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Spain's legal obligations as administering power of Western Sahara

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Abstract

Purpose The issue of the legal obligations of Spain as administering power is cer-tainly peculiar because since 1976, Spain does not has effective power on the territory (although the mari-time and aerial space present a very relevant problem). In this paper, starting from an essay of categoriza-tion of models of obligations of co-lonial powers vis-à-vis its colonies, we want to show the evolution of these models in the International law of the colonization until now. For this purpose, we will try to clar-ify what is the legal status of West-ern Sahara, discussing if it can be considered as the "administering power" of the territory. Taking into account the obligations now estab-lished for third countries and ad-ministering powers in the Interna-tional Law we want to study what obligations are imposed on Spain and its degree of compliance. 1. Antecedents: the obligations of colonizators 1.1. The debate in the foundations of the International Law. The foundations of modern Interna-tional Law were set by Spanish scholars when reflecting on the colonisation of America (Brown Scott). It is not surprising to see arise in that very first moment the ques-tion about the lawfulness and condi-tions of the colonisation. Three dif-ferent positions were taken into consideration.
Spain’s legal obligations as
administering power of
Western Sahara
Carlos Ruiz Miguel
Professor of Constitutional Law
University of Santiago de Compostela (Spain)
Introduction
The issue of Spain’s legal obligations as administering power
in Western Sahara is undoubtedly peculiar in that since 1976
Spain has had no effective power in the territory (although the
maritime and aerial space remain very relevant). In this paper,
starting from a categorisation of models of obligations
accruing to a colonial power vis-à-vis its colonies, I shall show
the evolution of these models in the international law of the
colonisation. To this end, I shall attempt to clarify what the
legal status of Western Sahara is and discuss whether Spain
can truly be considered the ‘administering power’ of the
territory. Taking into account the obligations now established
for third countries and administering powers under
international law, I shall consider what obligations are imposed
on Spain and its degree of compliance.
Antecedents: The obligations of colonisers
The debate in the foundations of international law
The foundations of modern international law were set by
Spanish scholars when reflecting on the colonisation of
America.
1
It is not surprising to see in these early stages
questions as to the lawfulness and conditions of the
colonisation. Three different positions were considered.
Spain’s legal obligations as administering power of Western Sahara 223
In terms of the first dating from 1539 and represented by
the founder of the international law, Professor Francisco de
Vitoria of the University of Salamanca, colonisation could be
lawful provided that the coloniser sought the good of the
colonised:
Cum illa limitatione ut fieret propter bone et utilitate eorum et
non tantum ad quaestum Hispaniorum.
2
The second proposition, this time from 1540 and presented
by a professor from the University of Valladolid, Bartolomé de
Carranza, colonisation is lawful, but only if it is provisional, so
that within a short period of time the colonised people may
regain their independence:
Should they (the barbarians) be instructed by honest men so
that they don’t return to their barbary; and when this task was
accomplished after 16 or 18 years and the land be plain,
because there is no risk that they return to their primitive way
of life, they should be left in their original and own freedom
because they don’t need more trusteeship.
3
However, in opposition to these, a professor from the
University of Alcalá, Melchor Cano, introduced a third point of
view in 1546. Starting from the idea that ‘for the wisdom or
policy sake no State has authority to conquest another’,
4
Cano
dissents from Vitoria and Carranza stating that ‘a sovereign
cannot clearly conquest by force the barbarians for their
welfare sake’. Hence, Cano rejects the lawfulness of any
colonisation , even if subject to conditions:
I reject that the wise men from Spain should rule the ignorants
of the barbarian peoples. It is necessary to consider all the
circumstances, because maybe it’s not convenient such a
perfect policy for those stupid people.
5
Western Sahara Conference Proceedings224
The obligations of colonial powers under the
General Act of Berlin.
As is generally known, the European powers decided to
establish a general international law to govern the colonial
process at the Berlin Conference. It was then possible to
choose between on of the three possibilities embodied in the
theories of the three quoted authors:
definitive occupation to promote the well being of the local
population with annexation of the territory;
transitory occupation to promote the well being of the
population with further granting of independence; and
prohibition of any occupation.
When choosing the content of this principle, they implemented
the first position but in a more radical way than formulated by
Vitoria. Two points characterise this legal status: the aim of
promoting the ‘moral and material well-being’ of the colonised
people is recognised, but as a secondary aim subordinated to the
profit of the metropolis; and no provision was made for the
granting of independence to the colonised territories.
The General Act of the African Conference, signed at Berlin
on 26 February 1885, was primarily intended to demonstrate
the agreement of the powers with regard to the general
principles which should guide their commercial and so-called
civilising actions in the little-known or inadequately organised
regions of Africa. In terms of its article VI:
All the powers exercising sovereign rights or influence in the
aforesaid territories bind themselves to watch over the preser-
vation of the native tribes, and to care for the improvement of the
conditions of their moral and material well-being and to help in
suppressing slavery, and especially the Slave Trade. They shall,
without distinction of creed or nation, protect and favour all
religious, scientific, or charitable institutions and undertakings
Spain’s legal obligations as administering power of Western Sahara 225
created and organized for the above ends, or which aim at
instructing the natives and bringing home to them the blessings
of civilization.
Moreover, the General Act provided in its article XXXIV a
system by which to organise the occupation of the African
continent:
Any power which henceforth takes possession of a tract of
land on the coasts of the African Continent outside of its
present possessions, or which, being hitherto without such
possessions, shall acquire them and assume a protectorate ...
shall accompany either act with a notification thereof,
addressed to the other Signatory Powers of the present Act, in
order to enable them to protest against the same if there exists
any grounds for their doing so.
This colonial law was applied to the territory of Rio de Oro
(in Western Sahara) which came under the Spanish rule some
months before the adoption of General Act.
On 28 November 1884, the representatives of the
independent Saharawi tribe in Rio de Oro signed a treaty of
protectorate with the representative of the Kingdom of Spain
where it was stipulated that:
[W]e have transferred to them the territory called Uadibe or
Cape Blanc, in the coast, so that it may lie by the sole protection
of the government of HM the King of Spain, Alphonse XI.
6
On 26 December 1884, a royal order to the
representatives of the King of Spain in the foreign countries,
confirms that Spain agrees to establish a ‘protectorate’ over
the region of Rio de Oro between cape Blanco (20º 51’ N-
10º 56’ W) and cape Bojador (26º 8’ N-8º 17’ W), that is, on
the centre and south of the Western Sahara.
