(PDF) The Power of Focus: Unlocking Creative Insight and Overcoming Performance Barriers

The Power of Focus: Unlocking Creative Insight and

Overcoming Performance Barriers

by

Jennifer Walinga

B.A., Brock University, 1987

B.Ed., University of Western Ontario, 1988

M.A., Royal Roads University, 2001

A Dissertation Presented in Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for the Degree

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

in the School of Public Administration

University of Victoria, 2007

photocopying or other means, without the permission of the author.

ii

The Power of Focus: Unlocking Creative Insight and

Overcoming Performance Barriers

By

Jennifer Walinga

B.A., Brock University, 1987

B.Ed., University of Western Ontario, 1988

M.A., Royal Roads University, 2001

Supervisory Committee

Dr. J. Barton Cunningham, (School of Public Administration)

Supervisor

Dr. James MacGregor, (School of Public Administration)

Co-Supervisor and Departmental Member

Dr. Vernon J. Storey, (Educational Psychology and Leadership Studies Department)

Outside Member

Dr. Bruce L. Howe, (School of Physical Education)

Additional Member

Dr. Marvin Washington, (School of Business and Faculty of Physical Education and

Recreation, University of Alberta)

External Examiner

iii

Supervisory Committee

Dr. J. Barton Cunningham, (School of Public Administration)

Supervisor

Dr. James MacGregor, (School of Public Administration)

Co-Supervisor and Departmental Member

Dr. Vernon J. Storey, (Educational Psychology and Leadership Studies Department)

Outside Member

Dr. Bruce L. Howe, (School of Physical Education)

Additional Member

Dr. Marvin Washington, (School of Business and Faculty of Physical Education and Recreation, University

of Alberta)

External Examiner

Abstract

Challenges, problems, and conflicts can be the seeds of growth, or the seeds of

destruction. It seems worthwhile to develop skills for addressing and resolving life

challenges in ways that promote growth. Problem solving skills are a component of any

performance challenge whether athletic, academic, professional, or personal. However,

the cognitive and physiological resources and processes associated with problem solving

have the potential to act in ways that both enhance and inhibit effective problem solving

and performance outcomes. The threat appraisal mechanism, the subconscious process of

evaluating whether a challenge poses a threat, is designed to preserve the individual but

can also work to interfere with an individual’s capacity for creative problem solving.

Focus, a process capable of galvanizing an individual’s attention and energies toward a

singular purpose, can erode performance just as powerfully by drawing energies away

from performance goals. Insight into the interactions and interdependencies of underlying

cognitive and physiological mechanisms and principles comprising the problem solving

process would better inform the design of facilitative performance interventions for a

variety of realms including business, academic, athletic, and interpersonal.

The following experimental and quasi-experimental field study explored the

relationship between cognitive appraisal, attentional focus, problem solving, and goal

iv

attainment. The research examined the influence that threat focus, assumption focus, goal

focus and ‘integrated’ focus had upon coping strategies, cognitive stress appraisal, and

performance outcome on problem solving tasks. Shifts in focus were achieved using

questions designed to direct thinking.

Qualitative and quantitative analyses were conducted in the form of three separate

but interrelated experiments. The first experiment compared the impact of three focusing

interventions on problem solving rate and approach on a variety of insight problems. The

second experiment evaluated a refined intervention against a control group on the same

tasks. The final experiment applied the refined intervention within an organizational field

setting and evaluated the impact of the intervention on problem solving approach and

outcome when faced with challenges related to a workplace injury. Outcome was based

upon correct solutions in the lab and sustainability of solutions in the field.

Analysis of variance results demonstrated that the focusing intervention

significantly and positively affected problem solving rate, outcome and approach in the

lab and moderately and positively affected problem solving outcome and approach in a

workplace setting.

The research has implications for other individual, team and organizational

settings suggesting that performance on a wide variety of problems may be improved by

utilizing an integrated focus.

v

T

ABLE OF CONTENTS

S

UPERVISORY

C

OMMITTEE

..............................................................................................

II

A

BSTRACT

.......................................................................................................................

III

LIST

OF

TABLES ....................................................................................................................................

VII

LIST

OF

FIGURES .................................................................................................................................

VIII

A

CKNOWLEDGMENTS

......................................................................................................

IX

D

EDICATION

.....................................................................................................................

X

CHAPTER 1 ITRODUCTIO ..................................................................................... 1

S

TATEMENT OF THE

I

SSUE

................................................................................................ 1

P

URPOSE

.......................................................................................................................... 2

O

BJECTIVES

...................................................................................................................... 4

H

YPOTHESIS

..................................................................................................................... 8

C

ONCEPTUAL

F

RAMEWORK

........................................................................................... 10

A

PPLICATIONS OF THE

I

NTEGRATED

F

OCUS

M

ODEL

...................................................... 19

S

IGNIFICANCE OF THE

R

ESEARCH

................................................................................... 22

CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW ....................................................................... 23

T

HEORIES OF

P

ROBLEM

S

OLVING

................................................................................... 23

P

ROBLEM

S

OLVING

T

RAINING

P

ROGRAMS

..................................................................... 38

T

HEORIES OF

A

TTENTIONAL

F

OCUS

............................................................................... 47

A

TTENTIONAL

F

OCUS

T

RAINING

P

ROGRAMS

................................................................. 55

C

OMMON

F

ACTORS IN

T

HEORIES AND

T

RAINING

P

ROGRAMS

........................................ 58

T

HEORIES OF

P

ROBLEM

S

OLVING AND

I

NJURY

............................................................... 63

A

P

ROPOSED

A

PPROACH

:

I

NTEGRATED

F

OCUS

.............................................................. 84

CHAPTER 3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY ........................................................... 85

I

NTRODUCTION

............................................................................................................... 85

S

ELECTION OF THE

V

ARIABLES

...................................................................................... 86

R

ESEARCH

D

ESIGN

......................................................................................................... 93

CHAPTER 4 EXPERIMET 1 ................................................................................... 102

I

NTRODUCTION

............................................................................................................. 102

E

XPERIMENT

1

P

ARTICIPANTS

...................................................................................... 102

E

XPERIMENT

1

D

ESIGN

................................................................................................ 109

E

XPERIMENT

1

P

ROCEDURE

......................................................................................... 109

E

XPERIMENT

1

D

ATA

A

NALYSIS

.................................................................................. 110

E

XPERIMENT

1

R

ESULTS

.............................................................................................. 117

E

XPERIMENT

1

D

ISCUSSION

......................................................................................... 127

CHAPTER 5 EXPERIMET 2 ................................................................................... 134

I

NTRODUCTION

............................................................................................................. 134

E

XPERIMENT

2

P

ARTICIPANTS

...................................................................................... 134

E

XPERIMENT

2

A

PPARATUS

.......................................................................................... 135

E

XPERIMENT

2

D

ESIGN

................................................................................................ 135

vi

E

XPERIMENT

2

P

ROCEDURE

......................................................................................... 135

E

XPERIMENT

2

D

ATA

A

NALYSIS

.................................................................................. 137

E

XPERIMENT

2

R

ESULTS

.............................................................................................. 137

E

XPERIMENT

2

D

ISCUSSION

......................................................................................... 143

CHAPTER 6 EXPERIMET 3 ................................................................................... 147

I

NTRODUCTION

............................................................................................................. 147

E

XPERIMENT

3

P

ARTICIPANTS

...................................................................................... 147

E

XPERIMENT

3

M

EASURES

........................................................................................... 148

E

XPERIMENT

3

D

ESIGN

................................................................................................ 148

E

XPERIMENT

3

P

ROCEDURE

......................................................................................... 149

E

XPERIMENT

3

D

ATA

A

NALYSIS

.................................................................................. 150

E

XPERIMENT

3

R

ESULTS

.............................................................................................. 150

E

XPERIMENT

3

D

ISCUSSION

......................................................................................... 157

CHAPTER 7 COCLUSIO ...................................................................................... 162

S

UMMARY

.................................................................................................................... 162

G

ENERAL

D

ISCUSSION

................................................................................................. 163

C

ONTRIBUTIONS TO THE

F

IELD

.................................................................................... 167

L

IMITATIONS OF THE

S

TUDY

........................................................................................ 171

F

UTURE

R

ESEARCH

I

MPLICATIONS

............................................................................... 172

R

EFERENCES

................................................................................................................ 173

A

PPEDIX

A

–

C

OSET

F

ORM

.................................................................................. 241

A

PPEDIX

B

–

E

XPERIMET

1

T

RAIIG

S

CRIPTS

(

ALL CODITIOS

) ..................... 242

A

PPEDIX

C

–

P

ROCESS

Q

UESTIOS

.......................................................................... 249

A

PPEDIX

D:

E

XPERIMET

2

T

RAIIG

S

CRIPTS

..................................................... 250

A

PPEDIX

E:

W

ORKPLACE

I

JURY

T

RASCRIPTS

................................................... 252

A

PPEDIX

F:

Q

UALITATIVE

T

ABLES

E

XPERIMET

1

AD

2 ..................................... 297

A

PPEDIX

G:

C

OTROL

G

ROUP

Q

UALITATIVE

D

ATA

E

XPERIMET

3 .................... 322

vii

LIST

OF

TABLES

T

ABLE

1:

E

XPERIMENT

1

S

AMPLE

D

ESCRIPTIVE

S

TATISTICS FOR

G

ENDER AND

F

ACULTY

A

CCORDING TO

T

RAINING

G

ROUP

............................................................................ 102

T

ABLE

2:

T

HE

P

ROBLEMS

................................................................................................. 105

T

ABLE

3:

R

OTATED

C

OMPONENT

M

ATRIX

I

NSIGHT

P

ROBLEMS

....................................... 117

T

ABLE

4:

G

ENDER

/

P

ROBLEM

S

OLVING

C

ORRELATION

................................................... 118

T

ABLE

5:

MANOVA

WITH

T

RAINING AND

R

EALISM AS

I

NDEPENDENT

V

ARIABLES

........ 119

T

ABLE

6:

O

NEWAY

ANOVA

FOR

M

ATCHES AND

A

LL

E

LEVEN

P

ROBLEMS

A

CROSS

T

RAINING

G

ROUPS

................................................................................................... 122

T

ABLE

7:

P

LANNED

C

OMPARISON

T

ESTS FOR

T

RAINING

G

ROUPS

.................................... 122

T

ABLE

8:

ANOVA

FOR

I

NDIVIDUAL

P

ROBLEMS AND

P

ROBLEM

C

LUSTERS

..................... 123

T

ABLE

9:

C

ONTRAST

T

ESTS FOR

P

ROBLEM

C

LUSTERS AND

I

NDIVIDUAL

P

ROBLEMS

........ 124

T

ABLE

10:

H

ELPFULNESS OF

T

RAINING

E

XPERIMENT

1 ................................................... 125

T

ABLE

11:

E

XPERIMENT

2

S

AMPLE

D

ESCRIPTIVE

S

TATISTICS FOR

G

ENDER AND

F

ACULTY

A

CCORDING TO

T

RAINING

G

ROUP

............................................................................ 134

T

ABLE

12:

T

EST FOR

C

ORRELATION

B

ETWEEN

G

ENDER AND

P

ROBLEM

S

OLVING

........... 138

T

ABLE

13:

C

ONTROL AND

T

RAINING

G

ROUPS

A

CROSS

A

LL

E

LEVEN

P

ROBLEMS

............. 138

T

ABLE

14:

ANOVA

FOR

P

ROBLEM

C

LUSTERS

................................................................. 139

T

ABLE

15:

D

ESCRIPTIVE

S

TATISTICS FOR

I

NDIVIDUAL

P

ROBLEMS

B

ETWEEN

G

ROUPS

.... 139

T

ABLE

16:

C

HI

S

QUARE

T

ESTS FOR

I

NDIVIDUAL

P

ROBLEMS

B

ETWEEN

G

ROUPS

.............. 141

T

ABLE

17:

ANOVA

H

ELPFULNESS

E

XPERIMENT

2 .......................................................... 142

T

ABLE

18:

T

HEMES OF

A

PPRAISAL AND

F

OCUS IN

P

ROBLEM

S

OLVING

............................ 142

T

ABLE

19:

G

ENDER AND

A

GE OF

P

ARTICIPANTS

.............................................................. 151

T

ABLE

20:

T

YPES OF

I

NJURIES

.......................................................................................... 151

T

ABLE

21:

D

ESCRIPTIVE

S

TATISTICS AND

O

NEWAY

ANOVA

D

ISABILITY

C

HANGE

A

CROSS

T

RAINING AND

C

ONTROL

G

ROUPS

........................................................................... 152

T

ABLE

22:

D

ESCRIPTIVE

S

TATISTICS AND

O

NEWAY

ANOVA

D

ISABILITY

S

CORES

A

CROSS

T

RAINING AND

C

ONTROL

G

ROUPS

........................................................................... 153

T

ABLE

23:

K

EY

T

HEMES OF

A

PPRAISAL AND

F

OCUS

........................................................ 155

T

ABLE

24:

A

PPROACHES TO

P

ROBLEM

S

OLVING A

W

ORKPLACE

I

NJURY

......................... 155

T

ABLE

25:

P

ARTICIPANT

G

ROUPINGS

B

ASED UPON

P

ERCEPTIONS AND

S

TRATEGIES

........ 155

viii

LIST

OF

FIGURES

F

IGURE

1

T

HE

I

NTEGRATED

F

OCUS MODEL

.......................................................................... 7

F

IGURE

2

M

EDIATORS AND

MO

DERATORS OF

P

ROBLEM

S

OLVING AND

P

ERFORMANCE

.... 10

F

IGURE

3

G

ENDER

D

ISTRIBUTION

A

CROSS

T

RAINING

G

ROUPS

E

XPERIMENT

1 ................ 118

F

IGURE

4

E

STIMATED

M

ARGINAL

M

EANS OF

C

ARDS

/H

EX

,

T

RAINING AND

R

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...... 120

F

IGURE

5

G

ENDER AND

A

GE

A

CROSS

T

RAINING

G

ROUPS

................................................ 151

F

IGURE

6

D

ISTRIBUTION OF

I

NJURIES

A

CROSS

S

AMPLE

................................................... 152

ix

The Power of Focus: Unlocking Creative Insight and Overcoming Performance Barriers

Acknowledgments

Special thanks to the staff and faculty of St. Michaels University School for their

encouragement and support throughout the educational process.

The workplace injury portion of the study was supported by a grant from WorkSafe BC

and completed with the help of clinic managers at the Canadian Back Institute and

Summit Rehabilitation Management clinics across Lower Vancouver Island and

Mainland. Special thanks, to Evan McKay and Tori Ellis for their help in coordinating

interviews, to Dr. Bryan Sweet for the brainchild, and to Greg McIntosh and David

Maxwell for their support of the project.

To the Vikes Soccer and Rowing Teams, thank you for engaging in the process!

Finally, deepest thanks to my advisors Dr. Bart Cunningham and Dr. James MacGregor

for their support, guidance, patience and camaraderie.

x

The Power of Focus: Unlocking Creative Insight and Overcoming Performance Barriers

Dedication

Deepest appreciation and gratitude to my team:

Craig White

J. Barton Cunningham

James MacGregor

Tanis Farish

Thank you for helping me to focus, integrate, process my fears,

and sustain my stupid passion.

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

Statement of the Issue

Challenges, problems, and conflicts can be the seeds of growth, or the seeds of

destruction. It seems worthwhile to develop skills for addressing and resolving life

challenges in ways that promote growth. Problem solving skills are a component of any

performance challenge whether athletic, academic, professional, or personal. However,

the cognitive and physiological resources and processes associated with problem solving

have the potential to act in ways that both enhance and inhibit effective problem solving

and performance outcomes. The threat appraisal mechanism, the subconscious process of

evaluating whether a challenge poses a threat is designed to preserve the individual but

can also work to interfere with an individual’s capacity for creative problem solving. The

focusing process, a process capable of galvanizing an individual’s attention and energies

toward a singular purpose, can erode performance just as powerfully by drawing energies

away from performance goals. Insight into the interactions and interdependencies of

underlying cognitive and physiological mechanisms and principles comprising the

problem solving process would better inform the design of facilitative performance

interventions for a variety of realms including business, academic, athletic, and

interpersonal.

Most intriguing in the problem solving literature, and perhaps most useful, is the

concept of creative insight. Insight is described as the ‘out of the box’ or ‘aha!’ solution

to a problem. A historical example of creative insight occurred within the Mann Gulch

fire of 1949. Mann Gulch occurred when a wildfire in the Helena National Forest,

Montana, United States, spread out of control and ultimately claimed the lives of 13

2

firefighters. Foreman Wagner Dodge led the team towards the Missouri River. The fire,

however, spread faster than anticipated and had already cut off the path to safety. The

men had to turn around. When Dodge realized that they would not be able to outrun the

fire, he started an escape fire and ordered everyone to lie down in the area he had burnt

down. The other team members hurried towards the ridge of Mann Gulch instead

(achieving heroic speeds in their desperate attempts to escape!). Only two of them, Bob

Sallee and Walter Rumsey, managed to escape through a crevice and find a safe location,

a rock slide with little vegetation to fuel the fire. Two other members survived with heavy

injuries and died within a day. Only Dodge was able to acknowledge that they could not

outrun the fire and look to the challenges that this reality created for him: the prospect of

being burned. His younger crewmembers remained focused on the threat: escaping the

fire. Accepting the threat as part of his reality perhaps allowed Dodge to focus upon the

goal of survival: How does one survive the fire given that one cannot outrun it? Perhaps

with this enlarged focus he was able to generate the truly insightful solution: the need to

remove fuel and reduce the chance of being burned by the fire. Ironically the two other

survivors benefited from the same principle Dodge applied in his solution; the rocky

slope they reached had no fuel for the fire. The concept of creative insight as it relates to

problem solving offers a framework for exploring and understanding how best to enhance

problem solving skills.

