No full-text available
To read the full-text of this research,
you can request a copy directly from the authors.
Cross-National Public Opinion on Climate Change: The Effects of Affluence and Vulnerability
Abstract
Climate change has emerged as one of the most important issues of the twenty-first century. Recent opinion polls show rising public awareness of climate change. Yet considerable cross-national variation exists in the intensity of public concern and in public willingness to pay for addressing climate change. Drawing on twelve multinational surveys, we examine two aggregate conditions—a country’s affluence and its vulnerability to climate risks—as key factors underlying cross-national differences in public support for and commitment to costly climate policies. In contrast to the post-materialism thesis, we find “strong” concern about climate change to be higher in developing countries. Contrary to expectation, climate vulnerability had little effect on public concern, but did have significant impact on some measures of personal commitment and support for climate policies. The analysis indicates that, in most countries examined, high concern about climate change is only beginning to translate into personal commitment to action.
... While excellent work has explored the effects of physical vulnerability to climate change on support for climate action (Brody et al., 2008;Harlan and Ruddell, 2011;Zahran et al., 2006), less is known about how social vulnerability shapes perceptions of climate change. Like many other threats to human security, people who are already vulnerable are likely to be disproportionately affected by climate change, and this could shape public opinion about climate change (Kim and Wolinsky-Nahmias, 2014). In this paper, I seek to explore this gap in the considerable literature on US public opinion about climate change in order to better understand how to overcome political barriers to climate action. ...
... Similarly, the greatest effects of climate change will be disproportionately felt by people who are already vulnerable (Adger and Kelly, 1999;Bohle, Downing and Watts, 1994;Diffenbaugh and Burke, 2019;Füssel, 2007;Kelly and Adger, 2000a;Kim and Wolinsky-Nahmias, 2014;Ribot, Magalhães and Panagides, 2005). As a result of their increased vulnerability to natural hazards, and to the effects of climate change, socially vulnerable people are likely to perceive incentives to learn about climate change that might not be apparent to other members of society who are less exposed to the the consequences of climate change and better able to cope with them. ...
... It is likely that people who are particularly vulnerable to the effects of climate change perceive different incentives to learn about climate change than others. Social vulnerability could help foster a willingness among individuals to improve their knowledge about climate change to make informed decisions at the ballot box, which could overcome heuristics such as political ideology or party ID that could otherwise affect people's engagement with climate change (Kim and Wolinsky-Nahmias, 2014). ...
Despite increasing evidence of the effects of climate change and scientific consensus about its threat, significant political barriers to climate action remain in the US. American public opinion about climate change is generally perceived as stable and sharply divided along partisan lines. However, less is known about the relationship between flood sensitivity and public opinion about climate change. Combining the ND-GAIN Urban Adaptation Assessment data of American cities with public opinion data from the Yale Program on Climate Change Communication, this paper demonstrates the positive association between flood sensitivity and beliefs about climate change, risk perceptions, and support for climate action. These results have important implications for the understanding of public opinion about climate change, suggesting that flood sensitivity shapes perceptions of climate change. The results also have important implications for advocates of political action, suggesting that making flood sensitivity salient could help mobilize public support for climate action.
... McCright & Dunlap, 2011;Scruggs & Benegal, 2012). Recently, a number of cross-national studies have brought to light the variation between nations and have identified contextual factors that may influence climate change views (Echavarren et al., 2019;Fairbrother et al., 2019;Kim & Wolinsky-Nahmias, 2014;Knight, 2016;Kvaloy et al., 2012;Lee et al., 2015;Lewis et al., 2019;Lo & Chow, 2015;McCright, et al., 2016aMcCright, et al., , 2016bMostafa, 2016;Poortinga et al., 2019;Sandvik, 2008;Tranter & Booth, 2015;Tvinnereim et al., 2020). ...
... While fewer people accept that climate change is a serious problem than accept it is happening and is caused by humans, previous studies have found that a high proportion of the population in almost every developed country acknowledge the seriousness of climate change, at least to some extent (Kim & Wolinsky-Nahmias, 2014;Lee et al., 2015;Poortinga et al., 2019;Tranter & Booth, 2015). For instance, in a study of 47 countries using data from the World Values Survey, Kvaloy et al. (2012) find that all EU countries included had mean scores of 3.4 or higher on a 4-point scale measuring individuals' perceptions of the seriousness of climate change. ...
... To help explain cross-country variation in climate opinion, and to further shed light on the differences between climate beliefs and issue salience, we examine two contextual factors: country wealth and level of greenhouse gas emissions. These factors have already been investigated in several previous cross-country studies of public opinion on climate change (Kim & Wolinsky-Nahmias, 2014;Knight, 2016;Kvaloy et al., 2012;Lo & Chow, 2015; e.g. Mostafa, 2016;Sandvik, 2008). ...
Cross-country research on public opinion on climate change has mostly focused on people’s beliefs about whether climate change is happening or is a serious problem, with little attention paid to other opinion dimensions such as issue salience. Relying on Eurobarometer data from 28 EU member states, we systematically compare the public’s belief in and salience of climate change, examining variation across the EU using Bayesian multilevel analysis. We find high levels of belief but low levels of salience in most countries. Salience varies substantially between countries and is positively related to country wealth. Levels of greenhouse gas emissions appear to have a negative relationship with both belief and salience, and individuals’ political orientation has more influence on climate opinion (particularly salience) in richer countries than in poorer countries. Overall, our findings suggest that belief and salience are distinct dimensions, and that country context influences salience more than belief.
... Political actors also frame climate change as a global or regional problem more often than comparable issues such as trade or human rights (see Koopmans, Chapter 7 in De Wilde et al., 2019). At the same time, climate mitigation is linked to energy in the media and government policy, so that people closely connect energy with climate (Kim & Wolinsky-Nahmias, 2014). This reflects the reality in that over half of the EU's emissions are from fuel combustion (Eurostat,2017) and around 18 percent of EU emissions are from coal-fired power plants (Climate Analytics, 2017). ...
... Generalizing post-materialist values theory to the national level, citizens in countries with higher levels of economic development are expected to care more about the environment, because they are no longer focused on survival and can worry about 'higher-order' needs such as environmental quality (Inglehart, 1990). Studies on climate attitudes using economic self-interest to explain country differences reveal different results: some show a negative relationship between development and concern (Kim & Wolinsky-Nahmias, 2014;Kvaløy et al., 2012;Tjernström & Tietenberg, 2008), others show the opposite effect (Knight, 2016;Lee et al., 2015). Within the EU, lower environmental concern in Eastern Europe has been connected its lower levels of economic development compared to the West (Shum, 2012). ...
... The literature on attitudes sees impacts as climate risks, 1 which are connected to a rise in concern in the developing world (Capstick et al., 2015). This is empirically demonstrated by Knight (2016) for a sample of 111 countries, but may not hold true for all regions: Kvaløy et al. (2012) found lower climate concern in countries with more disasters, while Kim and Wolinsky-Nahmias (2014) found no significant relationship between vulnerability and concern. It remains to be seen whether EU citizens' attitudes are impacted by their country of residences' climate risk. ...
Can ambitious climate policies in the European Green Deal succeed when faced with rising societal divisions between Europeans? This paper undertakes an empirical analysis using data from the European Social Survey to see whether the divisions between cosmopolitan and communitarian Europeans evident in other policy fields like migration are also found in relation to climate and energy. The results show that political ideology is most important determinant of individual attitudes, and that differences in attitudes between Eastern and Western Europe may be explained by energy security and economic development issues. The EU has maintained an ambitious policy since the mid-2010s, and with the Green Deal appears to be framing climate ambition in ways that the data suggests may reduce communitarian opposition, but not the differences between EU Member States resulting from security concerns.
... The affluence hypothesis has received mixed support in cross-national empirical comparisons. While some studies report a positive relationship between (per capita) national affluence and climate concern (Running 2013; Lo and Chow 2015;Knight 2016), others report an inverse (Sandvik 2008;Givens and Jorgenson 2011;Kim and Wolinsky-Nahmias 2014;Mostafa 2016) or non-significant (Kvaloy, Finseraas, and Listhaug 2012) relationship. Similarly, previous research has found positive (Drews and van der Bergh 2016) and negative (Kim and Wolinsky-Nahmias 2014) associations of affluence with perceived climate responsibility as well as with policy support and personal action. ...
... While some studies report a positive relationship between (per capita) national affluence and climate concern (Running 2013; Lo and Chow 2015;Knight 2016), others report an inverse (Sandvik 2008;Givens and Jorgenson 2011;Kim and Wolinsky-Nahmias 2014;Mostafa 2016) or non-significant (Kvaloy, Finseraas, and Listhaug 2012) relationship. Similarly, previous research has found positive (Drews and van der Bergh 2016) and negative (Kim and Wolinsky-Nahmias 2014) associations of affluence with perceived climate responsibility as well as with policy support and personal action. ...
... These inconsistencies might be due to the heterogeneity of content and methodological approaches. Studies that focus on general climate concern generally find positive association with affluence, while this is not the case for studies that more specifically focus on concern about the (negative) consequences of climate change (Kim and Wolinsky-Nahmias 2014;Lo and Chow 2015). It has also been discussed how economic resources can boost perceived responsibility to take action on climate change, and hence make population in wealthier nations potentially more climate minded (Drews and van der Bergh 2016). ...
There are differences across Europe in elements of climate citizenship, including climate concern, perceived responsibility, and willingness to support and take climate action. This paper examines how individual-level climate perceptions correspond to a country's contribution to climate change and its ability to develop climate policies. Data from the European Social Survey Round 8 (23 European countries, n = 44,387) was used to explore how national-level factors (affluence as per capita GDP, carbon emissions as per capita CO2 emissions, and democracy as electoral democracy index) are related to individual-level climate perceptions (climate concern, perceived climate responsibility, climate policy support, and personal climate action). The analysis shows that the studied individual-level perceptions are all linked, and that perceived climate responsibility is a factor that helps in understanding how individual-level climate views are connected. Further, national-level affluence and democracy are connected to stronger individual-level perceptions both directly and through mediating their connections. Our results suggest that achieving ambitious climate policy targets in Europe could benefit from focusing on the role of perceived climate responsibility in boosting policy support and action. Moreover, the connection between national-level (democratic and economic) factors and public climate perceptions emphasises the need to place climate policies in a wider context.
... Economy GDP per capita Gelissen (2007), Sandvik (2008), Givens and Jorgenson (2011), Arıkan and Günay (2021) Bravo and Marelli (2007), Shum (2012), Kvaløy et al. (2012), Franzen and Vogl (2013), Kim and Wolinsky-Nahmias (2014), Mayer and Smith (2017) Franzen (2003), Brulle et al. (2012), Shum (2012), Marquart-Pyatt (2012), Duijndam and van Beukering (2020) GDP growth Franzen (2003), Sandvik (2008), Duijndam and van Beukering (2020) Gelissen ( Environmental quality Greenhouse gas emission Zahran et al. (2006), Sandvik (2008), Marquart-Pyatt (2012), Duijndam and van Beukering (2020) This does not imply, however, that environmental concern is limited to affluent regions. To accommodate the observed environmental concern in low-income contexts, Inglehart (1995) amended his theory to include environmental quality. ...
