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Deductivism as an Interpretive Strategy: A Reply to Groarke's Recent Defense of Reconstructive Deductivism
Abstract
Godden, David M. 2005. 'Deductivism as an interpretive strategy: A reply to Groarke's defense of reconstructive deductivism,' Argumentation and Advocacy, 41(3), 2005, pp. 168-183. ABSTRACT: Deductivism has been variously presented as an evaluative thesis and as an interpretive one. I argue that deductivism fails as a universal evaluative thesis, and as such that its value as an interpretive thesis must be supported on other grounds. As a reconstructive strategy, deductivism is justified only on the grounds that an arguer is, or ought to be, aiming at the deductive standard of evidence. As such, the reconstruction of an argument as deductive must be supported by contextual and situational factors including facts about the arguer. Further, the plausibility of deductivism as a normative thesis is not tied to its plausibility as a descriptive or interpretive thesis.
... In "Deductivism as an Interpretative Strategy: A Reply to Groarke's Recent Defense of Reconstructive Deductivism," David Godden (2005) distinguished two notions of deductivism. On the one hand, as an evaluative thesis, evaluative deductivism (D1) is the view that for a conclusion to follow, it has to follow of necessity from the premises-or, in other words, that being a good inference implies being deductive. ...
... This is so because any set of propositions that stands for a deductive argument also stands for a valid argument. For this reason, authors like Berg (1987), Vorobej (1992, and Godden (2005) hold that whether an inference is deductive or not is a matter of the arguer's intentions. Specifically, an inference would be deductive if its conclusion is meant to follow of necessity; and if it actually does follow of necessity, then the inference will be not only deductive but also valid. ...
... Among others, Govier (1992) and Godden (2005) have argued that we cannot add the conditional that makes explicit the inferential link between premises and conclusion as a premise because, as Lewis Carroll (1895) would have shown, this conditional does not play the same role as the other propositions of the inference. However, as Castañeda (1960) and Botting (2016) have observed, that premises and associated conditionals play different roles does not imply that we cannot reconstruct inferences as deductive arguments. ...
In “Deductivism as an Interpretative Strategy: A Reply to Groarke’s Defense of Reconstructive Deductivism,” David Godden (2005) distinguished two notions of deductivism. On the one hand, as an interpretative thesis, deductivism is the view that all-natural language argumentation must be interpreted as being deductive. On the other hand, as an evaluative thesis, deductivism is the view that for a conclusion to follow, it has to follow of necessity from the premises—or, in other words, that being a good inference implies being deductive. The main goal of this paper is to show that evaluative deductivism is wrong.
... Deductivism may roughly be described as the view that all arguments should be interpreted and/or evaluated as attempts to employ deductive argumentation, or that all good arguments are deductively valid, i.e., formally valid (exactly how I define 'validity' will be discussed in section [3.3]). There are many problems with deductivism (Godden 2005) 12 , and one reason against deductivism is that arguments with deductive architecture only preserve truth and certainty, they fail to preserve plausibility, probability and likelihood (Godden 2005). 13 Another problem are those arguments that are 12 Several of them are advanced by Godden (2005) and refers to Govier. ...
... Deductivism may roughly be described as the view that all arguments should be interpreted and/or evaluated as attempts to employ deductive argumentation, or that all good arguments are deductively valid, i.e., formally valid (exactly how I define 'validity' will be discussed in section [3.3]). There are many problems with deductivism (Godden 2005) 12 , and one reason against deductivism is that arguments with deductive architecture only preserve truth and certainty, they fail to preserve plausibility, probability and likelihood (Godden 2005). 13 Another problem are those arguments that are 12 Several of them are advanced by Godden (2005) and refers to Govier. ...
... There are many problems with deductivism (Godden 2005) 12 , and one reason against deductivism is that arguments with deductive architecture only preserve truth and certainty, they fail to preserve plausibility, probability and likelihood (Godden 2005). 13 Another problem are those arguments that are 12 Several of them are advanced by Godden (2005) and refers to Govier. The standard objections are: (i) deductivism prevents contrasting degrees of evidential support between premises and conclusions; (ii) deductivism fails to provide an account of fallacies, or the account it provides is a faulty account of fallacies; (iii) deductivism does not do justice to the structure of natural language arguments. ...
This paper addresses several issues in argumentation theory. The over-arching goal is to discuss how a theory of analogical argument schemes fits the pragmadialectical theory of argument schemes and argument structures, and how one should properly reconstruct both single and complex argumentation by analogy. I also propose a unified model that explains how formal valid deductive argumentation relates to argument schemes in general and to analogical argument schemes in particular. The model suggests "scheme-specificvalidity" i.e. that there are contrasting species of validity for each type of argument scheme that derive from one generic conception of validity.
