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Psychological Science
http://pss.sagepub.com/content/early/2014/09/12/0956797614547919
The online version of this article can be found at:
DOI: 10.1177/0956797614547919
published online 12 September 2014Psychological Science
Marieke Roskes, Daniel Sligte, Shaul Shalvi and Carsten K. W. De Dreu
Does Approach Motivation Induce Right-Oriented Bias? Reply to Price and Wolfers (2014)
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DOI: 10.1177/0956797614547919
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Commentary
In 2011, we tested the hypothesis that people exhibit a
right-oriented bias when they are approach motivated
and act quickly (Roskes, Sligte, Shalvi, & De Dreu, 2011).
An experiment showed that when people had to act
quickly, they bisected lines farther to the right when they
were approach motivated than when they were avoid-
ance motivated. Analysis of archival data on soccer pen-
alty shoot-outs further revealed that goalkeepers dived
more to the right when their team was behind than when
their team was not behind, a situation we propose
induces approach motivation.
Price and Wolfers (2014) challenge whether the right-
oriented bias manifests itself in goalkeepers’ behavior.
They make three critiques of our findings: (a) The effect
does not replicate, (b) an alternative coding of “being
behind” eliminates the effect, and (c) the goalkeepers’
tendency to dive right is not dysfunctional. Our analysis
suggests that the bias exists, although Price and Wolfers’s
alternative coding raises interesting questions about the
exact settings that evoke approach motivation. We are
happy to see that more data are being collected, which
is important for enhancing understanding of the
phenomenon.
Prior research has demonstrated an association
between approach motivation and a variety of right-ori-
ented biases. This association is explained by increased
left-hemispheric brain activation under approach motiva-
tion, which enhances attention and action readiness
toward the right (Vallortigara & Rogers, 2005). For exam-
ple, dogs wag their tails toward the right when they
observe their owners (Quaranta, Siniscalchi, & Vallor tigara,
2007), and when quickly dividing lines into equal parts,
approach-motivated people divide them to the right of
their centers (Nash, McGregor, & Inzlicht, 2010). In our
original study, we tested whether right-oriented bias
under approach motivation is more likely to appear
when people have to act fast than when they have more
time in which to override their automatic responses. Price
and Wolfers challenge neither the theory nor the results
of our experiment. Rather, they challenge whether
approach motivation evokes right-oriented bias in goal-
keepers during penalty shoot-outs.
Does Right-Oriented Bias Affect
Goalkeepers?
In our original article, we aimed to identify real-life situ-
ations in which right-oriented biases occur. During soc-
cer penalty shoot-outs, goalkeepers make split-second
decisions between diving left and diving right. Penalty
shoot-outs are likely to evoke approach motivation
among goalkeepers because, as Oliver Kahn (a famous
German goalkeeper) explained, “Kickers are the ones
that can lose in a penalty shoot-out; goalkeepers . . . can
win and ultimately become the heroes” (quoted in
“Goalkeepers Give Shoot-Out Tips,” 2010, para. 25). We
predicted that approach motivation would be even stron-
ger when the goalkeepers’ team is behind and their role
in winning the match is crucial. We analyzed all penalty
shoot-outs from Fédération Internationale de Football
547919PSSXXX10.1177/0956797614547919Roskes et al.Right-Oriented Bias
research-article2014
Corresponding Author:
Marieke Roskes, Guilford Glazer Faculty for Business and
Management, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, P. O. Box 653,
Beer Sheva 84105, Israel
E-mail: mroskes@som.bgu.ac.il
Does Approach Motivation Induce Right-
Oriented Bias? Reply to Price and
Wolfers (2014)
Marieke Roskes1, Daniel Sligte2, Shaul Shalvi3, and
Carsten K. W. De Dreu2
1Guilford Glazer Faculty for Business and Management, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev;
2Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam; and 3Department of Psychology, Ben-Gurion
University of the Negev
Received 6/4/14; Revision accepted 7/28/14
Psychological Science OnlineFirst, published on September 12, 2014 as doi:10.1177/0956797614547919
at Association for Psychological Science on September 13, 2014pss.sagepub.comDownloaded from
2 Roskes et al.
Association (FIFA) World Cup matches: Goalkeepers
whose team was behind were more likely to dive right
(71%) than left (29%), compared with those whose team
was not behind (48% vs. 49%, respectively); see Table 1.