... Finally, there are time-invariant region characteristics which can influence the prioritization of environmental issues. Static environmental factors that determine physical vulnerability to natural hazards have so far received relatively little attention in the literature (Kim and Wolinsky-Nahmias, 2014;Mayer and Smith, 2017). There is, however, tentative evidence that proximity to the coast and living in a lowelevation area that is susceptible to flooding positively correlates with climate policy support (Zahran et al., 2006) and climate change risk perception (Brody et al., 2008). ...
Environmental concern is crucial as bottom-up support for policies that aim to tackle the multiple ecological crises. This paper investigates which characteristics of 206 European regions are robust drivers of generalized environmental concern. To this end, 25 Eurobarometer survey waves between 2009 and 2019 were combined with measures of the regional economy, population, geography, environmental quality, and meteorological events. Bayesian model averaging is used to systematically account for model uncertainty in the estimation of partial correlations. The results indicate that environmental concern increases with income level, a more equal distribution of income and wealth, and a less greenhouse gas-intensive industrial sector. Furthermore, regions with younger and better educated populations exhibit higher levels of environmental concern. In terms of environmental characteristics, both geographical vulnerability to natural hazards and meteorological events affect environmental concern. The results highlight the importance of the socio-economic and environmental context of opinion formation and have implications for designing and communicating environmental policies.
... This means risk perception is a critical driver of collective action against human-induced environmental problems. Studies in developing countries have indicated that people primarily perceive the risk of climate change more than those in developed countries (Kim & Wolinsky-Nahmias, 2014). In Somalia, climate-sensitive agricultural production and livestock herding has been particularly affected by recurrent extreme climate events. ...
... As evidenced by our results, even though young people's behavioral intentions to adapt forestation as a strategy to mitigate climate change was positively and significantly influenced by their attitude toward forestation, other factors such as climate change knowledge and biocentric value orientations played a significant role in their decision to adapt it. This could be the result of extreme climate vulnerability and deforestation that exist in Somalia as previous studies indicated that individuals in countries that are vulnerable to climate change express higher willingness to support and approve proactive climate change policies such as forestation (Kim & Wolinsky-Nahmias, 2014). However, research examining people's attitudes and intentions to approve forestation of trees that are not indigenous to East Africa's ecosystems are scant, but we expect negative views toward assisted migration of nonindigenous trees as these invasive species (e.g., Prosopis juliflora) as they largely colonized and disturbed the ecosystem balances when their exp2015ansion became out of control in arid and semiarid environments of East Africa such as Kenya, Ethiopia, and Somalia (Ayanu et al., ). ...
Understanding the perceptions of young people is a critical issue in the formulation and implementation of climate change mitigation strategies. Based on cognitive hierarchy theory, the present study aims to investigate the factors that motivate or hinder young people’s perception of forestation as a strategy to mitigate climate change in post-conflict Somalia. This study hypothesized a model in which climate change knowledge, risk perception and forest value orientations (anthropocentric/biocentric) influence attitude toward forestation and attitude, in turn, predicts behavioral intentions. We randomly surveyed students from three universities in three different regions of Somalia and collected 434 structured survey questionnaires. Using structural equation modeling, the results showed that climate change knowledge is a significant predictor of behavioral intention but not attitude toward forestation. The results also revealed that young people’s perception toward forestation as a strategy to mitigate climate change is significantly influenced by biocentric value orientation both directly and indirectly through attitude toward forestation. Contrary to previous studies, our results indicate that attitude partially mediates the relationship between biocentric value orientation and behavioral intentions and fully mediates the relationship between anthropocentric value orientation, risk perception and behavioral intentions, while it did not show any mediation results between climate change knowledge and behavioral intention. We found that the young people’s climate action or inaction is mainly shaped by climate change knowledge, biocentric value orientation, and attitude toward forestation. Finally, climate change mitigation efforts should avoid relying solely on attitude for behavioral decision-making formation and instead incorporate other factors into a more comprehensive framework.
... Un reciente informe del IPCC el año 2019, elaborado por expertos que conforman el Panel Intergubernamental de Cambio Climático (IPCC), pone en evidencia que la práctica de estilos de vida sostenibles y los cambios de comportamientos pro ambientales, son las mejores opciones que tenemos hoy en día para poner un límite al incremento de las temperaturas, que, como sabemos, representan una de las principales causas del cambio climático. Sin embargo, el cambio climático también podría ser percibido como un fenómeno distante, por ejemplo, cuando algunas personas tienden a distanciar o alejar los riesgos mentalmente, aunque este comportamiento los exponga a riesgos mayores (Kim & Wolinsky-Nahmias, 2014). ...
... Sin embargo, existen ocasiones en que el cambio climático es percibido como algo que no es necesario priorizar por el momento, es un problema que se encuentra muy distante (Kim & Wolinsky-Nahmias, 2014). Al respecto, diversos trabajos han demostrado que en algunas situaciones las personas pueden alejar los riesgos mentalmente, ubicándolos de una forma que estén muy distantes a ellos (Lorenzoni & Pidgeon, 2006); por ejemplo, si un individuo percibe el cambio climático como algo lejano geográficamente, piensa que está lejos de la ubicación donde se encuentra y que este fenómeno solo impactará en otros lugares y en, consecuencia, no se verá afectado. ...
El cambio climático representa una gran amenaza para la humanidad y es motivo de preocupación para la comunidad científica, la sociedad y los políticos. La escasez de conocimientos contextualizados sobre la percepción de riesgo genera una brecha entre los países desarrollados y en vías de desarrollo, siendo estos últimos los más vulnerables a sus efectos. Todo esto nos lleva a plantear un estudio de revisión sobre percepción de riesgo, distancia psicológica y comunicación de riesgo frente al cambio climático, contextualizado en Perú. Los esfuerzos que se realizan desde diferentes instituciones públicas y organizaciones no gubernamentales son para proponer programas sólidos frente al cambio climático. En este contexto, el apoyo de políticas de gobierno contextualizadas en la realidad peruana resulta fundamental para poner un freno al incremento de temperatura y al aumento de emisiones de gases de efecto invernadero. Se concluye indicando la necesidad de estudios interdisciplinarios que permitan identificar la importancia del rol que juegan variables como la percepción de riesgo, distancia psicológica y las estrategias de comunicación en los procesos de adaptación y mitigación frente al cambio climático.
... These levels of concern are often influenced by factors such as gender, income level, political ideology or the level of knowledge of socio-environmental problems [25]. However, this great disquiet for socio-environmental problems is generally not being truly transformed into a personal commitment to act [26]. ...
... These people seem to understand the question, but their responses suggest that they are not willing to make changes at an individual level. Literature points out that, as in so-called "developed" countries, paradigmatic problems of GEC such as Climate Change are perceived with great preoccupation, but this concern does not always lead to a disposition to make sacrifices to address them [26,63]. With regard to this problem, some studies indicate that the individualistic framework promoted by capitalist systems often causes a feeling of powerlessness when facing global problems [50,64]. ...
The aim of our research was to study attitudinal trends in Spanish trainee teachers regarding Global Environmental Change (GEC), in order to identify elements that should be enhanced in their education. The Scale of Global Environmental Change (SGEC) was used as a measurement instrument to explore attitudes on how to deal with GEC. A cluster analysis of the scores of the four SGEC factors (N = 950) was carried out in order to segment the cases into groups of similar response profiles. Two solutions are proposed: one made up of two clusters (Concerned and Disengaged) and the other of four clusters (Egocentric, Indifferent, Sceptical and Committed). Furthermore, we have analysed whether some of the students’ characteristics significantly influence their inclusion in one cluster or another. The results of this study show that among trainee teachers there are sceptical, self-centered and indifferent trends, which do not correspond to people capable of promoting the transformation needed to deal with GEC. Therefore, it is necessary to improve their training with new educational models that favour the recognition of the real origin of socio-environmental problems and provide them with skills to promote individual and social responsibility.
... Many authors (Brulle et al., 2012;Scruggs and Benegal, 2012; have highlighted that the reduction of GDP reduced climate change concern, particularly during the economic crisis period both in the United States and EU countries. Furthermore, a vast number of authors have found that economic development negatively influenced the concern for climate change (Kim and Wolinsky-Nahmias, 2014;Kvaløy et al., 2012;Mostafa, 2016). Meanwhile, Pelham (2018) found an insignificant impact of GDP on scepticism about global warming when considering 117 nations but a different result was found by , who have revealed that economic development has a positive impact on public concern about climate change using data from 74 separate surveys. ...
... Considering the relationship between economic development and climate change concern, the results showed an insignificant M. Jaku cionyt_ e-Skodien _ e and G. Liobikien _ e Journal of Cleaner Production 281 (2021) 125189 (Fig. 2). In the literature, researchers have revealed negative (Kim and Wolinsky-Nahmias, 2014;Kvaløy et al., 2012;Mostafa, 2016), or positive Lo and Chow, 2015;Knight, 2016) relationships between public climate concern and economic development. Only Pelham (2018) found an insignificant impact of GDP on scepticism about global warming. ...
To achieve the targets of climate change policy, it is important not only to enhance concerns about climate change but also to promote climate-friendly behaviour. Encompassing European Union (EU) countries, the objective of this paper was to analyse how economic development and Hofstede’s cultural dimensions contributed to climate change concerns, personal responsibility, and actions related to climate change mitigation. Furthermore, considering that actions related to climate change mitigation have different costs and benefits, in this study, we aimed to reveal whether climate change concerns and personal responsibility equally influenced all actions related to climate change mitigation and whether all types of actions were guided by the same goals. The results showed that the performance of actions related to climate change mitigation varied across European countries. The largest share of respondents declared that they reduce waste and regularly separate it for recycling. Meanwhile, a smaller share of people noted that they perform very high-cost actions such as the purchase of low-energy homes and electric cars. Economic development level significantly affects the assumption of personal responsibility and the number of actions related to climate change mitigation but not climate change concerns. Hofstede’s cultural dimensions influence climate change concerns, responsibility, and the number of actions differently. Considering separate actions related to climate change mitigation, the assumption of personal responsibility significantly and positively influenced almost all actions. Climate change concerns positively and significantly affected only low-cost actions. Because of the different costs and guiding goals, the respondents who performed one action did not necessarily perform other actions related to climate change mitigation.
... Experiences of extreme cold weather are also found to increase mean levels of concern about climate change among UK citizens (Capstick and Pidgeon 2014). In a review of 73 papers, Howe et al. (2019) summarize that there appears to be a small but discernible effect of short-term variation in temperature on climate change opinion, and that evidence in relation to precipitation is mixed, but also note the need for research in contexts other than the USA. ...
... The results are robust to a number of different measurement strategies, and sensitivity analyses. Our results are thus broadly consistent with evidence from the USA (Howe et al. 2019). ...
