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Research article
Refusing to apologize can have psychological benefits (and we issue no mea culpa
for this research finding)
TYLER G. OKIMOTO
1
*, MICHAEL WENZEL
2
AND KYLI HEDRICK
3
1
UQ Business School, The University of Queensland, Brisbane, Australia;
2
School of Psychology, Flinders University,
Adelaide, Australia;
3
School of Social Sciences and Psychology, Victoria University, Melbourne, Australia
Abstract
Despite an understanding of the perception and consequences of apologies for their recipients, little is known about the
consequences of interpersonal apologies, or their denial, for the offending actor. In two empirical studies, we examined the
unexplored psychological consequences that follow from a harm-doer’s explicit refusal to apologize. Results showed that the act
of refusing to apologize resulted in greater self-esteem than not refusing to apologize. Moreover, apology refusal also resulted in
increased feelings of power/control and value integrity, both of which mediated the effect of refusal on self-esteem. These findings
point to potential barriers to victim–offender reconciliation after an interpersonal harm, highlighting the need to better understand
the psychology of harm-doers and their defensive behavior for self-focused motives. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
“An apology? Bah! Disgusting! Cowardly! Beneath the
dignity of any gentleman, however wrong he might be.”–
Baroness Emmuska Orczy (1906), IWillRepay
People say apologies are cheap. They may be easy to provide,
but they can also be useful. Apologies lead their recipients
and other observers to reduce their perceptions of blamewor-
thiness (Gonzales, Haugen, & Manning, 1994; Tedeschi &
Reiss, 1981), resulting in a more positive view of the offender
(Bobocel & Zdaniuk, 2005; Shaver, 1985) and decreased
punishment severity (Darby & Schlenker, 1989; Felson &
Ribner, 1981; Rumsey, 1976). They can appease the protests
of injustice victims by mitigating negative emotions (Baron,
1990; Ohbuchi, Kameda, & Agarie, 1989) and can even
create constraints for their recipients, guiding the victims of
an offense toward possibly unearned forgiveness (Bennett &
Dewberry, 1994; McCullough, Worthington, & Rachal, 1997).
If apologies are relatively easy and effective in diffusing
offender-directed outrage, why then might offenders choose to
withhold them?
Apologies are, by definition, an acknowledgment of harm and
admission of responsibility. Therefore, in some instances,
harm-doers may avoid apologies to circumvent the implied
admission of guilt (Robbennolt, 2003) and elude additional
penance or restitution. Harm-doers may also have an implicit
knowledge of the acceptability of their apologetic actions,
withholding an apology for fear that it will be perceived as
insincere and further compound the initial transgression
(Skarlicki, Folger, & Gee, 2004). However, such strategic
omissions still do not explain reluctance to apologize when
it is clear that an apology will elicit forgiveness or when it
has already been determined that a harm-doer is at fault
and all that is required to reduce punishment severity is a
simple apology (Robbennolt, 2003). Indeed, in many cases,
apology is a clearly rational course of action for an offender
(Morse, 2005). If apologies are rational, it suggests that
psychological motives may partly underlie their denial. What
is the psychological benefit of refusing to apologize? Little
empirical research has explored the consequences of inter-
personal apologies for the harm-doer (cf., Exline, Deshea,
& Holeman, 2007), and there has been no research to
date explicitly investigating harm-doers’explicit “refusal”
to apologize as it contrasts with inaction, the psychological
consequences of that refusal for harm-doers, or what motivates
their refusal decision.
Given the dearth of evidence about refusals to apologize, we
attempt to glean insight into their effects by first examining
relevant research on thesymbolic meaning of apologies. Surpris-
ingly, examination of this work suggests that there may actually
be potential psychological “benefits”for harm-doers who explic-
itly refuse to apologize to their victims, consequences that may
partly underlie an offender’s desire to withhold an apology. Spe-
cifically, refusing to apologize may enhance a harm-doer’sfeel-
ings of power/control and value integrity, reactions that are tied
to feelings of self-worth.
The Meaning of an Apology for Victims
Research often conceptualizes apologies as an equity-restoring
response (Karp, 1998; Wood & Mitchell, 1981). Through their
*Correspondence to: Tyler G. Okimoto, UQ Business School, The University of Queensland, Brisbane QLD 4072, Australia.
E-mail: t.okimoto@business.uq.edu.au
European Journal of Social Psychology,Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 43,22–31 (2013)
Published online 4 November 2012 in Wiley Online Library (wileyonlinelibrary.com) DOI: 10.1002/ejsp.1901
Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Received 28 August 2012, Accepted 18 June 2012
transgression, offenders symbolically (and actually) remove
power from their victims (Heider, 1958; Miller, 2001; Murphy
& Hampton, 1988). Intentional harms disturb a victim’ssense
of autonomy and disrupt the balance of equitable status and
power between the two parties (Vidmar & Miller, 1980). The
offer of an apology may speak to this inequity, restoring a sense
of justice in victims by empowering them with decision-making
control to either accept or reject that apology and/or to withhold
forgiveness (Petrucci, 2002). Consistent with this view, recent
research has shown that heightened concerns over power and
control, implicated either through individual differences or
situational salience, lead victims of harm to seek apologies as
part of the desired injustice response (Okimoto, Wenzel, &
Feather, 2009, 2012). However, the benefits of receiving an
apology for a victim’s feelings of power/control go even further
than decision control. By accepting the apology and forgiving
the harm-doer, victims are given the opportunity to take the
moral high-ground by providing offenders with an undeserved
gift (Exline, Worthington, Hill, & McCullough, 2003), placing
the victim in a position of power and superiority (i.e., the power
to forgive; Schimmel, 2002; Wenzel & Okimoto, 2010). Even
rejecting a harm-doer’s apology can empower victims, affording
them a position of control over the offender (Abel, 1998). In
sum, receipt of an apology is empowering for the victims of harm.
