GOVERNMENT REGULATION AND BUSINESS STRATEGIES IN THE BRAZILIAN FRESH FRUIT AND VEGETABLE MARKET

Abstract

This paper addresses the issue of coordinating the Brazilian vegetable agri-chain to meet a large and widespread demand and, at the same time, to meet the higher quality standards of food services and modern retailing services. It examines three sources of change in the Brazilian fresh fruit and vegetables (FFV) chain coordination based on interviews and secondary data: a)the privatization of CEAGESP – an institutional change; b)the increasing importance of modern retail; and c)fast-food growth and new quality requirements.

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GOVERNMENT REGULATION AND BUSINESS STRATEGIES
IN THE BRAZILIAN FRESH FRUIT AND VEGETABLE MARKET
Elizabeth M.M.Q.Farina100
Eduardo Luiz Machado101
Abstract: This paper addresses the issue of coordinating the Brazilian vegetable agri-chain to
meet a large and widespread demand and, at the same time, to meet the higher quality
standards of food services and modern retailing services. It examines three sources of change
in the Brazilian fresh fruit and vegetables (FFV) chain coordination based on interviews and
secondary data: a)the privatization of CEAGESP – an institutional change; b)the increasing
importance of modern retail; and c)fast-food growth and new quality requirements.
Key Words: Chain Coordination, Fresh Fruit and Vegetable, Governance Structures
1. Introduction
The Brazilian market for fresh fruit and vegetables (FFV) is changing very fast. So far, general
standards are almost absent, transparency of market is very low, providing all sorts of rent-
seeking opportunities. Modern retail, international fast-food chains and other food services have
faced enormous difficulties to guarantee a regular and high quality supply. As a consequence a
variety of supply management strategies have been adopted.
This paper addresses the issue of coordinating the Brazilian vegetable agri-chain to meet a
large and widespread demand and, at the same time, to meet the higher quality standards of
food services and modern retailing services. The paper will focus on the supply of the São
Paulo metropolitan area, the largest in the country – 16 million people spread over 8,051 km2.
Brazil’s market for fresh fruit and vegetables has an important player: CEAGESP102 – the largest
wholesale distribution system in Latin America, which has hitherto been state-owned and
managed. However, privatization is in progress and the question is how this will affect the
supply of perishables to big cities. Although this center is located in the City of São Paulo, it
supplies other regions in Brazil and receives the outflow of those regions’ producti on as well.
This paper examines three sources of change in the Brazilian FFV chain coordination based on
interviews and secondary data: a) the privatization of CEAGESP – an institutional change; b)
the increasing importance of modern retail; and c) fast-food growth and new quality
requirements.
2. Theoretical Considerations
2.1 Characteristics of the vegetable market
Vegetables and fruits are hard to standardize because quality is difficult to measure objectively
and varies within the same lot of produce. Also, consumer preferences are heterogeneous,
increasing the complexity of defining the quality desired. Uncertainty about quality is high, as
this depends on seeds, production region, climate, season, and other natural resources. It also
depends on handling, transport, and storage conditions prior to reaching the final consumer. As
produce is highly perishable and sensitive to weather conditions, its prices may be extremely
variable, creating endogenous uncertainty. Coordination flaws lead to maladjustments that may
result in lower product value, higher costs, production losses, and shortage. (1)
100 Professor at the University of São Paulo and PENSA’s Co-coordinator
101 Ph.D. candidate in Economics at the University of São Paulo
102 Acronym for Entrepots and StorageCompany of São Paulo State. The São Paulo Entrepôt is
the largest Ceagesp warehouse.

