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Why Anti-Corruption Reforms Fail—Systemic Corruption as a Collective Action Problem
Abstract
With an increased awareness of the detrimental effects of corruption on development, strategies to fight it are now a top priority in policy circles. Yet, in countries ridden with systemic corruption, few successes have resulted from the investment. On the basis of an interview study conducted in Kenya and Uganda—two arguably typically thoroughly corrupt countries—we argue that part of an explanation to why anticorruption reforms in countries plagued by widespread corruption fail is that they are based on a theoretical mischaracterization of the problem of systemic corruption. More specifically, the analysis reveals that while contemporary anticorruption reforms are based on a conceptualization of corruption as a principal–agent problem, in thoroughly corrupt settings, corruption rather resembles a collective action problem. This, in turn, leads to a breakdown of any anticorruption reform that builds on the principal–agent framework, taking the existence of noncorruptible so-called principals for granted.
... En particular, para las políticas anticorrupción basadas en el fortalecimiento institucional esto significa que, en principio, la implementación de estructuras institucionales sólidas si bien estimula el incremento de las denuncias por actos de corrupción, la eficiencia de la operatividad de las instituciones se encuentra restringida, tanto por el crecimiento de las instituciones de control y sanción administrativa y penal y de los procedimientos jurídicos derivados, como por los requerimientos presupuestales adicionales a los originalmente asignados. 10 En consecuencia, es de esperarse que el incremento de las denuncias termine rebasando a las capacidades operativas de las instituciones encargadas de la investigación, con el resultado consecuente de la no atención o ausencia de seguimiento de las denuncias presentadas, fomentando, de esta manera, el clima de impunidad caracterizado por procesos de ralentización de las denuncias e investigación que, en lugar de la disminución, han favorecido los actos de corrupción (Persson et al., 2013). ...
... Evidentemente, esto contrasta con las estrategias anticorrupción comunes que, por más estrictas que sean, solo contemplan la sanción de incentivos a cargo de la voluntad política de unos pocos funcionarios gubernamentales selectos y/o de cambiar los niveles salariales en el sector público como parte de un paquete para reformar el comportamiento de quienes dirigen el sistema, como la policía, los políticos y los funcionarios públicos, y frenar los incentivos para aceptar sobornos. Al respecto, Persson et al. (2013) y Marquette y Peiffer (2015a) argumentan que un entorno libre de corrupción se convierte en el objetivo de comportamiento social, pero las prácticas de aprovechamiento indebido tienen como motivación el comportamiento individual que antepone sus intereses a los del grupo y la corrupción hace que todos sufran el agotamiento de los recursos tangibles. ...
... Sin embargo, en torno a la problemática de la corrupción prevaleciente, el papel de la acción colectiva, como forma alternativa para su combate efectivo, está siendo revaluado, sin que ello signifique sobreponer o minimizar la importancia del papel de las Instituciones y sus reglas como instrumento de combate. En este sentido, Mungiu-Pippidi (2013), Persson et al. (2013), Marquette y Peiffer (2015a) y OECD (2020), retomando el trabajo pionero de Olson (1965) respecto a la importancia de la acción colectiva para modificar estructuras institucionales que impiden el desarrollo social, analizan las estructuras y tejidos sociales, así como los incentivos económicos, que fortalecen las prácticas de corrupción. Para ello consideran las características estructurales que la soportan, bajo el planteamiento de un problema de acción colectiva de quienes se preocupan y combaten la corrupción, a pesar de que el estado de las cosas se torne alarmante e inestable. ...
The article aims to establish an overview of the phenomenon of corruption and the failure of anticorruption policies. Analytically the fight against anticorruption focuses on the possibility of collective action as a non-institutional, unexpected form of participation that can break with inertia, fear, passivity, and social inaction in the face of corruption. Under the hypothesis that the role of trust and integrity of individuals are conditioning factors for the construction of a collective action capable of dealing with corruption, the analysis allows us to deduce that the effectiveness of collective action in the fight against corruption will depend on their ability to shape decisions, over and above the incentives inherent to corruption and the reciprocal relationships of social groups.
... As such, enhancing a whole repertoire of sanctions and rewards is necessary for minimizing the divergence between the principal's objectives and the agent's actions (Han, 2020). Existing studies indicate that in settings where corruption is systemic, traditional anticorruption reforms often fail because corruption is a collective action problem (Persson et al., 2013). Research also shows that a collusion problem arises when the supervisor (who is supposed to monitor and guide the agent on behalf of the principal) forms an alliance with the agent to deceive or work against the interests of the principal (Laffont & Meleu, 1997;Strausz, 1997). ...
... However, the credibility of these anticorruption efforts is undermined by the selective implementation of policies among lower-level governments. As noted by Persson and other scholars, anticorruption reform is likely to evolve into a collective action problem of the "second order" (Persson et al., 2013). In other words, as the central government continues to intensify top-down monitoring and control over street-level bureaucrats, we argue that the enforcement capacity of local governments is integral to a comprehensive anticorruption strategy. ...
... While curbing corruption has assumed the form of a global crusade, marked by the introduction of a wide array of anticorruption reform packages, researchers contend that there is a notable discrepancy between the aspirational goals of these anticorruption measures and their tangible effects (Brinkerhoff, 2000;Persson et al., 2013). Previous literature typically suggests that the success or failure of anticorruption reforms can primarily be attributed to the "missing middle" the specific processes, resources, and actions required to effectively implement them (Heeks & Mathisen, 2012). ...
Penalties for corrupt acts are a vital component of integrity management systems within bureaucratic organizations, yet systematic inquiry into specific interventions is lacking. Drawing from the principal–supervisor–agent model, this article explores the criteria for imposing penalties on corrupt bureaucrats at the street level. We examine the impact of various factors on the severity of penalties for corruption, highlighting the influence of top-down anticorruption reform and local enforcement capacity. Utilizing text mining techniques, we build a comprehensive dataset containing 4025 cases of punishing corruption among grassroots officials in China from 2015 to 2023 and use multilevel analysis to explore these dynamics. Findings suggest that anticorruption reform directly led to an increase in the severity of penalties, but with substantial variation across practices. In particular, the analysis reveals a positive correlation between enforcement capacity and the severity of penalties. Moreover, while the relationship between harm and penalty severity represents a generalizable observation, significant disparities exist in the penalties imposed across various types of corruption. This study contributes to understanding the dynamics of multiple punitive measures and the factors leading to penalties imposed on corrupt street-level bureaucrats.
... And, as we have argued elsewhere (Meza et al., 2023), many of the above anti-corruption devices to control corruption will fail if a lack of clarity remains regarding the type of corruption being addressed (Jancsics, 2024). A second theoretical model is the one that presents corruption as a collective action problem (Persson et al., 2013). This perspective challenges the former approach. ...