Price and Wolfers’s first critique is that they could not
replicate the pattern in two additional competitions:
Union of European Football Associations (UEFA)
Champions League and Copa América. In these tourna-
ments, the interaction between standing of the goalkeep-
er’s team (behind vs. not behind) and diving direction
(right vs. left) was not significant (Table 1). Recent rec-
ommendations suggest that assessing accumulated data
is more informative than interpreting results of single
studies (Braver, Thoemmes, & Rosenthal, 2014; Stanley &
Spence, 2014). We therefore aggregated the data from the
three tournaments, and this revealed the same pattern as
the original data: Goalkeepers whose team was behind
were more likely to dive right (68%) than left (27%), com-
pared with those whose team was not behind (52% vs.
43%, respectively), p = .022 (Table 1).
Cumming (2013) proposed that replications should
not be labeled as successes (p < .05) or failures (p > .05)
and that confidence intervals are a better way to present
differences. Figure 1 presents the differences between
the proportion of goalkeepers who dived right when
their team was behind and the proportion who dived
right when their team was not behind. Indeed, the repli-
cation does not rule out a zero effect in the combined
UEFA and Copa América data (zero falls within the con-
fidence interval). However, it is also consistent with the
existence of right-oriented bias.
Price and Wolfers’s second critique relates to the situ-
ations evoking approach motivation. Because the game’s
score is salient, we had originally coded goalkeepers’
Table 1. Goalkeeper and Kicker Behavior Across Different Game Situations
Standing of goalkeeper’s
team
Goalkeeper’s behavior Kicker’s behavior
Direction of
goalkeeper’s dives Chi-square
interaction
pvalue
Chi-square
simple-effect
p value
Direction of penalty
kick Chi-square
interaction
p value
Chi-square
simple-effect
p valueRight (%) Left (%)
Goalie’s
right (%)
Goalie’s
left (%)
Data from FIFA World Cup .046 .594
Behind (n = 24) 70.8 29.2 .041 54.2 37.5 .394
Not behind (n = 180) 47.8 49.4 .821 48.3 42.8 .435
Data from Copa América
and UEFA Champions
League
.215 .453
Behind (n = 32) 65.6 25.0 .016 53.1 37.5 .353
Not behind (n = 208) 55.8 36.5 .004 43.8 41.8 .764
Combined data .022 .366
Behind (n = 56) 67.8 26.8 .002 53.6 37.5 .208
Not behind (n = 388) 52.1 42.5 .054 45.9 42.3 .449
Data from FIFA World Cup
(recoded)
.410 .787
Behind (n = 53) 56.6 43.4 .336 47.2 43.4 .773
Not behind (n = 151) 48.3 48.3 1.00 49.7 41.7 .307
Data from Copa América
and UEFA Champions
League (recoded)
.296 .532
Behind (n = 72) 62.5 30.6 .005 50.0 40.3 .385
Not behind (n = 168) 54.8 36.9 .016 42.9 41.7 .867
Combined data (recoded) .161 .790
Behind (n = 125) 60.0 36.0 .006 48.8 41.6 .397
Not behind (n = 319) 51.7 42.3 .083 46.1 41.7 .403
Note: The original data from Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) World Cup shoot-outs between 1982 and 2010 were taken
from Roskes, Sligte, Shalvi, & De Dreu (2011). The original data from shoot-outs during the Copa América tournament and Union of European
Football Associations (UEFA) Champions League final games between 1984 and 2011 were taken from Price and Wolfers (2014). The chi square
interaction p value compares the tendency to dive right with the tendency to dive left as a function of whether the goalkeeper’s team is behind
versus not behind. The chi square simple-effect p value compares the observed frequency of diving (or kicking) right with the frequency of diving
(or kicking) left with the expected frequency of choosing a side at random (50%-50%).