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Demand for vegetables is geographically widespread and diversified, while production is
widespread but specialized. As urban centers grow, production moves away. Therefore,
production must be aggregated from several spots, fractionated, and regrouped according to
retail segment requirements. This is the main function of entrepots, which are subject to strong
scale, scope, and network economies, generating large wholesale markets.
High perishability, fragmented supply, and imperfect and asymmetric information give the
wholesaler a better position compared to growers in the bargaining process, especially when
product standards are absent and market prices are unstable and not well known.
The control of market power and positive and negative externalities103 potentially related to
investments in distribution centers have provided support for government regulation or
coordination regarding the dimension of entrepots, access to distribution facilities, and location.
These motives justified state-managed public investments and regulation of fresh food supply
systems in many countries, including Brazil. Sector policy in OECD countries has traditionally
aimed to defend the grower’s market position and entailed varying degrees of intervention. (2)
Notwithstanding, as Coase teaches us, the identification of some sources of market failures
does not automatically lead to a prescription for public provision of entrepots or regulation of
fresh food distribution. It must be shown that government failures accompanying intervention
are fewer than private. Experience has demonstrated that publicly-owned and -managed
distribution centers have failed to provide an efficient and sustainable system for supplying big
cities that protects growers against market power and adapts quickly to market changes.
There is a clear world trend to replace the government-regulated market mechanism with
conscious private vertical coordination, showing that traditional systems have been unable to
supply the increasing demand of modern retail, fast food, and other food services. Even private
auctions have been bypassed by contract selling. This trend raises public policy concerns
regarding price information that tends not to be publicly available and the need for officially
recognized quality standards (2).
However, analyzing the fresh off-season fruit market in France, Brousseau and Codron (1)
showed that markets and hybrid governance structures can be complementary in the vertical
coordination of the fresh fruit system.
2.2 Vertical Coordination: the role of markets and hybrid governance structures
As several studies on vertical coordination indicate, Transaction Cost Economics provides the
analytical framework to better understand vertical coordination, which may embrace a diversity
of complex arrangements (1,2,3,5). According to Williamson (4), there are three commonly
recognized governance structures: market, hybrid contracting, and hierarchy (firm). The hybrid
mode arises from a bilateral dependency strong enough to require close coordination but not
strong enough to justify full integration (1). That dependency comes, usually, from asset
specificity, measurement problems, or complexity, which, along with uncertainty, increase
transaction costs (4).
A major attribute of transactions involving fresh produce is temporal and local specificity due to
high perishability and low value/weight ratio. Both are not enough to command hybrid
coordination unless combined to a required quality or delivery time contracted by the
downstream segments of the chain.
Several economic agents are involved in supplying big cities with FFV. In order to improve the
quality of fresh produce, especially its shelf life, aspect, and microbiological control, investments
must be made by each of these agents, and their performance depends on a well-coordinated
103 The operation of entrepots exhibits scale and scope economies related to transport
rationalization, repackaging, transshipment, and delivery. Their operation is connected to a
wider network of producers, wholesalers, transporters, and consumers creating network
economies and externalities that exceed the benefits raised within the entrepot. The adoption of
common standards is critical in order to create network benefits.

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action. The perishability requires completing certain operations within a precise and often very
short time span, which can be a factor of product differentiation that influences the value and
ease of sale. A slight deviation from a planned delivery timetable can result in the operator
losing credibility in the eyes of the buyer or the rejection of the shipment at its destination. Thus,
the seller’s risk may be extremely high. However, without a system that can trace back through
the chain, it is difficult to assign responsibility for damages to the product and there is a
tendency to transfer an undue share of market risk from operators to growers through lower
prices or return of shipments. Vertical coordination can be a mean of sharing risk and/or sharing
income amongst the many agents contributing to the process (2).
Hybrid contracts improve quality and quantity control, but the market power imbalance may
persist, and the distribution conflict may preclude net benefits, which could be collected by
cooperative behavior. Many examples can be obtained from Brazil’s experience in the FFV
supply chain, where vertical integration has replaced contracts due to price negotiation
stalemates.
2.3 Strategies and Governance Structures
Modern retailing has increased its share in the FFV markets. Two main strategies have been
adopted by different companies or within the same company to supply different stores and/or
consumers: low price leadership and high quality strategies. Different strategies require different
governance structures when transaction attributes are affected. (5)
Market governance still works for most sourcing transactions. The main advantage of physical
markets is the ability to gather many buyers and sellers in one location at a time. These markets
are efficient in matching supply and demand volumes, but broad price variations may be
observed. In addition, physical transactions often damage the quality of produce in terms of
aspect, shelf life, and contamination.
There is a trend to adopt descriptive standards, avoiding visual inspection of products, which is
the prime condition for virtual markets. Standardization rules allow the separation of the
negotiation and payment functions from physical operations, reducing logistics costs and
physical manipulation.
Virtual market operations require two important features: general standards and information
systems. Transactions are managed from a distance, on the basis of price and standards (size,
variety, packing, etc.) that must be adopted by most of the system. Both are either absent or
incipient in the Brazilian FFV system. Additionally, exposure to moral hazard is one of the costs
of virtual markets. Grades are controlled without the presence of the seller who is liable to suffer
the consequences of ex-post opportunism. The more perishable the FFV is, the greater the
exposure to opportunism.
The spot market, physical or virtual, is an adequate governance structure for low price
marketing strategy. For quality strategy, conscious vertical coordination is required,
guaranteeing regularity and volume programming, the establishment of specifications whether
microbiological, physical or, imminently, the presence of GMOs. However, the definition of
quality is still complex, as is its measurement and monitoring. These endogenous uncertainties
are combined with exogenous uncertainty, resulting in incompleteness of contracts and high
exposure to opportunism. (1)
Wholesale markets may continue to play a complementary role in the supply system to modern
retailing and food services. They are an alternative source of supply for buyers and sellers and
an outlet for traders when a lot is rejected by retailing. They are also an important source for all
whose strategy is based on low price and require produce for immediate consumption or with a
shorter shelf-life. (2)
As a rule it could be argued that strictly coordinated systems would emerge when the quality
standard is much stricter than the general requirements – e.g. fast food – which, together with
perishability, results in high asset specificity commanding hybrid governance structures or
vertical integration. Recent Brazilian trends confirm this expectation.

