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Church and State in Croatia: Legal Framework, Religious Instruction, and Social Expectations

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Abstract

This chapter provides an overview of Church-state relations in Croatia since the collapse of communism. The focus is mainly on the general development of the legal framework, and on the introduction and development of religious instruction in the public schools. The issue of religious instruction serves to illustrate and discuss the main dilemmas about how to frame Church-state relations in the post-communist era, or more precisely in a country with a high level of religiosity, with marked social role of the Catholic Church, but also a country which opted for the separation of Church and state, for equality of all religions before law, and for respecting of freedom of thought, conscience, and religion. Therefore, the presentation of different aspects of religious instruction is followed by a summary of the public debates on the introduction of religious instruction in the public schools in the 1990s. In addition, the chapter touches social perceptions and expectations from religion in the public sphere, as the development of Church-state relations largely reflect the overall social climate in a country, an important part of which are social expectations of people from religions.
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CHURCH AND STATE IN CROATIA:
Legal framework, religious instruction, and social expectations
The purpose of this article is to provide an overview of Church-state relations in
Croatia since the collapse of communism. Our focus is mainly on the general development of
the legal framework, and on the introduction and development of religious instruction in the
public schools. The issue of religious instruction is chosen for analysis as it can illustrate the
main dilemmas about how to frame Church-state relations in the post-communist era, or more
precisely in a country with a high level of religiosity, with marked social role of the Catholic
Church, but also a country which opted for the separation of Church and state, for equality of
all religions before law, and for respecting of freedom of thought, conscience, and religion.
Therefore, the presentation of different aspects of religious instruction is followed by a
summary of the public debates on the introduction of religious instruction in the public
schools in the 1990s. In addition, the article touches on social perceptions and expectations
from religion in the public sphere, as the development of Church-state relations largely
reflects the overall social climate in a country, an important part of which are social
expectations of people from religions.
Although we focus on Church-state relations in Croatia, for their better understanding
we found helpful to put them into a wider European context. Zrinščak has recently argued that
Church-state relations in post-communist Europe, despite differences connected with specific
social development features, are not profoundly different from what we can find in Western
Europe, both in detecting some similar contested issues and in identifying very different types
of relations, from profound separatism to State Churches
1
. The important parts of the same
analysis were the claims about very visible historical influences on how Church-state relations
are developing today, the need to study further the current development which is deeply
2
conflictual (from praising of religious liberty to denying some of the basic rights to particular
religions), the need to understand public role of religions as well as social expectations from
religions, and the need to pay much more attention to the issue of religion and identity
formation. That is why it is important to briefly mention here Church-state relations in Europe
as such.
Various scholars have argued that, despite big national differences, there is something
which can be identified as a European pattern of Church-state relations.
2
The European
dimension is to be found in: (1) the protection of individual rights of religious freedom, (2)
the lack of incompetence of the state on religious matters and the independence of religious
faiths, and (3) the “selective” collaboration between states and religious faiths.
3
In line with
the first two claims, it should be noted that respecting religious freedom and not interfering in
religious matters do not mean that these principles function properly in reality. These are two
ideal norms, more or less respected, and more importantly, embedded in the social reality
where other factors are in place as well, many of them which go in opposite directions. That is
why the problem of so-called new religions has emerged in many countries, and that is also
why, for example, the public role of Islam reveals how Church-state relations are deeply
framed in European history and in line with the Western development / understandings of
Christianity. This is also why there is a third principle which talks about selective, not equal
cooperation between states and religious communities, the fact found in all countries,
irrespectively of their model. Following that, Ferrari argues that there is a need to go beyond
three basic models (separationist, cooperation, and State Church model), and in more details
analyze the reality. The selective cooperation means that it is possible to identify a pyramidal
model, where at the bottom are religious communities with a very limited cooperation with
the state (they exist but are not supported or are not able to reach public institutions), in the
middle are religious communities with a considerable support from the state while sometimes,
3
though not always, the top position is occupied by Churches with maximum collaboration,
like in case of State Churches, or the Catholic Church in concordat countries, or in the case of
the Orthodox Church in Greece.
CHURCH AND STATE: LEGAL FRAMEWORK
As from 1945 to 1991 Croatia was a part of socialist Yugoslavia, which had a very
specific stance toward religions; some crucial elements need to be mentioned before
explaining the development after 1991. As with many other social spheres, religions (covering
here both the religious communities and religious people) lived in a double reality, the one
which guaranteed the religious freedom and autonomy of religious communities, and the
second one which favored the non-religious worldview. This double reality underwent many
changes, most importantly exemplified in the argument about two basic phases in Church and
state in socialist Yugoslavia: the conflictual one, particularly severely implemented after the
World War Two, and the cooperative one, from mid 1960s to late 1980s
4
. The cooperation
was not understood in today’s sense of supporting different religions in their everyday life and
in public activities, but as a way of reaching a basic consensus about the “peaceful” existence
of religious communities, and about resolving some practical issues. As the communist state
never abandoned its atheist stance, although that was not so fiercely implemented as in some
other communist states, the basic underlying principle remained one of separation of Church
and state which was interpreted as the need to prevent the public appearance of Churches,
interestingly in a similar way as it has been happening in France recently. Besides the
Constitution, which at least formally protected basic religious rights, the legal framework was
finally set up in the Law on legal aspects of religious communities from 1978, which was a
pragmatic act, but which did not answer to all needs of religious communities and certainly
did not change the basic parameters of religiosity in a particular communist state. To sum up,
4
the communist phase in Croatian history fostered negative public attitudes toward religions,
but had been changing considerably over time which only brought a slightly easier life to the
religious communities and to religious people. In that sense some sociologists emphasized
that, even in communism’s last days, believers remained second-class citizens
5
.
Still, the revitalization process started in the 1980s and the public visibility of religions
rose, which was a clear sign of social change. This rising public visibility received full public
recognition after the first democratic elections in April 1990, and the formation of the new
Government in May 1990, and was fully implemented in the new Constitution.
Although this is not a primary concern of our article, the general political and social
climate immediately after the fall down of communism should be briefly outlined. Besides the
collapse of communism, which favored the new social position of religion, the fact of the
breakdown of Yugoslavia is of particular interest. As the Socialist Federative Republic of
Yugoslavia was not only a country of different nations and different religions, but also a
country in which there was a strong connection between specific nations and religions
(Slovenes and Croats were Catholics, Serbs, Macedonians, and Montenegrins were Orthodox,
Bosniaks called Muslims in an ethnic sense - were of course Muslim in a religious sense,
etc.), the breakdown of Yugoslavia and particularly the war against the independence of the
new independent states (mainly Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina) strengthened
the nation-religious link. Different opinions about the religious involvement in the wars may
be detected in the literature, but we stick to the opinion that we could not speak about a
primary religious cause of the wars, and absolutely not about religious wars.
6
On the other
hand, these social circumstances made a high politicization of religion possible a fact which
was more or less extensively described elsewhere.
7
Still, the already underlined comparative
approach helps us to nuance our analysis, as it can be claimed that Church-state development
5
in Croatia party reflects specific war / transition circumstances, partly general post-communist
circumstances, and partly general European dilemmas and conflicts about Church and state.