Extreme weather patterns can be linked to the effects of anthropogenic climate change with increasing confidence. Evidence from the USA suggests a weak relationship between individuals’ experiences of many types of weather events and concern about climate change. Using data from Australia, we investigate the effects of experiences of increases in mean temperatures and drought on a range of measures related to individuals’ beliefs in, and concerns about, climate change. Our results show no association between recent experiences of elevated temperature relative to long-term average and views about climate change, though some association between longer-term temperature experiences. We find some evidence that experiencing less rainfall relative to the historical average is related to stronger sentiment that climate change is happening and higher levels of concern. The results are consistent with previous research showing experiences of extreme weather events do not have a large effect on beliefs in, or concerns about, climate change.
... Climate change has generally been perceived as a higher risk in developing countries than in most of the Western world [22]. So far, concern on CC has always been lower in the US and China than in continental Europe [23,24]. ...
Understanding climate change awareness and its related risks is crucial to plan efficient climate-smart strategies. An online survey was conducted on Italian consumers with the aim to understand consumers’ inclination toward food products obtained with climate-smart strategies. Specifically, consumers’ awareness about climate change and willingness to choose and pay for products derived from climate-smart agriculture were investigated. Results highlighted two targeted consumers, one more interested in economic issues and more “conservative” and the second one more concerned with climate changes risks with a higher interest in environmental and ethical values (fair trade), representing the primary target consumers for climate-smart foods. This segmentation can be useful to identify expectations and purchase drivers that can facilitate climate-smart policies and the establishment of the climate-smart foods on the market.
... (i) climate change as it relates to the frequency of extreme weather events (Li et al. 2021) leading to negative impacts on food and water security; (ii) population growth associated with an increase in resource consumption (York 2007); (iii) increased affluence and urbanization that pushes consumers to acquire goods and services that impresses large environmental footprints (Kim and Wolinsky-Nahmias 2014); and (iv) economic growth especially, in industries which leads to a surge in the use of such raw material inputs as energy and water (Kjaer et al. 2019). ...
Understanding how water, food, and energy interact in the form of the water-food-energy (WFE) nexus is essential for sustainable development which advocates enhancing human well-being and poverty reduction. Moreover, the application of the WFE nexus has seen diverse approaches to its implementation in cities across the globe. There is a need to share knowledge in order to improve urban information exchange which focuses on the WFE nexus’ application and impacts on the United Nations (UN) Sustainable Development Goals. In this study, Natural Language Processing (NLP) and Affinity Propagation Algorithm (APA) are employed to explore and assess the application of the WFE nexus first on a regional basis and then on the city level. The results show that after the exhaustive search of a database containing 32,736 case studies focusing on 2,233 cities, African and Latin American cities have the most potential to encounter resource shortages (i.e., WFE limitation) and are systematically underrepresented in literature. In addition, the study shows that Southern hemisphere cities can benefit from knowledge transfer because of their limited urban intelligence programmes. Hence, with regional and topic bias, there is a potential for more mutual learning links between cities that can increase WFE nexus policy exchange between the Northern and Southern hemispheres through the bottom-up case-study knowledge.
... If this theory is applied to the environmental or to sustainability concerns, then it presumes that these are subjective values that tend to be activated only once more fundamental and material needs are met. But many scientists admit that there is more than one sort of motivation for such concerns and in many cases it has rooted in a concern for livelihood and material vulnerability or the survival of a way of a life (Dunlap and York, 2008;Inglehart, 2017;Kalfagianni et al., 2019;Kim and Wolinsky-Nahmias, 2014). John Meyer (2019) in his work is stressing the fact that it is important to draw attention to the diversity of spaces and opportunities for sustainability strategies that resonate with the everyday concerns of many (Meyer, 2019). ...
Over the past few decades economic growth has come at the expenses of the environments and the topic of sustainable development is becoming more important. Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. The main aim of this dissertation was to investigate the available methodologies of sustainability assessment and to test which of them could be suitable for Russian conditions. Russia is an interesting subject for research as, it has its own history of sustainability science, but quite often the commitment to sustainable development is only in rhetoric and there are some problems with the interpretation of the concept of sustainable development. For example, in Russian official documents the term sustainability is used as a synonym for stable economic growth. The focus of the research was a creation of an indicator system for a regional sustainability assessment on the example of Tambov region of the Russian Federation. At the first stage of the research a regional assessment was performed with the help of the United Nations set of sustainable development indicators, SWOT analysis was performed to identify the main strengths and problems in the region. Also, the availability of statistical data and relevancy for the research region of the indicators was checked. During the next stage of the research a composite indicator was created using different techniques for normalization of indicator and weighting. Then robustness and sensitivity analysis of created indicators was performed, the results were visualised, and composite indicators were decomposed to explain the drivers of the aggregated results. The result of this work has shown that composite indicators together with regional assessment on the base of sustainability indicators are the tools that could support policymakers in sustainability decision-making. There are some problems with the availability of the statistical data in Russia, and there is no monitoring mechanism at the federal district level and lack of coordination with work of statistical agencies. This research is confirming a necessity of further research, and a need to develop a monitoring and assessment system in Russian Federation. The second part of the research was devoted to education for sustainable development. UNESCO is stressing that the approach of Education for Sustainable Development empowers learners to take informed decisions and responsible actions for environmental integrity, economic viability, and a just society for present and future generations, and therefore education is playing a crucial role in reaching sustainability (UNESCO, 2017). The aim of this research was to see how the sustainability topics are integrated into the curriculum of the agricultural universities, to define the sources of integration and research possible problems and formulate the recommendations for strengthening the integration. To research the education for sustainable development in Russia first a literature review was conducted, followed by 16 semi-structured interviews with the representatives of 8 universities. The research confirmed the fact that sustainability is present as a topic in the official documents, for example educational standard, but this mention remains only rhetorical and does not provide the background for the establishment of a framework for integration of sustainability concept. As a result, the integration into education is mostly driven by the personal initiative of the teaching staff. There is a clear demand for an integration framework of sustainability topics in the federal state educational standard. The main problems are uncoordination and competition between departments and ministries, overload of teachers, lack of best-practices, absence of system in the education and limited financing. These problems could be mitigated with creation of interdepartmental centres, creation of interdisciplinary working groups, creation of a systematic concept of education for sustainability and involvement of different stakeholders into educational projects, but the success of these measures depends on the general approach and if the importance of sustainability will be present only in official documents, then there will be no shift in integration, and everything will depend only on individual initiative of teachers.
... Early commentary in this space focused on the so-called post-materialism hypothesis: the notion that richer nations are the ones that are most likely to embrace progressive social movements such as environmentalism because they are more likely to have satisfied their material needs for physical and economic security 72 . In contrast with this hypothesis, some international surveys suggest that concern about climate change is greater in nations with relatively low gross domestic product per capita 73,74 and with relatively low per-capita carbon emissions 75 . ...
Despite over 50 years of messaging about the reality of human-caused climate change, substantial portions of the population remain sceptical. Furthermore, many sceptics remain unmoved by standard science communication strategies, such as myth busting and evidence building. To understand this, we examine psychological and structural reasons why climate change misinformation is prevalent. First, we review research on motivated reasoning: how interpretations of climate science are shaped by vested interests and ideologies. Second, we examine climate scepticism as a form of political followership. Third, we examine infrastructures of disinformation: the funding, lobbying and political operatives that lend climate scepticism its power. Guiding this Review are two principles: (1) to understand scepticism, one must account for the interplay between individual psychologies and structural forces; and (2) global data are required to understand this global problem. In the spirit of optimism, we finish by describing six strategies for reducing the destructive influence of climate scepticism. Hornsey and Lewandowsky examine psychological and structural reasons for climate change scepticism and describe strategies for reducing the destructive influence of such scepticism.
... Today, many countries are also increasing the formulation of policies to alleviate environmental problems (Mohai et al., 2010;Xu et al., 2020). Researchers are emphasizing the importance of individuals engaging in proenvironmental behaviors in their lives and at work to mitigate environmental issues (Kim & Wolinsky-Nahmias, 2014;Wibeck, 2014). The current literature indicated that environmental issues are likely to be perceived as distant issues, that is, environmental issues are viewed to be more relevant to a distant place, distant future, and others (Kollmuss & Agyeman, 2002;Milfont, 2010;Millarhouse et al., 2020;van der Linden et al., 2015). ...
Environmental issues are major global risks that call for urgent pro-environmental actions. The current literature suggested that many perceive environmental issues as psychologically distant. This perception is considered as one important psychological barrier that limits the public from adopting sustainable pro-environmental actions. The perception of environmental issues has ignited discussion of Construal Level Theory (CLT) as a theoretical framework to understand how perceived psychological distance influences attitude towards environmental protection. Our review suggested that the public may perceive environmental issues as psychologically distant on both social and spatial dimensions. We proposed that optimism bias might be one of the reasons for this. Our review highlighted the important role of psychological proximity in arousing concerns and eliciting positive attitudes toward the efforts of addressing existing environmental issues. Inducing a proximal psychological distance may elicit stronger positive attitudes towards pro-environmental behavior intention. We discussed moderators including efficacy of policy and social pressure that elucidate the role of psychological distance on attitude. Skepticism may cause one to perceive environmental issues as psychologically distant, reducing support for environmental policies. We recommended CLT as a useful theoretical framework to improve current methods on motivating and promoting actual pro-environmental behavior. We proposed that narratives of personal experiences and objective scientific reports could complement each other in communicating environmental risks. Many are often not keenly aware of environmental issues. For this reason, using a variety of approaches and tools to proximise environmental issues is important and beneficial in raising environmental concerns and promoting sustainable actions.
... Although, especially for Global South, climate disasters emerge as very vivid and urgent social justice problem (Fernandes-Jesus, Barnes, & Diniz, 2020), climate change risks can be invisible and experienced indirectly by some groups and societies (Weber, 2010), thus considered as distant psychological risks (van der Linden, 2015), contrary to physical life threats such as protest risks in high-risk contexts. Since climate change risk perception differs across countries (Kim & Wolinsky-Nahmias, 2014) as well as individuals who live in the same country (Smith & Leiserowitz, 2012), these variations can explain the individuals' motivation to participate in climate protests. Hence, we believe the importance of examining the impact of both psychologically distant (e.g., climate crisis risk as a risk of political inaction) and close risk (e.g., protest risk as a physical risk) on collective action participation in risky political contexts. ...
The current research investigates whether moral obligation and perceived close vs. distant risks of high vs. moderate risk collective actions are associated with willingness to participate in collective action in the case of Turkey. Two studies were conducted: one with replaced university students after the July 15, 2016 coup d'état attempt (high-risk context; N₁ = 258) and one with climate strikes (moderate risk context; N₂ = 162). The findings showed that moral obligation predicts collective action in both studies, however, the strength of this relationship is contingent on the level of subjective likelihood of protest risk in the high-risk collective action (Study 1), but not in the moderate-risk collective action (Study 2). Study 2 extended the findings of Study 1 by showing that higher perceived climate crisis risks (e.g., extinction of many species, destroying the vast majority of vital resources; distant risk), but not risks of protest (e.g., being arrested, blacklisted; close risk) predicts higher willingness to participate in collective action. We discussed the role of moral obligation and different risk perceptions (e.g., distant, close, moderate, high) on climate movements and collective action of marginalized groups in repressive political contexts.