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3. Current Organization of Brazilian FFV Markets and Changes in the
Institutional and Competitive Environments.
The Brazilian pattern of FFV consumption is very uneven: only 44% of the population consume
fruits and 58% consume vegetables. Almost 70% of total demand are concentrated in São
Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, and Belo Horizonte where open-air markets and alternative green
grocers (AGG)104 are the leading acquisition places. However, open-air markets are losing their
share fast, and supermarkets are already the main FFV suppliers in other Brazilian cities
(Exhibits 02, 05).
As expected, wholesale and retail prices vary widely not only due to seasonal effects,
decreasing almost 60% when products are in season. Prices of greens present the highest
variance compared to fruits and other food products (Exhibit 03), which increases endogenous
uncertainty and, consequently, transaction costs.
During the 60s, the Brazilian government created the CEASAs (the State Supply Centers)105, in
order to provide a public structure where private commercialization of primary produce could
occur in a competitive market, improving transparency and producers' access. At that time, a
diagnosis of FFV market flaws indicated that private investment in distributi on centers would be
sub-optimal due to network economies and externalities.
So far, the traditional and dominant commercialization system of FFV in Brazil has been
strongly dependent on physical spot markets, the CEASAs, among which São Paulo’s is the
largest and most important. FFV prices are set within these centers dominating the regional
commercialization of produce and are influenced by the strategies of wholesalers with privileged
information. Consequently, these wholesalers are interested in maintaining the current
commercialization system, albeit privately managed
Open-air markets are currently CEAGESP’s largest buyer (28% of commercialization), while
supermarkets represent 17% and have increased their share. Also, CEAGESP has increased its
importance in the public supply system through sales to other CEASAs, whose participation has
increased 16% in 10 years, and to AGGs, which have grown 14%. However, the total volume
and value traded by CEAGESP have declined 11.34% since 1995, due to the development of
alternative commercialization systems and the recent appearance of private distribution centers.
A new pattern of competition has taken hold, including price and quality competition, leading to
industry consolidation and rationalization. These new patterns of competition require that new
governance structures be adopted between FFV retailers and suppliers, as discussed below.
3.1 Transactions in the Brazilian Context: Looking for alternative coordination
systems106
3.1.1 Supermarkets X Wholesalers
Although in São Paulo open-air markets still hold the leading position, supermarkets, especially
medium and small, have increased their participation in FFV distribution in Brazil.
Since the 1990 deregulation process, and the 1994 monetary stabilization, the urban consumer
has become more demanding with respect to prices and quality. Several international retailers
have entered Brazil, through mergers and acquisitions and spurred the modernization of
Brazilian retailers. Heavier competition has depressed supermarkets’ operational margins and
104 The AGGs include three different types of retailing: varejões, sacolões and comboios. The
“varejões” are groups of several stores specialized in the sale of fruits and vegetables, at a low
price, in one place. The “sacolões” are shops where fruits and vegetables are sold by the kilo
at a single price, calculated based on the average of the wholesale prices and were created as
a social program to foster the consumption of FFV by the lower income population. The
“comboios” are mini-"varejões" with only a small store for each type of product.
105 Several private wholesale companies, of different sizes form CEASA.
106 Based on interviews with retailers and wholesalers.