Purpose

The present study proposed to increase understanding into the ways in which

attentional focus influences problem solving and performance outcomes. Insight into the

mechanisms governing attentional focus may assist in the development of interventions to

3

facilitate performance and problem solving. Knoblich, Ohlsson and Raney (2001), in a

study of problem solving found that ‘gaze’ predicted problem solving ability. They

concluded that a problem solver’s focus (in the case of matchstick problems upon either

the number or the operand) was a critical factor in the problem solving process. Studies in

performance and problem solving have demonstrated that focusing on perceived threats

or barriers diverts attention from goal achievement thereby detracting from performance

(Eysenck, 1992; Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, & Roche, 2001; Jones & Swain, 1992; Wulf,

McNevin, and Shea, 2001). Likewise, though goal oriented focus has been shown to be

more facilitative to problem solving and performance (Beilock et al., 2004; Wulf et al.,

2002), efforts to focus solely on the goal when a perceived barrier exists have proven

ineffective because the act of replacing the negative with the positive diverts energy and

focus from the task at hand (Beilock, Afremow, Rabe, & Carr, 2001).

The theoretical model guiding the study proposes that optimal attentional focus

may be achieved by ‘re-composing’ a problem, challenge or barrier by integrating

perceived threats with performance goals. An integrated focus enlarges the focus and

offers a goal orientation while still addressing the perceived threat. For instance, using a

‘threat focus’ an organization facing the challenge of a competitor may perceive the

competitor as a threat because they advertise lower prices. Typically, organizations with a

barrier or threat focus would attempt to compete with or eradicate the threatening

competitor by lowering prices. However, such a threat focus may result in a compromise

of quality, service, support for workers, infrastructure. In this way, the threat itself does

not represent the problem but does hold clues to the actual challenge. The problem that

this threat actually creates is a potentially reduced market share. Therefore, the goal of

4

the organization is to achieve market share despite the threat of the competing

organization, not to lower their prices. While it may be impossible to eradicate the

competition or compete with lower prices, it is still possible to compete for market share.

An integrated focus would result in a more precise and productive representation of the

challenge (in this case, market share) thereby generating more precise and productive

solutions (in this case, competitive product or ‘quality’ rather than pricing). The study

therefore also suggests that true creativity occurs most productively after the problem is

represented precisely. If a problem is represented unclearly or as merely a threat, attempts

to generate creative ideas or solutions will prove specious.

The integrated focus process reflects the model of insight problem solving in that

insight involves representing the problem in such a way as to unlock creative solutions.

The following experimental and quasi-experimental studies sought to more fully

understand the process of insight and what facilitates a precise representation of a

problem. The study explored the relationship between cognitive appraisal, attentional

focus, problem solving, and goal attainment, and examined the influence that facilitating

an assumption focus, goal focus, and ‘integrated’ focus had upon coping strategies,

cognitive stress appraisal, and performance outcome on a problem solving tasks requiring

insight.

Objectives

It is proposed that leverage for improving outcome in the face of any stressor lies

within a person’s focus. When a stressor is easily resolved, attentional focus shifts back

to the goal supporting performance outcome. Threat focus has been shown to debilitate

performance while goal focus has been shown to facilitate performance. Individuals who

5

cannot accept that they have no control over a performance barrier may be at greatest risk

for failure because attention is diverted from performance to threat as the individual

attempts to eradicate, change or control the threat. Acceptance is believed to be the key

mediating variable for behavioural change (Bond & Bunce, 2000; Bond and Bunce, 2003;

Livneh & Antonak, 1997), but acceptance of one’s lack of resources to change a threat

may be the central mechanism determining coping strategies and outcome, as opposed to

acceptance of negative thoughts, feelings, or sensations associated with the threat.

Influencing people to accept a lack of control may prove challenging. Therefore, an

intervention that facilitates an enlarged focus by linking threats to goals may be more

effective at helping individuals to penetrate barriers and unlock creative insight.

The objectives of the present study were to conduct two lab and one field

experiment within the context of insight problem solving. Attentional focus research and

training has been conducted mainly with single samples (i.e. test anxious students,

athletes, problem solvers). It was the aim of this study to test the theoretical principles of

attentional focus within two problem and performance contexts (laboratory problems and

the challenges of a workplace injury) in an attempt to generalize attentional focusing

theory across samples. The experiments examined the impact that different kinds of

attentional focus interventions have upon problem solving performance approach and

outcome. Ansburg and Dominowski (2000) in a series of experiments designed to test

insight problem solving training procedures, argued that elaboration and constraint

relaxation training procedures taught participants how to process problem for underlying

structure ‘By encouraging solvers to go beyond the details of content, one can increase

the likelihood that they will access useful, but inert knowledge’ (p. 50). However, the

6

training given to participants in such experiments assumes that insight depends upon

‘shaking loose’ knowledge that is otherwise inert. The present study sought to build upon

existing theory in creativity and insight problem solving by untangling the process of

insight itself further in order to gain an understanding of how insight itself is unlocked

along with the knowledge and creativity that accompanies the insight mechanism.

Secondly, the experiment explored the relationships between attentional focus,

cognitive appraisal, and goal attainment. In particular, the study explored the mediating

variables operating within the cognitive appraisal, attentional, and performance/problem

solving processes. It was hypothesized that cognitive appraisal of a threat has a causal

influence upon the dependent variable (performance outcome) because focus acts as a

mediating variable. That is, the individual’s ability to focus on the goal of a task varies

with the individual’s performance outcome. Implications for intervention design are

significant. Helping an individual see the link between perceived threats and personal

goals should serve to enlarge focus from threat focus to and integrated barrier + goal

focus and result in enhanced performance compared to individuals who remain solely

threat focused (Figure 2).

7

Figure 1

The Integrated Focus Model

For instance, if an individual is attempting to increase mobility within 2 weeks of

a back injury, and the barrier is the physical pain that she must endure in order to do so,

rather than trying to increase one’s control over the pain by ignoring or blocking it out

(threat focused), it may be more effective to first identify and then resolve the

‘symptoms’ of the problem, or the problems pain can cause relative to the goal of

mobility: including the threat of re-injury due to improper movement, a desire to stop, a

reduction in effort in order to reduce the pain. Shifting focus to ways in which knowledge

of physiology, focus, persistence, and effort can be sustained in order to achieve mobility

without incurring re-injury may prove much more productive in terms of recovery than

attempts to ‘push through’, ‘ignore’ or ‘succumb’ to the threat of the pain itself. In terms

of intervention design, it may prove most productive to utilize the power of focus by

Integrated Focus:

How do I resolve the challenges the

barrier poses to my goal?

(addresses barrier and goal)

Barrier focus:

How do I resolve the barrier?

(ignores goal)

Goal Focus:

How do I achieve my goal?

(ignores barrier)

Individual Goal Barrier

8

facilitating a focal shift, rather than attempting to engender acceptance of negative

feelings associated with the threat, or acceptance of a lack of power over the threat.

Hypothesis

Those who perceive performance barriers as threatening develop a barrier focus

and cope by focusing on attempting to change, avoid, or control the barrier, a focal

orientation shown to compromise problem solving ability and performance. It is

hypothesized that individuals are better able to let go of their barrier focus (i.e.

competition, lack of funding, rainy conditions, an injury) if they are able to focus on

threat ‘symptoms’ or the relationship of a threat to the goal of the problem task (i.e.

decreased market share, lack of support for programs, lack of control on the field,

inability to work and earn money). An integration of barrier and goal focus may enable

an individual to perform more effectively by creating a link between perceived threat and

identified goal. A more integrated focus would then acknowledge the perceived threat

while sustaining a goal focus thereby representing the problem in terms of goals rather

than in terms of threats or barriers. Problem solving literature in the areas of accounting

(Choo & Tan, 1995; Choo & Trotman, 1991; Christ, 1993; Chung & Monroe, 2000;

Lehman & Norman, 2006; Wright, 2001), academics (Gagne et al., 1993), foreign policy

(Sylvan & Voss, 1998), and medicine (Bordage, 1994; Boshuizen & Schmidt, 1992;

Rickers et al., 2003; Schmidt, Norman & Boshuizen, 1990, 1993; Van de Weil et al.,

2000) have shown that problem representation is a critical component to effective

problem solving, and have illustrated that conciseness of problem representation varies

with experience level. It was hypothesized that a more precise representation of the

problem would provoke more creative and sustainable solutions than either a barrier or

9

goal focus alone. Barriers provide clues to a more precise representation of the problem

by helping a problem solver link to the actual goal of the problem. A barrier is only

threatening because it threatens a goal. Addressing the barrier is important because

negative information receives more processing and contributes more strongly to the final

impression than positive information (Baumeister et al., 2001). Therefore utilizing the

barrier as a path to the goal of the problem not only generates a more precise definition of

the problem, it addresses the barrier itself.

Knoblich et al. (2001) prefer the hypothesis that “initial representations are

inappropriate or misleading rather than incomplete, and thus have to be deactivated or

inhibited rather than extended or elaborated” (p. 10), but the present study would argue

that rather than turning one’s gaze from the barrier and ‘deactivating or inhibiting’ a

representation, it would be more productive to follow one’s gaze through the barrier, to

the goal. By inquiring more deeply into the initial barrier focused problem representation

it is possible to penetrate the barrier and arrive at the actual goal of a challenging task. By

penetrating the barrier to the goal, one generates a more integrated representation of the

problem and subsequently unlocks more creative and relevant solutions that also address

the threat. It is hypothesized that an integrated focus would enhance both problem solving

ability and outcome on a variety of problem solving tasks.

It is also hypothesized that a series of questions will serve as a focusing

intervention. Questions cause individuals to respond cognitively thereby subtley

influencing an individual’s focus. The intervention designed for the study is comprised of

a series of questions designed to shift the individual’s focus from and through the

perceived barrier to the actual challenge or problem that the barrier poses. In this way, the

10

questions lead the individual’s focus through the barrier to the core representation of the

problem.

Conceptual Framework

Guiding the study is a conceptual framework which deems performance as a

problem solving process and proposes that problem solving is a function of the

relationships between challenge or stress, cognitive appraisal, and focus (Figure 1).

Figure 2

Mediators and Moderators of Problem Solving and Performance

Creative Problem Solving and Performance

A society committed to the search for truth must give protection to, and

set a high value upon, the independent and original mind, however

angular, however rasping, however socially unpleasant it may be; for it

is upon such minds, in large measure, that the effective search for

truth depends.

~~~ Caryl P. Haskins

Interpretation/

Appraisal

Attentional

Focus

Problem Solving

Outcome/Performance

Stressor/

Challenge

11

Creative problem solving (CPS) skills are an important component of

performance in a variety of realms. Problem solving is inherent to effective decision

making, innovation, and organizational development tasks (Ketchen, Snow & Street,

2004; Nutt, 2002, 2004) as well as individual physical, artistic, and mental tasks (Durand-

Bush & Salmela, 2002; D'Zurilla, & Sheedy, 1992; Kovác, 1998; Pugh, 1991; Wang &

Horng, 2002; Wanish, 2000). Discussion abounds as to what creative problem solving

involves (Callahan, 1991; Khatena, 1982). Those familiar with the recurrent waves of

interest in the field will note an emerging framework that emphasizes divergent thinking

coupled with convergent thinking (Cropley, 1999; Runco, 2004). Researchers have come

to agree that training CPS involves facilitating both divergent and convergent thinking

skills beginning with the father of brainstorming, Alex Osborn (1963). However, others

have since added to the literature on divergent thinking including: Bill Gordon (1956;

1961) and George Prince (1970) and their Synectics approach; Edward deBono (1971)

and the Six Hats or Lateral Thinking approach in which creativity is described in terms of

new ideas and new perceptions; Isaksen and Treffinger (1985) and Isaksen and Dorval

(1994) who focus on evaluating ideas using a Criterion Matrix; Rickards (1990) who

explores intuitive and structured techniques for ‘choosing wisely’; and finally those who

emphasize the importance of problem finding as it impacts convergent thinking and

problem resolution, (Basadur et al, 1982, 1992, 2000a; Kershaw & Ohlsson, 2004;

Rickards & Puccio, 1991; Runco & Chand, 1994). The sustainable solution is one that

shows insight by illustrating a profound understanding of the problem at its core, and

sustainability by offering a practical and enduring application. Facilitating sustainable

12

solutions depends upon how the problem is defined; however, a productive problem

definition is the result of a process.

The current study proposed that all three sources of problem solving difficulty

(perception of the problem, processing of the problem information, and prior knowledge)

are linked by interpretive mechanisms and as such may be resolved by facilitating a

cognitive shift in problem interpretation and focus in order to re-compose the problem in

a more definitive and productive way.

Focus, Creative Problem Solving and Performance

When one door closes, another opens; but we often look so long and so

regretfully upon the closed door that we do not see the one which has

opened for us.

~~~ Alexander Graham Bell

Focus can be a powerful tool for helping an individual to achieve goals but can

also interfere with a person’s efforts at goal attainment. Clearing one’s mind of

distractions and focusing upon a clear goal is thought to be an important aspect of

performance (Locke & Latham, 1990). However, we do not always have control over our

focus. Though one might try to focus on a particular goal, at times the mind cannot help

but focus on something else. At the same time, what we choose to focus upon can be

unproductive or debilitative to performance. Easterbrook (1959) in his ‘cue utilization

theory’ demonstrated that hyper-vigilant focus toward threatening cues can impede

performance because it draws focus away from performance relevant cues. If threats can

be resolved easily, then focus can be returned to the task; however, if threats persist or are

uncontrollable, valuable focus is indefinitely diverted from the task resulting in decreased

13

performance. Focus can be a help or a hindrance to problem solving or performance of

any kind.

Attentional resources directed toward avoidance, resignation, control, or ‘denial

of feelings’ are no longer available to address the barrier, nor decide upon and complete

the correct course of action for a successful outcome (Bond & Hayes, 2002; Hayes et al,

1999). In their study of mental health and work performance, Bond & Bunce (2003)

found that “people who do not try to avoid or control psychological events have more

attentional resources, engage in less avoidant behaviour, and may learn how to they can

most effectively use the control that they have to promote their mental health” (p. 1064).

Perception and focus may also play a large role in generating and resolving barriers to

return to work after illness or injury, and consequently in predicting disability and return

to work outcome as well as enduring outcomes for individuals struggling to overcome a

workplace illness or injury. Current psychological interventions assert that acceptance of

the negative feelings or anxieties that accompany a stressor is facilitative to rehabilitative

outcome (Hayes, 1987; Bond & Bunce, 2003; Bond & Hayes, 2002); however, not

everyone interprets anxiety as debilitative, and therefore not everyone would benefit from

accepting their negative emotions as a means to moving past them. Within a mental

health study, negative feelings may in fact be the primary threat to treatment outcome. In

order to generalize the concept of acceptance; however, it may be more fruitful to shift

focus to acceptance of perceived lack of control (acceptance meaning ‘tolerance’,

‘acknowledgement’, and ‘recognition’ as opposed to ‘surrender’, ‘giving up’, or

‘acquiescence’). If one considers anxiety to be yet another reality accompanying a

stressor, the result of a threat appraisal and a physiological readiness mechanism, it is

14

possible that anxiety will meet with a similar cognitive appraisal process. In fact, sports

psychologists have found that people appraise anxiety in much the same way that they

might appraise any stressor or challenge (Jones, 1992; Jones & Swain, 1995; Jones,

Swain, & Hardy, 1993); that is, one would primarily appraise anxiety as a threat or a non-

threat, and, if deemed threatening, secondarily appraise one’s capacity to respond to the

threat posed by the anxiety. If one finds one’s perceived inability to control the anxiety to

be threatening, then one would focus on trying to increase one’s control over the anxiety,

rather than focusing on the actual threats or problems that the anxiety may bring.

Optimal attentional states have been viewed as an outcome rather than a process

and therefore do not tell us much about the underlying process of optimal attentional

focusing (Hatfield & Landers, 1983). Attentional focusing processes seem to occur at the

subconscious level and have remained relatively unexplored in cognitive psychology

(Kissin, 1986). Unconscious processing has been allocated to the domain of

psychodynamics. In Erdelyi’s (1985) words, subconscious operations are an “obvious and

fundamental feature of human information-processing” (p. 59). Problem solving, writing,

listening, learning, and so on often do not require conscious awareness (Lewicki et al.,

1997). Some researchers have shown that attempting to actively or consciously control

the process involved in a skill can degrade performance by attempting to put the

execution of a skill under the ‘control processing’ mechanism when it typically falls

within the scope of automatic processing (Kimble & Perlmuter, 1970; Singer, 1988,

2002). Examples illustrating how conscious monitoring of a process interferes with

automaticity include piano playing (Keele, 1973), typing (Langer & Imber, 1979), and a

motor/visual laboratory task (Baumeister, 1984). It has been suggested that optimal

15

attentional processes may be achieved when physiological arousal is channeled into

automatic processing rather than control processing (Ravizza, 1984). However, the threat

appraisal and cognitive bias processes also appear to occur at the level of automaticity

and, as studies demonstrate, it remains unclear how to go about channeling arousal. The

present study proposed that shifting focus from threat to goal can be achieved by helping

the individual see the link between threat and goal.

