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The Rise of China and the Future of the West Can the Liberal System Survive?
Abstract
From Foreign Affairs , January/February 2008 Summary: China's rise will inevitably bring the United States' unipolar moment to an end. But that does not necessarily mean a violent power struggle or the overthrow of the Western system. The U.S.-led international order can remain dominant even while integrating a more powerful China --but only if Washington sets about strengthening that liberal order now. G. JOHN IKENBERRY is Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University and the author of After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars. The rise of China will undoubtedly be one of the great dramas of the twenty-first century. China's extraordinary economic growth and active diplomacy are already transforming East Asia, and future decades will see even greater increases in Chinese power and influence. But exactly how this drama will play out is an open question. Will China overthrow the existing order or become a part of it? And what, if anything, can the United States do to maintain its position as China rises? Some observers believe that the American era is coming to an end, as the Western-oriented world order is replaced by one increasingly dominated by the East. The historian Niall Ferguson has written that the bloody twentieth century witnessed "the descent of the West" and "a reorientation of the world" toward the East. Realists go on to note that as China gets more powerful and the United States' position erodes, two things are likely to happen: China will try to use its growing influence to reshape the rules and institutions of the international system to better serve its interests, and other states in the system --especially the declining hegemon --will start to see China as a growing security threat. The result of these developments, they predict, will be tension, distrust, and conflict, the typical features of a power transition. In this view, the drama of China's rise will feature an increasingly powerful China and a declining United States locked in an epic battle over the rules and leadership of the international system. And as the world's largest country emerges not from within but outside the established post-World War II international order, it is a drama that will end with the grand ascendance of China and the onset of an Asian-centered world order.
... They have laid the basis for unprecedented levels of cooperation and shared authority over the global system. (Ikenberry John, 2008) The key factor in stability and viability of Western world order in post-American epoch lies in its flexibility and ability to accommodate new actors. In fact, the so-called rising powers managed to reinforce inside this system and as a result of using wisely its institutes, so their future prosperity and development depend on the involvement in this system. ...
... As China sheds its status as a developing country (and therefore as a client of these institutions), it will increasingly be able to act as a patron and stakeholder instead. (Ikenberry, 2008) The thing is, that the more powerful the states get, the more advantages they are given by the system in terms of increasing their bargaining power in important decision-making process, making them stakeholders of the system. ...
... Declining states, in turn, fear their loss of control and worry about the security implications of their weakened position." (Ikenberry John, 2008) The future of liberal world order also rests on the actions of today's strongest state. As mentioned above, the rising powers will not attempt to topple the existing liberal order but they will only fight for the expansion of their rights within this system through increasing of their participation in international institutions, and therefore, increasing their participation in the decision-making process in order to gain more authority within the system. ...
Recently, there are many considerations of what will be the future of liberal world order after the end of unilateral hegemonyof the United States resulted in the decreasing of its role and increasing of the role and importance of non-liberal powers; whether thecurrent world order based on Western values will sustain or finally become a part of history in the so-called post-American era. Thepresent article is intended to demonstrate how liberal world order will keep functioning on the world arena regardless of tougheningnon-liberal forces by pleading its ability to accommodate the interests of the rising forces. The present article also discusses the USrole in preserving and steady developing of liberal world order in the future.
... China, in particular, with its unprecedented economic growth has emerged as a formidable adversary to the US [Hang, 2017, pp. 48-49;Ikenberry, 2008]. ...
... Through the implementation of its comprehensive and time-tested strategy of economic expansion through market integration, which has enabled it to extend its reach and influence beyond its domestic borders. This strategy has been applied in multiple regions around the world, including Asia, the Middle East, Latin America, Eurasia, and Africa [Ikenberry, 2008]. A political expert at the Science Academy of Russia claims that China 'has earned the utmost reverence amongst the international community and has become a brand-new superpower' [Xuetong, 2006, p. 6]. ...
... With its victory in World War-II and the Cold War, the US made its mark as the leading global power. Not only did it directed the establishment of institutions for global governance, but also created a world order that forged interconnectedness between states while propagating democratic and free market values in the international system [Ikenberry, 2008]. The post-Cold War hegemonic prospects of the US have undoubtedly sustained throughout the years, with power projection in the forms of foreign military interventions and a stronghold of the US dollar in international markets and trade. ...
Geopolitical evolution is a constant process; thus, the international system has transformed time and again. However, with rapid technological advancement, the transformation cycle of the international system has substantially been reduced. Hence, in less than two decades since the unipolar moment commenced, there begun chatter of a political paradigm shift. The root cause being the decline of the United States and rise of major powers; China, Russia, and India. Whereas, multiple intervening factors, newly emerged realities, such as emergence of non-state actors, rise of the East, the increasing scale of regionalization, the shift towards neo-nationalist foreign policy, the advent of fifth-generation technological warfare, and rising ecological issues, identified as catalyst to the paradigm shift. Nonetheless, these newly emerged realities have also a profound effect on the foreign policy orientation of states. This paper objectively and critically analyzes how the emerging realities in the international system are affecting the foreign policy of states.
