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Nationalism, the Mass Army, and Military Power
Abstract
Barry R. Posen is Professor of Political Science at MIT and a member of its Defense and Arms Control Studies Program.
The author would like to thank Omer Bartov, Liah Greenfeld, Jack Snyder, and Stephen Van Evera for comments on earlier drafts. The Committee on International Conflict and Cooperation of the National Research Council arranged for several helpful reviews. The Levitan Prize and the Carnegie Corporation of New York provided financial support.
1. For an example of such views, see Michael Howard, War in European History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976), pp. 109-115; Carlton J.H. Hayes, Nationalism: A Religion (New York: Macmillan: 1960), pp. 120-124.
2. This definition is consistent with that offered by Ernst Haas, "What is nationalism and why should we study it?," International Organization, Vol. 40, No. 3 (Summer 1986), p. 709. It also draws on Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundations of Nationality, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1966), chap. 4, "Peoples, Nations, and Communication," pp. 86-105. I have also borrowed from Ernest Gellner, who posits that a shared "high" or literary culture is the fundamental element of nationalism. Because he views culture as the glue that holds industrial capitalism together, he sees the spread of capitalism as the main cause of modern nationalism. Below I develop a different argument. Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983); for a useful summary, see pp. 139-143; and for elaboration, pp. 35-38.
3. The standard work is Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979); see esp. pp. 123-128. "Contending states imitate the military innovations contrived by the country of greatest capability and ingenuity," p. 127. This is also the theme of Charles Tilly, ed., Formation of National States in Western Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975). The essays in Tilly's collection stress competition and imitation in the development of the whole administrative apparatus of states, including their military; they address the development of nations less directly. See also Stanislav Andreski, Military Organization and Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), pp. 68-71.
4. William H. McNeill, The Pursuit of Power (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), pp. 123-124, views the Thirty Years War as the event marking the institutionalization of a "professional" officer corps in the sense of a Europe-wide, self-conscious group of technical experts in the "management" of violence, dedicated to the improvement of their craft. After the Thirty Years War, the institution of the standing army spread throughout Europe, providing regular employment for these professionals. As noted elsewhere in this article, the notion that one plied one's trade for a single state throughout one's career had not yet caught on.
5. Louis XIV put the largest ancien regime army into the field; at 450,000 it represented a feat unequalled by his royal successors. Russell F. Weigley, The Age of Battles (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991), p. 260. By late 1793, the revolutionary government had 700,000 soldiers. Jean-Paul Bertaud, The Army of the French Revolution, trans. R.R. Palmer (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), p. 243. Under Napoleon strength fluctuated, but between 1800 and 1812, 1.3 million conscripts were reportedly absorbed. McNeill, The Pursuit of Power, p. 200.
6. The germ of this argument is found in Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976, 1984), pp. 591-593. Of France he notes, "in 1793 a force appeared that beggared all imagination. Suddenly war again became the business of the people . . . all of whom considered themselves to be citizens. . . . The full weight of the nation was thrown into the balance." Of the consequences, he wrote, "Since Bonaparte, then, war, first among the French and subsequently among their enemies, again became the concern of the people as a whole. . . . There seemed no end to the resources mobilized; all limits disappeared in the vigor and enthusiasm shown by governments and their subjects."
7. Most historians date the problem to the appearance of muzzle-loading percussion-fired rifles in the mid-1800s, but I find...
... Nationalism continues vitally to inform foreign policymaking, arguably still constituting 'the most powerful ideology in the world' (Mearsheimer, 2001, p. 354). Yet, its connection to war and peace has long been unclear (Posen, 1993;van Evera, 1994). There is nonetheless little reason to doubt that the schism between good and bad nationalism also applies here. ...
... This indicates that cultural patterns and (national) context could have a significant role to play in these matters. Such nuanced findings connect well with key arguments from the broader literature on nationalism and international relations (Posen, 1993;van Evera, 1994), which posits that there is no straightforward relationship between nationalism and interstate conflict. ...
Research has long aimed to identify the effects of international sporting success or event hostship on nations. Overall findings suggest that tangible benefits are marginal at best. Still, some studies find that sport may have significant intangible effects, such as bolstering (short-term) feelings of national pride or happiness. Following this strand of research, the present paper asks whether international sporting success and/or hostship affects people's willingness to fight for their country. The connection between sport and international conflict is a plausible one, which scholars have debated for decades. Yet, this is also an issue that is underexplored, especially empirically. To expand on existing research, we analyse time-series cross-sectional survey data. The output from our estimations suggests that citizens' willingness to fight decreases slightly when their country is hosting a major sport event. Similar effects do not apply to sporting success, even if additional analysis suggests a context-dependent positive relationship. To form a future research agenda, our approach and results are discussed to invite new and alternative research perspectives to improve the understanding of the relationship between sport and (the absence of) conflict.
... This suggests that migrants from less deprived families are more likely to send money back home than migrants from highly deprived home. Similarly, concerning the relationship between deprivation and patriotism, Van Evera (1990), Posen (1993), Shayo (2009), Solt (2011 and Sharimakin and Ojewumi, (2022) found a positive relationship between the two variables, whereas Deutsch (1964), Tilly (1998), Gilbert (1998), Ikuo and MacDougall (1999), Shulman (2003) and Chen (2020) concluded that a significant wider inequality gap leads to lower patriotic level among the citizens. There is however a gap in literature to explore the relationship between the three variables (remittances, deprivation and patriotism). ...
... Our findings revealed that level of patriotism reduced when people are deprived. This supports cohesion (Deutsch 1964;Gilbert 1998;Shulman 2003), new-nation (Tilly 1998) and Asian developmental (Ikuo and MacDougall 1999;Chen 2020) theories as against the diversionary (Posen 1993;Van Evera 1990;Solt 2011) and social psychology (Shayo 2009) theories. Further, patriotic level were found to fall with the aged and higher academic qualifications. ...
Substantial research evidence have shown the benefits of foreign remittances and patriotism to national growth and human welfare. Also, many studies have established the importance of lower extent of deprivation on economic growth and better well-being. However, little or no research has examined the impact of foreign remittances on subjective personal relative deprivation and patriotism, and impact of deprivation on patriotism in a single study. This study, therefore examined the relationship between foreign remittances, personal relative deprivation and patriotism. Results generated through analysis of cross sectional data demonstrated that greater subjective feelings of personal relative deprivation were associated with higher foreign remittances from family members, friends and neighbours. Similarly, lower patriotic behaviours were found to associate with higher subjective feelings of personal relative deprivation. The results provide further evidence for theories on relative deprivation-patriotism nexus and calls for attention on public policy to reduce economic inequality through provision of gainful employment, standardised salary/wage structure and make regular review of such salary/wages according to the prevailing economic condition.