... HDI. The Human Development Index (HDI) was included as a control country-level variable, as previous research found an association between country development and climate change beliefs (Lee, Czarnek et al., 2015Kim and Wolinsky-Nahmias, 2014;Franzen and Vogl, 2013). The HDI is a composite index of three dimensions: health (life expectancy), education (expected years of schooling, mean years of schooling) and standard of living (gross national income per capita) (UN, 2013). ...
The long-term nature of climate policy measures requires stable social legitimacy, which other types of crises may jeopardize. This article examines the impact of the COVID-19 fear on climate change beliefs based on an autumn 2020 population survey in the Member States of the European Union and the United Kingdom. The results show that deep COVID-19 concerns increase climate change concerns, awareness, and perceived negative impacts of climate change. These effects are more robust among the lower educated Europeans. On the country level, strict governmental measures are also linked to deep climate change concerns. In contrast to the experience following the 2008 recession, the findings show that a secondary crisis can positively impact climate attitudes, which is a promising result for policy actions.
... Components of carbonaceous aerosol, elemental carbon (EC), and organic carbon (OC) account for a large element of atmospheric particulate matter (PM) and, on average, subsidize to 20-35% of coarse particulate and 20-45% of fine particulate [11,12]. Carbonaceous aerosols have a chief role in the interactions of light particles within the atmosphere and are one of the significant components of fine and coarse particulate matter; they are therefore associated with the negative climatic and environmental impacts and worsening public health and air quality [2,[13][14][15][16]. The Thermal-optical transmittance [TOT] method was used to address quantitative amounts of EC and OC in the samples collected for PM 2.5 and PM 10 evaluation through the use of the NIOSH 870 protocol for evaluating EC and OC with the laboratory analyzer. ...
The rapid increase in population growth due to industrialization and urbanization has resulted in air quality deterioration in Pakistan. Consequently, a considerable increase has been seen in the types of sources of air pollutants. However, the air quality of the country has deteriorated in the absence of management capabilities against air quality. Evidence from numerous governmental organizations and international bodies has specified that the environment, health, and quality of life are at high risk due to air pollution. Although the government of Pakistan established the Pakistan Clean Air Program, along with continuous monitoring stations to manage the quality of ambient air, air quality values have not yet been achieved. The present investigations were made in the city of Faisalabad in selected locations. Sampling of a 24 h average was done for selected sites. The air quality parameters such as NO2, SO2, COx, O2, noise level, and suspended particulate matter (SPM) were measured at two locations, i.e., Khurrianwala and Liaqatabad in the Faisalabad District. The measured values of air quality parameters were compared with national environmental quality standards (NEQS). Air pollutants such as SPM, SO2, and noise levels were found to be significantly higher than the 24-h standards of NEQS, which poses harmful effects on the quality of air and health, whereas the O2 concentration was found to be lower than the normal values, and NO2 and COx values were normal. The SO2, CO2, noise level, SPM, and O2 values ranged from 418–652 and 423–661 µg/m3, 3.03–3.44 and 3.08–3.51 mg/m3, 68–73 and 69–75 dB, 555–667 and 581–682 µg/m3, and 19.5–20 and 19.5–20.3 % for summer and winter season, respectively, as compared to standard values (150 µg/m3, 10 mg/m3, 65 dB, 550 µg/m3 and 21%). After the complete analysis of the selected locations, it was concluded that the ambient air quality of this area is severely degraded due to industrial as well as other commercial activities. These significant variations in air quality parameters suggest that there is a need to check the air quality regularly to take appropriate measures for reducing ambient air pollutants, especially in industrial areas as well as commercial areas.
... To understand the CCCM, we can turn to cross-country surveys, but most do not specifically look for denial per se. Many surveys show that concern for ACC is negatively associated with wealth and GHGs (Sandvik 2008;Kim and Wolinsky-Nahmias 2014). Tranter and Booth (2015) do in fact specifically look to climate skepticism and find that the highest levels of skepticism were in Australia, New Zealand, Norway, and the United States and that skepticism is positively correlated with higher levels of GHGs. ...
The rejection of climate change science is organized by a countermovement, a collective effort to oppose a threatening social movement, in this case global environmentalism along with climate mitigation efforts. This chapter shows that, from a comparative perspective, the Anglo group of countries are quite alone in organizing the Climate Change Countermovement (CCCM), even though climate denial manifests in an unorganized way more broadly. This chapter offers the theoretical possibility that this Anglo climate denial emerges as a defense of imperial privilege threatened by the social change required to address a warming world. The theory is then supported by selections from authors of books who reject climate change and that evidence a fear of loss—of US power, of possessive individualism, and of Western progress.
... Hence, a frequently used contextual factor in comparative work on CCOs is national GDP. Kim and Wolinsky-Nahmias (2014) and Sandvik (2008) find that higher levels of national affluence positively correlate with national CCA. National education levels, in combination with GDP, are furthermore found to explain cross-country variance in CCA, confirming that CCA is positively associated with education and the wealth of a nation (Knight, 2016). ...
Climate change can only be tackled with public support for sustainable policies. Thus, public attitudes towards climate change matter. More than 3 decades of climate change opinion (CCO) research-conducted by geographers, environmental psychologists, behavioural scientists, sociologists etc.-have provided us with a wealth of information about which predictors shape public CCOs. This review synthe-sises these findings and highlights the different geographies (the self, the nation, the region, the digital) that emerge within this research. Given the increased importance of social media, virtual geographies of climate change scepticism are increasingly being identified. Our paper argues that new research agendas must be developed to address the meshwork of virtual space and small scale geographies (regions, towns, districts) in which CCOs are formed. K E Y W O R D S climate change awareness, climate change opinion, climate change scepticism, digital geographies, nation state, sub-national
... Current research suggests that the alienation between people creates psychological distance which leads to the rejection of individual responsibilities of protecting the environment (Kim and Wolinsky-Nahmias, 2014;Wang et al., 2021). Moreover, the rapidly growing environmental issues have harmed people's safety, decreasing public well-being. ...
... Firstly, a broad range of studies suggest that attitude formation is based on individual motivation. This category of motivational factors encompasses studies suggesting that self-interest is a key motivator for individual behavior and, more importantly, values-based models which demonstrate how policy attitudes are the result of a distinctive set of core values (Perlaviciute and Steg, 2014), beliefs about and concern for the environmental situation and its causes (e.g., Lubell et al., 2007, Kim andWolinsky-Nahmias, 2014), and personal norms or moral obligations (Bamberg and Rölle, 2003). Furthermore, motivation to support or accept political steering in general, and policy instruments in particular, has been associated with an individual's political-ideological orientation (Feldman and Hart, 2018;Mccright and Dunlap, 2013;Jagers et al., 2019). ...
This article studies if, how, and why different revenue uses affect public attitudes to environmental taxation. More specifically, using a large-scale (N = 4292) randomized survey experiment with a 2 × 3 factorial design, the article analyses how attitudes towards a proposed increase in the current air passenger tax in Sweden are altered when combining a tax increase with three different suggestions for revenue use. The increasingly popular fee-and-dividend solution, where revenues are distributed back to the public, thus decreasing negative distributive tax effects, is compared with two additional revenue uses: unspecified government spending on welfare services, and re-investment of revenues into aviation biofuels. Our results show that, although some of the commonly used independent variables such as climate concern, personal norms and political-ideological orientation are significant in determining policy attitudes, varying both tax level and revenue use also tangibly affects how a policy proposal is received. Interestingly, however, the fee-and-dividend approach does not yield the most positive policy attitudes. Rather, directing the revenues to fund an increased use of biofuels for aviation is the alternative that most clearly drives positive attitudes to this policy, and is also the alternative that is perceived as the most effective and fair in both the high tax and the low tax alternatives.
... This perhaps explains why they find the message with biospheric orientation very persuasive. According to Marquart-Pyatt (2007) demonstrates that more highly educated, younger, and female respondents, postmaterialists, liberals, and egalitarians tend to express more pro-environmental attitudes and engage in fewer concern was apparent in developing or industrializing countries at similar levels and in some concern about climate change to be higher in developing countries" (Kim & Wolinsky-Nahmias, 2014). This is confirmed by a nationwide study conducted by Sia Su (2008), which reveals that Segev, Fernandes & Wang, 2015 an important factor that moderates the effectiveness of messages (Chang, 2010;Segev, Fernandes & Wang, 2015 e is for them, the highest results are: Geographical Message (3.928), Impact Message (3.899) and Biospheric Message (3.676). ...
We identify six rhetorical orientations that promote sustainability in travel behavior and evaluate their persuasive power. These six orientations underpinning the rhetoric of pro-sustainability messages are: economic, altruistic, justice-equity, biospheric, impact and geographical. We find that messages with impact, biospheric and geographical orientations are the most persuasive. Three explanations are provided why these three are the most persuasive: the demographic of our respondents, the relevance of the message, and the framing of the messages. We end with the limitations of our study and agenda for future work.
... Climate change is a multidimensional global hazard that poses many happenstances for people worldwide (Swim et al., 2011). The public sees this as the risks that require precarious consideration vary greatly (Kim and Wolinsky-Nahmias, 2014). Climate change has been defined by Weber (2010) as a systematic change in average conditions over time. ...
Purpose
Higher education plays a vital role in educating citizens about climate change and promoting pro-environment behavior. Based on this statement, this study aims to analyze and evaluate students’ perception of climate change at the University of the South Pacific in Fiji. The study aims to understand the main ideas and concepts of climate change by analyzing information habits and individual opinions on the causes of climate change as perceived by the students of two student organizations aimed at environmental protection.
Design/methodology/approach
A qualitative approach was used to gather data on students’ perceptions and information habits toward climate change. The data were collected through a questionnaire to characterize students from the socio-demography and their perceptions, information habits and knowledge relating to climate change. This paper uses the case study method to examine students’ climate change perceptions at two different student organizations at the same university. The research study involved a focus group technique. Two focus groups at the University of the South Pacific were administered. The focus groups’ selection in this study took into account the aims and objectives of the students’ organization toward climate change awareness, adaptation, mitigation and environment protection.
Findings
The focus groups participants believe that climate change is a serious problem in the South Pacific region. Results suggest significant differences in climate change perception at the two students’ organizations chosen for this study. Students at the Econesian society nicknamed climate change as a nuclear weapon for the South Pacific responsible for changes in the habitat, coral bleaching, lifestyle changes, mother of all other environmental problems and the introduction of invasive species into Fiji. Students at Wantok Moana-related climate change to drastic weather changes, lack of fish feed and additional toxins in the sea. The results also showed that students at the Econesian society have a better understanding of climate change than the students of Wantok Moana.
Practical implications
This paper provides an insight into how students of Small Islands Developing States view climate change and the factors affecting their opinions. It also shows how climate change perception varies within the same university. This implies the need to integrate climate change into the higher education curriculum and more research on this topic.