Stress, Focus, Creative Problem Solving and Performance

When it is dark enough, you can see the stars.

~~~ Charles A Beard, American Historian (1874-1949)

Stress or challenge has been shown to impact focus, causing the individual to

focus unproductively and debilitatively on, among other things, the stress itself (Jones &

Swain, 1992, 1995; Jones, Swain, & Hardy, 1993a, 1993b), associated negative emotions,

thoughts or images (Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, & Roche, 2001), the step-by-step processes

of a task (Wulf, McNevin, and Shea, 2001), or distractions such as the crowd or external

expectations (Eysenck, 1992) (Figure 1). According to the theory of cognitive appraisal,

an individual first appraises or interprets a potential performance stressor as threatening

or not, then appraises his resources for resolving the threat (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984).

Myriad personality, temperament, socio-cultural, and genetic factors may be influencing

the mechanism of cognitive appraisal (Cloninger, Przybeck, & Svrakic, 1993; Penley &

Tomaka, 2002); however, leverage for changing personal or biological factors may be

elusive. Svrakic, Svrakic, and Cloninger (1996) found that their factors of temperament

were invariant despite socio-cultural influences. The present study is only concerned with

how attentional focus may influence any given cognitive appraisal to enhance

performance outcomes.

16

According to the theory of cognitive bias, if an individual perceives a

performance barrier to be a threat to self or performance goals, he will attend to the

barrier in an effort to resolve it thereby diverting attention away from the goal (Eysenck

& Calvo, 1992; Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998). Effective problem solvers appear to

benefit from a facilitative interpretation or acceptance of stressors or performance barriers.

Accepting or positively interpreting barriers and stressors appears to free up the cognitive

resources required to attend to the task at hand supporting a goal focus as opposed to a

threat focus (Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, & Roche, 2001; Jones, Swain, & Hardy, 1993b;

Macleod & Mathews, 1988). However, the mechanism that enables individuals to accept

or positively interpret stressors and thereby sustain a more productive focus still eludes

researchers.

Mental functions and cognitive processes are terms often used interchangeably,

the term cognitive tends to have specific implications - to mean such functions or

processes as perception, introspection, memory, imagination, conception, belief,

reasoning, volition, and emotion--in other words, all the different things that we can do

with our minds. A specific instance of engaging in a cognitive process is a mental event.

In naturalistic settings, people are constantly confronted with words that have different

possible meanings, facial expressions that are equivocal, and entire social situations that

can lead to various interpretations. Research has identified robust emotion-congruent

effects on the interpretation of ambiguous stimuli. This notion has been tested empirically

in the past decade (Byrne & Eysenck, 1993; Eysenck, Macleod, & Mathews, 1987;

Halberstadt, Niedenthal, & Kushner, 1995; Mathews, Richards, & Eysenck, 1989;

Niedenthal, Halberstadt, & Setterlund, 1997; Pincus, Pearce, & Perrott, 1996; Richards,

17

Reynolds, & French, 1993). That is, people’s interpretations tend to reflect their current

emotional state.

At the same time, Mogg et al. (1990) found that there was no consistent evidence

of a cognitive bias associated with trait anxiety and the effect of the stress manipulation

did not appear to be mediated by state anxiety. It would seem that an individual’s

interpretation of a ‘stressor’ hinges more on perception and its myriad of contributing

factors, than upon emotional state. While debilitative anxiety may result from a negative

cognitive bias of a stressor, anxiety in itself and alone, does not appear to be the cause of

the negative interpretation.

By extending the theory of stress and coping, it is hypothesized here that when an

individual perceives herself as lacking in resources to manage a threat, her perceived lack

of control, and not necessarily her anxiety, becomes the new challenge and focal point. If

she deems her perceived lack of control to be threatening or problematic for any reason,

this would hypothetically cause her to fixate upon increasing resources for managing the

threat, and impede any kind of response to the particular threats the barrier itself

generates. If, on the other hand, she accepts her lack of control, deeming her lack of

resources to be a benign reality, she would be free to move her focus back to the threat

itself and consider options for its resolution.

In some studies, the concepts of control and coping have resulted in confusing

results. It is assumed that people with an internal locus of control believe that their own

actions determine the rewards that they obtain, and those with an external locus of control

believe that their own behavior doesn't matter much and that rewards in life are generally

outside of their control. However, as Susan Folkman (1984) herself states in her analysis

18

of coping, stress and personal control, “believing that an event is controllable does not

always lead to a reduction in stress or to a positive outcome, and believing that an event

is uncontrollable does not always lead to an increase in stress or to a negative outcome”

(p. 848). In their study on fear of crime, locus of control and coping, Caputo and

Brodsky (2004) found that locus of control had an association with problem-focused

coping in the opposite direction, that is, those who believed that they had little control

over crime had a more problem-focused approach. Likewise, in their study of a non-

curable health disorder called Tinnitus, Sirois, Davis and Morgan (2006) found that those

people who make “the appropriate shift in focus” by surrendering control over the

uncontrollable aspects of a chronic illness and adopting control over the more

manageable aspects of one’s health (i.e. symptoms) reflect a situational type of power

that facilitates psychological adjustment (p. 123). However, the prospect of

‘surrendering’ or ‘letting go’ of control can seem even more threatening to an individual

than the perceived threat itself. How to facilitate such a ‘letting go’ remains a challenge.

Surrender or ‘letting go’ may not be a productive or realistic pathway for

improving problem solving performance. It is hard to imagine letting go of something

unless there is something equally stable or reassuring to grab on to. The current study

proposes that facilitating a more productive focus involves an integrated approach as

opposed to a divisive approach. Rather than turning our gaze away from perceived threats,

it may be more productive to enlarge the frame and put threats into a goal perspective.

Threat and goal appear to be linked; a barrier is only perceived as such because it poses a

threat to a deep value or goal. Helping people to see the link between their perceived

threats and the goals that are threatened may facilitate a powerful focus and enhance

19

problem solving performance not by turning away from perceived threats or even

reinterpreting them, but by addressing threats from within a goal oriented perspective

Applications of the Integrated Focus Model

The question arises whether a re-composition of the problem by reframing a

perceived threat as part of the goal reality might enhance performance with any variety of

problem or task. To illustrate how the process of problem composition might work in a

number of challenge and performance scenarios, the following examples are provided:

Example 1

An example of attentional focus shift within NASA occurred during the early

days of the space program. Scientists tried to solve the problem of heat of re-entry by

devising a substance that could withstand heat, meeting with repeated failure. Perhaps

after accepting defeat, scientists were forced to explore the problem from a new

perspective, it becoming clear that the problem was not to ‘withstand heat’ (threat focus)

but to accept heat as part of the goal reality and in this way focus on how to enable the

capsule to adjust to the temperature change (goal focus). Their ultimate solution – the

ablative heat shield that burns away as the space vehicle penetrates the atmosphere,

taking the heat with it – turned upside down their original problem definition of ‘how to

withstand the heat.’

Example 2

A large healthcare facility was operating with success in a large urban centre

(Caldwell et al., 2007). The centre employed over 1000 doctors and several thousand

nurses and staff. A smaller health center opened within the same area, offering good care

at a reduced rate, and soon lured a good portion of the clientele away from the larger

20

centre. Focusing upon reducing their rates would have put the larger organization at a

disadvantage considering the greater overhead costs they sustained. A threat focus would

have resulted in an unsustainable strategy for addressing the threat the smaller centre

presented. One can imagine the implications of cost cutting upon both employee and

client satisfaction. Instead, the larger centre explored the challenge more deeply

discovering that the problems the smaller centre created were a reduced market share. A

more integrated focus found the larger centre addressing the threat to clientele that the

smaller centre’s reduced rates presented, while keeping in focus the goal of market share.

The large centre decided that to increase market share, they would focus on quality. Their

new mandate of offering ‘quality care at a moderate rate’ found commitment from

organizational members and was implemented over 2 years with a positive response from

clientele.

Example 3

A man was faced with the problem of a broken branch from a nearby tree

dangling ominously over his roof. After repeated attempts to cut the branch off he finally

accepted that he could not reach the branch in order to cut it off. An initial threat focus

found him focusing on the threat of the branch itself breaking and destroying his roof.

Once he accepted that he could not cut the branch off as part of his goal reality, it became

clear that the problem was actually to protect his roof and therefore the actual threat was

the weight of the branch. One imagines his thought processes following these steps:

Is it a threat? What is the threat?

• Yes, the branch might fall and break my roof

What are your solutions?

21

• I’ll cut it off, I’ll not care, I’ll get help, someone else should have done this

long ago, this is just my luck, I’m sure I’ll figure it out eventually…(threat

focus becomes cutting the branch, focus becomes lack of resources to resolve

the threat)

Are these working?

• Yes (problem solved)

• No, I can’t reach it (failure)

What is the threat now?

• I can’t cut it off so it will likely fall (threat focus).

At this point it is hypothesized that the individual assumes a threat focus

(I must cut the branch off) because he has constructed a barrier (I can't cut the

branch off because I can't reach it) based upon his assumptions that the branch

must be cut off at its source in order to prevent it from falling. If the individual

were to inquire into the barrier further, it would lead him to the actual challenge

or goal of the situation:

What is threatening about that or what worries/concerns you about that?

• The falling branch might break my roof

What is the real challenge then?

• How to protect my roof or keep the branch from falling on it (integrated

focus)

What are some creative solutions for achieving this goal?

• Perhaps I could cover my roof, or cut the branch off in the middle to reduce its

weight, or tie the branch to the tree so that it doesn’t fall.

22

Asking an individual to identify the problems that the perceived threat creates for

them will penetrate the threat and lead the solver to their actual goal and their actual

challenge. The threat is connected to the goal because the goal characterizes the threat as

such. Asking the solver what worries them most about the perceived threat (what makes it

a threat in the first place) will also link them to their goal, and create a more integrated

focus that frames the challenge in terms of goal while still addressing, rather than

ignoring, the threat (Figure 2).

Significance of the Research

The development of a focusing intervention to enhance problem solving processes

would have wide applications for a variety of problem solving scenarios including

academic, athletic, physical, organizational, and interpersonal. As well, a tool designed to

unlock creative insight would have far-reaching implications including the generation of

more innovative and sustainable solutions to social, economic, political, and

environmental challenges.

23

CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW

The following literature review explores components of the conceptual framework

outlined above (Figure 1): effective problem solving is a necessary component of

successful performance and is a function of cognitive appraisal, stress, and attentional

focus. The first section of the literature review surveys the research in the area of

problem solving and problem solving training programs. It is hypothesized that focus

plays a role in how well an individual is able to represent a problem. An attentional

focusing strategy or training procedure that addresses a barrier or threat in terms of its

relationship to a goal and thus facilitates an ‘integrated focus’ may support effective

problem solving and performance, thus the second section of the literature review surveys

attentional focus theories and training programs. Finally, while an attentional focusing

intervention may support problem solving outcome in a lab scenario, it is important to

also test the problem solving model in a realistic or field setting. Workplace injury is

considered a challenge and problem solving process for many and carries with it a certain

level of perceived stress. The final section will review the literature on problem solving

strategies associated with workplace injury and pain as an excellent example of a problem

solving process in a realistic setting.

Theories of Problem Solving

Divergence and Convergence

Divergence and Convergence are popular principles within the realm of problem

solving. Scott, Leritz, & Mumford (2004) performed a meta-analysis of creativity training

programs and, based upon 70 studies, found that successful programs were likely to focus

on both idea generation and cognitive skills training. The emerging challenge in training

24

CPS has been how to facilitate the divergence necessary to cast a wide attentional net,

along with the convergence that enables one to choose well among many alternative

solutions. But, while a correlation may exist between divergent thinking or remote

associations and creativity in solving problems (Feldhusen & Clinkenbeard, 1986;

Harrington, Block & Block, 1983; Mednick, 1959), creative insight does not appear to be

a function of divergent thinking alone. For instance, Fontenot (2001) found that creative

problem solving skill depended upon a combination of fluency in data and problem

finding (number of ideas and problem representations), flexibility in problem finding

(variety of ideas and problem representations), and quality of problem statement (degree

to which the needs and motives were satisfied as established by the owner, goal and

constraints of the final problem statement). The ability to think of many ideas, or to link

remote ideas, does not necessarily mean one is creative (Feldhusen & Clinkenbeard,

1986). Likewise, restructuring a problem representation (Ansburg, 2000) alone will not

ensure that a solution will be found or even that a person will notice that an impasse has

been broken (Ormerod, MacGregor, & Chronicle, 2002). However, the qualities of

divergence and remote association may signify a capacity for creative insight because of

the underlying principle they represent: The capacity to think divergently may be

operationalized by the same interpretive mechanism that enables a person to represent a

problem effectively, that is, a facilitative interpretation that is free from cognitive biases,

assumptions or constraints.

Problem Representation

The missing piece in understanding how people solve problems creatively seems

to be that of how an individual arrives at his problem representation and whether or not it

25

is possible to facilitate this process more effectively. Some cognitive psychologists have

shown that the interpretation of a problem mediates the processing of the problem

information by generating a cognitive bias. The cognitive bias then acts to moderate the

utilization of information cues or prior knowledge (Eysenck & Calvo, 1992; Easterbrook,

1959; Mendelsohn & Griswold, 1967; Mendelsohn & Lindholm, 1972) as well as the

ability to make ‘remote associations’ (Ansburg, 2000; Mednick, 1962). If an individual

interprets a problem as ‘beyond his locus of control’ or ‘threatening’ for whatever reason,

he becomes hypervigilant to threat cues, and his attention narrows, (Ansburg, 2002;

Eysenck & Calvo, 1992; Hertel, Mathews, Peterson, & Kintner, 2003; Mogg, Mathews,

Bird, & Macgregor-Morris, 1990) resulting in a limited capacity to utilize cues as they

are presented. The solver focuses on premature solutions or representations of the

problem making it difficult to see the problem for what it truly is (Ormerod et al, 2002).

If one is too busy looking at the obstacles, it is impossible to see the openings. It is not so

much what causes the imposition of problem constraints that concerns us, but rather that

such an imposition indeed takes place and how it might be possible to resolve imposed

constraints or at least navigate past them to a clarified view of the problem.

The purpose of the current work is to provide empirical evidence that all three

sources of problem solving difficulty (perception of the problem, processing of the

problem information, and prior knowledge) are linked by interpretive mechanisms and as

such can be resolved by facilitating a cognitive shift in problem interpretation. “The

majority of mistakes in ordinary thinking (outside technical matters) are mistakes in

perception. Our traditional emphasis on logic does little for perception. “If the perception

is inadequate, no amount of excellence in logic will make up for that deficiency” (deBono,

26

2005). Perception is a matter of directing attention. If you are not looking in the right

direction it does not matter how clever you are, you will not see what you need to see. By

beginning with solution constraints, and the underlying problems that exist within these

(lack of control, lack of sustainability), the solver may be more willing to let go of his

initial approach to solving the problem.

Max Wertheimer, together with Kurt Koffka and Wolfgang Köhler, was the

founder of Gestalt theory. In his (1912) "Experimentelle Studien über das Sehen von

Bewegung" he examined the phenomenon of apparent motion, where a pair of alternately

flashing lights stimulate a percept of a single light moving back and forth. Wertheimer

recognized that this phenomenon revealed a constructive or generative aspect of

perception. Gestalt theory would suggest that interpretation is constructed based on a

number of factors that influence an individual’s perception. In terms of problem solving,

how one interprets and constructs the problem, what one perceives as the heart of the

problem, determines how one might go about searching for and seeing potential solutions.

Many have experienced the phenomenon in which one has a problem and goes

about searching for something to fix the problem. Or, in the words of one colleague, “I

don’t know what I am looking for but I know it is somewhere on this workbench.” There

is a certain level of openness to potential solutions in such an endeavour that comes with

clearly representing the problem. For instance, Getzels (1975) provides an excellent

illustration of how problem construction sets the problem solver up for ‘choosing wisely’:

An automobile is traveling on a deserted country road and blows a tire. The occupants of

the automobile go to the trunk and discover that there is no jack. They define their

dilemma by posing the problem: “Where can we get a jack?” The look about, see some

27

empty barns but no habitation, and recall that, several miles back they had passed a

service station. They decide to walk back to the station to get a jack. While they are gone,

an automobile coming from the other direction also blows a tire. The occupants of this

automobile go to the truck and discover that there is no jack. They define their dilemma

by posing the problem: “How can we raise the automobile?” They look around and see,

adjacent to the road, a barn with a pulley for lifting bales of hay to the loft. They move

the automobile to the barn, raise it on the pulley, change the tire, and drive off (p. 38).

Let us examine how the two groups constructed the problem. If one’s cognitive

appraisal of a problem results in an interpretation of the problem as ‘outside of one’s

locus of control’ or ‘threatening’ in any way or for any reason, it is likely that the solver

will impose an implicit constraint upon the problem (i.e. we must have a jack to solve this

problem). Various explanations point to different constraints (prior experience, problem

display, assumptions), but all share the view that the locus of problem difficulty is

centered on the solver’s constrained representation of the problem (MacGregor et al,

2001).

In explicating the interpretive or appraisal process, it may become clear as to how

we might facilitate problem representation free from constraints. If a person appraises the

problem positively, he is more likely to represent the problem free from constraints (i.e.

we need something to lift the car). Such a phenomenon has been observed in a variety of

challenging or problem solving situations including cognitive (Eysenck, 1992), artistic

(Csikszentmihalyi & Getzels, 1970; Rump, 1982; Suwa, 2003), and athletic (Easterbrook,

1959; Jones & Swain, 1992, 1995; Eubank, Collins & Smith, 2000; Mathews & MacLeod,

1994). A positive interpretation of the problem leads to an unconstrained representation

28

of the problem. A lens through which the solver will represent the problem more clearly

places him in a position to notice appropriate solutions. Representing the problem to

accurately reflect the situation then supports a ‘preparation of mind’ or capacity to

recognize the insightful solution when it appears.

In previous research, creative endeavors were coupled with feelings of anxiety

(Eiduson, 1962; Maddi & Andrews, 1966). Clapham (1997) reviewed possible

