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P R W P 7012
School Autonomy and Accountability
in ailand
A Systems Approach for Assessing Policy Intent
and Implementation
Gustavo Arcia
Kevin MacDonald
Harry Anthony Patrinos
Education Global Practice Group
August 2014
WPS7012
Public Disclosure AuthorizedPublic Disclosure AuthorizedPublic Disclosure AuthorizedPublic Disclosure Authorized
Produced by the Research Support Team
Abstract
e Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the ndings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development
issues. An objective of the series is to get the ndings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. e papers carry the
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. e ndings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those
of the authors. ey do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and
its aliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
P R W P 7012
is paper is a product of the Education Global Practice Group. It is part of a larger eort by the World Bank to provide
open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research
Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. e authors may be contacted at hpatrinos@
worldbank.org .
ere is a consensus on the need for ailand to reform its
education system to be able to compete with other high
performing countries in the region. In terms of learning
outcomes, the most recent evidence from the Programme
for International Student Assessment shows little improve-
ment over time. is paper uses the World Bank’s Systems
Approach for Better Education Results (SABER) approach
in ailand to contrast policy intent and policy imple-
mentation in school autonomy and accountability. e
policy implementation data were obtained from a survey
of school principals of the schools that participated in the
Programme for International Student Assessment and
merged the data sets. First, the study analyzes the gap
between policy intent and policy implementation. en it
examines the eect of the gaps on various schooling out-
comes while controlling for covariates. e analysis nds
signicant dierences between the Systems Approach for
Better Education Results indicators of policy intent and
policy implementation in all areas assessed by the indica-
tors. Schools in ailand exercise more exibility in their
personnel management in practice than what is intended
by policy; student assessments need to address issues of
content, reliability, and validity and school accountability
needs to improve the interpretation of student assessments
to make schools more accountable. ere is a positive asso-
ciation between the Programme for International Student
Assessment scores and school autonomy and accountability.
School Autonomy and Accountability in Thailand:
A Systems Approach for Assessing Policy Intent and Implementation
Gustavo Arcia
Kevin MacDonald
Harry Anthony Patrinos1
JEL No: H4,I20,I25,J24,O15
Keywords: educational policy; educational autonomy; school accountability; Thailand
1 We thank Sunee Kleinin, Institute for the Promotion of Teaching Science and Technology, Thailand, for her
coordination of the school survey and data coding, and Angie Rivera Olvera, for her assistance with the school-level
dataset. We are indebted to Derek Pornsima, Advisor to the Secretary-General of KHURUSAPHA (Teachers’
Council of Thailand) and Kraiyos Pratawart, Quality Learning Foundation, for their support during the different
phases of this study. At the World Bank Office in Bangkok we thank Vachraras Pasuksuwan for her invaluable
assistance with the management and logistics of the SABER survey, and Lars Sondergaard, for his assistance and
advice during the policy dialogue with the Government. We also would like to thank Benjalug Namfa, former
Deputy Secretary General, Office of the Basic Education Commission, and Wongduan Suwansiri, Academic
Officer, Office of the Basic Education Commission, for their participation and support during the phase of policy
dialogue within the education sector in Bangkok. Gustavo Arcia and Kevin MacDonald are World Bank Consultants
and Harry Anthony Patrinos is Manager, Education, World Bank.
School Autonomy and Accountability in Thailand: A Systems Approach for Assessing
Policy Intent and Implementation
Summary
• There are significant differences between the indicators of policy intent and implementation.
• Schools in Thailand exercise more flexibility in their budget planning and management, and in
personnel management than is intended by policy.
• Student assessments need to address issues of content, reliability and validity.
• School accountability needs to improve the interpretation of student assessments to make
schools more accountable.
• There is a positive association between reading scores and school autonomy in budgetary and
personnel management.
Thailand: Benchmarking Policy Intent and Implementation in
School Autonomy and Accountability
Indicator
Policy
Intent
Policy
Implementation
School Autonomy in Budget Planning and Approval
Emerging
Established
School Autonomy in Personnel Management
Latent
Emerging
Participation of the School Council in School Finance
Established
Established
Assessment of School and Student Performance
Advanced
Established
School Accountability
Established
Emerging
Notes: Latent: reflects policy not in place or limited engagement; Emerging: reflects some good practice but still in
progress; Established: reflects good practice with some limitations; and Advanced reflects international best practice
2
1. Introduction
There is a general consensus on the need for Thailand to reform its education system to be able
to compete with other high performing countries in the region (Patrinos et al. 2012). Education
is crucial for economic growth (Jimenez, Nguyen and Patrinos 2012) and increasing the level of
education of the labor force in rural areas contributed to 26 percent of the reduction in poverty.
Nevertheless, Thai workers do not possess the skill set necessary to compete in the East Asian
manufacturing markets (Bhaopichitr, Mala and Triratanasirikul 2012).
In terms of learning outcomes, the most recent evidence from PISA (OECD 2013) shows little
improvement. In mathematics, the annualized rate of growth in Thai scores did not change since
2009, while reading scores increased by 1 percent and science scores by 4 percent. Despite these
modest advances in reading and science, Thailand had a lower than average share of high
scorers, and a higher than average share of low scorers, than the average for the 64 countries
participating in PISA.
The Thai education system over-emphasizes inputs and has a large administrative structure that
results in lower salaries for all, which reduces the probability of offering higher salaries for better
teachers. This structural problem reduces equity and efficiency, and leads to a lack of higher-
level and critical thinking among students (Fry and Bi 2013).
Overall, there is a general consensus that Thailand will need to reconcile its intent in education
system policies with the reality of the school level. One step in this direction is to assess the gap
between policy intent and policy implementation, which is the main focus of this analysis.
The objective of this analysis is to compare policy intent with policy implementation in school
autonomy and accountability in Thailand, with the purpose of assisting policy dialogue based on
school-level evidence. Benchmarking policy implementation can be very useful for decision
makers because the difference between policy intent and policy implementation can help fine
tune the incentives and disincentives required at the school level to ensure that education policy
has its desired effect.
Box 1—SABER. The Systems Approach for Better Education Results (SABER) is an initiative of
the World Bank with the purpose of producing comparative data and knowledge on education
policies and institutions. Its aim is to help countries systematically strengthen their education
systems. SABER evaluates the quality of education policies against evidence-based global standards,
using new diagnostic tools and detailed policy data collected for the initiative. The SABER approach
encompasses: (i) an analytical framework to guide policy dialogue and foster policy reforms; (ii)
relevant new data and information on education policies and institutional practices from other
countries in the world, and (iii) concise analyses of how well the policies and institutions in each
domain are aligned toward achieving Learning for All. SABER’s systems approach recognizes that
improving education requires strengthening all factors that improve learning, and that a system's
policies for governance, accountability, information systems, financ
ing rules, and school
management have to be aligned to ensure good performance. In the process, SABER identifies some
common policy and institutional threads that run through most of the more successful experiences,
allowing users to use the information as a tool for their own policy dialogue.
Source: http://saber.worldbank.org/index.cfm
3
Data for this analysis comes from the assessment of indicators of School Autonomy and
Accountability using a scale developed under the World Bank’s Systems Approach for Better
Education Results, or SABER (see Box 1). The assessment of the indicators of policy intent in
School Autonomy and Accountability was done in the first trimester of 2011, and validated
during the East Asia Regional Conference on Systems Approach for Better Education Results
(SABER), June 6-8, 2011 (World Bank 2012). The assessment of the indicators for policy
implementation was done in 2012, using data collected in the 226 schools that were sampled by
the 2009 PISA.
The report is organized as follows: Section 2 presents an overview of education in Thailand,
setting the stage for the assessment of its education policies. Section 3 gives an overview of
school autonomy and accountability through a conceptual framework that is used as the basis for
the development of indicators of policy intent and policy implementation. Section 4 summarizes
the results of the benchmarking on policy intent and discusses the content of the intent and
implementation rubrics. This section presents the basic results of the two benchmarks. Section 5
presents the results of the implementation survey, and the links between the intent-
implementation gaps with PISA results and selected covariates, and section 6 presents the
conclusions and recommendations.
2. Education in Thailand: Searching for the path to high performance in education
Education in Thailand is regulated by the Education Act of 2002, which establishes that all
children should compulsorily study for nine years—six years of primary plus three years of
lower secondary (OBEC 2003). For the past few years Thailand has made substantial gains in
secondary education achievement, getting closer to the levels of the better performing countries
in East Asia. UNESCO (2011) estimates that the school-life expectancy in Thailand is 12.3 years
of education, which means that, on average, Thai youth are expected to finish secondary school.
Still, the Ministry of Education considers that Thailand has structural problems that are
manifested in different forms:
• Education quality remains low due, mostly to the scarcity of good teachers. Based on
learning assessments, there is a need to substantially improve learning in mathematics in
primary school and in science in secondary school.
• Non-formal education still falls short of adequate coverage, particularly in rural areas, and
problems continue in the area of education quality, which vary significantly by schools
managed by different agencies.
• There is a need to improve primary and secondary education in order to produce students
with higher levels of critical thinking and improved levels of problem-solving skills.
• Inequalities persist in education funding, especially between urban and rural areas.
Starting in 2002 school finances and school administration were decentralized at the Education
Service Area level. The Education Service Area (ESA) is a division of the Ministry of Education
responsible for the overseeing, monitoring, evaluation and dissolution of basic education
institutions. The ESA also coordinates and promotes private institutions in the area and for the
coordination with the Local Administrative Organizations (LAO, which are managed by the
Ministry of the Interior). The ESA receives the transfers from the Ministry of Finance and
4
distributes the funds to the LOA or directly to schools. The LAO is the institution that will
eventually administer schools autonomously. In the meantime, decentralization is in progress,
transferring authorities from the ESA to the LAO as soon as it is feasible. Each LAO is
administered by an Area Committee for Education, which includes community representatives,
the Local Administrative Organization, the teachers’ association, the educational administrator
associations, the parents’ association, and educational scholars. Geographically, the Education
Service Area is above the local level but below the provincial level (UNESCO 2009). Under the
decentralized framework schools are free to manage their non-salary expenditures. The Ministry
of Education regulates policies and planning at the central level and each of the 76 provinces
develops its own provincial plan, while local governments develop their own local policies.
Teachers are managed under the rules of the Teachers Civil Service Commission, which now
allows for some managerial tasks to be performed by the Education Institution Committee at the
local level. Teacher management has also been decentralized to the ESA level, but the
Commission for Teachers and Administrative Personnel still has substantial influence, leaving
the ESA only with the responsibility for the recruitment and deployment of teachers.