7
This decree was
enacted before the entry into force of the General Act. The
Western Sahara Conference Proceedings226
Kingdom of Morocco did not express any reservations or
protest the Spanish declaration of a protectorate.
8
The obligations of the colonial powers after World War I
The First World War brought some changes to colonial law.
The main consequence was that the dominions of the defeated
powers were submitted to the League of Nations. Some of
those dominions (the German ones) were in Africa. And then,
the colonial law relating to Africa was split into two regimes.
As far as the colonies of the non-defeated powers were
concerned, the international law applied to their colonies
remained the treaties signed by the European powers and the
General Act of Berlin, with the new modifications introduced in
1919. The Convention Revising the General Act of Berlin of 26
February1885, and the General Act and Declaration of
Brussels of 2 July 1890 were signed at Saint-Germain-en-Laye,
on 10 September 1919. The 1919 Convention does not
introduce any substantive changes to the legal regime
established in Berlin in 1884. It provides that under the control
of the new authorities ‘the evolution of the native populations
continues to make progress’.
In terms of the new draft of article 11:
The Signatory Powers exercising sovereign rights or authority in
African territories will continue to watch over the preservation of
the native populations and to supervise the improvement of the
conditions of their moral and material well-being. They will, in
particular, endeavour to secure the complete suppression of
slavery in all its forms and of the slave trade by land and sea.
But, as far as the territories resorting under the defeated
powers were concerned, a new law was set into force, namely
the Covenant of the League of Nations of 28 June 1919. Its
Spain’s legal obligations as administering power of Western Sahara 227
article 22 contained the new law on colonisation for those
territories.
The first paragraph of the article introduced the general
principles which corresponded to those established in the
General Act of Berlin 1884, ie, the obligation to promote the
‘well-being’ of the colonised people; and the denial of any
obligation resting on the metropolis to grant independence to
those territories.
In this sense, therefore, there are no differences between the
colonies ruled under the General Act of Berlin 1884, and
those resorting under the Covenant of the League of Nations
1919. Certainly, the Covenant spoke, for the first time of the
ancient colonies of the states who lost the war as territories ‘not
yet able to stand by themselves’. However, no obligation was
imposed to grant independence even if the territories reached
the point at which they could stand alone:
To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the
late war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States
which formerly governed them and which are inhabited by
peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous
conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the
principle that the well-being and development of such peoples
form a sacred trust of civilisation and that securities for the
performance of this trust should be embodied in this Covenant.
Some important differences were, however, introduced in
the next paragraphs. These were that:
Those colonies were not under the sovereignty of a state but
under the tutelage of the League of Nations:
The best method of giving practical effect to this principle is
that the tutelage of such peoples should be entrusted to
advanced nations who by reason of their resources, their
experience or their geographical position can best undertake
this responsibility, and who are willing to accept it, and that
Western Sahara Conference Proceedings228
this tutelage should be exercised by them as Mandatories on
behalf of the League.
The character of the mandate differed ‘according to the stage
of the development of the people, the geographical situation
of the territory, its economic conditions and other similar
circumstances’. The degree of authority, control, or
administration to be exercised by the Mandatory should, ‘if
not previously agreed upon by the Members of the League,
be explicitly defined in each case by the Council’. And finally;
Some obligations were imposed on the Mandatories:
In every case of mandate, the Mandatory (should) render to the
Council of the League of Nations an annual report in reference
to the territory committed to its charge … A permanent
Commission (should) be constituted to receive and examine the
annual reports of the Mandatories and to advise the Council on
all matters relating to the observance of the mandates.
The character of the obligations imposed upon
the administering powers under the United
Nations Charter
The obligations of all United Nations members regarding
the non-autonomous territories.
Under the new law of the United Nations, three types of
colonial territory can be distinguished.
‘Mandates’ (inherited from the League of Nations);
‘Trust territories’ (trusteeships newly established by the UN);
and
’Non-autonomous territories’ (the colonies established
before the UN Charter).
As far as the non-autonomous territories were concerned, the
Charter of the United Nations introduced a major change in the
Spain’s legal obligations as administering power of Western Sahara 229
colonial law in that it imposed new obligations on all the powers
ruling this type of territory. In terms of article 103 of the Charter:
In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the
Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and
their obligations under any other international agreement,
their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.
Since the Western Sahara, a colony established before the
adoption of the United Nations Charter, was classified by a
Spain as a non-autonomous territory in 1961, the territory was
submitted to the provisions of the Charter. Two stages can be
distinguished in the consideration of this issue. In the first, there
is no special recognition of the obligations of the United
Nations members regarding the non-autonomous territories.
In the second, an obligation erga omnes to respect such
territories’ right of self-determination, developed.
In the first stage, immediately following the approval of the
United Nations Charter, no specific obligations of the member
states were established regarding the non-autonomous
territories. Certainly, the Charter was a step forward in existing
treaties on colonial law. But initially this change affected only
the United Nations as such and not its member states. No
reference is made in article 2 of the Charter to an obligation
on the member states not involved in the colonisation process.
However, article 1.2 imposes on the United Nations as a
whole an obligation ‘to develop friendly relations among
nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and
self-determination of peoples’.
However, in a further stage, some new obligations arose for
United Nations member states. The obligations imposed on the
third states to implement the respect of this right take two
forms: political and economic.
Western Sahara Conference Proceedings230
Politically, third states are obliged to observe, respect and
promote the right of self-determination. The development of the
principle of self-determination by the resolutions of the General
Assembly and the case law of the International Court of Justice,
has led to the imposition of obligations, not only to the United
Nations as such, but also on all member states even if not
involved in colonisation. As a result, it has been declared that
‘self-determination’ is not only a general principle of the law of the
United Nations, but also a right of the peoples that from now on
have a distinct and individual international status. This transfor-
mation of self-determination from a principle to a principle and a
right, has an important consequence. As a right, it has the
character of erga omnes which necessarily implies a correspon-
ding obligation for all the United Nations members to respect it.
The Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial
Countries and Peoples (GA resolution 1514 (XV)) states that ‘All
States shall observe faithfully and strictly the provisions of the …
present resolution’. The Declaration on Principles of International
Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among
States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (GA
resolution 2625 (XXV)) provides:
Every State has the duty to promote, through joint and separate
action, realization of the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples, in accordance with the provisions of
the Charter, and to render assistance to the United Nations in
carrying out the responsibilities entrusted to it by the Charter
regarding the implementation of the principle.
And further
the territory of a colony … has, under the Charter, a status
separate and distinct from the territory from the State
administering it; and such separate and distinct status shall
exist until the people of the colony … have exercised their
right of self-determination in accordance with the Charter.