... In addition to the economic aspects of defense and weapons, the country's military capabilities can also be reflected through military personnel. Some scholars of strategic studies argue that victory in war will only be achieved by those having more troops (Delbrück, 1985;Matthews & Yan, 2007;Mearsheimer, 1989;Posen, 1993 In addition to the economic aspects of defense and weapons, the country's military capabilities can also be reflected through military personnel. Some scholars of strategic studies argue that victory in war will only be achieved by those having more troops (Delbrück, 1985;Matthews & Yan, 2007;Mearsheimer, 1989;Posen, 1993 ...
... Some scholars of strategic studies argue that victory in war will only be achieved by those having more troops (Delbrück, 1985;Matthews & Yan, 2007;Mearsheimer, 1989;Posen, 1993 In addition to the economic aspects of defense and weapons, the country's military capabilities can also be reflected through military personnel. Some scholars of strategic studies argue that victory in war will only be achieved by those having more troops (Delbrück, 1985;Matthews & Yan, 2007;Mearsheimer, 1989;Posen, 1993 ...
When the UAE and Israel decided to normalize diplomatic relations, later known as the Abraham Accords, the decision sparked globalcontroversy, especially from Islamic countries. One of the countries which vehemently condemned this deal was Iran. Iran viewed theagreement as a form of betrayal of the Palestinian struggle. However, based on an analysis using the Balance of Threat theory, this article concluded that Iran had in fact caused UAE’s decision to normalize relations. It was because Iran, through its superiority of aggregate power, geographical proximity, and offensive policy character, presented a serious threat to the security of the UAE. Thus, the normalization of relations with Israel was the best and rational choice for the UAE in dealing with the Iranian threat. Through this normalization, the UAE has gained a new partner to jointly counterbalance Iran’s power and help in efforts to strengthen its own defense forces.
... A core political challenge in these societies concerns the incorporation of new arrivals into the national mainstream. Seminal work in political science, sociology, and economics argues that military service is critical for constructing national identity and fostering immigrants' integration (Janowitz 1976;Posen 1993;Weber 1976). Reflecting this view of military service, US President Theodore Roosevelt advocated military training as a means of "Americanizing" new immigrants (Krebs 2006, 1). ...
Seminal theories in political science argue that military service is a critical driver of minority integration. However, a major obstacle bedeviling the study of military service is self-selection: individuals who are better integrated may be more likely to join the military in the first place. We address the selection problem by examining the effects of military conscription during the Vietnam War using an instrumental variables approach. Conscription during 1970–72 was decided on the basis of national draft lotteries that assigned draft numbers based on an individual’s date of birth. Using the draft lottery instrument, we find no evidence of a causal effect of military service on a range of integration outcomes from the 2000 decennial census. At least for the Vietnam era, the link between service and long-term integration is largely driven by self-selection, which points to important scope conditions for the integrationist view.
... After a relatively long period of economic reforms and opening-up, Chinese society has experienced growing nationalistic and xenophobic sentiments in the recent few years. Past research has provided extensive evidence showing the impacts of nationalism on economic activities, immigration policy, and military defenses (e.g., Kaushal, 2019;Posen, 1993); however, to the best of our knowledge, no prior research has examined how nationalism impacts transborder information exchanges and interactions in cyberspace. ...
The Great Firewall of China, initiated by the Chinese government, blocks China-based netizens from accessing a range of foreign websites and services; however, some Chinese netizens manage to bypass the firewall using various technical tools. Common perceptions of this group of netizens who frequently crossed the firewall were that they hold critical views of China’s Internet censorship and were open-minded to worldviews and information from other parts of the world. However, the emergence and development of the “Little Pink” troops and the “Voluntary Fifty-cent Army” on overseas Internet platforms challenge these perceptions, suggesting that the rise of nationalism and activism in China has complicated Chinese netizens’ firewall transgression behaviors. In light of recent changes, a typology is proposed to classify Chinese netizens into four groups of people based upon the variations of their nationalistic tendencies and political engagement levels: active nationalists, active non-nationalists, silent nationalists, and disengaged non-nationalists. Using the 2017 Chinese Internet User Survey data, this study analyzes the predictive value of nationalism and political engagement in influencing the frequency of firewall bypasses among Chinese netizens. Results show that nationalism is a significant negative predictor of firewall bypass frequency among Chinese netizens. However, the negative relationship between nationalism and firewall bypass frequency only holds for people who are disengaged in politics. For those who have high levels of political engagement, nationalism becomes a positive predictor of their firewall bypass frequency. The different firewall bypass patterns among Chinese netizens indicate alarming political divides within Chinese cyberspace.
... 96 Malešević 2016. 97 Posen 1993. 98 Malešević 2019, 65-6. ...
Affective ties encompass a broad family of emotional phenomena, including love, affection, attachment, and devotion. Affective ties may appear deeply personal, and they most certainly are. But they are also important resources for the exercise of political power in international politics – not only as vulnerabilities that can be exploited for coercion but also, and more significantly, as means to mobilise action and sacrifice. Viewed from the vantage point of political agents, affective ties are thus power resources whose distribution in the international system shapes their strategies and choices. Viewed from the perspective of the system, the international realm is not only characterised by struggles over material capabilities or ideas but also competition over affective ties. Correspondingly, nationalism is not simply an identity. It is a collection of techniques and practices for generating and capturing affective ties that has emerged as a highly effective contender in this contest, with crucial implications for how the international system is organised. That being said, other forms of eliciting affective ties also persist.
... Political accounts highlight the modern state as the key agent of change (Hobsbawm 1990). On this view, states devise and implement nationbuilding programs to respond to both international and domestic threats (Hintze 1975;Posen 1993;Tilly 1994). A complementary perspective views the development of industrial economies as the main integrating force. ...
This paper uses the gradual expansion of the European railway network to investigate how this key technological driver of modernization affected ethnic separatism between 1816 and 1945. Combining new historical data on ethnic settlement areas, conflict, and railway construction, we test how railroads affected separatist conflict and successful secession as well as independence claims among peripheral ethnic groups. Difference-in-differences, event study, and instrumental variable models show that, on average, railway-based modernization increased separatist mobilization and secession. These effects concentrate in countries with small core groups, weak state capacity, and low levels of economic development as well as in large ethnic minority regions. Exploring causal mechanisms, we show how railway networks can facilitate mobilization by increasing the internal connectivity of ethnic regions and hamper it by boosting state reach. Overall, our findings call for a more nuanced understanding of the effects of European modernization on nation building.
