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Equality for Animals
... For more sympathetic responses, seeCrisp (2003),Holtug (2007), andHorta (2014). ...
According to the procreation asymmetry, we have strong pro tanto reason to do what prevents someone from coming into a miserable existence—an existence so bad that it would be rational to prefer having never been born—solely because it prevents them from coming into a miserable existence, but we do not have strong pro tanto reason to do what allows someone to come into a happy existence solely because it allows them to come into a happy existence. At best, the fact that an act would create a happy person merely offsets the reasons we have to avoid that act—i.e., an act that would be impermissible because it brings a miserable person into existence could be rendered permissible if it also brought into existence enough happy people. In this paper, I first argue that there is an intuitive asymmetry in the offsetting weight of happy humans and the offsetting weight of happy animals: the offsetting weight of happy animal lives vis-à-vis miserable animal lives appears to be greater than the offsetting weight of happy human lives vis-à-vis miserable human lives. This is the Procreation Asymmetry Asymmetry. I then argue that there is no Procreation Asymmetry Asymmetry. The best explanation of why happy human lives have only weak offsetting weight implies that happy animal lives also have only weak offsetting weight.
... What if, however, one denies that freedom of choice has any intrinsic value at all? This is indeed true of welfare-consequentialist views, which figure prominently in the animal ethics literature (Faria, 2014;Holtug, 2007;Horta, 2016;Singer, 1979Singer, /2011Varner, 2012). In this section, I will argue that there are compelling reasons to believe, on welfareconsequentialist grounds, that freedom of choice (as expounded in Section 1) is one of the ideals to which our political institutions should conform. ...
On expectation, most wild animals have lives of net suffering due to naturogenic causes. Some have claimed that concern for their well-being gives us reasons to intervene in nature on their behalf. Against this, it has been said that many interventions to assist wild animals would be wrong, even if successful, because they would violate their freedom. According to the Freedom-based Approach I defend in this paper, this view is misguided. Concern for wild animal freedom does indeed gives us reasons to secure these animals against control-undermining interferences, but also to intervene in nature in order to enrich their choices.
... So far, little attention has been paid to the possibility of including non-human animals in the distribution of welfare. The few who have attempted to apply a principle of distributive justice to inter-species wellbeing comparisons (Person 1984;Arneson 1999;Holtug 2007;Vallentyne 2007) have concluded with a negative result. ...
Besides the focus on the various approaches developed until now within animal ethics, perhaps it would be interesting to consider also what ethical theories have ruled out any moral concern for the interests of non-human beings. This article aims to rise some questions about the exclusion of (sentient) animals in the philosophical debates on distributive justice. The introduction briefly provides an overview on the current debate on distributive justice. The author focuses on those theories that adopt welfare as the currency of distribution (so-called “welfare ethics”), underlining how there seem to be a contradiction between the theory of value they rely on and their approach, exclusively focused on humans. The essay analyses the main issues related to the inclusion of animals in welfare ethics, i.e. (a) the alleged incommensurability between human and animal welfare, and (b) the “problematic conclusion”. The paper sketches a hypothesis of research to solve the “inter-species wellbeing comparisons” issue by proposing a model based on species-typical potentialities. Then, it tries to address the problem of demandingness by suggesting a sympathy-based foundation of welfare ethics. The last section singles out the moral issue of laboratory animals as an appropriate field of application for a welfarist approach.
... For reasons of space, we cannot further develop modern approaches in philosophy on the moral consideration of animals (see, for instance,Sunstein and Nussbaum, 2004;Holtug, 2007;Rowlands, 2009 andGruen, 2017, or the following website: https://www.animal-ethics.org/). ...