Spain’s legal obligations as administering power of Western Sahara 231
This legal evolution was confirmed by the ICJ when it stated
that:
In the Court’s view, Portugal’s assertion that the right of
peoples to self-determination, as it evolved from the Charter
and from United Nations practice, has an erga omnes
character, is irreproachable.
9
Economically, the fight against colonialism developed a
new obligation previously ignored. The Programme of Action
for the Full Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting
of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples’ (GA
resolution 2621 (XXV) 1970) established the obligation to
avoid any economic practice in a non- autonomous territory
on behalf of the colonial power, as this is a major obstacle to
the achievement of decolonisation:
Member States shall wage a vigorous and sustained campaign
against activities and practices of foreign economic, financial
and other interests operating in colonial Territories and on behalf
of colonial Powers and their allies, as these constitute a major
obstacle to the achievement of the goals embodied in resolution
1514 (XV). Member States shall consider the adoption of
necessary steps to have their nationals and companies under
their jurisdiction discontinue such activities and practices; these
steps should also aim at preventing the systematic influx of
foreign immigrants into colonial Territories, which disrupts the
integrity and social, political and cultural unity of the peoples
under colonial domination.
This obligation, imposed on all United Nations member
states for all non-autonomous territories, was explicitly linked
to Western Sahara in GA resolution 3292 (XXIV) (1974):
[The General Assembly] Reiterates its invitation to all States to
observe the resolutions of the General Assembly regarding the
activities of foreign economic and financial interests in the
Territory and to abstain to contribute by their investments or
Western Sahara Conference Proceedings232
immigration policy to the maintenance of a colonial situation
in the Territory.
We may therefore conclude that the third states have not only
an obligation to respect politically the separate, different and
specific status of then ‘non-autonomous territories’, but also to
prevent any economic action blurring this or supporting the
continuation of the colonial rule. This obligation also exists for
those third states that claim to have had some legal ties with the
‘non-autonomous territory’ before it was colonised by the
administering power. This is self-evident if we consider that even
an administering power occupying the territory under legitimate
and valid title, finds its title affected by the principle of self-
determination.
The obligations of administering powers
As with member states’ obligations, the regulation of the
obligations of the administering power regarding its colonies, too,
has evolved on several fronts. Initially progress was made in that
both socio-economic (promotion of well-being) and political
(development of ‘self-government’) rights were recognised. In a
second stage, both types of obligation – the socio-economic and
the political – were developed in greater detail.
In theoretical terms, during the first stage, the United
Nations Charter created a framework between the classical
Francisco de Vitoria model (promotion of the well-being of the
colony as condition for the annexation), and the Bartolomé de
Carranza model (promotion of the well-being of the colony
and obligation to grant further independence). During the
second, however, the Melchor Cano model (granting of the
independence without delay) appears to have dominated.
During the first stage, colonial law governing colonial powers
on non-autonomous territories was mainly contained in the article
Spain’s legal obligations as administering power of Western Sahara 233
73 of the Charter. This represents an advance on the old League
of Nations approach in that political obligations are included with
the existing social and economic ones.
These two obligations are expressed as follows in the article
73:
The colonial authority must promote the social, economic
and educational ‘well-being of the colonised people:
Members of the United Nations which have or assume
responsibilities for the administration of territories whose peoples
have not yet attained a full measure of self-government recog-
nize the principle that the interests of the inhabitants of these
territories are paramount, and accept as a sacred trust the
obligation to promote to the utmost, within the system of
international peace and security established by the present
Charter, the well-being of the inhabitants of these territories ,
and, to this end:
(a) to ensure, with due respect for the culture of the peoples
concerned, their (…), economic, social, and educational
advancement, their just treatment, and their protection
against abuses;
(…)
(d) to promote constructive measures of development, to encou-
rage research, and to co-operate with one another and,
when and where appropriate, with specialized international
bodies with a view to the practical achievement of the social,
economic, and scientific purposes set forth in this Article;
(e) to transmit regularly to the Secretary-General for information
purposes, subject to such limitation as security and constitutio-
nal considerations may require, statistical and other informa-
tion of a technical nature relating to economic, social, and
educational conditions in the territories for which they are
respectively responsible other than those territories to which
Chapters XII and XIII apply.
and
Western Sahara Conference Proceedings234
The colonial authority must develop the ‘self-government’
of the territory:
10
Members of the United Nations which have or assume responsi-
bilities for the administration of territories whose peoples have
not yet attained a full measure of self-government (…) accept as
a sacred trust the obligation to promote to the utmost, within the
system of international peace and security established by the
present Charter, the well-being of the inhabitants of these
territories, and, to this end:
(a) to ensure, with due respect for the culture of the peoples
concerned, their political, (…) advancement, their just
treatment, and their protection against abuses;
(b) to develop self-government, to take due account of the
political aspirations of the peoples, and to assist them in
the progressive development of their free political
institutions, according to the particular circumstances of
each territory and its peoples and their varying stages of
advancement.
In a second stage, which started in 1960, these two
obligations were expanded considerably: first, the political;
and then the economic. The political obligations of the
administering power saw a sudden and transcendental shift
with the adoption of the Declaration on the Granting of
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (GA
resolution 1514 (XV, 1960)). The economic obligations, in
contrast, evolved more slowly.
As far as the political obligations are concerned, General
Assembly resolution 1514 XV, 1960 (above) is reasonably
radical. After stating that the self-determination is not only a
‘principle’ of the United Nations, but also a ‘right’ of the
peoples, it imposes on the administering powers the obligation
to immediately start an unconditional independence process.
Spain’s legal obligations as administering power of Western Sahara 235
However, this process must be undertaken in accordance with
the freely expressed will of the peoples:
Immediate steps shall be taken, in Trust and Non-Self-
Governing Territories or all other territories which have not yet
attained independence, to transfer all powers to the peoples
of those territories, without any conditions or reservations, in
accordance with their freely expressed will and desire, without
any distinction as to race, creed or colour, in order to enable
them to enjoy complete independence and freedom.
This new obligation was further regulated in General
Assembly resolutions 1541 (XV) and 2625 (XXV). These
resolutions raise the possibility that the colonised people may
choose freely between several options: full independence, and
free association with, or integration into any other state.
