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Greece and the Claim to Regional Hegemony in the New Balkans: Myth and Reality

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Efstathios Fakiolas

University of Peloponnese

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Greece and the Claim to Regional

Hegemony in the New Balkans:

Myth and Reality

EFSTATHIOS T. FAKIOLAS

I. Introduction

The end of the Cold War resulted in structural changes in

the Balkan Peninsula that reinforced the sub-systemic position

of Greece. Since that time, a consensus has emerged among

Greek political and economic elites that Greece has the unique

opportunity to adopt a protagonistic role in constructing a re-

gional environment favorable to its security interests in the

Balkans, and primarily with reference to Albania, Bulgaria,

FYROM, and Romania.' Underlying the term "protagonistic"

is most often the idea that Greece is the predominant power in

the Balkans. In essence, this notion denotes the meaning of

regional leadership of its own, that is, regional hegemony.

Nonetheless, though widely propagating, it is difficult to

find written works explicitly asserting Greece's regional he-

gemonic role. One problem is that most of the advocates are

politicians who prefer lecturing to writing. Another is that the

proponenents of regional hegemony never openly use the term

"hegemony" when ref ering to Greece's foreign policy goals

in the Balkans. Therefore, it is difficult to explain precisely how

they conceive of hegemony. Clearly, whatever terms they usually

employ, their common denominator is that Greece is the pre-

eminent or the first power among equals that should pursue

a role of regional leadership of its own, which is to form and

EFSTATHIOS FAIKIOLAS

graduated

summa cum laude

in international

studies from Athens Panteion University of Social and Political

Sciences, while a scholar of the IKY National Scholarship Foundation

for outstanding performance for four years. He holds a master's degree

in international politics and security from Panteion University and in

international and strategic studies from Lancaster University, while

educated at the London School of Economics.

advance a regional security system for the purposes of serving

Greek security interests.'

Charalambos Papasotiriou is, at least to the best of our

knowledge, the only Greek scholar who explicitly uses in writ-

ing the term "hegemony" as it is conceived of in the interna-

tional political economy theory. He argues that there exists a

hegemonic structure of the economic system in the Balkans, and

that Greece takes hold of a hegemonic rank in the distribution

of economic power. He strongly believes that Greece's economic

hegemony will gradually go hand in hand with its political

leadership, and that both the European Union's great powers

and the United States support the Greek hegemonic role in

the Balkans. However, we must point out that Papasotiriou

significantly distances himself from all those who are in favor

of Greece's regional hegemony to the extent that this argument

by no means points to the establishment of a regional system only

in service of Greek national interests.'

The argument in support of Greece's claims to regional

leadership in its own right is based on the country's best place-

ment structurally in the distribution of power among the Bal-

kan states concerned. Preeminence is, by and large, defined in

economic, diplomatic, and military terms. Most argue that

Greece can, and should, exploit only its economic and diplo-

matic superiority in order to establish a form of regional

hegemony.

Many policymakers and analysts, however, have no clear-

cut idea of how Greece should go about establishing regional

hegemony. They tend to exaggerate the opportunities and un-

dervalue or discount the constraints and limits. This usually

leads to the misunderstanding of international conditions, and

the adoption of extremist stances. Greece appears to have as-

pirations, and to design policies, beyond its real capabilities.

Most importantly, it damages its image in the eyes both of its

allies in the EU and NATO, and of the Balkan states concerned.

This paper is intended to explore Greece's claim to the re-

gional hegemony in the New Balkans. It challenges the pre-

vailing view in that the picture that will be sketched out is

quite different from the one that is generally held in Greece.

It illustrates that no such thing exists as hegemonic distribu-

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JOURNAL OF THE HELLENIC DIASPORA

tion of economic power in favor of Greece in the broader con-

text of the Balkan peninsula. Greece's economic, and political,

hegemony is a great myth.

The notion of hegemony, as defined in related literature,

is not readily applicable to regional politics. Certain relative

terms may fit better in present regional circumstances. We

Suggest and distinguish between structural opportunity and

structural power, which stand somewhere between the end

points of a continuum of several forms of power from force

through socialization to hegemony. The structural opportunity

is a form of a somewhat "objective" power as derived from

the distribution of capabilities across states in a particular sys-

tem or an institutional arrangement. It is power that exists

away, as such in time and place, and is not expressible in some

tangible ways. Structural power is the perceptual, actual struc-

tural opportunity. It is power that exists to the extent that it is

created by those who enjoy the attributes of structural oppor-

tunity, and is perceived as such by those who subject to it. It

reflects and refers to the overall capacity of a state's grand

'strategy to influence or control the shaping of events within a

specific context, in the sense of improving the international

conditions favorable to the preservation and enhancement of a

state's long-term security interests. The intervening variable that

links structural opportunity to structural power is a state's grand

strategy design. In fact, structural opportunity is accessible only

through grand strategy. The latter makes possible the access

to the attributes of structural opportunity by converting it into

realized structural power.

In this respect, this paper's main thesis is that the country

is .not capable of assuming a leadership role of its own in the

New Balkans, which is the meaning that a number of politician's,

journalists, businessmen, and scholars most often attach to the

notion of regional hegemony. It consists of two arguments:

First, the distribution of power between Greece and the Balkan

states concerned has indeed provided the former with a unique

"objective" power, the structural opportunity to play an as-

sertive part in Balkan affairs. Second, the perceptual, actual

structural opportunity, the structural power, is conditioned by

several systematic imperatives and domestic constraints: the

Greece and the Claim to Regional Hegemony

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the strong economic and diplomatic presence of great powers,

the significant political penetration and strategic importance

of Turkey, the political disputes with PYROM and Albania,

and the serious problems of Greek economy.

On the whole, all other things being equal, Greece as a

regionally preeminent small power is able to play an active

role as a partner in leadership. Such a role is liable to lead up

to Greece's regional primacy. The notion of regional primacy

denotes the equal partnership in a regional leadership.' This

is far from the idea of regional hegemony, which refers to re-

gional leadership of one's own.

II. The Origins of Greece's Claim to Regional Hegemony

and the Preconditions of Regional Primacy

Greece's claim

regional hegemony rests on the strategic

features of the post-Cold War international system. Some of

them have given birth to systemic opportunities that poten-

tially allow regional preeminent small powers to acquire an

increased freedom of maneuver, and pursue more autonomous

courses of action. These are as follows:

The progressive rise of a multipolar power structure.

The collapse of communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern

Europe and the unification of Germany, combined with the

Gulf War, the breakup of Yugoslavia, the difficulties in follow-

ing through in practice the imperatives of the Maastricht Treaty,

all seem to have generated irreversible shifts in •the landscape

of world politics. The disciplines of bipolarity were wholly cast

off, and a highly fluid and complex international security en-

vironment predominantly marked by the acute revival of re-

gional conflicts has come into being.

The flowering of regionalism. The term "regionalism"

has been conventionally used to denote the more or less self-

sufficient organization and cooperation among states with nat-

ural geographical proximity. It implies a particular pattern of

interactions that emerges and grows in between the free-trade

area model and the so-called Fortress model (Hettne 1993).

Additionally, the end of bipolarity has provided the op-

portunity for assessing the impact of regionalism from another

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JOURNAL OF THE HELLENIC DIASPORA

perspective, most often neglected throughout the Cold War.

That is related to the return or restoration of regional sover-

eignty and independence, in the sense that prospects have been

opened up for regionally preeminent small powers to assume

more active or assertive roles.' In principle, the changing struc-

ture of the international system has enhanced the freedom of

small states to conduct foreign policy of their own and to un-

dertake leadership roles as well.

c) The dynamic emergence of certain dimensions of se-

curity, which were highly overshadowed by the East-West con-

frontation. Throughout the Cold War, security was almost

synonymous to military power and strategy. After the end of

the Cold War, it has become more evident that security is not

limited to a military dimension, because threats to security can

take a great many forms, grouped into five primary categories:

military, political, economic, societal, and environmental. To-

gether all these aspects of security are closely woven in a strong

web of linkages (Buzan 1991, Booth 1991a, Booth and Wheeler

1992). Of them, economic and social factors are ranked at the

top and perceived of as the primary constituents of security and

power (Kennedy 1993). This by no means points to the ob-

solescence of military power for security purposes in today's

world politics. Instead, it underlines that because of the high

cost of modern warfare, military power is politically most use-

ful when it is not being directly used (Knorr 1970, Garnett

1976, Booth 1991b). This in turn does not come hand in hand

with the reduction of antagonism and the disappearance of

threats. It is more valid to assume that although wars may be

fewer in the conventional definition of the word, "there may be

a great deal of violence in the coming decade" (Harkabi

1989, 25).

In this context, as we have already cited, a significant band

of influential people set forth the assertion that Greece should

pursue to become the regional hegemon in the Balkans. We

take issue with this view. What Greece is able to do is to aspire

to a regional primacy that is an equal partnership in collective

leadership. The term "regional primacy" is closely associated

with the notions of structural opportunity and structural power.

Holding constant no structural opportunity, a small regional

Greece and the Claim to Regional Hegemony

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state's structural power is relatively limited. Holding constant

structural opportunity, a regional small power may enhance its

structural power in such a large measure that it can make sound

claims to translate its preeminence into regional primacy. In

fact, a realized structural power is likely to lead up to a small

power's regional primacy. Structural opportunity and structural

power represent substantial differences of proportion and degree

in meeting the requirements for regional primacy.

We could contend that three preconditions should be met

so that a small power be in a position to play a preponderant

part in its adjacent area: first, the distribution of power capabili-

ties should be in favor of it, that is, the existence of a structural

opportunity; second, its attempt should not come overly into

conflict with the interests both of the present great powers, and

of other regional powers eligible for such a role; and last,

but not least, it should have not only the economic, military,

and diplomatic superiority over the regional states concerned,

but also the potential political and economic capacity to support

and sustain such a role over a relatively long period of time.

Waltz's discussion and his terminology of "permissive or

underlying" and "immediate or efficient" causes of war, where

the former are identified in an international system and the

latter in a domestic system, seem an appropriate way to frame

our perception of how the preconditions of regional primacy

are closely related to one another in a nexus of causes (Waltz

1959, 231-232, 238). We assume that the first two prerequisities

constitute the underlying causes or necessary conditions, in the

sense that without them regional primacy can never occur. The

third precondition has the attributes of immediate or efficient

cause or, to put it slightly differently, the sufficient condition, in

the sense that only its existence allows regional primacy on

occasion to come into being.

