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Bandera: memorialization and commemoration

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This article examines the current heroization of Ukrainian nationalist leader, Stepan Bandera, as manifested in monuments and commemorative practices. It offers a topographic survey that reveals the extent and variety of modes of Bandera heroization. It examines the esthetic and historical controversies that surround Bandera memorialization. It enquires into the personal motivations and political strategies that underlie the effort to project the chosen image of Bandera upon the public space in highly visible terms. It suggests that the campaign in favor of memorializing Bandera can best be understood in performative terms. It is in depicting Bandera as a hero of Ukraine that Bandera becomes a hero of Ukraine.
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Bandera: memorialization and
commemoration
Andre Liebicha & Oksana Myshlovskaa
a Department of International History and Politics, Graduate
Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva,
Switzerland
Published online: 14 Jul 2014.
To cite this article: Andre Liebich & Oksana Myshlovska (2014): Bandera: memorialization and
commemoration, Nationalities Papers: The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00905992.2014.916666
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Bandera: memorialization and commemoration
Andre Liebich and Oksana Myshlovska*
Department of International History and Politics, Graduate Institute of International and
Development Studies, Geneva, Switzerland
(Received 20 November 2013; accepted 17 March 2014)
This article examines the current heroization of Ukrainian nationalist leader, Stepan
Bandera, as manifested in monuments and commemorative practices. It offers a
topographic survey that reveals the extent and variety of modes of Bandera heroization.
It examines the esthetic and historical controversies that surround Bandera
memorialization. It enquires into the personal motivations and political strategies that
underlie the effort to project the chosen image of Bandera upon the public space in
highly visible terms. It suggests that the campaign in favor of memorializing Bandera
can best be understood in performative terms. It is in depicting Bandera as a hero of
Ukraine that Bandera becomes a hero of Ukraine.
Keywords: Stepan Bandera; monumentalization; memorialization; commemoration;
heroization; Lieux de Mémoire; memory politics
Sarti: Unglücklich das Land, das keine Helden hat
Galileo: Nein. Unglücklich das Land, das Helden nötig hat
1
On January 13, 2011, the Lvivska OblastCouncil, meeting at an extraordinary
session next to the Bandera monument in Lviv, reacted to the abrogation [skasuvannya]
of Viktor Yushchenkos order about naming Stepan Bandera a Hero of Ukraine
2
by
afrming that for millions of Ukrainians Bandera was and remains a Ukrainian Hero not-
withstanding pitiable and worthless decisions of the courtsand declaring its intention to re-
name Stepan Bandera Streetas Hero of Ukraine Stepan Bandera Street.
3
This was not
the rst re-christening of a major artery that had known many names over time.
4
It was
surely the most deant, even though there is no evidence that the name change was actually
carried out.
5
The gesture of the Lvivska OblastCouncil continues to reverberate through-
out the country. In June 2012, a member of the city council of Zdolbuniv justied the
erection of the rst monument to Bandera in Rivnenska Oblastas our response to the
© 2014 Association for the Study of Nationalities
The research for this paper was carried out as part of an international (DACH) project on Nation,
Region and Beyond. An Interdisciplinary and Transcultural Reconceptualization of Ukrainedirected
by Professor Ulrich Schmidt, University of St. Gallen. Field research was carried out by Oksana
Myshlovska and the preliminary ndings on which this paper is based were presented at a project
workshop at the Kyiv Mohyla Academy, Kyiv, September 2012. A rst version of this article was
presented at the ASN Conference, New York, April 2013. Appendix 1 provides a brief biography
of Bandera and a short review of contemporary historiography.
*Corresponding author. Email: oksana.myshlovska@graduateinstitute.ch
Nationalities Papers, 2014
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00905992.2014.916666
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anti-Ukrainian policies of the authorities, in particular, the shameful abrogation of Ban-
deras title of Hero of Ukraine.’”
6
This article suggests that the gesture of the OblastCouncil and, indeed, the prolifer-
ation of Bandera monuments and commemorative practices throughout Western Ukraine
can best be understood as what linguists have called performatives.As Austin
(1962, 5) who developed the term has argued, some statements are not statements of fact
or even of prescription. Rather, they create the reality to which they refer. Austin cites
several striking examples: I do take this woman (or this man) to be my lawfully
wedded [spouse], as uttered in a marriage ceremony; or I name this ship the Queen
Elizabeth, when smashing a bottle against the stern. In the same manner, it is naming
Stepan Bandera a hero of Ukraine that makes him a hero and it is erecting monuments
to Bandera as hero that further validates this status. Austin asks can saying make it so?
The answer is: perhaps not entirely, but when saying is buttressed by stone and bronze
one has gone beyond words to create reality.
7
Understanding the proliferation of Bandera monuments and rites in terms of their per-
formative meaning also responds to the observation made by Musil (1978, 506, ALs trans-
lation) and recently quoted by Rogers Brubaker (2006, 146):
What is most striking about monuments is namely that one does not notice them. There is
nothing in the world as invisible as monuments. They are undoubtedly erected to be seen,
indeed to attract attention, but, simultaneously, something immunizes them against attention,
like water drops on an oilcloth cover, not even staying for a moment.
8
Musils categorical statement is not entirely accurate, as even Musil (1978, 507) himself
promptly recognizes and we shall see it selectively refuted further on in this paper. Musil
acknowledges that some monuments transform the landscape and that others he mentions
the Bismarck monuments in Germany constitute an ensemble (Verein) which imprints
itself upon the mind by repetition. Musils main point does, however, re-enforce the argu-
ment that a monument performs its task simply by being. By occupying space, monuments,
even when they are not noticed, objectify memory, pre-empt alternative conceptions of the
past, and offer, when required, a rallying point for shared cultural practices. Monuments
may be invisible, at times, to some people. This does not mean that they are not there or
that they can be wished away.
In this paper we propose to consider the heroization of Bandera, as currently promoted
in Ukraine and as reected in monuments and commemorative practices. We shall begin
with a topographic survey, then attempt to interpret the data inventoried, and, nally, con-
sider the politics that underlie and surround this phenomenon.
Topography of Bandera commemoration
As of early 2014 there are 46 full-sized statues or busts of Stepan Bandera
9
plus 14
plaques,
10
all located in Lvivska, Ivano-Frankivska, and Ternopilska Oblastsas
well as most recently in Rivnenska and Volynska Oblasts far from what is often
referred to as the Banderivskyy kray.
11
All have been erected since 1990 and construc-
tion has continued at a steady pace. There are only ve years (1993, 1994, 1996, 2000,
2004) when no monuments appeared. Several years (1992, 2007, 2008) have each seen
four new monuments and the pace appears to be accelerating with ve new monuments
in 2011 and seven in 2012 (Table 1). Although the time lag between the decision to build
a monument, nd funding, have it conceived by a sculptor, and have plans carried out
makes it difcult to pinpoint dates, the tendency toward proliferation appears clear,
well beyond what the press has reported.