... On the other hand, it reduces the economic linkages and thus leverages the United States over the People's Republic of China. The importance of growing economic ties should not be underestimated as it was a significant factor in accommodating the two former enemies -Japan and West Germany into the Western World in the twentieth century (Ikenberry, 2008). ...
... As the friend-shoring trend grows with new initiatives such as the recently signed Memorandum of Understanding creating the US -India Semiconductor Supply Chain and Innovation Partnership (U.S. Department of Commerce, 2023), developed countries' policymakers should remember that being a tool to recreate the responsible balance in trade relationsfriend-shoring should not become a reason for the new imbalances and isolation, and the constructive en-gagement is probably the best way for the United States to navigate the competition with China -as John Ikenberry said: "The United States cannot thwart China's rise, but it can help ensure that China's power is exercised within the rules and institutions that the United States and its partners have crafted over the last century, rules and institutions that can protect the interests of all states in the more crowded world of the future" (Ikenberry, 2008). ...
The US-Taiwan Technology, Trade and Investment Collaboration framework is one of the American responses to the semiconductor Global Value Chains pandemic disruptions. It calls for closer economic and technological cooperation in the microchip industry including two-way investment. The aim of the study is to determine the poten- tial positive and negative effects of TTIC within the context of complex Sino-American relations, and new approaches to globalisation with a special focus on its friend-shoring features. As the outcome of the analysis of the secondary data from research papers or reports and the descriptive research method conducted in this paper, TTIC appears as a balanced means of addressing the supply chain disruptions in the key sectors of the economy. Keywords: GVC, friend-shoring, semiconductors, US, China. JEL Classification: F5, F52
... While some scholars assert that China qualifies as a revisionist state, citing its expanding economic and military capabilities, others argue that there is no inherent motivation for China to adopt a revisionist stance. The argument posits that China stands to benefit most from the current liberal international order (Ikenberry, 2008;Feng & He, 2020). Regardless of whether China is deemed a revisionist power, it is evident that China is increasing its political, military, and economic influence. ...
There are various power-balancing strategies have been examined in the field of International Relations and Political Science scholarship. While Western powers generally tend to use hard power or hard balancing strategies, China distinguishes itself from them by often seeking power balancing through soft and normative power. Since the founding of the People's Republic of China, the country has pursued a peaceful policy in its international affairs. Although China has recently adopted a more proactive foreign policy in parallel with its increasing political and economic influence in global politics and its tense relations with Taiwan, Hong Kong, and neighbouring countries, it has not moved away from its traditional peaceful foreign policy. Accordingly, China has focused on goals such as maintaining its Non-interference policies, realizing the Chinese Dream through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and establishing Confucius Institutes to increase its normative and soft power influence in the international arena. This study aims to analyse China's power balancing strategies through soft and normative power strategies, in the context of China's current rising power position in the international arena.
... This would be a proof that the current global governance system stands still and though the players may change, the structures remain the same. New groupings and institutions would, therefore, seek to integrate themselves into the existing system while trying to retain the highest possible degree of sovereignty and autonomy (Kahler, 2013), echoing Ikenberry's assertion that the current liberal world order is "easy to join, but hard to overturn" (Ikenberry, 2008). ...
O Novo Banco de Desenvolvimento (NDB), liderado pelo BRICS, declarou que o compromisso com o financiamento de infraestrutura e desenvolvimento sustentável é talvez a característicamais importante que o diferencia de outros Bancos Multilaterais de Desenvolvimento (Multilateral Development Banks – MDBs) existentes. A ausência de uma definição e de critérios claros para qualificar a própria noção de “ infraestrutura sustentável”, no entanto, será um desafio para o NDB designar infraestrutura como sustentável e realizar sua visão em torno do desenvolvimento sustentável. Este artigo argumenta que o NDB tem a oportunidade de definir uma infraestrutura sustentável e abrir uma nova abordagem para o financiamento ao desenvolvimento. Além disso, sugere que o NDB deva considerar o desenvolvimento de parcerias público-privadas e projetos de integração regional como opções a serem perseguidas. Essa estratégia daria ao NDB as ferramentas necessárias para articular o seu mandato e criar um nicho para si próprio na arquitetura global do financiamento para o desenvolvimento.
... The United States' ability to maintain its position as the global hegemon is being questioned, as it faces domestic challenges and a shifting geopolitical landscape. This shift has significant implications for global politics, trade, and security, as well as the future trajectory of international relations (Ikenberry, 2008). ...
This article examines the current global landscape, characterized by the decline of US hegemony and the rise of China, and draws parallels to Carr's "Twenty Years' Crisis." The implications of these shifts are explored, including the resurgence of realism, China's ascent as a global power, challenges to US leadership, and the potential risks of a global military conflict.
The resurgence of power politics challenges the prevailing belief that it had diminished in the post-Cold War era. Territorial disputes and the pursuit of national interests by major powers such as Russia and China highlight the enduring relevance of realism. China's rapid rise as a global power echoes the emergence of the United States as a superpower in the past. Meanwhile, the United States faces challenges as its economic and technological superiority wanes, with China posing a significant threat to its leadership. In conclusion, the current global landscape, similar to Carr's "Twenty Years' Crisis," demands a holistic approach to understanding and addressing the complexities of our time.