These basic European dilemmas could be detected even in the wording of the first
Croatian Constitution, passed in December 1990. The Constitution guaranteed all persons the
the enjoyment of rights and freedoms irrespective of, among other things, religion, political or
other convictions (article 14), freedom of thought and expression (article 38), freedom of
conscience and religion and the freedom to demonstrate religious or other convictions (article
40). Article 41 is of a particular interest as it stated:
“All religious communities shall be equal before the law and clearly separate from the
state. Religious communities shall be free, in compliance with the law, to publicly
conduct religious services, open schools, academies or other institutions, and welfare
and charitable organizations and to manage them, and they shall enjoy the protection
and assistance of the state in their activities.”
8
It appears that the main constitutional idea was the model of the separation of Church
and state, but at the same time the idea of cooperation: protection and assistance. How this
support (protection and assistance) should be implemented has remained one of the contested
issues in years to come.
Besides some legal decisions in the field of education that will be discussed in the
following section, the next important step in building the legal framework concerns the
signing of four agreements between the Government of Croatia and the Holy See in 1996 and
1998: an Agreement on Legal Issues, an Agreement on Cooperation in the Fields of Education
and Culture, an Agreement on Spiritual Care in the Military and Police Forces, and an
Agreement on Economic Issues
9
. The Agreement on Legal Issues is the main one as it
guarantees the public legal entity to the Catholic Church, guarantees its freedom in all its
activities, its internal autonomy in all aspects, etc. The Agreement also listed Christian
6
holidays which would be public holidays in Croatia. Very soon after its signing some aspects
of the Agreement provoked criticism among scholars, particularly from the legal points of
view, as they questioned whether the Agreement respected the constitutional basis of the
state’s autonomy
10
. Just to mention one example, the Agreement stipulated that, in cases of
judicial inquiry against any Church person, the judicial authorities should inform the Church
authorities about the case in advance, and also that decisions of the Church Courts on the
nullity of a marriage and decisions of the Supreme Church Authority on the dissolution of a
marital conjunction would be submitted to the state courts in order to implement the civil
effects of such decisions. There was also a criticism that, by signing these agreements, Croatia
violated the constitutional principle of equality of all religious communities before the law
11
.
Some scholars pointed to the secret negotiations between Croatia and the Holy See, which
was partly understandable as it involved an international agreement between two states, but as
these agreements brought big changes in the regulation of Church-state relations in all social
aspects, at least some public debates about formulation of basic principles could have been
expected.
12
In spite of everything, the fact is also that the agreements signed with Croatia are
not so different from agreements signed between the Holy See and many other European
countries, with similar constitutional principles, which allow us to include Croatia in a group
of cooperationist countries in Europe.
While the Agreement on Legal Issues provoked some scholarly debates, but not public
ones, the Agreement on Economic Issues raised much more public interest. It stipulated that
Croatia would restitute the property taken by communist authorities after World War Two, or
would compensate it (in real estate’s or in money), when restitution would not be possible.
This provision was based a the separate law from 1996 which guaranteed the same right for
all citizens and all public persons. The Agreement provided also for state support to the
Church by paying the agreed sum each month from the State budget, by financing educational
7
and other social activities of the Church, such as religious instructions in public schools
(analyzed in next section of the article), by exemption from the value-added tax, and the profit
tax for its main activity, etc.
The position of other religious communities remained unregulated until 2002 when the
Croatian Parliament passed the Law on Legal Status of Religious Communities
13
which
extended many of rights granted to the Catholic Church to other religious communities,
although not all rights and by subjecting them to further regulation. Specifically, the Law
differentiated between then existing religious communities which had a simple (formal)
registration process, and new ones, those which would be founded after the law came into
force, and which have a special procedure of registration: five years of existence as a citizens
associations and proof that the respective community has at least five hundred members. The
law envisaged the possibility of signing agreements between Croatia and religious
communities on issues of mutual interest, which would in fact further regulate rights that
Churches may enjoy: the religious instruction in public schools, chaplaincy in military and
police forces, and in health and social institutions, financing of Churches, state regulation of
Church weddings, etc. However, the unresolved underlying question, which would soon
created legal conflict, was who defines issues of mutual interests” and in what ways. Indeed,
after the law was passed, the Government very soon signed five agreements which covered
fourteen, mainly traditional religious communities, from the Serbian Orthodox Church and the
Islamic Community, to different Protestant communities, while the Jehovah Witnesses did not
want to have any kind of contract with the state. The question is: what about other religious
communities. The problem occurred when the Government formulated new criteria (in form
of a governmental conclusion) in December 2004, which specified two basic conditions of
which one should be met in order to sign the agreement: (1) that the given religious
community functioned on the territory of the Republic of Croatia on 6 April 1941 and
8
continued with its activity in continuity and in legal succession, having at least six thousand
members according to the last census; or (2) that it is one of the traditional religious
organizations of the country (meaning, the Catholic Church, the Orthodox Church, the
Evangelical Church in Croatia, the Reformed Christian Church in Croatia, the Islamic
community, or the Jewish Community).
The consequences of this government conclusion appeared in a lawsuit. Specifically,
three minority religious communities which had been registered in Croatia (the Protestant
Reformed Christian Church in the Republic of Croatia, the Full Gospel Church, and the Word
of Life Church) submitted applications during 2002/2003 to conclude agreements with the
government on issues of mutual interest. At the beginning of 2005, they received official
notification from the Commission for Relations with Religious Communities that, based on
the conclusion, they did not fulfil the conditions to be party to such agreements. The three
communities then claimed that this decision discriminated against them, and mentioned also
those that did not fulfil conditions required by the conclusion with respect to continuity,
number of followers, and legal succession (the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, the Macedonian
Orthodox Church, the Evangelical (Pentecostal) Church, and others). At the end of 2006, they
submitted a proposal for reassessment of the government’s conclusion based on its alleged
lack of conformity with the constitution and law concerning the Constitutional Court of the
Republic of Croatia. The Constitutional Court rejected the proposal of the assessment in 2007,
proclaiming itself not to be authorized to pass a decision. Claiming that the Constitutional
Court is authorized to protect human rights and legality, these communities brought a law suit
against the government of the Republic of Croatia to the International Court for Human
Rights in Strasbourg due to discrimination in 2007, i.e., because of the impossibility to
conclude agreements about issues of mutual interest with the government for regulating
different, for them important rights. By the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights
9
in December 2010 they won the case. The Government of Croatia did not appeal the court’s
decision, which promises to have important consequences for the state of religious rights,
religious freedom, social justice, and the rule of law in Croatia. However, it is not clear yet
how that will that affect future Church-State relations in Croatia, and in which ways the
government might change its conclusion and the way it treats minority religious communities.
CHURCH AND EDUCATION
The most visible changes of the position and the role of religion and churches in the
public sphere in Croatia are in education. This is the area in which the state, especially (in
particular) the government, has exerted its power to impose modes of regulating Church-state
relations. The introduction of religious instruction in the schools has been followed by debates
about the type of religious education should it be the confessional or non-confessional one.
The ruling political structures at that time (beginning of the 1990s) strongly supported the
confessional approach, backed by the Catholic Church. Protagonists who promoted a non-
confessional approach were intellectuals from different areas of social life, including religious
communities. But the non-confessional approach was completely marginalised.
In January 1991, the Ministry of Education and Culture sent a letter to the religious
communities in which it informed them that, beginning in the school year 1991/1992, a
confessional religious instruction would be introduced in all primary and secondary public
schools.
14
In June 1991, the Croatian bishops sent to the public a message on confessional
religious instruction in the school and in the parish community” in which they praised the
decision on the introduction of confessional instruction in the schools.