12
The peak of construction in 2011 and 2012
2A. Liebich and O. Myshlovska
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can be seen as a reaction to and a protest against the anti-Ukrainian Yanukovych regime
involved in the abrogation of Banderas title of Hero of Ukrainementioned above.
The monuments range from the very big to the very small. The Bandera monument in
Lviv measures seven meters in front of a 30-meter arch; presumably, the 30-meter size was
dictated by the fact that the Soviet-era Monument Slavy, one of two major Soviet war mem-
orials still standing in the city, is also 30 meters tall (Rossolinski-Liebe 2009). The Bandera
monument in Ivano-Frankivsk may not be huge in itself but it is set in a space of 4.8 hec-
tares. At the other extreme, one nds a modest statue and bust set, respectively, in the vil-
lages of Horishne (Lvivska Oblast) and Uzyn (Ivano-Frankivska Oblast) with their
populations of 701 and 927 souls. Some of these monuments are located in the very
center of town, such as that in Velyki Mostys(Lvivska Oblast) Proshcha Nezalezhnosti,
formerly Lenin square; others such as that in Buchach or Pidvolochysk (Ternopilska
Oblast) stand on the periphery of the town (Figures 13). Commentators have criticized
the fact that the Lviv Bandera monument stands beside, and higher than, the former
Polish Roman Catholic cathedral of St. Elżbieta, a provocation, it is said, given the extre-
mely negative meaning that Bandera has for Poles (one respect in which Polish and Soviet
historiography coincide) (Narvselius 2012, 479). One commentator even maintains that the
monument was placed in the most Polish place in Lviv next to a Catholic [Roman
Catholic] church facing a Polish school where the most radical activists were educated.
13
The decision to erect the monument to Bandera on Kropyvnytskoho square, adjacent to
Bandera Street,a main artery leading from the railway station to the city, was taken by
the Lviv City Council in 1993 (Melnyk and Masyk 2012, 279). In the sculptors view,
the square is a perfect location for the monument because it is a gateway to Lviv.
14
Some in Ukraine have criticized the location for a total non-correspondence between
the monolithic single style of the monuments ensemble and the heterogeneity of the
Table 1. Number of monuments to Bandera.
a
a
The table does not include the two monuments to Bandera erected in the birthplace of Bandera, Staryy
Uhryniv, in 1990 and 1991 which were destroyed in the year they were built.
Source: Compiled by O. Myshlovska.
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architectural space of the square.
15
The monument is also critically assessed in a book on
the monuments and memorial plaques of Lviv:
This construction in the traditions of the totalitarian architecture of Adolf Aloisovych [Hitler]
resembles a comb from afar; it does not look in harmony with a neo-gothic cathedral of
St. Elisabeth in the background. Whats more, one pillar which would symbolize the struggle of
UPA and OUN, inwhich Stepan Banderaparticipated, is missing. (Melnyk and Masyk 2012,279)
In addition to these constructions, over 100 streets have been renamed after Bandera,
even beyond the area containing monuments.
16
As a measure of what Hrytsak and Susak
(2003, 140) have called the symbolic codication of contested urban space in national
terms,renaming a street is easier than building a statue, although, as we have seen in
the Lviv case cited above, name changes also require administrative expenditure. Inas-
much too as street name changes are frequent, the identication of a street with its new
name may be fragile.
17
In some places, people continue to call streets by their earlier
names and advice visitors to use those names as new ones are little known. This may be
true though primarily for relatively neutral names, such as 8th of March Street, a commu-
nist holiday, to be sure, but one that continues to enjoy respect as International Womens
Day.According to a large-scale sociological survey carried out in April 2013, the most
celebrated holiday in Ukraine is indeed the 8th of March. Only in six oblasts is it slightly
overtaken by other holidays such as Victory Day, the 9th of May, in the city of Sevastopol
and Poltavska Oblast, and by Independence Day, the 24th of August, in Ternopilska,
Rivnenska, Lvivska, and Ivano-Frankivska Oblasts.
18
Moreover, in the case at hand,
there is no street sign indicating the new (or old) name of the street.
19
Besides the monuments, there are ve Bandera museums, established between 1990 and
2010, in places connected with phases in Banderas life.
20
The layout of the museums, their
exhibitions, their conception of their subject, and, above all, the reaction of visitors are sub-
jects eminently worthy of further study but ones which we are not able to delve into here.
Intuitively, one might suppose that these museums are likely to serve as shrines, replete
Figure 1. The map of the monuments, busts, plaques, and museums to Bandera.
Source: Designed by O. Myshlovska.
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Figure 2. Monument to Bandera in Lviv.
Source: Photographed by O. Myshlovska, 24 March 2012, Lviv.
Figure 3. Monument to Bandera in Uzyn.
Source: Photographed by O. Myshlovska, 27 March 2012, Uzyn.
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with relics, more intimate and warmer than stone or bronze monuments. It is in these terms too
that one may consider the excursion offered by the Lviv travel agency Vidviday,”“In the
paths of Stepan Banderafrom the cycle The Country of Heroes.
21
This one-day tour of the
Banderivskyy kray,at a price of 150 hryvna (approximately 20 USD), would seem to be a
sort of secular pilgrimage. Here heroization (for this would be a variant thereof) takes on the
connotations of a secular religion: awe before a monument turns into piety as one retraces the
stations of the heros life (Figure 4). It may be noted too that in 2012, the Lvivska Oblast
created a Hero of Ukraine Stepan Bandera Prizeto be awarded, on the day of Banderas
birth, the 1st of January, to an individual or organization who has contributed to the devel-
opment of the Ukrainian national state.
22
Interpretation of post-Soviet public memory
In conformity with trends in Western historiography, the topic of post-Soviet public
memory, including monumentalization and commemoration as encountered in Western
Ukraine, has already attracted a good deal of scholarly discussion (Hrytsak and Susak
2003; Marples 2006,2007; Rossolinski 2007; Portnov 2009; Rossolinski-Liebe 2009;
Sereda 2009;Amar2011). An important aspect of this debate is the relation of recent initiat-
ives to the Soviet and, specically, Leninist heritage.
Figure 4. Advertisement of a one-day excursion In the paths of Stepan Banderaoffered by the Lviv
travel agency Vidviday.
Source: Lviv travel agency Vidviday.
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Amar (2011, 3) and Bechtel (2008) have crossed swords over the meaning of contem-
porary public memory in Lviv. Amar has taken Bechtel to task for afrming that Soviet
propaganda has merely been replaced by another, opposite, Ukraino-centric [propa-
ganda].