... Instead, the descriptive accuracy of reconstruction will be established by situational as well as textual and contextual features of the argument. Indeed, if Godden (2005) is correct, descriptively accurate reconstructions may well involve knowledge of, or rely on postulations regarding, facts about arguers themselves such as their goals, or intentions. Further, schematic classification of an argument instance might easily require supplying some missing or unstated components of the argument. ...
... The second category marks a class of arguments having no counter-example, and whose warrants are truth-preserving. This is an important standard of evidence (Godden, 2005) which, though it may not be appropriate to all argumentative circumstances, is worthy of distinction as a standard which arguments can either meet or fail to meet. Similarly, the category of schematic arguments marks a class of arguments having no known counterexample (relative to some information state), and whose warrants are presumptionestablishing in normal circumstances and in the absence of defeating evidence or countervailing considerations. ...
This paper begins a working-through of Blair's (2001) theoretical agenda concerning argumentation schemes and their attendant critical questions, in which we propose a number of solutions to some outstanding theoretical issues. We consider the classification of schemes, their ultimate nature, their role in argument reconstruction, their foundation as normative categories of argument, and the evaluative role of critical questions.We demonstrate the role of schemes in argument reconstruction, and defend a normative account of their nature against specific criticisms due to Pinto (2001). Concerning critical questions, we propose an account on which they are founded in the R.S.A. cogency standard, and develop an account of the relationship between critical questions and burden of proof. Our ultimate aim is to initiate a reconciliation between dialectical and informal logic approaches to the schemes. Résumé: Dans cet article nous examinons le projet théorique de Blair (2001) et les questions critiques qui en découlent, et nous proposons quelques solutions aux problèmes théoriques saillants. Nous réfléchissons sur la classification des schèmes, leur nature fondamentale, leur rôle dans la reconstruction des arguments, leur fondement lorsqu'on les emploie comme catégories normatives des argu-ments, ainsi que le rôle évaluatif des questions critiques. Nous démontrons le rôle des schèmes dans la reconstruction des arguments, et défendons une expli-cation normative de leur nature contre des critiques de Pinto (2001). Nous fondons les questions critiques sur les critères de pertinence, d'acceptabilité et de suffisance, et décrivons la relation entre les questions critiques et la charge de preuve. Notre but final est d'initier une réconciliation entre les approches de la dialectique et de la logique non formelle sur les schèmes.
... Instead, the descriptive accuracy of reconstruction will be established by situational as well as textual and contextual features of the argument. Indeed, if Godden (2005) is correct, descriptively accurate reconstructions may well involve knowledge of, or rely on postulations regarding, facts about arguers themselves such as their goals, or intentions. Further, schematic classification of an argument instance might easily require supplying some missing or unstated components of the argument. ...
... The second category marks a class of arguments having no counter-example, and whose warrants are truth-preserving. This is an important standard of evidence (Godden, 2005) which, though it may not be appropriate to all argumentative circumstances, is worthy of distinction as a standard which arguments can either meet or fail to meet. Similarly, the category of schematic arguments marks a class of arguments having no known counterexample (relative to some information state), and whose warrants are presumptionestablishing in normal circumstances and in the absence of defeating evidence or countervailing considerations. ...
This paper surveys the state-of-the-art of argumentation schemes used as argument extraction techniques in cognitive informatics and uses examples to show how a series of connected problems needs to be solved to move these techniques forward to computational implementation. Some of the schemes considered are argument from expert opinion, practical reasoning, argument from negative consequences, fear appeal arguments, argument from commitment, argument from inconsistent commitments, and the circumstantial ad hominem argument. The paper shows how schemes need to be formed into clusters of sub-schemes work toward a classification system of schemes from the bottom up, and how identification conditions for each scheme can be helpful for argument extraction.
... 2). Such missing elements in an argument can be 'deduced' by asking what statements must be added to the explicit argument in order to render it persuasive or cogent (suYciently likely) (Godden, 2005;Groarke, 1999). Once identiWed, these statements can be scrutinized. ...
... Such theories generally reject abstract formalizations of argument processes and focus, instead, on the status of argument as a form of discourse, and on the role of the arguer and the inXuence of context (Evans, 2002;van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1988;Walton, 1995Walton, , 1999. At the same time, while formal, deductive logics may not be adequate models of many aspects of argumentation (Evans & Thompson, 2004;Godden, 2005), the present Wndings suggest that they remain relevant in important respects. While deductive systems do not establish the norms (e.g., validity, necessity) which regulate the construction and evaluation of most informal arguments, they may be important to the reconstruction or interpretation of informal arguments (Groarke, 1999), and, therefore, to the identiWcation of fallacies. ...