In terms of access, Thailand has made substantial progress in the last two decades. The gross
enrollment rate for primary school is now above 100 percent; for lower secondary, it is 99
percent; and for upper secondary, 76 percent. In 2012 there were more than 5 million children
enrolled in primary education, more than 4.7 million in secondary education and 2 million in
tertiary education (UNESCO Institute of Statistics 2014). In addition, almost 1 million children
attended vocational education (UNESCO 2011). Still, full coverage in basic education is not
complete due to inaccessibility of some areas, and lower school access among the poor.
3. A Model for Assessing School Autonomy and Accountability
Intuitively, good school management is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for learning.
However, improper or inadequate management practices can be a substantial barrier to school
and student performance. One can fix some managerial components and obtain no results or alter
some other components and obtain good results. What combination of management practices are
crucial for success are still under study, but the emerging body of practice point to a set of
variables that foster managerial autonomy, the assessment of results, and the use of the
assessment to promote accountability among all stakeholders (Patrinos, Velez and Wang 2013).
The lessons learned in the last 30 years indicate that by combining managerial autonomy,
assessing student learning, and being accountable to parents and other stakeholders tends to
produce good school performance and increased learning (Bruns, Filmer and Patrinos 2011).
Together, these factors work like a system; that is, they work as a set of interconnected variables
that can improve learning when they operate in close coordination. Moreover, these factors have
well identified components that all schools can manage on their own, such as the management of
the operating budget, the responsibility for selecting and managing teachers and staff, the
management of the school’s infrastructure, and the monitoring and evaluation of teacher
performance and of student learning outcomes.
School autonomy is a form of school management in which schools are given decision-making
authority over their operations (Patrinos 2011). Autonomy may take different forms and may
include the hiring and firing of personnel, and the assessment of teachers and pedagogical
5
practices. School management under autonomy may give an important role to the School
Council—representing the interests of parents—in budget planning and approval, as well as a
voice/vote in personnel decisions.2 By including the School Council in school management,
school autonomy fosters accountability (Di Gropello 2004, 2006; Barrera, Fasih and Patrinos
2009).
School accountability is defined as the acceptance of responsibility for one’s actions. In school
management accountability may take other additional meanings, including: (i) the act of
compliance with the rules and regulations of school governance; (ii) reporting to those with
oversight authority over the school and (iii) linking rewards and sanctions to expected results
(Heim 1996; Rechebei 2010).
Viewing the school as a closed system can lead to good insights on how to improve its
performance. System performance is maximized when all variables are synchronized, allowing
the system to close its internal loops. Under this framework, school management activities make
sense when they contribute to system closure, otherwise they may have little impact on
performance and become just a collection of isolated managerial activities. If school autonomy
and school accountability regulate school management, managerial activities should foster an
enabling environment for teachers and students, allowing for pedagogical variables, school
inputs, and personal effort to work as intended, and helping achieve system closure.
In that vein it is clear that for managerial factors to become critical the system has to achieve
closure before their components reach a critical status. If a system closes, the sudden rupture in
one of its components only leads to an imperfect solution. Therefore, defining a managerial
system that can achieve closure is conceptually important. If the system is unable to close, are
partial solutions effective? Yes, in a broad sense, in which schools can still function but their
degree of effectiveness and efficiency would be lower than if the system closes. In this regard,
the available evidence indicates that a school’s system can increase its chances of closure when it
enforces enough autonomy to evaluate its results and use those results to hold someone
accountable.
The main conclusion of the lessons learned on school-based management is that schools can
improve learning for all students when they interconnect managerial autonomy, student
assessments, and accountability, by aligning the functions of the school councils, the policies for
improving teacher quality, and the functioning of the Education Management Information
Systems (EMIS).
3.1 Autonomy and Accountability as System Components
School autonomy and school accountability allow a school to close its internal system and
maximize performance. Figure 1 shows how they interact with other system components and
how they help achieve system closure and maximize performance. School Councils are crucial
for implementing school autonomy because they become the representatives of the school
clients: parents and students. As such, the School Council can be a resource to school
management in the process of tailoring school services (curricula, teaching materials, school
2 For ease of presentation the term School Council Is used to represent the school-level organizations that represent
parents and that are often referred to Parent-Teacher Association, Parent Council, among other names.
6
calendar, and teacher selection) to the needs of students. A more active role of School Councils
in school governance can make school autonomy more effective.
Source: Arcia, Macdonald, Porta and Patrinos 2011
Teacher quality is interrelated with the assessment of teachers and students. The main objective
of any assessment system is to monitor learning, which in turn is strongly linked to teacher
quality. Hence, for the education system to achieve closure, one needs to link school and student
assessment to teacher performance and teacher quality.
Finally, information about student performance is linked to accountability because it is the
mechanism in place to report on performance indicators at the school and system levels. In this
vein, Education Management Information Systems (EMIS) help enforce accountability to the
extent that it is fed data of good quality and it is used to produce reports that are informative to
parents and society about the performance of the education sector.
In summary, the interrelation between Autonomy, Assessment, and Accountability must be made
operational by reinforcing the roles of school councils, policies aimed at improving teacher
quality, and the operation of an Education Management Information System. Otherwise, there is
a risk that the system may not reach closure.
It must be pointed out that the above links are conceptual in nature, since the empirical evidence
tends to confound these factors. However, in managerial terms it is clear that the point of contact
between autonomous schools and their clients is primarily through the school council (Corrales
2006). Similarly, school assessments are the vehicles used by schools to determine their needs
7
for changes in pedagogical practices and to determine the training needs of their teachers. Both,
pedagogical changes and teacher training are determinant factors of teacher quality (Vegas
2001). Finally, the role of EMIS on accountability has been well established and it is bound to
increase as technology makes it easier to report on indicators of internal efficiency and on
standardized test scores (Bruns, Filmer, and Patrinos 2011).
3.2 Linking the conceptual framework with SABER Indicators
The last paragraph in the previous section helps define the types of indicators that would signal
system closure and ensure better performance. Five indicators are used to benchmark school
autonomy and accountability (SABER):
1. School autonomy in budget planning and approval – an increasing degree of local control
over operating funds to better reflect the interests of parents and to improve operational
efficiency
2. School autonomy in personnel management – giving the school more control over its
teachers; depending on the laws, this control can range from teacher selection, to teacher
contracting, and teacher salaries and bonuses
3. The participation of the school council (or the Parent Teacher Association as it is called in
many countries) in school finance – dealing with their role in budget planning and
management
4. The assessment of school and student performance – the regular measurement of teacher
performance, student learning, or both; measuring school and student performance is a key
precondition for ensuring accountability
5. School accountability to stakeholders – mechanisms in place to be held accountable to
parents, local governments, and society at large
Each of these indicators has a set of sub-indicators that give more details on the subject. Each
indicator and sub-indicator is classified as Latent, Emerging, Established or Advanced. A Latent
score indicates that the policy behind the indicator is not yet in place. An Emerging score
indicates that the implementation of the program or policy is in progress. An Established score
indicates that the program or policy is in operation and meets the minimum standards. An
Advanced score indicates that the program or policy is in operation and reflects best practice.
3.3 Data Collection Process for the Policy Implementation Indicators
All the 230 schools that participated in the PISA 2009 cycle were given a questionnaire for
assessing school autonomy and accountability developed by the SABER initiative. The
questionnaire was translated into Thai language with traces of modification as to fit to Thai
education/schools system. Any modification was consulted and allowed by the SABER team.
The translated questionnaire was verified by Ministry of Education staff to ensure that the
translation correctly interpreted the original English content, and that the translation was
compatible with the Thai school context to ensure that school principals would understand the
questions and reduce the number of ‘not applicable’ responses. Every school in the sample was
contacted through the PISA 2009 schools coordinators. They were informed about the project
8
and its objectives. School coordinators were asked to contact schools principals to answer the
questionnaires.
The questionnaire was reproduced and sent by registered post to the schools. One month was
allowed for a response. A pre-paid envelope was provided to the schools along with a promise
of a 500 Baht ($15) honorarium paid to the school for their collaboration. Most schools returned
the questionnaire in time and those that did not were contacted by phone, through local education
authorities and, for some schools, in person. In the latter case the survey staff had instructions to
sit and wait until the questionnaire was completed.
The answers to the questionnaires were keyed in the schools’ files and the schools’ PISA 2009
scores were matched to the questionnaire answers. The merged data has only the Schools ID
since the school names are confidential.
School principals at all 230 schools filled out the implementation rubric by choosing the cell in
the rubric that most closely described their own situation. The implementation rubric is shown in
the annex. The responses were coded using a simple scale with the following values:
Latent = 1
Emerging = 2
Established = 3
Advanced = 4
These values are used as identifiers of the indicators for the subsequent analysis. The calculation
of an implementation score for an indicator is done with a simple formula:
Implementation Score = ( (Number of Latent scores * 1) + (Number of Emerging scores *2) + (Number of
Established scores * 3) + (Number of Advanced scores * 4) ) / Number of school responses
For example: For indicator 5.1 – defined as Guidelines for using school and student assessments
for accountability—in the SABER rubric, 127 schools responded as follows:
Indicator 5.1
Latent
Emerging
Established
Advanced
Total
Implemen
tation
Score
Guidelines for
using school
and student
assessments
for
accountability
No
guidelines.
Assessments
are used only
by central
authorities
and school
staff
19
Municipal
governments
have guidelines
for using the
assessments,
but they cannot
take personnel
actions
32
Municipal
governments and
schools have
guidelines for
using the
assessments and
can take personnel
actions
63
Guidelines
are published
online and
can be used
by the public
to demand
accountability
13
127
2.6
With these responses the score for indicator 5.1 can be calculated as follows:
Indicator 5.1 = ((19*1)+(32*2)+(63*3)+(13*4))/127 = (19+64+189+52)/127 = 324/127 = 2.6
For the overall score the formula remains the same, as it adds up all the scores in each category,
multiply them by their respective factors, and divide the sum by the total number of schools in
the sample.
9
4. Benchmarking Policy Intent and Implementation
In 2011, the SABER School Autonomy and Accountability Scale (SAAS) – which measures
policy intent – was applied in Thailand to benchmark the existing framework of policies in this
domain, and the results were discussed and validated with several institutions in the education
sector. In 2012, a modified SAAS was applied in the 226 schools that participated in PISA 2009.
The modified scale benchmarked the implementation of school autonomy and accountability
policies, with the objective of comparing policy intent with policy implementation in school-
based management. The results of the assessment of policy intent are summarized in Table 1
and discussed in more detail in their respective subsections. Clearly, the key issue for policy
dialogue is the gap that may exist between the policy intent outlined in Table 1 and the
implementation of these policies at the school level.
Table 1: Thailand: Indicators of Policy Intent in School Autonomy and Accountability 2011
1. School Autonomy in Budget Planning and Approval
Schools have autonomy over non-salary expenditures, and their budget management plans
feed up to the Educational Service Area (ESA) level; education budgets are decentralized
at the ESA and to continue to the Local Administrative Organization level; administrative
systems are in place and well established at the ESA level.