23
Amars argument is that, for the rst time, Lviv has been able to foster its
own memory rather than partake of a larger Soviet and Soviet Ukrainian narrative:
substantially more of Lvivs culture of memory is now in fact Lvivs own and not the mere
reection of its larger contexts, and it is also produced with substantially more local input from
the public sphere than under Soviet rule. (Amar 2011, 373)
At the same time, according to Amar, the fact that Lviv has developed a local version of
memory does not mean that it became more pluralist or less nationalist.
With respect to the Bandera monuments of concern here, it is a fact that only a few
monuments in Western Ukraine have directly replaced Soviet monuments. In Drohobych,
Velyki Mosty, and Turka, Bandera was erected on the spot where Lenin formerly stood. In
Berezhany, Bandera replaced Dzerzhinsky. In Ivano-Frankivsk, he stands in place of a
Soviet tank, in Sambir, in place of a monument to the victims of the Second World War,
and in Staryy Sambir, Bandera replaces a woman worker. In contrast, in Lviv, the rst
city in the Soviet Union to take down its Lenin monument, Lenin was succeeded, on the
same street, not by Bandera but by Taras Shevchenko. Faute de mieux, suggests Catherine
Wanner, with respect to this last case
24
(Figures 5 and 6).
Figure 5. A monument to Bandera in Velyki Mosty.
Source: Photographed by O. Myshlovska, 2 June 2012, Velyki Mosty.
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It would thus appear that Bandera monuments have generally not directly replaced
Soviet-era monuments on a one-to-one basis, but the persistence of a Soviet and even
specically Leninist heritage in esthetic terms has been widely noticed and has aroused
concern, although Adam Michniks sarcastic suggestion that ex-socialist workers had
only been trained to manufacture statues of Lenin, which nobody wanted to buy any
more after 1989, does not appear to hold (Kalb 2002, 319). The sculptors commissioned
to draw up plans for the new Bandera monuments have mostly been mature artists, not com-
promised by association with Soviet commemorative structures.
25
Public opinion was
therefore all the more astonished to nd that a number of Bandera monuments were
Lenin-look-alikes.
26
Perhaps people should not have been all that surprised, given other
borrowings from the Soviet repertory, such as Orders of Hero of Ukraineand patriotic
ceremonies oddly reminiscent of the bombast of the Brezhnev era. Nevertheless, one sculp-
tor at the unveiling of the Bandera monument he had designed suffered a heart attack upon
seeing the nal outcome of his conception.
27
Consternation at the apparent, non-ironic
revival of the Lenin image put into the shade numerous other criticisms, such as complaints
about the disproportionate size of the monument in Lviv or about the assembly-line-like
repetitiveness of some portrayals or even about the legless statue of Bandera in Truskavets
which made the hero appear to be an amputee
28
(Figures 7 and 8).
The sculptors themselves defended their works in telling terms. Mykola Posikira
shrugged off the criticism: If a person saw only Lenin in her/his entire life, s/he continues
to see him [Lenin] everywhere.
29
Yaroslav Loza, creator of the monument in Dublyany,
declared that he wanted to convey
decisiveness, courage, onward movement. The hand on the heart (a trait common to this monu-
ment and many others, both of Bandera and Lenin AL/OM) signies that he is giving it to
Figure 6. A monument to Lenin in Velyki Mosty replaced by a monument to Bandera.
Source: Tronko (1978, 606).
8A. Liebich and O. Myshlovska
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Ukraine. As for the resemblance to Lenin, only art specialists remark on this. Because this is the
style. I worked in the realistic manner. I wanted the sculpture to be close to ordinary people, as
it was built at public expense.
30
Ivan Samotos was even more straightforward. When asked, cautiously, about the Lenin
resemblance in his work, he answered:
you are right. The whole issue is one of stereotypes. Lenin was considered a leader, a helmsman
[kermanych], who organized and rallied the popular masses. In his gure appeared the dynamics
of revolution, revolt, transformation. Stepan Bandera is the leader of the nation. He too calls to
struggle, because many people are still guided by old stereotypes. (Rupnyak 2012,45)
Also striking is the sculptorsrealization, sometimes belatedly, that the diminutive and
frail Bandera was himself hardly of heroic stature.
31
This did not prevent them from por-
traying him in a heroic pose and the most recognizable available prototype of heroism
was Vladimir Illich Lenin.
Popular reaction, beyond the passionate debate that the issue evoked in the press,
echoed some of these concerns.
32
One woman expressed her disappointment that the
local Bandera monument portrayed a miniscule gure rather than the manlyimage she
expected. She went on to add though that her mother had explained to her that there had
been no corpulent men during the war years.
33
Others, both an elderly, Russian-speaking
former military man and a young businessman, complained, predictably, that the money
would have been better spent on improving the local roads or sewage systems.
34
Figure 7. A monument to Stepan Bandera in Dublyany which resembles a monument to Lenin in
Nizhyn.
Source: Photographed by O. Myshlovska, 25 May 2012.
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What these reactions also indicate is the extent to which Bandera is not so much a esh-
and-bones historical personage as a symbol, all the more valued for being, personally,
unknown. After his imprisonment in Poland in 1934, Bandera may never have set foot in
Ukraine again (he was, possibly, there briey in 1939 and again, perhaps, for a few days
in 1941). From 1939, Bandera was, rst, in the General-Gouvernement under German occu-
pation, then, as of 1941, in Germany as a prisoner, later as a collaborator, and nally, in the
post-war years, as a political exile. Nevertheless, his name became a symbol of a generation
of young nationalists who had led the liberation struggle, even though he led it from afar and
his actual achievements fell short of the legend surrounding him. In Soviet times, Bandera
represented a counter-memory, a name whose cult grew in proportion to Soviet denunciation
and one which was fostered particularly in the diaspora (Rudling 2011); hence the shock
value of the Braty Hadyukiny singing, be it ironically, My Khloptsi z Bandershtadtu
[i.e. Lviv][Were the lads from Bandera town] at the Chervona Ruta festival in 1991
(Wanner 1998, 130).
Rituals and politics of commemoration
To construct a monument to Stepan Bandera in heroic mode already establishes Bandera as
a hero. Once in place, however, a monument reiterates this status. It lends itself to recitation,
ritual observance, and regular, or even occasional, commemorative appropriation. In con-
trast to what Robert Musil has written, the monument is not invisible or, at least, not always
invisible. Bandera monuments do not appear to have become the backdrops for wedding
party pictures, as Lenin monuments once were and as the Shevchenko monument in
Figure 8. A monument to Lenin in Nizhyn, a look-alike of a monument to Bandera in Dublyany.
Source: Pyatpamyatnikov Bandere, kotoryye bolshe vsego napominayut Lenina.Gazeta, 30
November 2009. http://gazeta.ua/ru/articles/life/317792/4#photos.