After decades of research into formal or logical fallacies of reasoning, psychologists have only recently begun to examine the informal reasoning fallacies that are routinely present in critical discussions, debates, and other forms of argumentation. The present study considers several possible influences on an ability to identify and analyze these fallacies. College students completed measures of deductive reasoning, personal epistemology, and knowledge of specific argumentation norms and analyzed arguments containing fallacies such as argument from ignorance, begging the question, and slippery slope. Results indicated that effective analysis of informal fallacies was associated with some aspects of deductive reasoning—especially an ability to overcome belief bias—and with higher-order epistemic beliefs, as well as a commitment to argumentation norms for critical discussion. Results are discussed in terms of argumentation research and implications for pedagogical treatments of the fallacies are noted.
... Z lexikologického hlediska se v těchto prvcích nevyužívá primární, nocionální složka významu (která vyjadřuje vztah k denotátu znaku), nýbrž sekundární, pragmatická složka skládající se z vrstvy konotativní a vrstvy afektivní. 15 Dle tohoto stanoviska pouze při analýze nevěnujeme pozornost prostředí, ve kterém se argument vyskytuje. Například u Obrázku 5 je závěr (nekácejme stromy) implikován právě prostřednictvím pragmatických konotací. ...
The thesis introduces the topic of visual argumentation. Considerable space is devoted to formal ontological problems, i.e., questions of whether something like visual argument exists and, if so, what are its properties and relationship to an ordinary verbal argument. It later appears important to weigh the question of normative revisionism: whether visual arguments need their own new norms, theories, and criteria, or whether they can be dealt with within traditional theories. At the end, a heuristic model for dressing and assessing visual arguments is described and illustrated.
... That will likely involve controversies regarding the 9 Deductivism typically holds that all arguments should be analyzed as deductive arguments, and the degrees of argument strength can be characterized by different acceptability of premises. However, the deductivist perspective has been the subject of substantial debate, as explored by scholars like Groarke (1999), Godden (2005), and Govier (2018). It would be beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the controversies. ...
The orthodox view holds that analogical arguments are a distinctive type of argument, while the eliminative view and its enhanced variant proposed in this paper contend that analogical arguments can be reducible to non-analogical arguments by eliminating the similarities proposition. This paper shows that the existing defense for the orthodox view fails to tackle the challenge posed by the eliminative view and its enhanced variant. The new defense for the distinctiveness of analogical arguments argues that an analogical argument is composed of both a conductive and principle-based argument. Consequently, analogical arguments remain irreducible, as the similarities proposition is not eliminated.
... That will likely involve controversies regarding the 9 Deductivism typically holds that all arguments should be analyzed as deductive arguments, and the degrees of argument strength can be characterized by different acceptability of premises. However, the deductivist perspective has been the subject of substantial debate, as explored by scholars like Groarke (1999), Godden (2005), and Govier (2018). It would be beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the controversies. ...
The orthodox view holds that analogical arguments are a distinctive type of argument, while the eliminative view and its enhanced variant proposed in this paper contend that analogical arguments can be reducible to non-analogical arguments by eliminating the similarities proposition. This paper shows that the existing defense for the orthodox view fails to tackle the challenge posed by the eliminative view and its enhanced variant. The new defense for the distinctiveness of analogical arguments argues that an analogical argument is composed of both a conductive and principle-based argument. Consequently, analogical arguments remain irreducible, as the similarities proposition is not eliminated.
... However, if we analyze the structure of many arguments that are normally considered to be acceptable and reasonable, we will see that abstract rules different from the ones of deduction apply (Blair 2007). Reasoning from example or from sign, for instance, cannot be analyzed using deductive rules of inference such as modus ponens or modus tollens (Godden 2005). ...
The representation and classification of the structure of natural arguments has been one of the most important aspects of Aristotelian and medieval dialectical and rhetorical theories. This traditional approach is represented nowadays in models of argumentation schemes. The purpose of this article is to show how arguments are characterized by a complex combination of two levels of abstraction, namely, semantic relations and types of reasoning, and to provide an effective and comprehensive classification system for this matrix of semantic and quasilogical connections. To this purpose, we propose a dichotomous criterion of classification, transcending both levels of abstraction and representing not what an argument is but how it is understood and interpreted. The schemes are grouped according to an end-means criterion, which is strictly bound to the ontological structure of the conclusion and the premises. On this view, a scheme can be selected according to the intended or reconstructed purpose of an argument and the possible strategies that can be used to achieve it.
... Granting that DA and AC are deductively invalid forms of argument, we allow that there can, nevertheless, be cogent, yet invalid forms of argument. Some invalid arguments have more probative merit than others, and sometimes the degree of probative strength provided by an invalid argument can meet some situationally appropriate standard of evidence (Godden, 2005). We proceed to explore the cogency of DA and AC arguments by detailing the conditions on which their probative merits depend. ...