... Through a comparative analysis, the study elucidates the distinctions and similarities between Western and Asian leadership paradigms, offering a nuanced and substantiated comprehension of how cultural paradigms underlie leadership in an increasingly multipolar world. This analysis, timely and pertinent in the face of a global shift towards a multipolar world order, endeavors to demystify how divergent cultural narratives shape leadership styles and, by extension, the global organizational landscape (Ikenberry, 2008). ...
This article explores the intricate interplay between cultural paradigms and leadership styles within the context of transition to a multipolar world. Drawing on frameworks such as Hofstede's cultural dimensions and Deleuze and Guattari's Oedipal-rhizomatic archetypes, the study investigates how cultural values shape leadership behaviors and organizational dynamics in Western and Asian perspectives. Through a comparative analysis, the article examines contrasting leadership approaches and their implications for organizational performance, innovation, and sustainability. Key findings highlight the importance of cultural sensitivity in leadership, emphasizing the need for leaders to adapt their strategies to diverse cultural landscapes while fostering inclusivity, collaboration, and sustainability. Moreover, the study underscores the evolving nature of leadership in response to global challenges, advocating for a more integrative approach that combines traditional and contemporary leadership paradigms. The article concludes by emphasizing the significance of understanding cultural influences on leadership for building inclusive and adaptable organizations in today's multipolar world.
... Practical and political shortcomings of replicating the liberal model around the world came under harsh criticism as early as mid-2000s, as for example in critiques of liberal internationalism and peacebuilding (Richmond & MacGinty, 2015), of democracy promotion (Bridoux & Kurki, 2014;Hobson & Kurki, 2012) and of the EU enlargement (Kuus, 2004(Kuus, , 2007. At the same time, the rise of non-Western powers, be those BRICS collectively or China as a "great power" inspired much soul-searching about the decline of wWesternhegemony on the world stage (Ikenberry, 2008(Ikenberry, , 2009Lake et al., 2021). Indeed, debates about the end of the Liberal World Order have been raging for over a decade now (Alcaro, 2018;Börzel & Zürn, 2021;Flockhart, 2020;Lucarelli, 2018Lucarelli, , 2020Parsi 2022). ...
The Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 is seen by many as a catastrophe of global proportions and a critical juncture for International Relations, both as an academic discipline and as a political practice. In this review essay, I offer a stock-taking exercise that puts Ukraine-specific debates into the broader context of the International Relations (IR) discipline. My aim is twofold: to show how debates about Ukraine go right to the heart of major meta- theories in IR and to use Ukrainian specificity and complexity to problematize compartmentalized approaches to “area studies” and to some strands of “postcolonialism”. I conclude by showcasing recent publications of scholars of and from Ukraine to provide a glimpse into this relatively small but vibrant academic community. I further argue that Ukraine’s predicament helps highlight the persistence of Cold War binaries, with their strong colonial baggage, including within the so-called critical IR.
... Thus, Beijing's economic partnership expands to Southeast Asia, Latin America, Africa, and so on. Likewise, China rapidly integrated Western-led institutions and reaped the benefits of the United Nations (UN), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and so forth (Ikenberry, 2008). Alastair Johnston considers China's compliance with most of the global norms; these include sovereignty, free trade, non-proliferation and arms control, national self-determination, international treaties, etc. (Johnston, 2003). ...
What are the implications of ongoing US-China competition on the entire global system and particularly to strategically-placed countries like Nepal? The United States has been voicing its growing displeasure against China’s rise. The United States regards China's military modernization and economic growth as evidence that it will not be a status quo power. In this scenario, there is a widespread belief that great power is inherently offensive, that the quest for power never ends, and that China will maintain the status quo posture until it achieves power parity with the United States. As a result, the United States has shifted its policy toward the Asia-Pacific region and is forming strategic alliances to counterbalance China. It is argued that if there were no legacies of friendship and ideological proximity, a great power fall or power transition from a dominant nation to a challenger almost always results in a cold war or major war. The U.S. and China have cultural and ideological differences; however, China has integrated many aspects of the existing international order and its global norms. In this background, this article examines fundamental assumptions of offensive realism and the nature of the U.S.-China rivalry, as well as the meaning of China’s rise and the U.S.-China greater power competition for Nepal. This phenomenon will be tested through offensive realism and how it amounts to great power behavior.
... Some claim that hegemony over the US is currently being assumed by China. The three countries' complementary qualities and shared awareness of multipolarity present a unique opportunity to explore potential avenues for further cooperation as they navigate a rapidly shifting global landscape (Ikenberry 2008). ...
The US and other highly industrialized states' long-standing domination in the global economy is under challenge from the rise of developing economies like China, India, and Brazil. The global economy is evolving. At the same time, changes have been made to a number of international governance organizations to enhance the major growing economies represented. This article looks at the World Trade Organization, a key structure in the international regulation of trade, and the contributions and impact that Brazil, India, and China have had inside it. These shifts in power, which the rising nations are really influencing greatly, have resulted in the breakdown of multilateralism and the stillbirth of neoliberals at the WTO. There is now a battle between the new and old powers, despite the fact that the new powers are opposing US hegemony rather than the WTO's neoliberal worldview.