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the FFV department has become a factor of differentiation and margin recovery107. However, its
management is particularly complex due to the absence of standards, and the aforementioned
uncertainty.
Larger supermarkets have made formal or informal agreements with wholesalers. Frequently,
the market risk is transferred entirely to the latter, which are paid only for the quantity actually
sold and the price negotiation is strongly based on the spot market - CEAGESP. Consequently,
most wholesalers prefer to supply small and medium supermarkets and open-air merchants
who depend almost exclusively on the wholesaler or the spot market.
The most dynamic wholesalers are implementing new strategies in order to keep their clients. A
group of CEAGESP wholesalers created an association to supply small and medium
supermarkets – The Central Delivery, using the CEAGESP infrastructure only as a logistical
point. Without formal contracts, the retailer is guaranteed a regular supply at competitive prices
and the wholesaler keeps its market-share. This strategy reduces waste and benefits both
retailer and wholesaler.
Another strategy is formal contracts between wholesaler and supermarkets. For example, the
Pão de Açucar Group has formal contracts with fruit, onion, and potato wholesalers for supply
management and waste control. Wholesaler employees are responsible for both the produce
within the stores and supply chain management. These agreements enable the supermarket to
reduce risk and increase product quality.
Hortifruti is a wholesaler that uses a very different strategy based on downstream integration.
Hortifruti has opened 15 green groceries in São Paulo, Vitória, and Rio de Janeiro. These
groceries are directly supplied from the CEASAs, where the company has stands and buys FFV
daily. Vegetables come from Vitória and fruits from São Paulo (500 miles distance). This
strategy is based mainly on price, and on a rough quality standard , enough to satisfy the few
requirements of Brazilian consumers.
These examples show that the physical market will be the basis of new competitive strategies,
thus having a place in the future FFV coordination scenario, but it will not exclude stricter chain
management.
3.1.2 Supermarkets X Growers
Larger supermarkets have invested in their own distribution centers and buy some produce
directly from the growers. Partial vertical integration is justified by the retailers as a means of
supporting the quality strategy. However, of the few requirements that are indeed valued by the
supermarket buyers -- in general related to appearance characteristics -, the most important is
the actual weight of boxes, regularity, and volume control of delivery. Few retailers are willing to
pay premium prices to farmers or wholes alers in order to stimulate quality.
They have adopted informal agreements that very often include some credible commitments
from both participants. The retailer makes partial payment up front, provides previously cleaned
boxes, and obtains the guarantee of supply.
Research among distributors and supermarkets has shown that direct supply from producers is
growing even among medium and small supermarkets and wholesalers (3). Around 30% of
distributors buy from CEAGESP and producers. However, this informati on is somewhat
misleading. For greens in particular, whose production is geographically concentrated, retailers
and wholesalers (around 60%) buy from growers buying from other growers, becoming a sort of
local distributor. Legumes and tubercles are bought primarily at CEAGESP.
On the other hand, some producer companies have built private warehouses near CEASA in
order to improve control of the quantity and quality of commercialized produce and,
107 Some Brazilian retail companies have achieved a 23% margin on FFV sales, though the
target is 30%