Notably, there is an alternative view about the meaning of
an apology. Rather than restoring justice for the victim through
reallocation of power/control, apologies may be effective in
restoring a sense of justice for victims by communicating
agreement that the offense was wrong (Abel, 1998; Tavuchis,
1991). Through their violation, harm-doers undermine a
shared understanding that exists between harm-doer and
victim, the (often unspoken) agreement about what constitutes
acceptable behavior (Rousseau, 1989). Transgressions exhibit
the harm-doer’s disdain for or lack of agreement with the
norms/values defining that behavior as unacceptable, under-
mining the validity of those supposedly shared values
(De Castella, Platow, Wenzel, Okimoto, & Feather, 2011;
Durkheim, 1964; Tyler & Boeckmann, 1997; Vidmar, 2000).
Such value threats elicit in the victim a desire to restore a per-
ceived consensus surrounding those values, to see a renewed
agreement about the importance of shared values in that
relationship (Okimoto & Wenzel, 2008; Wenzel, Okimoto,
Feather, & Platow, 2008, 2010). However, by admitting the
wrongfulness of his or her actions through an apology, the
offender is often able to revalidate the shared consensus
between harm-doer and harm-victim (Abel, 1998; Tavuchis,
1991). Such consensus is often critical to a victim’s sense of
justice, particularly when that victim shares a relationship or
common group membership with the harm-doer (Okimoto,
Wenzel, & Platow, 2010). For example, Wenzel and collea-
gues (2010) showed that victims of workplace theft desired
an apology more when the thief was an ingroup versus
outgroup member and that this effect was mediated by a desire
for shared value consensus with the harm-doer.
Through these two processes, by empowering the victim and/
or revalidating acceptable standards of behavior, apologies may
speak to a victim’s feelings of injustice (Okimoto & Wenzel,
2008). Importantly, these same processes also imply symbolic
meaning for the conveyer of the apology, meanings that may
motivate acts of refusal rather than contrition.
The Meaning of an Apology (and its Refusal) for
Harm-doers
Both empowerment and acknowledgment functions of an
apology suggest corresponding consequences for the harm-doer.
If an apology confers control onto the victim (Abel, 1998;
Petrucci, 2002), it is reasonable to expect that apology to also
diminish the power held by the harm-doer. Such conferral may
restore equity between harm-doer and harm-victim, but disem-
powerment is nonetheless threatening to the harm-doer. Interest-
ingly, whereas the provision of an apology may relinquish
power/control, a harm-doer’sdecisionto“refuse”to apologize
may foster “greater”feelings of power/control. By refusing to
apologize, the harm-doer retains dominance over the victim
(Kittle, 1999; Regehr & Gutheil, 2002). Consistent with this
idea, Hodgins and Liebeskind (2003) found that individuals with
low self-determination (i.e., being concerned about their auton-
omy and control) were more likely to respond to severe reproach
with defensive behavior. In line with this reasoning, we predict
that apology refusals will foster greater feelings of power and
control in harm-doers compared with inaction.
Following the alternative view of apologies as a reaffirmation
of values andacceptable conduct, an apology functions as a form
of self-censure on the part of the harm-doer (Scher & Darley,
1997). However, such an apology also implies a lack of
consistency between the harm-doer’s past behavior and their
apologetic attitudes; acknowledging the wrong requires admis-
sion of incongruence between a harm-doers beliefs/values im-
plied by the apology and those implied by the act of harm.
Such self-incongruence may upset feelings of “value
integrity”—keeping one’s values intact and uncorrupted—a core
motive explicated in a number of psychological theories (e.g.,
Deci & Ryan, 2000; Festinger, 1957; Lecky, 1945; Sherman &
Cohen, 2006; Steele, 1988; Swann, 1983). Echoing this idea,
Goffman (1971) noted that apologies are “a gesture through
which the individual splits himself in two parts, the part that is
guilty of an offense and the part that dissociates itself from the
deceit and affirms a belief in the offended rule”(pp. 113). He
suggested that although this “splitting of the self”can give rise
to self-related dissonance, a sincere apology may also help to
reconcile this inconsistency by revealing their ideal or essential
moral character. Stated differently, an apology provides the
harm-doer with a social account (Gonzales et al., 1994; Tedeschi
& Reiss, 1981), reducing the self-relevant moral implications of
the transgression, reducing self-guilt, and revalidating commit-
ment to the values that define the true self (Bobocel & Zdaniuk,
2005; Shaver, 1985).
Interestingly, however, even if apologies are functional
for protecting one’s integrity and diminishing feelings of self-
blame, these benefits may not be exclusive to an apology.
Paradoxically, a “refusal”to apologize may also offer the same
psychological value to a harm-doer. Refusing to admit to a
wrong helps to maintain consistency between the harm-doer’s
actions and his or her idealized self-concept. Indeed, people are
often motivated toward self-consistency even when the resulting
attribution is negative (Lecky, 1945). Thus, even though defend-
ing a negative behavior may insinuate a less benevolent charac-
ter, the act of refusing to apologize may still help facilitate
perceptions of self-consistency, reducing self-oriented disso-
nance and enhancing feelings of value integrity.