15
Pursuant to the
decision of the Ministry of Education and Culture of the Republic of Croatia, as of 1991/92
confessional religious instruction was introduced in the schools as an optional subject. The
10
religious communities were given a mandate to define the content and the way of teaching the
classes, as well as the right to hire the instructors needed and to train them.
However, it was only six years later that the subject of religious education was
regulated in a proper legal manner by the Agreement between the Holy See and the Republic
of Croatia about Cooperation in the Field of Education and Culture, signed in 1996.
16
Both
sides agreed that the agreement should be based on relevant Constitutional articles and on II
Vatican Council declaration “Gravissimum educationis” and Canon law, that it should take
into account the irreplaceable historical and present role of the Catholic Church in Croatia in
the cultural and moral upbringing of the people and also its role in the field of culture and
education, and that it should take into account that majority of the citizens of the Republic of
Croatia belong to the Catholic Church. Based on Article 2 of this agreement, an additional
Contract between the Government of the Republic of Croatia with the Croatian Conference of
Bishops about Catholic catechism in public schools and public preschool institutions was
signed in 1999
17
.
The agreement and the contract guarantee:
- Catholic religious instruction (catechism) in all public primary schools, secondary
schools and preschools institutions as optional subject (but mandatory for those who
choose it) equal to other subjects,
- the number of students needed in order to organize the class (seven pupils),
- the obligation of the Church and school authorities to inform parents and pupils about
the goals and the content of the subject,
- the number of hours per week (two hours),
- a competency for creating the curriculum (the Croatian Bishops’ Conference) and who
confirms it (Minister of Science, Education and Sports),
- responsibilities for teacher training and the level of education needed for the teachers,
11
- that all public educational institutions will take into account values of Christian ethics,
- that the Church will enjoy the possibility to organize additional religious activities in
the school,
- the content of the textbooks and didactic materials, monitoring the quality of religious
education,
- the right of Catholic Church to establish pre-school institutions, and schools at all
levels, to manage them under the Canon law and state laws and which will have the
same duties and rights as state schools, including financing.
Other religious communities regulate religious education in schools through agreement on
issues of mutual interest they signed with the government of Croatia. But these agreements
differ from the agreement which the Government has signed with the Holy See in the field of
education. Specifically, they omit articles 11 and 12. Article 11 says that Catholic religious
traditions are deeply rooted in Croatian cultural heritage, which will be taken into account in
the public school system, especially in realizing appropriate religio-cultural initiatives and
programmes that comprehend different fields of social and cultural life besides the school
system. Although worship takes place in churches, it may also be performed and celebrated
on special occasions in schools with the consent of the principal and school authorities; the
participation of pupils and teachers is voluntary. The school will enable pupils and teachers to
meet the diocesan bishop in school. Article 12 provides that parish priests, because of the
nature of their service, have the right to perform the Catholic religious instruction in school
several times a week. Still, following the 2002 law and agreements signed, the program of
confessional instruction was prepared by six religious communities, and the Ministry of
Education and Sports of the Republic of Croatia finally approved the curricula for Catholic,
Orthodox, Islamic and Jewish religious instructions as well as for the Adventists and the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints.
12
The result is that religious instruction is markedly present, although it is only an optional
subject. In the year 2009/2010, in primary schools 345,914 pupils (93.6 per cent) attended
Catholic religious instruction, 2,792 pupils attended Islamic religious instruction and 2,051
pupils attended Orthodox religious instruction, therefore only a small minority of children do
not attend any religious class. In secondary schools (where children can choose between
religious instruction and ethics) 132,673 pupils (75.4 per cent) attended Catholic religious
instruction,
18
437 pupils attended Islamic religious instruction (another 1,407 pupils of
different grades attended Islamic religious instruction in mosques),
19
and 849 pupils attended
Orthodox religious instruction (for both primary and secondary schools data cover the
Eparchies of Osijek and Baranja and Vukovar and Srijem where Serbian ethnic minority is
present the most).
20
Curriculum
Religious education was actually introduced gradually depending on the number of
interested students and available teachers.
21
At the very beginning, some misuse of religious
instruction was observed especially in the position of the subject in daily schedule.
Theologian Anton Peranić from the Catholic Theological Faculty of the University of Zagreb
pointed to additional problems of entering the subject into the schools, including unfinished
syllabi, lack of textbooks and manuals for the teachers, a shortage of teachers, lay persons
who initially did not have the proper level of education, and priests and nuns who did not
have any methodical-didactical education and were afraid of the way other teachers would
accept them
22
. Special attention was paid to the personality of the teacher of religious
instruction in order to achieve better acceptance among pupils and other teachers (with
preference given to teachers who were simple, human and sympathetic)
23
.
13
a) Primary schools
The first programme of Catholic religious instruction was drafted in 1991. In 1998, an
amended plan and program of Catholic Religious Instruction was published in the form of a
comprehensive document. By virtue of Article 3, paragraph 4 of the Contract on the Catholic
Instruction in Public Schools and Religious Education in Pre-school Facilities
24
, and upon the
proposal of the Croatian Bishop’s Conference, the Minister of Education and Sports approved
the Program of the Catholic instruction in Primary School (II. amended and supplemented
edition) in 1999
25
. This amended edition, just as its first edition from 1998 was, is based on
theological-ecclesiastic and anthropological-pedagogical principles and criteria
26
. According
to the program (1999),
27
Catholic religious instruction emphasizes an integral education and
upbringing of people, and having in mind the religious dimension, the promotion of personal
and social general human and believers’ values. The confessional characteristic of religious
instruction is based on the universal educational and cultural meaning of a religious fact for a
person, culture, and society as a whole. The principles of religious instruction are the
following: devotion to God and humankind, ecumenical openness and openness to a dialogue
and correlation of religious upbringing and education (correlation among the subjects
according to the principle of an integral education of pupils) and an intercultural approach to
religious instruction and education. The purpose of Catholic religious education in primary
school is systematic and harmonised theologically the ecclesiological and anthropologically
pedagogical connection of revelation and church tradition with the worldly experience of the
pupil. However, there is no alternative subject in primary school to religious education. At the
same time, religious content is taught through other subjects as well, such as history,
geography, literature, and the arts.
b) Secondary schools
14
The Croatian Conference of Bishops in 1990 formed a special working group for
religious instruction in the secondary schools which prepared the program of religious
instruction for secondary school, which was, in turn, approved by the Croatian Bishops in
1991. The Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports reached a decision on introducing
religious instruction in Croatian secondary schools in 1991. The difference in relation to the
primary schools is that, in the secondary schools, an alternative to religious instruction is
offered ethics -- and both of them are taught one hour per week.
Ethics is taught over a four year period, as is religion. The syllabus for the subject stresses that
it does not prefer a single worldview or a single philosophy, and it aims at ensuring a respect
of multiculturalism and a philosophical openness for dialogue. Within each academic year,
religious content can be taught through two lessons pertaining to multiculturalism,
coexistence, human rights, and universalism, while a unit is allocated in the 4th grade to the
differing approaches to morality, one of which is the religious one.
Beside religious instruction and ethics, religious content is particularly included in two
additional subjects, Sociology and Politics and Economics. Sociology is an obligatory subject
in the 3rd grade taught in two weekly lessons. The accompanying textbook contains a special
chapter encompassing the sociological definition of religion, magic and religion, the classics
of the sociology of religion, types of religious groups, secularisation, and the
interconnectedness of religion and societal change, as well as the religious communities in
Croatia. It is up to the teacher’s discretion which parts of the textbooks to teach in greater
depth. Politics and economics is an obligatory subject in the 4th grade of secondary school and
is taught once a week. A single lesson, politics and religion, is dedicated to the relationship
between politics and religion in relation to the rights of an individual human being and a
citizen.