... For instance, realist theories suggest that the potential for conflict may increase as China's power grows and it seeks to reshape the regional order in its favor (Mearsheimer 2014;Waltz 1979, 103-13). However, other scholars argue that the nature of China's rise could foster cooperation and the development of new norms and institutions, which might mitigate potential tensions (Ikenberry 2008). This perspective underscores the importance of understanding not only the trajectory of China's rise but also the evolving international context in which it is taking place. ...
This research delves into the examination of China's potential hegemony in the regional sphere, juxtaposing its substantial military capacities, strategic ambitions, and ideological underpinnings. By leveraging a methodical triangulation of quantitative data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), theoretical implications from China's policy documents, and critical analysis of China's robust infrastructure, considerable resources, and impressive capabilities, this study explores China's strategic landscape in comparison with other regional and international contenders. It establishes that, despite the formidable potential for hegemonic pursuits, China's political ideologies-Harmonious World, Peaceful Development, Chinese Dream, and the vision of a Human Community with a Shared Future, intertwined with strategic imperatives 2 and nuclear deterrence, indicate a proclivity towards preservation of the existing global order and a commitment to peaceful evolution. The research concludes that, in the foreseeable context, China will likely persist in its endeavor to foster peaceful bilateral and multilateral relationships with neighboring states, demonstrating a strategic preference for peaceful development over aggressive hegemonic dominance.
... Similar views regarding the potential national security threat posed by China were expressed at the time by a variety of authors, for exampleIkenberry (2008) andWaldron (2005). ...
We employ insights from the international relations literature to offer a novel perspective on the regulation of inbound foreign direct investment (FDI). We argue that in a world of hegemonic rivalry, the incumbent, when it perceives a threat, tends to employ both internal and external policy mechanisms to maintain the balance of power. Specifically, in response to China’s rise, the US expanded its internal national security review regulations, moving from a primary focus on FDI by state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to including Chinese investments in a broad set of strategic industries, regardless of ownership. External mechanisms include the diffusion of those internal regulations to allied countries, and we focus on a specific Alliance, the Five Eye (FVEY) intelligence alliance. Empirically, we combine natural language processing of keywords with close reading of selected documents to analyze FDI regulations in the US and FVEY allies. The results suggest that the US is an early adopter of both SOE and broader FDI regulations targeting strategic sectors for national security considerations. While SOE regulations exhibit relatively limited evidence of convergence, we find a more significant and recent convergence between the US and its alliance partners on the national security reviews of FDI in strategic sectors.
... With the rise of China and other emerging powers, the traditional dominance of the West in international relations is being challenged. Some scholars have highlighted the potential for this shift to lead to a more multipolar world, with several centers of power (Ikenberry, 2008). Others have emphasized the risks associated with the rise of new powers, including the potential for conflict (Mearsheimer, 2019). ...
This article aims to analyze the global trends in political development and the state's position in the international relations matrix, with a special focus on the importance of choosing a development model for the state, particularly in terms of European and Euro-Atlantic foreign policy vectors. This study employs a descriptive analytical research design. The data were gathered from a comprehensive review of relevant literature on globalization, deglobalization, European integration, and Euro-Atlantic development. The research finds that globalization is a megatrend that has significant implications for the present world order. The increasing influence of post-modern structures, such as transnational corporations, and the global digitalization in all spheres of life of society, especially during pandemics, have accelerated global processes and are viewed as tools for sustainable development. Deglobalization, manifested in regionalization and glocalization, is considered a countertrend for globalization. The article also emphasizes the crucial role of European and Euro-Atlantic integration in the state's participation in globalization processes. The analysis presented in this article has several practical implications. It suggests that the state's foreign policy must be aligned with globalization trends and the deglobalization of the global universe's influence, establishing new centers of the world order and new regional powers. It also highlights the importance of European integration and the Euro-Atlantic vector of development in the state's globalization strategy.
... The role of the developmental state in East Asia, for example, was acknowledged only begrudgingly and in diluted form by the World Bank's 1993 report, The East Asian Miracle (Birdsall et al 1993). The remarkable economic growth and social development of China in recent decades (Yan 2001;Fang et al. 2004) had even less to do with neoliberal prescription and is even seen as a significant threat to 'the liberal system' (Ikenberry 2008). During the 1970s and 1980s, North American commitment to asymmetry was embedded in a doctrine called 'hegemonic stability theory', which had little to do with the community of sovereign nations, as in the United Nations Charter. ...
This article demonstrates that economic liberal theory, itself created in particular historical circumstances to serve powerful interests, has been selectively used by the nominally liberal Anglo-American hegemonic project. That project, in turn, has not simply been one of capitalism; but rather tied to a particular evolving oligarchy,
stretching back more than three centuries, into the pre-capitalist era. Hegemonic neoliberalism is the late Twentieth-Century iteration of this longer project.
... Indeed, Freedom House, for example, notes in its report that freedom (political rights and civil liberties) around the world has particularly deteriorated since 2014, and while there are many theories as to the causes of this "democratic retreat," many of the countries that are experiencing On the other hand, there is a contrasting view that China's recent rise is within international rules and need not be more alarming than necessary (Ikenberry, 2008). ...