Refusing to apologize 23
Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 43,22–31 (2013)
Refusals to Apologize and a Harm-doer’s Feelings of
Self-worth
As this discussion suggests, a harm-doer’s refusal to apologize
may have implications for that individual’s feelings of power/
control and value integrity. Although these possible conse-
quences may serve as a source of motivation for a harm-doer’s
refusal to apologize, they are also indicative of more fundamen-
tal concerns over self-worth. Both feelings of power/control and
value integrity are central to one’s self-concept.
First, as we have argued, apology refusals may empower
a harm-doer by disallowing the resignation of control over to
the harm-victim. Such feelings of power/control may have
broader consequences for feelings of self-worth or self-esteem
(Coopersmith, 1967). As suggested by self-determination theory
(Deci & Ryan, 2000), autonomous motivation is a critical ante-
cedent of subjective well-being (Kasser & Ryan, 1996; Sheldon
& Kasser, 1995). Similarly, the research by Heppner et al. (2008)
showed that daily perceptions of autonomy were positively
related to daily fluctuations in self-esteem. Thus, the power/
control claimed through an explicit refusal to apologize may also
be tied to heightened feelings of self-esteem.
Second, we have also argued that apology refusals may
defend the harm-doer’s integrity by denying the wrongfulness
of the harm itself and thus the inconsistency between one’s
values and actions. Again, this value integrity implication of
apology refusal is tied to more fundamental concerns over
feelings of self-worth (e.g., Cialdini & Trost, 1998; Deutsch &
Gerard, 1955). By definition, having integrity implies principled
and moral action, being true to one’svaluesandbeingagood
person (Sherman & Cohen, 2006). Research has shown that
individuals seek to maintain their existing view of the self,
particularly in the face of negative threats, to preserve a positive
sense of identity (Steele, 1988). Similarly, the study by Heppner
et al. (2008) showed that perceptions of authenticity (being true
to one’s self) were a positive predictor of self-esteem. Along
these lines, to the extent that the refusal to apologize aids the
harm-doer in maintaining feelings of value integrity, it should
also enhance feelings of self-esteem. Thus, through these two
processes (of maintaining status/power and value integrity), we
suggest that the act of refusing to apologize may serve to
enhance a harm-doer’s positive self-view.
Apologies versus Refusals versus Inaction
Interestingly, at face value this reasoning appears to contradict
research suggesting a potential link between the apologetic
sentiments and self-esteem (although to our knowledge, a direct
tie has yet to be identified). Specifically, feelings of guilt
often elicit the desire to apologize (Baumeister, Stillwell, &
Heatherton, 1995), and conferral of that apology can reduce guilt
(Witvliet, Ludwig, & Bauer, 2002). Given that feelings of guilt
accompany reduced self-esteem (see Baumeister, Stillwell, &
Heatherton, 1994), these findings suggest that the provision of
an apology (and the implied reduction in guilt) may also aid
the harm-doer in fostering feelings of self-worth. Importantly,
however, even if apology does elicit greater feelings of self-
esteem, it does not negate the possibility that “both apology
and refusal”have a positive effect on self-worth relative to
inaction. So, despite being apparent conceptual antonyms, both
apologetic “and”nonapologetic responses may help the
harm-doer maintain a positive sense of self.
Given this possibility, when examining the consequences that
follow from a refusal to apologize (the focus of the current
investigation), it is important to consider what the refusal is
being compared with. If apologies and refusals do have similar
consequences, their exclusive comparison (which assumes that
refusals are the opposite of apologies) may obscure meaningful
effects. Moreover, if any differences between refusals and
apologies do emerge, the exclusive comparison also leaves us
unable to attribute those consequences to the act of refusal versus
the absence of an apology. Thus, it is critical to consider
“inaction”as the most relevant comparison condition. It is worth
noting that much of the apology literature contains similar
conceptual confounds; in many cases, it is unclear whether the
consequences associated with apologies are in comparison with
an explicit apology refusal, inaction, or a failure to confer an
apology that the harm-doer wishes to offer (i.e., apologetic
regret). With this consideration in mind, although we focus on
the effect of apology refusals as they relate to inaction, we
examine their consequences as they compare with both inaction
and apology, dual comparisons that allow clearer insight into the
psychology of refusing to apologize.
The Current Investigation
Taken together, the literature surrounding the symbolic meaning
of apologies suggests that, although there are psychological
benefits of apologies for the victims of harm and perhaps even
benefits for the apologizing harm-doer, there may “also”be
potential benefits for that harm-doer when refusing to apologize.
Specifically, we predict the following:
Hypothesis 1: The act of refusing to apologize will result in
feelings of greater power/control than no act of refusal.
Hypothesis 2: The act of refusing to apologize will result in
feelings of greater value integrity than no act of refusal.
In addition, given the centrality of these concerns for broader
feelings of self-worth, we also predict the following:
Hypothesis 3: The act of refusing to apologize will result in
greater personal self-esteem than no act of refusal, mediated by
feelings of power/control and value integrity.
Perhaps underlying the lack of empirical research surround-
ing the harm-doer perspective in apologies (and deviance more
broadly), these predictions are particularly difficult to assess
using standard social-psychological paradigms. The trade-off
between realism and experimental control is compounded by
the limits that the “harm”context places on experimentation.
On the one hand, examining the correlates of respondents’past
(un)apologetic actions does not allow clear interpretation of the
effects as following from the (non)apology versus spuriously
correlated variables such as offense severity, moral justification,
or a lack of apology need/appropriateness (see Exline et al.,
2007). On the other hand, not only is it ethically questionable
to trick participants into thinking they have committed some
harm against another person, but it is also impossible to then
randomly assign them to explicitly deny closure to their victims.