Emerging
2. School Autonomy in Personnel Management
Teachers are hired at the ESA level under the Teacher’s Civil Service Commission rules;
the selection process is bureaucratic and schools have little influence over their personnel
choices; there is limited scope for implementing a system for managing teacher incentives
Latent
3. Participation of the School Council in School Finance
Parents participate in school board committees and play an advisory role at the local level,
and also contribute in fundraising activities; parents contribute up to 30% of total per
student expenditure in public schools, and the private sector another 10%; parent and
private donations are not registered in the school budget
Emerging
4. Assessment of School and Student Performance
Office for National Education Standards and Quality Assessment (ONESQA) is an
independently run public organization that manages the periodic evaluations of school
performance; National Institute of Educational Testing Service (NIETS) is responsible for
standardized testing in basic and secondary education; national test scores and rankings
are publicized and used in education policy and private results are available to students
and parents
Advanced
5. School Accountability
School boards can request the office of the Auditor General to perform financial audits;
school performance and learning outcomes are regularly made public; still, school
accountability is hampered by the lack of power of parents over school personnel and for
the weak linkages between student performance and teacher and school accountability
Established
Source: World Bank 2013
10
4.1 School autonomy in budget planning and management
The school autonomy in budget planning and management indicator has three sub-indicators:
a. Level of autonomy in the management of the school’s operational budget
b. Managerial autonomy of schools in managing non-teaching and teaching salaries
c. Autonomy of principals to raise additional funds on top of what the school receives from the
central and local governments
A Latent indicator means that the school may not manage any money because the Ministry of
Education or the local government sends goods directly to the school and pays for all services
directly, without any intervention by the school. At the opposite end, an Advanced indicator
means that school administrators may receive a transfer that is deposited into the school’s bank
account, disburse payments to teaching and non-teaching staff; pay suppliers of goods and
services, and manage the school flow of funds.
In 2012, education funding in Thailand amounted to 441.5 million Baht ($13.6 million), or 18.7
percent of the government’s budget (Bureau of the Budget 2013). Of this amount, 341 million
Baht were spent in basic education, and the rest in university education and other education-
related expenditures. Funding is decentralized to the Educational Service Area (ESA), which
may not correspond with geographical boundaries. Each ESA oversees the block transfers of
operational funds to its schools. School principals have autonomy over the use of operational
block transfers. Table 3 shows the results of benchmarking policy intent and policy
implementation using the SABER rubric. A small panel of informants assessed policy intent,
while the implementation score averages out the scores of 227 school principals.
Table 2: Thailand: Policy Intent and Policy Implementation Scores for Indicator of Budget
Autonomy
Sub indicator
Intent
Score
Implementation
Score
Intent Implementation
1.1 Management of the
operational budget. School
principals manage the operational
budget under ESA guidelines
3.0
3.3
Established
Established
1.2 Management of non-
teaching staff & teacher
salaries. ESA delegates managerial
authority to school principals.
1.0
2.8
Latent
Emerging
1.3 Raising additional funds for
the school. School principals raise
additional funds from parents and the
private sector.
3.0
3.0
Established
Established
Overall
2.3
3.0
Emerging
Established
Source: World Bank 2013 and school survey data. The differences between the intent and implementation scores are
statistically significant at the 0.001 level except for indicator 1.3, where the difference is not statistically significant.
11
In terms of policy intent schools should not manage teacher and non-teacher salaries, as they are
centrally regulated by civil service rules, resulting in a Latent score of 1 (Table 2). In practice,
however, school principals report that they do manage non-teaching and teaching staff salaries in
coordination with their Education Service Area, resulting in a score of 2.7, which is the level of
Emerging. This difference shows flexibility on the part of ESA authorities for budget
management at the school level, which bodes well for a possible increase in school autonomy.
However, this is the only significant discrepancy between policy intent and policy
implementation found in the indicator of budget autonomy.
4.2 School autonomy in personnel management
The school autonomy in personnel management indicator refers to the level of autonomy that the
school has in the everyday management of the school’s human resources. It has three sub-
indicators:
a. School autonomy in the hiring and firing of teachers
b. Role of the School Council—as representative of parents—in decisions relating to teacher
tenure or teacher transfers
c. Level of autonomy in the hiring and firing of school principals
Teachers in Thailand are managed under the rules of the Teachers Civil Service Commission,
which now allow for some managerial tasks to be performed by the Education Institution
Committee at the local level. Teacher management has also been decentralized to the ESA level.
However, the Commission for Teachers and Administrative Personnel retains administrative
control over teachers. Moreover, at the ESA level teachers can only be recruited and deployed;
they cannot be fired. As a result, teacher accountability is dissipated among the Civil Service
Commission, the ESA, the Local Administrative Organizations, and the school, leading to
situations where teacher accountability is low.
Personnel expenditures in education for 2012 amounted to 231 million Baht, or 52 percent of
total government expenditures in education. Most of these expenditures go to pay teacher
salaries (Bureau of the Budget 2013). Teacher management—the hiring and firing of teachers,
and the administration of the payroll—has been recently decentralized to the level of Education
Service Areas. Teacher hiring is regulated by the Teacher’s Civil Service Commission rules,
which tend to protect job tenure. The teacher selection process is based on compliance of
curricular requirements—such as the completion of a university degree—and without provision
for more local control over teachers. Because teacher hiring and deployment is bureaucratic,
schools have little room for maneuvering when assigned inadequate teachers. Moreover, since
teacher salaries are regulated by Civil Service rules, there is limited scope for implementing a
system of rewards and sanctions that could improve teacher incentives.
In terms of policy intent, legal authority to manage school personnel is centralized, leading to an
overall Latent score. Although an ESA can appoint a teacher, the law requires centralized
approval, leading to a score of Emerging. In a similar vein, parents—acting through the School
Council—have no legal authority over teacher tenure or over a request for a teacher transfer,
rendering a Latent score to this sub-indicator. Finally, in terms of intent, the law says that the
Ministry of Education appoints school principals, leading to a Latent score.
12
The assessment of policy implementation shows less rigidity than the law currently allows,
getting a benchmarking score of Emerging (Table 3). At the level of sub-indicator, municipal-
level authorities seem to have more say over teacher hiring and firing than what the law allows,
leading to a score of 2.7 that could be called Emerging, which is more autonomous than the
Emerging score given to policy intent. The same pattern is observed in the other two sub
indicators, where principals report more involvement by municipal-level authorities than the law
requires. In summary, personnel management is more flexible than what the law allows, and that
flexibility is significant because parents and schools may use it for designing better teacher
incentives.
Table 3: Thailand: Policy Intent and Implementation Scores for Indicator of Personnel
Management
Sub Indicator
Intent
Score
Implementation
Score
Intent Implementation
2.1 School autonomy in teacher
appointment and deployment
decisions. ESA appoint and deploy
teachers under union or civil service
agreements.
2.0 2.8 Emerging
Established
2.2 School Council’s role in teacher
tenure or transfer. Councils are
consulted and exert influence on transfer
requests.
1.0 2.3 Latent
Emerging
2.3 Autonomy in the hiring and
firing of principals. ESA has
autonomy in principal hiring and firing.
1.0 2.9 Latent
Established
Overall
1.3 2.7
Latent
Emerging
Source: World Bank 2013 and school survey data. The differences between the intent and implementation scores are
statistically significant at the 0.001 level.
4.3 Participation of the School Council in School Finance
The participation of the council in school administration is very important because it is where
parents can exercise their real power as clients of the education system. If the council has to
cosign payments, then it has purchasing power automatically. The use of an operational manual
is extremely important in this area, since it allows Council members to adequately monitor
school management performance, help the principal with cash flow decisions, and become a
catalyst for seeking additional funds from the community. The use of detailed operation manuals
by the School Council is also a good vehicle for increased accountability and for the
institutionalization of autonomy.
Policy intent for this indicator covers five sub-areas regarding the legal authority of the School
Council:
a. Participation in the preparation of the school budget
b. Approval of the school budget
c. Use of a manual outlining the participation of the School Council in school finances
13
d. Role of the School Council in the implementation of the school budget
e. Acceptance of the Council-approved budget by higher level authorities as a guide for detailed
fiscal transfers to the school. The more involved is the School Council in the planning and
implementation of the school budget, the higher the probability for improving accountability.
Overall, in terms of policy intent, Thailand gets an Established score (Table 4). Parents
participate in school board committees, which have a strong advisory role at the local level, and
also contribute in fundraising activities. Since schools are responsible for drawing their own
plans for managing non-salary resources, the role of parents in financial planning is very
important. Currently, parents contribute between 20 and 30 percent of the total per student
expenditure in public schools (UNESCO 2009) and another 10 percent is donated by the private
sector following the lead of parents. Although parent participation is significant, current policies
force schools to keep two sets of books in order to manage a combined budget of government
and private funds, creating problems of operational efficiency and transparency. In terms of
policy implementation the participation of the School Council in school finance remains near the
Established stage. At the sub-indicator level participation is higher than the law allows in the
areas of budget preparation and approval, with an Emerging score for intent score and an
Established – for implementation.
Table 4: Thailand: Policy Intent and Policy Implementation Scores for Indicator of School
Council Participation in School Finance
Sub-Indicator
Intent
Score
Implementation
Score
Intent Implementation
3.1 Participation of the School
Council in budget preparation.
School Council has a voice in budget
planning and preparation.
2.0 2.8 Emerging
Established
3.2 School Council's authority to
approve the school budget. School
Council consulted before approval.
2.0 2.8 Emerging
Established
3.3 Manual for participation of
Councils in school finances. There
are manuals, but participation by
Councils is less formal.
3.0 2.8 Established
Established
3.4 Role of the School Council in
budget implementation. ESA and
schools inform parents on off-budget
items on a regular basis.
3.0 2.7 Established
Emerging
3.5 Use of budget prepared with
School Council's participation.
Parent contributions used by ESA and
schools in budget planning.
3.0 2.8 Established
Established
Overall
2.6 2.8
Emerging
Established
Source: World Bank 2013 and school survey data. The differences between the intent and implementation scores are
statistically significant at the 0.001 level.
In the remaining three sub-indicators of School Council participation the intent and
implementation scores are similar. The fact that schools must separate their real budget from the
official budget means that School Councils have a say in budget planning and preparation, but it
14
is done with less certainty about the role of the council on budget management, and with lower
chances for the real budget to be used as an input for education authorities above the school
level. For the long term this gap reduces the transparency of school financing and reduces the
potential for analyzing the efficiency of the school budget.
4.4 Assessment of School and Student Performance
School assessments can have a significant effect on school performance because they force
parents and teachers to agree on scoring rules and ways to keep track of them, allowing for
accountability about student learning to emerge in a useful way. Measuring student assessment
is another important way to determine if a school is effective in improving learning. A key
aspect of school autonomy is the regular measurement of student learning, with the intent of
using the results to inform parents and society, and to make adjustments to managerial and
pedagogical practices. Without a regular assessment of learning outcomes school accountability
is reduced and, with it, improving education quality becomes less certain.