... We argue that understanding connections among different types of corruption is not a trivial aspect but a necessary one to tackle, especially if the aim is to curb the proliferation of corruption within policy processes (Meza et al., 2023). Although each corruption type might best be addressed by a speci c anti-corruption strategy (Jancsics, 2019), recent developments on systemic corruption call for understanding the dynamic character and the resiliency of these informal systems; systems which can circumvent almost any anti-corruption reform (Persson et al., 2013;Jancsics & Jávor, 2012). Studies that conceptualize corruption have seen three different forms of corruption. ...
... In this sense, it will be necessary for the population to be willing to see the phenomenon as something that needs to be changed and addressed, rather than viewing it as something necessary or indispensable. This observation is consistent with broader insights from studies on corruption that emerge from the collective action perspective (Persson et al., 2013). ...
It turns out we can learn alot about systemic corruption by looking at its manifestation in local governments. In places where corruption is the rule, we argue that local governments are frequently governed by and for entities that do not pursue goals regarding the public interest. And that under certain circumstances, which this book develops along its chapets, local governments could have entered into a stage coined as corruption consolidation (Meza & Pérez-Chiqués, 2021). Corruption consolidation is a specific state of governance where its institutional framework guides peoples’ actions, calculations and expectations. However, a state of corruption consolidation is ruled by informal institutions along and in coexistence with formal ones. People can sometimes act knowing they should not do some things but feeling that they have ‘no other choice’, while some others could act in oblivion of the situation, or unmindful to what is happening. This chapter introduces the reader to the corruption consolidation framework which has been used in many places to understand the structure of systemic corruption. After pointing into the theoretical elements of the framework, the chapter offers an analysis of the findings of the rest of the chapters in the book. The reader will understand each of the four dimensions of the CCF and will offer some theoretical insights on what could be the next steps for research along with policy implications regarding anti corruption policies being implemented under contexts with systemic corruption.
... Accordingly, the principal-agent model influenced the design of many anticorruption policies, laws, development aid projects, and programmes worldwide (Persson et al. 2013, Schwertheim 2017a. It is, therefore, unsurprising that many anticorruption efforts and programmes are often based on the assumption that the best way to combat corruption is to develop institutional and legal configurations and socioeconomic settings which would negatively affect agents' motivations to engage in corrupt practices (Rothstein 2018). ...
... Although the principal-agent model provides straightforward tools for assessing and combating corruption, it may have limited utility in social settings characterised by systemic corruption, a weak rule of law, and an authoritarian regime. A growing body of literature argues that the definition of an (honest/benevolent) principal and (corrupt) agent may differ depending upon the political context and forms and types of corruption (Persson et al. 2013, Rothstein 2018, Mungiu-Pippidi and Fazekas 2020. Under the classical approach, which is concerned with situations of bureaucratic corruption, rulers represent the principal and the bureaucracy represents the agent (Becker and Stigler 1974). ...
... Therefore, in such social settings, it is an exceptionally difficult task to identify who may act as an honest principal. If the ruling elite is heavily corrupt and reluctant to implement genuine anticorruption reforms, the principal-agent model would hardly produce the expected outcomes since no actors exist to willingly counteract corruption (Andvig et al. 2001, Persson et al. 2013. This dilemma led some to view rulers as agents and ordinary citizens (the public) as honest principals (Adserà et al. 2003, Besley 2006). ...
... In the corruption control literature, why people pay bribes and why public officials demand them is commonly explained by looking at the costs and expected benefits associated with corruption (Ades and Di Tella 1999;Kiltgaard 1988) and with social expectations regarding the probability or acceptance of corrupt behavior (Persson, Rothstein, and Teorell 2013). Research also indicates that, while corruption is influenced by cultural, economic, and institutional factors, certain features of public organizations may contribute to the prevalence of bribery. ...
... Roughly speaking, the literature distinguishes between rational actor approaches, such as principal-agent and deterrence models, that stress cost-benefit calculations of bribery and the probability of getting caught (Ades and Di Tella 1999; Becker and Stigler 1974) and collective action and social norms approaches that highlight the importance of social expectations regarding the corruptness of individuals. According to collective action models, bribery emerges as a dominant strategy for citizens and officials when they believe (other) citizens or public officials are corrupt (Persson, Rothstein, and Teorell 2013;Rothstein 2011). Social norms models assume that bribery occurs and persists because it becomes "normalized"; thus, it can be seen as an appropriate or accepted response under certain circumstances (Anand, Ashford, and Joshi 2004). ...
... Following the literature discussed above, the prevalence of bribery is associated with an incentive structure including the likelihood of detection, probability of punishment, penalty rates, and public officials' salaries and foreseeable costs on the one hand (Sundström 2016: 594) and with social expectations regarding the corruptness of street-level officials and their superiors in general on the other hand (Rothstein 2011). Both conditions are more likely to be satisfied in contexts characterized by weak institutions (BrinksLevitsky and Murillo 2020), where street-level bureaucrats' working conditions are often precarious (Lotta, Nieto-Morales, and Peeters 2023;Peeters and Campos 2022) and political and bureaucratic corruption is endemic (Bose 2010;Persson, Rothstein, and Teorell 2013). There, street-level bureaucrats are known to sometimes engage in "predatory," rent-seeking behavior (Bernstein and Lü 2003;Bose 2010) and "informal privatization" (Blundo 2006), and bribery is a common and often normalized practice in street-level interactions (Moreno-Jaimes 2022). ...
Bribery and other forms of petty corruption typically arise in bureaucratic encounters and are a common element of the everyday experience of the state in many countries, particularly in places with weak institutions. This type of corruption is especially troublesome because it creates direct costs for citizens when accessing services and benefits to which they are formally entitled. However, only a few studies deal with how situational attributes of bureaucratic interactions create incentives for citizens to pay bribes and opportunities for street-level bureaucrats to demand them. We contribute to filling this gap by providing evidence that administrative burdens increase the chance of bribery. We do so by analyzing the prevalence of (attempted) bribery in more than 63,000 interactions across 20 different types of bureaucratic encounters, ranging from paying taxes to accessing essential services, using multilevel logistic regression analysis. Our study contributes to understanding the possible consequences of administrative burdens and the factors conducive to petty corruption in specific citizen–state interactions.
... In the beginning of the 2010s, attention to the failure of anti-corruption policies challenged the principal-agent model, arguing that emphasising the principal's ability to control the agent fails to acknowledge that in many countries and organisations, no one is willing to act as the "principal" and effectively control the agent (Persson et al. 2013). The unwillingness to act as the moral principal may be explained if corruption is viewed from a collective action perspective. ...