24 Tyler G. Okimoto et al.
Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 43,22–31 (2013)
In the current investigation, we offer our best attempt at
experimentally probing these causal research questions by offer-
ing replication across two novel paradigms that fall between the
realistic (yet only suggestive) correlational studies asking parti-
cipants to report past behavior and the controlled (yet somewhat
artificial) scenario studies telling participants to imagine they
had refused to apologize. Study 1 examines reactions to past per-
sonal experiences of harm-doing, comparing cases of apology,
refusal, and inaction, while also capturing a number of poten-
tially confounding variables. Study 2 then employs a novel ex-
perimental paradigm that asks participants to recall personal
experiences of harm-doing and then randomly assigns them to
formulate (non)apologetic responses. By showing convergence
across these two methods, the current studies aim to offer evi-
dence that the act of refusing to apologize may engender positive
self-relevant consequences.
STUDY 1
In Study 1, participants were asked to recall and reflect on a per-
sonal experience where they had refused to apologize (or con-
ferred an apology, or taken no (un)apologetic actions), while
also keeping note of possible confounding variables. This method
allows us to identify the consequences of an apology refusal, while
also testing for a variety of confounds prevalent in examinations
of retrospectively recalling past decisions to refuse an apology.
Method
Participants included 228 adult respondents (US residents; 68%
female) between 18 and 77 years of age (M= 37.8, Mdn = 35.0,
SD = 13.4), recruited online in exchange for a lottery reward.
Study 1 consisted of a four-cell between-subjects design embed-
ded within a retrospective recall paradigm. Participants were
randomly assigned to one of the four recall conditions: baseline,
apology, refusal, or inaction. Participants in the baseline
condition were prompted to “Think about a time when you did
something that upset someone, something you did or said that
caused someone else to be upset.”By comparison, participants
in the apology condition were prompted to “Think about a time
when you did something that upset someone that you later
apologized for –something you did or said that caused
someone else to be upset and you chose to apologize to them.”
Participants in the refusal condition were prompted to “Think
about a time when you did something that upset someone, but
you refused to apologize –something you did or said that caused
someone else to be upset, but you chose NOT to apologize to
them.”Finally, participants in the inaction condition were
prompted to “Think about a time when you did something that
upset someone –something you did or said that caused someone
else to be upset, but you did NOT take any action.Youdidnot
apologize, but you also did not refuse to apologize –you simply
did nothing”. To better engage participants in these prompts, all
participants were also asked three open-ended questions about
the event: “What exactly did you do?”,“Who was the person
that you upset?”,and“How did they react?”Reported incidents
varied widely, from minor verbal conflicts and accidents to
severe cases of marital infidelity and criminal behavior.
Despite obvious selective recall confounds these prompts
might introduce (see Exline et al., 2007), we opted to ask
participants to recollect refusal events (or apologies, inaction,
or baseline) instead of employing pure correlational procedures
asking them to recall a harmful event and then code their (non)
apologetic behaviors. Given the possible confounds introduced
by this recall procedure, the results of Study 1 should be inter-
preted with caution. However, to help circumvent this issue,
we included a series of checks and controls measuring critical
variables on which our manipulations might be confounded.
Manipulation Checks and Controls
To assess the effectiveness of the manipulations, we asked
participants about their apologetic actions (“How apologetic
were you in your interactions with him/her?”)aswellastheir
apologetic feelings (“How apologetic did you feel?”;1=notat
all apologetic, 7 = very apologetic). We also assessed percep-
tions of offense seriousness. It is possible that apology refusals
relate to self-esteem because both reflect the harm-doer’smoral
justification of the offense, rationalization that increases both
self-esteem and the likelihood that he or she will refuse to
apologize (i.e., a spurious correlation). Indeed, Baumeister,
Stillwell, and Wotman’s (1990) correlational analyses of
harm-doers’autobiographical narratives provide evidence that
their accounts of an offense often contain self-serving rationali-
zations, perceiving the offense as less severe and more justified
than their victims and viewing those victims as excessively
angry (see also Darby & Schlenker, 1989). Such defensive
reactions are pervasive; individuals commonly reconstrue events
and actions to meet the egoistic impressions of the self
(Greenwald, 1980). From this perspective, both the apology
refusal and feelings of self-esteem are a “consequence”of ratio-
nalization, cognitive interpretations of the negative event as less
severe, serving to maintain positive self-evaluations. Notably,
this is not inconsistent with the current perspective, as the
decision to refuse an apology may indeed be partly determined
by preceding justifications. However, we suggest that moral
justification does not entirely explain the psychological
consequences of the act of refusing to apologize, in particular
the feelings of self-worth associated with elevated perceptions
of power/control and value integrity. Therefore, in Study 1, we
included a subjective assessment of severity (indicative of some
rationalization process) and examined it as a competing media-
tor; participants were asked, “How serious were your actions?”
(1 = not at all, 7 = very much). To identify other potential
differences between conditions that might confound the
manipulations, we also asked: “Did this person want you to
apologize?”,“Did this person ask you to apologize?”,“Did
you feel coerced, like you had to apologize?”,and“How close
are you with the person you upset?”
Dependent Measures
Participants reported how they felt about themselves following
this situation. Items were rated on 7-point scales (1= not at all,
7 = very much), reversed valence items [r/c] were recoded so that
higher numbers indicated positive feelings,and composite scales
were created by averaging items. Participants reported feelings
of power/control by rating the extent to which they felt: strong,
Refusing to apologize 25
Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 43,22–31 (2013)
powerful, weak[r/c], and demeaned[r/c]. Participants reported
feelings of value integrity by rating the extent to which they
felt: courageous, sincere, and passive[r/c]. Finally, participants
reported feelings of self-esteem by rating the extent to which
they felt: good, satisfied, proud, and worthy. Reliability statistics
and correlations between measures are presented in Table 1.