On the way to better establishing the conclusion of regional

primacy in contrast to the idea of regional hegemony, the

grounding of our argument is in order. On a general level of

analysis, a fundamental question arises as to what exactly the

term "hegemony" means. The principal intellectual tradition

behind this is the so-called hegemonic stability theory (Krasner

1976, Kindleberger 1981, Keohane 1984, Gilpin 1985, Gilpin

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JOURNAL OF THE HELLENIC DIASPORA

1987, Kennedy 1989, Mansfield 1992). This assumes that he-

gemony is closely related to all those situations in which one

state appears to have considerably more power than the others.

The inequality of power is so great that it allows a state to obtain

hegemony over others.

Theory, however, leaves the problem of how hegemony is

to be defined unresolved. That is related to the manner in which

the exercise of power by a hegemon is manifested. Most scholars

tend to conceive of hegemonic rule as the preponderance of

material resources and the use of coercion, as well as the threat

of violence on the part of the power. Others, who challenge

the traditional approach to hegemony, maintain that it should

best be seen as primarily the exercise of indirect or structural

power; in this regard, hegemony is closely associated with the

process of socialization (Nye 1990a, Nye 1990b, Strange 1994,

Strange 1987, Ikenberry 1989, Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990).

But, so long as it is remembered how structural power is

conceptualized, it is clear that hegemonic power is something

more. Following Gramsci's tradition, we could contend that

hegemony is characterized by a situation in which a leading

power has made its conception of order and stability acceptable

to others. In Robert Cox's words, a preeminent state has estab-

lished hegemonic rule if "the rules and practices and ideologies

of a hegemonic order conform to the interests of the dominant

power while having the appearance of a universal natural order

of things which gives at least a certain measure of satisfaction

and security to lesser powers" (Cox 1989, 825).

Therefore, structural power constitutes the minimum re-

quirement for the exercise of hegemonic power, which is, more

broadly, the ability to control outcomes and events in support

of maintaining an order, or regime, that is compatible with the

practices and ideologies of the hegernon. From this point of

view, as a result of its power capabilities and limitations, and

particularly in reference to the three classic functions of dip-

lomacy-representation, negotiation, and intelligence, it is very

difficult for a regionally preeminent small power to get its way

and establish a regional hegemony all of its own. The notion

of hegemony in its purist meaning can not be applied to regional

Greece and the Claim to Regional Hegemony

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IV. Greece in the New Balkans: Myth Versus Reality

The claim to regional hegemony on the part of Greece is

a great myth. What the country can pursue is regional primacy.

However, some requirements need to be met. The rest of the

paper will explore the preconditions for regional primacy as

they may apply to the case of Greece in the New Balkans. Be-

fore proceeding, some necessary clarifications are in order.

In the wake of Yugoslavia's breakup, the states assumed

to comprise the Balkan peninsula have changed. Following

their independence, Slovenia and Croatia have declared them-

selves as geographically and politically belonging exclusively

to Central Europe. In this regard, we take the term "New

Balkans" as a regional system pertaining to Albania, Bulgaria,

Romania, FYROM, Turkey, the New Yugoslavia (Serbia-Monte-

negro), and Greece. We refer to Albania, Bulgaria, Romania,

and FYROM as "the Balkan states concerned," while common

sense can empirically indicate Greece, Turkey, and the New Yugo-

slavia as the regionally preeminent small powers, which seek,

more or less, to take a prepondent role in the New Balkans.

Moreover, a point should be made pertaining to the serious

problem of national accounts data. The reliability of statistics

is not self-evident. Comparable statistics on these countries are

nonexistent; for where currently available, the figures that are put

together in a single table usually stem from a great many sources,

which often cover the period up to the end of 1995. Yet,

provided the political and economic instability, it is exceptionally

difficult to establsh a clear picture of current developments and

to form projections even about the very short-term future.

a) The First Precondition: Structural Opportunity

It is our aim to assess how well Greece is structurally posi-

tioned among the Balkan states concerned. This may illustrate

the existence of a unique structural opportunity. We are going

to examine the distribution of power by focusing on its mili-

tary, economic, and institutional dimensions. In addition, though

it is not our focus in this section, available figures with respect

to Turkey and the New Yugoslavia are cited so that a com-

parative picture forms, and we become aware of both the op-

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JOURNAL OF THE HELLENIC DIASPORA

portunities and

limitations of the other candidate protagonists

in the region.

The military dimension:

The distribution of military

capabilities comes out strongly in favor of Greece. At the pres-

ent time, it has at its disposal sufficiently equipped and sophis-

ticated armed forces. It is not accidental that it annually reports

among NATO member-states one of the highest defense-spend-

ing rates, though invariably second to Turkey. In 1995, mili-

tary expenditure valued at approximately 4.6 percent of its GDP

to $5.1 billion, or

$484

per capita, compared to 3.6 percent to

$6 billion, or $98 per capita for Turkey, and

22.1

percent to

billion

for the New Yugoslavia. It is forecast that through

1996 the defense budget of Greece and Turkey might stand at

around $3.5 billion and $5.7 billion, respectively (The Inter-

national Institute for Strategic Studies, 1996, 59,

70, 306).

According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies,

the defense budget of Greece is worth nearly as much as double

the sum total share of all the Balkan states concerned. The 1995

Greek military expenditure (and the 1996 defense budget record-

ed targets) amounted to $5.1 m. ($3.5 m.) compared to $872

million ($749 million) for Romania,

$387

million ($428 mil-

lion for Bulgaria, $49 million ($51 million) for Albania, and

$116 million ($126 million) for FYROM (The International

Institute for Strategic Studies, 1996, 59, 70-71, 77, 82, 92, 95).

Furthermore, following Turkey, which maintains the sec-

ond largest standing army in Europe, there is no denying that

Greece is far superior regarding equipment holdings, amount

of military hardware, and strength of weapons. In manpower,

the Greek army appears to lag only behind Romania. The 1995

Romanian combined armed forces totalled 228,400 active per-

sonnel and 427,000 reserves. The figures were slightly lower

in the case of Greece, at 168,300 and 291,000, respectively

(The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1996, 59, 65).

In short, Greece's army enjoys a significant number of

comparative advantages at operational level vis-à-vis the rest of

the Balkan states concerned. By no means does it follow that Greece

has the military capacity to impose its will against its Balkan

neighbors. It is quite capable, however, of deterring effectively

the combined attack of two or even three of its neighboring

Greece and the Claim to Regional Hegemony

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countries. Beyond that, Greek leaders have already embarked

upon capitalizing on the political potential of their military

superiority by promoting programs of close military and diplo-

matic cooperation with Bulgaria, Romania, and Albania. These

mutually beneficial agreements usually call for substantial tech-

nology transfer, training of officials, military assistance, polit-

ical support, and high-level consultation on issues of common

'interest. Moreover, Greece is explicitly committed to actively

support the efforts of these countries to enter NATO through

the institutional framework of the Partnership for Peace initia-

tive (Hellenic Centre of European Studies [EKEM) 1993a, 3-4,

The Economist Intelligence Unit [EIU1 1996a, 11).

Clearly, Greece is structurally well-positioned in military

terms. In effect, it will be able to successfully convert further,

where politically appropriate, the favorable distribution of

military power in the New Balkans into realized structural

power.

B. The economic dimension:

Greece •is structurally posi-

tioned at the top in terms of the distribution of economic

capabilities. It is the richest and most developed country in the

New Balkans, far ahead of Turkey and the New Yugoslavia.

Currently, its per capita income, evaluated at an estimated pur-

chasing power parity, is worth around $8,600, compared to about

$4,600 for Turkey, and $4,400 for the New Yugoslavia. By

contrast, in 1994 the per capita income of Bulgaria and Romania

averaged approximately $4,812 and $2,730, respectively; and

is expected to rise modestly in 1995 to $5,032 and $2,890, respec-

tively (EIU 1995a, 9, EKEM 1995a, 9). As for Albania and

FYROM, although there are no accurate figures available, their

GDP per capita averaged less than that of Romania.

With espect to the performance of the economy in terms

of output growth, Greece compares favorably. According to the

data in Table 1, the economy was hurt by modest recession

fluctuations over the 1990-1993 period. It experienced a sluggish

economic recovery in 1994 as GDP grew by 1.5 percent, com-

pared to a decline of 1 percent on the year-earlier period, and

by 1.7 percent in 1995. It is forecast that the GDP growth

rate will increase further to 2.1 percent in 1996. Projections

for 1997 suggest that the GDP growth rate will further on

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JOURNAL OF THE HELLENIC DIASPORA

and reach 2.4 percent

(Eru

1996a, 6). As far as Turkey is

concerned, after a downturn of about 6 percent in 1994, GNP

growth rate, at 1987 prices, remarkably grew by

8.1

percent in

1995. Prospects that this upturn will go on in 1996 hold firmly

(EIU 1996b, 3).

Unlike Greece, the economy of the Balkan states concerned

have moved into deep recession. As Table 1 illustrates, the GDP

of Romania fell sharply by a smuch as 27.3 percent between

1990 and 1992. Such was approximately the downturn in the

GDP rate of Bulgaria, whereas the picture of FYROM and

Albania appeared to be even much worse: the decline was nearly

36 percent and 47.3 percent, respectively.

Albania and Romania have begun to show signs of recovery

since 1993. Table 1 shows that the Albanian GDP grew respec-

tably by some 11 percent in 1993 and

7.4

percent in 1994; the

upswing continued in 1995 and will continue in 1996, though

at a modest pace. As far as Romania is concerned, the GDP

growth

rate stood at about

1.5 percent

in 1993, 3.9 percent in

1994, and 6.9 percent in 1995, while being estimated to reach

4.5 percent in 1996.

By contrast, in 1993 in the Bulgarian GDP growth rate

was still negative at 2.4 percent. A small recovery of

0.2 per-

cent

was recorded in 1994, and the prospects are rather better

as it is projected to reach 2.5 percent in 1995 and 3 percent in

1996. On the other hand, the recession of FYROM's economy

was getting all the more deeper. A further fall of

15.2 percent,

percent, and 3 percent in GDP was reported in 1993, 1994,

and 1995, respectively. It is forecast that GDP rate is likely to

be on an upward trend in 1996 when it is to stand at about

3 percent.

