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Transforming Transformation -- Will it Change the Character of War?
Abstract
The views expressed in this and other papers associated with the NIC 2020 project are those of individual participants. They are posted for discussion purposes only and do not represent the views of the US Government.
... The networks provide the means to share information and make cyberspace, in a broader sense, a global commons for electronic information in the same fashion that the high seas provide the means to share commodities across a commons for maritime trade. 12 Like the sea, cyberspace is international and available for all to use. It is a shared resource that is loosely governed, routinely navigated via myriad uncharted routes, and, of increasing concern, often not well-secured. ...
With cheap technology and minimal investment, current and poten-tial adversaries operating in cyberspace can inflict serious damage to DOD's vast information grid—a system that encompasses more than 15,000 local, regional, and wide-area networks, and approximately 7 million information technology devices. 1 —Robert Gates, former US Secretary of Defense T he US Government has robust data networks that provide rapid transport of imagery, textual information, command and control data, and routine communications to support military operations and core business needs. This information is vital in the conduct of its war and peacetime missions. Historically, America's adversaries attempt to leverage network vulnerabilities to gain strategic advantage by exploiting information about US military and commercial activities, trade secrets, financial information, system architectures, and other data. The US is arguably the most interconnected nation on earth and it plays a hegemonic role with regard to establishing and maintaining the rules that govern the Internet. Americans embrace digital technologies that promise greater interconnection for governmental, corporate, and personal utility. This article examines current Internet attack trends in the computer networking environment and proposes an enhanced framework for strategic system defense applicable to both corporate and federal networks. Presently, the balance of power favors those adversaries trying to attack US information systems, networks, and critical infrastructure. Well-designed cloud computing environments, however, may change the balance in favor of the defense, while reducing costs and improving service. The enhanced framework addresses these issues and assists in reducing the risks associated with assessing and adopting cloud computing. Computing clouds are large data centers, filled with generic processing and storage facilities, and operated as multiple reconfigurable virtual servers. 2 Colonel Timothy K. Buennemeyer, Ph.D., is a 2011 graduate of the US Army War College and winner of the Daniel M. Lewin Cyber-Terrorism Technology Writing Award. Currently, he is the Military Advisor for Net-Centric, Space, and Missile Defense Systems, working for the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation on the Secretary of Defense staff. He also teaches a graduate-level cybersecurity course for the Masters of Information Technology program at Virginia Tech.
... A more expansive implementation plan would be created following the adoption of the strategic framework by our military leadership. 183 Vice Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski ...
The United States Department of Defense (DoD) is currently engaged in a massive effort to transform America's military for the challenges of the 21st century. This transformation effort is focused on making structural, intellectual, and cultural changes to the world's greatest military force, but it has neglected the one area of change essential to military success in the information age: moral transformation. An individual and organizational moral transformation is required because the United States Military, the cornerstone of America's preeminent world position, is suffering from an insidious internal decay which threatens its warriors, the heart of the profession of arms, and the nation's future security. The Core Values revolution of the 1990s has failed to have any significant impact on this institutional malaise and now only serves to create a false sense of security regarding the institution's moral condition. The current moral condition of the Services is the result of inadequate individual moral development for America's warriors and the combination of institutional apathy and cultural duplicity. The general acknowledgement of the need for moral aptitude by Service leadership has not generated sufficient change in the shallow, disconnected programs currently in existence. This institutional abdication of moral responsibility and failures to correct cultural problems directly undermines the moral competence of the joint warrior, which can have significant negative impacts on trust and confidence in the organization, the establishment of domestic and international support, and operational effectiveness. In line with current DoD Transformation efforts, it is time to initiate a Joint Ethical Transformation Campaign to improve moral competence and ethical cultures within all of the Services.