... However, in practice, civilian deference is common: see Krebs, Ralston, and Rapport (2023). 9 On the military utility of nationalism and ideology, see Bartov (1994); Posen (1993). 10 The logic of these claims follows from Lyall (2020). ...
When deciding whether to support a military operation, do citizens in democracies weigh whether soldiers themselves support the operation? Recent research has concluded that, in the United States, public support for military operations rests in part on people’s beliefs that soldiers favor their own deployment. However, it is not known whether this finding extends beyond the United States to democracies with diverse national citizenship discourses and threat profiles, and its theoretical basis is not well understood. This article addresses both these gaps. Using novel survey data and an experiment in four democracies with divergent citizenship traditions—France, Israel, the United Kingdom, and the United States—we show that, in all four nations, support for military operations depends significantly on whether people believe that soldiers themselves favor the operation. We highlight two reasons: (1) battlefield performance (respondents think that soldiers who favor their mission fight better), and (2) soldier consent (humans’ capacity for empathy makes them sensitive to whether soldiers are willingly sent into harm’s way). This article has significant implications for debates on public support for the use of military force, the nature of citizenship in modern democracies, and contemporary militarism.
... Lastly, there have been a number of scholars focusing on the importance of nationalism regarding military effectiveness (Reiter 2007;Posen 1993). Dan ...
Despite the significant impact of nationalism on interstate conflicts, many existing studies on military effectiveness, defined as a state’s ability to convert its resources into military power, have paid relatively little attention to its role in shaping military effectiveness. This paper aims to address this gap by asking the following question: what effects does nationalism have on a state’s military effectiveness? By analyzing the case of Japanese nationalism and its impact on the Russo-Japanese War, this paper argues that nationalism can enhance a state’s military effectiveness in two ways: 1) by providing a source of motivation for military personnel, 2) by contributing to logistic support
through effective national mobilization of the public. The findings not only enrich the study on nationalism and state power but also provide valuable insights for South Korean decision-makers, showing how ongoing interstate conflicts around the world that may affect South Korea’s national interests could unfold and highlighting the need to work towards mitigating nationalistic
sentiments in its neighboring states.
... Putin understands a truth known to generations of statesmen before him: Nationalism is a powerful motivator in war and the lynchpin of the mass army in modern warfare. 11 As economic conditions worsen in Russia and more Russian soldiers come home maimed and disabled (if they return at all), Putin becomes ever more dependent on a radically nationalistic ideology to fill the ranks, justify his war, and legitimize his rule. While dictators are often thought to have greater flexibility to change course and even back down, training Russian nationalists in visceral hatred of Ukrainians creates constraints for Putin that he cannot easily ignore. ...
Those promising a negotiated end to the war in Ukraine operate under the mistaken assumption that there exists some combination of territorial and policy compromises that would satisfy all sides and bring about a stable long-term peace. In fact, the conflict is more intractable than ever: Bargaining models of war termination predict that peace negotiations are likely to fail. Win, lose, or draw, the war will be settled on the battlefield, not at the negotiating table. The stakes couldn't be higher: Whether the West continues its support for Ukraine's fight or forces Kyiv to make a deal with the devil, the consequences for international security and global democracy will reverberate for years to come.
... Gellner understood the power of mass education as the principal forger of nations, yet he rarely if ever considered institutional violence, compulsion, war, and ecological degradation as central in achieving the same goals. Military historians have instead stressed the importance of the army, particularly the compulsory draft, in shaping uniform loyal citizens (Bertaud, 1988;Lynn, 1996;Posen, 1993), as well as inoculating them with the vaccine of inhumanity, indifference, and lack of empathy toward "alien" human groups and other species. Soldiers are thus the quintessential examples of replaceability: a soldier killed in action is immediately replaced by a similar soldier, without a great hiccup in the war machine. ...
The entrance into the Anthropocene Epoch has pushed historians and social scientists to reconsider human history through new lenses and along an entirely different timeline. For historians, the notion of the Anthropocene can be seen as an overarching category superimposed on the usual chronological divisions into ancient, medieval, modern, and contemporary history. In social sciences in general, the notion of the Anthropocene has been embraced, often critically, by enlarging its semantic field through a series of neologisms, which this article aims to analyze and contribute to. Originating from within stratigraphy and geology, the new coining for a (not yet official) epoch acts as a tectonic shift by bringing geology into history, as well as into humanities and social sciences. Paradoxically, it could be said that humans are being “ejected from history” just as geology enriches itself with a human-centered eponym, Anthropocene, that is, when specific actions carried out by a single biological species, homo sapiens, have spawned consequences so deep and everlasting that an imprint upon the Earth’s stratigraphy has been impressed forever. These specific actions can be encapsulated in a single term: overconsumption, possibly accompanied by its twin dimension, overexploitation (of resources). This article sets out to identify the period and sequence of events leading to the shift from consumption to overconsumption and from exploitation to overexploitation. Identifying the moment these transitions occurred is essential, as the double excess of “over” patterns has characterized what is commonly understood as the Anthropocene Epoch.
... Preventing evasion is expensive, and it can require politically unpalatable measures. As a result, universal conscription has gone hand in hand with nationalism (Posen, 1993). Nationalism not only makes conscription more efficient, by reducing evasion and the corresponding need for enforcement, but it also implies that soldiers serve willingly, impelled by their sense of duty and their love of country. ...
Why do people think that soldiers and officers join the military? In this article, we report and explain unique survey results of nationally representative populations in five democracies—France, Germany, Israel, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Beliefs about motivations for military service vary significantly by nation. In Israel and France, large majorities endorse intrinsic accounts of service motivations—that is, those centering on patriotism and good citizenship. The U.S. population is nearly evenly split between extrinsic accounts—ascribing service to the pay and benefits received or to the desire to escape desperate circumstances—and intrinsic ones. A large majority of U.K. and Germany-based respondents hew to extrinsic service accounts. We argue that the most plausible explanation lies with prevailing national citizenship discourses, in combination with the military’s operational tempo. This research has implications for public support for military recruitment, the use of force, and democratic civil–military relations.