Recent work on conditional reasoning argues that denying the antecedent [DA] and affirming the consequent [AC] are defeasible but cogent patterns of argument, either because they are effective, rational, albeit heuristic applications of Bayesian probability, or because they are licensed by the principle of total evidence. Against this, we show that on any prevailing interpretation of indicative conditionals, the premises of DA and AC arguments do not license their conclusions without additional assumptions. The cogency of DA and AC inferences rather depends on contingent factors extrinsic to, and independent of, what is asserted by DA and AC arguments.
... For example, the ancient topics from antecedents or "dici de omni" formalize the deductive pattern of modus ponens normally used in dialectics. However, many acceptable and reasonable arguments, such as reasoning from example or sign, follow formal patterns different from the deductive ones (see also Blair 2007;Godden 2005). In addition to the deductive rules, also the inductive ones need to be accounted for, and the type of reasoning called "abduction" (Pierce 1992, pp. ...
One of the crucial problems of argumentation schemes as illustrated in (Walton, Reed & Macagno 2008) is their practical use for the purpose of analyzing texts and producing arguments. The high number and the lack of a classification criterion make this instrument extremely difficult to apply practically. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the structure of argumentation schemes and outline a possible criterion of classification based on alternative and mutually-exclusive possibilities. Such a criterion is based not on what an argument is, but on how it can be understood and interpreted. The schemes are grouped according to an end-means principle, which is strictly bound to the ontological structure of the conclusion and the premises. On this view, a scheme can be selected according to the intended or reconstructed purpose of an argument and the possible strategies that can be used to achieve it.
... Deductivism, as defended by argumentation theorists such as Leo Groarke (1999) or Dale Jacquette (1996,2009), is the view that in order to determine whether an argument is good or bad, we must make it fit a deductively valid argument schema. As David Godden (2005) has pointed out, deductivism involves both a thesis on the interpretation of natural language arguments (interpretative deductivism) and a thesis on the standard of argument goodness (evaluative deductivism). These two theses are related; for the deductivist, we must interpret natural language arguments so as to make them fit deductively valid schemas because this is a means to show that their conclusions cannot be false if their corresponding premises are true. ...
In a recent paper, Fábio Perin Shecaira (2013) proposes a defence of Waller's deductivist schema for moral analogical argumentation. This defence has several flaws, the most important of them being that many good analogical arguments would be deemed bad or deficient. Additionally, Shecaira misrepresents my alternative account as something in between deductivism and nondeductivism. This paper is both an attempt at solving this misunderstanding and an analysis and criticism of Waller and Shecaira's forms of deductivism.
... 4 If I am right in my conjecture, one of the principal factors that dispose us philosophers to dogmatism is deductivism. Now there are various ways to characterize deductivism (Godden, 2005). Here I take it as the idealization of deductive reasoning. ...
La percepción de que Wittgenstein influyó el desarrollo de la lógica informal existe. Que esta percepción está probablemente basada en varias creencias también. Una es la creencia que Wittgenstein influyó algunos de aquellos que estamos asociados con el desarrollo de la lógica informal, como Toulmin. Una segunda base para esta percepción podría afincarse en la asociación que se hace de Wittgenstein con lo que es llamado a veces como �filosofía del lenguaje ordinario�. La lógica informal emergió y ha sido presentada ella misma como �la lógica de la argumentación ordinaria/cotidiana�. El propósito de este trabajo es determinar hasta qué grado la percepción mencionada está respaldada por los hechos. En este artículo, presento el concepto de lógica informal, después de lo cual hago algunos comentarios respecto de la tarea de interpretar las perspectivas de Wittgenstein e indico el acercamiento que adopto.
Luego, discuto la influencia de Wittgenstein en Toulmin, Hamblin, y Scriven �todos cuyos ángulos sobre lógica y argumentación han sido importantes en el desarrollo de la lógica informal. A partir de esto me concentro en una de las aplicaciones directas de sus ideas, obtenida del trabajo de Fogelin de 1985 �The Logic of Deep Disagreements�.
La conclusión a la que llego es que la influencia de Wittgenstein en el desarrollo de la lógica informal has sido indirecta más que directa, más materia de �espíritu� que una influencia directa en algunos de sus pensadores seminales.