... Foucault's method of genealogy opposes the search for causal origins of social phenomena. This method stands in contrast to the standard ontological conceptualisation of corruption as an act that "is" or that has a specific cause, either in individual morality or in a context where structures and institutions provide an individual with extraordinary temptations to act corruptly (for example Rothstein 2001, Persson et al. 2013, Serritzlew et al. 2014, Mungiu-Pippidi 2015. Genealogy reveals the blocks of historical knowledge which are disguised in the present theoretical, unitary, formal, and scientific discourse (Foucault 1980, 82 and 85). ...
Corruption, defined as the “misuse of public position for private gain”, represents an act of deviance from official duties in the interest of self-enrichment. Denmark is ranked as one of the least corrupt countries in the world. Danish court records, however, show that corruption cases have appeared in the 21st century. Using Luhmann’s systems theory and Foucault’s method of genealogy, this article asks how this has happened. I argue that understanding corruption in Denmark may go back to changes in public administration ideas and practices since the 1990. New Public Management reform has increased the complexity in public administration where meaning horizons of communication related to different functional systems – especially the sub-systems of law and economy – clashes. I theorise and illustrate using court cases how the coexistence of different codes creates an environment for public employees that in some circumstances – however still rare – result in corruption.
... From this last category, corruption is a problem whose understanding and solution require including citizens as agents, not only as victims. Persson et al. (2013) conceive corruption as a collective action problem, where people act according to the behavior they expect from others. Mungiu-Pippidi (2013) considers that collective action can foster an ethical universalism that allows for reaching a balance of social well-being. ...
... As expected in the hypothesis, the participants in the signaling condition reported exceeding the limit in more rounds than in the without-signaling condition; that is, they lied more to obtain benefits following the requests of the confederates (Persson et al., 2013;Salahshour, 2019). The right thing was done when the confederate did it (to report the actual words), but when proposed cheating, the participant also did it (Rothstein, 2000). ...
This work integrates cooperation, punishment, damage to the treasury, and the transgression of norms in a single experimental model of corruption. Participants formed words with predetermined letters, receiving a reward for each word, and, if they reached a goal, an extra taken from the common fund. Manipulation in the letters made it impossible to reach the goal, so reporting exceeding it implied cheating for a benefit. Three studies model the effects of signaling, descriptive norms, and the possibility of punishing or investigating (transparency) corruption acts. 248 participants were randomly assigned to the conditions of each study. Significant differences were found in reports of words and earnings in Studies 1 and 3, but not in Study 2. The experimental model reveals the potential of transparency as an alternative of lower social cost than altruistic punishment to diminish corruption. The relevance of these results for implementing public policies was discussed.
... This theory suggests that corruption can be seen as a collective action problem, whereby individual actors are inclined to engage in corrupt behaviour because they believe that 'everybody is doing it'. Similarly, anticorruption efforts can also be viewed as a collective action problem, in which different actors must coordinate their actions to combat corruption effectively (Peiffer & Walton, 2019;Persson et al., 2013). At the same time, the theoretical underpinnings of the collective action approach also highlight the importance of collective action and coordination amongst different actors in order to effectively combat corruption (Persson et al., 2013). ...
... Similarly, anticorruption efforts can also be viewed as a collective action problem, in which different actors must coordinate their actions to combat corruption effectively (Peiffer & Walton, 2019;Persson et al., 2013). At the same time, the theoretical underpinnings of the collective action approach also highlight the importance of collective action and coordination amongst different actors in order to effectively combat corruption (Persson et al., 2013). This requires various strategies, including legal and regulatory frameworks that discourage corruption, independent oversight institutions that can monitor and investigate corruption, and civil society organisations that can raise public awareness and advocate for change. ...
This chapter aims to examine the impact of the international anticorruption agenda on the business and investment climate and legal culture in Uzbekistan. In undertaking this task, I specifically emphasise the daily life of anticorruption laws, policies, and agencies in Uzbekistan in order to understand how domestic institutions and actors perceive, interpret, negotiate, and challenge global anticorruption norms. These processes will be explored by drawing from interviews with key informants from the business and government sectors and by critically analysing Uzbekistan’s anticorruption legal framework and current public policy developments.
... 2. Collective Action Theory: A different hypothesis that has recently been developed to explain why systemic corruption endures despite legislation making it illegal as well as why corruption in some nations defies other anti-corruption initiatives is collective action theory. The collective action theory highlights the significance of elements like trust and how people perceive other people's behaviour, going beyond the typical principal-agent relationship (Persson, Teorell, and Rothstein, 2013). ...
... This study will choose principal-agent approach to explain corruption in areas such as economic development, bureaucratic corruption, legislative corruption and to reflects most of the anti-corruption programme (Ugur & Dasgupta, 2011, Jain 2001, Persson et al., 2013. Furthermore, there are many scholars in economics and political science who view corruption as a particular instance of a more general principalagent dilemma (Banfield 1975;Klitgaard 1988;Rose-Ackerman 1978;Shleifer and Vishny 1993). ...
Corrupt practices in public procurement in Malaysia are explained in this paper using a principal-agent model. The government leaders, who are typically politicians, ministers, or their relatives, are referred to as the" principal" while the officials who carry out their duties are referred to as "agents". The actors in the model who constitute the third party — the other actor in the cycle of corruption — include clients, customers, and the public at large. The principal-agent-client framework was applied to 18 selected corruption cases in Malaysia to describe and analyse the actors involved in the transgressions and illegal acts in these cases. The cases were investigated by the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission (MACC) from 2014 to 2019, charged and found guilty by the courts in Malaysia. The findings show that all the actors in the role of agent were public officials, while the actors in the role of client were from the private sector, and the actors in the role of principal were high-ranking government officials, their relatives, and politicians.
... A common link is through asymmetric information as a result of ineffective management transparency, monitoring, and law enforcement [15]. This information gap is also caused by manager-shareholder agency conflicts [16]. Because of poor ruling systems and regulations, emerging countries are deemed more corrupt than developed countries [17]. ...
... According to Méon and Weill [33], corruption decreases "the time cost of queues". Persson et al. [16] claimed that the costs of eliminating or decreasing corruption outweigh the benefits to businesses and society. Therefore, corruption's effect on corporate debt, mediated by financial development, is positive [22]. ...