10 A. Liebich and O. Myshlovska
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Lviv has become (Wanner 1998, 187). In keeping with the pathos they proclaim, Bandera
monuments have, however, emerged as the focus for commemorative celebrations on
dened days. In fullling this role they have also served as props for self-promotion of indi-
viduals, politicians, social organizations, and political parties.
The most frequent commemorations held at Bandera monuments throughout Western
Ukraine are those related to Banderas birthday on January 1. The weather may be incle-
ment at that time but the arrival of the new year, worth celebrating in any case, provides
an additional motivation to gather around the local Bandera monument. The next most fre-
quent date for celebration is October 14, a date which fortuitously brings together the date
of Banderas assassination and the date of the founding of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army
(UPA) with which he is so closely associated; the date is also only one day away from
the feast of the Intercession of the Blessed Virgin. Interestingly, what might be termed syn-
cretic commemorations also take place on May 9, the anniversary of the end of the Second
World War or the Great Patriotic War as it was known in Soviet times.
35
On this occasion,
gatherings are held side by side at both the Bandera monument and the Soviet war memor-
ial, often adjacent to each other; the latter memorials are, for the most part, still standing,
even in Lviv where efforts to do away with the Monument Slavyhave been stymied
by court order.
36
Respect for the dead, on whichever side, tends to stie sectarian passions
to such an extent that, in the town of Skole, for example, there is a common grave to the
victims of Ukrainian nationalists called Skorbna Maty[grieving mother] standing next
to the Bandera monument. Even though the Peoples Commissariat for Internal Affairs
(NKVD) men are buried there, the grave has not been touched.
37
The juxtaposition of
Soviet-era monuments and those of Bandera heightens the legitimacy of each, though it
is likely that the juxtaposition works in favor of Bandera as his proponents are thus able
to draw on established patterns and symbols.
The initiative for building Bandera monuments most often comes from belowor from
what might be properly called civil society organizations, such as local branches of the Con-
gress of Ukrainian Nationalists, Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN)UPA
Brotherhood, Rukh, or the Union of Political Prisoners. In some cases, personal or oppor-
tunistic considerations lie behind the construction of Bandera monuments and they do not
require the validation offered by commemoration even as they draw on the heroic legiti-
macy Bandera provides. In Skole, the monument to Bandera was initiated and nanced
by Andriy Lopushanskyy, a former deputy chairman of the national oil and gas
company of Ukraine, Naftohaz Ukrayiny, and a member of parliament in 20062007, as
part of the 2012 parliamentary election campaign (which he lost).
38
In Kremenetsa
local businessman, Volodomyr Chuba, put up a Bandera statue as a token of corporate
responsibility in front of the building that houses his former insurance company.
39
In
Dublyany, Volodymyr Snitynskyy, rector of the Lviv State Agricultural University
where Bandera studied from 1930 to 1933, initiated a statue and commemoration cer-
emonies for Bandera. He also had an iconic-like painting of himself commissioned
where he is seen placing a cornerstone of the future monument to Bandera.
40
In these
instances, simply putting up a Bandera statue may be enough. As various respondents
put it in an informal survey, having a monument in ones village is a sign of civilization
or other places have a Bandera monument, why shouldnt we?
41
Like a grand piano in a
bourgeois salon, its presence alone stands as testimony to ones culture and proof of
keeping-up-with the Joneses(Figure 9).
Bandera monuments, and indeed the Bandera myth, have also been exploited to the hilt
by political groupings, notably the VO Svoboda party. VO Svoboda takes its origin from a
right-wing party, the Social-National Party of Ukraine, founded in 1991 in Western Ukraine
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inspired by OUN ideology. With an aspiration to enter national politics, it assumed its
current name, changed the partys branding, expelled some radicals from the party, and
nominated young and dynamic Oleh Tyahnybok as party leader in 2004. The party has
been criticized for its ultra-nationalistic anti-Russian, anti-Soviet, anti-Polish, and anti-
Semitic pronouncements (Olszański 2011; Shekhovtsov 2011) as well as for the instru-
mentalization of history and the ofcial rehabilitation of the ultra-nationalists of the
1930s and 1940s(Rudling 2013, 228).
A search on the partys website returns 1520 entries concerning Stepan Bandera.
42
It is
therefore not surprising that VO Svoboda leaders have capitalized on the building of
Bandera monuments even when the initiative for construction has come from civil
society, as has often been the case. In fact, two-thirds of Bandera monuments have been
built since 2005 after the reconstruction of the VO Svoboda party. VO Svoboda represen-
tatives have made a point of funding the construction of Bandera monuments (Figure 10),
attending unveilings of new monuments, and holding commemorations, themselves often
linked to Bandera-related anniversaries, at the foot of Bandera monuments. It was VO
Svoboda Lvivska Oblastcouncilors too who made the proposition to rename Stepan
Banderastreets hero of Ukraine Stepan Banderastreets as mentioned at the outset of
this article.
43
After having done exceedingly well in regional elections in 2010, with a majority of
votes in the Banderivskyy kray, at the national elections in October 2012 Svoboda
took the Ukrainian political scene by storm, entering parliament for the rst time with 37
seats out of 450(Parusinski 2012).
44
Commentators speculated as to whether this
change of status would push VO Svoboda toward the middle of the political spectrum,
to leverage the foothold it had gained in Kyiv and to capitalize on the anti-corruption plat-
form and the consistent oppositional stance toward the Yanukovych régime that had helped
Figure 9. Painting in the museum depicting Volodymyr Snitynskyy, Rector of the Lviv State Agrar-
ian University, setting a stone in the place of the future monument to Bandera by Mykola Horda.
Source: Photographed by O. Myshlovska, 25 May 2012, Dublyany.
12 A. Liebich and O. Myshlovska
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it to break out of its narrow identication as a strictly nationalist party.
45
At present, such
speculations do not seem to have been borne out. The torchlight processions that have been
a feature of VO Svoboda activity, lately even in Donetsk, and for several years in Kyiv on
Banderas birthday, with rising numbers of participants, have not relieved the partys frus-
tration (Figure 11).
Whereas the cult of Bandera has made substantial inroads in Western Ukraine, as we
have seen in this article, an anti-Bandera narrative also prevails at different levels.
Vadym Kolesnichenko, a member of parliament from the Party of Regions and chairman
of the Human Rights Public Movement Russian-speaking Ukraine,’” has been an
ardent critic of Ukrainian nationalism and of Stepan Bandera as one of its leaders. In
2011, in response to the rise of VO Svoboda at the local level and the growing cult of
Bandera, he initiated the International Anti-Fascist Front which aims to counteract the her-
oization of Nazi collaborators [posobniki natsyzma], the rebirth of neo-Nazi, Fascist, and
xenophobic ideologies in society, and the distortion of history of the twentieth century.
46
In 2013, Kolesnichenko submitted a draft law On the Prohibition of Rehabilitation and
Heroization of the Persons and Organizations that fought against the Anti-Hitler Coalition
which remains under consideration in the parliament.