There are five sub-indicators for assessment:
a. Existence and frequency of school and student assessment
b. Use of school assessments for making school adjustments
c. Frequency of standardized student assessments
d. Use of student assessments for pedagogical and personnel adjustments
e. Publication of school and student assessments
Thailand has two government agencies in charge of system assessment: The Office for National
Education Standards and Quality Assessment (ONESQA), which is responsible for school
assessment, and the National Institute of Educational Testing Service (NIETS), which is
responsible for student assessment. ONESQA is an autonomous agency responsible for
conducting external evaluations of school quality in basic and post-secondary education, as
mandated by the National Education Act of 1999 (Office of the National Education Commission
2003; Kingdom of Thailand 2000, 2003, 2004, 2009). Between 1999 and 2010, ONESQA
conducted two complete rounds of school assessments in 40,000 schools, using an “amicable
assessment model” to evaluate school performance. This approach compares a school’s
performance with the standards set by the Ministry of Education using statistical data, indicators
of quality, and a listing of the school’s strengths and weaknesses within an environment of
cooperation in which consequences for low performance are framed in a positive way.
Assessments yield a set of recommendations, which should be implemented by failing schools
during a grace period. Failing schools are revisited to verify compliance with the
recommendations of the assessment. Every school in the country is assessed every five years by
a team of evaluators employed and trained by ONESQA. Thus, the third round of evaluations
began in 2011. For this round of evaluation ONESQA assessments began covering four areas:
(1) learning outcomes; (2) school administration and management; (3) student-centered teaching
and learning practices; and (4) internal procedures for quality assurance.
In 2010, an external evaluation committee reviewed ONESQA’s performance and gave it a Good
rating (85 percent), one level lower than the maximum rating of Very Good (90-100 percent).
Most of the recommendations received by ONESQA were operational in nature and aimed at
improving performance efficiency. However, a recent analysis of Thai education states that
15
ONESQA’s evaluations are too rooted on bureaucracy and do not reflect school quality as related
to student learning (Tangkitvanich and Sasiwuttiwat 2012: 8-9). While the first round of
ONESQA school assessment indicated that 65 percent of OBEC schools did not meet the
minimum standards, the second round of assessments in 2010 indicated that only 20 percent of
schools in basic education failed to meet the minimum standards (UNESCO 2011: 30).
However, learning outcomes declined during the same period, suggesting that the assessments
did not reflect school quality (Tangkitvanich and Sasiwuttiwat 2012). For the third round of
assessments ONESQA has developed a different methodology, which is aimed at producing
recommendations for improving education quality.
Table 5: Thailand: Policy Intent and Implementation Indicators of School and Student Assessment
Sub Indicator
Intent
Score
Implementation
Score
Intent Implementation
4.1 Existence and frequency of
school and student
assessments. Process well defined
but needs improvement in its
implementation.
4.0 3.6 Advanced
Established
4.2 Use of school assessments
for making school
adjustments. Links between test
results and adjustments not always
clear.
4.0 3.2 Advanced
Established
4.3 Frequency of standardized
student assessments. Process
well defined but needs improvement
in its implementation.
4.0 3.7 Advanced
Established
4.4 Use of student assessments
for pedagogical and personnel
adjustments. Links between test
results and adjustments not well
understood by principals and
teachers.
4.0 3.4 Advanced
Established
4.5 Publication of school and
student assessments. Process
well defined but needs improvement
in its implementation.
4.0 3.6 Advanced
Established
Overall
4.0 3.5
Advanced
Established
Source: World Bank 2013 and school survey data. The differences between the intent and implementation scores are
statistically significant at the 0.001 level.
The National Institute of Educational Testing Service (NIETS) was established in 2005, with the
mission of implementing standardized student testing to measure learning outcomes in basic and
vocational education. NIETS administers the Ordinary National Educational Test (O-NET), a
standardized achievement test for grades 6, 9, and 12 in eight subject areas (Thai language, math,
science, social science, religion and culture, health and physical education, art, career and
technology, and foreign languages). Each year 950,000 students take O-NET in the 6th grade,
16
880,000 in the 9th grade, and 330,000 in the 12th grade. In addition, NIETS administers the
National Test, a standardized test given to 3rd and 6th grade students. Local school systems
administer their own tests to students in grades 2, 5 and 8. NIETS also administers two tests
used to screen students for admission to the university: the General Aptitude Test (GAT) and the
Professional and Academic Aptitude Test (PAT). These tests are given to students in Grade 12.
The results of O-NET are published online, although the averages published without login-in are
for the national level only.
In general, the principals’ assessment of policy implementation for this indicator is generally
lower than the Advanced score found in policy intent (Table 5). The lower score given by school
principals may reflect the issues of reliability and validity, which lack meaningful analysis of test
scores, or the low use of the results for making pedagogical and personnel adjustments because
the school may exercise limited autonomy in these areas. It is important to point out that there is
substantial room for improvement in the implementation of current school and student
assessment policies. The qualifications to the existing system expressed by school principals
reduce the rating of this sub-indicator to Established, reflecting that the value of the indicator is
near the Advanced level.
4.5 School Accountability to Stakeholders
Accountability is at the heart of school-based management. The systemic connection between
budgetary and personnel autonomy, parent participation in the financial and operational aspects
of the school, and the measurement of learning outcomes are all aimed to reinforce
accountability. Only by being accountable to parents can education quality be sustainable. The
following indicators address the aspects of accountability that can be implemented within the
framework of school-based management: the presence of written guidelines for the use of the
results of school and student assessments; the strength of national institutions in charge of school
and student assessments; the use of analytical comparisons to inform the public and education
stakeholders about the performance of schools and students; the rights of school councils to
request financial audits; and the presence of written guidelines for the school council with which
to assess school financial performance.
The indicator of school accountability has five sub-indicators:
a. School has guidelines for using school and student assessments for accountability
b. There are national and/or regional systems for educational assessment
c. There are reports with comparisons of school and student performance
d. School Councils have legal authority to ask for financial audits
e. There are manuals for the participation of the School Council on school audits
The results of the assessment of policy intent are mixed. Two sub-indicators received an
Emerging score: the presence of guidelines for interpreting school and student assessments, and
the legal authority for school councils to request an audit also. Two other sub-indicators got an
Advanced score: the national system for assessing schools and students, and the presence of an
audit manual for school councils. School boards do not have direct legal authority to ask for
financial audits to enforce financial transparency and accountability, but can request the office of
the Auditor General to perform one. Still, school accountability is hampered by the lack of
17
power of parents over staffing decisions, which can be a very important factor in improving
learning.
Overall, the implementation of accountability needs improvement and it is rated as Established -
(Table 6). The implementation indicators for the functioning of a national system of school and
student assessment and for the manuals for interpreting school audits are significantly lower than
the indicators of policy intent. The gaps in these indicators suggest problems with key aspects of
accountability to parents, especially in the areas of parent information about the meaning of test
results, and on the use of results by schools to make modifications to their pedagogical practices.
Table 6: Thailand: Policy Intent and Policy Implementation Indicators of School Accountability
Sub Indicator
Intent
Score
Implementation
Score
Intent Score Implementation
5.1 Guidelines for using school
and student assessments for
accountability. ESA uses the
guidelines for teacher assessments
and personnel management.
2.0 3.1 Emerging
Established
5.2 National or regional systems
of educational assessments. ESA
autonomy in the interpretation of
guidelines may be inconsistent.
4.0 3.1 Advanced
Established
5.3 Comparisons of school and
student performance reports.
Comparisons done at National,
regional and municipal levels, and
previous years. Schools often publish
summary results online.
3.0 3.0 Established
Established
5.4 School Council's authority to
perform financial audits.
Councils tend to rely on school-level
negotiations, even though they can
ask for formal audits.
2.0 2.6 Emerging
Emerging
5.5 Manual for the participation
of the School Councils in school
audits. Manuals exist but personal
communications are preferred by
Councils.
4.0 2.5 Advanced
Emerging
Overall
3.0 2.8
Established
Emerging
Source: World Bank 2013 and school survey data. The differences between the intent and implementation scores are
statistically significant at the 0.001 level, except for indicator 5.3.
4.6 Intent and Implementation Scores by Type of School Sponsorship
The differences between the law’s intent and what happens on the ground may be due to many
factors, but one that needs to be explored first is the type of school sponsorship. High schools in
Thailand can be classified by type of institutional sponsor. Most schools are administered by the
Office of the Basic Education Commission (OBEC), while others are administered by the
Bangkok Metropolitan Administration (BMA), the Bureau of Local Educational Development
(BLED), the Commission for Higher Education (CHE) also known as SATIT schools. Private
18
schools may or may not receive government funding, but those that do are under the supervision
of the Office of the Private Education Commission (OPEC).
Resources available to each type of school vary widely. As reported by Patrinos et al (2012),
SATIT schools, which are governed by the Commission of Higher Education, have more
resources and more teacher than other public schools. If school autonomy in the Education
Service Areas vary in its interpretation by the schools—as measured by the SABER indicators—
the impact on learning outcomes within the context of autonomy needs to be explored.
After analyzing PISA data for 2006 and 2009 using a Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition
methodology, Patrinos et al (2012) conclude that a decline in the reading scores among the poor
was the net result of a decline in system quality, which was larger than the increase in student
performance, especially among the poor. Relatedly, schools in Bangkok outperformed school in
the rest of the country, and system performance was also a reflection of systems resources, which
were correlated with student wealth. These findings have direct implications for the analysis of
SABER indicators inasmuch they suggest a need to examine policy implementation by type of
school and geographical area.
Table 7 shows the different implementation and scores by type of school sponsorship. There are
no significant differences among the SABER sub-indicators by type of school sponsorship, but
the lack of a significant difference is related to the high variation found within the indicators,
which tended to reduce the statistical significance of the average differences between school
types (see Table A6 in the Annex). In terms of average sub-indicator scores, however, the
average differences between intent and implementation are statistically significant.
Table 7: SABER indicator scores for policy implementation by type of school sponsor, 2013
Indicator OBEC OPEC BMA BLED SATIT
SABER
Implem.