This study investigated the determinants of financing decisions of firms from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, particularly the effect of public corruption on financing decisions and the effect of disorder following the Arab Spring on public corruption-financing structure relationship. The study encompasses a total of 800 business entities from 14 different countries, spanning the time frame of 2005–2018. Data is analyzed through the application of static fixed effects and dynamic GMM-System models. Results indicate that large, tangible companies prefer debt, whereas profitable companies with more room for growth choose equity. Less corruption is associated with increased corporate debt. The use of debt decreased because of the Arab Spring, and corruption's effect on leverage became weaker. The speed of adjustment to the target leverage is comparatively slow for book leverage, while it is significantly greater for market leverage. These outcomes are consistent with the pecking order behavior resulted from increasing information asymmetry, but the tradeoff theory has some support as well. The implications of this study entail the need for enhancing investor protection, strengthening control measures, increasing transparency, and fostering the overall growth of the financial system to facilitate enterprises' use of debt financing, particularly in the post-Arab Spring era. This paper provides fresh empirical evidence demonstrating the effect of the Arab Spring on capital structure and on the relationship between country corruption and capital structure in the MENA region. The paper also expands the body of research on capital structure and corruption across countries by providing empirical findings from a region that has been relatively overlooked in previous scholarly works.
... Corruption undermines trust in institutions, officials, and fellow citizens, but in reciprocal ways; indeed, levels of trust may be a stronger influence upon perceptions of officials' performance and character (Xiao et al., 2024). Further, trust is needed in order to overcome the alienation, resignation and sense of injustice that can result from abuses of power but also to implement reforms that have a chance to succeed (those connections are explored in Dincer and Johnston, 2025), Persson et al. (2013) argue that corruption control requires effective, sustained collective action; that, in turn, is more difficult where citizens do not trust each other (Rothstein and Uslaner, 2005). Merchants asked to join a no-bribes pledge are less likely to stand by such commitments if they do not trust each other to honor their pledges; citizens asked to forego corrupt officials' petty benefits need to trust reformers' claims that doing so will bring benefits. ...
Purpose
Corruption control in the Republic of the Philippines (RP) has hardly failed, but it is not (yet) a success story either. Dramatic “people power” episodes have occurred, but populism has also, at times, led to repression. Still, essential reform lessons are available.
Design/methodology/approach
This is a conceptual reassessment of corruption control. Central concerns include the types of corruption experienced in the country, incentives that might sustain collective action, the need to measure both corruption and reform, and linking reform to citizens’ quality of life.
Findings
Top-down, whole-country approaches to reform often treat corruption as if it were the same everywhere, thereby emphasizing “best practices”. However, that can be misleading: a best practice in one society might be irrelevant, impossible, or harmful in another. Contemporary reformers must carefully examine the historical, social, economic, and political contexts, as well as the consequences of corruption. Groups and activities seemingly unrelated to corruption control can prove essential. Reformers must fight corruption with people, not for them.
Originality/value
The ultimate goal of reform must be justice: redressing imbalances of power while building social and political trust.
... In her article on 'Becoming Denmark ' Mungiu-Pippidi (2013) argues that the explanation of how Denmark controls corruption lies in how society and institutions developed in the past, not in what kind of policy instrumentation is adopted today. Here, Mungiu-Pippidi echoes the collective action explanation provided by Persson, Rothstein, and Teorell (2013) for Sweden, where systemic corruption is kept at bay via social mechanisms (Rothstein and Teorell 2015). ...
Abstract
Over the years the Member States of the EU and the UK have redesigned rulemaking with freedom of information acts, impact assessment of policy proposals, ombudsman and stakeholder consultation. The broad aim of this instrumentation is both to improve substantive regulatory quality and to impact on final governance outcomes. This book explains where and how the design of rulemaking procedures has effects on the quality of the business environment, perception of corruption, and environmental performance. The findings shatter predominant views on policy change in Europe, and offer a granular account of the efficacy of design.
... Systemic corruption is often viewed as a collective action problem rather than a principal-agent issue. This is the main argument in the article by Persson et al. (2013), which suggests that a collective action model better explains the reality of corruption and offers more effective ways to decrease it. In this collective action model, the cost/benefit analysis of agents and principals becomes secondary, while the expectation of what should be done in similar situations emerges as the underlying reason behind people's behavior, beyond personal gains. ...
Traditionally, corruption is seen as a rational pursuit of profit, focusing on personal gain. However, this view overlooks other influences. This paper focuses on the behavioral aspects of corruption, providing a deeper understanding of its complexities, and addressing the factors overlooked by conventional approaches. Reviewing some of the literature, we highlight how researchers have approached corruption from the perspective of behavioral sciences. Additionally, we examine how the emerging discipline of Behavioral Public Policy ( BPP ) employs innovative methods to reduce corrupt practices, offering new strategies that transcend traditional perspectives. Our paper innovates by demonstrating how corruption can be reduced by substituting traditional regulations with nonregulatory tools like nudges and sludge audits, or by leveraging digital choice architectures to minimize human-to-human interactions, known corruption enablers. By reducing regulations and administrative red tape, and introducing digital frameworks, these tools simplify processes minimizing opportunities for corrupt behavior. In this paper, we aim to infuse corruption research with a behavioral twist, a digital approach, and a deregulatory perspective, offering policymakers an alternative path to foster transparency, accountability and ethical governance. While this approach will not completely eradicate corruption, it strives to show how BPP can reduce its occurrences.
... This concept assumes that all actors maximize their own interests. Since a sufficiently large number of actors are expected to play unfairly, each of them may benefit from corrupt actions (Persson et al., 2013). This means that under certain conditions, all of them can be corrupted because such behavior is normal and expected in this environment. ...
In this article, the main determinants of experiences and perceptions of corruption in the Russian regions are analyzed. The research focuses on evaluating the determinants of corruption among ordinary people and business representatives in three regions of Russia. The main objectives of the research are: to reveal the relationship of individual characteristics and attitudes toward corruption with citizens’ actual experiences and perceptions of corruption; to learn how experiences and perceptions of corruption influence each other. The main conclusion is that the experience of corruption and its perception are interrelated. Those members of both the general public and the business community who perceive the prevalence of corruption to be high report experiencing corrupt practices more often than those who see a lower frequency of corruption. People who justify corruption are more likely to report encountering bribery and other low-level corruption practices. For business corruption, tolerance of corruption shows a significant link with perception of corruption, but not with real experiences of corruption. Social learning theory and victimization theory can explain the interdependence of perceptions and experiences of corruption in the Russian regions. The indicators of both perception and experience of corruption in the research can be used as indirect measures of corruption. Their interrelation in the same survey may also indicate their validity as instruments for measuring corruption.
... In environmental MRV, the technicians and/or administrators of the service providers work closely with the emitters and could still be bought to manipulate monitoring data. Besides external influence, self-conscious about it or not, those environmental engineers pursue multiple goals (professional, organizational, and personal) that may not be in congruence with each other, which may also lead to professional dilemmas (Persson et al., 2013;Guttman, 2017). ...