Results
Preliminary analysis indicated that, as intended, participants in
the apology condition reported feeling and acting the most
apologetic, whereas participants in the refusal condition reported
feeling and acting the least apologetic (see Table 2). Moreover,
preliminary analyses indicated that these conditions were not
confounded with demands for an apology, felt coercion, inter-
personal closeness with the victim, or perceived offense severity.
The manipulations did not have significant effects on any of
these additional measures, nor did their inclusion in the analysis
reduce or moderate the effects of the manipulations. Thus, these
additional measures are not discussed further, with the exception
of offense severity; given that severity could potentially under-
mine the interpretation of the other dependent measures, we
included it as a control in the analyses despite the lack of a
significant effect of the manipulations.
Results were obtained using regression techniques; manip-
ulated variables were dummy coded to indicate the effect of
apology and (separately) refusal, relative to the inaction condi-
tion; the baseline condition was included for comparison, but
this condition was ignored for the regression analysis. See
Table 2 for cell means and intercell comparisons and Table 3
for the full results of the regression analyses. Results indicated
that participants in the refusal condition reported greater feelings
of power/control, greater feelings of value integrity, and greater
self-esteem than participants in the inaction condition. Partici-
pants in the refusal condition also reported greater power/control
and self-esteem than those in the apology condition, although the
refusal and apology conditions did not differ in value integrity;
both refusal and apology elicited greater feelings of value
integrity compared with inaction.
Mediational/indirect paths were then explored using boot-
strapping techniques that allow for the examination of multiple
mediators and specific indirect effects with small samples
(Preacher & Hayes, 2008; see also Shrout & Bolger, 2002).
When considering status/power and value integrity as mediators,
the act of apology had a significant positive indirect effect on
self-esteem through value integrity, B= .20, SE = .09 (95%
CI = .05–.39). Refusal also had a significant positive indirect
effect on self-esteem, through both power/control, B=.46,
SE = .18 (95% CI = .08–.59), and value integrity, B=.17,SE =.13
(95% CI = .01–.39), and the direct effect of refusal on self-
esteem was reduced to nonsignificance when controlling for
these mediators.
Discussion
The results from Study 1 generally supported our predictions.
All participants reflected on a past event where they harmed
another person. However, those harm-doers who recalled events
where they had refused to apologize reported feeling more
powerful (Hypothesis 1), greater value integrity (Hypothesis
2), and more positive self-esteem (Hypothesis3), compared with
those harm-doers who recalled an event where they took no (un)
Table 1. Zero-order correlations between dependent measure scales
Study 1 1 2 3 4 5
1. Self-esteem (a= .85) —
2. Power/control (a= .73) .65*** —
3. Value integrity (a= .70) .55*** .49*** —
4. Apologetic feelings .25*** .41*** .19** —
5. Apologetic actions .18** .38*** .13* .85*** —
6. Offense severity .06 .07 .14* .21*** .19**
Study 2 1 2 3 4 5
1. Self-esteem (a= .93) —
2. Power/control (a= .89) .60*** —
3. Value integrity (a= .77) .45*** .46*** —
4. Apologetic feelings .21** .26*** .33*** —
*p<.05. **p<.01. ***p<.001.
Table 2. Study 1. Means and standard deviations for dependent measure scales
Measured Variable Baseline (n= 54) Apologized (n= 59) Inaction (n= 56) Refused (n= 59)
Apologetic actions 4.96 (2.58)
b
6.41 (1.80)
a
4.54 (2.26)
b
3.46 (2.39)
c
Apologetic feelings 4.67 (2.84)
b
6.24 (1.92)
a
4.38 (2.41)
b
2.95 (2.20)
c
Offense severity 3.26 (1.59)
a
3.51 (1.80)
a
3.39 (1.58)
a
3.75 (2.01)
a
Power/control 4.08 (1.45)
a
3.92 (1.29)
a
4.17 (1.31)
a
4.79 (1.29)
b
Value integrity 4.30 (1.17)
ab
4.51 (0.95)
a
3.99 (1.22)
b
4.47 (1.27)
a
Self-esteem 3.41 (1.62)
a
3.43 (1.38)
a
3.35 (1.40)
a
3.96 (1.34)
b
Note. Standard deviations appear in parentheses. Means within rows that do not share subscripts differ significantly at p<.05 as determined by Fisher’s least
significant difference comparisons.
26 Tyler G. Okimoto et al.
Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 43,22–31 (2013)
apologetic action. These findings offer the first evidence that
the refusal to apologize can result in positive self-relevant
consequences for harm-doers.
We can also compare these findings with the consequences of
apology conferral. Participants recalling an act of harm where
they apologized did not experience greater feelings of power/
control compared with inaction (and less than refusal). However,
like refusals, apologies did aid in enhancing feelings of value
integrity and (indirectly, through value integrity) feelings of
self-esteem. These findings are notable because they suggest that
apologies and refusals are not conceptual antonyms but rather
reflect different processes. Thus, the assumption that the effects
of an apology are opposite to those of a refusal to apologize
is misled.
