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AGENTS OF INFLUENCE: ASSESSING THE ROLE OF CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH ORGANIZATIONS AFTER THE 16TH PARTY CONGRESS
... 9 On the contrary, the concept of Sixiang ku" is literally translated from English and is often used to refer to policy research institutions. 10 Since there is disagreement among scholars on the definition of a think tank, however, certain typologies have been created to categorize the verity of think tanks that exist today 11 , moreover they also acknowledge that some of these think tanks cannot be simple be packed into any one of these categories. 12 Albeson has recognized five categories that are: (1) Universities without Students, (2) Government Contractors, Despite the divergence over the definition of "think tanks." the common feature that can be gleaned from the above interpretations is the "non-profit." ...
The astonishing economic development in the last twenty years has made remarkable transformations to China. In the backdrop of these transformations, China is increasingly facing up to some formidable and multifarious challenges both domestically as well as in foreign policy related issues. It is for this reason that think tanks are on the rise and become more visible and apparently more influential as the demand for sound and innovative policy initiatives, are on the rise in China. Scholars around the world are paying more attention, exploring their characteristics, their modes operandi, and more importantly their role in policymaking apparatus. This paper examines the growing role of Chinese think tanks in foreign policy making, and their influence on policy debate with the use of policy analysis. Introduction:
... A contributing factor may be a changing political climate in China: there is a greater tolerance for a multiplicity of competing views on foreign policy topics and occasionally a willingness to re-evaluate government policy based on expert criticism and/or recommendations. 49 It remains unclear, however, to what extent these analysts and scholars influenced the leadership's decision to cease official use of the term peaceful rise. Opposition by the MFA and the PLA was certainly important. ...
China's rapidly proliferating global interests and evolving political environment have begun to change the international and domestic context for its foreign policy-making. This article explores the changing inputs into and processes associated with foreign policy-making in China today. It does this by analysing the shifting fortunes of “peaceful rise,” one of the first new foreign policy concepts to be introduced under the Hu Jintao administration. The authors draw several implications from this narrow debate for understanding contemporary foreign policy-making in China. It provides an example of how new foreign policy ideas and strategies can come from outside the formal, central government bureaucracy, and underscores the growing relevance of think-tank analysts and university-based scholars. Finally, the authors argue that the Chinese leadership's decision to eschew “peaceful rise” in favour of “peaceful development” was fundamentally a question of terminology and thus preserved China's strategy of reassuring other nations.
China’s public policy research community has long been dominated by large state-run research institutes, but in recent years financially and bureaucratically independent think tanks have played a more prominent role. While private think tanks have used a variety of strategies to secure funding and access to officials, a major constraint is the continuing influence of their state-run counterparts. What are the conditions under which private institutes can prosper in this environment, both in terms of providing meaningful advice and developing prestigious brands? This essay theorizes that these goals can be achieved under three conditions: when human capital is leveraged to provide new advice, when networks are deployed to build bridges between scholarly communities, and when effective use of information technology supports the dissemination of research outputs. An organization’s ability to meet those criteria depends both on resource endowments and on willingness to buck the conventional wisdom.
Chinese scholars are debating whether, and how, to innovate a Chinese theory of International Relations (IR). This article examines the driving forces behind this theoretical debate. It challenges the commonsensical link between external events in the subject matter (i.r.) and theorizing (IR), which suggests that the innovation of a Chinese IR theory is a natural product of China's geopolitical rise, its growing political ambitions, and discontent with Western hegemony. We propose instead a sociological approach to intellectual innovation which opens the black box of knowledge production, and argue that theoretical innovation, in China and elsewhere, is best understood as an interplay between internal and external layers. The internal academic context comprises intellectuals pursuing prominence, with each intellectual trying to carve out a maximally distinct position in order to receive attention from their peers—theorizing a Chinese IR theory being one important way of doing this. The external layer—which ranges from power politics to sociopolitical developments—affects this process indirectly by providing more research funds and autonomy to the more immediate institutional environment where control over rewards such as research funds, promotion, and publications affects what kind of work is done, with theorizing being increasingly rewarded.