All in all, regardless of the marked improvement in the

performance of Albania, Romania, and Bulgaria, economic prog-

ress is relatively slow in comparative terms. The real potential

of Albania's economy appears to be better than that of the

others (Fakiolas 1994). It is indicative that in a 1994 official

letter to President of Albania Sali A. Berisha, the director of

the International Monetary Fund (IFM), M. Camdessus, ar-

gued, among other things, that "in the course of the past

years, Albania's economic results were the best among the

Greece and the Claim to Regional Hegemony

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rest of the

Eastern European countries" (EKEM 1994b, 18).

In essence, Albania has had the fastest-growing economy in

Europe in the past three years. In parallel, Romania's economy,

according to the assertions of the National Bank of Romania,

is "closer than ever to the beginning of a long-lasting upward

trend" (National Bank of Romania 1994, 63). On the other

hand, it is estimated that the Bulgarian GDP will reach its

1989 range by the year 2016, if growing as much as 2 percent,

and by 2006, if growing 4 percent, and by 2003, if growing

6 percent (Institute of Economics 1993, 80).

Greece is likewise compared favorably in some other sig-

nificant

economic indicators. For instance, the 1995 inflation

rate of Turkey and the New Yugoslavia was 93.5 percent and

120.2

percent, respectively, compared to 9.2 percent for Greece

(EIU 1996b, 3, EIU 1996c, 24) . According to the statistics of Table

the inflation rate in the Balkan states was exceptionally high

compared to that of Greece over the years 1993 and 1994. In

1995, however, Albania's and FYROM's inflation were below

by 3 percent and

0.2

percent on the Greek figures, respectively.

It is envisaged that in 1996 the declining trend of consumer

price inflation will accelerate in all the Balkan states, and

FYROM will achieve a rate below by

percent and 1 percent

on Greek and Albanian counterparts (EIU 1996b, 13). Except

for Romania, the unemployment rate is also much higher in the

Balkan states concerned than in Greece. In Romania, unemploy-

ment rate •brought clown from 10.2 percent in 1993 to 8.9

percent in 1995, standing on the same level with that

Greece. But, unlike Greece, almost half the 23 million popula-

tion of Romania lives on the poverty line.'

Furthermore, Greek foreign exchange reserves almost

doubled in value from $5.2 billion in 1991 to an unprecedented

record $14.8 billion in 1995 (EIU 1996a, 3). By comparison,

Turkey had a 1995 year-end foreign currency figure of around

$12.5 billion (EIU 1996b, 3). At the end of 1994, Greece had

at its disposal nearly twice as many reserves as Romania, Bul-

garia, Albania, and FYROM put together. The foreign cur-

rency reserves of Romania stood at about $1,700 million, of

Bulgaria at $700 million, of Albania at $1,980 million and of

FYROM at $165.4 million (EKEM 1995c, 17, EIU 1996c, 29).

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JOURNAL OF THE HELLENIC DIASPORA

It should be noted that the main source of Albania's foreign

exchange reserves is the remittances sent back home from migrant

Albanian workers. The latter picked up from nearly zero in

1991 to $150 million in 1992, $355 million in 1993, and over

$400 million in 1994 (FXEM 1994c, 70, ETU 1994, 38-40, 59,

EIU 1993, 31-33). Most of them are produced by Albanians

living legally or otherwise in Greece. Thus, Albania's economy

appears to be dependent on the latter in significant measure.

With respect to external debt, Greece is in far better posi-

tion than Turkey and the New Yugoslavia both in absolute and

relative terms. In 1993 (1991) the foreign debt averaged about

$27.3 billion ($24.1 billion) expressible in terms of percep-

tion over GDP as 36.3 percent (29.6 percent) compared to a

total of $67.8 billion ($50.1 billion) at a ratio debt/GDP of

55.3 percent (45.9 percent) for Turkey. The latter's external

debt recorded further increase in 1994 and 1995 to an estimated

$65.4 billion and $74 billion, respectively, while the Greek

respective figures were $32.7 billion and $34.2 billion (EIU

1996a, 3, EIU 1996b, EIU 1996e, 49, ETU 1996f, 65). As for

the New Yugoslavia, the plight is worse if we take into account

that, out of a 1995 GDP at current prices of $14.9 billion, the

sum share of foreign debt amounted to around $11.2 billion

(EIU 1996c, 5).

In sharp contrast, Greece lags behind the Balkan states

concerned in absolute terms. Statistics (EIU 1996a, 3, EIU 1996c,

29, EIU 1996i, 3, EIU 1996j, 4, 28) show that in light of a

1995 Greek external debt of $34.2 billion, the foreign debt

of Bulgaria stood at $9.5 billion, of Romania at $6.6 billion, of

Albania at $1 billion, and of FYROM at $1.2 billion. However,

given the real potential of the economy, the higher level of

development, the volume of foreign currency reserves, and the

annual average increase of debt over the 1990-1994 period,

Greece appears to be substantially better off in relative terms.

For instance, in 1994, Bulgaria's foreign debt was quite higher

than its overall GDP. Out of about $10 billion GDP at current

prices (EIU 1996g, 16), a total of $10.5 billion was owed to

international organizations, Paris Club countries, and London

Club commercial creditors. By the end of 1991, Romania had

a foreign debt of $2.2 billion. Since then, it has borrowed

Greece and the Claim to Regional Hegemony

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heavily, bringing its external debt to an estimated $5.6 billion

in 1994. The sum total of debt represented more than a

200

percent increase on the previous three-year period. This up-

swing is expressible in a ratio of debt/GDP as more than

double the rise from

7.5

percent in 1991 to 19.1 percent in

1994 (EIU 1996h, 42) compared •to around a 20 percent in-

crease from 29.6 percent to

37.5

percent, respectively, for

Greece (EIU 1996a, 65). Therefore, a debt of 19 percent ac-

celerated so fast in such a short while is worse for the poor

Romanian economy than a relatively immutable debt of around

37 percent for the richer Greek economy. Moreover, the credi-

bility of Greece in international financial markets is currently

high. On the other hand, the borrowing ability of the Balkan

states concerned is ambivalent. An illustrative case is Bulgaria,

where both the IMF and the World Bank have postponed the

1995 funding agreements because of governmental •failure to

meet reform targets.8

Finally, after the collapse of the old regimes, Greek trade

exchanges with Romania, Bulgaria, and Albania have been grow-

ing considerably. The structure of trade is undeniably to Greece's

advantage. Greece enjoys trade surplus in its trade relations with

the Balkan States concerned. In 1993, the Greek exports to (and

imports from) Bulgaria and Romania were worth 59.431 billion

drachmas, (36.814 billion drachmas) and

18.135

billion drach-

mas (13.166 billion drachmas), respectively; the trade surplus

was significant enough. The gap was almost eleven-fold, at the ex-

pense of Albania; the Greek exports to Albania totaled a record

24.842

billion drachmas, whereas imports averaged only 2.902 bil-

lion drachmas (EKEM 1994c, 27, 50, 70). It is obvious that by

comparison to Romania and Bulgaria, Albania is much more de-

pendent on Greece in absolute terms.

On the whole, the unrivaled economic superiority of Greece

over its fellow Balkan states, together with its traditional role

as a commercial crossroad, form the cornerstone of its hopes

for an active leadership role in the region. The economic struc-

tural opportunity has already been partly converted into re-

alized structural power. The drachma is a potential currency

of exchange. According to the assertion of the Economist In-

telligence Unit, "there is an established drachma zone in the

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JOURNAL OF THE HELLENIC DIASPORA

Eastern Balkans" (EIU 1995b, 58). The Central Bank of

Greece regularly designs and takes a number of measures in

support of maintaining and improving this structural advantage.

Among others, plans are in progress, and negotiations are under

way, to make both the Bulgarian Lev and the Romanian Lei

convertible by including them in the daily fixing of the drachma

(EIU 1995b, 17). Greece has already been authorized to set

up and organize in Thessaloniki, the capital of the province of

Macedonia, the International Bank of the Black Sea Economic

Cooperation Organization. Last, but not least, the Greek gov-

ernment struggles to get a significant share in the projected

construction of an oil pipeline that may transport crude oil

from the Caspian Sea to the Mediterranean through the Bul-

garian port of Bugras and the port of Thessaloniki, as opposed

to the Turkish proposal to pass across its territory. To this

end, some preliminary agreements with Russia and Bulgaria

have already been concluded.

In this regard Greece is structurally well positioned in eco-

nomic terms. By extension, it is capable of translating further,

where politically and economically appropriate, the favorable

distribution of economic power in the New Balkans into realized

structural power.

C. The institutional dimension:

All the Balkan states

concerned have joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council

(NACC) and the Partnership for Peace program. Romania and

Bulgaria have signed and effected with the EU the so-called

European Agreements; Albania and FYROM are regular recipi-

ents of EU aid assistance (EKEM 1995d). However, they are

still far from becoming full member-states.

On the other hand, Greece, as an active member of both

the EU and NATO, has at its disposal a uniquely important

source of institutional power. All other things being equal,

Greek governments can skillfully borrow power capabilities and

resources from these multinational institutions so as to safe-

guard and effectively promote the country's interests. In this

context, the former Greek minister of defense, Gerasimos Arse-

nis, has suggested that Greece should take the initiative for, and

contribute to, the actual implementation of the Partnership for

Peace program in the Balkans through the progressive opera-

Greece and the Claim to Regional Hegemony



tional link-up of NATO with the defense structures of Roma-

nia, Bulgaria, and Albania. This might lead in the long run to

the establishment of a NATO-like regional defense system with

combined joint task forces headquartered at Thessaloniki (EKEM

1995, 9).

Greece actively supports and reinforces the efforts of Bul-

garia and Romania to join the EU. Besides this, Athens has

already reached a cooperation agreement with both Bulgaria

and Albania to make use of the EU Phare and Interreg program

funds for the purpose of financing joint projects in fields such

as transportation, telecommunication, electric power generation,

and environmental protection (EKEM 1994, 13). Clearly, hold-

ing constant the favorable distribution of military and economic

power in the New Balkans, Greece can constantly take advantage

of the institutional power derived from its membership in the

EU and NATO.

To sum up, the main conclusion that can be drawn from

the discussion so far presented is that after the end of the Cold

War, the distribution of military, economic, and diplomatic

power in the New Balkans has endowed Greece with a unique

structural opportunity. Assuming the latter constant, its conver-

sion into a fully realized structural power is significantly de-

pendent on systematic imperatives and domestic constraints. Let

us now investigate the former.

b) The Second Precondition: Systematic Imperatives

and Dictates

Our intention is to explore how well Greece is structurally

positioned in the broad security environment of the Balkan

peninsula. Holding continuous structural opportunity, the sec-

ond precondition that Greece should meet for regional primacy

is that its attempts should not come overtly into conflict with

the vital interests of both the present great powers and other

regional small powers eligible for achieving such an objective.