21 века качественно изменился и стал сложнее, в нем появилось множество асимметричных угроз, противостояние которым на основе институтов и концепций индустриальной эпохи становится в луч-шем случае неэффективным, а чаще просто невозможным. Появляется на-стоятельная необходимость в пересмотре традиционных моделей войны и конфликта и разработки новых, позволяющих описать континуум войны 21 века. Существующие методологии и метрики оценки опасностей и угроз, позволяющие дать количественную оценку эффективности мероприятий в области военного строительства, оказываются неэффективными или просто неадекватными формирующейся новой глобальной среде.
Discussed here are the theoretical aspects of Armenia's Military Sphere and its transformation to be performed on the basis of the Armenian vision of war as well as using the advanced military thought and organizational experience of other nations. Conceptually this transformation is leaning upon the paradigm of non-linearity and the theory of complex adaptive systems constituting the basic princi-ples of the new concepts of warfare, such as the network-centric warfare and ef-fects-based operations. The human factor is a crucial element of new concepts, so that any transforma-tion of the Military Sphere is to be based upon admitting the complex and human-centric nature of war, thus suggesting the indispensable modification of the mili-tary culture. Transformation turns out to be a complex dynamic process, its success being in many ways contingent upon the capability to discover the equilibrium between the creative power, access to innovations, and an inevitable inertia of the military establishment.
The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that the Marine Corps can implement Distributed Operations (DO) without changing the current force structure or command and control hierarchy. This paper will present the currently proposed examples of incremental implementation and address how the current structure is able to absorb adaptation while providing for continuity of command and control. This paper begins with an explanation of what DO entails. It will then provide a discussion of why DO is relevant and how it nests within emerging concepts. This background information will provide a common language in order to facilitate a discussion of what command and control and force structure is required to facilitate an incremental implementation of DO. This paper will then transition to the crux of the current debate: why force structure and command and control (C2) relationships should change prior to implementation. Once the debate is understood, the paper will address force structure and C2 measured in relation to the five characteristics of DO: decentralization, complexity, multi-dimensionality, simultaneity, and continuous pressure. Next an evaluation is required of the current DO implementation courses of action. Finally, this paper will conclude with how the Marine Corps can implement DO without changing the current force structure or command and control hierarchy.
Headquarters Marine Corps faces a critical choice: to mobilize the Reserve F/A-18 squadrons for use in the GWOT, to change their role, or to confront a possible loss of the Reserve Tactical Aviation force structure. As of July 2004, there have been over 31,900 reserve Marines activated in support of the GWOT, the highest total since the Korean War. Yet with the current active duty operations tempo equating to a greater than one-to-one ratio, the Marine Reserve F/A-18 squadrons remain the only Reserve capability not to have been activated. Despite the Department of Defense's push for transformation, not a single Marine Reserve F/A-18 squadron has been used in either Operation Enduring Freedom or Operation Iraqi Freedom. In light of this fact, the following question must be asked: Are the Marine Reserve F/A-18 squadrons relevant? If they are relevant, then why, to date, have these Reserve squadrons not been used in the GWOT? If these squadrons are not relevant, then what should the Marine Corps do with them? This research concludes that the Marine Reserve F/A-18 squadrons are relevant. Subsequently, five courses of action are offered to Marine Corps leadership: (1) Mobilize 4th MAW F/A-18 squadrons for use in the GWOT; (2) Mobilize 4th MAW F/A-18 squadrons for use in UDP rotations; (3) Move all three Reserve squadrons to MAG-41, JRB Fort-Worth, Texas; (4) Decommission all three squadrons and change the role of that force structure; or (5) Maintain the status quo and face the possible loss of tactical aviation all together. The most advantageous course of action is to mobilize the Reserve F/A-18 squadrons to support the GWOT, which will reduce operations tempo for the active duty forces. The most dangerous course of action is to do nothing. This decision could be the first step toward losing tactical aviation competence as a whole, which would significantly reduce the potency of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF).
This selected bibliography lists references for readings related to U.S. Department of Defense transformation. Significant works on the U.S. intelligence community transformation and foreign defense transformation have also been added. With the exception of some important older titles, all of the works listed are dated from 2003 to the present.
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