Carbon neutrality cannot be achieved without different economic sectors, individuals and households, and the government making serious efforts. Green finance in different forms including environmental, social and governance investment and carbon emissions trading are used to measure the reduction in carbon emissions and place a monetary value on them. However, because of inconsistencies or even manipulation in the monitoring/measurement, reporting and verification (MRV) of air quality and carbon emissions data, the effectiveness of green finance has been largely compromised. Environmental MRV is a technology-based engineering task, which is also heavily impacted by institutional design and professionalism. This commentary will draw upon principal–agent theory and the practical arrangements of environmental MRV to discuss why professionalism is badly needed and how to bridge the missing link for achieving carbon neutrality and sustainability transitions.
... Another theoretical implication from our findings relates to the high average scores of ingroup identification and group-based action across the three experiments irrespective of experimental conditions (see analysis on high averages in the document 'Results of one-sample t-tests on identification and group-based action variables for Studies 1, 2a & 2b' on the project OSF site at: https://osf.io/qm8g5/?view_only=35292d860cb94550a52d42b01733f87e). These findings on the face of it go against numerous studies [e.g., 27,34,36,37,[69][70][71] that suggest that Africans negatively evaluate African identity and are not willing to take progressive action on behalf of the African group or collective (i.e., a collective action problem). Therefore, these high averages may (1) be indicative of African identity being a valued identity that Africans engage with, and (2) contradict the stereotype that Africans are not willing to mobilise or act for the benefit of the in-group. ...
This research tested the impact of how group members appraise their collective history on in-group identification and group-based action in the African context. Across three experiments (Ns = 950; 270; and 259) with Nigerian participants, we tested whether the effect of historical representations–specifically the valence of the in-group’s collective history–on in-group engagement, in turn, depends on whether that history is also appraised as subjectively important. In Study 1, findings from exploratory moderated-mediation analyses indicated that the appraised negative valence of African history was associated with an increase in identification and group-based action when African history was appraised as unimportant (history-as-contrast). Conversely, the appraised positive valence of African history was also associated with an increase in identification and group-based action when African history was also appraised as important (history-as-inspiration). Studies 2a and 2b then orthogonally manipulated the valence and subjective importance of African history. However, findings from Studies 2a and 2b did not replicate those of Study 1. Altogether, our findings suggest that the relationship between historical representations of groups and in-group identification and group-based action in the present is more complex than previously acknowledged.
... Another significant theoretical perspective is the "Collective Action" theory, which challenges the traditional view that corruption is primarily an individual moral failing. Instead, it emphasizes the role of systemic and cultural factors that normalize corrupt behaviour (Persson, Rothstein, & Teorell, 2013). This theory suggests that in many local municipalities, corruption is a self-perpetuating equilibrium where individuals engage in corrupt practices because they believe others are doing the same, and there is little incentive to act otherwise. ...
Corruption within local municipalities remains a significant obstacle to economic development and public trust, particularly in the context of property clearances and transfers. This study examines the extent to which corruption within the Ba-Phalaborwa Local Municipality undermines revenue enhancement strategies designed to streamline property clearances and transfers. By employing a mixed-methods approach, this research highlights the discrepancies between policy intentions and actual practices. The findings suggest that corruption significantly hampers the effectiveness of these revenue enhancement strategies, leading to inefficiencies and public dissatisfaction. The study draws on primary data collected from municipal employees, property owners, and real estate professionals. Interviews and surveys reveal a pervasive culture of bribery and nepotism that undermines formal procedures. Additionally, an analysis of municipal records uncovers irregularities in property clearance and transfer processes, suggesting systemic issues that require urgent attention. Addressing corruption in the Ba-Phalaborwa Local Municipality is crucial for restoring public trust and enhancing revenue from property transactions. The study proposes several policy recommendations, including stricter enforcement of anti-corruption measures, enhanced transparency, and improved accountability mechanisms. These strategies are essential for ensuring that property clearances and transfers are conducted fairly and efficiently, ultimately benefiting the local economy and community.
... Furthermore, under certain conditions, both forms of corruption can be viewed as different manifestations of the same ethical dilemma: principal-agent relationships in which agents exploit their power for personal gain, detrimentally affecting the principal and the economy (Jaakson et al., 2019). They may also be seen as outcomes of collective-action problems, where pervasive corruption continues due to tolerant attitudes or the absence of individual incentives to oppose corrupt practices (Persson et al., 2013). However, despite these similarities, we anticipate that participants will find it more challenging to identify ethical issues in scenarios involving private-to-private corruption compared to public corruption scenarios, as previous research has pointed out (Gopinath, 2008). ...
This study explores the micro-determinants of corruption tolerance among 1414 university students in Guatemala, a country grappling with significant corruption issues. By examining the attitudes of economics majors compared to students in other disciplines through ordered logistic regression analysis, we offer new insights into factors influencing corruption tolerance in a developing country setting. This approach, by focusing on a developing country, fills a research gap in the literature on the differences between economics students and their peers from other programs. We find that economics students exhibit a greater tolerance for corruption. This result aligns with theories and research that suggest that economists show a profit-maximizing mindset, and distinctive values and fairness perceptions. Furthermore, our analysis reveals significant effects of gender and age on corruption tolerance, with women and older students reporting lower tolerance to corrupt practices. The study also uncovers the higher tolerance towards private versus public corruption. These findings provide valuable guidance for developing policies and educational initiatives to reduce corruption tolerance among future professionals in similar socio-economic environments.
... Despite the anti-corruption slogans that dominated the political agenda in 2014, personal encounters with corruption have increased (in comparison to 2013) (Ibid). Persson, Rothstein and Teorell (Persson et al., 2013a(Persson et al., , 2013b state that 'what is considered a bribe in the Western context is simply considered a gift in countries with widespread corruption'. In essence, the illegal activities of the individual are not necessarily perceived to be morally wrong despite being against the law. ...
Many anti-crime efforts are found to be costly and unsuccessful in reducing crime, and new fresh approaches are needed. Morality has long been neglected in our understanding of crime prevention. This paper uses a theoretical and empirical approach to explore the relationship between individual morality, associated moral emotions, and crime in a sample of 11,671 respondents in Ukraine. To date, few studies have explored morality using large samples in a Ukrainian context. Existing morality studies have been largely limited to nonadult and Global North samples. In the current study, existing standardised scales are applied for the first time in a new context. Morality is measured with how right or wrong respondents feel that various acts of delinquent and criminal behaviour are, and logistic regression is used to analyse its association with self-reported corruption, theft, and violence. Findings show that weak individual morality is associated with higher corruption, theft, and violence. This paper empirically evidences this association, already evidenced in The Global North, in an Eastern-European context. The implications of this are potentially wide-reaching and can inform crime prevention measures in Ukraine and beyond. Individual morality, which develops from early childhood and throughout adolescence, is associated with crime involvement in numerous studies and samples. To reduce crime, suggestions are made to deliver and evaluate morality intervention programmes (such as The Compass Project) in schools (to youth) and in the workplace (to influential employees of organisations and institutions). This is likely to contribute to a societal shift in countries like Ukraine which are presented with politically historic complexities in relation to morally acceptable actions.