... Politicamente, como demonstrado no caso das votações, o ocidente depende destes mesmos países para levar adiante suas pautas em organizações internacionais. Contudo, o oposto também é válido, de forma que a China e outras potências emergentes só foram capazes de ascender econômica e politicamente graças a sua integração político-econômica à ordem vigente (Ikenberry, 2008). Em tons finais no que concerne a concepção de hegemonia interdependente a qual sustentamos: Na era atual do capitalismo transnacional, é menos provável que a China e as potências emergentes estabeleçam uma nova ordem mundial com uma hegemonia alternativa. ...
Este trabalho parte de uma perspectiva neogramsciana para indagar os rumos da ordem mundial atual em torno de uma transição ou reciclagem da hegemonia vigente. Para tanto, a partir de uma pesquisa exploratória e qualitativa apoiada em livros, artigos e documentos sobre a temática da ordem global e as características da EPI atual, a hipótese sustentada é de que as mudanças sistêmicas ocorridas nas duas últimas décadas representam uma mutação de uma hegemonia unipolar para uma hegemonia interdependente, em que potências do Norte e do Sul Global se entrelaçam em um processo co-constitutivo de constante formação e reformulação da ordem internacional. Empiricamente, dados como a maior fragmentação do poder em termos de PIB por poder paridade de compra (PPC), participação no campo da ciência e tecnologia, assim como uma descentralização e multilateralização institucional são analisados para sustentar a argumentação. Recebido em: 13 fev. 2023 | Aceito em: 07 jun. 2023.
... These concerns are related to the broader, ongoing debate about the implication of a rising China in global governance (Ikenberry 2008;Schweller and Pu 2011;Acharya 2014;Norrlof et al. 2020). While the AIIB should be understood as part of the Chinese party-state's international strategy, it is important not to conflate the establishment of a single MDB with the range of policies, institutions, bilateral/multilateral agreements, and other instruments that together constitute the latter. ...
How does the nature of a dissociation conflict affect its management by parties on opposite sides and, consequently, the interstate relations between the parties? In this paper, I seek to address this question through a case study of the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), understood as dissociation by creating alternative institutions, and its impact on the relations between China - the initiator and leading country of the new bank - and the US - the main stakeholder of the established global financial architecture. Based on my analysis of the interaction between the two countries during the AIIB's founding process (2013-2016), I argue that US-China relations saw moderately increased tensions due to the fact that the North American country had been overall more concerned with the ideational challenges posed by the AIIB than the material ones. I further postulate that the structural rivalry between the two countries has contributed significantly to the US perception of the AIIB representing an ideational challenge, thereby fostering the former's opposition of China's initiative. However, this dissociation conflict did not directly contribute to the deterioration of US-China relations under the Trump administration.
... Beginning in the 1990s, China went through a period of tremendous industrial growth, the rise of new industries, and ongoing economic progress (Kristof 1992). The nation's industrial industry expanded to rank among the largest in the world (Ikenberry 2008), and it became a significant exporter to other countries. China made significant investments in infrastructure and education during this time as well, establishing the framework for the ensuing stage of development. ...
The concept of power is inadvertently one of the most central topics in the field of politics. The concept has been intriguing for mankind as long as the human memory goes. Especially the realist school of thought has a primary focus on the power-narrative. One of the earliest studies undertaken was that of A.F.K. Organski who wrote World Politics in 1958 that constructed indicators what state power may or may not constitute. Organski’s work being explanatory has prompted a scientific prediction of war based on these indicators. Power Transition Theory provides relevance from a practical realist stance in today’s turbulent international order elaborating on Nation, International Relations and International Organizations. Constructivism criticizes the predictive abilities and the absoluteness as quick turn of events can make mockery of the tidiest of theories. However, this paper seeks to establish an alternative criticism to the Power Transition Theory as discussed in a vast body of literature on how wars are predicted during a transition of power on basis of Index of National Capability (INC).
... It argued that while the current international order cannot prevent China from rising, it may be able to shape its actions and help define its behavior. In other words, because China benefits from the LIO, it will not feel prone to overthrow it (IKENBERRY, 2008). According to this view, China will be a statusquo power if it can take advantage of this order to advance its interests (CHAN et al., 2018). ...
The contemporary security multilateral institutional framework is characterized by varied functional and geographical configurations, regimes, alliances, and dialogue fora. Some recent events and trends, such as the disintegration of the US-Russia arms control regime and the growing incapacity of multilateral organisms such as the United Nations Security Council, suggest, nonetheless, that this framework is in crisis. This article aims to explain the current crisis in the realm of peace and security multilateralism and the roles of the United States and China in this context. We conclude that the Global South actors need to exert their collective agency demanding more inclusive and cohesive security multilateral institutions to help manage great power rivalry in a way that better suits the collective aims of peace and development on a global scale.
This research outlines how China's rise affect on small states. Especially in Indian Ocean Region by its institutional and normative reforms. It emphasis how these reforms impact on small states in a debt trap. Also it sheds light on the foreign policy decisions of small states due to China's rise.