... In its most prominent and critiqued example, Huntington's (1996) clash of civilisations identifies cultures as drivers of conflict. To Posen (1993), a common culture and beliefs facilitate the organisation and mobilisation of mass armies. States therefore promote literacy to spread a certain vision of history that fuels national identity, where culture comes to be 'mainly a written language, but also a shared set of symbols and memories ' (1993, p. 85). ...
... Interstate conflict created the conditions in which states needed to observe, quantify, and mobilize populations and resources in order to survive. Yet, in addition to the state's organizational capacity to know and control its population, other explanations suggest interstate conflict increased the need for state programmes of "official nationalism", which were propagated through common schooling and the construction of a patriotic, national character [Posen 1993]. Because interstate conflict is positively related to a latent and developing social scientism of the state and to a turn towards national education as official state policy, I account for positive bias in the main relationship of interest by controlling for the prevalence of interstate conflict in the West, continuously measured as the percentage of states engaged in international armed conflict and dichotomously measured in terms of whether the UK was engaged in international armed conflict. ...
Until the 19th century, the UK state stayed out of education. Only in 1833 would Parliament first pass an act that subsidized education for the poor. By 1914, 160 education acts had been passed, consolidating into the state schooling system we recognize today. This paper seeks to explain this remarkable progression. I argue that the emergence of social-knowledge institutions across the West was a powerful force of cultural construction. What I term social scientization, this process was multidimensional and translocal, entailing the elaboration, reification, and diffusion of functionalist theories of the nation-state that centered national education as means to greater cultural rationalization. Longitudinal analyses on comprehensive population data comprising over 10,100 UK parliamentary acts support the core historical insight of this piece: increasingly routine and aggressive forms of state intervention in education were the progressive instantiation of the 19th-century nation-state model, which was fundamentally epistemic in character and inextricably linked to the expansive cultural content of the ascendant social sciences.
... Sipas studiuesit Posen politikat nacionaliste i japin mundësi regjimeve të mobilizojnë jo vetëm forcën e armatosur por edhe masat, duke krijuar shpirtin e sakrificës ndaj atdheut. [2] Ajo që ky studiues veçon është indoktrinimi dhe rrënjosja e patriotizmit për të motivuar forcat e armatosura në planin ushtarak. Në lidhje me argumentin e Mevius, në fakt në vendet komuniste të Europës Lindore, bashkimi i lindur mes komunizmit dhe nacionalizmit nuk rezulton të jetë i lidhur drejpërdrejt me tiparet e drejtuesve të regjimeve komuniste sesa me kushtet politike dhe shoqërore ku ata u gjendën. ...
Abstrakt Shtjellimi i koncepteve nacionalizëm dhe patriotizëm do të jenë dy elementet kryesore të këtij punimi. Ndërsa studiuesit e kanë të qartë dallimin mes dy koncepteve për masën e gjerë të popullatës loja me ndjenjat patriotike ka çuar në jo pak shembuj historik në lindjen dhe fuqizimin e sistemeve politike ekstremiste nacionaliste. Por synimi i punimit nuk është analiza e masave në gjerësi, por e një segmenti të veçantë të shoqërisë, ushtrisë shqiptare gjatë regjimit komunist. Argumenti që do të shtjellohet është: si formësohet ushtria e një regjimi komunist në emër të nacionalizmit? A shfrytëzohen ndjenjat patriotike të Forcave të Armatosura për të tejzgjatur jetën e një regjimi totalitar? Nisur nga fakti se një ndër tiparet bazë të karakterit që ushtaraku formëson që në fillesat e edukimit të tij është besnikëria, punimi do të provojë të argumentojë se ky tipar bëhet mjeti më i rëndësishëm ideologjik për të përcjellë mesazhe nacionaliste që deformojnë të vërtetën historike në regjimet totalitare. Ushtria shqiptare e periudhës së komunizmit që në këtë kumtesë sillet si rast studimor ka si veçori dalluese se ndjenjën e besnikërisë ndaj vendit e identifikoi me ndjenjën e besnikërisë ndaj një grupi të caktuar hegjemonist në pushtet Partisë së Punës. Pra, nëse në shumë punime është shpjeguar qartë lidhja e natyrshme e nacionalizmit me luftën, qasja në rastin tonë do të ketë në qendër si u interpretua nacionalizmi nga forcat e armatosura gjatë regjimit komunist dhe si ndikoi përvoja e tyre personale mbi "armikun imagjinar" në këtë interpretim. E thënë në mënyrë të përmbledhur përfundimet që punimi synon të arrijë lidhen me pyetjen se si u interpretuan nga forcat e armatosura gjatë regjimit komunist mesazhet e patriotizmit, sakrificës, unitetit kombëtar në emër të ideologjisë komuniste, veshur me petkun e nacionalizmit. Fjalë kyçe: nacionalizëm, patriotizëm, forca të armatosura, komunizëm, ideologji. Hyrje Në literaturën botërore në lidhje me nacionalizmin ka një numër të madh studimesh empirike që tentojnë të shpjegojnë lidhjet mes nacionalizmit dhe luftës. Por nga ana tjetër ka një numër të kufizuar studimesh të kësaj natyre të cilat dokumentojnë specifikisht për vendet komuniste sesi gjatë procesit të shtetformimit qeveritë monopartiake përdorin struktura të caktuara si forcat e armatosura për të ndikuar në ndjenjat nacionaliste të kombit. Vetë koncepti i nacionalizmit është i lidhur me besnikërinë ndaj shtetit dhe ndjenjat e patriotizmit, dy tipare kyçe për forcat e armatosura në ndërtimin e identitetit të tyre. Në analizën në vazhdimësi të këtij punimi fokusi do të jetë tek përdorimi i forcave të armatosura si një element i rëndësishëm për të rritur ndjenjën e nacionalizmit difensiv gjatë periudhës së shtetformimit komunist.
... As Taliaferro, Lobell, and Ripsman observed, ideational factors such as ideology and nationalism can play an instrumental role in helping a state's leadership extract, mobilize, and direct social resources and cultivate support among its power base (Schweller 2009). Taliaferro defines nationalism as a political movement wherein individuals begin to identify their interests with a group that is too large to meet together; wherein they identify those interests based on a common "culture," "ethnicity," "civic" or "national identity" that the members of the group share to the exclusion of other groups; and wherein individuals come to believe that the members of the group share a common history and to believe that the group requires its own state if it is to survive (Posen 1993;Taliaferro 2009;Van Evera 1994). Ideology is a concept that can be defined according to Michael H. Hunt as "an interrelated set of convictions or assumptions that reduces the complexities of a particular slice of reality to easily comprehensible terms and suggest appropriate ways of dealing with that reality" (Hunt, 2009, p. xi). ...