mechanisms through which beneficial effects of training might occur, and concluded that

they can be attributed to programs' ability to foster:

(a) development of appropriate thinking skills;

(b) acquisition of positive attitudes to creativity and creative performance;

(c) motivation to be creative;

(d) perception of oneself as capable of being creative;

(e) reduction of anxiety about creativity; and

(f) experience of positive mood in problem-solving situations.

It is apparent that this list goes beyond that of thinking skills, and encompasses attitudes,

motivation, self-image, and similar factors. Isen, Daubman & Nowicki (1987) found that

positive affect facilitated creative problem solving while negative affect seemed to pose

little or no detriment. However, negative affect generated by a sad or disturbing movie

may have little impact on how an individual interprets a problem distinct from the movie

experience. More specifically, Carlsson & Smith (1997) found grave anxiety to be

associated with low scores on creative problem solving tests, but also found high

creatives to possess more anxiety and to use a greater number of defense mechanisms

29

than low creatives. High creatives have been shown to have a higher level of basal

arousal.

In keeping with the work of Jones and Selye, poor performance may have less to

do with anxiety or arousal levels than with the individual’s interpretation of his arousal

levels. Furthermore, others have illustrated that it is not anxiety per se that causes a

narrowed attentional focus, but rather our interpretation of the arousal we experience in

the face of a challenge or problem, what Eysenck (1992) and Eubanks et al (2000) term

cognitive bias and Jones & Swain (1992; 1995) call anxiety direction. One may theorize

that the individual’s level of debilitative anxiety may act to constrain the attentional

resources available to solve the problem or even to see the problem. Without attentional

breadth of focus, (Ansburg and Hill, 2003) remote associations are not possible and

insight problems more difficult to solve. Every problem causes some degree of arousal

because it poses a challenge to the human system. Depending upon the nature of the

individual, whether trait anxious or confident, and the sociological factors impacting the

individual at the time, the arousal will become debilitative anxiety, or facilitative arousal

(Jones, anxiety direction). As such, the emotional processes underlying the solving of the

problem will then impact the neurological and thus the cognitive processes (cue

utilization, remote association, social differentiation, cortisol levels, threat hypervigilance,

attentional narrowing, cognitive processing bias) hindering or helping the individual’s

capacity for insight and thus for creative or innovative action.

The larger question appears to be whether positive interpretation of the problem

and resulting attentional breadth can be facilitated, whether it is possible to help an

individual ‘throw the interpretive switch.’ It makes sense that one would reach for what

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is most familiar or seek to control the situation as quickly as possible when threatened. In

a problem solving situation, threat interpretations would limit the person’s ability to see

the problem and result in a reluctance to break from a familiar frame, a problem

representation that reflects an external locus of control (such as the lack of a jack in

Getzel’s flat tire problem), or solution statements formulated in place of problem-

identification statements (a jack is actually a solution, not the problem), (Clinton &

Torrance, 1986). Forster and Friedman (2001) and Higgins (1997) suggest that a focus

on security, a risk averse, vigilant processing style impairs creativity because it causes

attentional narrowing. “Repetition is favoured over novelty” p. 1001. Perhaps it is the

individual’s natural desire for security when facing a problem or challenge that causes a

tendency to look to what is familiar, to jump to conclusions, or to make assumptions and,

in turn, inhibits the ability to frame the problem succinctly.

Interpretation in turn may not be explained or controlled. How one interprets an

event or a problem is the result of a myriad of infinite factors and can change from one

day to the next. A friend described how, though he was able to solve a coin problem in

his colleague’s office, when asked to do so in front of a classroom of students, he was not

able to solve it, despite his earlier success that very day. As well, though he faints at the

sight of a needle one day, another day or at the sight of another needle, he manages to

remain conscious. However, in understanding how interpretation acts upon problem

representation, it may be possible to facilitate a positive interpretation of the problem and

thus a representation of the problem free from constraints using an intervention that

generates a cognitive shift in interpretation.

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Failure

The mechanism whereby one might shift an interpretation of a problem and thus

increase divergence may exist within the problem itself. Ormerod et al (2002) point to an

unusual approach: that of failure. With failure, individuals are driven to restructure the

initial representation of the problem and open up their attentional focus. What are we

ultimately anxious about when attempting to solve a problem? Failure. In an anxious

state, we thus seek out what is familiar, our attention is narrowed, we spend our time

dodging failure as opposed to taking risks and ‘testing unusual moves’ (Ormerod et al,

2002), thus making us less open to available cues. “The music of the violin we get by

friction” (Ashcraft, 2002). When we meet failure at once, there is no need for constraints

or protection. The result is an impulse to seek alternative moves, to broaden and relax

our attentional focus, inadvertently increasing our capacity to solve the problem at the

same time.

MacGregor et al (2001) and Knoblich, Ohlsson, Haider & Rhenius (1999) suggest

that experiencing ‘criterion failure’ may induce an impulse to ‘seek alternatives’ while

creating ‘a state of preparedness that disposes the solver to attend to solution-relevant

information’. It seems a state of mental readiness is necessary for capitalizing upon novel,

solution-relevant information. While it is suggested that ‘repeated failure’ can serve to

relax constraints, unless the underlying mechanism causing constraints to be imposed is

changed, the solver may simply impose new constraints (i.e. we must find something like

a jack to fix a flat tire). It is not clear in either of these studies how or whether criterion

failure serves to generate a ‘state of preparedness that disposes the solver to attend to

solution-relevant information’. Intriguing is the concept of solution within failure.

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Perhaps within failure, the problem presents itself again and demands a fresh approach or

at least forces the solver to reevaluate what the problem is. In the case of the flat tire,

having no recollection of a service station would mean criterion failure, offering a prime

opportunity to not only reframe but to reevaluate the problem. The group might simply

look for other ways to find a jack, or they might think ‘why do we need a jack anyway?

What else could we use?’ What would encourage the group to look for the root of the

problem?

While divergent training programs like Synectics ask for a suspension of

judgment, openness and divergence of thinking (Harriman & Mauzy, 2003; Hicks, 1991;

Nolan, 1989), the synectic approach is an imposed open mindedness as opposed to an

emergent openness. Not everyone responds to being told to think openly. However, most

people have the capacity to think openly and thus could be facilitated to open up their

thinking processes. In line with all great pedagogical theory, a learner must follow their

own path, and make their own connections in order to truly understand.

Inquiring deeply into the problem may help the solver to see the causal

connections between the problem they experience and the actual source or ‘root’ of the

problem. It may be possible to expose the fundamental problem behind the assumed

representation of the problem. In clarifying the problem as such, one also clarifies what is

most important to solving the problem. It is this cognitive shift from constraint to need

that restructures the perception of the problem which has, in turn, been shown to increase

capacity to process problem information and activate prior knowledge (Eubancks, Collins,

& Smith, 2000; Eysenck & Calvo, 1992; Mogg, Mathews, Bird, & Macgregor-Morris,

1990). While putting De Bono’s six hats on may shake loose one’s paradigm or

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perspective, it would seem to be most effective if we could shift one’s thinking more

specifically. The key to removing constraints upon problem representation may lie within

the constraints themselves.

Criterion failure may not only signal the ‘need to abandon the current operator

and to search for an alternative operator’, but may also signal a deeper problem. It may be,

at the point of criterion failure, that an individual is not only open to alternative solutions,

but also to alternative problem representations. It is at this point that it may be most

possible to facilitate a shift in interpretation. As well, it may be this point that offers the

pivotal point upon which an individual can make that shift. Is your solution working?

No. Why not? Simply asking people to reconstruct the problem without facilitating an

actual shift in cognitive bias may result in a construction still grounded in external locus

of control: ‘where can we get a jack?’ ‘how can we make a jack?’ Shifting interpretation

of the problem can occur by exploring actual constraints and not only serves to

restructure the problem, but does so in such a way as to shift the interpretation of the

problem so that it is free of constraints: ‘why is the lack of jack a problem for you?’ or

‘what problems does the lack of a jack create?’, the answer being ‘because we need to lift

the car in order to change the tire’. The cognitive shift is made to the goal and as such

moves to a personal point of power: ‘we need to lift the car’. If there had been no way of

getting a jack, the group would have met with criterion failure and would have been

forced to think of ‘no jack’ as a new problem, thereby reconstructing the problem in the

appropriate way. Once the group constructs the problem appropriately, they are mentally

prepared to ‘see’ the barn and all of the ‘lifting’ possibilities held within it.

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While restructuring a problem representation does not necessarily lead to better

solutions, the restructuring process seems central to effective problem solving. Several

researchers in creative and insight problem solving suggest that the formation of a new

representation of the problem is the only manner by which activation can be redirected:

Getzels (1982) coined ‘problem construction’, Mumford et al (1994) was responsible for

introducing ‘problem representations’, and Ohlsson, (1984;1992) explored ‘restructuring’.

Kershaw and Ohlsson (2004) distinguish three classes of difficulty factors in solving

insight problems: perception of the problem, processing of the problem information, and

prior knowledge. Kershaw and Ohlsson (2004) and Ormerod, et al, (2002) demonstrate

that the elimination of one factor does not allow an individual to solve a problem with

multiple sources of difficulty. If a problem solver develops a correct representation of a

problem, the relevant operators will be activated.

Insight

Wertheimer (1959) articulated well the challenge we face in attempting to train

creative problem solving: insight results from the sudden realization of a new, more

penetrating view of a problem situation. Many cognitive psychologists agree that insight

plays a necessary role in the development of creative solutions (Dominowski, 1995;

Ohlsson, 1992; Knoblich, Ohlsson, Haider, & Rhenius, 1999; Schooler & Melcher, 1995;

Sternberg & Davidson, 1995; Sternberg & Lubart, 1996). The concept of insight seems to

capture the total mechanism we seek in aiming to determine how a person creatively

solves a problem: Creative problem solving requires a certain shift in thinking or letting

go of assumptions about the problem and its potential solutions characterized as insight or

the ‘aha’ moment. While many have suggested ways to achieve a new view of the

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problem (Clement, 1982, 1991; Newell and Simon, 1972; Schoenfeld, 1982; Schoenfeld

and Hermann, 1982) it is not clear how to facilitate a more ‘penetrating’ view of the

problem, a view of the problem that then prepares the mind to notice the insightful

breakthrough, ‘aha’ or ‘outside of the box’ solution.

The insight mechanism is of particular interest due to implications for related

areas of creativity, learning, and performance. For instance, the openness, looseness, or

breadth of attentional focus typical of the effective insight solver would be quite useful in

the athletic arena, enabling the player to utilize all relevant cues and see new possibilities

for playmaking. Wayne Gretzky was known for his uncanny ability to ‘see 3 plays ahead

of the play at hand’ and ‘hold the whole game in his mind’. Or, as Sidney Crosby, 16

year old hockey phenomena describes, insight is the ability to see “not where everyone is

when you look, (but) where everyone will be if you buy some time and hold the puck for

another second" (Allen, 2004).

While many theories abound, it is still unclear how insight really works. What is

the underlying mechanism that causes insight to occur? What neurological, physiological,

cognitive, or emotional processes are involved in promoting the insight experience? And,

based on this knowledge, how might one facilitate or enhance insight? Insight problem

solving has been characterized in various ways: For Schooler, Ohlsson, and Brooks

(1993), insight involves

a) a solution well within the competence of the average subject;

b) a high probability of an ‘impasse’, that is, a state in which the subject does not

know what to do next; and

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c) an ‘Aha!’ experience resulting from sustained effort in which the impasse is

suddenly broken and insight into the solution is rapidly attained.

Maier’s classic Two String Problem (1931) in which two strings are hanging from the

ceiling, the distance between them making it impossible to reach one string while holding

the other, the task being to tie the two strings together, is a classic illustration of insight

impasse. The problem may initially be presented as a problem of distance or length of

reach. Once this impasse is overcome however, the problem’s representation may open

up to that of how to make the string longer or how to bring the strings together. The

elegant solution is to take advantage of the string’s pendulum like qualities to bring the

two strings together.

Ormerod et al (2002) argue that past experience may not account for initial

problem representation as Kershaw & Ohlsson (2004) suggest but rather the problem

display influences the solver’s initial interpretation and approach. However, upon closer

reading, Ohlsson refers to ‘past problem solving experience’ which may indeed account

for how the individual represents and therefore approaches the problem. Research on

training insight problem solving supports this assertion (Ansburg & Dominowski, 2000).

In my classroom, simply warning kids that this kind of problem will require you to think

outside of the box prompts insightful solutions and serves to avoid potential impasses.

Bowden and Jung-Beeman (2003) explain the consensus view that insight

problems ‘misdirect’ solvers to consider unhelpful information or solution paths.

Macgregor et al (2001) point to the need for a certain level of ‘preparedness’ or openness

to attend to solution-relevant information. For instance, many participants in their nine-

dot studies attempted moves that captured the conceptual insight necessary to solve the

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problem, yet did not appear ‘ready’ to see the solution and therefore returned to their

initial limited thinking. What makes people ready to see that an impasse has been

broken? Perhaps not only are people prevented from seeing solutions when they lack

attentional breadth, but they are also prevented from seeing that an impasse has actually

been broken. Likewise, some people see failure as an opportunity to learn and others are

crippled by it. Again, if we draw a comparison to the sports field, even when there is an

opening, it is often difficult for an individual to see it if they are not prepared to see it.

Readiness

A certain amount of cognitive readiness may also be necessary to ‘choose wisely’

from alternative solutions once they arise. This suggests that the problem must be

represented in such a way that the solver is not only generating viable solutions but also

‘ready’ to see the sustainable solution as it emerges (Seifert et al, 1995). Ohlsson (1992)

re-conceptualized insight as “situations which are characterized by initial failure followed

by eventual success”. Ohlsson qualifies the term impasse as ‘unmerited impasse’ in that

the solver is competent to solve the problem, and extends the definition to one of ‘full

insight’ which consists of the breaking of the impasse plus the completion of the entire

solution in the mind’s eye pointing out that sometimes solvers continue to struggle even

after breaking the impasse or cognitive constraint. In this case the impasse is broken

accidentally or without the awareness of the solver. Such a concept points to Ormerod et

al’s (2002) suggestion that a certain level of preparedness is also necessary for full insight

to occur: the solver must be ready to see that an impasse has in fact been broken and that

a whole new realm of solution possibilities are available.

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Ormerod et al (2002) show how, ‘even when a move capture(d) the conceptual

insight necessary to solve the problem’, the solver would often return to the original

constrained thinking (p. 798). Pasteur once said “Dans les champs d l’observation, le

hazard ne favourise que les esprits prepares” (“In the field of observation, chance favours

only the prepared mind”). The American physicist Joseph Henry echoed this axiom with

“the seeds of great discoveries are constantly floating around us, but they only take root

in minds well- prepared to receive them.” How many others alongside Newton had also

witnessed an apple fall from a tree? This leads us to conclude that the cognitive shift,

‘shaking loose’ or ‘choosing wisely’ process need not occur at the solution end, but rather

at the problem end. Perhaps the problem finding process may be more accurately

described as a route finding process as well as a root finding process, in that we must

navigate a pathway to a more precise representation of the problem. Finally, navigating

one’s way past imposed constraints and being ‘ready’ to see solutions may demand a

certain ‘letting go’ of assumptions about the problem. Ormerod et al (2002) suggest that

meeting with failure can inspire the solver to look for alternative solution paths, or ‘let

go’, as opposed to fixating on a pathway that is ineffective.

Problem Solving Training Programs

The problem solving process demands creativity and insight in constructing the

problem and generating possible solutions. Many researchers believe that various phases

of the problem solving process can be augmented through awareness and practice of the

behaviours that awaken and strengthen the creative potential residing within every

individual to some degree (Basadur, 1986; Davis, 1973; Davis, 1983; Kane & Arnold,

1986). A number of approaches have been taken to training creativity and insight. Frame

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breaking or cognitive restructuring (Khatena, 1973) is aimed at making individuals more

‘self aware’ (Suwa, 2003) of the way perception underlies the current interpretation and

at helping them to break away from the commonplace to think more divergently or

generate a greater variety of solutions. Researchers have shown that creatives possess a

greater attentional and associative ‘breadth’ (Ansburg, 2000; Mednick, 1962;

Mendelsohn & Lindholm 1972). De Bono’s (1971) six hats approach, Morton and

Weinstein’s (2003), and Nalebuff and Ayres’ (2003) simple and varied techniques for

stimulating creative problem solving also present a variety of ways to ‘shake it up’

cognitively. Such programs have met with some success (Glover, 1980; Griffith, 1988;

Jaben, 1983; Khathena, 1973; Speedie, Treffinger & Feldhusen, 1971). Most programs

focus on raising the awareness or knowledge of the metacognition involved in creatively

solving problems including knowledge of types of problems and problem solving

strategies (Jausovec, 1994). In raising awareness of the assumptions or inappropriate

constraints that people tend to apply to problems, one can open up the mind to solutions

(Baughman & Mumford, 1995). Another path that has been taken to train creativity is

that of problem construction or problem finding (Baer, 1988; Basadur, Hudgins &

Edelman, 1988; Murdock, Isaksen, & Lauer, 1993; Riesenmy, Mitchell, Hudgins, & Ebel,

1991) which focus on developing the key cognitive processes underlying creative

problem solving including problem identification and concept selection.

Divergent Thinking

Parnes (1975) designed the Creative Problem Solving Institute (CPSI) of the

Creative Education Foundation. Based on Osborn's approach, the Institute has

incorporated a number of other theories and programs over the past 20 yrs. Fundamental

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to the Institute's teachings is a 5-step process: fact-finding, problem-finding, idea-finding,

solution-finding, and acceptance regarding one's goals. Synectics, creative analysis,

human potential development, creative experiences, and body awareness are approaches

that are used. The core of the program is to stretch the imagination at all stages of

problem solving, and to develop a balance between judgment and imagination. Likewise,

the Army Corps of Engineers utilize a modified version of the Parnes & Osborn model

including: Identifying problems and opportunities, Inventorying and forecasting

conditions, Formulating alternative plans, Evaluating alternative plans, Comparing

alternative plans, Selecting a plan. Rose & Lin (1984) conducted a meta-analysis of 46

creativity training program studies and evaluated these for fluency, flexibility, originality,