Research in economics is anthropocentric. It only cares about the welfare of humans and usually does not concern itself with animals. When it does, animals are treated as resources, biodiversity, or food. That is, animals only have instrumental value for humans. Yet, unlike water, trees, or vegetables, and like humans, most animals have a brain and a nervous system. They can feel pain and pleasure and many argue that their welfare should matter. Some economic studies value animal welfare, but only indirectly through humans' altruistic valuation. This overall position of economics is inconsistent with the utilitarian tradition and can be qualified as speciesist. We suggest that economics should directly value the welfare of sentient animals, at least sometimes. We briefly discuss some possible implications and challenges for (environmental) economics.
... We assume that the members of the population are all human persons, as opposed to nonhuman animals that possess a well-being but are not persons; nonhuman animals (if there are any) that are persons; and humans who are not persons or are at the margins of personhood. How welfarism and, specifically, prioritarianism should be extended to reflect the interests of beings other than human persons isagain -a question of major importance (Holtug, 2007). But, once more, the criticisms of prioritarianism have generally claimed that it fails even as a framework for taking account of the interests of human persons. ...
Prioritarianism is a moral view that ranks outcomes according to the sum of a strictly increasing and strictly concave transformation of individual well-being. Prioritarianism is ‘welfarist’ (namely, it satisfies axioms of Pareto Indifference, Strong Pareto, and Anonymity) as well as satisfying three further axioms: Pigou–Dalton (formalizing the property of giving greater weight to those who are worse off), Separability, and Continuity. Philosophical discussion of prioritarianism was galvanized by Derek Parfit’s 1991 Lindley Lecture. Since then, and notwithstanding Parfit’s support, a variety of criticisms of prioritarianism have been advanced: by utilitarians (such as John Broome and Hilary Greaves), egalitarians (such as Lara Buchak; Michael Otsuka and Alex Voorhoeve; Ingmar Persson; and Larry Temkin), and sufficientists (Roger Crisp).
In previous work, we have each endorsed prioritarianism. This article sets forth a renewed defense, in the light of the accumulated criticisms. We clarify the concept of a prioritarian moral view (here addressing work by David McCarthy), discuss the application of prioritarianism under uncertainty (herein of ‘ex post’ and ‘ex ante’ prioritarianism), distinguish between person-affecting and impersonal justifications, and provide a person-affecting case for prioritarianism. We then describe the various challenges mounted against prioritarianism – utilitarian, egalitarian, and sufficientist – and seek to counter each of them.
... A massive number of animals are routinely used as resources in harmful ways for different purposes (Singer 1975;Francione 2000). In addition, while it is commonly assumed that we should act in favor of other human beings when they need it, we do not do anything of the kind in the case of other animals (Ng 1995;Holtug 2007). ...
The argument from relevance expresses an intuition that, although shared by many applied ethicists, has not been analyzed and systematized in the form of a clear argument thus far. This paper does this by introducing the concept of value relevance, which has been used before in economy but not in the philosophical literature. The paper explains how value relevance is different from moral relevance, and distinguishes between direct and indirect ways in which the latter can depend on the former. These clarifications allow the argument to explain in detail how we can make two claims. The first one is that being a recipient of value should be the only criterion for full moral considerability. This follows if we accept that value relevance should determine, directly or indirectly, moral relevance. The second claim is that, given what the main theories of wellbeing imply regarding what entities can be recipients of value, sentience is both a sufficient and a necessary criterion for full moral considerability. The paper argues that this conclusion stands even if we hold views that consider other values different from sentience.
... Si se trata de proteger a los individuos de posibles daños infligidos por otros, ¿entonces por qué no tener en cuenta la capacidad de sufrir en lugar de la capacidad de entender los derechos de los demás? (Holtug, 2007). Los animales no humanos son mucho más inteligentes de lo que históricamente se ha asumido (Searle, 1994), pero no tanto como para satisfacer el criterio antropocéntrico de la reciprocidad moral tal como éste se ha entendido en nuestra tradición ética. ...