SABER
Intent
1a. Legal authority over management of budget
3.3
3.3
3.2
3.1
3.4
3.3
3.0
1b. Legal authority over management of salaries
2.8
2.9
2.7
2.6
2.5
2.8
1.0
1c. Legal authority to raise additional funds
3.0
3.1
3.2
3.0
2.8
3.0
3.0*
2a. Autonomy in teacher appointment decisions
2.8
2.9
2.7
2.7
2.9
2.8
2.0
2b. School council role in teacher tenure or transfer
2.3
2.2
2.2
2.5
2.2
2.3
1.0
2c. Autonomy in the hiring and firing of principals
2.9
2.9
2.5
2.8
2.8
2.9
1.0
3a. Participation of council in budget preparation
2.8
3.0
2.5
2.5
2.7
2.7
2.0
3b. School council authority to approve budget
2.8
2.9
2.8
2.7
2.8
2.8
2.0
3c. Manual for participation of council in finances
2.8
2.7
3.1
2.5
2.6
2.7
3.0
3d. Role of council in budget implementation
2.7
2.7
3.2
2.6
2.5
2.7
3.0
3e. Use of budget prepared with council
2.8
2.7
3.1
2.4
3.0
2.8
3.0
4a. Existence and frequency of assessments
3.6
3.5
3.8
3.6
3.6
3.6
4.0
4b. Use school assessments for decisions
3.2
3.2
3.2
3.4
3.2
3.2
4.0
4c. Frequency of standardized student assessments
3.7
3.7
3.8
3.7
3.7
3.7
4.0
4d. Use of assessments for adjustments
3.4
3.4
3.2
3.4
3.3
3.4
4.0
4e. Publication of school and student assessments
3.7
3.6
3.6
3.5
3.5
3.6
4.0
5a. Guidelines for assessments for accountability
3.1
3.0
3.1
3.2
3.2
3.1
2.0
5b. National or regional systems of assessments
3.2
3.1
3.2
3.2
3.0
3.1
4.0
5c. Comparisons of performance reports
2.9
2.8
2.7
2.9
3.3
3.0
3.0*
5d. Council authority to perform financial audits
2.6
2.8
2.2
2.8
2.4
2.6
2.0
5e. Manual for participation of council in audits
2.6
2.4
2.3
2.4
2.5
2.5
4.0
Source: Estimated by authors. Difference between the implementation and intent score is statistically significant at the 0.00l level except for 1c and 5c
Note: OBEC = Office of the Basic Education Commission; OPEC = Office of the Private Education Commission; BMA = Bangkok Metropolitan
Administration; BLED = Bureau of Local Educational Development; SATIT = Commission for Higher Education
19
This statistical significance can be summarized as follows:
a. In budgetary autonomy, schools tend to behave more autonomously than what is intended by
education policy, and sponsorship does not seem to matter
b. In terms of personnel management, autonomy implemented at the school level is higher
policy intent, regardless of school sponsorship
c. In the area of parent participation in school finance the score for policy intent in Bangkok
Metropolitan Administration (BMA) schools is higher than the scores of other schools, and
higher than the score for policy intent
d. In the area of school and student assessment policy implementation lags behind intent; there
are no clear differences among school sponsors
e. School accountability is mixed, with some policies showing higher implementation scores
and others showing higher intent scores, with no clear differences found among sponsors
5. Is policy implementation of autonomy and accountability important for student learning?
One of the key objectives of SABER is to assist governments in monitoring education policies
conducive to improved education quality. Schools can be classified by type of school financing:
public, private-subsidized, and fully private. In principle, classifying schools by the source of
school financing should reflect the degree of autonomy that schools may have in selecting
students and teachers, and in being more autonomous and, to some extent, more accountable.
Table 8 shows the implementation scores for schools classified by its source of financing. Public
schools are completely funded by with government funds; private-subsidized schools receive
government funds to cover their operational expenses but can have significant autonomy in
selecting students and teachers; private-independent schools are reliant on private tuition and are
completely autonomous in their selection of students and teachers.
The results of SABER implementation scores tend to be aligned with the source of school
financing. Public schools tend to have lower implementation scores than private-subsidized
schools, and both of these types of schools tend to show lower SABER scores than private-
independent schools.
20
Table 8: Thailand: Implementation scores for SABER indicators of autonomy and accountability
(2012) and average PISA Scores (2009)
School Type Budget
autonomy
Personnel
management
autonomy
School
council's
participation
School &
Student
Assessment
Accountability PISA
Score N
Public
3.0
(0.6)
2.6
(0.7)
2.7
(0.8)
3.6
(0.6)
2.9
(0.6)
425 201
Private
subsidized
3.3
(0.5)
3.6
(0.6)
3.1
(0.7)
3.4
(0.7)
3.0
(0.6)
403 19
Private
independent
3.7
(0.5)
3.7
(0.5)
3.3
(0.5)
3.5
(0.6)
3.3
(0.8)
432 6
Total
3.0
(0.6)
2.7
(0.8)
2.8
(0.8)
3.6
(0.6)
2.9
(0.6)
423 226
PISA 2009
Score ≥500
3.2
(0.6)
2.8
(0.7)
2.9
(0.9)
3.5
(0.6)
2.9
(0.8)
535 21
PISA 2009
Score ≤400
2.9
(0.6)
2.6
(0.8)
2.7
(0.7)
3.5
(0.7)
2.8
(0.6)
376 80
Source: Estimated by authors
Note: Numbers in parenthesis are the standard deviations
PISA scores also show a slightly different mix than the SABER scores. The PISA scores in
public schools tend to be higher than in private-subsidized schools, but lower than in private-
independent schools.
Schools with an average PISA score above 500 points show significantly higher indicators of
budget autonomy than schools with PISA scores below 400 points. Higher performing schools
have more budgetary autonomy. Private subsidized schools have higher indicators of budget
autonomy than public schools, but have lower average PISA scores. Similar statements could be
made for the differences between indicators of personnel management and accountability, but the
differences between schools with high PISA scores and schools with low PISA scores is smaller
than in the case of budget autonomy.
5.1 Exploratory Analysis of the Association between School Autonomy and Accountability
and Academic Achievement
The scores in Table 8 are just an approximation, since there is a need to control for several
school characteristics in the sample population. Table 9 presents the results of regressing the
PISA score for reading on the average total score for the SABER indicators of autonomy and
accountability as independent variables, after controlling for selected school characteristics.
Overall, the results of the estimations show that PISA scores could be significantly associated
with autonomy in personnel management. The overall impact of the SABER total score is
significant, as shown in equation 12 in Table 9. A one-point increase in the total SABER
indicator score accounts for an increase of 11 points in the PISA reading score. This could be
very significant, as it suggests that schools with higher levels of autonomy and accountability
have higher PISA scores.
At the sub-indicator level the results consistently show significant test score impacts associated
with budgetary autonomy (Equations 1 and 2 in Table 9) and personnel management autonomy
21
(Equations 3 and 4 in Table 9). The equations for budgetary autonomy indicate that a one-point
increase in the indicator is associated with more than 19 points in the PISA reading score for the
school. After adjusting for covariates, the one-point increase in the indicator is associated with an
increase of 9.4 points in the PISA reading score.
The equations for personnel autonomy also show similar associations. Schools that make
personnel decisions at the school level tend to have higher PISA scores. Table 9 shows that a
one-point increase in the implementation indicator of personnel autonomy is associated with an
increase of 10.6 points in the school’s average PISA reading score. After adjusting for
covariates, personnel autonomy at the school level is associated with an increase in the math test
score of 9.5 points. Table 9 also shows that the indicators for school council participation, and
for student assessment, are associated with higher reading scores. This effect, however, tends to
be attenuated once the equation includes some key covariates.
The results of Table 9, particularly in the area of personnel autonomy, are consistent with the
results of a recent factor analysis of SABER indicators for East Asia (Arcia, Lewis and Patrinos
2012) which shows that teacher management is one of two broad factors that explain most of the
variation in SABER indicators of policy intent in 20 areas of influence in education.
22
Table 9: Exploratory Analysis of the Association between School Autonomy and Accountability and Test Scores (PISA 2009)
Variables
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
Overall SABER Score
11.6*
Autonomy: Budget
19.2**
9.4*
15.0**
Autonomy: Personnel
10.6**
9.5**
3.9
School Council
9.0*
4.8
1.6
Student Assessment
15.4**
5.3
9.3
School Accountability
9.7
1.0
-0.8
Controls
NO
YES
NO
YES
NO
YES
NO
YES
NO
YES
NO
YES
Constant
363.4***
367.3***
392.8***
361.5***
396.3***
384.5***
367.1***
379.6***
393.3***
396.3***
331.1***
367.8***
R2
0.043
0.430
0.0190
0.440
0.015
0.410
0.020
0.430
0.012
0.430
0.055
0.391
F
10.15**
23.9***
4.37**
24.7***
3.41*
23.4***
4.68**
23.2***
2.62
23.0***
2.55**
28.3***
N
225
225
225
225
225
225
225
225
225
225
225
225
Source: Estimated by the authors
Notes: Significance: * = 0.1, ** = 0.05, *** = 0.01; PISA scores have a mean of 500 and a standard deviation of 100; controls: total school enrolment; student-teacher ratio; quality school resources; index
academic selectivity; public school
23
6. Conclusions
Benchmarking policy intent in education is useful for assessing a country’s position on certain
education areas relative to the policy position of other countries. For purposes of a more focused
policy dialogue, benchmarking policy implementation can be of added utility to decision makers,
since the difference between the value of an indicator of policy intent and the value of the same
indicator in policy implementation can help fine tune the incentives and disincentives required at
the school level to ensure that the policy has its desired effect.
In terms of the differences between the indicators of policy intent in school autonomy and
accountability, and the indicators of policy implementation, as reported by the school principals
of 230 schools that participated in the 2009 PISA survey, the results show the following:
1. School principals are already managing budgets related to personnel in ways that go beyond
what the law intends them to do. The difference between policy intent and policy
implementation in budget management suggests that authorities at the Education Service
Area level have found that important personnel management functions could be delegated to
school principals, thus deepening school autonomy.
2. Personnel autonomy—the hiring and firing of teachers—also seem to be delegated to local
areas under significant influence from school principals. In general, in all areas of personnel
autonomy, school authorities are making decisions that are later corroborated by the
Education Service Area.
3. In terms of parent participation through the school council, the indicator results show that
parents already have more say over the school budget than what the law currently allows.
Again, this bodes well for increasing autonomy at the school level.
4. In terms of school and student assessment, the results show an opposite trend. In theory, the
current system of school and student assessment is at an advanced level. However, principals
give it a lower rating because of perceived problems testing at the school level.
5. School accountability shows a mixed picture. The implementation indicators for the
functioning of a national system of school and student assessment and for the manuals for
interpreting school audits are significantly lower than the indicators of policy intent. The
gaps in these indicators suggest problems with key aspects of accountability to parents.
6. In terms of the relationship between SABER indicators of policy implementation in school
autonomy and accountability, and student learning, the results show that school autonomy
budget planning and management, and in in personnel management are associated with
higher PISA scores. These are key conclusions for education policy, since they seem to
confirm the trend found in high performing countries, where giving schools more autonomy
leads to higher learning outcomes.