... However, if we analyze the structure of many arguments that are normally considered to be acceptable and reasonable, we will see that abstract rules different from the ones of deduction apply (Blair 2007). Reasoning from example or from sign, for instance, cannot be analyzed using deductive rules of inference such as modus ponens or modus tollens (Godden 2005). ...
a bstr ac t The representation and classification of the structure of natural arguments has been one of the most important aspects of Aristotelian and medieval dialectical and rhetorical theories. This traditional approach is represented nowadays in models of argumentation schemes. The purpose of this article is to show how arguments are characterized by a complex combination of two levels of abstraction, namely, semantic relations and types of reasoning, and to provide an effective and comprehensive classification system for this matrix of semantic and quasilogical connections. To this purpose, we propose a dichotomous criterion of classification, transcending both levels of abstraction and representing not what an argument is but how it is understood and interpreted. The schemes are grouped according to an end-means criterion, which is strictly bound to the ontological structure of the conclusion and the premises. On this view, a scheme can be selected according to the intended or reconstructed purpose of an argument and the possible strategies that can be used to achieve it. Argumentation schemes have become an important topic in argumen-tation theory. Schemes have been developed as stereotypical patterns of inference, abstract structures representing the material (semantic) relation and logical relation between the premises and a conclusion in an argument. They are based on a richer semantic system than the formal representations used in logic, and for this reason they can mirror both necessary PR 48.1_02_Macagno-Walton.indd 26 28/01/15 6:57 AM
... The ancient topics from antecedents or "dici de omni" formalize deductive patterns of inference that are normally used in dialectics. However, many acceptable and reasonable arguments, such as reasoning from example or sign, follow formal patterns different from the deductive ones (see also Blair 2007;Godden 2005). On this view, formal rules of inferences can be considered as a level of abstraction different from the semantic-ontological one, a distinct theoretical way of tracing the complexity of natural arguments back to most generic principles (see Rigotti & Greco-Morasso 2010). ...
One of the cornerstones of argumentation theory is the analysis of the structure of natural arguments. Dialectical and rhetorical arguments cannot be investigated by simply using the logical categories drawn from the formal meaning of quantifiers and connectors. While formal rules merely transfer the truth value of the premises to the conclusion, natural arguments are characterized by the notion of acceptability. What argumentative reasoning conveys from the premises to the conclusion is the hearer's attitude towards the state of affairs or the judgment expressed by a dialogue move (Rigotti 1995: 8). However, if we take into consideration the speaker and the hearer of a message in analyzing argumentative reasoning, the traditional formal systems become inadequate to investigate natural arguments, as they cannot capture the very purpose of argumentation, i.e. the modification of the interlocutors' attitudes and commitments, their perception of reality (Krabbe 2013). In this wider perspective on reasoned argumentation, the pragmatic purpose of a dialogue move needs to be taken into account. Reasonableness (Rigotti, Rocci & Greco 2006), which is irrelevant in a formal approach to arguments, becomes the cornerstone of the pragmatic approach to natural arguments. What matters in argumentative inferences is not only whether the conclusion follows from the premises, but how it does. Even though the affirmation of the antecedent in a conditional necessarily leads to the affirmation of the consequent, not all antecedents reasonably support the consequent (Rigotti 2006). The logical axioms of inference cannot account for the pragmatic dimension of reasoning, which needs to be explained by rules of a different level, governing the reasonableness of a passage from premises to conclusion. The ancient model of topics, which was introduced by Aristotle in his Topics and developed in the Latin and Medieval tradition, provided criteria based on the ontological structure of language for exploring the semantic-ontological boundaries of inference. Rigotti made this intuition, interpreted in coherence with the categories of modern linguistic and argumentative theories, the cornerstone of a new practical approach to argumentation that systematically took the uses of an argument to persuade an audience into account. By setting out the connection between semantics and reasoning, the Argumentum Model of Topics (AMT, Rigotti 2006, 2008, 2009; Rigotti & Greco Morasso 2006) provides rules of reasonableness of an inference, by embedding it into ontology, semantics, pragmatics and argumentation. The purpose of this paper is to show how this innovative proposal can be used for developing a semantic approach to argumentation schemes (Walton, Reed & Macagno 2008). This proposal would integrate the logical approach provided by formal dialectics with a semantic-ontological dimension, combining together two distinct theories and traditions. For this purpose, in the first section we will show first the crucial relation between reasoning and semantics, analyzing how discourse coherence, or rather the relevance of a discourse move, can be interpreted as an argumentative relation. In the second section, this argumentative relation will be investigated and represented using the ancient model of topics, which are developed in the AMT. The types and the structure of the ancient loci will be inquired into in the third section, which will be focused on the distinction between their semantic content and logical form. The last section will be aimed at showing how argumentative relations can be conceived and formalized as combinations between semantic content and rules of reasoning, of which argumentation schemes represent the most common and prototypical ones.
... É possível construir uma teoria por estipulação, dizendo: «Chamemos "argumentos" às unidades do discurso que contribuem de tal & tal forma na realização de tal & tal objectivo colectivo». Mas, se é isso que estão a tentar fazer os teóricos que subscrevem a tese funcional, correm o risco de enganar os seus leitores, levando-os a pensar que eles estão a discutir, por assim dizer, argumentações -aquelas de tipo familiar e do dia-a-dia (ver Godden, 2005, para uma perspectiva similar). ...