Las biotecnologías en desarrollo tienen fuertes implicaciones más allá de los aspectos centrados en la satisfacción de ciertas necesidades individuales. Hay implicadas nuevas categorías moralmente relevantes, y tienen que ver con nuestra comprensión de la justicia distributiva, igualdad de oportunidades, nuestras obligaciones y derechos como padres, y nuestras obligaciones morales hacia los animales no humanos. Esta última cuestión es considerada particularmente determinante si demostramos que ellos son sujetos de derechos morales. Cuando intentamos determinar las prescripciones prácticas de este esquema argumentativo nos encontraremos con la obligación de analizar si las técnicas de mejora podrían ser consideradas como una herramienta para proporcionar más igualdad, dadas las situaciones naturales individuales de partida tan diferentes
... Sin embargo, de aquí se deriva otra consecuencia muy significativa, que a muchos puede no resultárselo tanto. Y es que el mismo enfoque puede ser empleado para argumentar a favor de la consideración moral de los animales no humanos, como han hecho, por ejemplo, Ingmar Persson (1993), Peter Vallentyne (2005) y Nils Holtug (2007). Más aun, el argumento no sólo implica que hemos de considerar en una cierta medida, tal vez secundaria y no muy relevante, a los animales no humanos. ...
El igualitarismo axiológico defiende que una situación mejora al menos en algún respecto si el valor que contiene es distribuido más igualitariamente. En este artículo defiendo esta forma de igualitarismo y apunto algunos de sus corolarios. Tras considerar y rechazar la objeción de la igualación a la baja, sostengo que del igualitarismo se sigue un cuestionamiento de la consideración meramente maximizadota del valor de la vida. Argumento, asimismo, que esta posición objeta a la concepciones antropocéntricas del valor.
... Due to this, according to these views, the enormous amount of suffering present in nature cannot be compensated by the fact that others are enjoying wellbeing. These are all the views according to which the unequal distribution of wellbeing and suffering is something negative, such as egalitarianism and prioritarianism (Temkin 1993;Holtug 2007;Faria 2014). And all those that consider that an outcome cannot be good if there are individuals whose lives do not reach a minimum level of wellbeing for their lives to be worth living, such as sufficientarianism (Crisp 2003). ...
This paper examines the problem of evil in nature, that is, the issue of the disvalue present in nature, and the question of whether or not it prevails over happiness. The paper claims that disvalue actually outweighs happiness in nature. This is an unavoidable consequence of the existence of an evolutionary process in a context where resources are scarce. Because of this, suffering and early death are the norm in nature. The number of individuals who come into existence just to die in pain shortly after, vastly outweighs the number of those who survive. The paper also claims that the idea that the interests of nonhuman animals need not be considered in the same way as those of humans is speciesist and unacceptable, and that animals not only have an interest in not suffering, but also in not dying. In light of this, the paper concludes that the good things present in nature are vastly outweighed by the huge amount of disvalue that exists there, and that we should try to reduce such disvalue.
... And, again, it is inconceivable that in such a situation we would consider it preferable for nonhuman animals not to be adequately protected. Furthermore, according to other theories which give more weight to the situation of those individuals who are faring the worstsuch as egalitarian or prioritarian theories of justicewe would again have ample reasons to protect nonhuman animals, and in this case those reasons would be even stronger, since they are usually worse off with than us and these approaches give priority to the worse off (Vallentyne, 2005;Holtug, 2007). ...
This article examines and rejects the view that nonhuman animals cannot be recipients of justice, and argues that the main reasons in favor of universal human rights and global justice also apply in the case of the international protection of the interests of nonhuman animals. In any plausible theory of wellbeing, sentience matters; mere species membership or the place where an animal is born does not. This does not merely entail that regulations of the use of animals aimed at reducing their suffering should be implemented. It actually supports the end of such use, as well as other positive steps to provide help and to promote what is good not only for domesticated animals, but also for those living in the wild. Another reason to bring the protection of animals' interests into the international arena is that it is at this level that numerous animal exploitation industries enjoy the protection of different agreements and institutions. It does not follow from this that changing international law should be animal advocates' first priority, but it does follow that they should conduct their work internationally and not limit it to their own countries.