It is also notable that the consequences of apologies and
refusals were not due to differences in perceived harm severity;
severity was a significant predictor of feelings of self-worth,
but it did not explain the effects of the manipulations. Thus,
the alternative explanation that participants’refusal is tied to
rationalization of the harm is not supported. However, despite
this evidence and the nonrelevance of other possible confound-
ing variables, Study 1 is limited in that there may still be unantic-
ipated spurious variables that correlate with (and thus confound)
the types of events recalled. Therefore, it is critical to offer more
direct causal evidence that is unimpeded by selective recall.
STUDY 2
In Study 2, we employed an experimental paradigm where
participants recalled a past case of harm-doing and then were
instructed to behave in accordance with the experimental manip-
ulation by formulating a written apology refusal (or apology,
or control) regardless of their own personal views. This approach
mirrors interventions that have been used in past research to
understand the consequences of cognitive perspective taking
(e.g., Coke, Batson, & McDavis, 1978), confession (e.g.,
Pennebaker, Hughes, & O’Heeron, 1987), and forgiveness
(e.g., Wenzel & Okimoto, 2010, 2012), procedures that ask par-
ticipants to reflect on a particular course of action that may or
may not diverge from their natural behavioral inclinations. This
method allows us to identify the causal consequences of an
apology refusal, while also avoiding a variety of confounds
prevalent in examinations of retrospectively recalling past
decisions to refuse an apology.
Method
Participants included 219 adult respondents (US residents; 73%
female) between 18 and 71years of age (M=36.4, Mdn =34.0,
SD = 12.8), recruited online in exchange for a lottery reward.
Study 2 included a 3-condition experimental manipulation
assigning participants to an act of apology, an act of refusal, or
control. At the start of the study, respondents were asked to
reflect on a personal experience where they did something that
upset someone (identical to the Study 1 baseline condition).
Following the retrospective recall prompt, participants in the
“apology condition”were instructed to:
Imagine that this had just happened, and that the other person
had asked you for an apology. Write an e-mail to this person,
telling him/her that you apologize for your actions. It doesn’t
matter if this is how you feel or what you did; please just
imagine that you are emailing to expressyour apology. Please
outline exactly what you would say. Tell him/her you
apologize, and tell him/her why.
In the “refusal condition,”participants were presented with
a similar prompt asking for an explicit apology refusal (e.g.,
“telling him/her that you refuse to apologize for your actions.”).
Participants in the control condition did not receive an additional
prompt. Although hypothetical in nature, this method of
allowing participants to formulate their own (non)apologetic
responses in connection with a retrospective event offers the
realism of an actual instance of harm, while still facilitating
much more experimental control than the manipulations in
Study 1 (which could be confounded with selective recall).
Manipulation Checks and Dependent Measures
To assess the effectiveness of the manipulations, we asked
participants about their apologetic feelings (“How apologetic
do you feel right now?”;1 = not at all, 7 = very much). For our
primary dependent measures, participants in Study 2 were asked
Table 3. Study 1. Hierarchical regression results for dependent measures
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3
Measured Variable Predictor bt-value bt-value bt-value
Offense severity Apologized .02 0.27
Refused to apologize .09 1.05
Power/control Apologized .09 1.04 .09 1.01
Refused to apologize .22 2.56** .23 2.64**
Offense severity ——.08 1.07
Value integrity Apologized .21 2.45* .21 2.41*
Refused to apologize .20 2.24* .18 2.07*
Offense severity —— .17 2.32*
Self-esteem Apologized .03 0.30 .03 0.34 .00 0.02
Refused to apologize .21 2.38* .22 2.48* .06 0.85
Offense severity ——.10 1.32 .12 2.04*
Power/control ———— .44 6.62***
Value integrity ———— .33 4.99***
*p<.05. **p<.01. ***p<.001.
Refusing to apologize 27
Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 43,22–31 (2013)
to rate their agreement (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree)
with a number of explicit statements; these measures diverged
from those assessed in Study 1 to avoid possible construct
ambiguity in participant reports of their general feelings.
Reversed valence items [r/c] were recoded so that higher numb-
ers indicated more positive feelings, and composite scales were
created by averaging items. The measure assessing feelings of
power/control included the statements: “I feel in charge”,“I
feel powerful”,“Ifeelincontrol”,and“Idon’t let other
people intimidate me”. The measure assessing feelings of value
integrity included the statements: “IfeelIamnoteasily
persuaded to change what I think is right”,“I stick my moral
convictions”,“I feel like I change my beliefs according to who
is around me [r/c]”,and“I feel like I am easily convinced to
adopt the perspectives of others [r/c]”. Finally, self-esteem
was assessed by Rosenberg’s (1989) 10-item Self-Esteem Scale
(e.g., “I take a positive attitude toward myself”and “IwishI
could have more respect for myself [r/c]”). Following past
research (Roberts & Gotlib, 1997), participants were instructed
to rate how they felt about themselves “at the present moment”
to capture fluctuations in state rather than trait self-esteem. See
Table 1 for reliability statistics and correlations between
measures.
Results
Preliminary analysis indicated the act of refusal made partici-
pants feel significantly less apologetic than the act of apology
or control; however, the apology and control conditions were
not significantly different, a finding that suggests that partici-
pants felt some level of apologetic feelings at baseline. Indeed,
when asked if they “actually”apologized in this situation,
61.6% of the respondents reported apologizing; however, when
asked if they “wanted”to apologize, the mean and median were
4.0 (the scale midpoint; SD = 2.5). Although these baseline
levels advocate caution when interpreting the control condition,
random assignment still allows for confident causal interpreta-
tion of the results. Also note that self-reported apologetic actions
did not interact with the experimental manipulations, indicating
that its effects were not dependent on congruence with respon-
dents’past course of action. Similarly, additional measures ask-
ing participants whether or not the harm-victim desired an
apology did not moderate the effect of the manipulations.