47
In a blog post published on the anniversary of Stepan Banderas birth on January 1,
2013 in reaction to the annual Bandera marches under VO Svoboda auspices Kolesni-
chenko expressed his unequivocal view about the nationalist leader:
Figure 10. A monument to Stepan Bandera in Romanivka with an inscription: Hero of Ukraine,
Stepan Bandera. Construction of the monument carried out with the support of VO Svoboda.’”
Source: Photographed by O. Myshlovska, 10 April 2013.
Nationalities Papers 13
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Stepan Bandera is a collaborator of Nazi Germany, the leader of the radical rightwing organ-
ization OUN and its armed wing, UPA, who collaborated with the Nazis during the Second
World War in the ght against the anti-Hitler coalition. Stepan Bandera and the organization
he headed are guilty of the crimes against humanity: they directly supported and contributed
to the Holocaust (the extermination of more than 2 million Jews and Roma) on the territory
of Ukraine, planned and carried out the genocide of about 160 thousand unarmed Polish popu-
lation of Western Ukraine (Volyn massacre) and organized terror against the civilian Ukrai-
nians on political and ideological grounds.
48
Dmytro Tabachnyk, Minister of Education of Ukraine, presented a new concept for
history school textbooks in 2010 in which OUN and UPA and their leaders, Stepan
Bandera and Roman Shukhevych, were to be depicted as nationalists and organizers of
mass murders and will be forever tainted by collaborationism.
49
In the absence of Bandera monuments in central and eastern Ukrainian cities, VO
Svoboda has chosen to rally around Shevchenko monuments as a pis aller. What it con-
siders intolerable, however, is to nd itself in a landscape dotted with Soviet monuments,
mostly dating from the Soviet era but including some more recent ones.
50
VO Svoboda
refers to research according to which there are four times as many Lenin streets as Shev-
chenko streets and there are some 1344 Lenin monuments in Ukraine as well as thousands
of other nominal remnants of the communist era.
51
The response has been the inauguration
of a campaign of disguration of such monuments by party activists that has drawn signi-
cant media attention.
52
Hardly surprisingly, retaliation measures against Bandera monu-
ments have been prompt to follow.
53
Such methods of expressing outrage are by no
means new. The rst two monuments to Bandera erected in his home village of Staryy
Uhryniv in the early 1990s were blown up, plaques to Bandera were desecrated with a
Nazi swastika in Sokaland Zdolbuniv,
54
and monuments to Stalin in Zaporizzhya
55
and
Lenin in Kyiv
56
were damaged or desecrated with paint.
Figure 11. Results of VO Svoboda in the October 2012 parliamentary elections in Ukraine.
Source: VasylBabych via Wikimedia Commons.
14 A. Liebich and O. Myshlovska
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One may console oneself with the thought that as long as confrontation between the pro-
and anti-Bandera camps expresses itself in attacks on monuments rather than people, some
measure of social peace reigns. Nevertheless, the tendency toward polarization with regards
to the politics of history remains unmistakable.
Conclusions
In terms of the categories proposed at the outset of this paper, monuments play a variety of
roles. Monuments are performatives in the sense that they create the reality that they pro-
claim. Statues of Bandera in a heroic pose authenticate Bandera as a hero. Monuments may
remain unnoticed and unseenuntil they are enlisted to serve as props for social and pol-
itical events. Finally, monuments act as lightning rods for the expression of political antag-
onisms, receiving the blows that otherwise might fall on people. Bandera zhyvyyis a
slogan one hears in the mouths of his followers, unconsciously imitating the earlier
Lenin zhiv [Lenin lives!].Literature has its cohort of statues coming to life, be it the Com-
mandatore or the Bronze Horseman. Who is to say that with regards to Bandera, life does
not imitate art?
Notes
1. Sarti: Unhappy the Land that has no heroes
Galileo: No. Unhappy the Land that needs heroes(Bertolt Brecht, Life of Galileo)
2. The title of Hero of Ukrainewas bestowed upon Stepan Bandera by a presidential order for
sturdiness of the spirit in defending the national idea and heroism and self-sacrice demonstrated
in the struggle for an independent Ukrainian state,Prezydent Ukrayiny, Ukaz 46/2010, Pro
prysvoyennya S. Banderi zvannya Heroy Ukrayiny.January 20, 2010. http://zakon4.rada.gov.
ua/laws/show/46/2010. Viktor Yushchenko issued the order one month before the end of his pre-
sidential term. The order was declared as contradicting the law and abrogated by a decision of the
Donetsk Administrative Court of April 2, 2010 and the abrogation reconrmed by a decision of
the Donetsk Administrative Court of Appeal of June 23, 2010. The decisions of the Donetsk
courts were announced on the ofcial website of the President of Ukraine on January 12, 2011
Rishennyam sudu prezydentskyy ukaz Pro prysvoyennya S.Banderi zvannya Heroy Ukrayiny
skasovano.January 12, 2011. http://www.president.gov.ua/news/19103.html.
3. Pro Heroya Ukrayiny Stepana Banderu, Rishennya sesiyi Lvivskoyi oblasnoyi rady.47,
January 13, 2011. http://www.oblrada.lviv.ua/index.php?option=com_joomdoc&task=doc_down
load&gid=97&Itemid=52. The decision also included the similar renaming of Shukhevych Street
but in this paper we shall limit ourselves to the issue of Bandera.
4. The street had been called Nowy Świat (18401886), Leon Sapieha (18861940), Komso-
molska (19401941), Fürstenstrasse (19411944), Stalin (19441961), Myru (19611992)
and Bandera as of 1992 (Kozytskyy and Pidkova 2007, 163; Lemko, Mykhalyk, and Behlyarov,
2007, 78).
5. City authorities invoked technical reasons, notably, the cost of re-registering addresses. See Perey-
menuvannya vulytspotyahne nezruchnosti ta vytraty dlya lvivyan chynovnytsya.April 1, 2011.
http://zaxid.net/home/showSingleNews.do?pereymenuvannya_vulits_potyagne_nezruchnosti_
ta_vitrati_dlya_lvivyan__chinovnitsya&objectId=1126173. Note too that only the intention to
rename was taken (see Bandera i Shukhevych vidbulysya yak heroyi v uyavi lyudey, mer
Lvova.April 5, 2011. http://zaxid.net/home/showSingleNews.do?bandera_i_shuhevich_vidbul
isya_yak_geroyi_v_uyavi_lyudey__mer_lvova&objectId=1126401). Now the question is still
being investigated by a group of experts.Other municipalities have followed the urging of the
Lviv OblastCouncil to rename their Stepan Bandera Street to Hero of Ukraine Bandera Street,
as well as their Roman Shukhevych streets, for example in Zolochiv (both Banderaand Shukhevych)
U Zolochevi na Lvivshchyni budutvulytsi Heroyiv Ukrayiny Bandery i Shukhevycha.January
30, 2011. http://zaxid.net/home/showSingleNews.do?u_zolochevi_na_lvivshhini_budut_vulitsi_
geroyiv_ukrayini_banderi_i_shuhevicha&objectId=1121723. And proposals to rename streets
have been made in Sambir (both Bandera and Shukhevych) Notatky iz sesiyi miskoyi rady.
