with a
Moscow-based newspaper that “you [Russia] without question were prepared. […] Russian
troops, by some miracle, turned up on the border at the right time”.19
Finally, Putin, Prime Minister since May 2008 and still Russia’s “strongman,” “flubbed”
when he told his audience at the Valdai Discussion Club in September 2008 about his
meeting with Chinese officials on the day of the opening ceremony of the Olympic Games
in Beijing. In these talks, Putin “recognised China’s problem with Taiwan and therefore did
not press China to recognise the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia”.20 Hence,
Putin admitted that he considered the possibility of “recognising the independence” of
Georgia’s separatist regions, at the latest, on the day of the beginning of fighting in South
Ossetia and possibly already decided on it. On August 26 it was announced by President
Dmitri Medvedev.
According to Moscow-based security analyst Pavel Felgenhauer, Russia
“…declared that it was forced to go to battle by the initial Georgian attack in South
Ossetia. But there is sufficient evidence that this massive invasion was pre-planned
beforehand for August [2008]. The swiftness with which large Russian contingents
were moved into Georgia, the rapid deployment of a Black Sea naval task force, the
fact that large contingents of troops were sent to Abkhazia where there was no
Georgian attack all seem to indicate a rigidly prepared battle plan. This war was not
an improvised reaction to a sudden Georgian military offensive in South Ossetia,
since masses of troops cannot be held for long in 24-hour battle readiness. The
invasion was inevitable, no matter what the Georgians did.”21
17 Ivan Preobrazhensky, “Est li u nikh plan?” [Do They Have a Plan?], Vedomosti, August 13, 2008,
http://www.pankisi.info/media/?page=ru&id=13503 (accessed April 14, 2009).
18 As quoted in: Brian Whitmore, “Did Russia Plan Its War In Georgia?” RFE/RL, August 15, 2008,
http://www.rferl.org/articleprintview/1191460.html (accessed April 13, 2009).
19 Michail Tsygar, “Bernar Kushner: ya, navernoe, menee diplomatichnyy i bolee chestnyy” [Bernard
Kouchner: I am, probably, less diplomatic and more honest], Kommersant Online, October 10, 2008,
http://www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?DocsID=1048686 (accessed October 30, 2008).
20 As quoted in: Andrei Kolesnikov, “Tak davayte zhe dogovarivatsya. Vladimir Putin prodemonstriroval
voinstvuyushchiy patsifism” [‘So, Let’s Negotiate for It!’ Vladimir Putin demonstrated belligerent pacifism],
Kommersant Online, September 12, 2009, http://www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?DocsID=1024665 (accessed
April 14, 2009).
21 Pavel Felgenhauer, “The Russian-Georgian War Was Preplanned In Moscow,” Eurasia Daily Monitor (The
Jamestown Foundation), August 14, 2008, vol. 5:156,
http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=33888&tx_ttnews[backPid]=166&no_c
ache=1 (accessed April 30, 2009).
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Conclusion
Saakashvili is seen in Western Europe as “pro-American,” and mainly due to America’s –
and not only former President George W. Bush’s – unpopularity this has become a liability
not only for him but for all of Georgia. It is therefore, from a subjective point of view,
traceable that many European and North American media outlets (such as the German
weekly Der Spiegel) argued that Georgia was responsible for the outbreak of the “five day
war”. However, they put the focus on the question of which state moved troops into South
Ossetia first, thereby ignoring Russia’s military preparations since the beginning of 2008 as
well as the pivotal question: who deployed troops on whose territory? And it is incontestable
that Russia intervened on Georgian soil (and not vice versa), which, according to
international law, constitutes an aggression. Little attention was paid to Russia’s recognition
of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as “independent states” in the West, albeit this amounted to a
forceful alteration of Georgia’s borders.
Responses from governments in Western Europe and North America indicated that the
relations with Russia are considered too important as to risk a worsening relationship over
“tiny and insignificant” Georgia. One often hears the argument in Western policymaking
circles and the media that Russia “should not be isolated” because without it, “international
problems cannot be solved.” The same voices, however, cannot name even a single example
of an international problem which has been jointly solved by Russia and the West.
Especially in the South Caucasian separatist conflicts, Russia for two decades has been a
huge part of the problems – and not of the solutions. In most Western capitals – and not only
in Berlin which pursues a policy of “rapprochement through entwinement” (“Annäherung
durch Verflechtung” in German) with Russia – policymakers obstinately ignore this fact.