... Первая -теория коллективных действий, где наблюдается устойчивый процесс сотрудничества заинтересованных сторон, что повышает влияние и авторитет отдельных действий, в том числе коррупционных [23]. Первое -экономика преступления (Economy of Crime), согласно которой основоположник теории Г.Беккер характеризовал коррупционера как рационального агента, инвестирующего в условиях [24]. Сложившуюся коррупционную практику в сфере распределения субсидий в Республике Казахстан можно отнести к коллективным действиям, что необходимо принимать во внимание при проведении антикоррупционной кампании. ...
Corruption remains a serious social problem in modern society, which damages the country's investment potential. Kazakhstan's agricultural sector, a key part of the economy, attracts both local and foreign investors. However, the industry faces significant corruption risks in state-business relations. To identify such risks, a specific sociological assessment of legal regulation was carried out - an analysis of the regulatory framework in the field of providing certain measures of state support to subjects of the agro-industrial complex. In particular, documents were examined regulating the provision of subsidies in the field of livestock farming, reimbursement of investment costs of agricultural entities, as well as in the implementation of procedures for identifying farm animals. The analysis revealed a number of legislative conflicts and vulnerabilities that contribute to the commission of corruption offenses. These factors lead officials to misuse their powers when providing government support to entrepreneurs. The study modeled how legal factors, rather than investor decisions, influence behavior considering the macro-environment. The authors conclude that corruption in agriculture harms the country's investment climate. At the same time, unscrupulous market entities can exploit corruption to gain unfair advantages over competitors. The article concludes with recommendations to improve state support for Kazakhstan's agro-industrial complex.
... However, scholars are skeptical about the will and ability of local organizations (particularly new ventures and small and medium enterprises) to resist corruption (Qian & Sandoval-Hernandez, 2016;Ufere, Gaskin, Perelli, Somers, & Boland, 2020). Fundamentally, extant literature has mostly regarded local entrepreneurs of new organizations as cultural followers who cannot resist corruption (Persson, Rothstein, & Teorell, 2013;Nichols, 2009) or has seen them as weak actors who lack the resources to act against corruption (Acheampong & Rand, 2023;Baron, Tang, Tang, & Zhang, 2018). Consequently, their strategies for corruption resistance remain underexplored. ...
This paper explores when and how entrepreneurs who operate new organizations in environments where corruption is endemic can resist it. Despite the continued scholarly interest in corruption, anticorruption efforts by micro, small, and medium enterprises have been largely overlooked. Instead, studies have focused on the intraorganizational actions of larger established organizations (local and multinational) without sufficiently considering their interdependence with other actors in their external environments. Given the social exchange nature of corruption, we collected and analyzed data from interviews with Tanzanian entrepreneurs, and theorized about when and how they circumvent or resist corruption. Our findings illuminate the complex relationship between entrepreneurs’ motivations and capability, and highlight the strategies entrepreneurs use when they seek to resist corruption without compromising their resource needs. Subject to their leverage (i.e., resource endowments and available alternatives), entrepreneurs resist corruption by avoiding powerful focal firms, restructuring their resource dependence in a firm-focused manner, and managing risks. Considering social-relational dynamics, entrepreneurs also find ways to avoid interactions with corrupt agents and to use power strategically (through political tactics, such as co-opting and challenging) that influence agents to act in the entrepreneurs’ best interests and against corruption.
... However, several challenges impede the capacity and independence of ACAs, including political interference, resource constraints, legal and institutional barriers, and public perception (Sampson, 2010;Hussmann, 2007;Doig & Riley, 1998;Persson et al., 2013). To overcome these challenges, the literature identifies best practices such as strengthening legal mandates, ensuring financial stability, building human capital, promoting transparency and accountability, and fostering international cooperation (Heilbrunn, 2004;Johnston, 2005;Recanatini, 2011;Quah, 2008;Pope, 2000). ...
Purpose: This article examines the impact of corruption on economic growth in North African and Middle Eastern countries. It aims to uncover the extent to which corruption influences economic performance and to provide policy recommendations for mitigating these effects. Methodology: A comprehensive literature review was conducted, analyzing existing studies on corruption and economic growth in the specified regions. Empirical data from various sources were used to perform a quantitative analysis, employing econometric models to identify correlations and causations. Results: The findings indicate a significant negative relationship between corruption and economic growth. High levels of corruption are found to stifle investment, reduce government efficiency, and deter foreign direct investment, thereby hampering economic development. The results highlight that countries with lower corruption levels tend to exhibit higher economic growth rates. Practical Implications: The study suggests several practical measures for policymakers, including strengthening anti-corruption laws, improving transparency and accountability in government operations, and fostering a culture of integrity within public and private sectors. The recommendations aim to create an environment conducive to sustainable economic growth. Originality/Value: This article contributes to the existing literature by providing a detailed analysis of the North African and Middle Eastern regions, which have been relatively under-researched in this context. The study's unique focus on these regions offers valuable insights and tailored recommendations for combating corruption and promoting economic growth.
... That is, members of homosocial groups are susceptible to corruption because their cognitive bias of viewing their own group positively makes them judge in-group unethical practices as unproblematic (Hoyt et al., 2010;Solaz et al., 2019). They can also be reluctant to report ethical violations because organization members who are influenced by in-group favoritism will consider it a betrayal (De Graaf, 2010;De Graaf & Huberts, 2008;Persson et al., 2013). This evidence suggests why male-dominated public organizations are more likely to have unethical practices. ...
We investigate the impact of women's representation in bureaucracy on corruption. In this study, we demonstrate how women bureaucrats' experiences in male‐dominated workplaces contribute to curbing corruption. To do this, we investigate three dimensions of women's representation (average share, average rank, and hierarchical dispersion) in South Korean regional governments. Empirical evidence shows that the higher women bureaucrats are ranked, the more bureaucrats are disciplined against misbehaviors and the lower the corruption risks are in public procurement. The findings imply that having women bureaucrats at higher ranks reduces corruption risks because they disrupt male‐dominated collusive arrangements and abide by ethical standards to legitimize their leadership.