The exploratory regression results are important because their statistical significance reinforces
the notion of evidence-based policy reform, which is at the core of the SABER approach. The
results point towards a consistent relationship between budget and personnel autonomy on
student learning. The evidence presented here is significant enough to suggest as a next step to
include budget autonomy and personnel management autonomy as components of evidence-
based policy dialogue.
24
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Benchmarking for Education Results (SABER). Washington DC: World Bank.
26
Annex: Policy Intent and Policy Implementation Scores by Indicator and Sub-Indicator
Table A1. Policy Intent and Policy Implementation Scores for Indicator of Budget Autonomy
Sub indicator
Latent = 1
Emerging = 2
Established = 3
Advanced = 4
Intent
Implementation
1.1 Management
of the
operational
budget
Management
of the
operational
budget is
centralized at
the Ministry
of Education
Management of
the operational
budget is at the
regional or
municipal levels
School principals
manage the
operational
budget under
municipal
guidelines
School principals
manage the
operational budget
autonomously 3 3.3
1.2 Management
of non-teaching
staff and teacher
salaries
Management
authority
over teacher
and non-
teaching
salaries is
centralized
Management
authority over
teacher and
non-teaching
salaries is at the
regional or
municipal levels
School principals
manage teacher
and non-teaching
salaries but must
to follow a
centralized pay
scale
School principals
set and manage
teacher and non-
teaching salaries. 1 2.8
1.3 Raising
additional funds
for the school
Budget is
fixed by the
Ministry of
Education
and no
additional
funding is
permitted
School
principals can
request more
funds from
regional and
municipal
governments.
School principals
can raise
additional funds
from the private
sector, and from
non-governmental
institutions.
School principals
can raise
additional funds
from any source,
including foreign
governments and
international
donors
3 3.0
27
Table A2. Policy Intent and Policy Implementation Scores for Indicator of Personnel
Management
Sub
Indicator Latent = 1 Emerging = 2 Established = 3 Advanced = 4 Intent Implementation
2.1 School
autonomy in
teacher
appointment
and
deployment
decisions
Teachers are
appointed by the
Ministry of
Education and
deployed by the
Ministry’s office
of human
resources under
a union or civil
service
agreement.
Municipal or
regional
governments
appoint
teachers under
union or civil
service
agreements.
Appointments
are subject to
final review by
central
authorities.
Municipal or
regional
governments
appoint and deploy
teachers under
union or civil
service agreements.
School
principal
appoint the
school’s
teachers. Union
and civil
service
agreement may
or may not
regulate the
appointments.
2 2.8
2.2 School
Council’s
role in
teacher
tenure or
transfer
School Councils
do not have a
voice in matters
of school
personnel.
School
Councils are
consulted over
the
appointment of
teachers or may
have veto
power; School
Councils can
request the
transfer for
non-
performance or
for grave
violations of
personnel rules.
The
local/regional
government
must take
action.
School Councils
appoint teachers.
School Councils
can also request a
transfer for non-
performance or for
violations of
personnel rules.
The School
Council does
not supervise
teachers
because formal
accountability
mechanisms
already work
well.
Occasionally
School
Councils use
those formal
mechanisms to
demand
management
actions
regarding
teachers.
1 2.3
2.3
Autonomy in
the hiring
and firing of
principals
Principals are
appointed and
deployed by the
Ministry of
Education. Their
performance is
evaluated
centrally and
they can be
transferred or
fired by Central
authorities.
Principals are
appointed and
deployed by the
Ministry of
Education.
Their
performance is
evaluated
regionally or by
municipal
inspectors,
which
determines
their tenure,
transfer, or
Principals are
appointed,
deployed, and
evaluated by
regional or
municipal
authorities, which
also determine
tenure, transfer, or
removal.
Principals are
appointed and
deployed by
municipal
authorities in
consultation
with the School
Council, or by
the School
Council alone.
Municipal
authorities
evaluate
principals to
determine
1 2.9
28
Table A2. Policy Intent and Policy Implementation Scores for Indicator of Personnel
Management
Sub
Indicator Latent = 1 Emerging = 2 Established = 3 Advanced = 4 Intent Implementation
removal by
Central
authorities.
tenure, transfer,
or removal.
29
Table A3. Policy Intent and Policy Implementation Scores for Indicator of School Council Participation in School
Finance
Sub
Indicator
Latent = 1 Emerging = 2 Established = 3 Advanced = 4 Intent Implemen
tation
3.1 Participation
of the School
Council in budget
preparation
No role for the
School Council;
budgets are
prepared centrally
by the Ministry of
Education
School Council have
a voice in the
planning and
preparation of the
budget at the school
level, but final
responsibility falls
on the school
principal.
School Council
have a voice in the
planning and
preparation of the
budget but final
responsibility falls
on the school
principal.
School Council has
formal mechanisms
for participation in
the school budget if
they so desire.
Budget systems may
function well
enough that an
active role for the
school council may
not be necessary.
2 2.8
3.2 School
Council's
authority to
approve the
school budget
Only the Ministry
of Education or a
central
Government office
has the authority to
approve the school
budget. School
council does not
participate.
Municipal School
Councils may be
consulted but the
municipal
government is
responsible for the
approval of the
school budget
Budget approval is
done at the school
level. School
councils may be
consulted but they
have no approval
responsibility.
School Councils
may be responsible
for budget approval
unless the formal
systems function
well enough to not
require their
participation
2 2.8
3.3 Manual for the
participation of
the School
Councils in school
finances
School Councils
do not participate
in school financial
issues
There are manuals
regulating the
procedures for
expressing the
Council's voice on
budget issues.
There are manuals
regulating the role
of the School
Council in the
preparation of the
budget
School Council is
not involved in the
school budget
because formal
systems function
well.
3 2.8
3.4 Role of the
School Council in
budget
implementation
The Ministry of
Education or the
local/regional
government
supervises budget
implementation.
School Councils
do not have a role.
Budget
implementation is
supervised at the
municipal level.
School Councils
only ask for
accounts on
additional funding
from parents and
other off-budget
funds.
School Councils
supervise budget
implementation and
occasionally request
formal audits from
the appropriate
authorities.
School Councils do
not receive specific
reports on the
school budget since
it is public
information readily
available. Formal
supervisory systems
work well.
3 2.7
3.5 Use of the
budget prepared
with the School
Council's
participation
Budgetary
decisions are made
at the national and
sub-national levels
without school
council
participation.
National and sub-
national levels use
the budget sent by
the schools as
recommendations
for the final
allocation of
resources.
National and sub-
national authorities
use the proposed
budget as their main
source of
recommendation for
the transfer of
resources to the
school.
National and sub-
national authorities
use the proposed
budget as the base
for the final transfer
of resources to the
school.
3 2.8
30
Table A4. Policy Intent and Policy Implementation Indicators of School and Student Assessment
Sub
Indicator Latent = 1 Emerging = 2 Established = 3 Advanced = 4 Intent
Implemen
tation
4.1
Existence
and
frequency of
school and
student
assessments
Schools are
not assessed
and students
do not take
standardized
tests.
Schools assessed
every few years.
Sample of
students assessed
in primary and
secondary
schools every
few years.
Schools assessed every
few years. All students
assessed in primary and
secondary schools
every few years.
Schools are assessed
every year. All students
assessed in all or in
selected grades of
primary and secondary
school every year.
4 3.6
4.2 Use of
school
assessments
for making
school
adjustments
Schools are
not assessed.
Adjustments
made with
different
criteria.
Ministry of
Education
analyzes school
assessment and
results sent to the
schools. Results
used in
pedagogical and
operational
adjustments.
Ministry of Education
analyzes school
assessments and makes
direct recommendations
to regional and local
offices and to schools.
Schools use the
information to make
pedagogical and
operational
adjustments.
Ministry of Education
or municipal
governments analyzes
school assessments.
Results easily
accessible to schools
and the public. Schools
use the information to
make pedagogical,
personnel, and
operational
adjustments.
4 3.2
4.3
Frequency
of
standardize
d student
assessments
Students do
not take
standardized
tests.
Representative
sample of
students assessed
in primary and
secondary
schools every
few years.
Student assessed in all
or in selected grades of
primary and secondary
school every few years,
or a sample of students
assessed every year.
Assessments of student
learning in all or in
selected grades of
primary and secondary
school are done every
year for all students in
the country.
4 3.7
4.4 Use of
student
assessments
for
pedagogical
and
personnel
adjustments
Schools are
not assessed
and students
do not take
standardized
tests.
Ministry of
Education only
analyzes
standardized exit
exams and sends
the results to the
schools. Schools
may use the
results to make
pedagogical and
operational
adjustments.
Ministry of Education
analyzes all
standardized student
assessments and sends
results and
recommendations to
regional and local
offices and directly to
the schools. Schools
may use the
information to make
pedagogical and
operational
adjustments.
Ministry of Education
or municipal
governments analyzes
school assessments,
makes results easily
accessible to schools
and the public. Schools
may use the
information to make
pedagogical, personnel,
and operational
adjustments.
4 3.4
4.5
Publication
of school
and student
assessments
Assessments
are only
available to
the
educational
authorities
and to school
personnel
Only student
assessments are
made public.
School
assessments are
used only
internally.
School assessments are
available to the School
Council and student
assessment results are
made public.
Both school and student
assessments are made
public and are available
online. 4 3.6
31
Table A5. Policy Intent and Policy Implementation Indicators of School Accountability
Sub Indicator Latent = 1 Emerging = 2 Established = 3 Advanced = 4 Intent
Implemen
tation
5.1 Guidelines for
using school and
student
assessments for
accountability
There are no
guidelines.
Assessments
are used only
by central
authorities
and school
staff
Municipal
governments
have guidelines
for using the
assessments,
but they cannot
take personnel
actions
Municipal
governments and
schools have
guidelines for
using the
assessments and
can take
personnel actions
Guidelines are
published
online and can
be used by the
public to
demand
accountability
2
3.1
5.2 National or
regional systems
of educational
assessments
There are no
national or
regional
systems of
educational
assessments
Assessments
are components
of a national or
sub-national
system but
there is no
strategy for
their use
Assessments are
components of a
national or sub-
national system
and there is a
strategy for their
use
Assessments
are components
of a national or
sub-national
system with a
strategy for
their use. They
are readily
available online
4
3.1
5.3 Comparisons
of school and
student
performance
reports
Analytical
comparisons
are never
made
National
comparisons
made for
different types
of schools,
regions, and
with previous
years.
National and
municipal
comparisons
made for
different types of
schools, regions,
and previous
years. Schools
publish summary
results online.
National,
regional and
municipal
comparisons
made; schools
produce student
reports that are
given directly to
parents; school
results
published
online
3
3.0
5.4 School
Council's
authority to
perform financial
audits
School
Councils
have no
voice over
the school
financial
affairs
School
Councils have
access to
detailed
financial reports
and can voice
their concerns
to the Ministry
of Education
School Councils
have access to
detailed financial
reports and can
demand an audit
from the
appropriate
government
office.