The economic obligations were developed subsequent to
the ‘permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and
resources’, first declared in General Assembly resolution 1314
(XIII), being extended to non-autonomous territories. The
consequence was that the administering power was specially
tasked to respect the economic right of non-self governing
territories to enjoy their resources. General Assembly resolution
44/84 (1989) reiterates that:
… [A]ny administering Power that deprives the colonial peoples
of Non-Self-Governing Territories of the exercise of their
legitimate rights over their natural resources, or subordinates the
rights and interests of those peoples to foreign economic and
financial interests, violates the solemn obligations it has assumed
under the Charter of the United Nations.
The economic obligations of the administering powers were
further developed in several GA resolutions.
First, the obligation to take effective measures to safeguard
and guarantee the inalienable rights of the peoples of the non-
Western Sahara Conference Proceedings236
self-governing territories to their natural resources was
introduced (GA resolutions 48/46 (1994)).
Urges the administering Powers concerned to take effective
measures to safeguard and guarantee the inalienable rights
of the peoples of the Non-Self-Governing Territories to their
natural resources, and to establish and maintain control over
the future development of those resources, and requests the
administering Powers to take all necessary steps to protect the
property rights of the peoples of those Territories.
It was further provided in General Assembly resolution
62/120 (extended to marine activities by GA resolution
62/113) that the economic activities of the administering
power should not ‘adversely affect the interests of the peoples’.
Calls upon the administering Powers to ensure that economic
and other activities in the Non-Self-Governing Territories
under their administration do not adversely affect the interests
of the peoples but instead promote development, and to assist
them in the exercise of their right to self-determination.
And
Calls upon the administering Powers to ensure that the
exploitation of the marine and other natural resources in the
Non-Self-Governing Territories under their administration is
not in violation of the relevant resolutions of the United
Nations, and does not adversely affect the interests of the
peoples of those Territories.
The status of Spain as administering power
Three different stages can be distinguished in establishing
Spain’s status in the Western Sahara.
Spain’s legal obligations as administering power of Western Sahara 237
Before 19 November 1975
In 1961, just a few years after its admission to the United
Nations, Spain accepted Western Sahara’s official classification
as a non-self-governing territory, ie as a colony. In 1963 Spain
accepted the inclusion of the issue on the agenda of the Fourth
Commission
11
so becoming part of the decolonisation process in
accordance with the United Nations Charter.
The United Nations subsequently recognised Spain as the
administering power of the Western Sahara. The first United
Nations General Assembly resolution to refer to Spain as the
‘administering Power (puissance administrante) of the Western
Sahara was resolution 2072 of 17 December 1965. In
paragraph 2 of this resolution the General Assembly urgently
requested ‘the Government of Spain, as the administering Power,
to take immediately all necessary measures for the liberation of
the Territories of Ifni and Spanish Sahara from colonial
domination’. Spain’s status as administering power was
confirmed in General Assembly resolutions: 2229 (20 December
1966), 2354 (19 December 1967), 2428 (27 December 1968),
2591 (16 December 1969), 2711 (14 December 1970), 2983
(14 December 1972) and 3162 (14 December 1973).
Between 19 November 1975 and 26 February 1976
On 14 November 1975, six days before Franco’s death, Spain
signed an Agreement with Morocco and Mauritania. This
agreement consisted of a ‘political declaration’ transmitted to the
United Nations and some secret annexes. The Declaration of
Principles between Spain, Morocco and Mauritania on the
Western Sahara Agreement
12
became commonly known as the
Madrid Agreement. In this agreement Spain agreed to establish
a tripartite (Spain-Morocco-Mauritania) interim administration to
which all the responsibilities and powers of Spain as ‘administe-
Western Sahara Conference Proceedings238
ring power’ would be transferred. In the first paragraph of the
agreement, Spain confirmed its ‘resolve to decolonize the
Territory of Western Sahara by terminating the responsibilities and
powers which it possesses over that Territory as administering
power’. According to the second paragraph of the Agreement,
Spain committed to ‘proceed forthwith to institute a temporary
administration for the Territory’. Morocco and Mauritania were
to participate, in collaboration with the Djemaa (the assembly of
Saharawi notables/sheikhs). All responsibilities and powers ari-
sing from Spain’s status as administering power over Western
Sahara were transferred to these two states. It was also agreed
that two Deputy Governors nominated by Morocco and Mauri-
tania should be appointed ‘to assist the Governor General of the
Territory in the performance of his function’. Finally, paragraph
2 of the agreement announced that the Spanish presence in
Western Sahara would be terminated by 28 February 1976 ‘at
the latest’. The Madrid Agreement entered into force on 19
November 1975, once Spain passed the law stipulated in
paragraph 6.
The Madrid Agreement provoked a sharp debate in the
General Assembly in November 1975. As a result two
resolutions were passed, both on 10 December 1975.
United Nations General Assembly resolution 3458(A)
specified Spain five times as ‘administering power’, twice in the
Preamble and three times in the main text. This carried special
relevance in that this specification was made after the Madrid
Agreement had been signed. In other words, in its resolution
3458(A) the General Assembly disregarded the Madrid
Agreement insofar as it failed to acknowledge the transfer of
the status of administering power to the tripartite entity (Spain-
Morocco-Mauritania).
Spain’s legal obligations as administering power of Western Sahara 239
United Nations General Assembly resolution 3458(B) noted
the tripartite agreement but did not endorse it insofar as it reques-
ted the interim administration to act differently than proposed in
the Madrid Agreement. Resolution 3458(B) requested the interim
administration not to consult only the Djemaa as the Madrid
Agreement provided, but to consult ‘all the Saharan population
originating in the territory’ and ‘to take all steps to ensure that all
the Saharan population in the territory will be able to exercise their
inalienable right to self-determination through free consultations
organized with the assistance of a representative of the United
Nations appointed by the Secretary-General’.
13
A consideration of these two resolutions leads to the
conclusion that the United Nations General Assembly did not
endorse the Madrid Agreement, and that Spain was still
considered the administering power. United Nations General
Assembly resolution 3458(A) simply ignored the Madrid
Agreement, while resolution 3458(B), although quoting it (‘took
note’ of it) ignored it because it requested a referendum that the
Madrid Agreement did allow for. According to the United
Nations, Spain was still to be considered the administering power
of the Western Sahara.
But there is another argument which shows that Spain,
although a signatory, did not regard the Madrid Agreement void.
On 26 February 1976, Spain’s Permanent Representative
to the United Nations sent a very important letter to the
Secretary General.