Douglas Walton tem tido razao em chamar-nos a atencao para os aspectos pragmaticos da argumentacao. Contudo, insistiu tambem que as argumentacoes devem ser compreendidas e avaliadas considerando a funcao que desempenham; e, disto, discordo. As argumentacoes nao tem uma funcao determinavel no sentido proposto por Walton e, mesmo que tivessem, nao poderiamos fundar as normas da pratica argumentativa nessa funcao. Como alternativa a uma teoria funcional da pragmatica argumentativa, proponho uma perspectiva design, a qual se concentra na forma como os participantes estrategicamente subsumem e impoem normas sobre eles proprios de modo a conferirem forca aos seus argumentos.
... It is possible to proceed to construct theory by stipulation, saying: "Let us call units of discourse which contribute in such & such a way to achieving such & such a collective goal, 'arguments.'" But if that's what they are trying to do, theorists making function claims run the risk of misleading their readers into thinking that they are discussing, well, argumentsthe familiar, everyday kind (see Godden, 2005 for a similar point). ...
Douglas Walton has been right in calling us to attend to the pragmatics of argument. He has, however, also insisted that arguments should be understood and assessed by considering the functions they perform; and from this, I dissent. Argument has no determinable function in the sense Walton needs, and even if it did, that function would not ground norms for argumentative practice. As an alternative to a functional theory of argumentative pragmatics, I propose a design view, which draws attention to the way participants strategically undertake and impose norms on themselves in order for their arguments to have force.
A pervasive aspect of human communication and sociality is argumentation: the practice of making and criticizing reasons in the context of doubt and disagreement. Argumentation underpins and shapes the decision-making, problem-solving, and conflict management which are fundamental to human relationships. However, argumentation is predominantly conceptualized as two parties arguing pro and con positions with each other in one place. This dyadic bias undermines the capacity to engage argumentation in complex communication in contemporary, digital society. This book offers an ambitious alternative course of inquiry for the analysis, evaluation, and design of argumentation as polylogue: various actors arguing over many positions across multiple places. Taking up key aspects of the twentieth-century revival of argumentation as a communicative, situated practice, the polylogue framework engages a wider range of discourses, messages, interactions, technologies, and institutions necessary for adequately engaging the contemporary entanglement of argumentation and complex communication in human activities.
In order to gain a better understanding of philosophical dialogues as critical discussions, this paper focuses on the evaluative strategies that philosophers use in their argumentation, and especially in the charge of committing a fallacy. In order to illustrate some problems with the evaluation of philosophical arguments, the charge of committing a genetic fallacy is analyzed. It is argued that the charge of committing such fallacy could be better understood as a case of strategic maneuvering. Some historical evidence is presented in favor of this grasp by revisiting the controversy given rise to over the genetic fallacy around the nineteen fifties and sixties. An account of charging the other party of committing a genetic fallacy as strategic maneuvering is presented, and some ways in which such maneuver could derail are analyzed. To conclude, some general remarks are made regarding the use of (certain) fallacies in philosophical controversies and some valuable consequences of considering philosophical arguments as strategic maneuvering are stated.
“Deductivism” is a broad label for various theories that emphasize the importance of deductive argument in contexts of rational discussion. This paper makes a case for a very specific form of deductivism. The paper highlights the dialectical importance of advancing deductively valid arguments (with plausible premises) in natural-language reasoning. Sections 2 and 3 explain the various forms that deductivism has taken. Section 4 makes a case for a particular form of deductivism. Section 5 discusses the value of deductive argument in law. Section 6 concludes and acknowledges critical questions that need to be addressed more fully in future work.
This chapter is a slightly revised version of a keynote address at the 2014 International Society for the Study of Argumentation conference. I describe the emergence of two themes that I think are key to the constitution of informal logic. One is the development of analytic tools for the recognition, identification and display of so-called “non-interactive” arguments. The other is the development of evaluative tools for assessing deductive, inductive, and other kinds of arguments (or other evaluative criteria than deductive validity and inductive strength). At the end I mention several current interests of informal logic.
It is true, as van Eemeren and Garssen say, that argumentation always occurs in context: to engage in argumentation, an arguer must be in some context or other. But are argument norms similarly contextual? That is, are the norms governing argument quality relative to or dependent upon the context in which the argument is either asserted or evaluated? Let contextualism be the view that criteria of argument quality vary by context: According to contextualists, whether an argument is good or not, and how good it is, depends upon the context in which it is either uttered or evaluated. In this paper I defend contextualism, but only within limits.