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consequently, the received price, which is a sign of the low transparency of business within
CEAGESP – a problem the system was designed to overcome. 108
3.1.3 Wholesalers and Industry109 X Growers
Especially important in the fresh produce market are informal contracts or arrangements based
on reciprocal advantages to participants. Agreements are enforced by trust and commercial
punishments, such as the supplier exchange, rather than by litigation. However, informal
arrangements tend to be superceded by formal methods as the market evolves and quality
requirements become stricter, i.e., as asset specificity increases. Some of these Brazilian fresh
cut company maintain formal contracts with suppliers. The contracts establish quality standards,
prices, and exclusivity between growers and firm. Contractual hold ups are frequent because
CEAGESP is a good alternative for both growers and firms to negotiate FFV products. However,
industry’s exposure to opportunistic behavior is higher as they are committed to quality
strategies, while growers can trade any level of produce quality.
Other companies that supply fast-food stores have adopted informal, though written and well-
documented, contracts in which the buyer confirms the payment in any event. When the
contracted production exceeds the demand the company pay and destroys the produce,
because there is no market to sell the excess at rewarding prices. This commitment has
guaranteed the producer investments and trust. At the same time shows that the demand for
high quality produce is small and that consumer’s or retailers are not willing to pay for higher
quality.
4. Alternative coordination systems
International fast-food companies have also invaded Brazil and many national chains have
appeared. Two important features of franchising business are: a) strict standards of business
and quality control; and b) location in expensive areas, which limits the rational use of space.
Regarding FFV, they cannot receive, clean, cut, and prepare the produce within the store and
must be supplied according to a very strict timetable. Hence, fast-food chains have become the
most demanding clients of fresh cuts, though limited in number.
4.1 Fast-food Supply Strategy
When fast-foods arrived in Brazil in 80's, they had a hard time guaranteeing supplies. The most
efficient solution at the time was backward integration, building its own distribution center.
Although not a common practice for the chain, in Brazil they could not find a supplier ready to
regularly service the stores in the time, volume, and quality demanded. Special difficulties were
faced regarding fresh cuts. On some occasions the companies imported fresh vegetables and
they still import pre-fried potatoes.
Some fast-foods contracted out to a specialized firm to managed the distribution of fresh cuts to
stores in Brazil. The requirements are very strict both in terms of timetables and quality. In this
case, quality involves physical (cuts, color, shelf life) and microbiological requirements which
are stricter than the Brazilian legislation on vegetables. As a consequence, these supply
companies had had to invest in highly-specific assets to fulfill those requirements. Fast Foods
demand a daily microbiological control and audit the company monthly. The contractual
relationship is formal but above all is based on hostages. Fast foods depend on the prompt
delivery by suppliers and the latter's return on dedicated investment capital depends on
transaction continuity.
Some fresh cuts companies also supplies modern retailers with high quality produce, as they
offer pre-packed, ready-to-eat salads whose shelf-life and productivity depend on quality of
produce and the application of high technology of handling, packing, and transportation. While
in US the usage of lettuces is about 60%, Brazilian fresh cuts companies use no more than
42%, and regular retailers and wholesalers, 30%. The most important limit to the companies
108 This is the case of FRUNORTE, the second largest melon producer, who did not trust the
Ceagesp commercialization system and duplicated some of the facilities in order to obtain
higher control of information.
109 Companies that produce fresh cuts and ready to eat salads.

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growth is not market demand but the supply of high quality vegetables. Traditional growers have
a strong resistance to new technology and quality standards, which has led the company to
formally contract select growers and more recently to backward integrate to produce part of its
own vegetables. The intention is to supply 70% of the company's needs but the recognized
ideal should be 50%.
On the other hand, some companies have exclusiveness contracts with fast foods. In this case,
there is a strong commitment between fast foods and fresh cuts companies. Successful of this
kind of contract requires that both partners be able to count on one another to honor their
agreements and, thus, the reputation mechanism has long been one of the most important
requirements for ensuring that contracts are honored.
5. CEAGESP privatization: what next?
Privatization is the goal of the Brazilian government that would complete the general institutional
change toward a more liberal economy. The CEAGESP privatization model has not yet been
defined, but it will command changes in the country’s supply system .
CEAGESP wholesalers would like to replicate the state-managed wholesale center in private
hands. That is, a single large distribution center that sets the price of FFV both in Sao Paulo and
around the country. They argue that having several entrepots around the city would preclude
the exploitation of large scale economies and could dim price transparency. However, price
setting in CEAGESP is not clear to all participants. In fact, were more than one distribution
center created, there could be competition among them, fostering management efficiency and
technical evolution. There is strong resistance to changes beyond the transfer of property and
management to the private sector.
The São Paulo State Government is increasingly aware that the lack of standards is a central
deficiency of the FFV system and has addressed this problem through the “Camara Setorial”, an
interprofessional board in which all segments involved in the system are present, led by the
Secretary of Agriculture and CEAGESP. They have implemented new standards for specific
products, especially regarding physical attributes and packing. Furthermore, the Camara
Setorial is discussing alternative systems to collect and release price information to wholesale
markets. However, the results are still very limited.
6. Conclusion
The main feature of Brazilian FFV markets is the lack of minimum standards, very strong
information asymmetries, and a precarious cold chain. As a consequence, endogenous and
exogenous uncertainty is high and the physical market is still needed to coordinate the flow of
produce.
Virtual markets, albeit more efficient, depend on the general adoption of minimum standards,
which have been discussed in the FFV interprofessional board, but are far from being easily
implemented and enforced. Thus, CEAGESP is still the most important supply center to almost
all retailers. Indeed, because the average Brazilian is not very interested in quality requirements
and is unwilling to pay premium prices, the traditional commercialization system has managed
to fulfill consumer demand. Notwithstanding, the volume traded through CEAGESP has
decreased in the last 3 years, due to growing alternative supply systems adopted by the larger
supermarkets and fast-food chains.
CEAGESP wholesalers are aware of this threat, recognize the growing importance of modern
retailing, and have adopted different strategies, mostly related to the supply of supermarkets
through delivery services. However, their strategies are developed using CEAGESP facilities to
receive, repack, and deliver produce.
The larger supermarkets are supplied by wholesalers and by their own distribution centers in
order to guarantee regular volume and quality of produce, although the prime variable of
negotiation continues to be price.