School
Councils have
access to
detailed
financial reports
and can demand
an audit from
public or
private sources.
2
2.6
5.5 Manual for
the participation
of the School
Councils in
school audits
School
Councils do
not have a
role in
school audits
There is a
manual
regulating the
procedures for
school audits by
the central or
municipal
governments
Schools Council
have a manual
regulating their
roles and
responsibilities
during and after
a school audit
Guidelines used
by school and
the School
Council are
available online
and can be used
by the public to
demand
accountability.
4
2.5
32
Table A6. PISA scores by type of school sponsorship
School
Sponsorship
PISA Reading
N
SD
OBEC
421
130
49.7
OPEC
414
34
44
BMA
432
13
75.6
BLED
412
16
41.8
CHE
428
32
48.9
Total
421
230
51.2
PISA Math
N
SD
OBEC
426
130
59.4
OPEC
407
34
54.4
BMA
431
13
69.4
BLED
413
16
39.7
CHE
431
32
63.1
Total
423
230
58.3
PISA Science
N
SD
OBEC
427
130
55.6
OPEC
419
34
45.7
BMA
439
13
65
BLED
421
16
46.4
CHE
430
32
53.1
Total
426
230
53.2
Source: Calculated by the authors. None of the scores are
significantly different from the others.
33
Table A7. T-Test of SABER Policy Implementation Indicators vs. Policy Intent Indicators, Paired Samples
Test for all schools
SABER Indicator
Paired Differences
Std.
Error
Mean
95% Conf. Int.
of the Difference
t
df
Sig.
(2-
tailed)
Mean
Std.
Dev.
Lower
Upper
1a. legal authority over management of
the operational budget
0.261
0.793
0.053
0.157
0.365
4.947
225
0.000
1b. legal authority over the management
of non-teaching staff and teacher’s
salaries
1.765
0.86
0.057
1.653
1.878
30.847
225
0.000
1c. legal authority to raise additional
funds for the school
-0.027
0.76
0.051
-0.126
0.073
-0.525
225
0.600
2a. school autonomy in teacher
appointment and deployment decisions
0.823
0.739
0.049
0.726
0.92
16.739
225
0.000
2b. school council’s role in teacher
tenure or transfer
1.301
1.07
0.071
1.161
1.441
18.279
225
0.000
2c. autonomy in the hiring and firing of
principals
1.876
0.767
0.051
1.776
1.977
36.749
225
0.000
3a. participation of the school council in
budget preparation
0.748
0.876
0.058
0.633
0.863
12.834
225
0.000
3b. school council's authority to approve
the school budget
0.81
0.881
0.059
0.694
0.925
13.81
225
0.000
3c. manual for the participation of the
school councils in school finances
-0.252
0.99
0.066
-0.382
-0.122
-3.829
225
0.000
3d. role of the school council in budget
implementation
-0.301
0.979
0.065
-0.429
-0.173
-4.621
225
0.000
3e. use of the budget prepared with the
school council's participation
-0.217
1.088
0.072
-0.359
-0.074
-2.996
225
0.003
4a. existence and frequency of school
and student assessments
-0.398
0.64
0.043
-0.482
-0.314
-9.354
225
0.000
4b. use of school assessments for making
school adjustments
-0.779
0.689
0.046
-0.869
-0.688
-
16.982
225
0.000
4c. frequency of standardized student
assessments
-0.288
0.582
0.039
-0.364
-0.211
-7.425
225
0.000
4d. use of student assessments for
pedagogical and personnel adjustments
-0.593
0.756
0.05
-0.692
-0.494
-
11.793
225
0.000
4e. publication of school and student
assessments
-0.385
0.624
0.041
-0.467
-0.303
-9.28
225
0.000
5a. guidelines for the use of school and
student assessments for accountability
1.137
0.628
0.042
1.055
1.219
27.22
225
0.000
5b. national or regional systems of
educational assessments
-0.863
0.614
0.041
-0.943
-0.782
-
21.135
225
0.000
5c. comparisons of school and student
performance reports
-0.035
0.923
0.061
-0.156
0.086
-0.576
225
0.565
5d. school council authority to perform
financial audits
0.611
1.032
0.069
0.475
0.746
8.893
225
0.000
5e. manual for the participation of the
school councils in school audits
-1.491
0.865
0.058
-1.605
-1.378
-
25.905
225
0.000
Source: Calculated by the authors.
34
Annex 2: Number of Schools by Type of Sponsorship and Indicator Score
1a. legal authority over management of the operational budget
SABER
Latent
Emerging
Established
Advanced
Total
Score
OBEC
7
10
54
56
127
3.3
% within OBEC
5.50%
7.90%
42.50%
44.10%
100.00%
OPEC
1
3
16
14
34
3.3
% within OPEC
2.90%
8.80%
47.10%
41.20%
100.00%
BMA
1
7
5
13
3.2
% within BMA
7.70%
53.80%
38.50%
100.00%
BLEDC
2
1
6
7
16
3.1
% within BLEDC
12.50%
6.20%
37.50%
43.80%
100.00%
CHE
0
1
16
14
31
3.4
% within CHE
0.00%
3.20%
51.60%
45.20%
100.00%
Unknown
0
1
3
1
5
3.0
% within Unknown
0.00%
20.00%
60.00%
20.00%
100.00%
1b. legal authority over the management of non-teaching staff and teacher’s salary
Latent
Emerging
Established
Advanced
Total
OBEC
13
22
67
25
127
2.8
% within OBEC
10.20%
17.30%
52.80%
19.70%
100.00%
OPEC
3
4
21
6
34
2.9
% within OPEC
8.80%
11.80%
61.80%
17.60%
100.00%
BMA
2
2
7
2
13
2.7
% within BMA
15.40%
15.40%
53.80%
15.40%
100.00%
BLEDC
2
3
10
1
16
2.6
% within BLEDC
12.50%
18.80%
62.50%
6.20%
100.00%
CHE
4
9
15
3
31
2.5
% within CHE
12.90%
29.00%
48.40%
9.70%
100.00%
Unknown
1
1
2
1
5
2.6
% within Unknown
20.00%
20.00%
40.00%
20.00%
100.00%
1c. legal authority to raise additional funds for the school
Latent
Emerging
Established
Advanced
Total
OBEC
8
19
70
30
127
3.0
% within OBEC
6.30%
15.00%
55.10%
23.60%
100.00%
OPEC
4
24
6
34
3.1
% within OPEC
11.80%
70.60%
17.60%
100.00%
BMA
10
3
13
3.2
% within BMA
76.90%
23.10%
100.00%
BLEDC
1
1
11
3
16
3.0
% within BLEDC
6.20%
6.20%
68.80%
18.80%
100.00%
CHE
3
7
15
6
31
2.8
% within CHE
9.70%
22.60%
48.40%
19.40%
100.00%
Unknown
0
1
2
2
5
3.2
% within Unknown
0.00%
20.00%
40.00%
40.00%
100.00%
35
2a. school autonomy in teacher appointment and deployment decisions
SABER
Latent
Emerging
Established
Advanced
Total
Score
OBEC
6
31
69
21
127
2.8
% within OBEC
4.70%
24.40%
54.30%
16.50%
100.00%
OPEC
1
9
18
6
34
2.9
% within OPEC
2.90%
26.50%
52.90%
17.60%
100.00%
BMA
2
1
9
1
13
2.7
% within BMA
15.40%
7.70%
69.20%
7.70%
100.00%
BLEDC
2
2
11
1
16
% within BLEDC
12.50%
12.50%
68.80%
6.20%
100.00%
CHE
0
7
20
4
31
2.9
% within CHE
0.00%
22.60%
64.50%
12.90%
100.00%
Unknown
2
2
1
5
2.8
% within Unknown
40.00%
40.00%
20.00%
100.00%
2b. school council’s role in teacher tenure or transfer
Latent
Emerging
Established
Advanced
Total
OBEC
35
44
17
31
127
2.3
% within OBEC
27.60%
34.60%
13.40%
24.40%
100.00%
OPEC
9
14
5
6
34
2.2
% within OPEC
26.50%
41.20%
14.70%
17.60%
100.00%
BMA
3
7
1
2
13
2.2
% within BMA
23.10%
53.80%
7.70%
15.40%
100.00%
BLEDC
2
7
4
3
16
2.5
% within BLEDC
12.50%
43.80%
25.00%
18.80%
100.00%
CHE
7
15
5
4
31
2.2
% within CHE
22.60%
48.40%
16.10%
12.90%
100.00%
Unknown
2
2
1
5
2.0
% within Unknown
40.00%
40.00%
20.00%
100.00%
2c. autonomy in the hiring and firing of principals
Latent
Emerging
Established
Advanced
Total
OBEC
8
21
69
29
127
2.9
% within OBEC
6.30%
16.50%
54.30%
22.80%
100.00%
OPEC
3
6
18
7
34
2.9
% within OPEC
8.80%
17.60%
52.90%
20.60%
100.00%
BMA
2
2
9
13
2.5
% within BMA
15.40%
15.40%
69.20%
100.00%
BLEDC
1
2
12
1
16
2.8
% within BLEDC
6.20%
12.50%
75.00%
6.20%
100.00%
CHE
1
4
25
1
31
2.8
% within CHE
3.20%
12.90%
80.60%
3.20%
100.00%
Unknown
2
2
1
5
2.8
% within Unknown
40.00%
40.00%
20.00%
100.00%
36
3a. participation of the school council in budget preparation
SABER
Latent
Emerging
Established
Advanced
Total
Score
OBEC
14
27
62
24
127
2.8
% within OBEC
11.00%
21.30%
48.80%
18.90%
100.00%
OPEC
1
6
20
7
34
3.0
% within OPEC
2.90%
17.60%
58.80%
20.60%
100.00%
BMA
1
6
4
2
13
2.5
% within BMA
7.70%
46.20%
30.80%
15.40%
100.00%
BLEDC
3
3
9
1
16
2.5
% within BLEDC