Cet article propose une cartographie de la confrontation entre deux systèmes capitalistes dont l’un est libéral et l’autre dirigiste. Le premier, c’est-à-dire les Etats-Unis d’Amérique jouent au maintien de son leadership mondial économique et le second, c’est-à-dire la Chine cherche à remettre en cause l’ordre économique mondial instauré par les Etats-Unis d’Amérique. Dans cet affrontement américano-chinois se trouve l’implication de la Corée du Sud dans la mesure où l’internationalisation de son économie la rend particulièrement sensible aux évolutions de l’économie mondiale et en particulier à celles de ses partenaires les plus proches : la Chine, les Etats-Unis et le Japon. Cet environnement a rarement été aussi incertain, allant du pire au meilleur. Cette réflexion analyse les faits d’actualité et cherche à démêler les bons et faux arguments qui justifieraient l’augmentation des barrières commerciales américaines, en particulier contre la Chine, et met en lumière les enjeux économiques de cette possible « guerre commerciale » sur la Corée du Sud. Mots-clés : capitalisme libéral, capitalisme d’Etat, guerre commerciale, la Chine, les Etats-Unis d’Amérique et Corée du Sud.
There are various power-balancing strategies have been examined in the field of International Relations and Political Science scholarship. While Western powers generally tend to use hard power or hard balancing strategies, China distinguishes itself from them by often seeking power balancing through soft and normative power. Since the founding of the People's Republic of China, the country has pursued a peaceful policy in its international affairs. Although China has recently adopted a more proactive foreign policy in parallel with its increasing political and economic influence in global politics and its tense relations with Taiwan, Hong Kong, and neighbouring countries, it has not moved away from its traditional peaceful foreign policy. Accordingly, China has focused on goals such as maintaining its Non-interference policies, realizing the Chinese Dream through the BRI, and establishing Confucius Institutes to increase its normative and soft power influence in the international arena. This study aims to analyse China's power balancing strategies through soft and normative power strategies, in the context of China's current rising power position in the international arena.
One of the most significant events in international affairs after the end of the Cold War is the rapid economic growth of China, an authoritarian state. Spanning 40 years, China has made remarkable progress, with an average double-digit economic growth rate. Asia is the best region to analyze the dynamic pattern of China’s rise. More than 30 years after the end of the Cold War, while China’s rise is evident, it has not achieved absolute dominance in Asia and is still struggling to forge a regional order that works in its favor. The Asian region currently features three prominent characteristics. First, there is no regional economic integration movement that spans the entire Asian region, nor is there a regional institution like the European Union that spans most of Europe. Second, among the numerous organizations in the Asian region, most are regional organizations for economic cooperation, while there are few regional organizations related to security. Third, while the US plays an important role in the security arena in Asia, China is beginning to play a central role in the economic sector. This chapter explains the characteristics of the current Asian regional order from the perspective of China’s Asian policy after the end of the Cold War, and it verifies how the characteristics of the Asian regional order were created amidst Chinese policy and the reaction to China from Asian countries.
This chapter focuses on American Climate Emergency Narratives that describe how climate breakdown has created international geopolitical tension and conflict. These are narratives that show the US and other major powers such as China, India, and Russia leveraging their considerable military resources to compete over and secure vital natural resources, in the process of which they establish new command over, or lose, hegemony over the world-system. These texts thus register the fact that continued socio-ecological erosion may produce world wars in the future, but they see no alternative to such development. The questions these texts pose are ultimately how such future wars can be won by the American security apparatus or the nightmare that follows if other actors in the world-system take advantage of American failure.
The article examines the impact of the Russian-Ukrainian war on international system and international order. It assesses the former through the lenses of realism and neorealism, while approaching the latter within constructivist and English School approaches. Structural and normative changes in international politics are examined. The war has been revealing and transforming the balance of power on a global and regional levels. By doing so, it is enhancing structural changes in the international system. The article explores the scope of these changes. On the normative side, the conflict challenges and potentially alters the rule-based international order, affecting established norms and institutions. This war not only affects Ukraine but also has broader implications, contributing to the ideological standoff and security paradigm shifts globally. The article underscores the interplay between structural changes and normative shifts, illustrating how these dynamics are interconnected and mutually reinforcing. This comprehensive analysis provides insights into the evolving landscape of international relations and security, emphasizing the far-reaching consequences of the Russian-Ukrainian war on both international system and order.
In recent years, China has become a dominant power with a formidable blue-water navy in the Indo-Pacific. American power projection in the South China Sea is merely an island in an ocean of enduring Chinese presence. Beijing's growing economic clout, its geopolitical aspirations combined with its grey-zone tactics in the South China Sea has consistently tested the robustness of strategic stability and international maritime law in the region. In light of such developments, the chapter argues that India needs a new Indo-Pacific strategy summarized in a multi-pronged approach. Success for New Delhi rests on four main pillars: (a) consolidating geostrategic relations with critical island nations of the Indian Ocean Region (IOR); (b) deepening multilateral engagements with ASEAN, Japan and Australia, Pacific Island nations; (c) joint naval exercises and maritime expeditions to increase interoperability of navies; and (d) shoring up critical naval warfighting capabilities at critical geostrategic locations such as the Andaman and Nicobar archipelago.