15
Textbooks
The first textbooks for Catholic religious instruction had been published between 1992
and 1994. Textbooks mainly follow issues that have been represented in the program. As
with the syllabi, textbooks are firmly based on doctrinal teaching of Catholic Church and its
normative theology. Textbooks communicate moral values originating from Catholic ethical
teaching from Catholic truth and the Catholic understanding of morality. An analysis of
programs and textbooks shows that they emphasize the formative nature of Christian
(Catholic) values in education helping to form the Christian (Catholic) identity.
28
Here one of the principles of Catholic religious instruction is of particular interest,
namely the principle concerning “ecumenical and dialogical openness”. In accordance with
this principle, tolerance toward other major religions is present in all textbooks. Nevertheless,
no matter how much it would be ecumenical, it validates these religions from a confessional
outlook. On the other hand, a tolerant and dialogical approach gives up in the case of new
religious movements whose authenticity and distinctness are denied. Atheism and secularism
are also treated negatively.
29
The Islamic religious community has textbooks for all grades of primary and
secondary schools. All textbooks are approved by the Ministry of Science, Education and
Sports. There are no special units in primary and secondary school textbooks dedicated to
other religious traditions. But tolerance toward other people besides Muslims is clearly stated
(for instance in the unit “Islam”, where basic Islamic principles are exposed): the relationship
between Muslims and non-Muslims “has to be in accordance with human Islamic principles”.
In this respect there is a quotation from the Qur’an: “If your Master wanted, everybody in the
world would believe the same things. Are you going to hate people until they become
believers? One unit in secondary school textbook is dedicated to secularism and laicism (in
the sense of the people without religion) and their negative influence on religion in general
16
and on the Islamic community in particular. A negative attitude towards the paganism, magic,
and astrology is also present
30
The Serbian Orthodox Church has textbooks for all grades of primary and secondary
school, published in Serbia and approved by the Ministry of Science, Education and Sports of
the Republic of Croatia. As schools order and buy textbooks for their pupils in Serbia, they
were not available for analysis.
Religious communities which did not sign a contract with the government do not teach
confessional education in public schools, only in their churches and communities; so they are
not obliged to have officially approved textbooks.
DEBATES, EXPECTATIONS, UNRESOLVED ISSUES
Public discourse on the introduction of religious instruction in schools in the 1990s
Public debates have been held sporadically, in the period that preceded the laying
down of the regulatory norms, as well as in the whole period of the practice of confessional
religious instruction in Croatia, and the basic tone has been given by the theologians of the
Catholic Church. Actually, the way in which the discussion was organized before decisions
were taken about the introduction of religious instruction led to the perception that discussions
organized in a hurry were a mere alibi and have been held only because of the need for a
“quasi-scientific verification of the political decision.
31
In the debates on two possible
approaches to the religious phenomenon in the teaching process the idea of non-confessional
religious culture was gradually marginalized and confessional religious culture was given
prominence.
The arguments for introducing confessional (Catholic) instruction were as follows:
a) Catholic religious tradition is deeply rooted in the Croatian cultural heritage;
b) In the past religious contents have been suppressed or distorted for ideological reasons;
17
c) It enables students to get acquainted with and improve their knowledge of their own
cultural religious identity and develop respect for the religious culture of others.
The arguments against introducing confessional religious instruction and versus the
procedure under which the confessional religious instruction has been introduced and for non-
confessional culture of religion were as follows:
a) Confessional religious instruction should not be introduced until experts, professors,
and teachers have been consulted;
b) Religion cannot be the frame or philosophy of life in a public school and the
separation of State and Church should be respected in a consistent manner;
c) The deficit of spirituality, culture, and knowledge should be compensated by religious
culture that will take into account a multi-confessional character of society, since the
spirituality should not be reduced to a confessional model;
d) The dangers of proselytism, since confessional religious education, such as carried out
in churches, can become the subject of confessional misunderstanding;
e) Religious instruction as upbringing in belief and for belief belongs to family and
church communities.
Discussions in the media sporadically continued later too, especially after some salient
dates in the process of enacting into law of confessional religious instruction. After
introducing confessional religious education, the subject that was created by a sort of
summarizing of parish religious instruction and confessional religious culture, more or less
stopped debates on introducing a confessional neutral subject that was the most often dubbed
as religious culture, and only sporadically some isolated expressions of support in its favor
could be heard and some shy initiatives emerged. Until nowadays, a similar subject has not
been introduced in public schools, and the concept of non-confessional religious culture has
been strongly criticised by the Catholic Church.
18
Although confessional religious education in schools was not supported by other religious
communities in the beginning, they finally agreed that it could be introduced in the public
schools after they signed the agreements of mutual interest with the government.
Social perceptions and expectations from religion in public sphere
The analysis of Church-state relations and of public controversies about those relations
should not be separated from the analysis of other aspects of public role of religions, and in
particular social perceptions and people’s expectations from religion. Although it is not usual
to connect the analysis of legal aspects of Church-state relations with a sociological analysis
of people’s opinions, we find that potentially very instructive.
In order to complement our analysis we rely on existing research which partially
touched the respective subject. We are focusing specifically on attitudes of Croatian citizens
toward religious education in schools, while we also present social expectations of religions’
social role, attitudes on relation between politics and religion, position of Catholic Church and
other religious communities, and issues of financing religious communities as some of the
features of Church-state relations.
a) Social expectations from religious education in schools
Data on attitudes toward religious education are available from various researches
conducted on representative samples of the adult population in Croatia, as well as samples of
pupils and teachers.
32
The 1989 research showed that sixty-eight percent of adult citizens
answer “yes” and thirty-two per cent answered “no” to the question: “Should a greater role in
education for religious organizations be allowed?” Even at that time the tolerance and
readiness to accept a greater role for the Church in education was present among the majority
of respondents.
19
In research conducted in 1996, respondents were asked about their opinion concerning
introduction of religious education in public schools. The majority (sixty-five percent)
declared that religious/confessional instruction in public schools should be optional which it
already was at that time. Another twenty-eight percent thought it should be mandatory and
only seven percent that it should be expelled from public schools.
In research conducted in 2004, respondents were asked to answer the question “How
should be religion taught in schools?” Less than half of respondents (forty-two per cent) were
in favour of confessional instruction, twenty-six percent favored the subject “religious
culture”, twenty-one percent supported both options, and eleven percent said that neither is
needed in public schools.
Data from the research on the representative sample of primary school pupils are also
of interest here: forty-eight percent of pupils were for, and fifty-two per cent against
confessional religious instruction in schools
33
.