Originality/value
This paper is the first to compare and contrast university students’ climate change perception in Fiji. The results make an essential contribution to the extant climate change literature by identifying and categorizing climate change perception and the factors that shape students’ perception of climate change from the university students’ perspective in Fiji.
... HDI. The Human Development Index (HDI) was included as a control country-level variable, as previous research found an association between country development and climate change beliefs [7,13,30,31]. ...
The long-term nature of climate policy measures requires stable social legitimacy, which other types of crises may jeopardize. This article examines the impact of the COVID-19 fear on climate change beliefs based on an autumn 2020 population survey in the Member States of the European Union and the United Kingdom. The results show that deep COVID-19 concerns increase awareness, climate change concerns, and perceived negative impacts of climate change. These effects are more robust among the lower educated Europeans. On the country level, strict governmental measures are also linked to deep climate change concerns. In contrast to the experience following the 2008 recession, the findings show that a secondary crisis can positively impact climate attitudes, which is a promising result for policy actions.
... This latter finding aligns with literature suggesting that it is the poorest countries and communities most likely to suffer from the impacts of climate change due to their low income and geographic location (Nath & Behera, 2011). However, some research did not find any relationship between GDP and individuals' strength of climate change concern (Kim & Wolinsky-Nahmias, 2014). Inglehart's (1977Inglehart's ( , 1990) theory of post-materialism has been the main theoretical framework used to understand the relationship between wealth and environmental concern. ...
The relationship between wealth and climate change concern has been a focus of several studies. In this article, we hypothesize that richer households (and countries) are less concerned about climate change because wealth provides a buffer against some of the related risks. This leads people in wealthier countries and households to perceive a greater sense of control over climate change impacts, which in turn results in lower levels of concern. We tested this hypothesis using a unique household survey encompassing 11 OECD countries and over 10,000 households and applying mixed multi-level regression models. Our results confirmed a statistically significant negative relationship between country and household wealth and individuals’ perceptions of the seriousness of climate change. This study contributes to current literature by showing that this relationship is mediated through sense of control, measured at the country level by the country’s readiness index and at the individual household level by the extent of adoption of energy efficiency improvements. These findings raise the question of how best to incentivize action on climate change amongst those with the ability—but not necessarily the motivation—to respond.
... It is important to understand people's perceptions about climate change because it could potentially increase the public's willingness to make changes and to accept public policy measures [9]. Similar to Kim and Wolinsky-Nahmias [41], we found that public concern about climate change is very high in both surveyed deltas. This supports previous research indicating that inhabitants of coastal zones are highly informed and concerned about climate change [10] and shows an increase in concern from former studies in southern Europe [42]. ...
Acceptance of mitigation and adaptation strategies is related more to the perceived levels of threats as opposed to real risks. Understanding public perception of climate change is crucial for the implementation of appropriate and effective actions. This study analyzed the perceptions of climate and global changes in two European Mediterranean deltas in order to determine the similarities and differences at a regional scale and to apprehend potential adaptation and mitigation strategies necessary for the future. A total of 395 participants responded to a questionnaire through person to person interviews. Survey analysis was conducted through a multi-method approach using standard descriptive statistics and qualitative data analysis. The majority of participants in both deltas expressed that climate change was a serious problem and that human activity was a contributing factor. Despite the recognition of the importance of climate change, little action was being taken to adapt or mitigate these changes. Our results suggest that a site specific approach using confirmed information sources with adapted communication techniques is necessary to be more effective and to spur changes in practice at a local scale.
... On the other hand, the climate crisis suffers from a "spatial optimism" dilemma wherein wealthy people in the industrialized world see the consequences of the climate crisis happening primarily elsewhere (Dolsak and Prakash 2020;Tvinnereim et al. 2020). Public opinion research supports the importance of psychological distance as those who witness the effects of the climate crisis in their own backyard are both more concerned and more willing to pay for responsive policies (Kim and Wolinsky-Nahmias 2014;Rickard et al. 2016). ...
The COVID-19 pandemic is the largest public health crisis in recent history. Many states have taken unprecedented action in responding to the pandemic by restricting international and domestic travel, limiting economic activity, and passing massive social welfare bills. This begs the question, why have states taken extreme measures for COVID-19 but not the climate crisis? By comparing state responses to COVID-19 with those to the climate crisis, we identify the crisis characteristics that drive quick and far-reaching reactions to some global crises but not others. We inductively develop a conceptual framework that identifies eight crisis characteristics with observable variation between the COVID-19 and climate crises. This framework draws attention to under-considered areas of variance, such as the perceived differences in the universality of impacts, the legibility of policy responses, and the different sites of expertise for both crises. We use this structured comparison to identify areas of leverage for obtaining quicker and broader climate action.
... One principal proponent of the theory, Ronald Inglehart, claims that people are concerned about the environment because they face serious objective problems [28]. Numerous empirical studies find evidence to support the OPSV argument by showing that people who have experienced climate extremes such as flooding or heatwaves are more likely to perceive the risk of climate change [33][34][35][36][37]. Indicators of national or regional vulnerability to climate change are also found to be positively related to public environmental concern and pro-environmental behaviors [38][39][40]. ...
Climate change poses unprecedented risks to human society. Ample scientific evidence suggests that greenhouse gas emissions are the primary contributor to climate change. Large-scale greenhouse gas emissions are mainly caused by the consumption of fossil fuels. Thus, promoting renewable energy is one key strategy to mitigate these emissions and combat climate change. In this study, we investigate some potential driving forces of renewable energy deployment. We analyze panel data from 118 countries worldwide from 1995 to 2015. Results show that countries that are more vulnerable to climate change and have less carbon-intensive economies deploy higher shares of renewable energy in their total energy consumption. However, carbon tax has a statistically insignificant influence on renewable energy deployment. This study complements the literature by exploring the impact of climate change vulnerability, carbon intensity, and carbon taxes on renewable energy deployment. The findings imply that countries become more supportive of renewable energy when their economies are less intertwined with fossil fuels and when relevant policies are in place to provide incentives on renewables.
... A large number of studies on the perceived psychological distance of environmental problems have shown that people around the world are very concerned about environmental problems, but most of them do not believe that environmental problems are the most urgent problems that need to be resolved first among various problems faced by human beings (Kim and Wolinskynahmias, 2014). From the perspective of optimism (Cheng et al., 2019), people think that the risk caused by environmental changes will not bring immediate damages to them. ...
The social system can spread tightly coupled complex practices under the context that members of the social system do not have the shared experience that enables them to coordinate within longstanding tight formal organizations. To promote the understanding of such a process, and given the possibility for other members in the social system to cheat and adopt pro-environment behavior, we draw on the organizational justice literature and the perspective of justice enforceability, and construal level theory, to develop a conceptual model in which the impact of social members’ perceived psychological distance on their response to other social members adoption of pro-environmental behaviors (PEBs) is contingent on their perception of justice enforceability and cognitive appraisals (positive, not significant) towards other social members’ adoption of PEBs. We find that when social members perceive that the adoption of pro-environment behaviors is justice-enforceable, their cognitive appraisals of other social members’ adoption of PEBs is high, and then the more proximal the psychological distance they perceive, the stronger they will react to other social members’ adoption of PEBs. Further, they will adopt and enact such behaviors, otherwise, they would be unwilling to adopt and enact such behaviors. So, uneven perceived psychological distance of social members can harm their adoption and the spread of pro-environment behavior. We tested our model in a survey study. Results show that the proposed model is supported, and our understanding is enhanced about how social members’ willingness to adopt and spread pro-environment behavior is contingent on their perceptions of justice enforceability. This paper is comprised of five parts, of which include an introduction, a part on the theory and hypothesis, data and methods, results and discussion, and conclusion.
... . Among few exceptions,Kim and Wolinsky-Nahmias (2014) argue that collective concerns about national welfare and living conditions are more important predictors of public views on climate policy than individual materialistic considerations. ...
Climate policy has distributional effects, and ratcheting up climate ambition will only become politically feasible if the general public believes that their country can win from ambitious climate action. In this article, we develop a theory of belief formation that anchors distributional effects from climate action at the sector level. Specifically, we study how knowing about these impacts shapes public beliefs about collective economic consequences from climate policy—not only in a home country but also abroad. A nationally representative survey experiment in the United Kingdom demonstrates that respondents are biased toward their home country in assessing information about winning and losing sectors: while beliefs brighten for good news and worsen for bad news when the home country is involved, distributional effects from abroad are discounted for belief formation. We also show that feelings of “international embeddedness,” akin to globalization attitudes, make UK respondents consistently hold more positive beliefs that the country can benefit from ambitious climate action. Ruling out several alternative explanations, these results offer a first step toward a better understanding of how distributional effects in one issue area, such as globalization, can spill over to other issue areas, such as climate change.
... Changes in rainfall patterns, leading to both increased flooding and drought, are one predicted effect of climate change. However, the ways in which 'the public' assess these risks differ across countries (Kim and Wolinsky-Nahmias 2014), suggesting the need to consider risk perception in national cultural contexts. Taylor et al. (2014) postulate that positive association of drought with warm weather may attenuate climate risk perceptions among the British. ...
This paper explores stakeholder perspectives on the drought discourse in the UK, where climate change is predicted to increase drought risk. This study took a co-productive, mixed-methods approach to investigate drought risk communication issues through repeated engagements with local advisory groups in seven catchments across Britain and a national stakeholder competency group. These data were enriched by in-depth interviews with 17 statutory and non-statutory stakeholders working in a variety of capacities from water supply to habitat management. Codes were divided into contextual factors (cultural or drought specific factors) and individual factors (individual attributes relating to the person receiving the communication or factors within the control of communicators). The paper considers the implications of these contextual and personal factors for approaches to, and the framing of, drought risk communication (DRC). We conclude by proposing a framework for thinking about DRC in maritime climates where drought risk may not be readily perceived by some publics. This framework explores the role of heuristics in risk perception, and proposes a way of conceptualising publics that may more readily engage with DRC. In proposing the framework, we seek to stimulate new ways of thinking about DRC.
... When presenting the data, some of these studies show the percentage of respondents in a country that gave a particular response to a given question (Dunlap, Gallup Jr. and Gallup 1993;Bloom 1995;Inglehart 1995;Leiserowitz 2007;Kull 2007;Beate M.W. Ratter 2012). Others calculate correlation coefficients between responses and GDP per capita, or run linear regressions (Dunlap and Mertig 1995;Diekmann and Franzen 1999;Franzen 2003;Dunlap and York 2008;Sandvik 2008;Franzen and Meyer 2010;Kvaløy, Finseraas and Listhaug 2012;Kim and Wolinsky-Nahmias 2014). ...