Russia’s annexation of Crimea and war on Ukraine has led to upheaval in NATO’s discourse and practice. Taking a step back from the security debate, this article contends that the very process of responding to Russian aggression has led to the reimagining of NATO’s identity. While NATO tends to present change as continuity, this article’s mixed methods analysis illuminates how a trio of new and ambitious self-representations have risen to prominence within NATO’s post-Crimea discourse. NATO has anointed itself defender of the international rules-based order and purveyor of truth and facts amidst a world of disinformation, while pushing a resilience policy agenda that expands its authority into new domestic domains. Problematizing these shifts, the article warns that NATO’s new narrative ignores its own role in the problems it seeks to solve and thus risks undermining NATO efforts to rally global support for Ukraine.
The COVID-19 pandemic has been recognized as one of the deadliest episodes of human history, which claimed nearly 7 million deaths worldwide. It has also caused an economic slowdown with a significant drop in GDP growth worldwide. Today's economic crisis can be compared with the Great Depression of the 1930s and the Financial Crisis of 2008-09.
The region of South Asia, which consists of eight developing economies, has suffered immensely during the pandemic. All the region's major countries, including India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh, have been experiencing stagnant economic growth in the post-COVID-19 years. This paper attempts to analyze the impact of COVID-19 on South Asian economies and the region's post-COVID recovery scenario. As the world economy continues to struggle with slower growth in the post-pandemic period, South Asian countries need to cooperate to address the post-COVID-19 stress and strengthen the region's economy with greater inclusivity and social well-being.
Many international institutions are facing challenges due to changes in domestic politics and global power shifts. In this literature review, we ask whether international institutions are sufficiently robust to cope with a contested world in transition. We note that while changes in domestic politics and global power shifts put the liberal vision of a global order under pressure, the literature does not clearly show that the forces of populism and the rising powers uniformly challenge the rules-based global order. We also find that some international institutions have been surprisingly robust in the face of such challenges. Therefore the literature appears to indicate that we need to develop a better understanding-both conceptually and empirically-of how specific international institutions are challenged, how they cope with pressures, and what impact this has on their longer-term effectiveness and democracy in global governance.
This chapter explores the existing literature and policy debates introduced in the introduction. First, this chapter provides a historical overview of Internet governance debates on Internet fragmentation and multistakeholder governance (in general and around Chinese stakeholders’ engagement) in the context of growing debates on digital sovereignty and the rise of China in the liberal international order. Second, the chapter presents theoretical and methodological notes on regime complexity and norm entrepreneurship, which drive the author's interpretation of his findings. This chapter provides a quick illustration of the methods without delving too deeply into the technical aspects of them, which are instead addressed in an appendix. Furthermore, this chapter maps the sub-bodies and organisational functionings of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), and the Third Generation Partnership Project (3GPP)—as the three main bodies in which Chinese engagement is analysed—illustrating their sui generis structures and decision-making mechanisms.
The system of alliances is the only element of US power that China is unable and unwilling to surpass in the foreseeable future. However, in the past decade, China’s rise has posed a challenge to the transatlantic alliance in the form of a potential alliance drift that has not been addressed by existing literature. Western European allies of the United States have not hesitated at times to adopt a stance contrary to Washington’s interests, but at other times, they still maintain a position similar to that of the United States when dealing with China. This paper argues that the presence of security concerns is what largely prevents them from adopting a position favourable to China. This conclusion is reached after the examination of three factors (economic opportunities, security concerns and Washington’s pressures) in the behaviour of Germany, the UK, France, Italy and Spain in three crucial cases for the balance of power between Washington and Beijing: the AIIB, the BRI and Huawei’s 5G. The evolution of their responses suggests that China’s rise, once a divisive aspect among allies, has the potential to become an unexpected source of unity for the transatlantic alliance.
This chapter analyzes how the US-China rivalry has played out in the field of global financial governance over the past two decades. It introduces a distinction between the traditional world of intergovernmental organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the new world of government networks, such as the Financial Stability Board (FSB) and the Network for Greening the Financial System (NGFS). The chapter recounts the IMF dispute over China as a currency manipulator, and it traces the evolution of an FSB dispute between China and Western regulators over how to measure shadow banking. The chapter then turns to areas of quiet and growing cooperation between China and Europe in the realm of green finance, highlighting convergence in what counts as sustainable economic activity (green taxonomy) and what counts as a green bond. It concludes with policy recommendation for European policymakers.
As a rising global power, China is assuming an increasingly pivotal role in the realm of international cooperation. Notably, its regional collaborative endeavours have transitioned into a more integral facet of multilateral cooperation, exemplified by the establishment of entities such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the expansion of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and the inception of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). Within this framework, China has emerged as a pronounced focal point for the United States of America and several other developed Western nations. Within the discourse of International Relations scholarship, there exists a contention regarding the pivotal role(s) that multilateral cooperation can play for a burgeoning power, facilitating the augmentation of its soft power and enhancing its negotiation processes in engagements with a hegemonic power or a state of greater influence. Consequently, China's escalating engagement in multilateral collaboration with diverse regions and nations introduces a disruptive element in the strategic landscape for the United States and other comparatively influential states. Indeed, such collaborative initiatives are construed as a source of tension within the context of power balancing. This study seeks to scrutinize the underlying dynamics propelling China's multilateral cooperation initiatives and to analyse the expectations that China harbours from these collaborations, which have engendered discontent among its rival states.