Scholars have identified strategic culture as an important ideational factor that influences grand strategy decision making. However, they pay less attention to the role of strategic subcultures in the grand strategy formation. This paper departs from structural realism and exams the effects of strategic subcultures in grand strategy formation at the unit level. To investigate the role of strategic subcultures, the author uses the Type II neoclassical realist approach, which focuses on the influence of ideas on foreign policy and grand strategy response to structural imperatives. Thus, strategic subculture is an ideational intervening variable that affects grand strategy behavior. This paper uses China as a case to conduct a preliminary study to support the author's theoretical argument. Many scholars have emphasized the impact of thousands of years of Chinese civilization and highlighted the pervasive influence of Confucianism over its state behavior. Nevertheless, China's grand strategy is frequently affected by its strategic subcultures, such as nationalism and ideology. This paper traces evidence of Chinese grand strategy in the post-9/11 era as a case study.
... Takvi su pojedinci bili i pod utjecajem masovnih medija i onog dijela javne sfere koja je u najvećoj mjeri naciocentrična. A prije svega, kao bivše djelatne vojne osobe ti su ljudi osposobljavani i bili su zaposleni u vojnim ustanovama za koje se općenito smatra da zastupaju iznimno nacionalističke vrijednosti (Faris 1995;Posen 1993;Burk 1989;Janowitz 1971). ...
The Croatian translation of my book 'Grounded Nationalisms: A Sociological Analysis' (CUP 2019).
... This situation further increases implausibility for a superordinate identity that would successfully and effectively expand Ukrainians' self-identification to include Russia, the current aggressor. Moreover, research has found that aggravation of conflict often leads to further consolidation of national identities (Connor 1994;Fearon and Laitin 2003;Posen 1993). ...
Research has found that affirming national identity can encourage the public’s trust toward a foreign adversary. On the other hand, aggressor states have attempted to recategorize identity by promoting a superordinate identity that includes both aggressor and defender states. In comparison with national identity affirmation, we test how effective emphasis of a common identity might be in the context of Russia-Ukraine and evaluate the scope conditions under which such a strategy may backfire. We propose that the effectiveness of the two identity affirmation approaches should differ across people with varying levels of national chauvinism. We expect that high-in-chauvinism individuals will experience more worldview-conflict when exposed to promotion of superordinate identity. Experimental findings on Ukrainians’ trust toward Russia in 2020 suggest a policy that emphasizes a common identity can backfire among highly chauvinistic Ukrainians in the Western region. This indicates that recategorizing one’s nation as a member of a larger group may fuel resistance among individuals with a sense of nationalistic superiority. By contrast, highlighting Ukrainian national identity boosted trust toward Russia even among the more chauvinistic respondents in the Southeastern region. This study helps identify the scope conditions of identity affirmation as a way to increase trust in international relations.
... To test this argument, I use natural language processing techniques as well as network, discourse, and generalized least squares (GLS) regression analyses to 1 For example, schooling for economic exploitation (Laqueur 1976), for social control and reproduction of class, race, gender hierarchies (McCann 1977), for political suppression, manipulation, and mobilization (Posen 1993). analyze the 1.1 million parliamentary speeches in the digitized archive of the UK Hansard. ...
Early in the nineteenth century, members in the UK Parliament (MPs) hardly ever debated education. When they did, it was nearly always in the context of aid for the religious instruction of the poor. Indeed, even by 1850, nearly two decades after the first Great Reform Act (1832), the Prime Minister Lord John Russell made the case that a system of compulsory state schooling would be immoral and un-British. Yet, by the ‘80s, MPs debating in Westminster routinely drew connections between schooling and the most critical social issues of the day: social-class mobility and equity, child welfare, national development, emigration, and the civil service, among others. What explains the expanding, and expansive, political uses that elite policymakers put to schooling? How did schooling and education take on such an aggrandized role in society for British statesmen? To address these questions, this paper combines natural language processing techniques, semantic network, discourse, and regression analyses to read and interpret the ∼1.1 million political speeches given in the UK Houses of Parliament during the long nineteenth century (1804–1913). In contrast to explanations emphasizing the direct role that economic, social, and political development as well as conflict played in the UK state’s historic expansion, this piece demonstrates how social scientization, the sweeping international epistemic movement that institutionalized and diffused functionalist social theory, created the context that made it possible for political elites to see and promote schooling as an effective policy instrument of greater cultural rationalization supporting the development of capitalist industrial society.
... The theory of distraction states that when a country has not reached a high level of economic development, its government may try to distract attention from domestic conflict, inequality, and poverty by fostering nationalist sentiment among the general public. Thus nationalism postpones the implementation of redistribution policies (Eley and Suny 1996;Posen 1993). ...
Social media is the most popular platform for the expression of public opinion, and it is a critical channel through which researchers can observe the dynamics and patterns of public opinion. This study explores the political origins of Chinese nationalism by focusing on how official media shapes mass nationalism in Cyber China. Analyzing 26 million Weibo posts made during the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic, we found significant variations in nationalism among user types, localities, and stages of the pandemic. Unlike previous studies, we found that the official Chinese media did not always play the expected role of promoting nationalism; instead, it acted as a system of emotional valves that channeled social sentiment. Official media is intended to stabilize social sentiment and prevent social unrest, and nationalistic news stories are used to draw attention away from domestic problems.
... 107. Gellner 1983Posen 1993. What are we to make of all these findings? ...
Charles Tilly's classical claim that “war made states” in early modern Europe remains controversial. The “bellicist” paradigm has attracted theoretical criticism both within and beyond its original domain of applicability. While several recent studies have analyzed the internal aspects of Tilly's theory, there have been very few systematic attempts to assess its logic with regard to the territorial expansion of states. In this paper, we test this key aspect of bellicist theory directly by aligning historical data on European state borders with conflict data, focusing on the period from 1490 through 1790. Proceeding at the systemic, state, and dyadic levels, our analysis confirms that warfare did in fact play a crucial role in the territorial expansion of European states before (and beyond) the French Revolution.