Resumo: Douglas Walton tem tido razão em chamar-nos a atenção para os aspectos pragmáticos da argumentação. Contudo, insistiu também que as argumentações devem ser compreendidas e avaliadas considerando a função que desempenham; e, disto, dis-cordo. As argumentações não têm uma função determinável no sentido proposto por Walton e, mesmo que tivessem, não poderíamos fundar as normas da prática argumen-tativa nessa função. Como alternativa a uma teoria funcional da pragmática argumen-tativa, proponho uma perspectiva design, a qual se concentra na forma como os parti-cipantes estrategicamente subsumem e impõem normas sobre eles próprios de modo a conferirem força aos seus argumentos. Durante os últimos vinte anos, Douglas Walton tem liderado a via para o estudo prag-mático da argumentação. Ao longo do seu extenso corpo de trabalho tem-nos incitado a olhar para argumentações concretas, insistindo que a avaliação de um argumento como bom, ou não, apenas pode ser feito no contexto do seu mundo real. Procurou que reco-nhecêssemos que um argumentador elabora uma argumentação com um propósito – e, frequentemente, por ser obrigado a tratar de um assunto entre si e os outros; que as suas obrigações, a qualquer momento, dependem de uma forma decisiva daquilo que ele e os outros disseram anteriormente; que, à medida que a conversa argumentativa prossegue, a sua argumentação se ramifica frequentemente para além do simples par premissa/ * Artigo originalmente publicado em 2007 com o título «Argument Has No Function» in Informal Logic, vol. 27, n.º 1, pp. 69-90. ** Professora da Iowa State University.
Corroborative evidence has a dual function in argument. Primarily, it functions to provide direct evidence supporting the main conclusion. But it also has a secondary, bolstering function which increases the probative value of some other piece of evidence in the argument. This paper argues that the bolstering effect of corroborative evidence is legitimate, and can be explained as counter–rebuttal achieved through inference to the best explanation. A model (argument diagram) of corroborative evidence, representing its structure and operation as a schematic pattern of defeasible argument is also supplied. In addition to explaining the operation and theoretical foundation of corroborative evidence, the model facilitates the correct analysis and guides the evaluation (assessment and critique) of corroborative evidence as it occurs in argument.
It is wrong to think that questions of interpretation are significant in informal logic only to the extent that they contribute to the assessment of an argument's conclusion. For one thing, logic is essentially about validity, about that in virtue of which conclusions do or do not follow from given premises, and not about the truth or falsity of conclusions by themselves. Secondly, the evaluation of a given argument requires first determining what the given argument is. Moreover, since arguments are given in rational discourse in order to persuade-in order to arrive, by reason, at agreement-it is necessary to address the very arguments that arguers actually intend.
Logical Form, Probability Interpretations, and the Inductive/Deductive Distinction
Consider a set S of statements that may be taken to represent an idealized body of scientific knowledge. Let s1 and s2 be members of S. Should we regard the conjunction of s1 and s2, also as a member of S? It is tempting to answer in the affirmative, and a number of writers, whose systems we shall consider below, have indeed answered this way.
In this paper I examine five distinctions between deductive and inductive arguments, concluding that the best of the five defines a deductive argument as one in which conclusive favorable relevance to its conclusion is attributed to its premises, and an inductive argument as any argument that is not deductive. This distinction, unlike its rivals, is both exclusive and exhaustive; permits both good and bad arguments of each kind; and is both useful and needed in evaluating at least some arguments.
Preface. I. BASICS OF LOGIC. Introduction. The Structure of Simple Statements. The Structure of Complex Statements. Simple and Complex Properties. Validity. 2. PROBABILITY AND INDUCTIVE LOGIC. Introduction. Arguments. Logic. Inductive versus Deductive Logic. Epistemic Probability. Probability and the Problems of Inductive Logic. 3. THE TRADITIONAL PROBLEM OF INDUCTION. Introduction. Hume"s Argument. The Inductive Justification of Induction. The Pragmatic Justification of Induction. Summary. IV. THE GOODMAN PARADOX AND THE NEW RIDDLE OF INDUCTION. Introduction. Regularities and Projection. The Goodman Paradox. The Goodman Paradox, Regularity, and the Principle of the Uniformity of Nature. Summary. 5. MILL"S METHODS OF EXPERIMENTAL INQUIRY AND THE NATURE OF CAUSALITY. Introduction. Causality and Necessary and Sufficient Conditions. Mill"s Methods. The Direct Method of Agreement. The Inverse Method of Agreement. The Method of Difference. The Combined Methods. The Application of Mill"s Methods. Sufficient Conditions and Functional Relationships. Lawlike and Accidental Conditions. 6. THE PROBABILITY CALCULUS. Introduction. Probability, Arguments, Statements, and Properties. Disjunction and Negation Rules. Conjunction Rules and Conditional Probability. Expected Value of a Gamble. Bayes" Theorem. Probability and Causality. 7. KINDS OF PROBABILITY. Introduction. Rational Degree of Belief. Utility. Ramsey. Relative Frequency. Chance. 8. PROBABILITY AND SCIENTIFIC INDUCTIVE LOGIC. Introduction. Hypothesis and Deduction. Quantity and Variety of Evidence. Total Evidence. Convergence to the Truth. ANSWERS TO SELECTED EXERCISES. INDEX.