RESUMO O objetivo do estudo foi investigar o efeito da divulgação de notícias sobre a guerra comercial entre China e Estados Unidos nos principais mercados Latino-Americanos. Assim, por meio de um estudo de eventos e adotando método paramétrico (teste t) e método não paramétrico (teste de Wilcoxon) foi testada a hipótese de que as notícias apresentadas pelo site cnn.com propiciam retornos das ações anormais maiores junto ao mercado de capitais Latino-Americano entre o primeiro semestre de 2016 e o final do primeiro semestre de 2019. Os resultados apontaram que: (i) o mercado brasileiro reage mais às notícias ruins do que a notícias boas, ao contrário de México e Argentina; e, (ii) o mercado chileno indicou que, o mesmo reage tanto positivamente quanto negativamente respectivamente, em relação às notícias boas e ruins, relacionadas à guerra comercial entre Estados Unidos e China. Palavras-Chave: Guerra Comercial; Mercado de Capitais; Retorno das Ações. ABSTRACT The aim of the study was to investigate the effect of the dissemination of news about the trade war between China and the United States in the main Latin American markets. Thus, through a study of events and adopting the parametric method (t test) and the non-parametric method (Wilcoxon test), the hypothesis was tested that the news presented by
The discussion of China's rise as a global economic and political power in recent decades has been fueling various theoretical discussions based on the evolution of its foreign trade policy. Hence, empirical research method is proposed in the field of international law involving the study of institutions, norms and procedures based on academic evidence. In this sense, this article analyzes the underlying reasons why this country, despite its late insertion into the Multilateral Trading System, has a relevant influence in the present. In fact, this influence from China has generated a scenario of regionalism both in the Asia-Pacific and with other strategic partners. All this, in addition to also evidencing a progressive "shadow institutionalism". Thus, this whole previous situation means that exist a real primacy achieved by China at world nowadays which also tends, in certain circumstances, to tarnish and even undermine the role of the GATT-WTO paradigm and its logic of multilateralism. Accordingly, this implies a particular scenario that suggest a whole parallel model of authority that affects the dynamics of international relations.
The future of international politics today hinges on the manner in which the Sino-American rivalry unfolds. Views of this vary from expectations of peaceful evolution to hegemonic transition, but many seem to overlook the significant potential of the liberal international order (LIO) in shaping the course of events. Thanks to its structure and adaptability, the LIO is more than the mere environment surrounding this rivalry and may be the primary determinant of American and Chinese choices, propelling relations toward cooperation. Drawing on liberal internationalist theory, this article argues that the LIO demonstrates substantial potential to emerge as the ultimate victor of the intensifying rivalry between great power rivalry. By evaluating multiple arguments, this article’s analysis concludes that a reformed version of the LIO, one that accommodates both American and Chinese expectations and reflects newly shaped power dynamics, holds the solution to the Sino-American conflict.
Examining the twenty years since China acceded to the World Trade Organization, this collection provides an original, systematic assessment of the opportunities and challenges that China has presented to the WTO. Offering in-depth analyses of the 'two-way' relationship between China and the WTO, the contributions explore a range of key issues from the varied effects of WTO membership for China and the global economy to the responses of the WTO members to China's rapid economic growth. It presents diverse perspectives of leading scholars from multiple disciplines, including law, economics, political science, and international relations, as well as practical insights from senior policymakers from both China and the United States. This is an invaluable contribution to ongoing debates about the implications of the rise of China for global economic governance and enriches discussions of the wide-ranging implications of China's growing integration into the multilateral trading system, both now and in the future. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.
The strategic rivalry between the United States and China has heightened since COVID-19. Secondary states face increasing difficulties maintaining a 'hedging' strategy between the United States and China. This Element introduces a preference-for-change model to explain the policy variations of states during the order transition. It suggests that policymakers will perceive a potential change in the international order through a cost–benefit prism. The interplays between the perceived costs and the perception of benefits from the order transition will shape states' policy choices among four strategic options: (1) hedging to bet on uncertainties; (2) bandwagoning with rising powers to support changes; (3) balancing against rising powers to resist changes; and (4) buck-passing to ignore changes. Four case studies (Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, and Thailand) are conducted to explore the policy choices of regional powers during the international order transition. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.
In a second image reversed-perspective on global order, economic globalization did not level the differences between national models of capitalism as expected by many observers. Instead, it has given rise to completely new models of dependent and state-permeated capitalism in emerging economies. Currently, we are witnessing tendencies towards economic de-globalization in the areas of trade and foreign direct investments, further supported by the Covid-19 pandemic and the Russian war against Ukraine. Economic de-globalization will also have profound repercussions on national models of capitalism, particularly to those models that are strongly exposed to global economic flows. Based on a second image perspective, the rise of large emerging economies—in particular China—leads to manifold institutional incompatibilities with the existing global economic order. The current heterogeneity of the growth models of the most important economic powers not only limits the cooperation in regulating global finance, but also leads to a state-capitalist contestation of the postnational financial order.KeywordsGlobal orderGlobalizationDe-globalizationEmerging economiesChinaFinance
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