... Worse, they seek to build an alternative, China-led global telecom infrastructure, positioning Beijing to spy on the users and capture yet more U.S. commerce" (Epstein, 2019, p. A17). In 18 For a discussion of military emulation inspired by Waltz's theory, see (Posen, 1993). We should not be surprised by China's theft operations. ...
Kenneth Waltz constructed a pure theory of international politics by isolating structural from unit-level causes. Today’s return of great-power politics signals the persistent relevance of Waltz’s notion of patterns and regularities driven by structural-systemic forces. We have entered an unbalanced bipolar world, in which America still exceeds China in every important category of national power but the gap is narrowing. The relative-power trajectories of the two sides now frames the structural dynamics of their relationship, and how others perceive and calculate their strategic competition. No longer occupying a position of “primacy” either globally or in the Asian Pacific region, the United States now tends to exaggerate, not underestimate, the perceived threat from China in the economic and security realms. More broadly, the world is transitioning from hegemonic order to global disharmony and a restored balance of power—what I refer to as a “Dissent” phase of history. In this phase, disruption of global stability comes not only from the emergence of a counter-hegemonic alliance, which begins to voice its dissatisfaction with the status-quo order and underlying social purpose. It also comes from the hegemon itself, which behaves in ways that undermine its own order—an order that it now sees as not only unprofitable but a drain on its wasting assets through sponging allies and the exorbitant costs of delivering global public goods.
Why did Meiji Japan succeed in modernizing its state apparatus while Qing China failed? According to neorealists, states respond to threats by balancing. Successful balancing requires an efficient bureaucracy to extract enough resources from society to sustain a formidable military. Yet not all states are equal when it comes to modernizing. We argue that a state's ability to adopt best practices depends on its past position in the international system. States suffering from a longstanding material weakness will tend to adopt new practices from abroad more quickly than states that have enjoyed a dominant position for a long time. Embeddedness decides whether or not the state perceives its model's crisis. Therefore, we propose a theory of neorealist imitation success or failure that counts three variables: embeddedness as the independent variable, political leadership's willingness to adopt best practices, and elite cohesion as intervening variables.
It is generally accepted that violations of state-nation congruence can cause conflict, but it remains unclear which configurations cause civil and interstate conflict, and how these conflict types interact. Inspired by Myron Weiner’s classical model of the “Macedonian Syndrome,” we propose an integrated theoretical framework that links specific nationality questions to both conflict types. Using spatial data on state borders and ethnic settlements in Europe since 1816, we show that excluded and divided groups are more likely to rebel and, where they govern on only one side of the border, to initiate territorial claims and militarized disputes. To make things worse, rebellion and interstate conflict reinforce each other where ethnic division coincides with partial home rule. We obtain similar findings for civil wars and territorial claims in a global sample post-1945. Yet governments shy away from engaging in interstate disputes to address nationality questions and instead support ethnic rebels abroad.
Are countries that use conscription more restrained in their use of military force? A common argument holds that military conscription restrains leaders from using force because it increases the political cost of war and distributes them more evenly and broadly across the population. Despite this intuition, empirical evidence to support it is at best inconclusive. This article introduces a novel perspective on the relationship between military recruitment (MR) policies and conflict initiation (CI) by arguing that the military’s size relative to society – its military participation rate (MPR) – is an important and overlooked part of this story. MPR is a more direct measure of the population’s exposure to the costs of war, but high MPR may also increase CI by enhancing military capacity. By incorporating MPR into the analysis of CI, both independently and in interaction with conscription, this article provides a more comprehensive understanding of how MR practices shape CI. It tests these new hypotheses about the relationship between MPR, conscription and CI using a variety of time-series models that cover all country-years from 1816 to 2011. The findings do not support the conventional wisdom, instead revealing that neither conscription nor volunteerism is independently associated with restrained initiation of military conflicts abroad. On the contrary, these recruitment practices are more likely to be associated with an increase in the likelihood of CI. These findings indicate that we should be skeptical of traditional arguments that assume conscription leads to restraint in the use of force, either independently or conditional on MPR. These counterintuitive results underscore the need for additional research on the complex relationship between MR practices, civil–military relations and foreign policy.
The 19th-century disappearance of mercenary forces within Europe is generally regarded as a cornerstone in the historical sociology of the international as it provided important conditions of possibility for the historical consolidation of the state’s monopoly on violence. Contrary to the claim that mercenaries disappeared in this time frame, this article argues that the mercenary concept was constituted within it. The argument unfolds in three steps. First, it revisits a central dichotomy within this narrative, the soldier/mercenary dualism, exposing the conceptual ambiguity surrounding these terms before the 19th century. Second, drawing on the work of Michel Foucault, it turns to an overlooked dimension of the 19th-century transformation in military force, namely a change in the conditions of knowledge and the constitution of the modern subject grounded in the modern state. Last, by investigating 19th-century discourses on ‘effeminacy’ and the formation of the social, it exposes how the mercenary enters into reflective practice as an actor threatening to undo the compact between man and state, by being simultaneously a symptomatic expression of, as well as cause for, the erosion of the masculine principle upon which this compact rests.
What is the future of sovereignty? This work argues that the size and shape of nations is likely to continue to devolve, and the Americas offer a helpful laboratory for thinking about new forms of sovereignty because of their diverse experiments with decentralization. All parallels are imperfect, but the early Americas in particular provide unusually good examples of how small numbers of people with force projection problems cobble together cohesive polities across a range of geographic, economic, military, and ideological circumstances.
The leaders of authoritarian regimes often invoke nationalist themes to garner support from their populations. However, negative experiences with the regime may effectively inoculate individuals against nationalist campaigns, reducing the ability of the regime to sway public opinion. In this paper, we study the long-term effects of mobilization and repression on nationalist attitudes. We exploit a discontinuity in exposure to a student movement, by comparing alumni who were in college and on campus during the movement with alumni who only enrolled after the movement was suppressed. We find that alumni who were in college during the movement are substantially less nationalistic than those who enrolled shortly thereafter. Our findings are consistent across a range of specifications and show that exposure to mass mobilization and state repression is associated with lower support for nationalism. These differences are observable more than twenty-five years later, despite sustained state censorship.
