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¿Quién le susurra al Presidente? Asesores versus ministros en América Latina

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¿Quién le susurra al Presidente? Asesores versus ministros en América Latina

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This article examines who and how influences presidential decisions within the Executive Power. Based on interviews with 21 former presidents, this paper argues that the tension between advisors and ministers varies according to the type of presidential leadership and whether the president freely appoints the ministers or they are imposed by political parties. The interaction between both variables conditions the relations between the two groups, allowing advisors to complement, substitute, accommodate or compete with the ministries' duties. To systematize this argument, this paper proposes a categorization of the degree of conflict that exists between ministers and advisors.
... REVISTA ESTUDIOS DE POLÍTICAS PÚBLICAS · NÚMERO 1 · JUNIO 2015 las líneas de investigación sobre CdG se han vinculado principalmente al análisis de diseños institucionales, amplitud de poderes presidenciales y su conexión con los principales actores partícipes del proceso de toma de decisiones para la elaboración de políticas públicas (Coutinho, 2007;Arana, 2012). ...
... El grupo tradicionalmente más importante que sustenta el proceso decisorio ha sido el de los ministerios políticos. La articulación de este grupo de ministerios permite al CdG coordinar la ejecución de políticas públicas en función de las áreas más relevantes de la administración del Estado (Arana, 2012). Sin embargo, los costos de transacción entre el presidente y su coalición, ha generado en estos ministerios políticos un efecto de doble subordinación, uno hacia el presidente y otra hacia su partido, causando la descentralización del proceso decisorio efectuado por el CdG (Waissbluth, 2008). ...
... De esta forma, la duplicación de tareas genera un proceso de rivalidad, lo cual favorece el control presidencial durante los procesos decisorios y el aumento de fuentes de información. No obstante, el modelo requiere altos niveles de tiempo para administrar problemas vinculados a conflictos internos y costos de transacción (Arana, 2012;BID, 2013). ...
... Despite this hierarchical organisation, based on different types of relationships, the central government tends to operate beyond the scope of its formal structure, and informal institutions have an important influence on its functioning. Groups of advisors and the personal cabinets of authorities, for example, provide support in the management and implementation of public policies (Arana, 2012;Palacios and Jofré, 2016). It is in this diffuse context, with more or less informal models that have varied over time, that advice to the President (directly or through commissions), the delivery or centre of government unit, and advice to ministers operate (Palacios and Jofré, 2016;Cisternas and Vásquez, 2018). ...
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This article presents a case study of the Chilean executive, focusing on the civil service in the period after the Pinochet dictatorship and the country's transition to democracy. It provides synchronic and diachronic analysis of the organisation of the executive, public employment and the civil service. Both the qualitative description and statistical evidence reveal the establishment of a flexible regime of public employment with low levels of stability in senior public management positions.
... This article makes two relevant contributions to the literature. First, it provides the first analytical approach to coalition management that goes beyond anecdotal evidence of the use of junior ministers as overseers in presidential systems (Araya 2012). Second, it empirically analyzes the effect of three conditions under which the president would monitor a coalition partner (preference distance, portfolio salience, and coalescence). ...
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... This article makes two relevant contributions to the literature. First, it provides the first analytical approach to coalition management that goes beyond anecdotal evidence of the use of junior ministers as overseers in presidential systems (Araya 2012). Second, it empirically analyzes the effect of three conditions under which the president would monitor a coalition partner (preference distance, portfolio salience, and coalescence). ...
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