and elaboration. Of these studies, the Osborn Parnes Creative Problem Solving Program

sustained a substantial impact on verbal creativity and seemed to support the conclusions

of Torrance (1972) and Parnes and Brunelle (1967) in support of the effectiveness of this

program.

Scott, Leritz, & Mumford (2004) performed a meta-analysis of creativity training

programs and, based on 70 studies, found that successful training programs were likely to

focus on both idea generation and cognitive skills training. Each type of training program

is described in terms of course length, sample size, age and nature, difficulty, delivery,

and criteria. Idea Production Training programs include conceptual combination,

divergent thinking, ideation, elaboration analogies, brainstorming, and problem

identification (Castillo, 1998; Glover, 1980; Griffith, 1988; Jaben, 1983; Jausovec, 1994;

Khatena, 1971; Speedie, Treffinger, & Feldhusen, 1971). For example, generating

metaphors that capture the problem or situation can challenge assumptions and lead to

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new insights and ideas. De Bono’s Six Hats Thinking calls for all thinkers involved to be

thinking in the same 'direction.' The direction is indicated by one or other of the six

coloured hats. For example, the White Hat requires an attention to information: what do

we have; what do we need; what is missing. The Green Hat demands a focus on 'creative

effort.' When the Green Hat is in use everyone makes a creative effort: new ideas,

alternatives, modifications of an idea, possibilities, or provocations. Divergent thinking

strategies that ‘break loose’ from standard ways of thinking are believed to cultivate and

increase creativity and thus enhance problem solving ability.

Metacognition

Raising an individual’s awareness of the cognitive skills and processes involved

in problem solving has been shown to enhance problem solving skill (Anderson, 1987;

Perkins & Salomon, 1989; and Sternberg & Frensch, 1993). Masaki Suwa (2003)

suggested that a meta-cognitive approach in which ‘individuals are trained to become

more self aware of the operation of one’s own perception and conception’ in order to

facilitate the ‘reorganization of perception and construction of a new interpretation’ (p.

232) resulted in improved problem solving and creativity skills. Cognitive skills training

can include critical thinking elements such as problem finding, idea generation and

evaluation, meta-cognition, elaborations, selection monitoring (Hudgins & Edelman,

1986; Ohlsson, 1992; Hudgins, Riesnmy & Ebel, 1989), and creative processing skills

such as problem identification, information gathering, concept selection, idea generation

and evaluation, implementation, planning, monitoring, divergent and convergent thinking

(Baer, 1988; Murdock, Isaksen, & Lauer, 1993). Dominowski and Ansburg (2000), in

attempting to promote insight problem solving skills, used a meta-cognitive approach,

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providing solvers with advance strategic instructions that a) are procedurally relevant, b)

point to the procedural similarities among problems, and c) emphasize the usefulness of

the procedures across the problems (p. 34). Cropley (2000) also used a meta-cognitive

approach in training creative problem solving by providing ‘counselling’ to engineering

students challenged to ‘build a wheeled vehicle powered by the energy stored in a mouse

trap’. Cropley (2000) offered lectures on cognitive processes involved in creative

problem solving as well as individual ‘counselling sessions’ in which students were

encouraged to tolerate unusual or unexpected ideas, to defer judgment, and to think

divergently, with significant effect on creative performance.

Cognitive Restructuring

For some, the key to creative thought may be the combination and regorganization

of information and concepts to advance new understanding of new conceptual systems.

Hertel, Mathews, Peterson, & Kintener (2003) demonstrated that it is possible to train

interpretations of ambiguous homographs and conclude that it is then possible to facilitate

a shift in interpretive bias. Rothenberg (1996, 2005) in his studies of Nobel laureates,

found that these new combinations often provided the basis for scientific and

technological advances. Owens (1968) and Mumford et al (1997) found that conceptual

combination was one of the best predictors of creative achievement in advertising and

mechanical engineering (managing creativity). To measure the skill of conceptual

combination, Mednick (1969) developed the RAT (Remote Associations Test).

Conceptual combination training can take many forms, but generally involves

using analogical reasoning mechanisms to extract abstract elements of concepts in order

to make new linkages between concepts. Such remote associations can aid in the ‘frame

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breaking’ aspect of creativity, relaxing the default constraints that culture, experience,

prior knowledge and expectations place upon an individual’s representation of various

concepts such as ‘knife’ (for cutting). For instance, by default, birds and planes may be

seen as related because both fly. However, planes have the added feature of ‘container’,

or the metaphorical feature of ‘escape’. Identifying this added feature to a plane may

allow an individual to align plane with another concept not typically in juxtoposition with

it. It is argued that such conceptual combination or remote association is the hallmark of

creative thought because new combinations may provide the basis for improved

understanding and for new ideas.

For example, Ohlsson describes three mechanisms for restructuring a problem: re-

encoding, elaboration, and constraint relaxation. Re-encoding involves letting go of an

initial representation of problem elements. The hotel could be a toy hotel and thus the

man becomes bankrupt because he is playing monopoly. Elaboration changes the

problem representation through the addition of information, something the solver may

have overlooked. The two hikers might be hiking toward each other rather than assuming

that they are moving away from each other, thus explaining the fact that they meet very

soon after departing in opposite directions. Who says they started from the same point?

Constraint relaxation rectifies impasses caused by inappropriate representations of the

goal state. A car can be raised in a variety of ways beyond that of using a jack. Once the

constraint of ‘needing a jack’ is relaxed, several other alternatives present themselves:

‘what else can we use besides a jack to raise the car?’

Ansburg and Dominowski (2000) designed a program to promote insight problem

solving ability by developing the skills of re-encoding, elaboration and constraint

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relaxation. Their program consisted of advanced strategic instructions, practice with

feedback on procedurally similar problems, and problem comparison, finding that

facilitations effects ranged from 14-24% gain in overall solution rates. Mumford and

Baughman (1997) suggest using feature mapping or metaphor search strategies to

improve concept combination and have shown that such strategies can be utilized to

improve creativity. Such training techniques date back to historical studies (Tweney,

1992) and experimental studies (Maier & Burke, 1970; Rothenberg, 1973, 1986). Other

techniques include Forced Relationships, Free Association, Attribute Listing, Synectics,

and Lateral Thinking, all involving to some degree, strategies for exploring alternative

views of concepts and their relationships in order to support new combinations,

understanding, and ideas.

The Organizational literature (Andriopoulos, 2001 for a review) points to several

factors that could enhance creativity in employees including culture, climate, leadership,

resources, structure and systems, many geared to promoting ‘autonomy, ownership, and

control over their own work and ideas’ and ensuring ‘participative safety’. Employees

can only be encouraged to think creatively if they are not afraid of criticism and

punishment. Several techniques for effective problem solving and decision making have

emerged in the organizational literature, all designed to guide the problem solving

process by both ‘breaking the old frame’ and ‘restructuring a new frame’. Tools include:

Brainstorming - Generating Options, Critical Path Analysis - Planning and Scheduling

Complex Tasks, Decision Trees - Powerful Quantitative Analysis of Decision Impact ,

Force Field Analysis - Analysis of all Pressures For and Against Change, SWOT

Analysis - Analysing your Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats. Tools that

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demand individuals explore a variety of aspects of the problem increase the possibility for

solutions by both relaxing constraints, enhancing conceptual combinations and clarifying

the problem at its root.

Problem Finding

Divergent thinking has been shown to correlate with creative problem solving

ability (Feldhusen & Clinkenbeard, 1986; Harrington, Block & Block, 1983). But the

challenge for creative problem solving trainers lies not only with facilitating divergent

thinking but also then with ‘choosing wisely’ from the wildly divergent ideas. Lateral

thinking alone will not necessarily arrive at a good solution. Likewise, analyzing the

problem too convergently may limit the quality of solution. A combination of divergence

and convergence seems ultimately desirable. The success of solution choice seems then

to rely on how the problem is defined.

A certain amount of divergence is required but mostly with regard to how the

problem is represented. Jay and Perkin’s (1997) review of the problem-finding literature

indicated that interventions focusing on a particular skill such as problem finding within a

particular domain such as science can yield tangible improvement in creative

performance. What will allow a person to see the problem for what it is at its foundation

(the need to raise the car) as opposed to symptomatically (the need for a jack). Perhaps it

is the individual’s natural desire for security when facing a problem or challenge that

causes a tendency to look to what is familiar, to jump to conclusions, or to make

assumptions and, in turn, inhibits the ability to frame the problem succinctly. In that case,

all that is required is a certain amount of ‘shaking loose’ or exercise in ‘thinking outside

of the box’ to enable people to relax constraints placed on the problem construction.

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The concept of problem finding comprises another effort at training creativity.

Suwa (2003) explored the possibility of training conceptual reorganization and concluded

that ‘a coordination of both perceptual reorganization and conceptual generation in a

productive cycle constitutes acts of problem finding in a creative experience’ (p. 232).

The coordination of the two cognitive actions was found to demand the skill of

constructive perception (a meta-cognitive skill to coordinate the operation of one’s own

perception and conception), a skill thought to demand elaborate training. However,

others have designed more straightforward frameworks for approaching a problem in

‘problem finding’ ways thought to be more conducive to solution finding. While

strategies such as the IDEAL framework (Bransford, Hayes, Stein & Lin, 1998) stress the

‘identification’ of problems in general, suggesting that an attitude of differentiation or

sensitivity to the problematic be encouraged, it remains unclear as to how such an attitude

is ‘trained’. Others suggest that skill in problem construction (definition and redefinition

of the problem) will promote creativity by providing a more flexible approach to problem

solving. The ability to reframe problems in a variety of ways suggests that the problem

solver possesses not only an ability to explore a problem thoroughly but also a readiness

to change approach or even redefine the problem (Runco, 1994). Training ‘problem

reconstruction’ may be a more complex matter than simply practicing the act of

reformulating problems as Reiter-Palmon et al (1997) discovered. Using active

processing (Baer, 1988), inducing participants to restate the problem before solving it,

Reiter-Palmon et al found no effect despite support for the intervention by Redmond et al

(1993). Perhaps delving more deeply into the problem construction process will provide

a more significant leverage point with which to enhance creative problem solving.

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Theories of Attentional Focus

Theories of attentional focus and related concepts such as cognitive and stress

appraisal offer insights into how humans construct and then solve the challenges and

problems they face. Competing theories have been proposed to account for decrements in

skilled performance under pressure. Many of the attentional focus theories demonstrate

that an ‘external’ or goal focus is facilitative to performance. A goal is defined as

something that an individual is trying to accomplish; it is the object or aim of an action

(Locke & Latham, 1990). Goals are also believed to move in and out of conscious

awareness at different times, operate largely through the internal comparison processes,

and require internal standards against which to evaluate ongoing performance (Weinberg,

1994).

Distraction Theories

Distraction theories propose that pressure creates a distracting environment that

shifts attentional focus to task-irrelevant cues, such as worries about the situation and its

consequences (Eysenck, 1992; Wine, 1971). This shift of focus changes what was single-

task performance into a dual-task situation in which controlling execution of the task at

hand and worrying about the situation compete for attention.

Self-focus Theories

Perhaps more appropriately termed explicit monitoring or execution focus

theories, as they are concerned with attention to skill execution, self-focus theories

suggest that pressure raises self-consciousness and anxiety about performing correctly,

which increases the attention paid to skill processes and their step-by-step control

(Baumeister, 1984; Lewis & Linder, 1997). Attention to execution at this step-by-step

48

level is thought to disrupt well-learned or proceduralized performances (Kimble &

Perlmuter, 1970; Langer & Imber, 1979; Lewis & Linder, 1997; Masters, 1992). Wulf,

McNevin, and Shea, (2001) and Wulf, Shea, and Park (2001) have shown that by

focusing on body movements themselves, performers intervene in the control processes

of the body, resulting in decreased learning and performance. Focusing externally allows

for the body’s automatic system to control an individual’s movements, whereas focusing

internally causes interference in automatic processes of the body. This has been shown

for a variety of tasks—including soccer and volleyball (Wulf & McNevin, 2003) and

piano playing (Wan & Huon, 2005) and mathematical problem solving (Beilock & Carr,

2001), mental health (Bond and Bunce, 2000, 2003; Hayes, et al, 2001), team perspective

(Driskell, Salas, Johnston, 1999), and creativity (Higgins, Shah, Friedman, 1997;

Friedman & Forster, 2001).

Reinvestment Theory

Reinvestment theory (Masters, Polman, Hammond, 1993) hypothesizes that individuals

have a predisposition toward reinvestment of controlled processing (a tendency to

introduce conscious control of a movement by isolating and focusing specific

components of it). The Reinvestment Scale, an instrument to measure such a construct,

was developed from the Cognitive Failures Questionnaire, the Rehearsal factor of the

Emotional Control Questionnaire, and the Public and Private factors of the Self-

Consciousness Scales and administered to 144 undergraduates. Results from 4 studies

indicated that high reinvesters were likely to suffer from performance breakdown under

pressure.

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Self Consciousness Theory

Self Consciousness theory (Baumeister, 1984) proposes that the personality trait of self-

consciousness may moderate the relationship between pressure and performance.

Baumeister argued that competition induces arousal, which, in turn, results in attentional

focus on oneself and disruption of well-learned skills. Furthermore, Baumeister suggested

that “persons who are habitually self-conscious should find it easier to cope with

situations that engender self-consciousness because they are accustomed to performing

while self-conscious” (p. 611). Thus, less (as opposed to more) self-conscious persons

should be more likely to choke because they are unused to dealing with the self-focus

brought about by (competition-induced) arousal. Although data from several laboratory

experiments (Baumeister) were consistent with that position, support within a genuine

sporting context was missing.

However, in a study by Dandy et al. (2001) the relationships between self-

consciousness and decrements in performance were not consistent with those predicted

by Baumeister (1984; Baumeister & Showers, 1986) or with the concept of

‘reinvestment’ (Masters, Polman, & Hammond, 1993) but to some degree with both.

Rather, decreased performance seemed to be caused by a variety of attentional

distractions and to depend upon the individual.

Cue utilization or ‘Hypervigilance’ Theory

Cue utilization or ‘hypervigilance’ theory proposes that anxiety leads to more focused or

‘narrowed’ attention. Easterbrook's (1959) hypothesis proposes that emotional arousal is

related to a restriction in attentional range. In contrast, Eysenck's (1992) hypervigilance

theory predicts that anxiety is related to an increase in the range of stimuli that will be

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attended to, at least until an actual threat has been detected. However, emotional state

might interact with certain situational factors to produce either of these effects. The

classic arousal perspective argues that stress results in heightened arousal and that arousal

leads to a narrowing of attention (see Broadbent, 1971; Easterbrook, 1959). As attention

narrows, peripheral (or less relevant) task cues are first ignored, followed by further

restriction of central or task-relevant cues. To the extent that task-relevant cues are

neglected, performance suffers. Accordingly, tasks that demand attention to a wide range

of cues are more susceptible to degradation under stress.

Regulatory Focus

The concept of ‘regulatory focus’, approach and avoidance motivation (Friedman &

Forster, 2000), or promotion and prevention focus (Higgins, Shah and Friedman, 1997)

addresses the power of focus direction. Higgins posits two motivational orientations that

govern cognitive mechanisms: promotions focus (motivation to attain nurturance) and

prevention focus (motivation to avoid harm). Studies in this area have focused mostly on

creativity and creative problem solving. A promotion focus implies a cognitive style that

is more exploratory and ‘risk-taking’ whereas a prevention focus adopts a cognitive style

of processing that is more vigilant, defensive and ‘risk-averse.’ Promotion focus is seen

to enhance performance while prevention focus is seen to impair performance and

creativity.

The Theory of Cognitive Bias

The theory of ‘cognitive bias’ (Eysenck, 1997) suggests that one of the major

functions of anxiety (the result of a cognitive ‘threat’ appraisal) is to create a bias in

cognition. It is a well-established fact that emotions bias the cognitive processing of

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stimuli: There is preferential processing of emotional stimuli that are congruent with

one's current mood or stable personality traits (see review in Rusting, 1998). Anxiety has

probably been the main focus of interest in this regard (Eysenck, 1997; MacLeod, 1999).

In a functional account of emotions (Keltner & Gross, 1999), anxiety is part of a

defensive mechanism against potential dangers. Anxiety fulfills this protective function

both at the cognitive level, by means of facilitating anticipatory threat detection, and also

at the behavioral level, by means of mobilizing resources before the actual harm occurs.

Accordingly, if threat is to be identified early, in order to further preparatory defensive

responses, anxiety should bias the cognitive system toward prioritizing the processing of

threat-related cues: (1) attention should be selective, favoring the coding of threat-related

stimuli over neutral stimuli; (2) ambiguous stimuli should be interpreted preferentially as

threatening; and (3) threat-related information from prior experience should be especially

retrievable from memory. There is now considerable experimental evidence for an

attentional bias including increased attention to threat cues (Bradley, Mogg, Falla, &

Hamilton, 1998; Byrne & Eysenck, 1995; Fox, 1996; MacLeod & Mathews, 1988; Mogg,

Bradley, & Hallowell, 1994).

Many of the studies on the topic of cognitive bias involved high anxious or ‘trait-

anxious’ individuals showing a greater propensity for bias. However, following acute

stress, it was later shown that all individuals appear to selectively allocate processing

resources to threat stimuli (Mogg, Mathews, Bird, Macgregor-Morris, 1990). A biased

response to acute stress does not seem to be modified by individual differences in

susceptibility to anxiety. This bias is thought to result from the stressful event directly

priming cognitive representations of threat. Thus, both high and low trait anxious

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individuals appear to react to an acute stressful event in the same way—by becoming

vigilant for further sources of threat in the environment. Keogh and French (2001) found

further support for Mogg et al.’s study in an experiment with test-anxious individuals.

Inhibition Theory

Connelly, Hasher, and Zacks’ (1991) ‘inhibition theory’ proposes that a deficient

inhibition mechanism causes working memory resources to be consumed by task-

irrelevant distracters. Thus performance depends upon ability to inhibit attention to

distracting information. In many ways the concept of attentional inhibition is just a

negative way to describe external focus. One is unable to inhibit distraction in much the

same way one’s attention is drawn to threat. It is possible to conceive of attentional

control in terms of either ‘blocking out distraction’ or of ‘retaining a task focus.’

However, it can be argued that energy spent ‘blocking out distraction’ would also detract

from performance. The theory would also imply that trait anxious individuals would

suffer from a general state of distractability whether the distracters are threatening or not.

Evidence argues against such a general degree of distractibility in anxiety. Keogh and