Results were obtained using regression techniques; manipu-
lated variables were dummy coded to indicate the effect of the
act of apology and (separately) the act of refusal, relative to the
control condition. See Table 4 for cell means and intercell
comparisons and Table 5 for the full results of the regression
analyses. Results indicated that the act of refusal elicited greater
feelings of power/control than the control condition. Interest-
ingly, the act of an apology also elicited greater feelings of
power/control than the control condition but was not signifi-
cantly different from the act of refusal. This same pattern was
also identified in feelings of value integrity; both the act of
refusal and the act of an apology elicited greater feelings of value
integrity than the control condition, whereas refusals and
apologies did not significantly differ. However, only the act of
refusal resulted in greater self-esteem relative to the control
condition, whereas the act of apology fell between the two other
conditions and was not significantly different from either.
Mediation was then explored using bootstrapping techniques
that allow for the examination of multiple mediators and specific
indirect effects with small samples (Preacher & Hayes, 2008).
When considering the two mediators, despite the lack of a total
effect, the act of apology had a significant positive indirect effect
on self-esteem, through both power/control, B=.29, SE =.11
(95% CI = .09–.52), and value integrity, B= .13, SE =.06
(95% CI = .03–.27). The act of refusal also had a significant
positive indirect effect on self-esteem, through both power/
control, B= .35, SE = .12 (95% CI = .15–.61), and value
integrity, B= .16, SE = .08 (95% CI = .05–.35), and the direct
effect of refusal on self-esteem was reduced to nonsignificance
when controlling for the mediators.
Discussion
Study 2 again provides evidence showing self-relevant benefits
of refusing to apologize. Consistent with Study 1, participants
who expressed their refusal to apologize reported greater
feelings of power/control (Hypothesis 1) and value integrity
(Hypothesis 2). Moreover, both feelings of power/control and
value integrity predicted self-esteem, mediating the effect of
the refusal (Hypothesis 3). Likewise, reactions to the act of an
apology also had notable effects. Similar to a refusal, expressing
an apology also enhanced feelings of greater power/control,
value integrity, and (only indirectly) self-esteem. Again, these
results highlight the fact that refusals do not elicit the opposite
effects of apologies. Rather, there is potential for both responses
to aid in self-esteem maintenance.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Taken together, the results of these two studies provide
converging evidence that there can be beneficial psychological
consequences for individuals who refuse to provide an apology
to the victims of their harmful actions. The positive relationship
between apology refusals and indices of self-worth were
Table 4. Study 2. Means and standard deviations for dependent measure scales
Measured Variable Act of apology (n= 72) Control (n= 79) Act of refusal (n= 68)
Apologetic feelings 2.86 (1.41)
a
3.10 (1.87)
a
2.28 (1.69)
b
Power/control 5.58 (1.39)
a
4.90 (1.68)
b
5.73 (1.35)
a
Value integrity 5.88 (0.86)
a
5.39 (1.18)
b
6.01 (1.10)
a
Self-esteem 5.42 (1.30)
ab
5.17 (1.40)
a
5.74 (1.03)
b
Note. Standard deviations appear in parentheses. Means within rows that do not share subscripts differ significantly at p<.05 as determined by Fisher’s least
significant difference comparisons.
28 Tyler G. Okimoto et al.
Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 43,22–31 (2013)
consistent across the two methodologies. This pattern was
evident when manipulating the type of event recalled in Study 1,
suggesting that it is indicative of a harm-doers’authentically
unapologetic feelings about a past transgression. Furthermore,
this basic pattern was replicated whenmanipulating participants’
unapologetic response in Study 2, suggesting that the findings of
Study 1 were not due to confounding features of the different
event types recalled and that the act of refusal had a causal
impact on feelings of self-worth.
Interestingly, although parenthetical to the current investiga-
tion, these findings may provide insight into the psychological
motives underlying a harm-doer’sdecisiontowithholdan
apology: Why would a harm-doer refuse to apologize even when
it is clear that such an apology will reduce culpability and elicit
(possibly unearned) forgiveness? Because the act of refusal
results in greater feelings of power/control, value integrity, and
self-worth (at least in the short-term), it is reasonable to predict
an individual’s decision to withhold an apology may be partly
motivated by basic psychological needs for autonomy (e.g., Deci
& Ryan, 2000) and consistency (e.g., Festinger, 1957; Lecky,
1945; Steele, 1988). However, further research is needed to
substantiate this suggestion.
This research broadens existing work on the feelings
associated with apologies by offering evidence specificto
explicit apology refusals. Past research has operationalized
apologies by examining respondents’self-reported presence
or absence of an apology (e.g., Exline et al., 2007). This
approach, however, confounds “apology refusals”with the
“absence of apologies”indicative of indecision or an inability
to offer a desired apology. As a result, it is difficult to discern
whether these results are driven by differences between
apologies and refusals, unrealized apologetic desires, or
indecision. This distinction is important, particularly if the
psychology underlying apologies is different from the psychol-
ogy underlying apology refusals. Interestingly, the current
findings about apology refusals in particular appear to diverge
from existing research reflecting on salient nonapologies,
suggesting that asking participants about how they felt when
they did not apologize (Exline et al., 2007) is different than
asking them about how they felt when they “refused”to apolo-
gize (the current studies). The former may be driven by cases
where respondents “failed”to apologize, experiences likely to
be strongly influenced by the psychology of regret (Gilovich
& Medvec, 1995). In contrast, probing apology refusal appears
to elicit unrepentant actions, albeit actions that may be aided by
post hoc cognitive justification.