Finally, according to the opinion of the school-grade and junior-high teachers, thirty-
four percent consider that religious instruction should not be conducted in public school. At
the same time, they support the introduction of more foreign languages, IT as a mandatory
subject, sex education, learning about human rights etc. They consider that the inadequacy of
the present curriculum lies in the fact that it is insufficiently balanced, as can be seen in the
under-representation of “pedagogical’’ subjects whose number of hours per week should be
increased (arts, music, gym, health and technical culture) and over-representation of some
others which should be reduced (religious instruction is in the first place, as mentioned by
fifty-one percent of teachers)
34
.
b) Social expectations about some other aspects of Church-state relations
20
Ančić
35
analyzed data from the European Value Study (1999/2000) and the Aufbruch
project (2007) and found out that in seven analyzed countries (Bulgaria, Croatia, Poland,
Romania, Slovakia, Ukraine, Hungary) public differently assess religion’s possibility to give
answers to moral problems from possibility to give answers to social problems. It also
revealed that respondents differentiate socio-political and socio-cultural role of religion, while
socio-political role of religion was the least accepted. Results for Croatia from the Table 1
confirm this claim. Around eighty percent of respondents reject religion’s interference with
politics while seventy percent do not find it appropriate when religious organizations involve
themselves in the politics of the government.
Table 1. Religion and politics in Croatia (%)
(Strongly)
agree
Neither agree
or disagree
(Strongly)
disagree
Can’t
choose
Religious leaders should not
influence people's vote on elections
82,6
7,5
7,6
1,7
Religious leaders should not
influence government
78,1
9,7
9,2
2,1
ISSP 2008
Acceptance of the social role of religion is confirmed, but is not unambiguous (Table
2). There is a considerable space for Churches to address some pressing social issues, such as
growing social differences and unemployment. Expectations in regard to the engagement of
religious organizations in more private issues, such as abortion, extramarital relations, and
same-sex relations are not expected by large majority, but still about half of respondents find
it appropriate that big Christian churches deal with these issues. The acceptance of the social
21
role of big Christian churches (the phrase used in the Aufbruch research projected) is also
visible from the approval of Church ownership of social institutions, like hospitals or
retirement homes
36
.
Table 2. Social expectations from religion’s social role in Croatia (%)
Do you find it appropriate, when the big Christian
Churches deal with the following issues?
Unemployment
Abortion
Extramarital relations
Same-sex relations
Growing social differences
Politics of the government
AUFBRUCH 2007
The social role of Churches, or even the social role of big Christian Churches, does not
imply inequality. The data presented in the Table 3 reveal that Croatian citizens strongly
support the equal right for all religious groups, and indeed think this is not happening in
reality as in the 2004 research 60.8% claimed that the state privileges the Catholic Church.
More research in these issues is needed. The acceptance of equality is encouraging; however,
that should be put in correlation with the acceptance of new religious groups as there are
indicators that Croats are very suspicious about new religious groups.
Table 3. Religious communities in Croatia - social perception and social expectation
In your opinion how do you perceive the relationship of
the state towards religious communities in Croatia?*
%
22
State privileges the Catholic Church
60,8
All churches are treated equally
38,6
State privileges (some of) non-Catholic churches
0,6
All religious groups should have equal rights**
%
(Strongly) agree
81,0
Neither agree or disagree
7,7
(Strongly) disagree
8,2
Can’t choose
2,5
*SOCIAL AND RELIGIOUS CHANGES IN CROATIA 2004
**ISSP 2008
However, there are different opinions when it comes to the issue of financing. As we
mentioned before, in public debates concerning the financing of Churches there were claims
that the Catholic Church gets too much from the state budget. Financing of other Churches,
(those with signed contracts with the Government), although they according to their size get
much less, were not questioned in public. So, the question how the Churches should be
financed still remains partly open.
Table 4. Religions and finance in Croatia
In your opinion, how should religious
communities finance in Croatia?
%
What do you think about taxation of
religious communities in Croatia?
%
There should be a church tax only for the
believers with a permanent income
9,9
Religious organizations should pay
taxes on income and assets
42,3
There should be a church tax for all citizens
with a permanent income
6,3
Religious organizations should not pay
taxes on income and assets
21,9
23
They should be financed from the state
budget
35,3
Do not know
35,9
They should be financed on their own
(charity and their own revenues)
48,5
SOCIAL AND RELIGIOUS CHANGES IN CROATIAN SOCIETY 2004.
The results shown in table four reveal that there is support for financing from the state
budget, but 48.5% think that the churches should rely on sources other than the government to
finance their activities. Tax exemptions are also not widely accepted.
CONCLUSION
This article has addressed Church-state relations in Croatia since the collapse of
communism and the breakdown of Yugoslavia. As these relations changed completely in
comparison with socialist times, we have presented in detail the development of the legal
framework, particularly as visible in the new Croatian Constitution passed in December 1990,
the Agreements with the Holy See signed from 1996 and 1998, the Law on Legal Status of
Religious Communities from 2002, and regulation of status of other religious communities.
On the basis of the foregoing analysis, we can conclude that Croatia has similarities with
those European countries which are usually included in a group of countries with selective
cooperation (countries which usually opted for separation of Church and state but build
different links with mainly traditional communities, and grant and protect their numerous
social functions), and consequently a group of countries with a pyramidal model of status of
different religious communities. There are three issues that should be mentioned in connection
with that. First, although we included Croatia in a group of countries with selective, not equal
cooperation with different religious communities, there are of course further differences
24
between these countries: Croatia has been an example in which, particularly in 1990s, the
strong link between the political regime and the Catholic Church was maintained. Second, the
government took a large number of arbitrary decisions, even reflecting incompetence, which
has been visible in a way of formulating the agreements with the Holy See, and moreover in a
way the government acted in connection with the registration of other religious communities
and signing of agreements on issues of mutual interests with them. Third, although
historically and culturally deeply embedded, Church-state models are under constant
pressures (though pressures could be very contradictory), but in many countries there are at
least an open public debate about different aspects of Church-state relations. We still miss that
kind of debate in Croatia.
Another part of the article has focussed on religious education. Again, without much
debate but in line with the strong social and political presence of the Catholic Church, and
even in line with a majority public opinion, confessional religious instruction was introduced
in public schools in 1991 as an optional subject. Eventually, the religious instruction has
become a widely accepted subject with developed curricula, textbooks, and teachers, and is
taught not only by the Catholic Church but by other traditional religious communities. Still,
there are some open issues, such as those connected with the treatment of minority
(particularly those non-traditional, or “sects”) religions as well as of those who do not belong
to any religion. Data about attendance of religious instruction show that the attendance is,
mainly in primary schools, higher than the ratio of Catholics in population (80.6% according
to the European Value Survey data from 2008),
37
which can be an indication of social
pressure in that respect.
In order to complement our analysis we also addressed social expectations from
religions. Presented data confirmed that, as said, religious instruction is accepted but as an
optional subject and, which we find particularly important, that citizens differentiate between
25
socio-political (which was rejected), and socio-cultural (which was mainly accepted) role of
religion. People support the social presence of traditional Churches, their social function that
should be supported by the state, but do not support their political involvement, do not
support unequal treatment of different religious communities (but we do not know if that
include all minority religions that are usually considered as controversial), and are unsure how
Churches should be financed. Indeed, the direct state financing is not supported by the
majority.
In sum, Church-state relations reflect history and overall social circumstances. It is
therefore not surprising that Croatia has developed a kind of model which privileges the
Catholic Church, which accepts and cooperates with other predominantly traditional religious
communities, while it discriminates some others. Still, privileges (as they reflect differences
in social significance) could not be in a sharp contrast with sensitivity to needs of other
religions, and to people with different religious or irreligious stands. That remains a main
challenge for the future. We do not expect any radical change of the existing model in the
near future, but certainly its slight refining in line with democratic development.
NOTES
1
See S. Zrinščak, “Church, State and Society in Post-communist Europe”, in Religion and the
State. A Comparative Sociology. ed. J. Barbalet, A. Possamai and B. S. Turner, 159-184
(London: Anthem Press, 2011).