French (2001) provided no evidence either of a general deficit in the ability to focus

attention in anxiety or of increased susceptibility to distraction by neutral stimuli. The

idea that one is simply not drawn to attend to a distraction because it is not perceived to

be threatening is more likely because it implies sustained attention toward the task for

high performers.

euro-Physiological Approaches

Recently, neuro-physiological approaches to the study of attentional focus have

emerged. While most studies examining attentional focus effects have exclusively used

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performance outcome measures (e.g., accuracy), some studies used ‘electromyography’

(EMG) to determine neuromuscular correlates of external versus internal focus

differences in movement outcome. Zachry, Wulf, and Mercer (2005) recorded EMB

activity on basketball players under both internal focus (wrist motion) and external focus

(basket) conditions finding that an external focus of attention enhances movement

economy, and presumably reduces “noise” in the motor system that hampers fine

movement control and makes the outcome of the movement less reliable.

Fichtenholtz, Dean, Dillon, Yamasaki, McCarthy and LaBar (2004) used event-

related functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to investigate how attentional

focus can modulate the neural activity elicited by scenes that vary in emotional content.

Emotional and attentional functions are known to be distributed along ventral and dorsal

networks in the brain, respectively. However, the interactions between these systems

remain to be specified. Using a visual oddball task a main effect of emotion was found in

the amygdala (AMG) and ventral frontotemporal cortices. A main effect of attentional

focus was found in dorsal frontoparietal cortices, whose activity signaled task-relevant

target events irrespective of emotional content. The only brain region that was sensitive

to both emotion and attentional focus was the anterior cingulate gyrus (ACG). The ACG

response to emotional scenes increased when they were task-relevant, and the response to

circles concomitantly decreased. These findings support and extend prominent network

theories of emotion-attention interactions that highlight the integrative role played by the

anterior cingulate.

Vance et al. (2004) used electromyography (EMG) to determine whether

differences between external and internal foci would also be manifested at the

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neuromuscular level. In two experiments, participants performed biceps curls while

focusing on the movements of the curl bar (external focus) or on their arms (internal

focus). Under an external focus, the task was performed faster and integrated EMG

(iEMG) activity was reduced. Results were in line with the constrained action hypothesis

in which an external focus promotes the use of more automatic control processes (Wulf,

McNevin, & Shea, 2001).

Motivational Climate and Achievement Goal Theory

In the area of motivational climate and achievement goal theory, it has been

shown that motivational climate has a central place in the regulation of subsequent

affective states, cognitions and behaviour in achievement contexts. Motivational climate,

the context in which an individual is performing, can induce a certain achievement

motivation or performance focus based on the achievement criteria it supports. Based on

goal achievement theory, performance criteria may be more task focused, emphasizing

self-referenced mastery and personal growth, or more ego focused, emphasizing other-

referenced social comparison as a measure of success. Therefore motivational climate can

be seen to impact attentional focus as well. Ommundsen and Roberts (1999) examined

the relationship between different profiles of the motivational climate in teamsport and

achievement, and socially related cognitions among Norwegian team sport athletes.

Athletes perceiving the climate as high in mastery and high in performance oriented

criteria reported psychological responses that were more adaptative than those perceiving

the climate as low in mastery and high in performance criteria. Importantly, the high

mastery climate seemed to moderate the impact of being in a high performance climate.

The pattern of findings suggests that perceiving the motivational climate as performance

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oriented may not be motivationally maladaptive when accompanied by mastery oriented

situational cues. In other words, having a goal focus may serve to resolve the pressures of

a performance situation. Brunel (1999) demonstrated that motivational climate or

expectations at the contextual level may override individual goal orientations. However,

he asserts that climate should only have temporary effect at the contextual level if it is not

regularly emphasized at the situational level.

The above theories share a number of common principles including a conceptual

basis grounded in appraisal and neurophysiology and the assumption that attention

‘shifts’ from one focus to another (i.e. from threat to goal). However, no theories have

accounted for considerations of individuality or situation. Individuals may find an infinite

number of things potentially threatening based on both individual nature and situation.

Attempting to find cause for threat appraisal (i.e. internal, self, distraction, step-by-step

process, external expectation, etc.) may be an indefinite pursuit.

Attentional Focus Training Programs

Imagery and Relaxation

Attentional training techniques have included techniques in imagery (Garza &

Feltz, 1998), relaxation (Suinn, 1985), and development of pre-performance routines

(Boutcher, 1990; Moran, 1996). However, research results are inconsistent or criticized as

methodologically weak (Perry & Morris, 1995; Weinberg, Seabourne, & Jackson, 1987).

In an important study on 126 golfers, the practice of simply attempting to replace

negative images with corrective ones proved ineffective in preventing a performance

decline due to the attention required to suppress negative images (Beilock, Afremow,

Rabe, & Carr, 2001). Blocking out, replacing, or averting attention from perceived threats

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to performance goals appears ineffective. Perceived threats may require some form of

amelioration or resolution before attention can move from threat to goal.

Biofeedback

The most promising technique appears to be biofeedback (Landers et al., 1991)

though it too is unsubstantiated by empirical research. While biofeedback interventions

consider psycho-physiological correlates of attention, arousal, and performance,

interventions are complicated and have limited empirical support. It has been suggested

that biofeedback may be most effective as a complex, multi-stage approach in which

different processes are relevant at different stages of performance, an approach that may

be too difficult to replicate realistically (Qualls & Sheehan, 1981). Findings suggest that

an external attentional focus strategy is associated with more ideal alpha frequencies and

heart rate during the performance of a self-paced motor task. It has been demonstrated

that psycho-physiologically, the magnitude of EEG alpha power was significantly higher

(lower mental activity suggesting more efficiently activated task-relevant brain areas) for

an external focus group as opposed to an internal focus group. In the area of problem

solving, Jausovec (1997) showed that twenty five students displayed lower alpha power

(higher mental activity and chaos) when reading and approaching ill-defined problems

and higher alpha power when reading and approaching more clearly defined problems.

As well, regarding heart rate, participants using the external attentional focus strategy

experienced a deceleration in heart rate immediately prior to dart release, while a group

using the internal focus strategy showed an increase in heart rate (Radlo, Steinberg,

Singer, Barba, Melnikov, 2002). However, attempting to create optimal attentional focus

states using biofeedback (heartrate training) has been unsuccessful for the most part. For

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instance, in a study on golf putting, although subjects in biofeedback conditions learned

to control their HR during training, the transfer of this skill was inhibited (Damarjian,

1993).

Acceptance of egative Experience/Emotion

In their study of mental health and work performance, Bond and Bunce (2003)

found that “people who do not try to avoid or control psychological events have more

attentional resources, engage in less avoidant behaviour, and may learn how to they can

most effectively use the control that they have to promote their mental health” (p. 1064).

Attentional resources directed toward avoidance, resignation, control, or denial of

feelings are no longer available to address the barrier, nor decide upon and complete the

correct course of action for a successful outcome (Bond and Hayes, 2002; Hayes et al,

1999). Perception and focus may also play a large role in generating and resolving

barriers to return to work after illness or injury, and consequently in predicting disability

and return to work outcome as well as enduring outcomes for individuals struggling to

overcome a workplace illness or injury.

Current psychological interventions assert that acceptance of the negative feelings

or anxieties that accompany a stressor is facilitative to rehabilitative outcome (Hayes,

1987; Bond & Bunce, 2003; Bond & Hayes, 2002); however, not everyone interprets

anxiety as debilitative, and therefore not everyone would benefit from accepting their

negative emotions as a means to moving past them. Within a mental health study,

negative feelings may in fact be the primary threat to treatment outcome. However, in

order to generalize the concept of acceptance, it is important to identify acceptance as the

common mechanism for attentional shift as opposed to the object of acceptance

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(acceptance meaning ‘tolerance’, ‘acknowledgement’, and ‘recognition’ as opposed to

‘surrender’, ‘giving up’, or ‘acquiescence’).

Failure or Impasse

In the area of problem solving, Ormerod, MacGregor, & Chronicle (2001, 2002),

and Knoblich, Ohlsson, Haider & Rhenius (1999) suggest that when attempting to ‘relax

constraints’ during the problem solving process the experience of ‘criterion failure’ may

induce acceptance and generate an impulse to ‘seek alternatives’ while creating ‘a state of

preparedness that disposes the problem solver to attend to solution-relevant information.’

It is not clear in either of these studies how or whether criterion failure serves to generate

a ‘state of preparedness that disposes the solver to attend to solution-relevant

information,’ though the concept of solution within failure is intriguing. Perhaps within

failure, a certain degree of acceptance and ‘letting go’ of perceived threats occurs,

enabling the solver to re-evaluate the performance challenge with the perceived threat

becoming part of the performance goal reality. In the particular case of failure, the

individual may ask ‘what must I do to achieve my goal given this new reality?’ In this

way, threat is transformed into goal. Operating within a goal frame allows automatic

processing or ‘smart motor systems’ to generate solutions for resolving the threat relative

to the goal rather than generating solutions for resolving the threat at the expense of the

goal.

Common Factors in Theories and Training Programs

Appraisal

Appraisal models of emotions (Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 1991, 1999; Roseman,

Spindel, & Jose, 1990) propose that emotions arise from the evaluation of an event's

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impact on valued goals. Smith and Lazarus (1993) identified two categories of appraisal

that influence emotion. Primary appraisal assesses the personal relevance of a situation

(its motivational relevance) and the extent to which the situation is in keeping with

personal goals (its motivational congruence). These identify the situation's valence:

threatening situations, for example, are characterized by motivational relevance and

motivational incongruence. Secondary appraisal evaluates coping options and outcomes,

and includes accountability (who/what is responsible for the situation), future expectancy

(likelihood of change), problem-focused coping potential (options for influencing the

situation), and emotion-focused coping potential (ability to emotionally adapt to the

situation). According to Lazarus (1991), secondary appraisal involves an evaluation of

coping options and as a consequence the type of coping strategies an individual adopts.

Appraisal may influence coping, and therefore focus, by directing attention towards

certain environmental features or opportunities as well as internal characteristics (such as

self-efficacy beliefs).

It is important to note that attentional focus implications (i.e. explicit vs implicit)

are caused by the appraisal mechanism. Beilock et al. (2004), in attempting to establish

the legitimacy of the explicit monitoring theory by illustrating the impact of high pressure

or perceived threat on working memory, demonstrate that high pressure only impacts

performance on high demand problems. However, they miss the point in that anxiety is

not necessarily always perceived as threatening or as a barrier to performance to everyone

(Jones, 1992; Jones & Swain, 1995; Jones, Swain, & Hardy, 1993) therefore it is

questionable whether an attentional focusing effect would come into play in the scenarios

they describe. Their results may have little to do with working memory and more to do

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with cognitive appraisal. In any study on the impact of attentional focus, it is important to

establish that the ‘pressure’ or ‘threat’ is perceived as a real barrier for the individual.

europhysiology and Stress

In his extensive review of the literature, Baumeister et al. (2001), in ‘a

disappointingly relentless pattern’ in over one hundred articles, found that when equal

measures of good and bad are present, the psychological effects of bad ones outweigh

those of the good. This may in fact be a general principle or law of psychological

phenomena, possibly reflecting the innate predispositions of the psyche or at least

reflecting the almost inevitable adaptation of each individual to the exigencies of daily

life. This pattern has already been recognized in certain research domains. This is

probably most true in the field of impression formation, in which the positive–negative

asymmetry effect has been repeatedly confirmed (Anderson, 1965; Peeters & Czapinski,

1990; Skowronski & Carlston, 1989). In general, and apart from a few carefully crafted

exceptions, negative information receives more processing and contributes more strongly

to the final impression than positive information.

Ledoux (1989, 1998) has shown that cognition and emotion are mediated by

separate but interacting systems within the brain. As de Sousa points out (1991, as cited

in Taylor, p. 223) “no logic determines salience: what to notice, what to attend to, what to

inquire about. And no inductive logic can make strictly rational choices.” Emotions also

limit what the brain processes based on salience or value judgments. Feelings guide

reason and vice versa. Physiological and neurobiological studies using brain imaging

techniques (PET and MRI) confirm the interaction between cognitive and emotive

processes by showing increased bloodflow to areas of the brain responsible for emotional

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processing (i.e. the amygdala, hypothalamus and limbic system) during stress, failure,

worry. The emotional part of the brain shows decreased bloodflow or ‘deactivation’ when

the individual is engaged in a more cognitively demanding task (Drevets & Raichle,

1998).

Pratto and John (1991) set out to test whether attentional resources are

automatically directed away from the current task when extraneous stimuli, either good or

bad, are presented. Using a modified Stroop paradigm, the researchers presented

participants with personality trait adjectives (i.e. sadistic, honest), and participants were

instructed to name the color ink in which each word was printed. To the extent that

attention was automatically seized by the meaning of the trait, participants would be

slower to name the color. In the first study, people took longer to name the ink color

when the word referred to a bad trait than when it was a good trait. Thus, the meanings of

bad traits had greater power for attracting attention, as compared with good traits.

Retrospective self-reports indicated that participants claimed they ignored the words and

concentrated on the colors, which is consistent with the view that any interference

occurred at an automatic and not a fully conscious level.

Individuality

While attentional theories seem to agree on certain key processes, they are

polarized in terms of cause. The common factors among them include stress or pressure

and a distracting concern drawing focus away from, or too much within, the task at hand.

Each theorist asserts a unique cause for the phenomenon of debilitative focus from

distraction to explicit monitoring to threat vigilance. However, all of the theories may be

correct for none of these theories accounts for individuality. Under pressure, individuals

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find different things to be stressful and distracting. In fact, some individuals may interpret

the pressure or stress to be facilitative rather than debilitative and not feel stressed or

pressured in the least. If one considers anxiety a stressor unto itself accompanying a

challenge situation, the result of a threat appraisal and a physiological readiness

mechanism, one can see that anxiety might meet with a typical cognitive appraisal

process. In fact, sports psychologists have found that people appraise anxiety in much the

same way that they might appraise any stressor or challenge (Jones, 1992; Jones & Swain,

1995; Jones, Swain, & Hardy, 1993); that is, one would primarily appraise anxiety as a

threat or a non-threat, and, if deemed threatening, secondarily appraise one’s capacity to

respond to the threat posed by the anxiety.

Attentional focus theories also tend to ignore considerations of state versus trait

responses to challenge situations. An individual may find a time constraint to be

threatening in one situation such as on a test, but not in another, such as in the pre-race

area of a ski race. While trait characteristics may influence situational attentional focus, a

situational measure or approach is more relevant and informative to performance

enhancement efforts.

Attentional Shift

The insight within these theories is that under perceived debilitative pressure or

stress, an individual’s focus, and thus performance, is impaired because the individual

perceives something to be threatening to their performance and must attend to it. It

matters not what the perceived threat is specifically, whether it is the crowd, or their

rising heart rate, but only that their focus (and associated cognitive resources) has shifted

to address a threat. Again the myriad of individual strategies for dealing with the equally

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infinite kinds of perceived threats could range anywhere from ‘trying harder to control

execution of specific body movements’ to ‘trying to block out the noise of the crowd’ to

‘trying to lower one’s heart rate with deep breathing.’ Each of these strategies, whether

they fall within the explicit monitoring theory, distraction theory, or cue utilization theory,

are the result of a perceived threat and are an attempt to control or reduce the threat. All

of these strategies shift focus toward a threat focus and away from task performance.

How to facilitate a goal focus despite perceived threats poses the greatest

challenge to researchers and performers in any realm. In a review of attentional focus

training methods, it is difficult to ascertain what mechanism might serve to shift an

individual’s attentional focus from threat to goal.

Theories of Problem Solving and Injury

No matter what obstacles are at play in developing chronicity of injury, one area

of research that seems to offer insight into the problem of workplace injury is that of

perception, attentional focus and consequent representation of the challenges associated

with the injury. Following a musculoskeletal injury, such as in the lower back, the

development of chronic pain and disability has been attributed to the ‘deconditioning

syndrome’ (Mayer, 1999). Deconditioning occurs as a result of fear-related inhibition and

physical disuse. However, psychological variables such as fear avoidance are likely only

a small piece of the rehabilitation puzzle. A number of physiological, psychological, and

sociological variables interact to help or hinder an individual’s rehabilitation and

treatment outcome making it difficult to isolate causal factors (Brooker et al, 2000;

NIDMR, 2000, Schrey, 1996). Therefore, insight into the more common mediating

factors of appraisal and focus determining an individual’s problem solving or coping

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response may provide leverage in designing more effective individual rehabilitative

programs.

Pain as Problem Solving

The most prevalent and expensive work-related injuries are soft-tissue injuries,

primarily those of the lower back and upper extremities (Armstrong, et al, 2000; Brooker,

Clarke, Sinclair, Pennock & Hogg-Johnson, 1998; Silversides, 1998). Workplace injuries

can result in substantial financial losses to employers through disability insurance

premiums, workers’ compensation premiums and worker replacement costs (Johanning,

2000; Krause & Ragland, 1994; Scheer, Racack, & O’Brien, 1995). Well documented

factors ensuring successful disability management programs, or safe and early return to

work, include employer participation, a supportive work climate, and cooperation

between labour and management (Frank et al, 1996; Frank et al, 1998; van der Weide,

Verbeek, & van Tulder, 1997). However, in a systematic review, van der Weide et al.

(1997) found that for patients with low back pain, physical, behavioural, educational, and

pharmaceutical interventions when administered during the acute or chronic phase had

limited effect on return to work. There is a growing body of research to suggest that

cognitive and affective variables play a significant role in determining the chronicity of

low back pain or injury (Hazard, Fenwick, & Kalisch, 1989; Rainville, Ahern, & Pahlen,

1993). It is suggested that isolating the specific belief, affective factor, or attitude