Tanulmányom célja, hogy szakirodalmi áttekintés segítségével feltérképezze, hogy milyen tényezők befolyásolják az egyéni és társadalmi attitűdöket a klímaváltozással kapcsolatban, és milyen mechanizmusok alakítják a cselekvési hajlandóságot és a klímapolitikák társadalmi elfogadottságát. A tanulmány három különböző szinten vizsgálja ezeket a mechanizmusokat. Az olyan mikroszintű faktor, mint az iskolázottság, az egyéni preferenciákat alakítja. Az egyéni preferenciákat azonban erősen befolyásolhatják intézményi (mezo-) és strukturális (makro-) tényezők. Egy ország gazdasági fejlettsége például meghatározhatja a társadalmi vélekedéseket a környezetvédelmi kihívások fontosságáról, de egy régió fokozott kitettsége a klímaváltozás negatív hatásainak (sérülékenység) is befolyásolhatja a társadalmi percepciókat a probléma súlyosságával és az elvárható klímavédelmi intézkedések mértékével kapcsolatban (makroszint). Hasonló közvetítő fontossággal bírnak az olyan intézményi faktorok (mezoszint), mint az intézményekbe vetett magas társadalmi bizalom, mivel az mélyebb elköteleződést von maga után a közös ügyek megoldása iránt. Az áttekintés ezért több intézményi és strukturális tényezőt is számba vesz a teljesebb kép elérése érdekében.
Tanulmányom nem csupán a különböző magyarázó elméleteket mutatja be, hanem számot ad a legfontosabb empirikus kutatások eredményeiről is. A klímatudatosságot több különböző tudományág vizsgálja, ezért különösen fontos, hogy eredményeiket oly módon szintetizáljuk, ami a különböző kapcsolódási pontokon keresztül lehetővé teszi a tudásfelhalmozást. Jelen munkámmal ehhez kívánok tudományos hozzájárulást nyújtani. A klímatudatosságot alakító tényezők ismeretének ugyanakkor kiemelt közpolitikai vonatkozásai is vannak, mivel az eredményes klímapolitikának hatékony választ kell adni az egyéni preferenciákra éppen úgy, mint a társadalomban húzódó különbözőségekre.
When young people started with school-strikes for climate in autumn 2018, it was seen as a new start to the environmental movement. Inspired by the mobilization of Greta Thunberg, Swedish school children and young adults took to the streets. Was this wave of activism expected? Were young people very concerned over climate change and the environment before the wave of mobilization, and which kind of young people were more concerned than others? This chapter answers these questions by combining the well-known value-based and media approaches. The analysis shows that young adolescents (18–24) are clearly more concerned about climate change and environment than people over 50s, and the varying concern among young adults is best explained by their basic world views and values and only in small part by socio-economic background or organizational membership. The results are also related to the concept of “stand-by-citizens” and the potential for non-electoral political participation.
To answer this question, this paper reviews the huge and growing body of empirical literature on climate change awareness and summarizes insights emerging from a critical review of about 220 papers. It provides (i) a historical overview of climate change awareness worldwide, (ii) a guide to the most widely used datasets, with particular attention to the wording of questions used to measure climate change awareness when the analysis is performed at individual level; (iii) a detailed analysis of the main socio‐economic and climatological determinants of climate change awareness, such as age, gender, education, political values, the use of mass media and social media, social and institutional trust, experience of extreme weather conditions and the stage of development of the country where people live; and (iv) a summary of the main implications of these findings in terms of public policy responses.
Understanding how water, food, and energy interact in the form of the water-food-energy (WFE) nexus is essential for sustainable development which advocates enhancing human well-being and poverty reduction. Moreover, the application of the WFE nexus has seen diverse approaches to its implementation in cities across the globe. There is a need to optimize knowledge sharing to improve urban information exchange focused on the WFE nexus’ application and impact on the UN Sustainable Development Goals. In this study, Natural language processing (NLP) and affinity propagation algorithm are employed to explore and assess the application of the WFE nexus on a regional basis as well as at city levels. The results show that after the exhaustive search of a database containing 32,736 case studies focusing on 2,233 cities, cities with the most potential to encounter resource shortages (i.e. WFE limitation) are systematically underrepresented in literature (African and Latin American cities). Hence, with regional and topic bias, there is a potential for more mutual learning links between cities that can increase WFE nexus policy exchange between Northern and Southern hemispheres through bottom-up case-study knowledge. In addition, this study shows that Southern hemisphere cities can benefit from knowledge transfer because of their limited urban intelligence programs.
Forest dieback due to climate change has severe consequences for the sensitive environments of mountain forests which provide important ecosystem services for local communities, lowlands inhabitants, and visitors. However, this phenomenon is sometimes hard to identify for the lay public as it can manifest as a slow-onset phenomenon with rather inconspicuous signals or as large-scale disturbances like in the case of bark beetle outbreaks. The aim of this contribution is to analyze whether lay people perceive climate change-induced forest dieback in the landscape or not and what kind of damage they identify. To address this issue, we carried out a cross-comparison case-study in two mountain areas in France and Germany. To analyze the data, we introduce an innovative variable clustering approach to identify different groups of respondents based on their perception of climate change and forest dieback. Five groups of respondents—illustrating different degrees of worry—were identified in each case study: the non-alarmist, the carefree, the least informed, the worried, and the alarmist. These results show that both phenomena are not perceived as distant but as happening here and now; and that their perceptions are influenced by local contexts and personal experiences. We finally show that public perception of forest dieback has influenced the agenda setting on the enactment of new forest policies.
Perception of climate change and forest dieback impacts: A graphical representation of the typologies
Political and cultural polarisation are leading explanations for climate change denial and inactions as seen in the Cultural Cognition Thesis (CCT). In this view, individuals hold positions on contested issues to conform to their ideological groups: people ascribe to certain beliefs, not to express what they know but to show their group identity. We present a conceptual test of the CCT using high-quality cross-national data from 21 European countries, Russia, and Israel (total N = 44,378). Climate change concern was correlated with identification with the political left (rs = 0.04–.13), egalitarianism (rs = 0.04–.13) and communitarianism (rs = 0.01–.07), but in a broad definition cultural cognition was a weak predictor of climate change beliefs (R² = 3.82%), policy preferences (R² = 2.09%), and actions (R² = 0.62%). Moreover, climate change polarisation was not greatest among the highly educated as predicted by the CCT. Education was positively associated with climate beliefs (rs = 0.07–.17), irrespective of political affiliation. Non-linear regressions indicated little evidence that the CCT's predictions held better for more extreme ideological groups. These results suggest cultural cognition may not be central to thoughts about climate change in Europe.
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to reflect on how climate change risk reporting might evolve in various world regions in the post COVID-19 pandemic era.
Design/methodology/approach
Using a multiple-case study approach and adopting an institutional theory lens, we assess whether the pandemic is likely to strengthen or weaken institutional pressures for climate change risk disclosures and predict how climate-related risk reporting will evolve post-pandemic.
Findings
The authors find that climate change risk reporting is likely to evolve differently according to geographical location. The authors predict that disclosure levels will increase in regions with ambitious climate policy and where economic stimulus packages support sustainable economic recovery. Where there has been a weakening of environmental commitments and economic stimulus packages support resource intensive business, climate change risk reporting will stagnate or even decline. The authors discuss the scenarios for climate change risk reporting expected to play out in different parts of the world.
Originality/value
The authors contribute to the nascent literature on climate change risk disclosure and identify future directions in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic.
Though many individuals are aware of the need to address environmental concerns, fewer are willing to pay for climate action or think the environment should be a priority for government spending. One compelling reason is that they prioritize using scarce resources to address immediate material concerns. This is particularly likely for individuals facing absolute material scarcity or for those who think they are relatively economically worse off, especially in contexts characterized by rapid transformation and volatility in the levels and quality of social welfare provision. To test these expectations, we analyze survey data from formerly Communist economies, which today find themselves with vastly different fortunes. Empirical findings suggest that absolute and relative material scarcity affect opinions regarding government spending on, and the willingness to pay more for, environmental action. However, willingness to pay more for government public services, inclusive of anti-poverty initiatives, has an impact on willingness to pay more for climate action, but in counter-intuitive ways. Overall, the results appear to suggest that explicitly addressing and relating individual living standards and inequality with environmental concerns may expand support for climate action.
Public acceptance is a precondition for implementing taxes and laws aimed at mitigating climate change. However, it still remains challenging to understand its determinants for the climate community. Here, we use a meta-analytic approach to examine the role of public opinion about climate change taxes and laws. Fifteen variables were examined by synthesizing 89 datasets from 51 articles across 33 countries, with a total sample of 119,465 participants. Among all factors, perceived fairness and effec- tiveness were the most important determinants. Self-enhancement values and knowledge about climate change showed weak relationships and demographic variables showed only weak or close to zero effects. Our meta-analytic results provide useful insights and have the potential to inform climate change researchers, practitioners and policymakers to better design climate policy instruments.
The major cause of climate change is increasing concentrations of atmospheric greenhouse gases (predominantly carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide) – mainly a result of human actions – and this is an existential threat to Earth systems (International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 2014). From a science teaching perspective it might appear as if a simple solution to this issue is ensuring that students learn about the causes and effects of global warming and that humans are mainly responsible for what is occurring. Students, as tomorrow’s citizens, will then take appropriate pro-environmental action. Unfortunately, although there is longstanding evidence that a ‘basic’ knowledge about global warming does influence students’ concerns about climate change (e.g., see Lee et al., 2015), we know that for many people awareness and knowledge about the causes and effects of global warming does not translate into action (Kollmuss & Agyeman, 2002). The apparent pedagogical simplicity of a linear connection (knowledge leads to action) needs to be enhanced by more sophisticated educational pedagogies.
In 2018, Swedish teenager Greta Thunberg began a school strike that quickly spread across the globe. After a ritual strike every Friday by school pupils to call for urgent action against climate change had gone on for several months, what had become Fridays for Future (FFF) called for various global days of action throughout 2019, bringing millions of people out onto the streets in the largest climate protests in world history. Drawing on unique protest survey data on FFF events across European cities in 2019, this article explores the structural bases of organized collective mobilization for climate justice. Nuancing narratives that focus on either the privileged background of climate justice protesters or the environmentalism of the poor, our results show the heterogeneity of the social composition of the protests, suggesting the need for cross-class alliances for mass mobilizations. Moreover, our analysis reveals that the social background of protesters shaped their attitudes regarding what institutions and approaches can be relied upon to tackle climate and environmental challenges. This suggests an important and under-studied connection between social background and the strategic choices of environmental movements.
This paper examines public perceptions of shale gas development in China and the United States. Public perceptions are important, as they are known to influence public policy at national and local levels of government in both multi-party and single-party governance systems. Online surveys were conducted in several states/provinces in each country, the US survey in 2014 (N = 2833); the China survey in 2016 (N = 1571). Similar survey instruments were used in both countries.