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Without adequate standards and trustworthy information systems, those strategy is based on
higher quality have either had to adopt vertical coordination through formal contracts or
integrate backwards. Fast food is the most demanding. They have stimulated the organization
of new firms, similar to North America and Europe’s, that prepare fresh cuts to be delivered and
used by fast-food restaurants. These companies contract selected growers under an exclusivity
condition. However, contractual hold ups and resistance to new technology and standards have
led to partial backwards integration larger than desired.
The privatization of CEAGESP alone will not guarantee a more efficient solution to FFV supply.
Any further improvement depends on the definition and adoption of minimum standards that
reduce transaction costs and distribution and logistics costs as well. So far, buyers define their
own standard, which precludes positive network externalities and transparency of price
systems. A legally recognized standard could stimulate the development of virtual markets or
even the better functioning of physical markets. These official standards could be limited to food
safety requirements, appearance and packing standards in order to facilitate trade, leaving more
complex organoleptic requirements to buyers.
Furthermore, the proliferation of vertical coordination systems may contribute to dimming price
transparency, and preserving or even increasing information asymmetries. To counteract this
tendency the Government could encourage the development of virtual markets whose prices
could be publicly known.
7. Bibliography
Brousseau, E. & Jean-Marie Codron (1997), The Hybridization of Governance Structures:
supplying French supermarkets with off-season fruits. Paper presented at the SFER
Congress “Modern Food Retailing”, Montpellier-France.
OECD (1997), Vertical Coordination in the Fruit and Vegetable Sector: Implications for existing
Market Institutions and Policy Instruments.
Souza, R.M.de, Comercialização Hortícola: análise de alguns setores do mercado varejista de
São Paulo, Informações Econômicas, v.28, n.10, out.1998:7-23.
Williamson, O, The Mechanisms of Governance, Oxford University Press, 1996.
Zylbersztajn, D. & E.M.M.Q. Farina (1998), Supply Chain Management: Recent Developments
And Applicability Of The Concept. II Annual Conference of the International Society for New
Institutional Economics. Paris, September, 17-19.

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Exhibts
Exhibit 01 - CEAGESP FIGURES (1997)
Area ( m2 )
700,000
Trade Volume (ton/day)
8,500
Trade Value (US$/day)
4,500,000
Number of wholesalers
4,075
Number of visitors/day
50,000
Number of trucks/day
10,000
CEAGESP – 1997
Exhibit 02 – Changes in Acquisition Places of Fruits and Vegetables (%)
Belém Belo
Horizonte Curitiba Fortaleza Porto
Alegre Recife Rio de
Janeiro Salvador São
Paulo Total
Grocery store -6,31
-7,41
-3,17
16,80
-2,19
5,45
1,90
1,72
-0,50 0,84
Green
grocery 0,35
-0,33
1,29
-3,33
-0,10
0,54
-0,11
3,14
13,05 5,28
Open-air
market -1,70
-7,45
-9,31
-1,95
-2,75
-9,34
-17,89
-23,52
-22,22 -19,81
Supermarket 7,78
-5,62
16,26
-2,13
4,61
7,88
-9,33
14,40
5,23 2,95
AGG 1,59
71,72
1,80
6,61
3,51
8,32
28,93
2,73
10,17 18,45
Others -1,60
-50,77
-6,94
-16,00
-3,18
-12,85
-3,74
1,47
-5,54 -6,33
Family Budget Survey – IBGE – 1986/87 - 1995/96
Exhibit 03 - Variance of Price
With Seasonal. Without Seasonal.
FOOD 60,8 59,6
Fruits 67,7 50,5
Greens 961,8 494,7
Tubercles 308,9 197,4
Legumes 369,3 251,1
Consumers’ price Index – FIPE – USP
Exhibit 04
Family Budget Survey – IBGE – 1996
FRUITS AND VEGETABLES
0
0,1
0,2
0,3
0,4
0,5
0,6
0,7
0,8
Grocery store
Green grocery
Open-air market
Supermarket
Alternative Green Grocery
Others