interfering with an individual’s treatment outcome, may allow the intervention to address

the specific belief. However, it seems an infinite number and kind of interventions would

be necessary to address the myriad of individual beliefs. Rather than trying to change

people’s beliefs, the current research proposes to explore the problems that beliefs can

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pose to the rehabilitative process. If an individual perceives an injury to be particularly

threatening, this perception however real or imagined, exerts a very real effect upon the

individual’s cognitive processes, dominating attention, creating a barrier oriented focus

and inhibiting the generation of creative and sustainable solutions.

Pain and injury could be considered ‘problems’. How one interprets the problem

of pain or injury may contribute to one’s ability to find solutions. According to cognitive

behavioural theory, individuals’ cognitions, beliefs, and coping behaviours play key

causal roles in determining their adjustment to pain (Jensen, Romano, Turner, Good, &

Wald, 1999; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). Negative affect such as fear, catastrophizing,

learned helplessness, and avoidance response to pain can interfere with rehabilitation

efforts or contribute to the chronicity of the injury (Brewer, 1994; Fritz, George, Delitto,

George, 2001; Grove, 1993; Weiss & Troxel, 1986; Udry, 1997; Weise-Bjornstal, Smith,

Shaffer, & Morrey, 1998). ‘Catastrophizing’is a multi-dimensional construct including a

tendency to focus excessively on pain (i.e. rumination), to exaggerate the pain (i.e.

magnification), and to underestimate one’s ability to manage pain (i.e. helplessness)

(Sullivan, Bishop, & Pivik, 1995). Mechanisms such as misattribution of arousal,

hypervigilance to pain, worrying, and avoidance behaviour can be very adaptive in acute

pain situations to prevent injury and promote recovery; in chronic pain; however, ongoing

phyisiological arousal and hypervigilance to pain, induced or magnified by negative

affect, may cause sensitization to pain and increase disability long term (Aldrich,

Eccleston, & Crombez, 2000; Janssen, 2002; Melzack & Wall, 1982; Reynolds, 1969).

Sullivan, Sullivan and Adams (2002) found that duration of injury increases negative

affect and adds to negative interpretation of the injury in a recursive, spiraling manner.

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Likewise, in the ‘diathesis-stress’ model (Flor & Turk, 1984; Flor and Turk, 1999; Turk

& Flor, 1984; Turk & Salovey, 1984), causal attribution can be circular rather than linear.

Once the stress and sympathetic arousal activate the dispositional factors, the pain cycle

begins, with pain acting as a new stressor that causes increased muscle tension, and the

cycle is perpetuated. Therefore, early intervention is considered most effective (Krause,

Dasinger, Neuhauser, 1998; Loisel, et al., 1997; Yassi et al., 1995).

Various explanations point to different sources of constraint in problem solving

(prior experience, problem display), but many share the view that the locus of problem

difficulty is centered on the solver’s constrained representation of the problem or

interpretive frame (Ormerod et al, 2002). While anxiety has been targeted as a chief

inhibitor of problem solving capacity, Jones et al (1993, 1995) and Scheier and Carver

(1988) argued against a causal relationship. Any stressor or challenge can cause arousal

or ‘anxiety’. How this arousal is then interpreted determines how effectively an

individual will respond to the challenge. In this way Jones et al (1993; 1995)

differentiated between facilitative and debilitative anxiety, calling the interpretive factor

‘anxiety direction’. According to the Processing Efficiency Theory (Eysenck & Calvo,

1992; Eysenck et al, 1987) a negative bias or interpretation of a challenge reduces the

processing and storage capacity of working memory. Baddeley (1988, 1993) proposed

that the working memory system includes a central executive that is involved in active

processing, an articulatory loop that is assumed to be responsible for the storage and

processing of verbal, visual, and spatial information. When in a threat vigilant state,

processing resources will be allocated to perceived threats as opposed to the task at hand.

Ohlsson (1992) echoed information processing theory in suggesting that ‘restructuring’

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the problem can succeed in activating the relevant operators for solving the problem.

Similarly, Kahneman and Tversky (1981) argue that the ‘frame that a decision-maker

adopts is controlled partly by the formulation of the problem and partly by the norms,

habits, and personal characteristics of the decision-maker’ (p. 453).

Appraising the Problem of Pain

Some individuals appear more psychologically vulnerable to both injury and

chronicity of injury or pain. Researchers have documented a number of biopsychosocial

risk factors for predicting chronic pain or injury including physical, psychological,

behavioural, social, environmental, and quality of life variables that impact both health

and well being (Bombardier, Kerr, Shannon, & Frank, 1994; Gatchel, Polantin, & Mayer,

1995; Klenerman et al., 1995; Ohlumd, Lindstrum, & Areskoug, 1994; Pincus, Burton,

Vogel, & Field, 2002; Sanders, 1995; Turk, 1997; Vlaeyen, Kole-Snijders, Boeren, & van

Eek, 1995). As well, the physical, environmental, social and psychological antecedents

to injury have been the focus of considerable research (Holmes, and Rahe, 1967;

Williams and Roekpke, 1993; Williams & Andersen, 1998). In the area of athletic injury,

the research showing association between life events stress, anxiety, and athletic injury

appears quite robust (see Williams & Roepke, 1993 and Williams & Andersen, 1998 for

reviews). In the area of psychoneuroimmunology, there is overwhelming evidence to

show that a negative mindset or disposition can have negative effects on the immune

system function (O’Leary, 1990). But, while the immune system was clearly identified as

the mediating link between life events stress and an increased risk of illness, perceptual

deficits (in terms of decreased coping resources, increased negative affect, and increased

peripheral narrowing) accounted for 26% of subsequent athletic injury incidence variance

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(Andersen & Williams, 1988). While a variety of personal and situational factors

influence the way individuals cognitively appraise their situations, how individuals

cognitively appraise their situations influences their emotional and behavioural responses

making them more susceptible to injury. People in pain, or expecting pain, sometimes

bias their attention towards pain-relevant cues. Vlaeyen et al. (1995) explored whether

experimentally induced pain, and the expectation of pain, involved an information

processing bias towards the hand in question. Both pain and the expectation of pain

increased and the findings were consistent with a bias in information processing toward

the painful or impending painful hand (Hudson, McCormick, Zalucki, Moseley, 2006).

It is believed that cognitive appraisal can moderate individual ability to cope

effectively with injury. Cognitive appraisal models (Wiese-Bjornstal & Smith, 1993;

Wiese-Bjornstal et al., 1995, 1998) among injured athletes are rooted in the stress, coping,

and self-efficacy literature of general psychology (Bandura, 1977; Cohen & Wills, 1985;

Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). Interpretive biases have been demonstrated in the laboratory

with materials ranging from homographs (words spelled the same but with different

meanings) to social scenarios, and with participants experiencing high levels of trait

anxiety as well as a variety of anxiety disorders (Eysenck et al., 1987; Hirsch & Mathews,

2000; Richards & French, 1992). Individuals who perceive themselves as lacking the

resources with which to manage their injury are more susceptible to debilitation while

people experiencing high anxiety levels do in fact lack the resources to prevent injury. In

general it is agreed that pain is heterogeneous in terms of etiological factors, mechanisms

and temporal characteristics and that, consequently, treatment must be targeted not at the

general symptom, the pain, or its acute or chronic temporal properties, but rather at the

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underlying neurobiological mechanisms responsible (Scholz & Woolf, 2002; Woolf &

Mannlon, 1999). If one were able to restructure one’s cognitive appraisal or interpretation

of pain or injury, one may be able to increase one’s capacity for rehabilitation, or for pain

tolerance. Bum, Morris, and Andersen (1998) found that a simple program of relaxation

(autogenic training) for an experimental group resulting in improved perceptual capacity

suggesting that simple interventions may help reduce stress responsivity and, possibly,

injury risk.

It is commonly agreed that employer participation, a supportive work climate, and

cooperation between labour and management are critical to facilitating return to work, yet

the problem remains of how to treat the psychologically vulnerable employee, and to

what extent the employer is responsible for the psychological health of its employees.

While it may be in the best interest of the employer to facilitate rehabilitation of work

related injury, exploring the reasons behind each individual’s maladaptive behaviours and

perceptions would take researchers down a tangled path of infinitely interactive variables,

many of which would be far beyond the reach or influence of the researcher, health

consultant, or employer. On the other hand, the mechanism of interpretation, beliefs or

‘cognitive appraisal’ of pain and injury, is generalizable and thus offers a significant

point of leverage for rehabilitative intervention (DeGood & Kiernan, 1997; DeGood &

Shutty, 1992). Beliefs seem easier to measure reliably and with validity than are coping

strategies (SOPA; Jensen, Karoly, & Huger, 1989). Rather than attempting to control life

events, personalities, or environments, it may be more encouraging and productive to

focus on understanding and ultimately facilitating the cognitive frame required to

problem solve pain and injury.

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Pain, Problem Solving and Failure

In the area of insight problem solving, MacGregor et al (2001) and Knoblich,

Ohlsson, Haider & Rhenius (1999) suggest that experiencing ‘criterion failure’ may

induce an impulse to ‘seek alternatives’ while creating ‘a state of preparedness that

disposes the solver to attend to solution-relevant information’. People who accept failure

and seek to identify the problem that this failure poses for them, are more likely to move

beyond a failure to new growth and learning. People who frame the failure as a problem

in itself to be solved have less success. A person who has made an error in judgment,

lifted a heavy load inappropriately, and induced an injury, may fixate on the failure, and

ruminate, refusing to accept it or move on. Appraising pain and injury as a situation or

‘reality’, as a point of failure as opposed to a problem in itself, may be the first step in

achieving a state of readiness to see alternative solutions, and in reconstructing their

representation of the problem. Pain and injury may not be the problem and in this way,

may not be solvable or ‘fixable’, rather, the problem exists in how the pain or injury

impacts the individual’s life. Framing the problem in such a way has the potential to shift

focus and unlock more creative solutions. For instance, the machinist who sees his lower

back injury as the ‘end of life as he knows it’ may try to fix the injury or give up entirely.

By reframing the injury as a ‘reality’ over which he has no control (failure), and making

the step toward reconstructing the problem in terms of the implications this reality has for

him, he may come to understand that the real problem lies not in his lower back injury,

but in how he will go about getting retrained, or keeping himself occupied, or developing

his other skills, or adapting to his lack of mobility while he waits for the therapy to

improve his mobility, or while he strives to reinvent himself as a machinist or as a person.

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Predicting Interpretive Frame and Pain Treatment Response

A number of studies have identified subgroups of patients according to

psychosocial and behavioral characteristics (Johansson & Lindberg, 2000; Mikail,

Henderson, & Tasca, 1994; Turk & Rudy, 1988, 1990b; Turk, Sist, et al., 1998). Several

studies (Dahlstrom, Widmark, & Carlsson, 1997; Epker & Gatchel, 2000; Rudy, Turk,

Kubinski, & Zaki, 1995) found that patients classified into different subgroups on the

basis of their psychosocial and behavioral responses responded differentially to identical

treatments. Subgroups of chronic pain patients characterized by a number of psychosocial

and behavioral characteristics seem to be fairly consistently observed across different

pain syndromes (i.e. cancer, FMS, TMD, headaches, low back pain; Turk & Rudy,

1990b; Turk, Sist, et al., 1998), suggesting the independence of psychosocial factors from

the physical pathology.

A number of investigators (Dworkin, von Korff, & LeResche, 1992; Turk, 1990)

recommend the use of a dual-diagnostic system: a biomedical diagnosis and a

psychosocial diagnosis. Distinctiveness of the psychosocial profiling implies that patients

in different subgroups may exhibit differential responses to a treatment. Indeed, this has

been demonstrated in several outcome studies. For example, one of the most frequently

used pain inventories, the Multidimensional Pain Inventory (MPI; Kerns, Turk, & Rudy,

1985; Piotrowski, 1998), yields a three-subgroup solution. The MPI subgroups were

initially developed using the cluster-analytic approach. Turk and Rudy (1988) labeled one

subgroup characterized by severe pain, compromised life activities and enjoyment,

reduced sense of control, and high level of emotional distress as "dysfunctional. "

Another subgroup, also marked with relatively high degrees of pain and affective distress

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but further characterized by low levels of perceived support from significant others, was

labeled "interpersonally distressed." The third subgroup consisted of chronic pain patients

who appeared to be coping relatively well despite their long-standing pain. This group,

which experienced low levels of pain, functional limitations, and emotional distress, was

labeled “adaptive copers.” The subgroups have been replicated and validated in numerous

studies (Jamison, Rudy, Penzien, & Mosley, 1994).

There is a growing body of evidence supporting the importance of patients' beliefs

in chronic pain. Beliefs about the meaning of symptoms, the patient's ability to control

pain and the impact of pain on his or her life and worry about the future are just some

constructs that have been shown to play a central role in chronic pain. Such beliefs have

been found to be associated with psychological functioning (Jensen, Romano, Turner,

Good, & Wald, 1999; Stroud, Thorn, Jensen, & Boothby, 2000), physical functioning

(Stroud et al. , 2000; Turner, Jensen, & Romano, 2000), coping efforts (Anderson, Dowds,

Pelletz, Edwards, & Peeters-Asdourian, 1995), behavioral responses (Jensen et al. , 1999),

and response to treatment (Tota-Faucette, Gil, Williams, Keefe, & Goli, 1993).

Depression, Low activity/high pain behavior, Negative beliefs/fear of pain: These

four psychological-behavioral factors have continued to show consistent, empirically

supported predictive capabilities (Bombardier, Kerr, Shannon, & Frank, 1994; Gatchel,

Polantin, & Mayer, 1995; Klenerman et al., 1995; Ohlumd, Lindstrum, & Areskoug,

1994; Sanders, 1995; Turk, 1997; Vlaeyen, Kole-Snijders, Boeren, & van Eek, 1995).

Thus, these risk factors have to remain on the list as important predictive variables. The

MMPI Scale-3 focuses on patients’ reports of sensory or motor symptoms, denial of

problems or social anxiety, and feelings of lassitude or malaise (Hathaway & McKinley,

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1989). It has not yet been determined which of these factors is involved in predicting

disabling low-back pain. The factor of depression primarily is relevant for patients who

exhibit clinically significant levels of mood disturbance. The final element in this

constellation—negative beliefs or fears about pain—manifests when patients express

strong beliefs or fears that their pain is harmful, disabling, or out of their control, or that

increasing their activity level (e.g., by returning to work) would increase their pain.

There are few, if any, controlled studies that investigate appraisal and attentional

focus as predictors of treatment outcome for sufferers of pain or injury. Pessimistic

explanatory style has been shown to predict stressful life events, poor health habits, and

decreased feelings of self-efficacy with regard to changing such habits (Peterson,

Seligman, & Vaillant, 1988; Seligman, 1989 cave article). It appears that we know more

about how people cope poorly with pain than how they cope effectively (DeGood, 2002).

Any coping strategy can be seen to be adaptive or maladaptive under particular

circumstances. For example, rest may be adaptive in one situation but could lead to

atrophy in another. Also, chronic pain disorders seem to be a function of the interaction

between an individual’s premorbid biological and psychological predispositions

(diathesis) and the challenges or stressors (stress) faced as a result of physical or

environmental factors (Banks & Kerns, 1996). Thus it would seem more productive and

practical to isolate the individual’s beliefs and facilitate a change in focus, than to attempt

to alter cognition, personality, or situation. Identification of such a frame in patients

would allow us to direct our intervention at the psychological as well as the medical

factors of significance in treatment (Beck, 1964; Seligman, 1991). Thus, four separate

belief quadrants have been identified: belief about the self, belief about the stressor,

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belief about the world, belief about others. These variables take the form of self-efficacy,

locus of control, perceived optimism, and fear avoidance and contribute to overall

cognitive appraisal of a challenge such as workplace injury.

Self Efficacy and Locus of Control

The construct of self-efficacy (SE; beliefs about self and capacity for control) has

gained a great deal of attention in the pain literature (Dolce et al., 1986). An SE

expectation is defined as a personal conviction that one can successfully perform certain

required behaviors in a given situation. Bandura (1977) proposed that given sufficient

motivation to engage in a behaviour, it is a person's SE beliefs that determine whether

that behavior will be initiated, how much effort will be expended, and how long effort

will be sustained in the face of obstacles and aversive experiences. From this perspective,

coping behaviors are conceptualized as being mediated by people's efficacy beliefs that

situational demands do not exceed their coping resources. People with weak efficacy

expectancies are less likely to emit coping responses or persist in the presence of

obstacles and aversive consequences than those with positive efficacy expectations.

Mastery experiences gained through performance accomplishments are

hypothesized to have the greatest impact on establishing and strengthening perceived SE.

Thus, techniques that enhance mastery experiences (e. g. , graded task accomplishments

with both physical and verbal feedback) should be powerful tools for bringing about

behavior change. Moreover, the patient's self-attribution of success should facilitate

maintenance of improvements. If patients feel that there is little they can do to control

their symptoms, they will expend minimal effort in trying to use self-control techniques;

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conversely, they may become more emotionally distressed, which may amplify symptom

perception.

Converging lines of evidence indicate that SE is important in the control of pain

(Lorig, Chastain, Ung, Shoor, & Holman, 1989), adaptive psychological functioning

(Spinhoven, Ter Kuile, Linssen, & Gazendam, 1989), disability (Lorig et al., 1989),

impairment (Lorig et al., 1989), and treatment outcome (O'Leary, Shoor, Lorig, &

Holman, 1988). For example, SE seems to have some predictive value for the level of

performance of physical tasks in back pain patients (Council, Ahern, Follick, & Kline,

1988). Similarly, SE expectancies were found to closely parallel increases in actual

exercise levels during treatment (Dolce, Crocker, Moletteire, & Doleys, 1986).

Furthermore, post-treatment SE ratings were correlated significantly with reduction in

medication use and return to work at follow-up periods ranging from 6 to 12 months

(Dolce et al., 1986).

Additionally, patients' anticipation of pain during and following physical tasks

seems to interact with SE, collaboratively determining the level of performance. The

influence of SE extends to pain reports, depression, and disability in chronic pain patients

(Lorig et al., 1989). Furthermore, improvement in SE has been associated with

improvement in pain, disability, and mood (Keefe et al., 1997; Smarr et al., 1997). In

short, SE appears to play a particularly important role in perception of and adjustment to

pain and subsequent disability. Cioffi (1991) suggested that at least four psychological

mechanisms could account for the association between SE and behavioral outcome: (a)

Because perceived SE decreases anxiety and its concomitant physiological arousal, the

patient may approach the task with less potentially distressing physical information to

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begin with; (b) the efficacious person is able to willfully distract attention from

potentially threatening physiological sensations; (c) the efficacious person perceives and

is distressed by physical sensations but simply persists in the face of them (i.e. displays

stoicism); and (d) physical sensations are neither ignored nor necessarily distressing but

rather are relatively free to take on a broad distribution of meanings (i.e. change

interpretations).

There are several ways in which perceived coping efficacy can contribute to relief

from pain. People who believe they can alleviate suffering will likely mobilize whatever

ameliorative skills they have learned and will persevere in their efforts. Those who doubt

their controlling efficacy are likely to give up readily in the absence of rapid results. A