... han mantenido desde posiciones que, sin coincidir con la igualitarista, son cercanas a esta. Por ejemplo, Nils Holtug la ha asumido siguiendo una perspectiva prioritarista (según la cual, aunque la igualdad no es propiamente un valor, se entiende que es siempre prioritario mejorar la situación de quien se encuentra peor) 16 . A su vez, Roger Crisp la ha defendido desde un planteamiento suficientista (según el cual lo relevante es que cada uno de nosotros o nosotras tenga lo suficiente para poder tener una vida buena −lo que, cabe apuntar, lleva a censurar el uso de animales no humanos como recursos, puesto que este implica su muerte y/o su sufrimiento−) 17 . ...
There is great injustice in the distribution of wellbeing among humans. But the situation may appear even worse once we expand our outlook to include other animals. Even a human who has a decent but not very good life plausibly has a much better life than the life of a mouse or an ant. And yet, if nonhuman animals are typically worse off than humans, does that mean that we should favor distributions that prioritize their wellbeing over the wellbeing of humans? Many of the popular principles of distributive justice imply that we should, and some philosophers view this as a problem. I carefully specify this alleged problem, reject two popular approaches that have been taken to resolve it, and I then explore how a desertist approach to distributive justice handles the problem. I suggest that desertism about distributive justice sometimes favors human over nonhuman wellbeing in distributions. However, I then show that the desertist principle that I advance offers only a very limited justification for favoring human wellbeing over the wellbeing of other animals.
Animals, like humans, suffer and die from natural causes. This is particularly true of animals living in the wild, given their high exposure to, and low capacity to cope with, harmful natural processes. Most wild animals likely have short lives, full of suffering, usually ending in terrible deaths. This book argues that on the assumption that we have reasons to assist others in need, we should intervene in nature to prevent or reduce the harms wild animals suffer, provided that it is feasible and that the expected result is positive overall. It is of the utmost importance that academics from different disciplines as well as animal advocates begin to confront this issue. The more people are concerned with wild animal suffering, the more probable it is that safe and effective solutions to the plight of wild animals will be implemented in the future.
This is the first book on climate change denial and lobbying that combines the ideology of denial and the role of anthropocentrism in the study of interest groups and communication strategy. Climate Change Denial and Public Relations: Strategic Communication and Interest Groups in Climate Inaction is a critical approach to climate change denial from a strategic communication perspective. The book aims to provide an in-depth analysis of how strategic communication by interest groups is contributing to climate change inaction. It does this from a multidisciplinary perspective that expands the usual approach of climate change denialism and introduces a critical reflection on the roots of the problem, including the ethics of the denialist ideology and the rhetoric and role of climate change advocacy. Topics addressed include the power of persuasive narratives and discourses constructed to support climate inaction by lobbies and think tanks, the dominant human supremacist view and the patriarchal roots of denialists and advocates of climate change alike, the knowledge coalitions of the climate think tank networks, the denial strategies related to climate change of the nuclear, oil, and agrifood lobbies, the role of public relations firms, the anthropocentric roots of public relations, taboo topics such as human overpopulation and meat-eating, and the technological myth. This unique volume is recommended reading for students and scholars of communication and public relations.
This chapter compares prioritarianism and utilitarianism as frameworks for evaluating climate policies. Prioritarianism is an ethical view that gives greater weight to well-being changes affecting worse-off individuals. This view has been much discussed in recent moral philosophy but, thus far, has played little role in scholarship on climate change—where the utilitarian approach has, to date, been dominant. Prioritarianism and utilitarianism can be operationalized as policy-evaluation methodologies using the formalism of the “social welfare function” (SWF). Outcomes are converted into vectors (lists) of well-being numbers, one for each person in the population of concern. These lists are then ranked using some rule. The dominant approach in climate economics is to employ a discounted-utilitarian SWF. Well-being numbers are multiplied by a discount factor that decreases with time; these discounted numbers are then summed. The discounted-utilitarian SWF is problematic, both in incorporating an arbitrary preference for earlier generations, and in ignoring the well-being levels of individuals affected by policies. By contrast, the non-discounted prioritarian SWF eschews a discount factor, and adjusts well-being numbers so as to give priority to the worse off. This chapter describes the discounted-utilitarian and nondiscounted-prioritarian SWFs, and compares them with reference to three important topics in climate policy: the Ramsey formula, the social cost of carbon, and optimal mitigation.