This paper investigates how China's institutional context and characteristics affect the nature and agency of Chinese think tanks and if the marketization of the Chinese economy over the last generation has had an impact on the knowledge–policy interface. To do this, it marshals and deploys the knowledge regime framework that probes how ideas and institutions intersect to provide opportunities for knowledge actors to generate and transmit policy relevant knowledge. Through application, we can infer that China possesses a politically tempered knowledge regime that is far more plural and diverse than ever before but where policy influence is contingent on administrative linkages to different government ministries. Externalization of policy advice is thus largely a product of institutional parameters that condition the relationship between think tanks and various ministries; it is also being accelerated by a dramatic rise in supply of policy professionals that are available to influence policy from the sidelines. By demonstrating this, the paper transcends prevailing think tank accounts that have largely refrained from studying their rise vis-à-vis incumbent political contexts, which is critical to their existence and efficacy.
In foreign policy realm, Chinese think tanks are day by day getting more influential, complex, and numerous. This article is an effort to trace the nature, scope, typology, and influence of policy advice institutions in China against the time blocks of past, present, and future. After defining the factors working behind the present growth of think tanks in China, the present era is also substantiated for all non-Chinese actors as the unprecedented time of access and interaction since 1949.
The Chinese government and media rely on think tanks for insight and expertise on international events.
Over the past two decades China's international relations (IR) think tanks have come to play increasingly important roles in China's foreign policy making and intelligence analysis, as well as serving as an increasingly important liaison to officials and specialists in foreign countries. During this period China's IR think tanks have expanded in quantity as well as improving the quality of personnel and analytical product. Publications by, and discussions with, these think tanks often offer important indications of broader policy debates and competition among institutes and their staff. This article surveys the current organization and state of research in China's IR think tanks, offers historical perspectives on the evolution of this community, and provides current information of relevance to those who interact with these institutions and read their publications.
Chinese Civilian Foreign Policy Research Institutions
- Bonnie S Glaser
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Bonnie S. Glaser and Phillip
C. Saunders, "Chinese Civilian Foreign Policy Research Institutions," pp. 597-
The classic work on the military is Michael Swaine, The Role of the Chinese Military in National Security Policymaking
- Bates Gill
- James Mulvenon
Bates Gill and James Mulvenon, "Chinese Military Related Think Tanks,"
pp. 617-624. The classic work on the military is Michael Swaine, The Role of the
Chinese Military in National Security Policymaking, Santa Monica, CA: The RAND
Corporation, 1998. Additional important sources include Michael Pillsbury,
"China's Research Institutes," paper commissioned by the U.S.-China Economic
and Security Review Commission, 2002, http://www.uscc.gov/cri.pdf; He Li, "The
Role of Think Tanks in Chinese Foreign Policy," Problems of Communism, March/
April 2002, pp. 33-43.
- David Shambaugh
David Shambaugh, Beautiful Imperialist, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1991.
Resolving the Korean Peninsula Nuclear Crisis and Moving the Korean Peninsula out of the Cold War
- Xu Weidi
Xu Weidi, "Resolving the Korean Peninsula Nuclear Crisis and Moving
the Korean Peninsula out of the Cold War," Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi, September 14,
2003, p. 59-64.
Adopting a Great Power Diplomatic Strategy is Imperative for China: Several Considerations Concerning China's Diplomatic Strategy
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See Ye Zicheng, "Zhongguo shixing daguo waijiao zhanlue shizai bixing:
guanyu zhongguo waijiao zhanlue de jidian sikao" [Adopting a Great Power
Diplomatic Strategy is Imperative for China: Several Considerations Concerning
China's Diplomatic Strategy], Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi [World Economics and
Politics], No. 1, 2000, pp. 5-10;
Viewing China's International Environment from the Asia-Pacific
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Gao Haikuan, "Viewing China's International Environment from the
Asia-Pacific," p. 10-11;
An Assessment of Two Types of New Factors in China's International Environment
- Jin Canrong
- Beijing University
Jin Canrong, Beijing University, "An Assessment of Two
Types of New Factors in China's International Environment," p. 7-9;
Seeking Progress in Stability, Smoothly Passing Through the 'Security Bottleneck
- Ye Zicheng
- Zhang Baijia
- Party History Research
- Center
Ye Zicheng,
"Adopting a Diplomatic Strategy that Adapts to Changes in the Environment,"
pp. 24-25; and Zhang Baijia, Party History Research Center, "Seeking Progress in
Stability, Smoothly Passing Through the 'Security Bottleneck,'" p. 20-22.