It points to the degree of their economic and political penetra-

tion into the region. Furthermore, it is important to take into

consideration the fundamental foreign policy goals of the Bal-

kan states concerned. As a whole, Greece is not so well struc-

turally positioned as it might initially appear. It lags behind

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JOURNAL OF THE HELLENIC DIASPORA

great powers both in economic and political terms, while stand-

•ng second to Turkey in terms of the degree of diplomatic and

military influence.

We begin firstly with the degree of economic penetration

by focusing on these basic indicators: the structure of trade re-

lations, the inflows of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), and

the aid assistance. It should be noted that as a result of the

previous two-year-long Greek embargo on FYROM, the eco-

nomic presence of Greece in the latter can not be registered

and, in effect, as such can not be compared to that of both

the great and other regional small powers. We take the latter

to be relatively high.' Equally, there is a similar general prob-

lem in the case of the New Yugoslavia due to the past five

years of UN-imposed sanctions.

In regard to foreign trade, statistics (EIU 1994, 28) show

that in 1993 •Greece was just the fourth trading partner of

Bulgaria. It was in fifth place as a market for its exports with

a share of 5.9 percent of the total, and in the fourth place as

a market of its supplies with 3.7 percent. On the other hand,

though on a far lower scale compared to 1990, the former

USSR was still the leading partner of Bulgaria, accounting for

19.4 percent of its exports (from 64 percent in 1990) and 36

percent of its imports (from 56.5 percent), followed by Ger-

many with 6.4 percent (from 4.2 percent) and 12.3 percent

(from 10.8 percent), and former Yugoslavia with 10.6 percent

(from 1 percent) and 2.1 percent (from 2 percent), respec-

tively. Turkey was the fifth trading partner of Bulgaria, sec-

ond to Greece. Accounting for

7.8

percent of the Bulgarian

exports, Turkey, however, was third to the former USSR and

the former Yugoslavia, followed by Germany and Greece. Finally,

the United States and the United Kingdom lagged significantly

behind the three largest partners. The share of the former in

Bulgarian

exports and imports stood at 3.3 percent and 3.4 per-

cent, respectively, whereas that the latter was 3 percent and 3.8

percent, respectively.

Additionally, out of the figures (EIU 1995a, 15-18) per-

taining to the value of exports to and imports from Bulgaria

of some major EU member-states, and of the United States,

some interesting points can be drawn:

Greece and the Claim to Regional Hegemony



•

Germany is in first place in the listing among the EU great

powers. Its 1993 exports and imports averaged nearly $345.6

million and $546 million, respectively, but the figures had

risen to $456.9 million and $653.8 million, respectively, by

1994. Comparing to the data above, it seems that although

its exports were much higher than its imports as percentage

share, they were worth less than imports.

•

Both the other European countries and the United States

lagged significantly behind Germany.

•

Italy is potentially likely to play a growing part in the short-

and middle-run as a market of Bulgarian supplies. In 1993,

it exported $177.6 million-worth of goods, but this figure

had jumped to $336 million by 1994.

In Romania, Greece does not play an important role at

all. Statistics (EIU 1996h, 41) show that the 1994 ranking

of the top ten trading partners of Romania did not encompass

Greece. Instead, Turkey was the fifth destination for Romanian

goods, accounting for 4.1 percent of the total to $251 million.

It was also eighth in the listing of the main ten markets of

Romanian supplies with

2.5

percent of the total to $151 million.

On the other hand, Germany was the first largest trading

partner of Romania, accounting for 16.1 percent of its exports

and

20.8

percent of its imports to $988 million and

$1,278

million, respectively. As a market for Romanian exports, Ger-

many was followed by Italy with 12.9 percent (to 795 million),

France with

5.1

percent ($316 million) and China with 4.5

percent ($276 million). As a market of Romanian supplies,

Germany was followed by Russia with 16 percent (to $984

million), Italy with 13.7 percent ($841 million), the United

States with 7.6 percent ($465 million), and France with 5.9

percent ($362 million). Again, both the rest of the EU great

powers and the United States

lagged

behind Germany.

In Albania, Greece is far second to Italy, while the pur-

changes of Turkish products are not strong enough. The latest

statistical figures available (EIU 1996g, 71-72) show that in

1994 Greece was the second destination of Albanian exports,

with a percentage share of 10.4 percent of the total followed

by the United States with 11.1 percent, Germany with 4.8 per-

cent, Belgium with 4.3 percent, and France with 2.1 percent.

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JOURNAL OF THE HELLENIC DIASPORA

In parallel, Greece was the second supplier of the Albanian

market, accounting for 24 percent of the total imports, followed

by Bulgaria with 8.2 percent, Germany with 5.5 percent, Tur-

key with 4.6 percent, and the New Yugoslavia with 4.5 percent.

Italy is unequivocally the leading trading partner of Al-

bania, accounting, in 1944, for 52.1 percent of its exports

and 35 percent of its imports. As compared to Bulgaria and

Romania, Albania is dependent on its principal trading partners

much more as a market of supplies than as a market for its

exports. It is also more dependent on its leading trading partner

than Bulgaria and Romania. Finally, the German trade with

Albania, as opposed to the rule in the New Balkans, lagged

significantly behind the Italian and partly the US trade.

With respect to the inflow of Foreign Direct Investment

capital, Greece is the leading foreign investor in Bulgaria, with

77 percent of all foreign investments (EIU 1995b, 17). It is

first in the number of registered FDI cases. According to the

UN data,' by August 3, 1994, Greek firms had put forth some

421

investment projects, more than double those of the Turkish

and Russian firms that followed in the rank with

200

and 116,

respectively. It is also estimated that at the beginning of 1994

there were some

700

joint ventures of Greek firms with Bul-

garian partners (EICEM 1994c, 28, 72). It is clear that Greek

companies have thoroughly penetrated the Bulgarian maket by

establishing large-scale pattern of business affiliations.

The same data reveals that the listing for Greece is some-

what different in terms of the value of the cumulative capital

invested. In August 1994, Greece was in eighth place with a

total of $10.5 million. Nonetheless, this figure was about ten

times as high as the $1.4 million-worth of the Turkish com-

panies' capital.

As a whole, Germany is the largest single consolidated

investor. By August 1994, German firms had invested more

than $120 million in 96 investment cases, followed by The

Netherlands with $30.6 million (in 30 cases), Switzerland with

$26 million (in 47), Belgium with $20.3 million (in 37)

and the United States with $18.7 million (in 69). The latest

government figures published at the beginning of April 1995

Greece and the Claim to Regional Hegemony



demonstrate that the value of German investments has made

up almost 46 percent of the total (EIU 1995c, 21).

In Romania, Greece lags behind both Turkey and the great

powers. Statistics (EIU 1995c, 39, Romania's National Commis-

sion for Statistics 1994, 15, EKEM 1995b, 24, EKEM 1995c,

21) show that at the end of 1994 Greece was in seventh place

in the listing pertaining to the number of FDI cases, and in

thirteenth as to the worth of the total capital invested; more

than 1,300 investment projects by Greek firms brought into

Romania, at an estimated purchasing power parity, some $33.7

million. Unlike Greece, Turkey was in the third and tenth

place, respectively; Turkish capital inflows averaged around

$58 million directed at 3,658 projects.

In general, South Korea appears to be first in the listing

with $158 million-worth of capital invested in a mere four

projects, followed by the United States with about $115.7 mil-

lion (in 2,043 cases), Germany with $112.7 million (in 4,803),

France with $105.7 million (in 1,446), and Italy with $110.3

million (in 4,730). In contrast to the situation in Bulgaria, in

Romania no great power can be regarded as the indisputably

single consolidated investor. What should be noted are the

strong investment interests of the United States, standing al-

most on an equal scale with those of Germany. That seems to

be the big exception to the rule in the New Balkans.

In Albania, the figures (EKEM 1994c, 72) illustrate that

at the end of 1993 Greece was second to Italy with respect to

the total capital invested. Greek firms accounted for approx-

itnately 20 percent, a little less than half of the 53 percent share

of Italian. The presence of German and American companies

was not very strong, since their share stood at 6 percent and 3

percent, respectively. The latest estimates tend to confirm that

Greece remains the second largest investor in Albania (EIU

1995b, 17).

As far as aid assistance is concerned, most of it has been

granted by multinational agencies such as the G-24, the EU,

the World Bank, and the IMF. As to bilateral credits, data

proves that both Greece and Turkey play no important role.

In Bulgaria, in 1992, before the rescheduling of its foreign

debt, Germany accounted for

21.5

percent of the total, followed

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JOURNAL OF THE HELLENIC DIASPORA

by Japan with 19.8 percent and the United Kingdom with 12.7

percent; Italy was in ninth place with a share of 2.8 percent

(ETU 1994, 31). In Romania, by the beginning of 1995, France

was in first place with some $337.8 million-worth of credits,

followed by the United States with $327 million, Germany

with $94.7 million, and China with $87.2 million (EKEM

1995e, 20-22, 25, National Bank of Romania 1995, 13).

In short, the main point to be made from the assessment

of economic data is that Greece has the strongest trade and

investment links in Albania and Bulgaria. Indeed, it is the

second trading partner and investor of Albania. However, the

latter is more heavily dependent both in terms of trade and

investment capital on its leading partner, Italy, than on the

second, that is, Greece.

follows that Albania has alternative

options to replace Greece as a 'selling market, and as a source

of both supplies and investments. In effect, the use of eco-

nomic means as instruments both of political coercion and of

controlling Albania's behavior on behalf of Greece is con-

ditioned primarily by the interests of Italy, and secondly by the

interests of the United States, Germany, and partly of Bul-

garia. This conclusion likewise holds very true in the case of

Bulgaria, where Greece is its fourth trading partner, but is not

so important as a source of foreign capital. As for the great

powers, Bulgaria is equally dependent for its foreign trade on

Russia and Germany, and secondly on Italy, France, and the

United Kingdom; it is heavily dependent on Germany for capital

flows, and far less on the United States; it is equally de-

pendent for credit on Germany and Japan, and secondly

on the United Kingdom. In Romania, the Greek economic pres-

ence is relatively limited. Germany is the leading trading partner

of Romania. The latter is also primarily dependent for its for-

eign trade on Italy and France, and far behind on Russia and

the United States; it is equally dependent for investment capital

on Germany, the United States, and France, and far second

on Italy; it is likewise primarily equally dependent for credit

on France and the United States, and far second on Germany

and China. Finally, with respect to Turkey, Greece is much

better structurally positioned in Albania and Bulgaria than in

Romania.