Nationalities Papers 15
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February 2011. http://www.sambircity.gov.ua/index.php?id=56&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=8&
cHash=a986f536af9de7a4e32fb3062878b75f and Dolyna (only Bandera) Vidbulyshromadski
slukhannya pro pereymenuvannya vulytsi.March 18, 2011. http://rada.dolyna.info/novyny/
vidbulys-hromadski-sluhannya-pro-perejmenuvannya-vulytsi/.
6. Pershyy na Rivnenshchyni pamyatnyk Banderi vstanovlyatu dennezalezhnosti.June 17,
2012. http://gazeta.ua/articles/life/_pershij-na-rivnenschini-pam-yatnik-banderi-vstanovlyat-u-den-
nezalezhnosti/441222.
7. Note too that a sign Hero of Ukrainewas also attached to several monuments to Bandera,
namely in Berezhany and Ternopil. Local authorities in Zalishchyky told one of the authors
(OM) that they would add the same sign because for them Bandera was indeed a hero. Interview
with a representative of the city council, May 21, 2012, Zalishchyky.
8. The bibliographic reference to Musil in the references section is inaccurate.
9. 22 in Lvivska Oblast(Boryslav, Chervonohrad, Drohobych, Dublyany, Hordynya, Horishne,
Kamyanka-Buzka, Krushelnytsya, Lviv, Morshyn, Mostyska, Mykolayiv, Sambir, Skole,
Sosnivka, Staryy Sambir, Stryy, Truskavets, Turka, Velyki Mosty, Velykosilky and Volya-
Zaderevatska), 12 in Ternopilska Oblast(Berezhany Buchach, Chortkiv, Kozivka, Kreme-
nets, Pidvolochysk, Romanivka, Strusiv, Terebovlya, Ternopil, Verbiv and Zalishchyky), 11
in Ivano-Frankivska Oblast(Chornyy Lis [Black forest], Horodenka, Hrabivka, Ivano-
Frankivsk, Kalush, Kolomyya, Mykytyntsi, Pidpechery, Seredniy Bereziv, Staryy Uhryniv
and Uzyn), and one in Rivnenska Oblast(Zdolbuniv).
10. Eight in Lvivska Oblast(Dublyany, Lviv (2), Sokal, Stryy (2), Volya-Zaderevatska and
Urych), two in Ivano-Frankivska Oblast(Ivano-Frankivsk and Yezupil), two in Rivnenska
Oblast(Zdolbuniv and Rivne), one in Ternopilska Oblast(Kobyvoloky), and one in
Volynska Oblast(Kivertsi).
11. Banderivskyy krayis used in this article to denominate places related to Stepan Banderas life
in Ukraine, i.e. the places where he was born, lived, and studied (currently in Ivano-Frankivska,
Lvivska, and Ternopilska Oblasts) (Figure 1). The term has been used to refer to the entire
Western Ukrainian region as the center of radical Ukrainian nationalism. It has also been used
to denominate only the place where Bandera was born, the village of Staryy Uhryniv in
Kalush region. The Historical Memorial Stepan Bandera Museum in Staryy Uhryniv publishes
a journal entitled Banderivskyy kray.
12. V Ukrayini vstanovleno 17 monumentiv Banderi.July 21, 2011. http://tyzhden.ua/News/
26849.
13. Pamyatnyk Banderi skhozhyy na Stalina istoryk.December 21, 2013. http://gazeta.ua/
articles/history/_pam-yatnik-banderi-shozhij-na-stalina-istorik/533333.
14. Pamyatnyk nezhody.Vysokyy Zamok, February 2, 2004, http://archive.wz.lviv.ua/articles/
27328.
15. Natsionalna bronza.October 29, 2009. http://zaxid.net/home/showSingleNews.do?natsion
alna_bronza&objectId=108825.
16. We have used the database of the Central Electoral Commission for the 2012 parliamentary elec-
tions, which lists all streets belonging to single-seat 33646 electoral districts. http://www.cvk.
gov.ua/pls/vnd2012/wp030?PT001F01=900#. According to the database, there are 51 Bandera
streets in Lvivska Oblast, 51 in Ivano-Frankivska, 42 in Ternopilska, 26 in Rivnenska, 7
in Volynska, 4 in Chernivetska, 2 in Zakarpatska. In all likelihood, there are other ones as
well, as yet unregistered.
17. Among the new Bandera streets are ones that were previously Pershotravnevaand before that
Trzeciego majaor Pilsudskiegothen Leninathen Ukrayinska.See also the example
given in note 4. It would be worthwhile to carry out a study as to how inhabitants themselves
refer to these streets. In Paris, we are convinced that only tourists would refer to Place
Charles de Gaullewhereas for Parisians it is and always has been Place de lEtoile.
18. The survey was carried out on behalf of the DACH project Nation, Region and Beyondcredited
at the outset of the article.
19. Example from Mykolayiv (14,801 residents in 2011), Lvivska Oblast, O. Myshlovska, eld
research notes, April 4, 2013, Mykolayiv.
20. The Stepan Bandera Museum-Estate in Volya-Zaderevatska (1990); Stepan Bandera Museum in
the Lviv National Agrarian University in Dublyany (1999); Stepan Bandera Historic-Memorial
Museum in Staryy Uhryniv (2000); Bandera Room-Museum in Yahilnytsya (2009); Bandera
16 A. Liebich and O. Myshlovska
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Family Estate-Museum in Stryy (2010). There are also plans spearheaded by VO Svoboda to
open a Bandera museum in Lviv.
21. The advertisement of the excursion on the website of the travel agency reads: If you respect your
glorious ancestors who gave their lives for our freedom, you are invited to participate in a one-day
excursion Following in Stepan Banderas steps from the series the country of heroes’”,which
includes visits to Staryy Uhryniv, Stryy, Volya-Zaderevatska and Kalush.http://www.vidviday.
com.ua/%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B5%D0%B6%D0%BA%D0%B0%D0%BC%D0%B8_%D1%
81%D1%82%D0%B5%D0%BF%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%B0_%D0%B1%D0%B0%D0%BD%
D0%B4%D0%B5%D1%80%D0%B8_ua_829prod.html.