14
It was requested that this letter be
distributed as an official document in the General Assembly
and the Security Council. The letter stated that with immediate
effect the Spanish government terminated its presence in the
Western Sahara. In this document Spain deemed it necessary
to put two statements of major relevance on record:
Western Sahara Conference Proceedings240
(a) Spain considers itself henceforth exempt from any
responsibility of an international nature in connection with
the administration of the said Territory, in view of the
cessation of its participation in the temporary administra-
tion established for the Territory;
(b) the decolonization of the Western Sahara will be reached
when the opinion of the Saharawi population was validly
expressed.
Neither Morocco nor Mauritania objected to the Spanish
note. This letter is an international act of extraordinary relevance
as it serves as evidence that Spain remained the ‘administering
power’ of Western Sahara at that time. By this note, Spain not
only tried rid itself unilaterally of its responsibilities and status as
administering power, but also unilaterally re-interpreted the
agreement or referred it back to the international community to
establish that the Madrid Agreement did not effect decolonisa-
tion. And if statement (b) was made unilaterally by Spain, and not
by the tripartite administration, and there was no protest from
Morocco and Mauritania, it is because Spain explicitly, and
Morocco and Mauritania implicitly, considered that Western
Sahara had not been decolonised.
After 26 February 1976
From the above, there is no doubt that Western Sahara was not
decolonised through the Madrid Agreement. And this is confirmed
by the fact that the issue of Western Sahara is still on the Agenda
of the 4th Committee of the General Assembly. The question,
then, is who was the administering power after that date?
Morocco continues to invoke the Madrid Agreement as the
basis for title to its presence in the Western Sahara as
‘administering power’. As far as I could establish, this was last
done in a letter to the Secretary-General dated 26 January
2006.
15
In this letter Morocco said:
Spain’s legal obligations as administering power of Western Sahara 241
As long as there is no definitive agreement on a political
solution, Morocco, under the Madrid Accord of 14 November
1975 concluded with Spain, remains the sole competent
administrative authority [la seule autorité qui dispose des
compétences d’administration in the original French] over the
entire Territory of Western Sahara.
However, careful analysis of the Agreement reveals that
Morocco’s claim is highly questionable for various reasons.
First, Spain’s responsibilities and powers as administering
power were not transferred to Morocco under the Madrid
Agreement but to a tripartite entity ‘in which Morocco and
Mauritania will participate’ alongside Spain. Consequently, it
is incorrect to state that the Madrid Agreement gave Morocco
any exclusive status as administering power.
Secondly, the tripartite administration assumed not only the
powers, but also the responsibilities that corresponded to those of
Spain as administering power. The most important of these
responsibilities, according to international law, was the task of
decolonising the territory through a self-determination referendum
as demanded by United Nations General Assembly resolutions.
While this task was not included in the Madrid Agreement itself,
General Assembly resolution 3458(B) mention it clearly when
referring to the Agreement. Accordingly, the Madrid Agreement
failed to deliver one of the main responsibilities to be discharged
– the holding of a self-determination referendum. One could even
argue that as the Madrid Agreement neglects this major
responsibility of the administering power, it should be regarded
invalid.
Thirdly, it is also appropriate to recall that the tripartite
administration was meant to be temporary (interim). Hence, by
definition it was to wind up at the moment Spain abandoned
the territory, that is before 28 February 1976. Spain even
abandoned the territory two days earlier on 26 February 1976.
Western Sahara Conference Proceedings242
This means that after 26 February 1976 the tripartite
administration came to an end as one of the parties was absent.
The Madrid Agreement did not provide how the two remaining
actors could assume the rights of the tripartite administration. The
delegation of powers that Spain conceded to the tripartite
administration did not provide for sub-delegations.
Consequently, after 26 February 1976 the tripartite
administration ceased to exist and since administration was not
(to be) delegated, Morocco and Mauritania were no longer
co-administrators of the territory. Since 26 February 1976
Morocco is neither administering power nor co-administrator.
The Treaty on the Borders between Morocco and Mauritania
from April 14th 1976
16
proceeded to the partition and
annexation of Western Sahara. The partition of Western Sahara
is spelled out in article 1, while the annexation is established in
the article 2 (where both parties speak of ‘sovereignty’).
Both parties intended to conduct this partition and
annexation:
in conformity with the Declaration of Principles, signed in Madrid
on November 14
th
1975 which transferred to the interim
administration participated by Morocco and Mauritania with the
collaboration of the Djemaa, the responsibilities and powers
which Spain had on the Sahara.
17
However, the basis for this partition and annexation is void.
The main reason is that it is made on 14 April 1976, three
months after the termination of the interim administration on
26 February 1976. This means that, from whatever legal
perspective it is approached, the treaty lacked a legal basis on
which to justify the presence of Morocco and Mauritania in the
territory after 26 February 1976.
The United Nations had clearly stated that Morocco is
neither sovereign (as represented in the treaty of 14 April
Spain’s legal obligations as administering power of Western Sahara 243
1976), nor ‘administering power’ over the whole or part of
Western Sahara. This analysis was confirmed by the law of the
United Nations. When confronted with the question of Western
Sahara after Spain had abandoned the Territory, the United
Nations General Assembly clearly classified the presence of
Morocco in the Western Sahara as ‘continued occupation’.
18
Furthermore, a letter dated 29 January 2002 from the
United Nations Under-Secretary-General and Legal Counsel,
Hans Corell, to the President of the Security Council,
confirmed these conclusions as follows:
Morocco however, is not listed as the administering Power of
the territory in the United Nations list of Non Self Governing
Territories, and has, therefore, not transmitted information on
the territory in accordance with Articles 73 (e) of the United
Nations Charter.
19
After 26 February 1976 there is no United Nations
resolution stating that Spain is the ‘administering power’ of
Western Sahara. However, this does not mean a lack of United
Nations actions recognising this status. In every report by the
United Nations Secretary-General on ‘Information from Non-
Self-Governing Territories transmitted under Article 73(e) of the
Charter of the United Nations’, Spain was consistently referred
to as the administering power of Western Sahara.
20
Moreover, the United Nations Under-Secretary-General
and Legal Counsel, Hans Corell, also confirmed that in his
opinion Spain was the ‘administering power’ of the territory:
The Madrid Agreement did not transfer sovereignty over the
territory, nor did it confer upon any of the signatories the
status of an administering Power, a status which Spain alone
could not have unilaterally transferred.
21
However, Spain still has not completely abandoned the
administration of the territory. Spain still enjoys administering
Western Sahara Conference Proceedings244
competences in Western Sahara in two areas: airspace and
search and rescue missions.
As far as airspace is concerned, the airspace of the Western
Sahara is included in the Spanish airspace, and more precisely
in the Canary Islands Flight Information Region.