It is common to think of argument or argumentation as a set of reasons put forward for the purpose of persuading or convincing an audience or interlocutor that something is so. Govier, for example, offers a definition which is fairly typical:
An argument is a set of claims that a person puts forward in any attempt to show that some further claim is rationally acceptable.1
In The Uses of Argument (1958) proposed a new, dialectically grounded structure for the layout of arguments, replacing the old terminology of “premiss” and “conclusion” with a new set of terms: claim, data (later “grounds”), warrant, modal qualifier, rebuttal, backing. Toulmin’s scheme has been widely adopted in the discipline of speech communication, especially in the United States. In this paper I focus on one component of the scheme, the concept of a warrant. I argue that those who have adopted Toulmin’s scheme have often distorted the concept of warrant in a way which destroys what is distinctive and worthwhile about it. And I respond to criticisms of the concept by (1984), (1996) and (1991). Their criticisms show the need for some revision of Toulmin’s position, but his basic concept of warrant, I shall argue, should be retained as a central concept for the evaluation of arguments.
This paper defends the view that the classification of an argument as being deductive ought to rest exclusively upon psychological considerations; specifically, upon whether the argument's author holds certain beliefs. This account is justified on theoretical and pedagogical grounds, and situated within a general taxonomy of competing proposals. Epistemological difficulties involved in the application of psychological definitions are recognized but claimed to be ineliminable from the praetice of argumentation. The paper concludes by discussing embryonic arguments where the author's relevant beliefs are not sufficiently fine-grained so as to accord the argument deductive or inductive status.
CILN, iL2) gives an account of deduc-tive arguments that is designed to be com-patible with the following claims: a) There are invalid deductive arguments, and b1 No arguments are both deductive and inductive. He succeeds in his objective but I think there are compelling reasons for rejecting his account. He can find a place for the deductive-inductive distinction but the terms inVOlved apply to arguings not ~-~.
A central theme throughout the impressive series of philosophical books and articles Stephen Toulmin has published since 1948 is the way in which assertions and opinions concerning all sorts of topics, brought up in everyday life or in academic research, can be rationally justified. Is there one universal system of norms, by which all sorts of arguments in all sorts of fields must be judged, or must each sort of argument be judged according to its own norms? In The Uses of Argument (1958) Toulmin sets out his views on these questions for the first time. In spite of initial criticisms from logicians and fellow philosophers, The Uses of Argument has been an enduring source of inspiration and discussion to students of argumentation from all kinds of disciplinary background for more than forty years.
In this paper I prove one interesting result and provide strong argument for another. First, I refute deduetivism. To be precise, I show that there are deductively invalid forms of inference that a deductivist cannot consistently reject as unsound. These forms are not, however, inductive. Second, I argue that precisely if there are sound inductive forms of argument, science can be given an adequate rational reconstruction using only non-inductive forms of argument. So to this extent, inductive forms are either unsound or unnecessary. This, I suggest, is the core of truth in much Popperian argument. However, I also argue that precisely if scientific argument can be so analysed, there must be sotmd inductive forms of argument. Inductive inferences, therefore, are either needed for the analysis of scientific inference, or sound. This, I suggest, is the core of truth in much anti-Popperian argument. In fact, surprisingly, relative to uncontroversial assumptions, these two positions are in fact equivalent.
This paper responds to two aspects of Ralph Johnson's Manifest Rationality (2000). The first is his critique of deductivism. The second is his failure to make room for some species of argument (e.g., visual and kisceral arguments) proposed by recent commentators. In the first case, Johnson holds that argumentation theorists have adopted a notion of argument which is too narrow. In the second, that they have adopted one which is too broad. I discuss the case Johnson makes for both claims, and possible objections to his analysis.
Coalescent argumentation is a normative ideal that involves the joining together of two disparate claims through recognition and exploration of opposing positions. By uncovering the crucial connection between a claim and the attitudes, beliefs, feelings, values and needs to which it is connected dispute partners are able to identify points of agreement and disagreement. These points can then be utilized to effect coalescence, a joining or merging of divergent positions, by forming the basis for a mutual investigation of non-conflictual options that might otherwise have remained unconsidered. The essay proceeds by defining and discussing argument, position and understanding. These notions are then brought together to outline the concept of coalescent reasoning.
The present paper elaborates a deductivist account of natural language argu-ment in the context of pragma-dialectics. It reviews earlier debates, criticizes some standard misconceptions in the literature, and argues that the identification and analysis of deductive argument schemes can be the basis of a compelling theory of argumentative discourse.
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