Tomaré un famoso parágrafo de J S. Mill como punto de partida para defender la idea de que la filosofía moral tiene que hacerse cargo definitivamente de aquellos que han sido menos afortunados en la lotería natural. Esto significa que debemos considerar con seriedad la posibilidad de incrementar la capacidad para el bienestar de los animales. La pretensión del texto es mostrar la relevancia del actual debate ético sobre enhancement también en el contexto de la reflexión en torno a nuestras obligaciones hacia los animales no humanos sensibles.
p>Hay quien rechaza los derechos homínidos o simios afirmando que son fruto de una confusión conceptual. Sin embargo, aunque hay muchas disputas filosóficas acerca de si existen los derechos naturales o los derechos positivos, sobre la plausibilidad de las teorías del status y la elección, o sobre la concepción de los derechos como triunfos o constricciones, la opinión mayoritaria en todos esos debates es perfectamente compatible con el concepto de derechos simios. De hecho, los derechos homínidos pueden defenderse desde cualquier posición en esos debates e incluso desde cualquier combinación de posiciones en esos debates. Quienes están confundidos sobre los derechos son quienes niegan esta compatibilidad.</p
Explaining Right and Wrong aims to shake the foundations of contemporary ethics by showing that moral philosophers have been deploying a mistaken methodology in their efforts to figure out the truth about what we morally ought to do. Benjamin Sachs argues that moral theorizing makes sense only if it is conceived of as an explanatory project and carried out accordingly. The book goes on to show that the most prominent forms of moral monism-consequentialism, Kantianism, and contractarianism/contractualism-as well as Rossian pluralism, each face devastating explanatory objections. It offers in place of these flawed options a brand-new family of normative ethical theories, non-Rossian pluralism. It then argues that the best kind of non-Rossian pluralism will be spare; in particular, it will deny that an action can be wrong in virtue of constituting a failure to distribute welfare in a particular way or that an action can be wrong in virtue of constituting a failure to rescue. Furthermore, it also aims to show that a great deal of contemporary writing on the distribution of health care resources in cases of scarcity is targeted at questions that either have no answers at all or none that ordinary moral theorizing can uncover.
It is often maintained that (nonhuman) animals cannot be considered persons, so it is not possible to sue on their behalf. This article examines this idea. Firstly, it analyzes the different meanings that the term "person" has in the colloquial, the metaphysical, the moral and the legal realm. It shows that there is no necessary connection between these meanings. Then, the paper breaks down and assesses the different arguments in favor of moral anthropocentrism. It concludes that none of them is successful. Finally, the paper argues that if the category of personhood remains central in the legal realm, but we keep on excluding nonhuman animals from its domain, we will assume a position which will not be morally justified.
Derek Parfit has argued that prioritarianism “naturally” has global scope, i.e. naturally applies to everyone, irrespective of his or her particular national, state or other communal affiliation. In that respect, it differs from e.g. egalitarianism. In this article, I critically assess Parfit's argument. In particular, I argue that it is difficult to draw conclusions about the scope of prioritarianism simply from an inspection of its structure. I also make some suggestions as to what it would take to argue that prioritarianism has either global or merely domestic scope.
Can material Egalitarianism (requiring, for example, the significant promotion of fortune) include animals in the domain of
the equality requirement? The problem can be illustrated as follows: If equality of wellbeing is what matters, and normal
mice are included in this egalitarian requirement, then normal mice have a much stronger claim to resources than almost any
human. This is because normal mice have a much stronger claim to resources than almost any human. This is because their wellbeing
is much lower than that of normal humans. Thus, equality of wellbeing requires a massive shift of resources away from most
humans to mice. This view, however, seems crazy. I explore this problem and propose a solution.