22
This means
that Morocco requires Spanish permission for flights in this
territory. This explains why, when the Moroccan air force wished
to conduct military exercises in Western Sahara (airspace over the
coast between El Aaiun and Dakhla-Villa Cisneros), it
approached Spain for permission. The press informed that
between 6 September and 31 December 2004, the Spanish Air
Force imposed restrictions on air traffic in this region to facilitate
the Moroccan military exercises.
23
Regarding the maritime space, in the framework of the
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, the
International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue
(signed at Hamburg 27 April 1979 and entered into force on
22 June 1985) divides the international waters into various
‘search and rescue regions’ (SAR regions). Certainly, the Annex
to this latter treaty, establishes that ‘the delimitation of search
and rescue regions is not related to and shall not prejudice the
delimitation of any boundary between States’.
24
According to the ocean atlas published by the International
Maritime Organisation (IMO) one of the Spanish ‘SAR regions’,
that of the Canary Islands, includes the entire coastline of
Western Sahara.
25
This certainly does not incorporate Western
Sahara within the Spanish borders, but it is an indication that the
waters of Western Sahara, though not under Spanish sovereignty,
are also not subject to Moroccan administration.
Since the appointment of Rodriguez Zapatero as prime
minister, the Spanish government has shown a radical shift in its
traditional position in that it recognised Morocco as the
Spain’s legal obligations as administering power of Western Sahara 245
administering power of Western Sahara. The Zapatero
government is the first Spanish government after Franco’s death,
to recognise Morocco as Western Sahara's ‘administering
power’. A number of highly placed government representatives
have repeatedly insisted that Morocco is the territory’s administe-
ring power. In June 2005 Spanish Foreign Affairs Minister,
Miguel Ángel Moratinos, stated as many as four times that the
Madrid Agreement ‘gave Morocco its quality as administering
power recognised by United Nations’. Statements to this effect
were made on 22 June 2005 in the Senate, on 27 June 2005
during the Tele 5 channel program La Mirada Crítica, on 29
June 2005 in the Spanish Congress, and on 7 August 2005 in
the city of Asilah, Morocco. In turn, Agustín Santos, Executive
Assessor for Parliamentary Matters at the Spanish Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, alluded to the ‘Moroccan authorities, as the
Western Sahara administering power’.
26
However, as far as I know, this does not mean that either
the airspace of Western Sahara, or the search and rescue
competence in the waters of Western Sahara, has been
transferred to Morocco.
Spain’s legal obligations as administering
power: Doubts and responsibilities
The position of Western Sahara, then, is closely akin, though not
identical, to that of East Timor. As in East Tomor, the
‘administering power’ (Spain, Portugal) lost its effective dominion
at least over the territorial space of the country. When the East-
Timor case was argued before the International Court of
Justice,
27
no one contended that Portugal was still the ‘administe-
ring power’ of the colony, although, as in the Western Sahara
case, no General Assembly resolution mentioned it after 1975.
However, the cases do differ: in Western Sahara the occupying
Western Sahara Conference Proceedings246
power does not occupy all the territory; and the colonised people
have founded their own state (the SADR) which controls a part of
the territory and is recognised by an important number of states.
This special context in the case of Western Sahara, raises the
question of Spain’s obligations as administering power and the
extent to which these obligations have been honoured. As stated
earlier, an administering power has two main types of obligation:
political (to take immediate steps towards the independence of
the colony) and social, economic and cultural.
Spain is firstly subject to the obligations imposed on all
member states of the United Nations, among them: to
observe, respect and promote the right of self-determination,
and to maintain the separate and distinct character of Western
Sahara, and to avoid any obstacle to future self-determination.
But then, it also has special obligations as administering
power. According to the General Assembly resolution 1514
(XV), Spain, has an obligation to take: ‘[i]mmediate steps … to
transfer all powers to the peoples of those territories, without
any conditions or reservations, in accordance with their freely
expressed will and desire’.
In the case of Western Sahara, the problem is that part of
the occupied Territory and the occupying power, reject the
holding of a free referendum to establish whether the people
of Western Sahara want independence, notwithstanding that
their right to independence has been acknowledged by both
the General Assembly and the International Court of Justice
which saw no obstacle to the application of resolution 1514
(XV) to the Western Sahara.
The question is what are Spain’s obligations in this case? As
was stated in the letter dated 26 February 1976: ‘…(b) the
decolonization of the Western Sahara will be reached when the
opinion of the Saharawi population was validly expressed’.
Spain’s legal obligations as administering power of Western Sahara 247
But what can be done if the opinion of the Saharawi
population cannot be validly expressed? In my opinion, the right
of self-determination of a people cannot be derailed simply
because the administering power is unable to hold a referendum
to establish the freely expressed will of the whole colony. It could
be contended that when the non-occupied part of the people
expresses its wish to hold the referendum, Spain will be under an
obligation (and not merely a right) to recognise, even if only
provisionally, a state proclaimed by the people exercising their
right to independence. But, what is not contended is that, in such
a case, the United Nations has a responsibility to the people of
Western Sahara. And certainly, the resolutions of the General
Assembly reaffirm this
28
when they state that the General
Assembly reaffirms the ‘responsibility of the United Nations
towards the people of the Western Sahara’.
As in the case of political obligations, Spain is subject to the
economic, social and educational obligations applicable to all
the members of the international community. Among these, it
is important to note that:
Member States shall wage a vigorous and sustained
campaign against activities and practices of foreign
economic, financial and other interests operating in colonial
Territories and on behalf of colonial Powers and their allies,
as these constitute a major obstacle to the achievement of the
goals embodied in resolution 1514 (XV). Member States shall
consider the adoption of necessary steps to have their
nationals and companies under their jurisdiction discontinue
such activities and practices; these steps should also aim at
preventing the systematic influx of foreign immigrants into
colonial Territories, which disrupts the integrity and social,
political and cultural unity of the peoples under colonial
domination.
29
Western Sahara Conference Proceedings248
But, as administering power Spain is also subject to these
obligations. The General Assembly:
Reiterates that any administering Power that deprives the colonial
peoples of Non-Self-Governing Territories of the exercise of their
legitimate rights over their natural resources, or subordinates the
rights and interests of those peoples to foreign economic and
financial interests, violates the solemn obligations it has assumed
under the Charter of the United Nations;
30
and:
Urges the administering Powers concerned to take effective
measures to safeguard and guarantee the inalienable rights
of the peoples of the Non-Self-Governing Territories to their
natural resources, and to establish and maintain control over
the future development of those resources, and requests the
administering Powers to take all necessary steps to protect the
property rights of the peoples of those Territories;
31
and:
Calls upon the administering Powers to ensure that economic
and other activities in the Non-Self-Governing Territories
under their administration do not adversely affect the interests
of the peoples but instead promote development, and to assist
them in the exercise of their right to self-determination;
32
and:
Calls upon the administering Powers to ensure that the
exploitation of the marine and other natural resources in the
Non-Self-Governing Territories under their administration is
not in violation of the relevant resolutions of the United
Nations, and does not adversely affect the interests of the
peoples of those Territories.