Beginning in the 1960s, advanced industrialized states have gradually replaced the mass army, recruited via mandatory conscription, with a volunteer military recruited via market mechanisms. Although some military sociologists bemoaned that military service was consequently becoming merely a “job,” rather than a duty of citizenship, many post-conscription polities valorize and romanticize their volunteer soldiers, recruited for service on the open labor market, as paragons of patriotism and good citizenship. In the spirit of this special issue, this article explores the relationship between contemporary militarism and the national security state. Militarism might well be in the interests of the national security state: it might help sustain the national security state’s fiscal foundation, promote deference to military officers and perhaps even civilian defense managers, undermine democratic scrutiny and control over the security apparatus, bolster recruitment into the organs of the security state, and lower the impediments to the use of force. Drawing on novel observational and experimental survey data from four democracies, we show that militarism is in fact associated with these political consequences. Although we cannot conclude that the managers of the national security state bear direct responsibility for the emergence and spread of militarism, the evidence clearly suggests that there is an “elective affinity” between militarism and the national security state.
Though previous research has recognized that armed groups do not always recruit fighters on a voluntary basis, varieties and determinants of insurgent forced recruitment are still poorly understood. What drives armed groups to employ certain methods of coercive recruitment? This article conceptualizes and studies a particular form of coerced recruitment—insurgent conscription—whereby rebel groups rely on their administrative capacity to compel civilians to fight. Building on scholarship that highlights the impact of state violence on rebel recruitment, I theorize that state violence incentivizes armed groups to employ insurgent conscription. Leveraging a novel, cross-national dataset of insurgent conscription in state-rebel dyads between 1946 and 2008, I find that state targeting of an armed group’s civilian support base increases the likelihood of insurgent conscription. These findings have important implications for our understanding of the relationship between state violence and insurgent recruitment, rebel-civilian relationships, and the transformation of institutions and networks in civil wars.
The rationalist bargaining literature explains how public statements and military mobilizations can signal resolve. But recent political psychology scholarship shows how such actions can “provoke” targets, increasing their resolve by arousing emotions among their leaders and public. While rationalist models have largely omitted provocation, psychological approaches have neglected its strategic consequences. We model provocation in bargaining, assuming that a challenger’s signals endogenously increase the target’s resolve. Our model shows that introducing provocation can make signals of resolve more credible precisely because their provocative effects make them more costly to send. Moreover, against the prevailing intuition that provocation uniformly promotes conflict, the information from these signals can mitigate their provocative effects and elicit more generous offers than not signaling. Thus, in contrast to psychological accounts, we show that taking provocative actions can be rational and necessary for reaching peaceful bargains. We illustrate these findings with the 1911 Agadir Crisis.
While it is often assumed that the core debates about nationalism were settled by modernist scholars already in the 1980s, there are reasons to question this theoretical ‘consensus’, especially because it fails to anticipate the wave of nationalist geopolitics that is currently sweeping through the world. Contemporary studies of nationalism typically refrain from conceptualising politics in spatial terms, while overstating states' ability to shape ethno‐national identities irrespective of their ethnic roots and offering little empirical validation. To overcome these limitations, it is useful to analyse how nationalism transforms the state, rather than the reverse. This article reports findings from an EU‐funded research project that uses historical maps covering borders of states and ethnic groups to show how nationalism causes increasing congruence between these borders and how a lack thereof makes conflict and border change more likely. This risk is further increased by ‘restorative’ narratives bemoaning supposedly lost independence and unity. Further research traces the spread of reactive nationalism through modernisation processes driven by railroad expansion until the early 20th century. Yet this does not mean that state partition offers the only, or the best, solution to nationality problems. Power sharing can pacify at least as well as ethno‐nationalist border change.
How can scholars theorize about phenomena like the eroding support, within the West, for the liberal democratic practices that once defined the post-1945 international order? Cumulative evidence shows that resentment toward out-groups shapes public attitudes toward issues like immigration and globalization, bolstering support for isolationist foreign policies in Western democracies. Yet, these findings contrast with the logics of action—based on means-end calculations, shared norms, practices, or habit—that IR scholars use to develop theory. Because existing logics provide a limited vocabulary to theorize about group processes with crucial symbolic and affective features, an important dimension of foreign policy behavior remains undertheorized. In this article, I draw on multi-disciplinary research to develop an expressive logic of action, whereby political behavior expresses an actor's social identification. Based on this logic, group attachment provides a compelling motivation for political behavior, whose activation depends on an interaction between issue framing and psychological dispositions. By focusing on the distinctive features of expressive behavior and specifying the mechanisms behind this behavior, an expressive logic encourages theory development and refinement across domains.
Can mandatory military service increase confidence in the state across the population when only men are required to serve? To answer this question, we leverage the case of South Korea to examine how male-only conscription influences trust toward a critical state institution, the military. Based on the foreign policy opinion literature on the gender gap, we hypothesize that women hold different views of the military and respond in distinct ways to conscription. Analysis of public opinion data from 2003 to 2021 shows that women generally exhibit less trust in the military than men. Male conscription also has diverging effects along gender lines for parents of sons who must serve, increasing distrust of the military for their mothers while not affecting fathers. The findings suggest that mandatory military service can (further) divide opinions of the military across society.
One of the most urgent problems in politics today is to understand and manage nationalism. In particular, much attention is paid to the dangers of nationalism in China, but to date, there is little causal evidence on whether and how the government can rein in the anti-foreign sentiments of a nationalistic public. We fielded national survey experiments in China to evaluate the persuasion devices used by the government to contain anti-foreign sentiments. Through a novel “question-as-treatment” design, we identified their effectiveness in making citizens more likely to cooperate with a foreign rival at the operational level, even when they did not always change how people felt at the emotional level. The persuasion devices, however, were less effective on highly patriotic citizens, unless it was salient to them that the government was trying to persuade them. These results contribute a first set of causal evidence on whether anti-foreign sentiments can be contained by the Chinese government, and how.
This article reports findings from an empirical investigation of the generalization captured in the aphorism that ‘god is on the side with the biggest battalions.’ Departing from the focus on major or decisive battles in previous studies, this quantitative analysis using ordered logit and ordinary least squares regression of two data sets of 945 and 823 large, medium and small engagements between the armies of France and its enemies during the Wars of the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars from 1792 to 1815 reveals that a preponderance of numbers was positively associated with victory but also higher casualties.