Egalitarianism, the view that equality matters, attracts a great deal of attention amongst contemporary political theorists. And yet it has turned out to be surprisingly difficult to provide a fully satisfactory egalitarian theory. The cutting-edge articles in Egalitarianism move the debate forward. They are written by some of the leading political philosophers in the field. Recent issues in the debate over equality are given careful consideration: the distinction between 'telic' and 'deontic' egalitarianism; prioritarianism and the so-called 'levelling down objection' to egalitarianism; whether egalitarian justice should have 'whole lives' or some subset thereof as its temporal focus; the implications of Scanlon's contractualist account of the value of choice for egalitarian justice; and the question of whether non-human animals fall within the scope of egalitarianism and if so, what the implications are. Numerous 'classic' issues receive a new treatment too: how egalitarianism can be justified and how, if at all, this value should be combined with other values such as desert, liberty and sufficiency; how to define the 'worst off' for the purposes of Rawls' difference principle; Elizabeth Anderson's feminist account of 'equality of relations'; how equality applies to risky choices and, in particular, whether it is justifiable to restrict the freedom of suppliers who wish to release goods that confer different levels of risk on consumers, depending on their ability to pay. Finally, the implications of egalitarianism and prioritarianism for health care are scrutinized. The contributors to the volume are: Richard Arneson, Linda Barclay, Thomas Christiano, Nils Holtug, Susan Hurley, Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, Dennis McKerlie, Ingmar Persson, Bertil Tungodden, Peter Vallentyne, Andrew Williams, and Jonathan Wolff.
Prioritarianism is a principle of distributive justice. Roughly, it states that we should give priority to the worse off in the distribution of advantages. This principle has received a great deal of attention in political theory since Derek Parfit first introduced the distinction between egalitarianism and prioritarianism in his Lindley Lecture, published in 1991. In the present article, prioritarianism is defined in terms of a number of structural features of the principle. These structural features are also used to distinguish between this principle and other distributive principles such as utilitarianism, egalitarianism, and leximin. Prioritarianism is mostly discussed as an axiological principle that orders outcomes with respect to their (moral) value, but it is also clarified how it can be incorporated in a criterion of right actions, choices, or policies. Furthermore, different aspects of the principle that need to be further specified to arrive at a full-fledged distributive theory are discussed, including the weights that give priority to the worse off, currency (what kind of advantages should be distributed), temporal unit (the temporal span in which one has to be worse off in order to be entitled to priority), scope (whether the principle applies globally or only domestically, and whether, for example, future generations and non-human animals are covered by the principle), and risk. For each aspect, different possible views are distinguished and discussed. Finally, it is discussed how prioritarianism may be justified, for example, by outlining and discussing the argument that, unlike certain other distribution-sensitive principles such as egalitarianism, prioritarianism is not vulnerable to the so-called “leveling down objection.”
I regard myself as an advocate of animal rights—as part of the animal rights movement. That movement, as I conceive it, is committed to a number of goals, including:
the total abolition of the use of animals in science;
the total dissolution of commercial animal agriculture;
the total elimination of commercial and sport hunting and trapping.
Abstract According to the Levelling Down Objection, (teleological) egalitarianism implausibly implies that it can be in one respect good to bring about equality, even if no-one benefits from it. Larry Temkin has argued that this objection presupposes a principle he calls the ‘Slogan’. And he has raised two objections to this principle. According to the first, the Slogan gets us into trouble when applied to the so-called Non-Identity Problem. According to the second, the Slogan cannot be supported by a substantial theory of well-being. Against this, I argue that if suitably (and plausibly) modified, the Slogan does not get us into trouble when applied to the Non-Identity Problem. And I argue that Temkin's case for thinking that the Slogan cannot be supported is hardly conclusive.