sense of coping efficacy also reduces distressing anticipations that create aversive

physiological arousal and bodily tension, which only exacerbate pain sensation and

discomfort. In 1975, Wortman and Brehm observed that reactance and learned

helplessness each sometimes followed exposure to uncontrollable outcomes and proposed

that expectations of control determined which reaction would occur. If an individual

maintained an expectation of control, reactance would result, manifest in behavioral

assertion and hostile feelings. If one came to expect no control, then learned helplessness,

with its depression like affect and behavior, would result. The studies Wortman and

Brehm reviewed provided tentative support for this formulation.

Nearly two decades later, Mikulincer's (1994) review of the subsequent literature

led him to conclude that high expectancy of control is indeed a determinant of anger and

increased problem-focused coping, and that an expectancy of no control is a determinant

of anxiety, depressed affects, and learned helplessness deficits. Subsequently, Roseman et

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al. (1996) found that believing there was something one could do about an event

distinguished recalled experiences of emotions such as frustration and anger

(characterized by high coping potential) from emotions such as fear, sadness, and distress

(characterized by low coping potential). Roseman (2001) found that experiences of these

same emotion groups were distinguished by three measures of high versus low control

potential.

Bandura (1977) suggested further that those techniques that enhance mastery

experiences the most will be the most powerful tools for bringing about behavior change.

He proposed that cognitive variables are the primary determinants of behavior but that

these variables are most influenced by performance accomplishments. Thus, SE may play

a role in fear avoidance. Exposure to feared activities without the negative consequences

anticipated may reduce that fear while at the same time increasing perceived SE. Pain

sufferers who avoid activity because of fear of pain, injury, or re-injury will never receive

corrective feedback or information that can enhance their sense of SE—that is, the

knowledge that they can successfully confront the feared activity without the dire

consequences they anticipate. Again, attempting to change an individual’s appraisal of

resources (i.e. their ability to confront a feared activity) may prove less productive than

understanding the problems that such an appraisal creates for the individual. Helping

individuals to link their negative self efficacy beliefs to their goals (i.e. what problems

does the fact that I do not have the personal resources to manage this stress create for

me?) will help them to unlock creative solutions for achieving their goals as opposed to

focusing on trying to increase their resources or change their self efficacy beliefs which

can prove to be frustrating and fruitless.

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Fear Avoidance / Threat Vigilance

Because fear is a natural consequence of pain, avoidance of a fear-provoking

event is reasonable for acute pain but may serve as an impediment to recovery from

chronic pain. In chronic pain, pain-related anxiety and fear may actually accentuate the

pain experience (Crombez, Vlaeyen, Heuts, & Lysens, 1999). Chronic pain patients with

elevated pain-related anxiety tend to anticipate higher levels of pain than those with low

anxiety, and anticipation of pain often results in poorer behavioral performance

(McCracken, Gross, Sorg, & Edmands, 1993).

When people with pain symptoms are exposed to a feared situation (e. g. ,

walking up a flight of stairs), some experience a cascade of avoidance responses,

including a cognitive response, worry (McCracken & Gross, 1993); effort to escape and

avoid increased pain and exacerbation of injury (Crombez, Vervaet, Lysens, Eelen, &

Baeyerns, 1998; Crombez, Vlaeyen, Heuts, & Lysens, 1999; Vlaeyen, Haazen,

Schuerman, Kole-Snijders, & van Eck, 1995); and self-reported disability (Crombez et al.,

1999). Fearful patients appear to attend more to signals of threat and appear to be less

able to ignore pain-related information (Crombez et al., 1999).

Waddell and colleagues (1993) reported that fear avoidance (beliefs about

stressor) of physical activities and work tasks is more strongly associated with disability

and work loss during the previous year than are biomedical variables and characteristics

of pain. They concluded that "fear of pain and what we do about it is more disabling than

the pain itself" (Waddell et al. , 1993, p. 164). Several authors (Hildebrandt, Pfingsten,

Saur, & Jansen, 1997; Mayer & Gatchel, 1988) have argued that patients with chronic

back pain often demonstrate prolonged iatrogenically abetted protectiveness and passivity,

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largely induced by fear. The result is likely to be a decrease in spinal mobility, muscle

strength, and cardiovascular fitness, and ultimately an increase in disability. Klenerman et

al. (1995) demonstrated that fear avoidance was one of the most powerful predictors of

chronic disability in back pain patients. In fact, Vlaeyen, Kole-Snijders, Boeren, & van

Eck (1995) observed that fear of reinjury by activity was a better predictor of self-

reported disability than were biomedical signs and symptoms or pain severity.

Furthermore, Vlaeyen and colleagues (Vlaeyen, Haazen, et al., 1995; Vlaeyen,

Kole-Snijders, et al., 1995) found a strong association between pain-related fear and

increased physiological arousal. Physiological arousal might contribute to maintenance

and increase in pain severity (Flor & Turk, 1989). Burns, Wiegner, Derleth, Kiselica, and

Pawl (1997) and Vlaeyen et al. (1999) demonstrated that fear-induced increases in lower

paraspinal muscle reactivity predicted greater pain during subsequent physical

performance tests.

Finally, McCracken and Gross (1998) reported that reduction in pain-related

anxiety predicted improvement in functioning, affective distress, pain, and interference

with activity. Woby, Watson, & Roach (2004b) found that hierarchical multiple

regression analyses revealed that patients' perceptions of their ability to decrease pain

explained a small, but statistically significant, proportion of the variance in pain intensity.

In addition, patients' levels of catastrophizing, as well as their fear-avoidance beliefs

about both work and physical activity, were independently associated with levels of

disability. Interestingly, however, when exploring the relative predictive utility of these

three psychological factors, it became evident that fear-avoidance beliefs about physical

activity (FABs-PA) were the only significant predictor of patients' disability. Woby,

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Watson, & Roach (2004a) also found that reductions in fear-avoidance beliefs about work

and physical activity, as well as increased perceptions of control over pain were uniquely

related to reductions in disability, even after controlling for reductions in pain intensity,

age and sex. It appears that fears, pain-related anxiety, and concerns about harm

avoidance all play an important role in chronic pain. Thus, it is appropriate to address

these factors when treating chronic pain patients.

It is not clear why fear during the acute phase is extinguished for some but

becomes a chronic factor for others. One plausible hypothesis is that premorbid

individual differences may modulate this process. A good deal of attention has been

given to the potential predisposition of negative affectivity and anxiety sensitivity in fear

related to pain symptoms (Asmundson & Norton, 1999). Negative affectivity, the general

tendency to experience subjective distress and dissatisfaction, has been demonstrated to

be associated with elevated symptom reporting by chronic pain patients (Vassend,

Krogstad, & Dahl, 1995). Other explanations for the inability to extinguish fear by some

patients include differences in prior learning history and the normal distribution of

sensitivity to noxious stimulation. These explanations are not mutually exclusive. The

results of future studies may help us to understand better the individual variability

observed (Turk and Okifuji, 2002).

Perceived Optimism

The anticipation of success or failure is believed to influence behaviour and outcomes.

The work of Bandura (1977), who viewed optimism (beliefs about environment and

others) as highly influenced by a sense of self efficacy, illustrated the belief that positive

expectations mediate stress. The anticipation of positive outcomes will sustain, and

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possibly re-energize, one’s goal-directed efforts in situations with undetermined

outcomes, possibly due to the effects described by Eysenck and Calvo’s Processing

Efficiency Theory (1992). A key assumption underlying the processing efficiency theory

is that emotions such as anxiety, worry and self-concern, use up available processing

resources and, consequently, reduce the resources and storage capacity available in

working memory for the task at hand (Baddeley, 1986, 1990).

The anticipation of negative outcomes can debilitate efforts toward an intended

goal (Scheier, Weintraub, & Carver, 1986). Schwarzer (1994) noted that framing one’s

expectation in a positive light can lead to two different effects: functional and defensive.

Functional optimism or learned optimism infers that external, variable and specific

attributions are used to describe an event (Seligman, 1991). Dispositional optimism refers

to the optimists tendency to anticipate positive outcomes and, in doing so, behave in a

manner that increases likelihood of success (Scheier & Carver, 1985, 1992). Schwarzer’s

(1994) defensive optimism, an unrealistic estimation of one’s personal control over life’s

events, predicted better adjustment to disease (Pettingale, Greer, Morris, & Haybittle,

1990; Reed, Kemeny, Taylor, Wang, & Visscher, 1994), greater likelihood of returning to

prior level of functioning (Taylor & Armor, 1996), and more successful adjustment to

adverse experiences, including life-threatening traumas and disease (Bulman & Wortman,

1977; Taylor & Armor, 1996; Taylor & Brown, 1988). The power of optimistic

interpretations of life events and situations to have a positive effect on both psychological

and physical well-being, supports the view that positively framing a problem may

contribute to its resolution.

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As David Butler and Lorimer Moseley point out in their book Explain Pain (2003),

pain is not pain if it is not perceived as pain, and pain relies upon context. Whether

physical or mental, an emergency raises cortisol production. ACTH hormones are

released which then increases cortisol. Cortisol, the stress hormone, then puts the body

and mind in a hyper vigilant ‘high alert’ state. Health professionals treating people with

workplace injuries have discovered that understanding the neurophysiology of pain is

important to patient recovery. In fact, a poor knowledge of currently accurate information

about pain and the underestimation of patients' ability to understand currently accurate

information about pain represent barriers to re-conceptualization of the problem in

chronic pain within the clinical and lay arenas and inhibits recovery (Moseley, 2003). It is

recommended that because of the multi-factorial nature of pain, a multidimensional

treatment approach to injury is preferable (Burton et al., 1999; Middleton & Pollard,

2005; Moseley, 2004; Trief, Grant, & Fredrickson, 2000)

Moseley (2002) defines chronic pain as part of a multi-system output that

motivates and assists the individual to get out of a situation that the brain perceives to be

threatening body tissue. Pain-specific neurons called nociceptors are stimulated by tissue

at risk to danger. More recent evidence demonstrates that nociceptors are the neurons that

transmit pain signals to the brain, and that the frequency of their transmission of signals is

not proportional to the amount of tissue damage that has occurred. It is therefore

important to teach clients about pain in order to reduce catastrophic thinking, and

eliminate the belief that pain is uncontrollable or that pain equals damage. The brain uses

a complex set of mechanisms to determine how dangerous the threat is. It uses various

sensory input from the body such as previous experience, cultural factors, expectation

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about consequences of danger and/or pain, the social/work environment, as well as

beliefs, knowledge and logic, to determine the level of the threat. The brain then

produces a multi-system response after the level of threat is determined, and the motor,

endocrine, pain production, immune, parasympathetic and sympathetic nervous systems

respond to the threat. Once the multi-system response has occurred, the body prompts

you to take action by removing the danger. After action is taken, the brain will determine

whether the action taken is sufficient, or if more action is needed, thereby increasing or

decreasing the sensation of pain.

Trief et al. (2000) through regression analyses found a strong predictor of chronic

low back pain to be a combination of the Zung Depression Scale and Modified Somatic

Perception Questionnaire, known as the Distress and Risk Assessment Method (DRAM).

These results indicate that screening for presurgical distress is likely to identify those

patients at risk for poor outcome and suggest that studies to evaluate whether presurgical

psychological treatment improves outcome are warranted. Further analyses demonstrated

that the relationship between changes in pain-related anxiety and treatment outcome were

independent of changes in physical capacity performance. Changes during treatment in

pain-related anxiety may be more important than changes during treatment in physical

capacity when predicting the effect of treatment on behavioural outcome measures

(McCracken, Gross, & Eccleston, 2002).

It is hypothesized that these four factors (self efficacy, locus of control, optimism,

and fear avoidance) would combine and interact to produce an individual’s interpretive

frame of a problem situation. The interpretive frame would determine then how that

individual composes the problem thereby mediating ability to see or recognize

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sustainable solutions. In terms of chronic pain or injury, it is hypothesized that an

individual’s array of beliefs would influence their ability to frame the injury / pain as a

problem that is within their capacity to solve.

A problem finding intervention capable of shifting an individual’s problem frame

to that of a more integrated focus would simultaneously achieve the resolution of anxiety

that enables the mental readiness to see and recognize the initial goal and lead to the

identification of sustainable solutions to achieving that goal.

A Proposed Approach: Integrated Focus

Facilitating failure seems ridiculous, as does asking people to accept that they

have no control over a perceived threat; however, by incorporating the perceived threat

into the performance goal reality, one attends to the threat but within a goal frame.

Acknowledging the threat by exploring the challenges that it poses relative to the goal, or

its ‘symptoms’, may also serve to satisfy the individual’s desire to resolve the threat.

Resolving the challenges posed by a perceived threat is very different from resolving the

threat itself. For instance, trying to resolve the ‘wet conditions’ on a soccer field is likely

debilitative to performance as the player attempts to ‘stay focused’ or ‘block out the rain.’

Such a threat focus is very different from exploring the challenges the ‘wet’ poses to the

soccer player (i.e. decreased ball control, decreased speed and agility). When framed as

part of the goal, more specific and facilitative solutions emerge such as wearing longer

cleats for greater traction and being ready for less predictable ball movement. Focusing

‘sharply upon the goal’ has been shown to facilitate performance in a variety of studies

(Beilock & Carr, 2001; Bond and Bunce, 2000, 2003; Driskell, Salas, Johnston, 1999;

Hayes, et al, 2001; Higgins, Shah, Friedman, 1997; Friedman & Forster, 2001;

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Selvaratnam & Mazibuko, 1998; Wan & Huon, 2005; Wulf & McNevin, 2003).

Therefore, focusing on threat ‘symptoms’, or the challenges and problems a perceived

threat creates for the individual, should bring the individual closer to a goal focus while

making still addressing the threat (Figure 2).

CHAPTER 3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Introduction

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This chapter describes the theoretical framework guiding the study and the overall

design of the study including quantitative and qualitative methods utilized for gathering

data. The selection of independent and dependent variables and measures is discussed

along with ethical considerations. The main purpose of the present work was to discover

whether it was possible to increase problem solving performance outcome by shifting an

individual’s focus from a barrier or goal focus. “Perspective transformation is the process

of becoming critically aware of how and why our assumptions have come to constrain the

way we perceive, understand, and feel about our world; changing these structures of

habitual expectation to make possible a more inclusive, discriminating, and integrating

perspective; and, finally, making choices or otherwise acting upon these new

understandings” (Cranton, 1994, p. 22). A more integrated focus may serve to enhance

performance by attending to the challenges a barrier poses to a goal while sustaining a

goal focus overall.

Selection of the Variables

Independent Variables

Attentional Focus

As explained in the literature review, attentional focus appears to offer leverage in

determining problem solving outcome. Therefore training conditions were designed to

manipulate participant focus to goal focus, assumption focus, integrated (barrier and goal)

focus, and a control focus condition.

Likewise in a field situation in which workers are faced with the challenges of

workplace injury or illness, insight may serve to unlock creative and sustainable solutions

for supporting recovery and rehabilitation despite physical, emotional, professional, and

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mental barriers posed by the workplace injury or illness. Focusing on barriers presented

by a workplace injury or illness may have the same ‘fixating’ effect and lead to chronicity

or re-establishment of the injury or illness, a vicious cycle.

Problem Type

Another condition applied within the experiment included problem type (puzzle

or realistic). It has been shown that a more realistic or ‘experiential’ task can provide for

more productive understanding, learning, and problem solving (Boyatzis & Kolb, 1991;

Kolb, 1984; Zull, 2004). Within the framework of this study, a realistic problem should

enhance problem solving ability by helping participants to frame the problem in terms of

a goal focus more clearly and draw upon knowledge and skills more readily. Familiarity

with the problem components (i.e. a clamp, a molecule, a light fixture) should

hypothetically enhance participants’ performance.

Alternatively, it could be argued that familiarity may breed ‘fixation’ and lack of

creativity (i.e. a screw only moves one way, a clamp only works one way). Successful

experiments begun as early as the 1920s by Gestalt psychologists Karl Duncker and, later,

Abraham Luchins demonstrated that habitual use of familiar objects and problem-solving

strategies limits the ways individuals employ them. Psychologist Jennifer Wiley (1998)

revived this work with a study investigating the relation between expertise and blindness

to alternatives.

Gary Johns (2006), in his study of ‘context’ and its impact on organizational

behaviour, defines context as ‘situational opportunities and constraints that affect the

occurrence and meaning of … behavior as well as functional relationships between

variables’ (p. 387). Johns argues that seemingly innocuous contextual variables can have

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rather marked effects while apparently strong contextual stimuli can have little or no

impact depending upon countervailing and supportive forces. Therefore, adding a

realistic dimension to the problems in one condition may help or hinder problem solving

ability.

Of course, the central issue is whether an attentional focusing intervention would

apply in a more realistic setting. While solving puzzles demonstrates a certain skill set

that, it may be argued, will extend and apply to more realistic settings, the true test of any

intervention is whether the intervention indeed has practical applications and tangible

results for solving real world problems within environmental, organizational, political,

social, educational, and health scenarios. Thus a more realistic context was provided for

the problems as one of the conditions in experiment 1. Finally for experiment 3, to extend

the concept of context more fully the problem gained a fully realistic context in that

participants faced the challenges of workplace injuries.

Dependent Variables

Insight in the Laboratory: Problem Solving Ability

Many cognitive psychologists agree that insight plays a necessary role in the

development of creative solutions (Dominowski, 1995; Ohlsson, 1992; Knoblich,

Ohlsson, Haider, & Rhenius, 1999; Schooler & Melcher, 1995; Sternberg & Davidson,

1995; Sternberg & Lubart, 1996). The study used insight problems as the dependent

variable for the first two experiments. Performance on insight problem solving may be

seen as a critical factor to overall creative problem solving ability. Performance was

measured in terms of time to solve each problem.

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The concept of insight seems to capture the total mechanism we seek in aiming to

determine how a person creatively solves a problem: Creative problem solving requires a

certain shift in thinking or letting go of assumptions about the problem and its potential

solutions characterized as insight or the ‘aha’ moment. While many have suggested ways

to achieve a new view of the problem (Clement, 1982, 1991; Newell and Simon, 1972;

Schoenfeld, 1982; Schoenfeld and Hermann, 1982) it is not clear how to facilitate a more

‘penetrating’ view of the problem, a view of the problem that then prepares the mind to

notice the insightful breakthrough, ‘aha’ or ‘outside of the box’ sol

The Power of Focus: Unlocking Creative Insight and Overcoming Performance Barriers

Figures