The survey results show that the reported levels of public support for shale gas development among Chinese respondents in select provinces are significantly higher than that among US respondents in the states included in this study. Perceptions of the advantages and disadvantages of shale gas have both similarities and differences. Shale gas is perceived favorably in both samples because it is seen as a way to reduce dependence on foreign energy suppliers and strengthen the economy. The potential environmental advantages appear to be relatively more important to Chinese respondents than to American respondents. The statement “shale gas development is good for the environment because it substitutes dirty energy such as coal and oil” is seen as “Extremely important” by 54.23% of all Chinese respondents but by only 33.75% of American respondents. When it comes to the potential disadvantages of shale gas development, concerns about impacts on drinking water quality are important in both samples. Earthquakes related to shale gas is the second most important concern to Chinese respondents but a lesser concern to US respondents. We argue that the results are consistent with risk experiences, a variety of socio-cultural theories, and differences in media coverage in the two countries. Future work should examine how public perceptions in the two countries change over time, and how the stances of environmental groups, government, and industry may influence public opinion.
To answer this question, this paper reviews the huge and growing body of empirical literatureon climate change awareness and summarizes insights emerging from a critical review of about220 papers. It provides (i) a historical overview of climate change awareness worldwide, (ii) aguide to the most widely used datasets, with particular attention to the wording of questionsused to measure climate change awareness when the analysis is performed at individual level;(iii) a detailed analysis of the main socio-economic and climatological determinants of climatechange awareness, such as age, gender, education, political values, the use of mass media andsocial media, social and institutional trust, experience of extreme weather conditions and thestage of development of the country where people live; and (iv) a summary of the mainimplications of these findings in terms of public policy responses
While there is little scientific doubt that the climate is actually changing, people are relatively averse to taking action. To better understand climate change (in-)action, I will summarize the recent literature that examines the affective and emotional processes associated with climate change. Currently, mainly two routes are discussed: first, the study of affective responses to risk perception; second, conceptualizing climate action as a collective phenomenon. Studies show that personal relevance and perceived importance of environmental issues increase risk perception, and that collective environmental actions are driven by group-based emotions. However, instead of focusing mainly on negative affect and (group-based) emotions, such as ‘eco guilt’ or fear related to climate change, I conclude by suggesting a more optimistic and positive approach to establish new norms of climate-friendly lifestyles and policies.
In the wake of transitioning from fossil and nuclear energy systems to a renewable energy age, industrialized countries face many challenges related to the question of how to politically implement local renewable energy projects. In the present paper, we investigate if local populations are more likely to support local infrastructure projects if they are economically and politically involved in said projects. We collected data from a representative sample of 4,141 individuals in Switzerland and use conjoint analysis to examine citizens’ general preference patterns with regards to the design of localized renewable energy projects and related processes. The study goes beyond previous research by more systematically comparing the specific modes of political and economic participation and their effect on the acceptance of local renewable energy projects and by considering that political and economic participation may play a different role for different population groups. We find moderate positive effects of political and economic participation on individual support for RET projects. However, not all modes of inclusion are equally effective and the results reveal that individuals’ general propensity to support or oppose such projects moderates the relationship between political and economic participation and local acceptance.
In September 2015, world leaders adopted the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) represent a distinctive approach to development that moves away from a narrow perspective on economic development to an integrative agenda that simultaneously pursues ecological, social and economic goals. Trade and foreign investment are important economic vectors through which many of these goals can be achieved. Much depends, however, on whether and how SDGs are incorporated in international trade and investment agreements, and in private or public sector initiatives. Policymakers are also confronted with the interdependence of the SDGs which raises difficult trade-offs between various Goals. The contributions in this book explore the penetration and trade-offs of the SDGs, drawing on a multi-disciplinary approach incorporating insights from economists, lawyers and political scientists. The book offers a valuable guide for scholars and policy makers in identifying and evaluating the complex challenges related to sustainable development.
According to conventional wisdom and many social science analyses, widespread concern about environmental quality is limited to industrialized nations. People in developing nations, the reasoning goes, are simply too occupied with obtaining the basics of food, clothing, and shelter to worry about environmental matters. The authors tested this theory in the largest environmental survey ever conducted by asking people in 24 developed and developing countries everything from what the most serious problem in their nation is to whether they would pay higher prices for improved environmental quality. The results of this unprecedented survey will surprise you.
This article reports results from a 1992 Gallup survey conducted in six nations (Canada, USA, Mexico, Brazil, Portugal and Russia) that explored public perceptions of global warming in some detail. Overall the results tend to support those of the small-scale but in-depth studies on which the present study built: Lay publics in these six nations see global warming as a problem, although not as serious as ozone depletion or rain forest destruction. Most people acknowledge that they do not understand global warming very well, and results from questions about the perceived causes and consequences of global warming illustrate their limited understanding. While often confusing global warming with ozone depletion and air pollution, majorities of respondents in all but Russia believe that it is already occurring and large majorities within all nations believe that it will occur within their lifetimes. Furthermore, as discussions of the `risk society' suggest, public perceptions of global warming do not vary consistently across differing social strata within the nations. The article ends by discussing implications of the results, and questions whether detailed public understanding of highly complex issues like global warming is feasible or even necessary for effective policy-making.
Using data provided by the 1993 International Social Survey Programme, the authors examine the relationship between economic factors, values, and environmental attitudes both at the societal level and the individual level. They tested the hypothesis derived from Inglehart that postmaterialist values mediate the relationship between economics and support for the environment. In a multilevel analysis, they also explored whether the relationship between individuals’ income and their attitudes toward the environment varies as a function of societal-level indicators. Results demonstrate that economic factors predicted proenvironmental attitudes at the societal level and less so at the individual level, but at neither level was the influence of economic factors mediated through postmaterialist values. Further, a society’s recent economic growth, but not current levels of economic development, predicted to what extent individuals’ proenvironmental views were linked to their personal economic resources.
Human solidarity in a divided world
Conventional wisdom has long held that widespread citizen concern for environmental quality is limited to wealthy nations. Both academics and policymakers assume that residents of poor nations are too preoccupied with satisfying their “material” needs to support the “postmaterialist” value of environmental protection. This view was challenged by results of Gallup's 24-nation “Health of the Planet” (HOP) survey conducted in 1992, as the HOP found highly inconsistent and often negative correlations between national affluence and environmental concern. The current article compares results from three waves of the “World Values Survey” (WVS) to those of the HOP. When appropriate measures of environmental concern are employed, the WVS results generally replicate those of the HOP, as in all three waves such concern correlates inconsistently with national affluence. The overall results suggest that citizen concern for the environment is not dependent on national affluence, nor on affluence-based postmaterialist values.
It is widely assumed that public concern for environmental quality is dependent on affluence, and is therefore stronger in wealthy nations than in poor nations. This assumption is tested via results from a 1992 international survey conducted by the George H. Gallup International Institute that obtained data on a wide range of environmental perceptions and opinions from citizens in 24 economically and geographically diverse nations. Aggregate, national-level scores for a variety of measures of public concern for environmental quality were created and correlated with per capita gross national product. Although the results vary considerably depending upon the measure, overall national affluence is more often negatively rather than positively related to citizen concern for environmental quality—contradicting conventional wisdom.
Despite growing international environmental interdependence, the international system lacks a central authority to foster environmental protection. As a consequence, countries have adopted different policies to reduce international environmental problems. More specifically, costly regulations are not universally supported. In order to explain the success and failure of international environmental regulation, it is necessary to systematically focus on the factors that shape the environmental foreign policy of sovereign states. Since such an approach is missing from the literature, we develop an interest-based explanation of support for international environmental regulation and postulate which impact it should have on state preferences for international environmental regulation. Specifically, we apply our framework to two prominent cases of negotiations on atmospheric pollution control, namely, efforts to protect the stratospheric ozone layer and the regulation of trans-boundary acidification (“acid rain”) in Europe.
We examine the reasons why a US locality would voluntarily commit to the Cities for Climate Protection (CCP) campaign. Using geographic information systems analytic techniques, we map and measure a locality’s vulnerability to climate-change impacts at the county level of spatial precision. We analyze multiple measures of climate-change vulnerability, including expected temperature change, extreme weather events, and coastal proximity, as well as economic variables, demographic variables, and civic-participation variables that constitute a locality’s socioeconomic capacity to commit to costly climate-change policy initiatives. Bivariate and logistic regression results indicate that CCP-committed localities are quantitatively different to noncommitted localities on both climate-change risk and socioeconomic-capacity dimensions. On vulnerability measures, the odds of CCP-campaign participation increase significantly with the number of people killed and injured by extreme weather events, projected temperature change, and coastal proximity. On socioeconomic-capacity measures, the odds of CCP-campaign involvement increase with the percentage of citizens that vote Democrat and recycle, as well as the number of nonprofit organizations with an environment focus. The odds decrease in a county area as the percentage of the labor force employed in carbon-intensive industries increases.
Objective. In a recent study, Steven R. Brechin and Willett Kempton show that environmentalism is present in both wealthy and poor countries and suggest that environmentalism is thus not a product of the postmaterialist culture shift. The purpose of the present research is to reexamine the relationship between postmaterialist values and global environmentalism. Methods. This research analyzes data from the World Values Survey, 1990-1993. Unlike the data Brechin and Kempton used, the World Values Survey includes a measure of postmaterialism. Results. This research shows that, while environmentalism is certainly universal, postmaterialist differences are also obvious. Respondents who identify as postmaterialists tend to be more concerned about the environment than are respondents who identify as materialists, regardless of the economic development level of their society. Conclusions. Brechin and Kempton's findings are inaccurate and are largely the result of overgeneralizing the postmaterialist-values thesis and using data that are inadequate to test the relationship between postmaterialism and environmentalism.
Objective. This paper examines the viability of the latest explanation for global environmentalism. This new view sees global environmentalism as the combined product of direct experiences of the citizens of "poorer" nations (objective problems thesis) with the subjective values shift of the citizens of "wealthier" countries (postmaterialist values thesis). Methods. Using two statistical tests, data from the 1992 Gallup Heath of the Planet survey and a two-dimensional measure of environmental concern, local and global, the paper examines citizen attitudes from twelve relatively wealthy countries against those from twelve relatively poor ones on fifteen different items. Results. While citizens from poorer countries (with relatively low numbers of postmaterialists) were far more concerned about local environmental problems than citizens from wealthier countries (with relatively high numbers of postmaterialists), no statistically significant differences between the two groups were found on questions concerning more symbolic global environmental problems. Conclusions. Using an objective problems plus subjective values explanation fails to describe adequately the bases of southern and northern enviror mental concern, respectively, and hence environmental concern globally. In addition, using a postmaterialist explanation for environmentalism at the wider cultural level becomes incoherent versus the much more modest claims found at the social-psychological level. In sum, global environmentalism is a complex social phenomenon consisting of multiple movements, driven by multiple engines requiring further specification and discussion.
The abstract for this document is available on CSA Illumina.To view the Abstract, click the Abstract button above the document title.