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Right-Oriented Bias 3
teams as behind if their team scored fewer goals than
their competitors. Price and Wolfers devised an alterna-
tive coding method, in which goalkeepers’ teams were
considered behind if their team missed more attempts
than the competitors. In this situation, the score (from the
goalkeeper’s perspective) can be either behind or tied.
Although the new coding includes these different situa-
tions, we agree that this may be an elegant way to assess
goalkeepers’ motivation. However, as acknowledged by
Price and Wolfers, the alternative coding does not invali-
date our original coding.
Recoding our original data using Price and Wolfers’s
method revealed no evidence of right-oriented bias
(Table 1). However, the aggregated data show that goal-
keepers whose team was behind were more likely to dive
right (60%) than left (36%), compared with those whose
team was not behind (52% vs. 42%, respectively).
Although consistent with the predicted pattern, the inter-
action was not significant, p = .16. Price and Wolfers
wrote that “the conclusion of Roskes et al. is highly sensi-
tive to the assumption about which situations are likely
to yield approach motivation” (p. XXX). It is indeed fas-
cinating to figure out whether stronger approach motiva-
tion is evoked if one considers teams behind when they
missed more attempts to score than if one considers them
behind if they scored less, which can be tested in both
laboratory and field settings.
Finally, Price and Wolfers suggest that the goalkeepers’
right-oriented bias is not dysfunctional. In Roskes et al.
(2011), we tested the single prediction that right-oriented
bias emerges under approach motivation. We had no
predictions about the bias being either functional or dys-
functional. We discussed the possibility that the bias has
disadvantages because it reduces accuracy and can be
exploited. Price and Wolfers suggest that “the reason that
diving right in these situations is a good choice is that the
kicker is more likely to kick to the goalkeeper’s right:
54.2% of the time versus 37.5%” (p. XXX). However, as
can be seen in Table 1, effects for kickers were not
significant.
Conclusion
Approach motivation has been associated with a variety
of right-oriented biases. Price and Wolfers challenge our
observation that the bias exists among goalkeepers. The
accumulated data support the existence of right-oriented
bias; however, many questions remain open. For exam-
ple, which situations evoke approach motivation, and
when does it translate to right-oriented bias? In which
–.6 –.4 –.2 0.2.
4.
6
Difference Between the Two Proportions
FIFA Data
Copa América and UEFA Data (recoded)
Combined Data (recoded)
Copa América and UEFA Data
FIFA Data (recoded)
Combined Data
Fig. 1. Effect of the standing of the goalkeeper’s team on the goalkeeper’s decision to dive right. For each data set, the
proportion of times that the goalkeepers dived right when their team was not behind was subtracted from the propor-
tion of times that the goalkeepers dived right when their team was behind. The top three data points show results for
Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) World Cup shoot-outs between 1982 and 2010 (taken from
Roskes, Sligte, Shalvi, & De Dreu, 2011), shoot-outs during the Copa América tournament and Union of European Foot-
ball Associations (UEFA) Champions League final games between 1984 and 2011 (taken from Price & Wolfers, 2014),
and the combined data from both studies. For these analyses, goalkeepers’ teams were considered behind if they scored
fewer goals than their competitors’ teams. The lower three data points show the same data recoded according to alter-
native criteria devised by Price and Wolfers, in which goalkeepers’ teams were considered behind if they missed more
goal attempts than their competitors’ teams. The plot was generated using Exploratory Software for Confidence Intervals
(ESCI; Cumming, 2013). Error bars show 95% confidence intervals.
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4 Roskes et al.
settings does the bias emerge (e.g., drivers’ behavior)?
When is the bias dysfunctional? We hope the discussion
continues and that researchers will keep collecting new
data to provide insight into if, when, and why motivation
evokes directional biases.
Author Contributions
M. Roskes and S. Shalvi drafted the commentary, and D. Sligte
and C. K. W. De Dreu read and commented on it.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The authors declared that they had no conflicts of interest with
respect to their authorship or the publication of this article.
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