33
If the fulfilment of its political obligations by the
administering power is difficult in the context of the Western
Sahara, it seems that this is not so in respect to its economic
obligations. There is now an ongoing process of exploitation
Spain’s legal obligations as administering power of Western Sahara 249
of the natural resources of the Western Sahara (phosphate and
fisheries). We also find the establishment of economic
initiatives by the occupying power in order to obtain benefits
from the sand, from agriculture, and from tourism. In all these
activities, Spain is involved.
The maritime resources are being exploited by Morocco with
the complicity of Spain through the Fisheries Agreement signed
by the European Union and Morocco.
34
Spain actively lobbied
for and voted in favour of such an agreement. The agreement:
(a) included the waters of the Western Sahara; (b) those waters
were not treated separately from those of Morocco; (c) the
economic compensation from the European Union did not
benefit the local Saharawi population; and (d) a huge majority of
the people involved in the agreement in Western Sahara
(approximately 95%) were not Saharawi citizens included as such
in the United Nations census of those eligible to take part in the
referendum on self-determination. It is very clear that this
agreement presents a major obstacle to the self-determination of
the Western Sahara.
35
As far as the phosphates are concerned, all the revenue
benefits from their exploitation accrue to a Moroccan-owned
company. Even if this sector represents a larger percentage of
Saharawi workers than the fisheries sector, there is no provision
reserving these jobs for the Saharawi, despite the high
unemployment rate among the native population. Hence the
trade in phosphates, too, presents an obstacle to self-deter-
mination. There are several foreign firms importing Saharawi
phosphates, among them a Spanish firm (FMC Foret) which has
met with no opposition from the Spanish government.
The sand is also a product imported, in the main, by Spain.
Here again, benefits for the local population are unclear as
Morocco fails to comply with the reporting obligation under
Western Sahara Conference Proceedings250
article 73(e) of the United Nations Charter. In the agricultural
sector, as with fisheries and phosphates, the product labelling
fails to specify that the product originated in a territory
separate and distinct from Morocco. Finally, the occupying
power is trying to build a tourist infrastructure, but also here
there is no evidence that the revenue generated will benefit the
local population as there appear to be no plans to employ the
local native population officially identified by the United
Nations as members of the Saharawi people. There are also
Spanish firms involved in these projects.
36
The problems raised by the decolonisation process in
Western Sahara present distinctive features. Although Spanish
non-compliance with its economic legal obligations as
‘administering power’ is clear, its political legal obligations are
less clear-cut. This is why I feel that the following questions
should be posed by the General Assembly in a request to the
International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion:
(i) Does Spain remain the administering power of the Western
Sahara under United Nations resolutions?
(ii) If so, is it obliged to hold a referendum on self-determina-
tion?
(iii) If Spain cannot comply with this obligation, does the
United Nations have a corresponding obligation to hold a
referendum on self-determination?
Conclusions
Three models have been formulated under international law to
deal with the relationship between the coloniser and its colony:
(a) the obligation to promote the well-being of the colony
compatible with its annexation; (b) the obligation to promote
its well-being and grant it independence; and (c) the
obligation to grant the colony independence without delay.
Spain’s legal obligations as administering power of Western Sahara 251
The history of colonial law shows how the different models
have been implemented. The first model was adopted in the
colonial law derived from the General Act of Berlin in 1885. This
was also the model in colonial law under the Covenant of the
League of Nations, although here for the first time reference was
made to the possibility that a people could be able to stand
alone. With the establishment of the United Nations, we have
seen a sea-change regarding the obligations of third parties and
administering powers. Nowadays, there is no doubt that there is
a legal obligation to grant colonised peoples who freely express
the desire, independence as soon as possible. This political
obligation is complemented by a progressively stricter obligation
to avoid any economic activity which may block the indepen-
dence of a non-autonomous territory.
The legal status of Spain in the Western Sahara has seen
three different stages. During the first – until November 1975
– Spain was the unquestioned de facto and de iure
‘administering power’; during the second – November 1975
to February 1976 – its legal position as administering power
was blurred by a de facto and probably illegal ‘tripartite
administration’ by Spain-Morocco-Mauritania; during the third
– February 1976 to date –, Spain unilaterally abandoned its
position as ‘administering power’, but the United Nations has
not accepted this ‘abandonment’ and still regards Spain as the
de iure administering power which continues to exercise certain
de facto administrative functions.
Even if its position is principally that of a de iure
administering power, Spain has obligations, both political and
economic, which it must fulfil. Developments on the ground
show that there have been some economic and legal issues on
which Spain has been compelled to take a position. The best
known of these is the fisheries agreement between the
Western Sahara Conference Proceedings252
1
Brown Scott The Spanish origin of international law (1934).
2
De Vitoria De indis recenter inventis (1934) 119.
3
De Carranza Ratione fidei potest Caesar debellare et tener indos novi Orbis
1540 in Pereña Vicente Misión de España en América (1956) at 38ss.
4
Cano De dominio indiorum in Pereña Vicente n 3 above at 90.
5
Id at 109.
6
French version in CIJ Mémoires Sahara Occidental vols I and II (Exposés
écrits et documents) t II 89; Spanish original version in Diego Aguirre Historia
del Sahara Español 163.
7
French version of this text in CIJ Mémoires n 6 above at t II 96; Spanish
original version Diego Aguirre n 6 above at 164.
8
CIJ Mémoires n 6 above at t I 288.
9
East Timor (Portugal v Australia) 1995 ICJ Rep par 29.
10
See also art 76.b for the ‘trust territories’.
11
De Pinies y Rubio La Descolonización Española en Naciones Unidas (2001)
91 ss.
12
1975 United Nations Treaty Series 258.
13
Paragraph 4.
14
UN Doc A/31/56 S/11997. For the printed text, see Official Records of
the Security Council, Thirty-first Year, Supplement for January, February and
March 1976; Published also, in the newspaper ABC (27-II-1976) 15-16 and
in De Piniés n 11 above at 809-810.
15
S/2006/52.