Greece and the Claim to Regional Hegemony



If we now turn to the degree of political penetration on

the part of the great powers, we may come to the conclusion

that although there is an obvious correlation, we can not estab-

lish a rigid pattern of cause and effect between economic pres-

ence and political power. Having said that, it is not surprising

that despite its relatively low economic penetration in the New

Balkans, the United States is unquestionably the diplomatic

and military protagonist. Without engaging directly in the con-

flicts, the American administrations play a very active role,

not only in resolving bilateral disputes, but also in strengthening

the domestic stability and the market reforms in progress. To

this end, they employ such instruments as political support,

economic assistance for eclectically chosen projects, and mili-

tary diplomacy. For instance, in 1993, the United States granted

through the UN to Bulgaria and Romania $850,000-worth of

credits in order to refurbish their border stations located on

both sides of the Danube (EKEM 1993b, 4). It has put

into effect military cooperation agreements and defense proto-

cols with Romania and Bulgaria (EKEM 1994d, 6, EKEM

1995f, 3). In FYROM, since March 1994, some five-hundred

American soldiers have been deployed and stationed under

the auspices of the UN (The International Institute for Stra-

tegic Studies 1994, 17). Yet, there have long been established

strong political and military links between the United States

and Albania. It is not an accident that at the beginning of

1995, the two nation-states held a joint military exercise in-

volving Italy, the United Kingdom, and Germany (EIU 1995d,

42).

The latter point highlights the significant degree of the

political penetration of the European great powers as well.

What distinguishes, however, the United States diplomatic pres-

ence from that of the European great powers is basically two-

fold: first the United States is regarded by the Balkan states

as the indisputable leading military and political power of

world politics; secondly, the European powers have much

stronger economic and political interests in the region than

the United States does. There seems a correlation between the

economic presence of the EU's major powers and their political

penetration in the sense that their extensive business contacts

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JOURNAL OF THE HELLENIC DIASPORA

have paved the way for the development of all the more closer

political relations with the Balkan states concerned. That is precise-

ly the case of Italy, primarily in Albania, and secondly in Romania,

of Germany in Bulgaria and Romania, and of France in Romania.

The United Kingdom seems to keep a low, though increasingly

important, political and military profile; among other things,

at the end of 1993 it signed an agreement on defense coopera-

tion, know-how transfer, and military training with the govern-

ment of Albania (BIU 1995d, 42, E1KEM 1993c, 9).

On the other hand, Russia systematically seeks to revitalize

and broaden its close political relations with Bulgaria. The

efforts so far have been rather successful. In this regard, in

March 1995, on the official announcement of the signing of

two military and technical cooperation agreements with Rus-

sia, the Bulgarian prime minister declared that a would-be

expansion of NATO to eastern Europe should not be effected

without the prior consensus of Russian government (EKEM

1995b, 2). By contrast, Russia's influence over the behavior

of Albania and Romania is rather limited.

In regard to Turkey, it appears to be taking a number

of initiatives for the purpose of becoming the leading political

power in the New Balkans (Ozgur 1994). Compared to its

economic presence, Turkey's political penetration seems to be

extremely strong. In Albania, the military and diplomatic con-

tacts are exceptionally intensive. In November 1992, the two

countries signed several agreements on technical and scientific

cooperation, as well as on military training. Later, in February

1995, they went a step further by concluding a defense coopera-

tion agreement on holding joint military exercises (EKEM

(EKEM 1995f, 5). In Bulgaria and Romania, the military and

diplomatic links are likewise strong, though not so deep-rooted

as those in Albania. Turkey and the governments of these

countries have already reached agreements on mutual diplomatic

support, confidence-building measures, as well as on coopera-

tion in technology transfer and military training (EKEM 1995b,

3). Nonetheless, we should be aware that there exist certain

limitations to Turkey's attempts at political penetration. These

spring principally from two sources. First, because of its Mus-

lim orientation, though a secular state, all the Balkan states

Greece and the Claim to Regional Hegemony



but

Albania find their Orthodox populations opposed to the

idea of a closer affiliation to Turkey. Secondly, Turkey is

faced with serious problems of national identity and social

cohesion as a result both of the resurgence of all the more

assertive Islamic beliefs, and of the Kurdish challenge, a very

militant minority, which accounts for more than

percent of

the total population and has claims to self-determination.

On the other hand, although it unequivocally remains

potentially a major regional pole, the New Yugoslavia is cur-

rently dealing with such enormous economic and political prob-

lems that it is not capable of supporting efforts of political

penetration into the New Balkans. The breakdown of links

with the former Yugoslav republics, the economic requirements

of armed conflicts, the costs both of reinforcing Serbs in Bos-

nia-Herzegovina, and of housing a million refugees from neigh-

boring countries, along with the consequences of the UN sanc-

tions, the country is awaiting the upturn of the economy in

are no reliable figures available, it is beyond any doubt that

the economy remains in deep and dramatic recession with a

good number of problems hampering growth to accelerate:

fiscal imbalances, high external debts and government deficits,

inflated public spending, shortage of capital, and outdated equip-

ment. In fact, after the end of war and the lifting of sanc-

tions, the country is awaiting the upturn of the economy in

order to recover the ground it has lost over the last six years,

and to build up normal trade and investment links with other

states, primarily in its adjacent area. Once recovery dynamically

comes back, the New Yugoslavia is liable to gradually assume

a more active role in the New Balkans.

To sum up, the structural opportunity that the distribu-

tion of power in the New Balkans has endowed Greece with

is further reinforced by a very noteworthy systemic trend of

the broader Balkan security environment: the willingness of the

great powers to abstain from actively intervening in the region.

On the other hand, the structural opportunity is conditioned,

more or less, by two systemic constraints:

• First, the strong economic and diplomatic presence of the

great powers, and principally of the United States and Ger-

many. That, in turn, dictates that in search of a leadership

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JOURNAL OF THE HELLENIC DIASPORA

role, Greece should not come overtly into conflict with the

great powers' general interests.

• Second, the significant political penetration of Turkey. In

economic terms, Greece seems to be much better structurally

positioned than Turkey. On the other hand, though at a

condition of mutual deterrence, the distribution of military

power comes at the expense of Greece. In political terms,

the two countries appear to be equally well structurally posi-

tioned. In fact, we could contend that Turkey is in a more

fortunate position as a result of its geopolitical location

and military superiority. At all events, other than on rare

exceptions, Turkey succeeds in selling itself to the great

powers as a major strategic asset serving and promoting their

interests in the wider oil-rich Middle East arena. In compara-

tive perspective, the strategic importance of Turkey to the

great powers appears to be much higher than that of Greece.

Finally, we should not lose sight of the foreign policy

attitudes of the Balkan states concerned. All these countries,

and in particular Bulgaria and Romania, are, in one way or

another, committed to the principle of the "equal distance"

vis-A-vis the great powers, on the one hand, and Greece, Tur-

key, and the New Yugoslavia, on the other. Their common

objective is twofold: first, to retain the sovereign independence

that they have recently fully restored; and second, to safeguard

their security by joining NATO and the EU. Therefore, it is

rational to infer that while they urgently seek the help and

support of other countries, they are, more or less, determined

not to offer their political obedience in return. They are ready

to be influenced, but not to be controlled in a similar way that

some of them experienced

to the very recent past. That

holds especially true pertaining to the regionally preeminent

powers. Clearly, Greece can not escape from this somewhat

systematic imperative. But, such is the heart of the matter

regarding domestic constraints.

c) The Third Precondition: Domestic Constraints

The third precondition for Greece's regional primacy is

related to the degree of its political and economic capacity. Al-

Greece and the Claim to Regional Hegemony



tematively, that points to the domestic constraints with which

Greece should cope successfully in the context of a grand

strategy design. Suffice to say that we take the domestic political

constraints to pertain to foreign policy problems.

Let

begin with political problems. Some critical ques-

tions both of grand strategic orientation and of immediate

external threats to Greece's territorial integrity remain open.

First, following the end of the Cold War, Greece is pro-

foundly split between pro-European Union advocates who give

priority to the successful implementation of the government's

Maastricht convergence program, and the Atlantic Alliance sup-

porters who argue that Greece should proceed to establish a

special relationship with the United States.

Second, Greece is seriously threatened by Turkish expan-

sionism. Indeed, the continuing breach of the sovereign inde-

pendence of Cyprus, most often perceived as the second "center

of broader Hellenism," by more than 30,000 Turkish troops,

as well as the lasting presence of the Aegean Army, known

as the Turkish Fourth Army Corps, very close to eastern Greek

Aegean islands all point to Turkish expansionist designs on

Greek territory. On the other hand, Turkey claims that Greece

has fortified many of its Aegean islands, and that if it fully

recognizes the sovereignty of Greece in the Aegean Sea, there

would, then, be no international sea passages to western Turkish

ports, the Bosporus, and the Black Sea. However, the long

declared official position of all Greek governments is that as

the former assertion is concerned, Greece is only exercising a

legitimate sovereign right of self-defense. As to the latter, the

International Treaty on the Law of the Sea, which came into

force in November 1994, gives the sovereign right to Greece

to extend its territorial waters to

miles.

Last, but not least, over the last five years Greece has

come explicitly or implicitly in conflict with its EU and NATO

partners on three issues of great importance to their interests.

The first concerns the Joint Defense Doctrine embracing the

Greek province of Thrace, the Aegean Sea, and Cyprus that

Greece has concluded with the legitimate Cypriot government.

The second has to do with the Greek policy in the Yugoslav

crisis. Although Greece reluctantly agreed to recognize Croatia

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JOURNAL OF THE HELLENIC DIASPORA

Slovenia and complied with UN sanctions on the New Yugo-

slavia, it steadily opposed NATO airstrikes against the Bosnian

Serbs and maintained close relations with the Serbian and

Bosnian leaderships. The third issue is related to the imposi-

tion of the Greek embargo on FYROM. This points to the

political problems that Greece faced until very recently, and

in one way or another still faces in its relations, such as in the

cases of FYROM and Albania. The dispute with FYROM

revolved around the prolonged effort of consecutive Greek

governments to prevent recognition of FYROM under the name

of "Macedonia?"11 At the outset of the dispute, Greece took a

very hard line. It insisted on recognizing the new state with a

name that would not include in any form the name "Macedonia."