43. On China's response to U.S. missile defense policies, see Shi Yinghong,
"Meiguo Guojia Daodan Fangyu Jihua yu Zhongguo ke you de he yinggai you
de duice," [U.S. Missile Defense Plan and the Countermeasures China Could and
Should Take], Harbin Gongye Daxue Xuebao [Harbin Industrial University Journal],
No. 3, 2000, pp. 12-16. For discussion of China and security dilemma dynamics
see Tang Shiping, "Zai Lun Zhongguo de Da Zhanlue," [Reconsidering China's
For a survey and assessment of the debate over China's advocacy of multipolarization, which draws on a rich array of Chinese-language journal articles, see Alastair Iain Johnston
- Grand Strategy
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Grand Strategy], Zhanlue yu Guanli [Strategy and Management], No. 4, 2003. For a
survey and assessment of the debate over China's advocacy of multipolarization,
which draws on a rich array of Chinese-language journal articles, see Alastair Iain
Johnston, "Is China a Status Quo Power?" p. 25-38. Finally, on whether China
needs to assume a great power diplomatic strategy, see Ye Zicheng, "Zhongguo
shixing daguo waijiao zhanlue shizai bixing: guanyu zhongguo waijiao zhanlue
de jidian sikao," Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi [World Economics and Politics], No. 1,
2000, pp. 5-10;
Guanyu taoguang yanghui he yousuo zuowei: zai tan zhongguo de daguo waijiao xintai
- Ye Zicheng
Ye Zicheng, "Guanyu taoguang yanghui he yousuo zuowei: zai
tan zhongguo de daguo waijiao xintai," Taipingyang xuebao [Pacific Journal], No.
1, 2002, p. 62-66;
Zhongguo shixing daguo waijiao zhanlue weishi shangzao: yu Ye Zicheng shangque
- Xiao Huanrong
- Zhongguo De Daguo Zeren Yu Diquzhuyi Zhanlue
Xiao Huanrong, "Zhongguo de daguo zeren yu diquzhuyi
zhanlue" [China's Great Power Responsibilities and the Strategy of Regionalism],
Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi [World Economics and Politics], 2003, No. 1, p. 46-51; and
Liu Shengxiang, "Zhongguo shixing daguo waijiao zhanlue weishi shangzao:
yu Ye Zicheng shangque" [It's Still Too Early for China to Have a Great Power
Diplomatic Strategy: Response to Ye Zicheng], Shijjie jingji yu zhengzhi [World
Economics and Politics], No. 7, 2000, p. 76-80.
China Orders End To SARS Coverup; Officials Begin Belated Campaign Against Disease
- John Pomfret
John Pomfret, China Orders End To SARS Coverup; Officials Begin Belated
Campaign Against Disease," Washington Post, April 19, 2003, p. A08;
The entire expression as described in the July 1, 2003, speech to the Communist Party by Hu Jintao is: "ershiyishiji touershinian, dui wo guo lai shuo, shi yi ge bixu jinjin zhuazhu bingqie keyi da you suo zuo wei de zhuyao zhanlue jiyuqi
- John Pomfret
- U S China
John Pomfret, "China, U.S. Cooperate In Large Heroin Sting; Distrust Had
Hampered Previous Efforts," Washington Post, May 13, 2003, p. A10.
51. The entire expression as described in the July 1, 2003, speech to the
Communist Party by Hu Jintao is: "ershiyishiji touershinian, dui wo guo lai shuo,
shi yi ge bixu jinjin zhuazhu bingqie keyi da you suo zuo wei de zhuyao zhanlue
jiyuqi."
52. Medeiros and Fravel, "China's New Diplomacy."