2
See G. Robbers, “State and Church in the European Union”, in State and Church in the
European Union, ed. G. Robbers, 577-589 (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft,
2005).; See also R. Torfs, “Religion and State Relationship in Europe”, Religious Studies
26
Review, Vol 1, No. 4 (2007): 31-41; S. Ferrari, “The Legal Dimension”, in Muslims in the
Enlarged Europe. Religion and Society, ed. B. Maréchel, S. Allievi, F. Dassetto, J. Nielsen,
166-190 (Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2003).; and S. Ferrari, The European Pattern of Church and
State Relations, Comparative Law, Vol. 20 (2003): 1-24.
3
See S. Ferrari, “The Legal Dimension”, in Muslims in the Enlarged Europe. Religion and
Society, ed. B. Maréchel, S. Allievi, F. Dassetto, J. Nielsen, 166-190 (Leiden-Boston: Brill,
2003).
4
See Z. Roter, “Katoliška cerkev in država v Jugoslaviji 1945-1973“, (Ljubljana: Cankarjeva
založba, 1976); see also S. Zrinščak, „Odnos Crkve i države u Hrvatskoj od 1945. do 1990.
Godine“, in Religija i sloboda. Religijska situacija u Hrvatskoj 1945-1990, ed. I Grubišić,
107-125 (Split: Institut za primjenjena društvena istraživanja – Centar Split, 1993).
5
See Z. Roter, “The Position of Believers as Second-Class Citizens in Socialist Countries:
The Case of Yugoslavia, Occasional Papers in Religion in Eastern Europe Vol. 3 (1989): 1-
17.
6
See S. Zrinščak, “Religion and Values“, in Democratic Transition in Croatia, ed. S. P.
Ramet and D. Matić, 137-159 (Texas: A&M University Press, College Station, 2007); see
also S. Zrinščak, “Rôles, attentes et conflits: la religion et les Eglises dans les sociétés en
transition, Social Compass, Vol.49, No.4 (2002): 509-521; E. Pace, Zašto religije ulaze u rat?
(Zagreb: Golden marketing tehnička knjiga, 2009); and J. Jukić, “Društvo, rat i religija“,
Društvena istraživanja, Vol. 3. No. 10-11 (2-3) (1994): 165-189.
7
See S. Vrcan, Vjera u vrtlozima tranzicije (Split: Glas Dalmacije, Revija Dalmatinske akcije,
2001); See also S. P. Ramet, “The Catholic Church in Croatia since 1990“ in Serbia, Croatia,
and Slovenia at Peace and at War: Selected Writings 1983-2007, ed. S. P. Ramet, (Berlin &
Vienna: Lit Verlag, 2008).
27
8
Ustav Republike Hrvatske, Narodne novine No. 56/9, 1990.
9
Ugovori između Svete Stolice i Republike Hrvatske, Zagreb: Glas koncila, 2001.
10
See M. Alinčić, “Građanski brak sklopljen prema državnim propisima i u vjerskom
pogledu“, Zbornik Pravnog fakulteta u Zagrebu Vol. 47, 6(1997): 647-676.; see also A.
Uzelac, “Od liberalizma do katolicizma: neki apsekti reguliranja pravnih odnosa između
crkve i države u Republici Hrvatskoj – novo pravno uređenje braka”, in Liberaliziam i
katolicizam u Hrvatskoj. II. Dio, ed. Hans-Georg. Fleck i Grozdana Cvitan, 242-291 (Zagreb:
Friedrich-Neumann Stiftung, 1999).
11
I. Padjen, “Church and State in Croatia”, in Law and Religion in Post-Communist Europe,
ed. S. Ferrari and W. C. Durham Jr., 57-80 (Leuven-Paris-Dudley, MA, 2003); J. Milić,
“Pravni i činjenični status vjerskih zajednica u Republici Hrvatskoj”, Hrvatska pravna revija
br. Vol. 3(2008): 9-15.
12
S. Zrinščak, “Religion and Society in Tension in Croatia: Social and Legal Status of
Religious Communities”, in Regulating Religion. Case Studies from Around the Globe, ed. J.
T. Richardson, 299-318 (New York: Kluwer Academic Plenum Publishers, 2004).
13
Zakon o pravnom položaju vjerskih zajednica, Narodne novine br.: 83, 2002.
14
J. Bozanić, “Najnovija europska istraživanja o vjeronauku u školi“ in Identitet kao odgojno-
obrazovna vrednota. Zbornik radova s tribina Zajednički vidic, ed. Valentina Blaženka
Mandarić and Ružica Razum, 11-26 (Zagreb: Glas Koncila,2009).
15
Ibid
16
Zakon o potvrđivanju Ugovora između Svete Stolice i Republike Hrvatske o suradnji na
području odgoja i culture, Narodne novine, Međunarodni ugovori, 2/97 izvod.
28
17
Ugovor između Vlade RH i HBK o katoličkom vjeronauku u javnim školama i vjerskom
odgoju u javnim predškolskim ustanovama, signed 29.01.1999, Narodne novine, Međunarodni
ugovori, No. 2/97, 1999.
18
For Catholic religious instruction information: Valentina Blaženka Mandarić, “Vjeronaučna
nastava iz organizacijsko-pravne i statističke perspektive”, Lađa, Vol. 6, No. 3 (2011): 10-11.
19
For Islamic religious instructions information obtained from “Godišnji izvještaj o
polaznicima vjeronauka Mešihata Islamske zajednice u Hrvatskoj” (information gained from
Mešihat).
20
For Orthodox religious instruction information provided Info-service of Eparchy
osječkopoljska and baranjska of Serbian Orthodox Church.
21
Anton Peranić, “Dosadašnja iskustva s vjeronaukom u školi na području Riječke
metropolije”, Riječki teološki časopis, Vol. 6, No. 1 (1998): 156-164.
22
Ibid.
23
A large number of articles in the review Kateheza were dedicated to the desirable personal
characteristics of the religious instruction teacher during 1999s and on.
24
Ugovor između Vlade Republike Hrvatske i Hrvatske biskupske konferencije o katoličkom
vjeronauku u javnim školama i vjerskom odgoju u javnim predškolskim ustanovama, (signed
on 29th of January, 1999), http://www.nku.hbk.hr/dokumenti/index.html, (accessed 21
May,2011).
25
Program katoličkog vjeronauka u osnovnoj školi, Narodne novine br. 156/03, 2003.
26
The program follows the relevant catechetic and other documents of the Catholic Church,
especially the documents of the II. Vatican Council, the General Catechetic Directorate (GCD
1997), the Croatian Bishops’ document “Joyful Announcement of the Gospel and Upbringing
in Belief” (1983), Catechism of the Catholic Church (1993), basic starting points of the Plan
29
and Program of the Catholic Religious Instruction in Primary School (1998) of the Croatian
Bishop’s Conference, and its document the Parish Catechesis in Renewal of the Parish
Community (2000).
27
Program katoličkog vjeronauka u osnovnoj školi, Narodne novine br. 156/03, 2003.
28
A. Marinović Bobinac and D. Marinović Jerolimov, “Religious education in Croatia”, in
Religion and Pluralism in Education: Comparative Approaches in the Western Balkans, ed.
Z. Kuburić and C. Moe, 39-71 (Novi Sad : CEIR, 2006).
29
Ibid
30
Ibid
31
"Vjeronauk - nova ideologizacija?"in Slobodna Dalmacija, September 23, 1990.