This article contributes to growing efforts to explain when nonviolent resistance campaigns emerge in autocratic regimes. Building from a novel framework for distinguishing civil-military relations in autocracies, it contends that regimes in which military and political leaders engage in a ‘grand bargain’ generate opportunity structures that are especially amenable to nonviolent resistance. Militaries in these regimes exhibit distinctive characteristics – they are corporate, cohesive institutions as opposed to fragmented in structure and also wield political influence in regime institutions. Consequently, these militaries are especially inclined to care about their societal reputations and to retain their institutional independence from the regime’s political leaders. These factors together can lessen expectations among activists that the military will repress protests and increase the odds of elite splits in the face of mass movements. They also render the military more receptive to nonviolent protest tactics. We operationalize the concept of grand bargains with indicators from three datasets on civil-military relations and autocratic regimes. We then test the argument quantitatively using data on the onset of nonviolent resistance campaigns, as well as events-level data on nonviolent resistance campaigns. The findings support claims that civil-military grand bargains make nonviolent resistance in autocracies more likely, contributing to scholarship on this vital topic.
Judging by its doctrinal publications, the UK Defence establishment stands poised to begin a process of unprecedented change. The language of ‘multi-domain’ thinking is prominent within this discourse and is identified as being a key vehicle via which UK Defence will deliver upon its programme of reform. This article seeks to offer an initial evaluation of these claims and to assess them in light of the burgeoning literatures on Western defence ‘transformation’ and military innovation that have emerged since the early 2000s. We argue that ‘multi-domain’ thinking reflects a form of ‘cosmetic’ emulation by the British Defence establishment and that its appearance within UK doctrine has been driven more by internal politics than by a clearly thought-through adoption of a new form of military practice.
Nationalism has long been a normatively and empirically contested concept, associated with democratic revolutions and public goods provision, but also with xenophobia, genocide, and wars. Moving beyond facile distinctions between 'good' and 'bad' nationalisms, the authors argue that nationalism is an empirically variegated ideology. Definitional disagreements, Eurocentric conceptualizations, and linear associations between ethnicity and nationalism have hampered our ability to synthesize insights. This Element proposes that nationalism can be broken down productively into parts based on three key questions: (1) Does a nation exist? (2) How do national narratives vary? (3) When do national narratives matter? The answers to these questions generate five dimensions along which nationalism varies: elite fragmentation and popular fragmentation of national communities; ascriptiveness and thickness of national narratives; and salience of national identities.
The nation-building process involves various approaches such as democratization, inclusiveness, promotion of nationalism, unification, internal restructuring for cultural promotion, and developmental activities to build the loyalty of peripheral people towards the centre. The Nepali State has been employing the Nepali Army as a strategic means to build the Nepali Nation. However, how the Nepali Army has contributed to nation building since its establishment is area that is under-explored. Hence, this article focuses on some of these important strategies using nation-building theories. It is argued that the Nepali army has been significantly contributing to nation building through territorial unification, internal restructuring, and developmental activities in support of nation building since the unification of Modern Nepal. This study initially discusses the contribution of the Nepali Army in territorial unification by conquering principality states and internal restructuring through consolidation of administration and promotion of nationalism. Thereafter, it delves into the integration of local folk cultures to build the Nepali Culture and inscription symbols. Finally, the article analyses developmental works in support of nation building that connects peripheral remote places with the capital city Kathmandu. A conceptual framework based on Saunders' Research Onion Peeled Method is applied with purposive sampling and document study from John Galtung and Stein Rokkan's theoretical lenses has been applieed. The article finds that the Nepali Army initially contributed to the nation building through a unification campaign before consolidating nationalism in the 1950. Further, the Nepali Army continued participating in development activities to link the periphery to the center.
Autonomous systems are often lauded as revolutionary. However, what makes them revolutionary is still up for debate. We identify assumptions about the revolutionary effect of autonomy and draw on historical work to examine how these characteristics have affected past conflicts. Our look at the past suggests where these systems may be most revolutionary is in cost mitigation—both political and economic. Mitigating economic cost helps create mass, firepower, and resiliency while mitigating political cost allows states to control force with escalation risks and domestic support. This balance is key for states that rely on autonomous systems to win competition strategies.
Pursuit of Power, pp. 185-206; and Hew Strachan, European Armies and the Conduct of War
- For
For brief accounts see McNeill, Pursuit of Power, pp. 185-206; and Hew Strachan, European Armies and the Conduct of War (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1983), pp. 36-42.
Pursuit of Power, p. 187. This of course had the effect of making revolutionary propa-ganda accessible to the army
- Mcneill
McNeill, Pursuit of Power, p. 187. This of course had the effect of making revolutionary propa-ganda accessible to the army.
It is Lynn's judgment that the primary purpose of this political propaganda was to instill obedience to legitimate political authorities; combat motivation was of secondary importance
- Lynn
Lynn, Bayonets of the Republic, pp. 122, 136. It is Lynn's judgment that the primary purpose of this political propaganda was to instill obedience to legitimate political authorities; combat motivation was of secondary importance.
IV: The Modern Era For a lengthier treatment see Paret
- Delbriick
Delbriick, History of the Art of War, Vol. IV: The Modern Era, pp. 449-455. For a lengthier treatment see Paret, Yorck, pp. 11-153.
Peasants into Frenchmen, p. 302. See also Ralston, The Army of the Republic
- Weber
Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen, p. 302. See also Ralston, The Army of the Republic, p. 48.
Nationalism and the Sense of Military Obligation He asserts that the explicit teaching of nationalism in school and in the army was a direct imitation of the Prussians
- Peter Paret
Peter Paret, "Nationalism and the Sense of Military Obligation," Military Affairs, Vol. 34, No. 1 (Winter 1970), p. 5. He asserts that the explicit teaching of nationalism in school and in the army was a direct imitation of the Prussians.
A Nation to Patriots The main theme of this book is the manner in which French patriotism was system-atically supported by the educational system, the army, and a host of cultural institutions in post
- Carlton Hayes France
Carlton Hayes, France: A Nation to Patriots (New York: Columbia University Press, 1930), pp. 35-36. The main theme of this book is the manner in which French patriotism was system-atically supported by the educational system, the army, and a host of cultural institutions in post-World War I France.
The debate on secondary school reform in France and Germany The Rise of the Modern Education System: Structural Change and Social Reproduction 1870-1920
- James Albisetti
James Albisetti, "The debate on secondary school reform in France and Germany," in Detlef K. Muller, Fritz Ringer, and Brian Simon, eds., The Rise of the Modern Education System: Structural Change and Social Reproduction 1870-1920 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 187;
In addition to a popular mystique about the army becoming the school of the nation ... , the inverse proposition consequently developed
- Mitchell
Mitchell, Victors and Vanquished, pp. 151-152, writes: "In addition to a popular mystique about the army becoming the school of the nation..., the inverse proposition consequently developed