After taking office, the present PASOK government gave up

the negotiation process under the auspices of the UN. In Feb-

ruary 1994, it declared an embargo on FYROM. As a measure

of reaction in practice, the European Commission brought an

action against the Greek government before the European Court

of Justice with the question of the embargo's legality under the

EU treaties. At the first instance, the Court rejected a request

for a temporary lifting of the embargo, but its final decision

on the basic issue was expected to be taken at the start of 1996

(EKEM 1994a, 30-32).

Finally, an official package deal, the so-called Interim Agree-

ment of New York, was concluded in September 1995, whereby

FYROM changed the ancient Macedonian symbol on its flag

and gave a written guarantee that it has no territorial claim

on Greek Macedonia and, in return, Greece lifted the embargo.

Nonetheless, the name issue is still open and negotiations are in

progress without any remarkable development at the end of 1996.

The problem with Albania is twofold. On the one hand,

there is a Greek ethnic minority in Albania, which, according

to Greek estimates, totals some 350,000 people. It is organized,

by and large, under the Democratic Union of the Greek Ethnic

Minority, generally known as OMONIA, and has elected some

of its members to the Albanian parliament. Succeeding Greek

governments have repeatedly declared that Greece has no claim

on Albanian territory, but that what it seeks is the observance

of the fundamental human rights of Albania's Greek minority.

Greece and the Claim to Regional Hegemony



However, there are a significant number of politicians and

people who are implicitly struggling to annex the geographical

location where the Greek minority in Albania lives. Their ac-

tivities are not always under control and are denounced suc-

cinctly by the Greek governments. On the other hand, Albania

has systematically refused to guarantee the religious and edu-

cational rights of the Greek minority, while raising a non-

existent issue of an Albanian minority in Greece. This should

be added to the fact that there are nearly

200,000

illegal Al-

banian migrants in Greece.

A discernible hardening in the attitude of both the Greek

and Albanian governments over their dispute was experienced

in mid-1993 following the decision of the Albanian leaders to

deport an Orthodox clergyman. Greek authorities responded

by deporting tens of thousands (out of about 200,000) illegal

Albanian refugees. Tensions grew on both sides, when the

president of Albania, Sali Berisha, produced a draft constitution

that included the restriction of the religious freedom of ethnic

Greeks. Albanian voters, however, rejected the new constitution,

and, in effect, some signs of reconciliation were evident. In

April 1994, relations once again deteriorated after some Al-

banian soldiers were killed in a border station by men pre-

sumably wearing Greek army uniforms. In turn, six members

of OMONIA were arrested and convicted of espionage by the

Albanian police. Greece retaliated by blocking the first instal-

ment of an EU package of economic assistance to Albania total-

ing approximately $20 million out of $45 million It also pro-

ceeded with the expulsion of some thousands of Albanian

workers residing illegally in the country (EKEM 1994c, 57-61,

EKEM 1994a,

26-28) .

Only when five out of six ethnic Greeks

were released from jail did relations improve significantly.

Since then, there have been a good deal of meetings be-

tween the two countries on a ministerial level, and Albania has

agreed to respect human rights, while Greece has consented to

lift its veto on the disbursement of EU funds to Albania.

Though the relations between Greece and Albania are improv-

ing for the time being, the dispute pertaining to the protection

of religious and educational rights of Greek minority is not

definitely over.

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JOURNAL OF THE HELLENIC DIASPORA

In the hope of having explained the political problems

that condition Greece's structural opportunity, we turn our

focus to the economic constraints. Greece is usually faced with

a weak long-term output performance and sustained macro-

economic imbalances. The economy has grown by an annual

average that is a third or a fourth as small as that of its EU

partners over the last ten years. The inflation rate has been

among the highest in the EU, while the budget deficit, the trade

deficit, and the foreign debt have been exceptionally high.

Greek governments, since the preceding decade, have systemat-

ically implemented a policy of stabilization and reform, but due

to acute political instability, they have never succeeded in their

targets.

In fact, the economy was badly damaged by the fluid

political situation over the years 1988 through 1991. The

serious heart condition of then Prime Minister Andreas

Papandreou, along with the allegations of corruption in state

enterprises and banks leveled by the opposition both at the

prime minister and at cabinet members and senior administra-

tion officials, paved the way for the loss of power by the

PASOK government in the election of June 1989. The result,

however, of the election was indecisive, ultimately producing

an interim coalition government of the New Democracy party

and the leftist political alliance with Synaspismos with a two-

fold aim. First, a catharsis, that is, the purging of the public life

of PASOK's scandals; and second, the call for elections in

October. The new elections were also inconclusive, insofar as

no party achieved outright victory by winning the absolute ma-

jority of seats in parliament. An ecumenical government was

set up out of the New Democracy, PASOK, and Synaspismos,

but the viability of the venture was highly uncertain. The leaders

of the three parties anticipated a new election, since a new

president was to be elected in March 1990, and no party had

the absolute majority. Indeed, following the elections in April,

the New Democracy single-party government was formed, bring-

ing to an end the two-year period of political turmoil, which

heavily hindered economic stability. Not only did the interim

coalition government give way to satisfying the public cry for

pay raises and public-sector employment, but decisions from a

Greece and the Claim to Regional Hegemony



long list of issues on economy and foreign policy were put off

pending the outcome of the next election. Coalition govern-

ments were wholly unable to make policy, take initiatives, and

pass legislation without the explicit agreement of the leaders

of constituent parties. As a consequence, Greece was not properly

prepared in economic and political terms to cope with the

demanding imperatives of further integrated EU policies.

Ultimately, in 1991 the New Democracy government in

conjuction with the European Commission drafted a medium-

term recovery program. Its basic objective was to put the Greek

economy in a better position so as to meet the dictates of the

Maastricht Treaty. However, this program failed as a result

of a worsening external political and economic environment, as

well as of the unexpected fall of the government in 1993. In

that year, the GDP growth rate was almost negative at 0.5

percent, while the gross government debt and the fiscal deficit

stood at over 116 percent and 13 percent of GDP, respectively.

The consumer price inflation was at a record 14 percent and,

in effect, Greece had the highest levels of nominal and real

interest rates in the EU (European Commission 1995a, 57-59,

European Commission 1995b, 16-23).

Since the new PASOK government took office in October

1993 and renewed its authority in September 1996, a number

of restrictive income, fiscal, and monetary policies have been

reintroduced. A new revised middle-term recovery program has

been concluded and put into effect in conjunction with the EU.

Both the then and the present prime minister, together with

the leadership of the ministry of national economy and finance.

have firmly demonstrated their determination to seriously im-

plement the necessary measures in order to reduce the chronic

fiscal deficit and to tackle the strong inflation pressures. To

this end, Greek authorities have announced their intention to

sustain the hard drachma policy and to restrain income growth.

In general, the commitment of the Greek government to the

highest priorities of economic policy, that is, the reduction of

the public sector debt and the strict implementation of anti-

inflationary measures, has been very strong and unwavering,

despite periodic upheavals in the international currency mar-

kets and public dismay over the measures.



JOURNAL OF THE HELLENIC DIASPORA

For the time being, some signs of recovery are evident,

and the prospects for an improving performance and growth

are more encouraging. It is forecast that the GDP growth rate

will rise to

percent in 1996, while the total fixed investment

will grow by

7.6

percent; the manufacturing output will like-

wise pick up (EIU 1995e, 3-6, 20-25,

EIU

1995f, 3, 17-20).

This modest upswing is likely to be led overwhelmingly by pub-

lic sector investment based on EU support, since residential

construction and private sector investment is expected to re-

main relatively weak. Furthermore, the inflation rate has progres-

sively slowed down to less than

percent currently.

Nonetheless, the core program of the Greek economy re-

mains the size of the gross government debt. Although the

annual percentage increase has declined, the absolute size of

public sector debt was around

117

percent in 1995. In effect,

debt servicing is bound to continue as the single largest item

of government expenditure. From this standpoint, the capacity

of the government to further save a significant amount of

funds for the purpose of financing the economic, military, and

diplomatic penetration of the country in the New Balkans is

relatively limited. It is obvious that the narrow nature of

government expenditure inhibits Greece from reinforcing more

effectively the activities of Greek firms in the New Balkans,

broadening its networks of economic business and diplomatic

missions, and enhancing foreign aid.

The main conclusion that we can draw from the discussion

presented is that the structural opportunity bestowed upon

Greece by the distribution of power in the New Balkans is

significantly conditioned not only by a number of imperatives

and dictates derived from the broader security environment of

the Balkan peninsula, but also by significant domestic political

and economic constrains.

V. Conclusion

The paper proceeds from the fact that the end of the

Cold War, the progressive rise of a multipolar international

system, the restoration of regional sovereignty, and the emergence

of the economic dimension of security and power all have given

Greece and the Claim to Regional Hegemony



rise to unprecedented systemic opportunities for regionally pre-

eminent small powers to assume more active or assertive roles

in their respective regions. This by no means follows that

these powers are able to establish a regional hegemony purely

of their own. As a result of their intrinsic power limitations,

the notion of hegemony, as defined in the literature, is not

readily applicable to regional politics.

For the purposes of our analysis, we suggest the term

"regional primacy" as consisting of a regionally preeminent small

power's structural opportunity and structural power. The dis-

tribution of capabilities in a particular regional subsystem may

provide one small power or a band of small powers with a

sort of unique "objective" power to influence regional politics

of their own. This is labeled as structural opportunity. Struc-

tural power is the perceptual, actual structural opportunity, that

is, when it comes into being through a grand strategy design.

It is related to the improvement of structural opportunity in

terms of all those international conditions favorable to the

maintenance and enhancement of a state's perceived security.

A regional small power may be endowed with the unique

structural opportunity of enhancing its structural power so

much as to obtain regional primacy.

Clearly, the attributes of structural opportunity are not

given. Actually, we can assume that the potential structural op-

portunity might exist away in time and place, and offer some

benefits for a while. Alternatively, structural opportunity does

not automatically entail realized structural power. A grand

strategy design in the terms of an enduring set of active policies

is needed in order to convert a fully structural opportunity into

realized structural power, which, in turn, may yield sound claims

to regional primacy. The latter presupposes that some require-

ments are met. In fact, structural opportunity and realized

structural power reflects differences of proportion and degree

in meeting the requirements of regional primacy.