18.80%
18.80%
56.20%
6.20%
100.00%
CHE
5
5
15
6
31
2.7
% within CHE
16.10%
16.10%
48.40%
19.40%
100.00%
Unknown
3
1
1
5
2.6
% within Unknown
60.00%
20.00%
20.00%
100.00%
3b. school council's authority to approve the school budget
Latent
Emerging
Established
Advanced
Total
OBEC
16
16
72
23
127
2.8
% within OBEC
12.60%
12.60%
56.70%
18.10%
100.00%
OPEC
4
3
19
8
34
2.9
% within OPEC
11.80%
8.80%
55.90%
23.50%
100.00%
BMA
1
1
10
1
13
2.8
% within BMA
7.70%
7.70%
76.90%
7.70%
100.00%
BLEDC
3
2
8
3
16
2.7
% within BLEDC
18.80%
12.50%
50.00%
18.80%
100.00%
CHE
4
5
16
6
31
2.8
% within CHE
12.90%
16.10%
51.60%
19.40%
100.00%
Unknown
2
2
1
5
2.8
% within Unknown
40.00%
40.00%
20.00%
100.00%
3c. manual for the participation of the school councils in school finances
Latent
Emerging
Established
Advanced
Total
OBEC
16
26
53
32
127
2.8
% within OBEC
12.60%
20.50%
41.70%
25.20%
100.00%
OPEC
5
5
18
6
34
2.7
% within OPEC
14.70%
14.70%
52.90%
17.60%
100.00%
BMA
4
4
5
13
3.1
% within BMA
30.80%
30.80%
38.50%
100.00%
BLEDC
3
4
7
2
16
2.5
% within BLEDC
18.80%
25.00%
43.80%
12.50%
100.00%
CHE
9
3
10
9
31
2.6
% within CHE
29.00%
9.70%
32.30%
29.00%
100.00%
Unknown
1
2
1
1
5
2.4
% within Unknown
20.00%
40.00%
20.00%
20.00%
100.00%
3d. role of the school council in budget implementation
Latent
Emerging
Established
Advanced
Total
OBEC
14
45
35
33
127
2.7
% within OBEC
11.00%
35.40%
27.60%
26.00%
100.00%
OPEC
3
10
14
7
34
2.7
% within OPEC
8.80%
29.40%
41.20%
20.60%
100.00%
BMA
1
3
2
7
13
3.2
% within BMA
7.70%
23.10%
15.40%
53.80%
100.00%
BLEDC
2
5
6
3
16
2.6
% within BLEDC
12.50%
31.20%
37.50%
18.80%
100.00%
CHE
6
9
9
7
31
2.5
37
% within CHE
19.40%
29.00%
29.00%
22.60%
100.00%
Unknown
2
2
1
5
2.8
% within Unknown
40.00%
40.00%
20.00%
100.00%
3e. use of the budget prepared with the school council's participation
Latent
Emerging
Established
Advanced
Total
OBEC
24
24
37
42
127
2.8
% within OBEC
18.90%
18.90%
29.10%
33.10%
100.00%
OPEC
5
11
7
11
34
2.7
% within OPEC
14.70%
32.40%
20.60%
32.40%
100.00%
BMA
1
2
5
5
13
3.1
% within BMA
7.70%
15.40%
38.50%
38.50%
100.00%
BLEDC
5
3
5
3
16
2.4
% within BLEDC
31.20%
18.80%
31.20%
18.80%
100.00%
CHE
4
5
9
13
31
3.0
% within CHE
12.90%
16.10%
29.00%
41.90%
100.00%
Unknown
1
3
1
5
3.0
% within Unknown
20.00%
60.00%
20.00%
100.00%
38
4a. existence and frequency of school and student assessments
SABER
Latent
Emerging
Established
Advanced
Total
Score
OBEC
10
25
92
127
3.6
% within OBEC
7.90%
19.70%
72.40%
100.00%
OPEC
3
10
21
34
3.5
% within OPEC
8.80%
29.40%
61.80%
100.00%
BMA
3
10
13
3.8
% within BMA
23.10%
76.90%
100.00%
BLEDC
1
5
10
16
3.6
% within BLEDC
6.20%
31.20%
62.50%
100.00%
CHE
2
8
21
31
3.6
% within CHE
6.50%
25.80%
67.70%
100.00%
Unknown
3
1
1
5
2.6
% within Unknown
60.00%
20.00%
20.00%
100.00%
4b. use of school assessments for making school adjustments
Latent
Emerging
Established
Advanced
Total
OBEC
3
12
66
46
127
3.2
% within OBEC
2.40%
9.40%
52.00%
36.20%
100.00%
OPEC
4
19
11
34
3.2
% within OPEC
11.80%
55.90%
32.40%
100.00%
BMA
2
7
4
13
3.2
% within BMA
15.40%
53.80%
30.80%
100.00%
BLEDC
0
2
6
8
16
3.4
% within BLEDC
0.00%
12.50%
37.50%
50.00%
100.00%
CHE
0
3
18
10
31
3.2
% within CHE
0.00%
9.70%
58.10%
32.30%
100.00%
Unknown
2
1
2
5
3.0
% within Unknown
40.00%
20.00%
40.00%
100.00%
4c. frequency of standardized student assessments
Latent
Emerging
Established
Advanced
Total
OBEC
8
18
101
127
3.7
% within OBEC
6.30%
14.20%
79.50%
100.00%
OPEC
2
6
26
34
3.7
% within OPEC
5.90%
17.60%
76.50%
100.00%
BMA
1
1
11
13
3.8
% within BMA
7.70%
7.70%
84.60%
100.00%
BLEDC
1
3
12
16
3.7
% within BLEDC
6.20%
18.80%
75.00%
100.00%
CHE
1
7
23
31
3.7
% within CHE
3.20%
22.60%
74.20%
100.00%
Unknown
2
3
5
3.2
% within Unknown
40.00%
60.00%
100.00%
4d. use of student assessments for pedagogical and personnel adjustments
Latent
Emerging
Established
Advanced
Total
OBEC
4
10
38
75
127
3.4
% within OBEC
3.10%
7.90%
29.90%
59.10%
100.00%
OPEC
2
15
17
34
3.4
% within OPEC
5.90%
44.10%
50.00%
100.00%
BMA
1
8
4
13
3.2
% within BMA
7.70%
61.50%
30.80%
100.00%
BLEDC
0
2
5
9
16
3.4
% within BLEDC
0.00%
12.50%
31.20%
56.20%
100.00%
CHE
1
5
8
17
31
3.3
39
% within CHE
3.20%
16.10%
25.80%
54.80%
100.00%
Unknown
2
1
2
5
3.0
% within Unknown
40.00%
20.00%
40.00%
100.00%
4e. publication of school and student assessments
Latent
Emerging
Established
Advanced
Total
OBEC
1
4
33
89
127
3.7
% within OBEC
0.80%
3.10%
26.00%
70.10%
100.00%
OPEC
3
6
25
34
3.6
% within OPEC
8.80%
17.60%
73.50%
100.00%
BMA
1
3
9
13
3.6
% within BMA
7.70%
23.10%
69.20%
100.00%
BLEDC
0
1
6
9
16
3.5
% within BLEDC
0.00%
6.20%
37.50%
56.20%
100.00%
CHE
1
1
9
20
31
3.5
% within CHE
3.20%
3.20%
29.00%
64.50%
100.00%
Unknown
1
2
2
5
3.2
% within Unknown
20.00%
40.00%
40.00%
100.00%
40
5a. guidelines for the use of school and student assessments for accountability
SABER
Latent
Emerging
Established
Advanced
Total
Score
OBEC
4
7
82
34
127
3.1
% within OBEC
3.10%
5.50%
64.60%
26.80%
100.00%
OPEC
2
2
23
7
34
3.0
% within OPEC
5.90%
5.90%
67.60%
20.60%
100.00%
BMA
1
10
2
13
3.1
% within BMA
7.70%
76.90%
15.40%
100.00%
BLEDC
0
0
13
3
16
3.2
% within BLEDC
0.00%
0.00%
81.20%
18.80%
100.00%
CHE
0
2
20
9
31
3.2
% within CHE
0.00%
6.50%
64.50%
29.00%
100.00%
Unknown
1
3
1
5
3.0
% within Unknown
20.00%
60.00%
20.00%
100.00%
5b. national or regional systems of educational assessments
Latent
Emerging
Established
Advanced
Total
OBEC
15
76
36
127
3.2
% within OBEC
11.80%
59.80%
28.30%
100.00%
OPEC
5
22
7
34
3.1
% within OPEC
14.70%
64.70%
20.60%
100.00%
BMA
1
8
4
13
3.2
% within BMA
7.70%
61.50%
30.80%
100.00%
BLEDC
2
9
5
16
3.2
% within BLEDC
12.50%
56.20%
31.20%
100.00%
CHE
5
20
6
31
3.0
% within CHE
16.10%
64.50%
19.40%
100.00%
Unknown
1
2
2
5
3.2
% within Unknown
20.00%
40.00%
40.00%
100.00%
5c. comparisons of school and student performance reports
Latent
Emerging
Established
Advanced
Total
OBEC
9
34
39
45
127
2.9
% within OBEC
7.10%
26.80%
30.70%
35.40%
100.00%
OPEC
2
13
8
11
34
2.8
% within OPEC
5.90%
38.20%
23.50%
32.40%
100.00%
BMA
1
6
2
4
13
2.7
% within BMA
7.70%
46.20%
15.40%
30.80%
100.00%
BLEDC
0
5
7
4
16
2.9
% within BLEDC
0.00%
31.20%
43.80%
25.00%
100.00%
CHE
0
5
11
15
31
3.3
% within CHE
0.00%
16.10%
35.50%
48.40%
100.00%
Unknown
0
1
3
1
5
3.0
% within Unknown
0.00%
20.00%
60.00%
20.00%
100.00%
5d. school council authority to perform financial audits
Latent
Emerging
Established
Advanced
Total
OBEC
27
22
50
28
127
2.6
% within OBEC
21.30%
17.30%
39.40%
22.00%
100.00%
OPEC
4
5
18
7
34
2.8
% within OPEC
11.80%
14.70%
52.90%
20.60%
100.00%
BMA
5
2
4
2
13
2.2
% within BMA
38.50%
15.40%
30.80%
15.40%
100.00%
BLEDC
2
1
12
1
16
2.8
% within BLEDC
12.50%
6.20%
75.00%
6.20%
100.00%
CHE
10
3
13
5
31
2.4
41
% within CHE
32.30%
9.70%
41.90%
16.10%
100.00%
Unknown
1
1
2
1
5
2.6
% within Unknown
20.00%
20.00%
40.00%
20.00%
100.00%
5e. manual for the participation of the school councils in school audits
Latent
Emerging
Established
Advanced
Total
OBEC
19
32
63
13
127
2.6
% within OBEC
15.00%
25.20%
49.60%
10.20%
100.00%
OPEC
6
9
17
2
34
2.4
% within OPEC
17.60%
26.50%
50.00%
5.90%
100.00%
BMA
4
1
8
13
2.3
% within BMA
30.80%
7.70%
61.50%
100.00%
BLEDC
2
5
9
0
16
2.4
% within BLEDC
12.50%
31.20%
56.20%
0.00%
100.00%
CHE
5
8
15
3
31
2.5
% within CHE
16.10%
25.80%
48.40%
9.70%
100.00%
Unknown
1
1
2
1
5
2.6
% within Unknown
20.00%
20.00%
40.00%
20.00%
100.00%
42