16
1977 United Nations Treaty Series 118-119.
European Union and the Kingdom of Morocco affecting the
waters of Western Sahara. The evidence points to Spain not
complying with its legal obligations as administering power
with the result that it could be held responsible for the violation
of its obligations under international law. The distinct
characteristics of the case make it highly desirable that the
International Court of Justice be approached for an advisory
opinion on how Spain (or any other administering power) can
best fulfil its political obligations vis-à-vis the Western Sahara
to facilitate the decolonisation of the territory.
Endnotes
Spain’s legal obligations as administering power of Western Sahara 253
17
Preamble to the Treaty.
18
UNGA res 34/37 pars 5 and 6 of 21 November 1979 and 35/19 pars 3
and 9 of 1 November 1980.
19
UN Doc S/2002/161 n 6 s 7.
20
See UN docs A 61/70 [2006] and A/62/67 [2007].
21
UN Doc S/2002/161 s 6.
22
http://www.aena.es/csee/Satellite?cid=1047658457254&pagename=
subHome&SMO=1&SiteName=NavegacionAerea&Section=3&c=Page
&MO=1&Language=EN_GB.
23
This information was published in several news: Press releases from
Agencia Canaria de Noticias-CAN (7-10-2004) [http://es.groups.yahoo.com
/group/sahara-info/ message/2965], La Opinión de Tenerife (11-10-2004)
[http://es.groups.yahoo.com /group/sahara-info/message/2962].
24
Annex par 2.1.7.
25
http://www.oceansatlas.com/unatlas/issues/emergencies/gmdss_sar/SA
RMAP.PDF.
26
Reference of these acts in Ruiz Miguel at 310.
27
East Timor (Portugal v Australia) n 9 above.
28
See, lately GA resolutions 58/109 [2003], 59/ 131 [2004], 60/114
[2005], 61/125 ][2006], 62/116 [2007].
29
Resolution 2621 (XXV) 1970.
30
GA res 44/84 (1989).
31
GA res 48/46 (1994).
32
GA res 62/113) (2007).
33
Ibid.
34
Council Regulation (EC) No 764/2006 of 22 May 2006 on the conclusion
of the Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Community
and the Kingdom of Morocco; OJ L141 of 29/05/2006 at 1.
35
Milano ‘The new Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European
Community and the kingdom of Morocco: Fishing too south? (2006) XXII
Anuario de Derecho Internacional 413 ss.
36
Further information: Western Sahara Resources Watch www.wsrw.org.
... In 1975, Spain tried to cede administrative control of the territory to a joint Moroccan 4 and Mauritanian administration in the Madrid Agreement. However, in Resolution 3458 (A), which was issued shortly after the Agreement was signed, the UNGA ignored its stipulations (Ruis-Miguel 2008), meaning that the UN does not recognise the legality of the cession of Spain's status of 'administrative power' or its sovereignty. In the words of the report of 29 January 2002 written by the UN Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs, Hans Corell, the Agreement 'did not transfer sovereignty over the territory, nor did it confer upon any of the signatories [Morocco and Mauritania] the status of an administering Power, a status which Spain alone could not have unilaterally transferred' (Corell 2002). ...
Article
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Natural resources have been defined by the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, Polisario Front, and a number of non-governmental organisations not only as an essential part of the Western Sahara conflict, but also as a battlefield that has attracted the interest of the international community. This article explores how the ethical trade guidelines of two large institutional investors – the Norwegian and Swedish pension funds – have affected the behaviour of companies that export and exploit the natural resources of Western Sahara. The results of applying a triad-network model suggest that as pension funds have more instruments of influence, their strategy becomes more effective. Moreover, investments that follow ethical trade guidelines play a key role in pressuring companies to modify objectionable behaviours.
Article
Full-text available
The EU’s international agreements with Morocco on trade in agricultural and fishery products have drawn criticism due to their application to the disputed territory of Western Sahara, a territory that remains on the list of non-self-governing territories to be decolonised in accordance with the right of self-determination of the indigenous Sahrawi people. Recently, the Sahrawi liberation movement Front Polisario brought an action for annulment before the General Court of the European Union (GC) against the Council Decision approving the conclusion of one such agreement, alleging multiple violations of European and international legal norms. Interestingly, although the GC concurred by annulling the Decision insofar as it applies to Western Sahara, it chose to exclusively base its judgment on EU fundamental rights, invoking the EU’s failure to ensure that the fundamental rights of the Sahrawi people were not infringed by applying the agreements to Western Sahara. By summarily setting aside Front Polisario’s other claims, several relevant questions of applicable international and European law, which warrant further discussion, remain. This article examines these questions using the GC’s judgment in Front Polisario, thereby combining general matters of international and European law with the specific circumstances of the EU-Morocco relations and Western Sahara.
Article
1. INTRODUCTION. 2. A SHORT REHEARSAL OF THE WESTERN SAHARA QUESTION. 3. THE 2006 FISHERIES PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT. 4. THE LEGAL VALIDITY OF THE FPA WITH REGARD TO WESTERN SAHARA. 5. THE COMPATIBILITY OF THE FPA WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW. 6. THE EC AND THE OBLIGATION OF NON-RECOGNITION APPLIED TOWESTERN SAHARA. 7. THE LAW OF OCCUPATION AND THE USE OF NATURAL RESOURCES BY MOROCCO. 8. POSSIBLE CHALLENGES OF THE FPA BEFORE JUDICIAL INSTITUTIONS. 9. CONCLUSIONS.
De Carranza Ratione fidei potest Caesar debellare et tener indos novi Orbis 1540 in Pereña Vicente Misión de España en
De Carranza Ratione fidei potest Caesar debellare et tener indos novi Orbis 1540 in Pereña Vicente Misión de España en América (1956) at 38ss.
For the printed text, see Official Records of the Security Council, Thirty-first Year, Supplement for Published also, in the newspaper ABC (27-II-1976) 15-16 and in De Piniés n 11 above at 809-810
  • A Doc
Doc A/31/56 S/11997. For the printed text, see Official Records of the Security Council, Thirty-first Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1976; Published also, in the newspaper ABC (27-II-1976) 15-16 and in De Piniés n 11 above at 809-810. 15 S/2006/52.
For the printed text, see Official Records of the Security Council, Thirty-first Year, Supplement for
  • Un Doc
UN Doc. A/31/56 S/11997. For the printed text, see Official Records of the Security Council, Thirty-first Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1976; Published also, in the newspaper ABC (27-II-1976), p. 15-16 and in De Piniés, La Descolonización española, pp. 809-810.