The paper suggests that three basic preconditions should

be met for regional primacy on the part of a regional small

power. First, the distribution of power capabilities should be

in its favor, which entails the existence of a unique structural

opportunity. Second, its attempt should not come overtly into

100

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JOURNAL OF THE HELLENIC DIASPORA

conflict with the interests of both the present great powers and

other regionally preeminent small powers. And third, it should

be capable of bearing the political, economic, and military burden

for a relatively long period of time.

In exploring the application of these requirements to the

case of Greece in the New Balkans, the principal thesis emerges

that the country is not presently in a position to assume a leader-

ship role of its own. Although Greece enjoys a unique struc-

tural opportunity, there are significant limits to its structural

power. This determines the limits of Greece's regional primacy.

Greece's regional primacy can actually be conceived of as a

sort of partnership in collective leadership.

Indeed, Greece sufficiently meets the first precondition for

regional primacy in the New Balkans. The distribution of

military, economic, and institutional-diplomatic power between

Greece and the Balkan states concerned has endowed the former

with a unique structural opportunity to play a protagonistic

part in its region. The economic and institutional superiority

of Greece in particular is beyond any doubt. Nonetheless,

Greece's structural opportunity is conditioned by a number of

systemic imperatives and domestic constraints.

First, Turkey is better positioned than Greece in the dis-

tribution of military and political power, while having notable

military, political, and economc links with the Balkan states

concerned. As compared to Turkey, Greek economic presence

is very strong only in Albania and Bulgaria, relatively limited

in Romania, and almost trivial in FYROM. In sharp contrast

to a powerful Turkish influence, Greek diplomatic penetration

and political influence is merely satisfactory in Bulgaria and

Romania, while being exceptionally problematic in Albania

and FYROM.

Second, the Western great powers have a strong military,

economic, and diplomatic presence in the region. The United

States appears to prefer investing and promoting political and

military contacts rather than engaging in direct trade. The

EU's great powers appear to prefer developing their economic

interests rather than to assume immediate political initiatives.

As a whole, the United States and Germany seem to be the

Greece and the Claim to Regional Hegemony



101

major actors, followed closely by France and Italy, and then

by the UK.

Third, the political disputes with FYROM and Albania,

along with the sluggish growth of economy, restrict Greece's

capacity to get Balkan states to do or want what it wants.

The name issue with FYROM is still open, whereas the prob-

lems with Albania have not yet been solved. The economy is

far from sound. The extremely large size of gross government

debt is the most serious concern, particularly because it is coupled

with an overextended and unproductive public sector. In effect,

the Greek government can not readily afford to finance political

and economic activities in the New Balkans.

In addition, an important point should be kept in mind.

Common sense indicates that the great powers are not prepared

to grant Greece the status of a leadership power in terms of

regional hegemony. Broadly speaking, a single great power or

some great powers in concert can take one of three attitudes

toward a regional area in which they have less than absolutely

vital interests at stake. They can actively support one or a set

of regional powers in the policies that they seek to set forth;

they can actively get involved in order to control the interna-

tional politics of the region; or they can withdraw partially only

after the containment of regional conflicts has been guaranteed.

It seems that the great powers prefer establishing deep-

rooted patterns of economic, military, and political links with

the Balkan states concerned rather than directly intervening

into their current politics and economics. Regardless of the con-

stituent range of national interests, they seek to promote in

concert a threefold central objective: first, to strengthen the

transition of the Balkan states toward democracy and a mar-

ket economy; second, to contain the spillover of the bilateral

conflicts of these countries; and third, to confirm their political

prestige and economic status. In this respect, the logic and

the struggle for a separate "sphere of influence," as we pre-

sumably treat the term in accordance with the historical record

of the period prior to the Second World War, as well as of the

interwar era, is not predominant, at least for the time being.

Rather, the great powers have repeatedly demonstrated signs

of their willingness to support Greece and Turkey, the two

102

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JOURNAL OF THE HELLENIC DIASPORA

regionally preeminent powers, in order that they take over a

prota.gonistic role in the region for the purpose of promoting

the great powers' interests. Sometimes, they are inclined to

legitimize Turkey for this role.13 This is not coming as a sur-

prise. Not only does Turkey have strong political and military

interests in the region, but also, and probably of greater im-

portance, it sustains strong and stable political links with the

great powers. The geopolitical location of Turkey in the Bal-

kans and the Black Sea, very close to Russia and the Middle

East, is of paramount strategic importance to the interests of

the great powers.

On the other hand, Greece has come explicitly or im-

plicitly in conflict with its EU and NATO partners on a sig-

nificant number of issues, and in particular with reference to

the embargo on FYROM and the Yugoslav crisis. After all,

many of the Greek leaders have no clear vision of how Greece

should go about safeguarding its security

interests.

Greek for-

eign policy activities suffer from the absence of a united and

integrated grand strategy design. This is vividly evident: first,

in the split regarding the central strategic orientation of Greece

in the post-Cold War era; second, in the divergent ways in

which consecutive Greek governments have dealt with the

problems of FYROM, Albania, and the Yugoslav crisis; and

East, but not least, in the manner in which the Greek authorities

have handled the serious economic problems of the country.

All in all, the claim to regional hegemony has no basis

in reality. It is a great myth. What Greece can really pursue

is regional primacy in terms of an equal partnership in collective

leadership for the purposes of helping the Balkan states concerned

come to grips with new systemic conditions and to enter the

Western international organizations. The preconditions for

such a role are not all met. Therefore, the country can not for

the moment aspire to regional primacy. In fact, the fundamental

dilemma presently facing Greece is how to design a grand

strategy that neither ignores systemic imperatives and domestic

constraints nor forecloses structural opportunity in sight. What

is needed is a pattern of behavior so that the country remains

directly involved in the New Balkans as a partner in leader-

ship, a pragmatic but active role commensurate with its struc-

Greece and the Claim to Regional Hegemony



103

tural position and real political and economic weight, as well

as with its elites' and people's expectations.

NOTES

'The contention on the need of Greece's pmtagonistic role in the

Balkans is rooted in the belief that Hellenism was the one and only driving

force in the region within the economic and political system of the

Ottoman Empire. In this respect, the Balkan Peninsula. is regarded as a

sort of huge "inner space" (6vSoxi'opm), or in other terms, as what is

for Russia the Near Abroad. This attitude has dynamically come back

into the forefront since the demise of the Soviet block. In general, the lat-

ter has given boost to traditional nationalist sentiments which

call

for an

independent foreign policy exclusively in the service of Greek national

interests. We could maintain that the most extreme expression of these

posturings is the claims to the annexation of part of southern Albania,

(North Epirus, Bc5patoc "fficeipoc) where the Greek minority settles in

Greece and the password is "Macedonia is Greek" as well.

2For instance, the former Minister of Public Order, Stelios Papa-

themelis, argues that Greece should aspire to a role of multi-facetedly

penetrating into the Balkan states, and on occasions of guardianship

(wilasp,ovia) that is, establishing patron-client relationships with them.

The ex-Minister of Defense, Gerasimos Arsenis, asserts that: 'Bus%

Siv utAdus rat ilystiovix6 p6Xo

Tfl;

`Daciaocc csrai BaXxcivicc ucACTcue

yca% gva xarcaurcxb p6Xo rt; 'EXXiSac. Er& BaXxcivca xaviva

roc av pampa' va4 irc4st. fi1suovix8 pcao [



'EXAckaa urcopsi.

%at rcpinsi No& sivat 11iruouvixavil yi&1



noXtrixt %al oixoyoucxii

auvapyotata csrec BaAxdivia. Kat aUtb v alv'



6vo pi& usycriXvi rcp6-

xXvicni, 1.u& sUmapta yick uetg, yiec rip) TAXOtaa, &AA& stvat

parSiXn diO6vii" (we do not speak of Greece's hegemcmic role in the

Balkans;

we speak

of Greece's catalytic role in the Balkans. In the

Balkans •no state can play an hegemonic role [ ...], Greece can, and

must, be the 'steam engine' towards political and economic cooperation

in the Balkans. Not only is such a role a great challenge, an opportunity

for us, for Greece, but it is in our important responsibility as well).

Stelios Papathemelis, "OE ZrOxot. rrig 1D.Xviviaq 'Ecorspixt;

'scat; cm& BccXx6ivicc" (The Targets of Greek Foreign Policy in the

Balkans), in D.C. Constas and P. I. Tsakonas (eds),



'Eo-

repxI lloXccx. 'Eacircepixi; xat Letitia% Ilapiparpot (Greek For-

eign Policy. Domestic and International Parameters) (Athens: Odysseas

for the Institute of International Relation, 1995), pp. 96-1D1: pp. 86-

88; Gerasimos Arsenis, '"AccpiXeca xal Tuvepyania at& Ba)adivia xat

TAAdigla" (Security and Cooperation in the Balkans and Greece), in

Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP),

104



JOURNAL OF THE HELLENIC DIASPORA

'Enernpltra 'Attuvtvgc xal 'EorceptlAc lloAvx '95: 'II EX.XiSa.

xat, 66agog 19944995 (Defense and Foreign Policy Yearbook '95:

Greece and the World 1994-1995) (Athens: ELIAMEP, 1995),

pp. 19:26: p. 24. See also Gerasimos Arsenis, "T6 No 'Atturctx6

6yp,oc"

in Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy

(ELIAMEP), 'Ensvolk 'Ap.uvrocilc xcd 'Eci.)tept.x9)G Ilavazifiq '94:

'EXAcik stal 6 K6attoy 1993-1994 (Defense and Foreign Policy

Yearbook '94: Greece and the World 1993-1994) (Athens: ELIAMEP,

1994), pp. 37-47; Chrisanthos Lazaridis, "EEto-cspocii 11oAttcx1):

'Av-

Texyontcruxh

Dcdocrai o' gvccv 'Avtarovvrcvx6 K6sp,o (Foreign Policy:

An Antagonistic Stance in an Antagonistic World), in Institute of In-

ternational Relations, 1996 (Yearbook 1996) (Athens: I. Sideris, 1996),

pp.

181-190:

pp.

184-187.

3Charalambos Papasotiriou espouses the theory that Greek national

interests dictate the advancement, "6176 iX)olvt,wil ',Weak

ivcodou 6chAxaycxoti obtovoli,Lxo0 xtxt TcoAt,TtxOCS 67coaustlitLiztoc

CITat

nktoca 'cot) yzotUnzpou Suttx,ori cuor6pmme' (under Greek leadership,

of a unified Balkan economic and political sub-system in the context

of broader Western system). Papasotiriou, Tac RzAxitita (The Bal-

kans) p. 278. See also an article by the Director of the North Greece

Industries Association, who adopts the same line of thinking. Nicolaos

Eythimiadis, "TDvrivExt Movapxxil Kurxxxoxim

CT& Bria%M141X

=I 6

p6Xo; Tiro 'F.fictxscpwcvaxdiv (Dopitov. .tot3

E.B.B.E."