32
Researches on representative samples of adult population: “Social structure and quality of
life” conducted the Institute for Social Research Zagreb in 1989, “Social structure and
quality of life in the transitional period” conducted the “Centre for transition and civil society
research” in 1996, “Social and Religious Changes in Croatian Society” conducted the Institute
for Social Research Zagreb in 2004. Research on representative sample of primary school
pupils from 5th to 8th grade “Children and the media” conducted in 2000 by the Institute for
Social Research Zagreb and the State Bureau for the Protection of Family, Motherhood and
Youth, and “Evaluation of the curriculum and development of the models of curriculum for
primary education in Croatia” conducted by the Centre for Education of the Institute for
Social Research in Zagreb in 2003 on the sample of 2134 junior-high and 1134 grade-school
teachers and 2674 pupils of the 8th grade and 120 principals in 121 primary schools in
Croatia.
30
33
A. Marinović Bobinac, “Obitelj i škola”, in Djeca i mediji, ed. V. Ilišin, A. Marinović
Bobinac and F. Radin, 41-77 (Zagreb: Državni zavod za zaštitu obitelji, materinstva i mladeži
and Institut za društvena istraživanja u Zagrebu, 2001).
34
B. Baranović, “Osnovni trendovi razvoja i metodologija izrade nacionalnog kurikuluma za
obavezno obrazovanje”, Metodika, Vol. 6, No. 10 (2005): 22-43.
35
B. Ančić, “What Do We Want from Religion? Religiosity and Social Expectations in
Central and Eastern Europe”, in Space and Borders. Current Research on Religion in Central
and Eastern Europ, ed. A. M. Tóth and C. Rughiniş, 151-169 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter,
2011).
36
See S. Zrinščak, “Church, State and Society in Post-communist Europe”, in Religion and
the State. A Comparative Sociology. ed. J. Barbalet, A. Possamai and B. S. Turner, 159-184
(London: Anthem Press, 2011).
37
See G. Črpić and S. Zrinščak, „Dinamičnost u stabilnosti: Religioznost u Hrvatskoj 1999. i
2008. godine“Društvena istraživanja, Vol. 105-106, No. 1-2 (2010): 3-37.
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This article analyses the welfare role of the Church in Croatia and Finland focusing on the way majority churches co-operate with secular authorities in social welfare. The main question is how co-operation is conditioned by the history of both differentiation between Church and State and the continuing strong position of majority churches in both countries, in particular within the context of the restructuring of the welfare state and the increasing role of non-state actors. Based on a review of the literature and the results of empirical qualitative data from three regions in each country, the article provides insights into the co-operation—both formal and informal—and in general confirms a complex interaction between the religious and the secular, which challenges the view of the strict separation between the two spheres. In terms of theory, and besides theories of distinctive welfare models and the specific history of Church–State relations, the article relies on the religious–secular competition theory to explain the research results.
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The chapter investigates the role of religion in prison in Croatia from legal and sociological points of view. As a legal provision, the religious right of prisoners was set up only in the late 1990s and the early 2000s. The intention was to determine whether it was respected by state authorities, in particular in relation to small religious communities and their believers. Based on the analysis of the legal framework and data gathered from the Ministry of Justice, as well as on semi-structured interviews with authorised religious persons from different religions, both majority and minority, it has been concluded that all religious communities have equal access to prisons. However, this general conclusion is followed by a detailed description that shows how the system really works in its different aspects. An inclusive approach revealed in relation to the access of different religions to prisons is discussed in the Conclusion in relation to some particularities of the Croatian case, such as debates about religious presence in public institutions, limited and contested pluralisation in Croatian society in general, weak State performance, etc.
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Migracije su postale goruće pitanje suvremenoga svijeta, a imigranti »inkarnacija autsajdera«. Sve učestalije naglašavanje njihove kulturne i pritom dominantno religijske različitosti od većinskoga stanovništva u zemljama primitka poticaj je za istraživanje povezanosti religije i migracija. U radu se na temelju empirijskog istraživanja stavova prema stranim radnicima u Hrvatskoj propituje postoji li povezanost između religioznosti i stavova prema imigrantima te religija kao simbolička granica prema imigrantima. U prvom dijelu rada problematizira se primarno sociološki pristup istraživanju povezanosti religije i imigracije. Potom se iznose i analiziraju rezultati istraživanja provedenoga s pomoću anketnoga upitnika na reprezentativnom uzorku od 1300 punoljetnih hrvatskih građana i građanki. Pritom se dovode u vezu dimenzije religioznosti (religijska samoidentifikacija, konfesionalna samoidentifikacija i religijska praksa), stav prema povezanosti religijskoga i nacionalnog identiteta i izražena društvena distanca prema pripadnicima drugih religija (nekatolicima), kao nezavisne varijable, s izraženim stavovima prema stranim (imigrantskim) radnicima. Pokazalo se da su sve tri istraživane dimenzije religioznosti statistički značajno povezane sa stavovima prema imigrantima, odnosno da su oni religiozniji i koji prakticiraju religiju skloniji izraziti veću društvenu distancu prema imigrantima i imigrante percipirati ponajprije kao kulturnu prijetnju. Također se pokazuje da su društvenu distancu prema imigrantima skloni izraziti oni koji imaju stav da su religijsko i nacionalno usko povezani, a osobito oni koji su skloni izraziti društvenu distancu prema pripadnicima drugih religija (nekatolicima).
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Discussing religion and values in Croatia, and the influence of religion on dominant values, is an extremely difficult task for at least three important reasons. The shortage of data is the first and most obvious one. Research on this topic during the communist period was rare, and in the following years the situation became even worse, especially with regard to comparative research that would allow comparisons with other countries at different points in time. Even in cases in which such a comparison is possible, a methodological problem arises from the fact of extremely different social circumstances before and after 1990. The change significantly affected religion, which, although it had considerable social impact, was relegated to a marginal position under communism and has enjoyed a completely different situation during the post communist period. Religion, including individual Churches as its institutional and concrete manifestation, is not a unique and unproblematic social reality. The accepted norm in the sociology of religion is to differentiate among at least five dimensions: Belief (the ideological dimension), practice (ritual), feelings (experience), knowledge (intellectual), and effects (the consequential dimension). There can be and usually are "inconsistencies" among these dimensions. Analysis of religious institutions further complicates the picture, particularly in the case of very complex institutional bodies, like the Catholic Church-in such a case there is a need not only to identify what messages come from the different institutional parts of the same Church but also to assess which message is more influential and, moreover, what kind of power can be attributed to Churches operating within complex social circumstances. Scientific analysis that pays attention only to one aspect of influence or to a single side of a rather complex story offers a misleading picture.1 Differentiation of the religious dimension does not solve the problem of religious influence in contemporary, usually secularized societies. Two recent analyses are worth mentioning in this regard. Loek Halman and Thorleif Peters son found that religion lost its influence over many public issues but maintained its power over private and family issues, even in highly secularized societies. The influence of religion on attitudes toward the parent- child relationship or abortion, for example, can be even stronger in societies where religious involvement is comparatively low than in societies where religious involvement is comparatively high; it tends to be stronger in the Netherlands than in Ireland.2 On the other hand, Rodney Stark found that data from the 1990 World Values Survey suggest that the relationship between religion (measured as the importance of God in everyday life) and morality is weakest in Eastern Europe, particularly in the Orthodox countries of Eastern Europe. He explains his findings largely as a consequence of communist repression of religion, which was consequently unable to act in a public space.3 The complexity of the religious situation in Eastern Europe, visible in great differences among countries concerning the position, role, and influence of their religions, I have discussed elsewhere.4 The same can be said about the "inconsistency, " at least in Croatia and some other countries, between liberal and religious- normative values.5 To reduce an enormous task to manageable proportions, this chapter explores only partially the relations between religion and values by focusing on two connected research problems: Church- State relations, and relations between religion and some democratic values. In the first part I analyze the basic development of Church- State relations in Croatia after 1990 according to the new social circumstances, emphasizing the question of religious minorities and the problem of reconciliation between the social significance of a particular religion and the principle of equality of all religions. The second part, based on data from 1999-2000 European Values Survey, explores attitudes toward different questions concerning democratic development, with a particular focus on the differences between those who are more and those who are less religious. When appropriate, but more systematically in this second part, I compare the Croatian data with Slovenian data. The comparison between Croatia and Slovenia can be interesting because while these two countries had similar pasts (they were the most developed parts of socialist Yugoslavia and republics with a Catholic majority), they have had very different experiences in the transition period; the war that occurred in connection with the Slovenian declaration of independence from socialist Yugoslavia in 1991 lasted only days, and this country has experienced a much easier and more successful transition to democracy. The analysis here, in conjunction with other research mentioned, lays the base for the main thesis of the chapter, which posits that religion-and particularly the Catholic Church in Croatia, which serves a symbolic "sacred canopy" for the Croatian people-had much more social power at the beginning of the 1990s in the context of threatened national identity, while in the late 1990s and the first years of the twenty- first century it has become only one among other important social factors affecting the development of democracy and overall modernization of the society.6.