Notably, although the current research begins to reconcile
ambiguities in the potential effects of apology refusals, it raises
new questions about the consequences of apologies. In both
studies, participants felt greater value integrity following an
apology (either recalled or manipulated) compared with harm
without apologetic action, and this had indirect consequences
for self-esteem. This finding is consistent with Goffman’s
(1971) notion of an apology as a “splitting of the self”that serves
the functionof realigning the harm-doers apologetic actions with
his or her idealized values, a value reaffirmation that promotes
genuine self-forgiveness (Wenzel, Woodyatt, & Hedrick, in
press). However, the effects of apology on feelings of power/
control were not consistent across the two studies. In Study 1,
recalling apologetic events elicited the same feelings of power/
control as recalling inaction harm events. By contrast, in Study 2,
the act of apologizing appeared to increase feelings of power/
control. There are a number of possible reasons for this inconsis-
tency. It could be that actively apologizing elicits temporary
feelings of agency that eventually dissipate and thus are not
reflected in recalled apologies, suggesting a need for longitudinal
research. Alternatively, there may be two different processes
through which apologies affect feelings of power/control (one
positive and one negative), the salience of which might differ
between recalled and active apologetic acts. On the one hand,
apologizing may be considered a relinquishing of control to
the victim (Karp, 1998; Wood & Mitchell, 1981); on the other
hand, an apology could also be thought of as an active attempt
to control the victim’s attributions of blame (Tedeschi & Reiss,
1981). More work is needed, both theoretical and empirical, to
disentangle the potential consequences of apology on feelings
of power/control and the conditions that moderate those
diverging effects.
The current research may be broadened in other ways as well.
For example, many scholars view the provision of an apology as
only one half of a dialogical process of reconciliation between the
harm-doer and his or her victim (Scheff, 1998). To the contrary,
the current results suggest that the expression of an apology
refusal may be sufficient to elicit a more positive sense of
self, even in the absence of the victim’s receipt of that refusal
(i.e., expressions of refusal not heard by the victim; Study 2).
Although the expression of a refusal was adequate to elicit
psychological effects, these effects may be amplified or change
when asked to refuse an apology while the aggrieved victim is
present. Moreover, the victim’s subsequent response to an
explicit nonapology (or failure to apologize) may also have
dramatic effects on the harm-doer. These empirical questions
Table 5. Study 2. Hierarchical regression results for dependent measures
Step 1 Step 2
Measured variable Predictor bt-value bt-value
Power/control Act of apology .21 2.81**
Act of refusal .25 3.39***
Value integrity Act of apology .21 2.83**
Act of refusal .27 3.58***
Self-esteem Act of apology .09 1.24 .06 0.92
Act of refusal .21 2.77** .03 0.40
Power/control —— .50 8.33***
Value integrity —— .22 3.55***
*p<.01. **p<.01. ***p<.001.
Refusing to apologize 29
Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 43,22–31 (2013)
beg further investigation into apology refusals while also
considering the dynamic relationship between harm-doers and
their victims. These relational complexities also suggest that
broadening our survey of the psychological consequences of
apology refusals may yield interesting and important patterns.
For example, the act of refusing to apologize may be much less
psychologically advantageous for harm-doers when considering
relational outcomes (e.g., relationship quality, group identifica-
tion, and belongingness) that are less self-focused and are more
likely to capture the importance of the dialogical interplay
between a harm-doer and his or her victim. Although the refusal
to apologize may positively impact a harm-doer’s self-oriented
goals, that same refusal may negatively impact relational goals.
Questions also remain about the lasting benefits of apology
refusals, suggesting a need for longitudinal research aimed
at identifying patterns as they develop over time. Future research
should consider the broader spectrum of both self-oriented
and other-oriented concerns, short-term and long-term conse-
quences, and the impact of the dyadic interplay between harm-
doer and victim.
Notwithstanding the need for further specification, the current
findings are remarkable given that an apology refusal may, in
some cases, reinforce commitment to antisocial behavior that
has harmed another individual and is largely perceived by others
to be unjust. In the current research, the heightened self-relevant
perceptions of power/control and value integrity implied by the
explicit act of refusing to apologize appeared to trump any
potential negative effect on self-esteem resulting from the
defense of harmful actions. Such findings may help to explain
barriers to reconciliation and the seemingly irrational, antisocial,
or callous behavior of harm-doers in real-world contexts. For
example, in judicial proceedings, even when apologies are
inadmissible as evidence of culpability, many offenders still
refuse their counsel’s suggestion to apologize despite the
likelihood that it will reduce sentencing severity (Robbennolt,
2003). Within organizations, effectiveness and learning may be
hindered by a leader’s reluctance to admit error and take
responsibility, perhaps indicative of a more fundamental tension
between the organizational goals that leaders are charged with
implementing and their self-oriented goals to maintain power
and status (see Magee, Gruenfeld, Keltner, & Galinsky, 2004).
In intergroup contexts, symbolic apologies in response to histor-
ical victimizations are a common strategy for trying to promote
reconciliation (see Blatz & Philpot, 2010; Chapman, 2007;
Philpot & Hornsey, 2008, 2011; Wohl, Hornsey, & Bennett,
2012), but the debate about whether or not such apologies should
be conferred often becomes a major political issue, giving rise
to added contention between groups. Recognition of the self-
serving consequences of nonconciliatory behaviors, which may
deny victims of harm psychological closure, provides much
needed insight into the psychology of unrepentant harm-doers.
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