(Greek Economic Predominance in the Balkans and the Role of Enter-

prises Associations. The Case of North Greece Industries Association), in

ELIAMEP, 'Ens.tvEScc '94,

pp.

151-165.

4A number of politicians and scholars are very close to what I

suggest as regional primacy. Alternate Minister of Foreign Affairs George

Papandreou asserts that: "as a thriving pluralistic and democratic society,

which is politically, economically and militarily immuntable, Greece

is ideally suited to play a major role in facilitating the transition

of the Balkan states from totalitarian and autocratic to enduring, modern

democratic and pluralistic states with free-market economies." In addition,

Theodore Christodoulides argues: "Greece could become the driving

force in promoting intra-regional cooperation, which would not only

serve the requirements of an overall Community policy, but would also

initiate an integration-generating process in an area marked by deep

political cleavages."

5See the special issue of International Journal on the question of

regionalism in the Post-Cold War Era: "Regional Powers,"

International

journal,

Vol. XLVI (Summer 1991).

6As Colin 'Cray contends, "as a Realist I believe that force is ir-

relevant to most of the relations among political communities most

of the time. But I also believe that there are rare occasions when force,

and only force, can satisfy the security needs of the moment. Force is

like an airbag; generally unneeded but life preserving on that one day

in a thousand when the peril is truly acute." Colin S. Gray, "Villains,

Greece and the Claim to Regional Hegemony



105

Victims, and Sheriffs: Strategic Studies and Security for an Interwar

Period,"

Comparative Strategy,

Vol. 13, No. 4 (October-December

1994), pp. 353-368: p. 354.

7The Times, 16 December 1994, p. 11.

eiFinancial Times East Europe, Vol. 5, No. 9,

May 1995, p.

20.

°In fact, newly released data illustrates that Bulgaria and New

Yugoslavia are the leading trading partners of FYROM. In 1994

Bulgaria was in the first rank as a destination for its goods accounting

for 20 percent of the total, followed by Germany and New Yugoslavia

with 13 percent, and Italy with 10 percent. At the same time, New

Yugoslavia was the first market for FYROM's supplies accounting for

23 percent of the total, followed by Germany and Bulgaria with 17

percent and Italy with 6 percent. The EIU,

Macedonia and Serbia-

.Montenegro. Country Profile 1995

(London: EIU, 1996),

"United Nations Commission for Europe,

East

West Investment

News,

Autumn/Winter 1994, p. 30.

l'Greece argued that the use af the name Macedonia denotes

the northern Greek Province of Macedonia and, in effect, implies

claims to Greek territory. This argument was reinforced by three ele-

ments: first, the reference of some provisions of FYROM's constitution

to several Macedonian minorities that exist in neighboring countries;

secondly, the continuing propaganda of nationalists, compounded by

related literature distributed worldwide, calling for a greater Macedonia

embracing, among others, Thessaloniki, the capital of the Greek province

of Macedonia; and thirdly, the placing of the "16- sited sunbeam"

.s..

star of Philip and Alexander the Great, a royal



1 of the Kings

of the ancient Greek Macedonia, on FYROM's flag.

"The considerable progress made is characteristically expressible in

the agreements signed in May 1996, which deal with an enormously

interesting set of several issues such as Albanian migrants, cliplomatic

representation and further defence cooperation.

"Several American scholars at least cite Turkey as the only rising

regional power in the Balkans and propose the US Administration to

count on it in order to pronaote the country's interests in the region.

See Graham E. Fuller and John Arquilla, "The Intractable Problem of

Regional Powers,"

Orbis,

Vol. 40, No. 4 (Fall 1996), pp. 609-621;

Robert S. Chase, Emily B. Hill, Paul Kennedy, "Pivotal States and US

Strategy,"

Foreign Affairs,

Vol. 75, No. 1 (January/February 1996).

106

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JOURNAL OF THE HELLENIC DIASPORA

APPENDIX

TABLE 1

GDP growth in Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, Albania, and

FYROM (as % change on same period of preceding year)

1990

1991 1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

Greece

-1.0

3.1

0.4

-1.0

1.5

1.7

2.1

Bulgaria

9.1

-12.0

-7.7

-2.4 0.2

2.5

3.0

Romania

-5.6

-12.9

-8.0

1.5

3.9

6.9

4.5

Albania

10.0

27.7

9.7 11.0

7.4

6.0

5.0

FYROM

9.9

-12.1

-13.4

-15.2

-7.0

-3.0

3.0

a. estimates-projections

Source: The table is based on data stemming from:

The Economist Intelligence Unit, Bulgaria and Albania.

Country Report, third quarter 1996, London: EIU, 1996,

pp.

15, 28.

EKEM, Balkan Briefing, No. 18, March 1995, pp. 16-18.

EKEM, Balkan Briefing, No. 17, February 1995, pp. 19, 22.

EKEM,

Semi-Annual Report for the Balkans, No. 2, June

1994, pp. 21, 45.

The Economist Intelligence Unit, Romania. Country Report,

third quarter 1996, London: EIU, 1996, pp. 3, 7.

National Bank of Romania, Annual Report 1993, Bucharest:

NBR, 1994, pp.

7, 88

89.

The Economic Intelligence Unit, Bosnia-Herzegovina,

Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia-Montenegro and Slovenia. Country

Report, second quarter 1995, London: EIU, 1995, p. 18.

The Economist Intelligence Unit, Greece. Country Report,

third quarter 1996, London: EIU, 1996, pp. 3, 5.

9) The Economist Intelligence Unit, Business Report Eastern

Europe. Regional Overview, second quarter 1996, London: EIU,

1996, p. 10.

Greece and the Claim to Regional Hegemony



107

10)

United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, Press

Release, ECE/GEN/44, December 1994, p. 9.

11)

European Commission, European Economy. Economic

Trends. Supplement A, Brussels: Directorate-General for Eco-

nomic and Financial Affairs, No. 4/5, April/May 1995,

pp.

16-23.

12)

European 'Commission, European Economy Annual Eco-

nomic Report for 1996, Brussels, Directorate-General for Eco-

nomic and Financial Affairs, No. 61, 1996, p. 86.

13)

European Bank for Reconstruction and Development,

Transition Report Update, London: EBRD, April 1996, pp.

22,

24, 28, 32,

41.

TABLE 2

Inflation (as % change on the same period of preceding year)

and Unemployment (as % change of labor force) in Greece,

Bulgaria, Romania, Albania, and FYROM.

1993



1994



1995

inflation un/ment inflation un/ment inflation un/rnent

Greece

14.3

9.7

10.8

8.9

9.2

8.9

Bulgaria

60.0

16.4

112.4

12.8

62.0

10.5

Romania

256.1

10.2

104.4

11.0 32.3

8.9

Albania

85.0

32.5

23.0

19.5

6.0

13.0

FYROM

335.0

29.0

57.0

27.3

9.0

31.6

Source: The table is based on data stemming from:

European Commission, European Economy. Economic

Economic Trends. Supplement A, Brussels: Directorate

-G

eneral

for Economic and Financial Affairs, Supplement A, No. 4/5,

April/May 1995, pp. 16-23.

European Commission, European Economy. Annual Eco-

nomic Report for 1996, Brussels: Directorate-General for Eco-

nomic and Financial Affairs, No. 61, 1996, p. 86.

108

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112

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JOURNAL OF THE HELLENIC DIASPORA

Turkey in the Post-Arab Uprisings Era: Vacillating between Regional and Domestic Priorities

Article

Full-text available

Apr 2024

Stavros Drakoularakos

This article analyses Turkey’s foreign policy in relation to the post-Arab uprisings status quo through the prism of regional hegemony theory. The aspiring regional hegemon is identified through criteria that are applied to Turkish foreign policy, recontextualizing soft power initiatives of the previous decades with current hard power policies. The article suggests that while the Arab uprisings played an important part in the redefinition of Turkish foreign policy, Erdoğan’s domestic priorities informed its recalibration in order to weather political difficulties and maintain power. The objective would be to challenge the status quo shepherded by the West during the twentieth century as articulated by the Mavi Vatan doctrine, the motivation to renegotiate the Lausanne treaty, the conversion of the Hagia Sophia into a mosque, and even the escalating Erdoğan-Macron verbal feud. Turkey’s aspirations for regional hegemony are evidenced in policies including military intervention, diplomatic and economic support to state entities, and escalation of tensions with other regional powers, as well as through Erdoğan’s consolidation of power over Turkish domestic affairs.

The Role of Military Power

Chapter

Dec 2020

John Garnett

The International Purposes of Military Power

Chapter

Jan 1970

Klaus Knorr

Power is a form of influence and, like other forms of influence, it has several dimensions. Power is coercive influence based on the threat of value deprivation or penalties. Such penalties may take several forms, one of them being military. Military power is ultimately the power to destroy and kill, or to occupy and control, and hence to coerce. In the international system, military power — like other forms of influence — is a relation among states that permits one government to induce another to behave in a way which the latter would not have chosen freely. Military power thus permits a degree of control over the environment.

Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis

Article

Jul 1960

Contending Philosophies about Security in Europe

Chapter

Oct 1992

Economic Outlook for Bulgaria 2012-2014

Conference Paper

Oct 2012

Garabed Minassian

Rethinking the Origins of American Hegemony

Article

Oct 1989

G. John Ikenberry

Middlepowermanship, Japan, and Future World Order

Article

Oct 1989

Robert W. Cox

The Changing Nature of World Power

Article

Jul 1990

Joseph S. Nye

The Political Economy of International Relations

Article

Jun 1988

Dominance and Leadership in the International Economy: Exploitation, Public Goods, and Free Rides

Article

Jun 1981

Charles P. Kindleberger

It is often difficult to distinguish dominance from leadership in international economic relations. The latter concept, however, rejects exploitation and implies an often critical function in the provision of public goods. In its absence, the provision of such public goods as a market for distress goods, a steady flow of capital, and a rediscount mechanism may disappear. This stabilization function was provided by the United States in the first postwar decades, but the U.S. now has neither the will nor the international acceptance to play such a role. And a successor is not in sight.

Greece and the Claim to Regional Hegemony in the New Balkans: Myth and Reality

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