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Introduction The collapse of communism is most usually symbolically equated with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 (about twenty years ago), although in some countries it is reckoned a bit later. But the term “post-communist Europe” is not an adequate one for variety of reasons. Two of these reasons are worth mentioning in connection with the content of this chapter. First, the term simply acknowledges that some countries have a communist past, but does not say anything about the main features their new social orders have developed during years of post-communist transformation. Second, there are numerous post-communist countries, countries which range from the center of the continent through the southeast to Eastern Europe, or from the Czech Republic and Slovenia through Macedonia and Albania to Ukraine and Moldova. These are countries with different histories, social and cultural specificities and social development possibilities with, in a word, profound social differences despite 45 (or, in the case of the majority of ex-Soviet Union states, 70) years of common past. Therefore, the term “post-communist Europe” used in this chapter is simply a technical one. In addition, the chapter covers only part of post-communist Europe: countries that joined the European Union in 2004 (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia) or in 2007 (Bulgaria and Romania) and one country which is set to become the twenty eight member state of the European Union in July 2013 (Croatia). © 2011 Jack Barbalet, Adam Possamai and Bryan S. Turner editorial matter and selection.
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Drawing on data from the European Values Study (EVS) 1999, the author gives a brief overview of religions in post-communist societies and Croatia's place among them. He shows that for some societies religion is still crucial for their overall functioning. In order to understand this role, which is only partially visible on the level of empirical data, and to point out some difficulties in the sociological approach to it, the author discusses two themes: religion and war, and religion and transition. Although the recent war on the territory of the former Yugoslavia was not a religious one, the Churches played a key role both at the symbolic level of maintenance of separate national identities, and on the level of complex social processes. The contradictory and uncertain nature of transition processes additionally complicated the role of religion in society and partly prevented its accommodation to new social circumstances. These elements can all be seen in the different roles that religion has to play, contradictory expectations of the public towards the Church and sharp social conflicts that divide society.
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Churches as essential components of European culture have major significance for European integration. A Europe, bound by common constitutional traditions, cultures and traditions of its Member States, their national identity and the principle of subsidiarity, will have to respect the deep-rooted systems of State and Church relationships in its Member States. The volume presents in its third edition a broad comparison of different systems of State and Church relationships in the Member States of the European Union. It includes the new Member States and gives an account of the new developments throughout Europe. The volume shows the implications of European integration on the position of the Churches. It is of interest to all working in the field of State-Church relationship as well as to public and church institutions. The volume has been produced in association with the European Consortium for State-Church Research. The authors are experts in the field from the different Member States of the European Union, presenting the relevant systems of their home countries. The editor is a former professor at the University of Trier.
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Historical as well as current social processes are key factors for understanding particular social questions, such as churchstate relations in a country. Differences in European patterns of churchstate relations are only understandable from different historical legacies, as some prominent analyses show (e.g., Robbers, 1996). This is also the best way to control ideological positions that can in different and subtle ways influence not only the architecture of church-state relations but also scientific approaches to them. But the question arises, in what way can sociological understanding serve as a basis for analysis? Or, to put in a different way: to what extent can understanding serve as justification?
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The religion–state relationship is determined at the national level in Europe, and European systems give the impression of variety—from strict separation (France, the Netherlands) to state churches (England, Denmark, Finland, Greece). Yet they share specific values and approaches that indicate a coherent European model, characterized by the continuous existence of a two level system: level A, in which all religious groups enjoy individual, collective, and organizational liberty; and level B, in which there is a typically European level of state support, both moral and financial, to one or more religious groups.
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This paper is based on the results of the European Values Study carried out in Croatia in 2008 on a sample of 1525 individuals, adults living in Croatia. The study was performed to compare the state of religiosity in Croatia to that of 1999 when the same population was tested with the same questionnaire during the first study. The basic dimension of religiosity was studied. We were interested in whether there have been significant changes in the dynamics of religious life in Croatia, and in which direction these changes might be going. The results obtained indicate that the level of religiosity in Croatia continues to be high and stable, although some significant changes are visible. For individual indicators we note a slight decrease in the level of religiosity, particularly in respect of denominational identification, attending religious services and the public role of the Church where a significant decrease in confidence in the Church was noted, particularly in the ability of the Church to provide an adequate response to moral, spiritual, family and social problems and questions. On the other hand, many indicators remain stable and Croatia continues to be among the most religious countries in Europe. One result of the research of particular importance is insight into the dynamics of changes in the structure of religiosity. An increased share of young people compared to older people was registered among the religious, as well as an increase in the share of men and a decreased share of women.
The Legal Dimension The European Pattern of Church and State Relations
  • S Ferrari Maréchel
  • S Allievi
  • F Dassetto
  • J Nielsen
  • S Ferrari
Review, Vol 1, No. 4 (2007): 31-41; S. Ferrari, "The Legal Dimension", in Muslims in the Enlarged Europe. Religion and Society, ed. B. Maréchel, S. Allievi, F. Dassetto, J. Nielsen, 166-190 (Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2003).; and S. Ferrari, The European Pattern of Church and State Relations, Comparative Law, Vol. 20 (2003): 1-24.
Od liberalizma do katolicizma: neki apsekti reguliranja pravnih odnosa izmedu crkve i države u Republici Hrvatskoj-novo pravno uređenje braka
  • Alan Uzelac
  • A Uzelac
Uzelac, "Od liberalizma do katolicizma: neki apsekti reguliranja pravnih odnosa između crkve i države u Republici Hrvatskoj -novo pravno uređenje braka", in Liberaliziam i katolicizam u Hrvatskoj. II. Dio, ed. Hans-Georg. Fleck i Grozdana Cvitan, 242-291 (Zagreb: Friedrich-Neumann Stiftung, 1999).