22. Pro zatverdzhennya Polozhennya pro Oblasnu premiyu imeni Heroya Ukrayiny Stepana
Bandery.423, March 15, 2012. http://oblrada.lviv.ua/index.php?option=com_joomdoc&task=
doc_download&gid=938&Itemid=1. For the rst awards, the Council did not wait until
January. They were awarded on the 71st anniversary of the declaration of Ukrainian indepen-
dence, June 30, 1941.
23. Citation as translated by Amar and emphasis added by him.
24. Wanner (1998, 181) cites an observer:
If they take him down, who will be the next guy on the pedestal? In some parts of Ukraine,
they were in a hurry. They didnt have anyone else so they put up Shevchenko. Thats not
good. But the worst thing of all would be to do nothing .
25. Sculptors who have each designed several Bandera monuments are Mykola Posikira (born 1946),
Ivan Samotos (born 1933), Roman Vilhushynskyy (born 1963) and VasylVilshuk (born
1946).
26. Monuments in Horodenka, Dublyany, Berezhany, Ternopiland Lviv. Pyatpamyatnykiv
Stepanovi Banderi, shcho naybilshe nahaduyutskulptury Lenina.Krayina, November 27,
2009. http://gazeta.ua/articles/people-and-things-journal/_p-yat-pam-yatnikiv-stepanovi-banderi-
scho-najbilshe-nagaduyut-skulpturi-lenina/318953.
27. Ivan Osadchuk in Horodenka Pyatpamyatnykiv Stepanovi Banderi, shcho naybilshe naha-
duyutskulptury Lenina.Krayina, November 27, 2009. http://gazeta.ua/articles/people-and-
things-journal/_p-yat-pam-yatnikiv-stepanovi-banderi-scho-najbilshe-nagaduyut-skulpturi-lenina
/318953.
28. The sculptor was Ivan Samotos. He is also the author of the monuments to Bandera in Staryy
Sambir, Turka, and Skole.
29. Interview with Mykola Posikira. Mykola Posikira: tse politychnyy pamyatnyk, a ne prosto
skulpturnyy portret Bandery.October 22, 2007. http://www.ukrnationalism.org.ua/
interview/?n=64. See also Pyatpamyatnikov Bandere, kotoryye bolshe vsego napominayut
Lenina.Gazeta, November 30, 2009. http://gazeta.ua/ru/articles/life/_pyat-pamyatnikov-
bandere-kotorye-bolshe-vsego-napominayut-lenina-foto/317792.
30. Pyatpamyatnykiv Stepanovi Banderi, shcho naybilshe nahaduyutskulptury Lenina.
Krayina, November 27, 2009. http://gazeta.ua/articles/people-and-things-journal/_p-yat-pam-
yatnikiv-stepanovi-banderi-scho-najbilshe-nagaduyut-skulpturi-lenina/318953.
31. Mykola Posikira: People are used to pictures where Bandera is young with a wide forehead. In
reality, he was short, with an elongated face. To create Banderas portrait I used his death mask. I
wanted to emphasize his resoluteness, a feature of every revolutionary,see Mykola Posikira: tse
politychnyy pamyatnyk, a ne prosto skulpturnyy portret Bandery.October 22, 2007. http://
www.ukrnationalism.org.ua/interview/?n=64. Also, Samotos interview (Rupnyak 2012,45).
32. Lishchenko (2007); Istorik Georgiy Kasyanov: Leninu i Bandere mozhno sdelatodin pamyat-
nik. Menyattolko golovy na rezbe.March 12, 2013. http://censor.net.ua/resonance/235563/
istorik_georgiyi_kasyanov_leninu_i_bandere_mojno_sdelat_odin_pamyatnik_menyat_tolko_gol
ovy_na_rezbe.
33. Turka (population 7114), Lvivska Oblast, where a monument was inaugurated in October
2012. Interview by O. Myshlovska, April 5, 2013, Turka.
34. Interview by O. Myshlovska, April 5, 2013, Turka.
35. Current Ukrainian textbooks refer to it as The Second World War and the Great Patriotic War
(Turchenko, Panchenko, and Tymchenko 2008).
36. Lvivskyy sud vyznav bezpidstavnym pozov pro demontazh monumenta Slavy.January 29,
2012. http://zik.ua/ua/news/2012/01/19/329415.InLviv the Bandera monument and the
Nationalities Papers 17
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Soviet-era Monument Slavy are located sufciently far from each other to avoid the need to carry
out joint celebrations.
37. Interview with an employee of the Skole rayon administration, O. Myshlovska, April 6, 2013,
Skole.
38. Interview with an employee of the Skole rayon administration, O. Myshlovska, April 6, 2013,
Skole; Na Lvivshchyni vybortsiv pidkupovuyutpamyatnykamy Bandery.October 11,
2012. http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2012/10/11/6974425/;Lopushanskyy rozvynuv burkh-
lyvu diyalnistne tilky na maybutnyomu okruzi.August 3, 2012. http://vgolos.com.ua/politic/
6710.html.
39. Pohruddya Stepana Banderi postalo u Krementsi.September 5, 2011. http://narodne-slovo.te.
ua/2011/09/05/pohruddya-stepana-bandery-postalo-u-krementsi/.
40. The painting executed by a painter from Lviv, Mykola Horda, is located in the Bandera museum
at the University.
41. Reactions obtained by O. Myshlovska, May 2122, 2012, Zalishchyky and Strusiv.
42. The website of Svoboda http://www.svoboda.org.ua/, accessed January 24, 2014; a search on the
Party of Regions website http://www.partyofregions.org.ua/ua brings up only 77 entries, accessed
January 24, 2014.
43. The proposals were made by VO Svoboda local representatives in Lviv, Zolochiv, Sambir, and
Dolyna.
44. It may be noted that Andriy Lopushanskyy, see above, lost his election campaign to the brother
of VO Svoboda leader, Andriy Tyahnybok.
45. Svobodu pidtrymaly navitideyni oponenty cherez viru v yiyi opozytsiynist.November 1,
2012. http://razumkov.org.ua/ukr/expert.php?news_id=3721.
46. The website of the International Anti-Fascist Front. http://www.antifashyst.org/?page_id=301.It
is interesting that the Front aims to be an international movement, but its website is only in
Russian.
47. Pro zaboronu reabilitatsiyi ta heroyizatsiyi osib y orhanizatsiy, shcho borolysya proty antyhitle-
rivskoyi koalitsiyi.2060, May 7, 2013. http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb2/webproc34?id=&
pf3511=46867&pf35401=260911.
48. Kolesnichenko, Vadym. Heroyizuvaty Banderu namahayutsya tilky pyata kolonata vorohy
Ukrayiny.January 1, 2013. http://blogs.pravda.com.ua/authors/kolesnichenko/50e32921f4051/.
49. V novom uchebnike istorii Bandera i Shukhevich budut ubiytsami Tabachnik.June 6, 2010.
http://gazeta.ua/ru/articles/politics/_v-novom-uchebnike-istorii-bandera-i-shuhevich-budut-ubijca
mi-ndash-tabachnik/342287.