... In the terminology of principal-agent theory (PA model), transparency is an efficient tool for the principal to evaluate whether its agents seek their own benefits by shirking or corruption rather than serving the interests of the principal (Lindstedt and Naurin, 2010;Miller, 2005). The theory further suggests that agents' information advantages over principals enable the former to hide their true preferences and behaviors from the latter (Persson, Rothstein, and Teorell, 2013;Donadelli, Fasan, and Magnanelli, 2014). Transparency helps lower the information asymmetries between principals and agents and strengthen principals' scrutiny and monitoring to hold agents accountable (Holmström, 1979;Miller 2005). ...
... Although there have been some discussions concerning the two explanatory frames of rational-choice theory and their combination (Persson et al., 2013;Rothstein, 2018;Marquette & Pfeiffer, 2018;Persson et al., 2019), for the purpose of our article, we ourselves like to combine aspects of both frames: the collectiveaction and the principal-agent framework. ...
Too often, the catchphrase “systemic corruption” leads to political and normative statements usually expressing its strict rejection and blaming the actors engaging in it. But despite decades of fighting systemic corruption, the world map of corruption is still red to dark red in many countries. We can keep complaining how bad this is. Scientists, and activists are telling us a lot about the negative consequences of systemic corruption. And we do not deny the negative consequences. But aren’t there any positive consequences, and not only for those who enrich themselves personally in a criminal way? As sociologists, however, we are used to ask ourselves also the other way around. If systemic corruption is so long lasting, what is the productivity, indeed functionality, of systemic corruption for a given society?
... The Principal-agent theory explicates corruption through the lens of the relationship between a principal, assigning tasks, and an agent, tasked with execution. Asymmetric information poses a challenge when the agent misguides the principal's interests for personal gain, creating a breeding ground for corruption (Becker & Stigler, 1974;Persson et al., 2013). The revisionist theory contends that corruption is intrinsic to developing countries, ingrained in social norms, traditions, and practices. ...
This research investigated the influence of control of corruption on the economic growth of Nigeria spanning from 1996 to 2022. The Autoregressive Regressive Distributed Lagged Model was employed for data analysis. The study found that control of corruption has weak positive influence on economic growth in Nigeria in the long run but a strong negative influence on economic growth in the short-run. The dual nature of the influence of corruption control on economic growth in Nigeria-weakly positive in the long run and strongly negative in the short run-can be rationalized by considering the gradual nature of institutional change. The study recommends the empowering of anti-corruption agencies like the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC) and enforcing strict sanctions to influence cultural and moral change, while creating additional agencies, promoting transparent leaders, and fostering public discourse.
Public procurement is particularly vulnerable to corruption due to the substantial financial transactions and discretionary powers involved. Inadequate governance structures and cultural norms often exacerbate this vulnerability. This study explores the systemic and behavioral factors contributing to corruption in public procurement through a global comparative lens, focusing on regions including Africa, Asia, Australia, Europe, and the Americas. Systemic factors, such as weak legal frameworks, lack of transparency, and institutional weaknesses, are analyzed alongside behavioral influences, such as cultural norms, individual ethical considerations, and moral disengagement. By conducting a comprehensive literature review, this study consolidates existing knowledge to pinpoint areas for improvement and emerging trends concerning procurement corruption. The research reveals that corruption in public procurement is deeply ingrained in both institutional frameworks and the cultural context in which procurement occurs. It recommends an integrated anti-corruption strategy combining structural reforms, such as bolstering regulatory oversight, with behavioral interventions to reshape cultural norms and foster ethical behavior. These findings offer valuable insights for policymakers and academics, emphasizing the necessity of tailored and multifaceted approaches to combat procurement corruption effectively. The study's results enrich the theoretical understanding of corruption by connecting structural and behavioral strategies, guiding policymakers and international organizations striving to promote transparency and accountability in public procurement.
Kniha se zabývá specifickým aspektem korupce ve veřejných zakázkách v prostředí systémové korupce v České republice. Autor analyzuje fenomén veřejného zadávání, navrhuje teoretický koncept jako explanační nástroj pro odhalení příčin a zdrojů korupce ve veřejném zadávání a rozpracovává teoretická východiska pro návrh účinné protikorupční politiky. Publikace přináší čtenářům nejen základní přehled problematiky, ale také konkrétní odpovědi na tyto otázky: Jak veřejné zadávání ovlivňují předem uzavřené koluzní dohody a další projevy systémové korupce? Jak se v prostředí systémové korupce projevují selhání veřejné správy, resp. jejích aktérů? Jaká je role paralelních (vnějších) struktur v rozhodování veřejné správy co a jak zadávat?
The literature on anti-corruption has paid limited attention to understanding who the experts are and under what conditions they construct their knowledge. In particular, we lack information about the gender composition of the field and how a potential bias shapes the production of expertise. This chapter explores these inquiries through a study with experts in anti-corruption who have been active from 1990 to 2020. It resulted in a novel database of global experts analyzed under the framework of field theory and Geometric Data Analysis. The exercise found three salient poles of power: one associated with having degrees from US universities, a second related to the possession of quantitative skills and relations with international financial institutions, and a third related to public exposure through newspaper citations and appearance in media outlets. Within this structure, women appear at a disadvantage not only in terms of their numeric presence, but also because their more common characteristics are less associated with influence in the field.
Over recent decades Mexico, like many countries, paradoxically exhibits persistence of high levels of corruption despite intense political attention to the problem of corruption and an assortment of anti-corruption reforms. This chapter explores factors behind the persistence paradox in Mexico. It highlights three broad areas: a state of low-level equilibrium rooted in societal expectations of corruption, collective action problems, and informal institutions incorporated within the idea of Mexico’s “culture of corruption”; the failure of the government to adequately implement anti-corruption reforms, particularly as it relates to investigations and prosecution of corruption; and the political and strategic use of both corruption and anti-corruption, resulting in gatopardismo, or “change in order to remain the same.” The chapter closes by drawing out the lessons from the Mexican case for the study of corruption in the Global South and beyond.
Corruption in business can be understood as a collective action problem: although many businesses would rather not pay bribes, for any individual firm, refusing to pay them risks losing access to contracts or necessary permits. Theory and practice suggest that solutions to collective action problems can emerge in the form of clubs or initiatives where many stakeholders make voluntary commitments to regulate themselves through “voluntary private regulation” (VPR). Most of the first generation of integrity initiatives were international in scope while most members were large multinational companies. However, in recent years, a number of business integrity initiatives have emerged in the Global South, and they increasingly attract smaller companies. Based on interviews with entrepreneurs in several African, Asian, and Latin American countries as well as with donors helping to support business integrity initiatives, this chapter explores how VPR clubs change the incentives to engage in corruption for local companies.