Soulevant, a la suite de T. Nagel, la question de la (re)distribution des benefices entre un enfant en bonne sante et un enfant handicape pour une famille qui doit decider ou non de demenager, l'A. etablit une distinction entre deux formes d'egalite, l'une dependant de l'etat de choses le plus mauvais et definissant un egalitarisme telique, fonde sur le principe de l'utilite; l'autre dependant de l'injustice et definissant un egalitarisme deontique, fonde sur l'idee de faire le mal. A cette alternative, l'A. prefere le point de vue de la priorite, fonde sur le besoin, en tant qu'il echappe a l'objection du nivellement par le bas
Les etres humains different cruellement dans les dons que la nature leur fait et ces inegalites peuvent affecter leur mode de vie. Fort de cette constatation, l'A. propose une reflexion sur le lien qui unit incapacite cognitive, malchance et justice sur un plan philosophique. Il insiste sur la methodologie suivie : il distingue en effet argument comparatif et argument non comparatif. Il explique pourquoi il prefere le second au premier. Il conclut sa reflexion sur le statut moral du caractere congenital des inegalites cognitives
Roughly, according to conditional egalitarianism, equality is non-instrumentally valuable, but only if it benefits at least one individual. Some political theorists have argued that conditional egalitarianism has the important virtue that it allows egalitarians to avoid the so-called levelling down objection. However, in the present article I argue that conditional egalitarianism does not offer the egalitarian a plausible escape route from this objection. First, I explain the levelling down objection and suggest some particular concerns from which it derives its force. Then I provide a more precise definition of conditional egalitarianism. Finally, I give two arguments against this principle. According to the first, it violates the transitivity of the betterness relation (or more specifically, betterness with respect to equality ). According to the second, there is no plausible explanation of why equality must benefit at least one individual in order to be non-instrumentally valuable.
According to impersonal moralities, welfare is good, period. Therefore, it is good that welfare is realised, whether by the
benefiting of individuals who already exist or by the bringing of new (happy) individuals into existence. According to an
impersonal morality, then, we can improve an outcome by seeing to it that extra individuals exist and it may even seem that,
in certain circumstances, the welfare of such extra beings can outweigh benefits to ourselves. To avoid these implications, many theorists have defended person-affecting moralities that, in various
ways, restrict our obligations to possible future people.
What, if Anything, Renders All Humans Morally Equal
- Richard Arneson
Arneson, Richard, "What, if Anything, Renders All Humans Morally Equal", in Dale Jamieson
(ed.), Singer and His Critics (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1999).
The Prudential Life-span Account of Justice Across Generations
- Norman Daniels
Daniels, Norman, "The Prudential Life-span Account of Justice Across Generations", in his
Justice and Justification. Reflective Equilibrium in Theory and Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1996).
Person-affecting Moralities The Repugnant Conclusion
- Holtug
Holtug, Nils, " Person-affecting Moralities ", in Jesper Ryberg and Torbörn Tännsjö (eds.), The Repugnant Conclusion. Essays on Population Ethics (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2004).
The Ethics of Killing. Problems at the Margins of Life
- Jeff Mcmahan
McMahan, Jeff, The Ethics of Killing. Problems at the Margins of Life (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2002).
A Bassis for (Interspecies) Equality The Great Ape Project
- Persson
- Ingmar
Persson, Ingmar, " A Bassis for (Interspecies) Equality ", in Paola Cavalieri and Peter Singer (eds.), The Great Ape Project (London: Fourth Estate, 1993).
New Essays on the Nature and Value of Equality
- Egalitarianism
Egalitarianism. New Essays on the Nature and Value of Equality (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
2007).
A Bassis for (Interspecies) Equality
- Ingmar Persson
Persson, Ingmar, "A Bassis for (Interspecies) Equality", in Paola Cavalieri and Peter Singer
(eds.), The Great Ape Project (London: Fourth Estate, 1993).
- Sen
Sen, Amartya. On Economic Inequality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973).
- Peter Singer
Singer, Peter, Animal Liberation (New York: Random House, 1975).