The research reported here examines the relationship between risk perceptions and willingness to address climate change. The data are a national sample of 1225 mail surveys that include measures of risk perceptions and knowledge tied to climate change, support for voluntary and government actions to address the problem, general environmental beliefs, and demographic variables. Risk perceptions matter in predicting behavioral intentions. Risk perceptions are not a surrogate for general environmental beliefs, but have their own power to account for behavioral intentions. There are four secondary conclusions. First, behavioral intentions regarding climate change are complex and intriguing. People are neither “nonbelievers” who will take no initiatives themselves and oppose all government efforts, nor are they “believers” who promise both to make personal efforts and to vote for every government proposal that promises to address climate change. Second, there are separate demographic sources for voluntary actions compared with voting intentions. Third, recognizing the causes of global warming is a powerful predictor of behavioral intentions independent from believing that climate change will happen and have bad consequences. Finally, the success of the risk perception variables to account for behavioral intentions should encourage greater attention to risk perceptions as independent variables. Risk perceptions and knowledge, however, share the stage with general environmental beliefs and demographic characteristics. Although related, risk perceptions, knowledge, and general environmental beliefs are somewhat independent predictors of behavioral intentions.
The authors engage ecological modernization and treadmill of production theories as well as the longstanding postmaterialist values hypothesis and the objective problems subjective values hypothesis to assess the effects of national level Affluence, economic growth, and environmental degradation on the likelihood of Environmental Concern of individuals in 38 nations. Results of multilevel logistic regression analyses indicate that a higher level of national Affluence lessens the likelihood of individual-level pro Environmental Concern, whereas contrarily, Economic Development and growth in environmental degradation both increase the likelihood of such values. The authors conclude by considering the theoretical implications of the findings and outlining future steps in this research agenda.
This article tests the hypothesis that postwar affluence led to an integenerational shift from Materialist to Post-Materialist values among Western publics, and analyzes the consequences of the economic uncertainty prevailing since 1973. The young emphasize Post-Materialist values more than the old. Time-series data indicate that this reflects generational change far more than aging effects, but that the recession of the mid-1970s also produced significant period effects. As Post-Materialists aged, they moved out of the student ghetto and became a predominant influence among young technocrats, contributing to the rise of a @`New Class.@' They furnish the ideologues and core support for the environmental, zero-growth and antinuclear movements; and their opposition to those who give top priority to reindustrialization and rearmament constitutes a distinctive and persisting dimension of political cleavage.
Using a variety of public opinion polls over a number of years and from a number of countries this paper revisits the questions of crossnational public concern for global warming first examined over a decade ago. Although the scientific community today speaks out on global climatic change in essentially a unified voice concerning its anthropogenic causes and potential devastating impacts at the global level, it remains the case that many citizens of a number of nations still seem to harbor considerable uncertainties about the problem itself. Although it could be argued that there has been a slight improvement over the last decade in the public’s understanding regarding the anthropogenic causes of global warming, the people of all the nations studied remain largely uniformed about the problem. In a recent international study on knowledge about global warming, the citizens of Mexico led all fifteen countries surveyed in 2001 with just twenty-six percent of the survey respondents correctly identifying burning fossil fuels as the primary cause of global warming. The citizens of the U.S., among the most educated in the world, where somewhere in the middle of the pack, tied with the citizens of Brazil at fifteen percent, but slightly lower than Cubans. In response to President Bush’s withdrawal of the Kyoto Protocol in 1991, the U.S. public appears to be far more supportive of the action than the citizens of a number of European countries where there was considerable outrage about the decision.
This research aims to test Inglehart's thesis regarding the relationship between post-materialist values, wealth of nations and environmental intentions as measured by willingness to sacrifice to protect the environment. Due to the hierarchical nature of the data, the study uses multilevel and Bayesian multilevel modeling to cross-culturally test Inglehart's thesis. The results from 25 nations contradict Inglehart's thesis, which claims that environmental intentions are post-material values—a set of attitudes that develop among wealthy people once the more basic needs have been achieved. The general pattern of the results shows that willingness to sacrifice to protect the environment is a global phenomenon and not unique to the wealthy nations. The findings of this paper highlight the importance of simultaneously assessing individual-level and contextual-level variables in determining environmental intentions across nations. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment.
Over the past 20 years, there have been dozens of news organization, academic, and nonpartisan public opinion surveys on global
warming, yet there exists no authoritative summary of their collective findings. In this article, we provide a systematic
review of trends in public opinion about global warming. We sifted through hundreds of polling questions culled from more
than 70 surveys administered over the past 20 years. In compiling the available trends, we summarize public opinion across
several key dimensions including (a) public awareness of the issue of global warming; (b) public understanding of the causes
of global warming and the specifics of the policy debate; (c) public perceptions of the certainty of the science and the level
of agreement among experts; (d) public concern about the impacts of global warming; (e) public support for policy action in
light of potential economic costs; and (f) public support for the Kyoto climate treaty.
This article relies on data from the 2005–09 World Values Survey to examine individual and cross-national variation in perception of the seriousness of global warming. The data show that a large majority of the public in all countries are concerned about the problem of global warming and that this assessment is part of a broader concern for global environmental issues. The widespread concern implies that global warming has the potential to generate mass political participation and demand for political action. Motivated by a value-based approach to the study of public opinion, the article shows that perception of the seriousness of the problem is positively correlated with high education, post-materialism, and a leftist position on the left–right scale. In addition, religious beliefs are important, suggesting that there is some diversity in the value basis for the issue and that it is not only linked to the ‘new-politics’ perspective. Variation across nations in wealth and CO2 emissions is not significantly related to the publics’ assessments of the problem, and, somewhat counterintuitively, people from countries relatively more exposed to climate-related natural disasters are less concerned about global warming. We suggest possible explanations for the latter finding and discuss our results in relation to the broader literature on environmental change, insecurity, and the potential for conflict.
It has been shown previously that the awareness and concern of the general public about global warming is not only a function
of scientific information. Both psychological and sociological factors affect the willingness of laypeople to acknowledge
the reality of global warming, and to support climate policies of their home countries. In this paper, I analyse a cross-national
dataset of public concern about global warming, utilising data from 46 countries. Based on earlier results at the national
and regional level, I expect concern to be negatively correlated to national measures of wealth and carbon dioxide emissions.
I find that gross domestic product is indeed negatively correlated to the proportion of a population that regards global warming
as a serious problem. There is also a marginally significant tendency that nations’ per capita carbon dioxide emissions are
negatively correlated to public concern. These findings suggest that the willingness of a nation to contribute to reductions
in greenhouse gas emissions decreases with its share of these emissions. This is in accordance with psychological findings,
but poses a problem for political decision-makers. When communicating with the public, scientists ought to be aware of their
responsibility to use a language that is understood by laypeople.
If uncontrolled, human influences on the climate system may generate changes that will endanger various aspects of life on Earth. The precise implications of the scientific claims about climate change, and the extent to which they pose dangers to various populations, are becoming intensely debated at many levels in relation to policy. How `danger' is interpreted will ultimately affect which actions are taken. In this paper, we examine how climate change is conceptualised by publics in Europe and in the USA. Although there is widespread concern about climate change, it is of secondary importance in comparison to other issues in people's daily lives. Most individuals relate to climate change through personal experience, knowledge, the balance of benefits and costs, and trust in other societal actors. We analyse these factors through findings from various surveys and studies, which highlight both the distinctiveness and some shared perspectives at a generalised level. We reflect upon these in relation to trust and responsibility for climate change action, and risk communication, supporting the call for discourses about climate change to also be situated in people's locality, as a means of increasing its saliency.
Extremes of weather and climate can have devastating effects on human society and the environment. Understanding past changes in the characteristics of such events, including recent increases in the intensity of heavy precipitation events over a large part of the Northern Hemisphere land area, is critical for reliable projections of future changes. Given that atmospheric water-holding capacity is expected to increase roughly exponentially with temperature--and that atmospheric water content is increasing in accord with this theoretical expectation--it has been suggested that human-influenced global warming may be partly responsible for increases in heavy precipitation. Because of the limited availability of daily observations, however, most previous studies have examined only the potential detectability of changes in extreme precipitation through model-model comparisons. Here we show that human-induced increases in greenhouse gases have contributed to the observed intensification of heavy precipitation events found over approximately two-thirds of data-covered parts of Northern Hemisphere land areas. These results are based on a comparison of observed and multi-model simulated changes in extreme precipitation over the latter half of the twentieth century analysed with an optimal fingerprinting technique. Changes in extreme precipitation projected by models, and thus the impacts of future changes in extreme precipitation, may be underestimated because models seem to underestimate the observed increase in heavy precipitation with warming.
In meeting the threat posed by climate change nations have responded quite differently. Using an extensive data set this study explores factors that affect individuals' attitudes towards climate change and how those attitudes ultimately affect national climate change policy. The results show that attitudes do indeed matter in implementing policy and that attitudes are shaped not only by how individuals react to the specific attributes of climate change, but also by information, by the openness of society and by attitudes toward the trustworthiness of government.
European Union Policy & Decision Making, Corruption, Civil Justice, E-Communications, Agriculture, and Environmental Protection
- Eurobarometer
Eurobarometer. 2007. European Union Policy & Decision Making, Corruption, Civil Justice, E-Communications, Agriculture, and Environmental Protection, Nov 2007-Jan 2008. Dataset from the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research.
Global Climate Risk Index
- German Watch Group
German Watch Group. 2012. Global Climate Risk Index. Available at http://germanwatch
.org/en/cri, accessed October 5, 2013.
World Economic Outlook
- Imf
IMF. 2011. World Economic Outlook. New York: International Monetary Fund. Available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2011/02/weodata/index.aspx, accessed
October 5, 2013.
International Polling Climate Change: A WorldPublicOpinion.org Analysis
- Steven Kull
Kull, Steven. 2007. International Polling Climate Change: A WorldPublicOpinion.org
Analysis. Washington, DC: World Public Opinion. Available at http://www
.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/dec07/CCDigest_Dec07_rpt.pdf, accessed October 5, 2013.
Pew Global Attitudes Project
- Pew Research
- Center
Pew Research Center. 2007. Pew Global Attitudes Project 2007. Washington, DC: Pew Research Center. Available at http://www.pewglobal.org/category/datasets/2007/, accessed October 5, 2013.
The Environmental Vulnerability Index Technical Report. Suva, Fiji Islands: South Paciªc Applied Geoscience Commission
- Sopac
SOPAC. 2004. The Environmental Vulnerability Index Technical Report. Suva, Fiji Islands:
South Paciªc Applied Geoscience Commission. Available at http://www.sopac
.org/sopac/evi/EVI_Indicators.htm, accessed October 5, 2013.
Public Concern, Knowledge, and Support for Costly Policies and Actions for Climate Change. Paper presented at the 32 nd Annual Scientiªc Meeting of the International Society of Political Psychology
- Yael Wolinsky-Nahmias
- So Young Kim
Wolinsky-Nahmias, Yael, and So Young Kim. 2009. Public Concern, Knowledge, and
Support for Costly Policies and Actions for Climate Change. Paper presented at the
32 nd Annual Scientiªc Meeting of the International Society of Political Psychology,
Dublin.
World Bank. 2009. Public Attitudes toward Climate Change. Washington, DC: World
Bank.
Turn Down the Heat: Why a 4°C Warmer World Must be Avoided. Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research and Climate Analytics
World Bank. 2012. Turn Down the Heat: Why a 4°C Warmer World Must be Avoided.
Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research and Climate Analytics. Report
Commissioned by the World Bank.