50. A new Lenin monument was erected in Donetska Oblastin 2012, V Donetskoy oblasti poya-
vilsya novyy pamyatnik Leninu.April 23, 2012. http://society.lb.ua/life/2012/04/23/147535_
donetskoy_oblasti_poyavilsya_noviy.html, and a Stalin monument in Zaporizhzhya in 2010
(rebuilt in 2011after being blown up), V Zaporozhye otkryli novyy pamyatnik Stalinu. Podor-
vatyego teperbudet trudneye.November 7, 2011. http://gazeta.ua/ru/articles/politics/_v-
zaporozhe-otkryli-novyj-pamyatnik-stalinu-podorvat-ego-teper-budet-trudnee/408546.
51. Pamyatnyky komunistychnoyi doby yak indykator kryminohennoyi sytuatsiyi.June 13, 2013.
http://www.svoboda.org.ua/dopysy/dopysy/039980/.
52. Miroshnychenko poobitsyav znesty pamyatnyk Leninu v Lebedyni.February 21, 2013. http://
gazeta.ua/articles/politics/_miroshnichenko-poobicyav-znesti-pam-yatnik-leninu-v-lebedini/
483808;Svobodovets poobeshchal unichtozhit’‘chuchelo Leninav rodnom sele.February 23,
2013. http://glavred.info/politika/svobodovec-poobeschal-unichtozhit-chuchelo-lenina-v-rodnom-
sele.html.
53. Na Zakhidniy Ukrayini splyundruvaly pamyatni znaky Banderi i Shukhevychu.March 7,
2013. http://www.istpravda.com.ua/short/2013/03/7/116319/.
54. Na Lvivshchyni nevidomi rozmalyuvaly svastykoyu barelyef Banderi.October 12, 2012.
http://www.unian.ua/news/529624-na-lvivschini-nevidomi-rozmalyuvali-svastikoyu-barelef-
banderi.html;Na Rivnenshchyni nevidomi roztroshchyly memorialnu doshku Banderi i nama-
lyuvaly svastyku.March 11, 2013. http://tsn.ua/ukrayina/na-rivnenschini-nevidomi-roztros
chili-memorialnu-doshku-banderi-i-namalyuvali-svastiku-285414.html.
55. Pamyatnyk Stalinu u Zaporizhzhi oblyly farboyu.May 27, 2010. http://tsn.ua/ukrayina/pam-
yatnik-stalinu-u-zaporizhzhi-oblili-farboyu.html.
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56. Natsionalisty, yaki spotvoryly pamyatnyk Leninu, vykonuvaly ukaz prezydenta.July 2, 2009.
http://tsn.ua/ukrayina/natsionalisti-yaki-spotvorili-pam-yatnik-leninu-vikonuvali-ukaz-prezidenta.
html.
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Appendix 1. About Stepan Bandera
Stepan Bandera was born on 1 January 1909 in the village of Staryy Uhryniv in the region of Kalush
in Ivano-Frankivska Oblast. His father was a Greek-Catholic priest. Bandera studied in Stryy and
Dublyany (both in Lvivska Oblast). In 1927, Bandera joined the Ukrainian Military Organization
and in 1929 the OUN. As regional head of OUN, Bandera organized terrorist and sabotage actions in
the Second Polish Republic. In 1934, he was sentenced to life imprisonment for assassination of the
Polish Interior Minister Bronislaw Pieracki. Released from prison in September 1939 and, following a
split in OUN in 19401941, Bandera became the leader of the radical OUN (B) (OUN-Bandera). This
organization declared the independence of Ukraine on 30 June 1941 in Lviv when German troops
entered the city. From September 1941 until September 1944, Bandera was a prisoner in Germany.
After the Second World War, Bandera lived in Munich under the pseudonym Stepan Popel. He
was killed there by a KGB agent Bohdan Stashinskyy on 15 October 1959. He is buried in
Munichs Waldfriedhof cemetery.
As a leader of the nationalist movement in Ukraine from the 1930s to the 1950s, Bandera is a
controversial gure. He became regarded by his followers as a symbol of the ght for Ukrainian
state independence. Soviet and some post-Soviet sources described him as a bourgeois nationalist,
fascist, and Nazi collaborator (Andreev and Shumov 2005; Kozlov 2008), leading some to argue
that Banderas popularity is a reaction to Soviet propaganda.
Myth-making about Bandera, OUN-B, and UPA was undertaken by the Ukrainian diaspora, often
associated with the OUN-B, after the Second World War (Mirchuk 1961) following the lines of earlier
OUN propagandistic materials. The myths were re-exported to Ukraine at the end of the 1980s and
became reinterpreted in a positive and exculpatory light in the contemporary nationalistic historiogra-
phy (Havryliv 2012; Posivnych 2008a,2008b;Vyatrovych 2011) and in the popular literature (Hor-
dasevych 2008; Fedoriv 2008; Perepichka 2006; Svatko 2008).
Some Western scholars have been severely critical of what they have seen as the totalitarian, anti-
Semitic, and fascist nature of the Ukrainian nationalist movement and they have deconstructed the
myths associated with it (Rossolinski-Liebe 2010; Himka 2011; Snyder 2010; Marples 2006,2007;
Motyka 2013; Rudling 2011). A number of Ukrainian scholars has also done so in a somewhat
milder way (Hrytsak 2004; Kasyanov 2004; Zaytsev 2013; Portnov 2013).
For Rudling (2011, 3), The OUN shared the fascist attributes of antiliberalism, anticonservatism,
and anticommunism, an armed party, totalitarianism, anti-Semitism, Führerprinzip, and an adoption
of fascist greetings.Rossoliński-Liebe (2010, 3) offers a similar critical view: “…Bandera
became the main symbol of the OUN-B and the UPA although he himself did not participate in
the atrocities of the OUN-B and the UPA …” such as “…collaboration with the Nazis and their
involvement in the Holocaust, the ethnic cleansing of Poles in Volhynia and Eastern Galicia in
1943/44, and the massacres of civilian Ukrainians who supported or were accused of supporting
Soviet power in Western Ukraine between 1944 and 1951.
Furthermore, Timothy Snyder (2010) has referred to Bandera as a fascist heroin a blog post
published shortly after the conferral of the status of Hero of Ukraineupon Stepan Bandera by Pre-
sident Yushchenko and he has assessed the latters legacy in negative terms: Bandera aimed to make
of Ukraine a one-party fascist dictatorship without national minorities. During World War II, his fol-
lowers killed many Poles and Jews.Finally, Himka has exposed the participation of Ukrainian
nationalists in the Lviv anti-Jewish pogroms in 1941 (Himka 2011).
20 A. Liebich and O. Myshlovska
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ychnyy zhurnal 1: 2942; 2: 6882.
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