Although a significant number of studies have reported that gender is associated with less corruption, the underlying mechanism is still unclear. Using 2017 Afrobarometer individual-level survey data for Uganda, this chapter examines gender differences in paying bribes and the mediating effect of perceived descriptive norms. We estimated a multivariate logistic model to examine the effects of gender on bribe-paying while controlling for individual and household factors, and then implemented the Karlsson-Breen-Holm method to determine the mediating effect of perceived descriptive norms of corruption on the relationship between gender and paying bribes. We observed significant gender differences in paying bribes for obtaining government documents and police assistance. Results further revealed that perceived descriptive norms significantly mediated the relationship between gender and paying bribes. The results suggest that gender differences in paying bribes can be sizably reduced by appropriate interventions that deal with social norms of corruption in society.
The chapter describes how the Brazilian national congress is reversing decades of anti-corruption advances by amending critical legislation. The Brazilian case illustrates how changes supported by multi-party agreements can make anti-corruption legal frameworks fuzzy. The evidence suggests that Brazilian congress representatives are applying the rules created to protect democracy, promote accountability, and ensure public integrity to protect corrupt transactions, roll back the results achieved by anti-corruption reforms, and enforce a clientelist political power structure. The chapter provides evidence that while legal reforms can play a significant role in combating corruption, without simultaneous progress in oversight and accountability practices, threatened lawmakers can unite to overturn the legal framework and ensure impunity for themselves.
Numerous studies assess how politicians control and shape bureaucracy. Yet, how politicians' behavior affects the norms and behaviors of bureaucrats through role modeling has not been studied. This is a curious omission, in light of evidence that social norms shape bureaucratic behavior. Through a lab experiment with over 900 bureaucrats in Bangladesh, we explore whether political corruption affects bureaucrats' pro‐social behavior and whether this effect is particularly pronounced for corruption of the current government , as a particularly relevant social norm referent. Using a political corruption prime, we present evidence that those bureaucrats who recall episodes of the current government's political corruption when prompted to think about political corruption donate significantly lower real monetary amounts to charity. By contrast, we do not find clear effects of political corruption by other actors. Our findings underscore the importance of political leaders as role models for bureaucrats and the damage that political corruption may inflict on pro‐social behavior in bureaucracies.
Como os congressistas manipulam as ferramentas legislativas para reverter reformas anticorrupção? Este trabalho descreve como algumas votações recentes pelos legisladores do Congresso Nacional Brasileiro contribuem para reverter os avanços na luta contra a corrupção. Essas votações são realizadas por meio de acordos entre políticos de todos os espectros ideológicos e tornam a legislação voltada para o combate à corrupção vaga. Para tanto foram coletados e analisados documentos das casas legislativas e da imprensa. As evidências sustentam a hipótese de que as regras criadas para proteger a democracia, promover a responsabilidade e garantir a integridade pública são, na verdade, usadas pelos políticos brasileiros para proteger transações corruptas, reverter os resultados alcançados pelas reformas anticorrupção e garantir a estrutura de poder político. Por meio da análise do caso brasileiro, destacamos a importância das reformas anticorrupção para melhorar a supervisão sobre os partidos políticos. Também enfatizamos que, sem uma supervisão adequada, os partidos políticos podem desempenhar um papel crítico em permitir a corrupção política sistêmica, que ameaça especialmente os países do Sul Global.
В статье определены основные подходы к понятию «добросовестность» (integrity) как антикоррупционной ценности. Выявлено, что антикоррупционный подход является наиболее ориентированным на учет социального контекста в понимании добросовестности. Проанализированы основные методики измерения добросовестности, на основе чего было выявлено, что их использование должно сочетаться с оценкой окружающей социальной среды и ее восприятия участниками исследования. Были рассмотрены такие направления антикоррупционной политики, как «комплаенс» и «эффективное управление». При формировании антикоррупционной политики руководители чаще думают о негативных (запретительных или ограничительных) инструментах борьбы с коррупцией. Однако для формирования правильных поведенческих моделей необходимо ввести позитивные ориентиры и практики для того, чтобы честное поведение стало желаемым, одобряемым и выгодным. Эти установки важно формировать в молодом возрасте, когда формируются мировоззренческие ценностные ориентации, влияющие на всю последующую жизнь. В то же время, понятие добросовестности нельзя сводить к простой противоположности коррупции и иным формам нарушений. При разработке ценностных аспектов антикоррупционной политики необходимо учитывать роль социального контекста, сложившихся норм и традиций в формировании установок относительно коррупции. Для подтверждения этого были использованы теория коллективного действия и концепция социального научения.
The article defines the main approaches to the notion of “integrity” as an anti-corruption value. It is revealed that the anti-corruption approach is the most oriented to take into account the social context in understanding the anti-corruption values. The main methods of measuring integrity were analyzed and it was found that their use should be combined with an assessment of the surrounding social environment. The areas of anti-corruption policy were considered, such as “compliance” and “good governance”. When formulating anti-corruption policies, managers more often think about negative (prohibitive or restrictive) tools to combat corruption. However, in order to form correct behavioral patterns, it is necessary to introduce positive guidelines and practices so that honest behavior becomes desirable, approved and beneficial. It is important to form these attitudes at a young age, when the worldview values are being formed. At the same time, the notion of integrity cannot be reduced to a simple opposite of corruption and other forms of violations. When developing the value aspects of anti-corruption policy, it is necessary to take into account the role of social context, established norms and traditions in shaping attitudes towards corruption. To confirm this, the theory of collective action and the concept of social learning were used.
What candidates do voters perceive as best to combat corruption? While recent studies suggest that parties recruit women in order to restore legitimacy, we know less about whether voters believe that women candidates are better equipped than male candidates to fight corruption. This study suggests that women mayors are seen as more likely to fight corruption, yet that the credibility of both male and female politicians increases if they are ascribed traits traditionally seen as ‘female,’ including being risk averse or specializing in the provision of welfare services. Leveraging the diverse levels of socio-economic development, corruption, and gender equality across 25 EU member countries, our unique conjoint experiment shows support for these claims. Both women and male candidates benefit from being described as risk averse and prioritizing social welfare issues, while outsider status has no effect. Male candidates, however, have a consistent disadvantage, particularly among women voters. Moreover, the effects of candidate gender are strongest in areas of Europe with the highest levels of political gender equality.
This chapter seeks to contribute to expanding knowledge about corruption at the local government level in Brazil. Using the Corruption Consolidation Framework (CCF), we advance an explanatory model that assumes that common variables used to measure and detect corruption in subnational governments are often useless. The work shows how corruption at the municipal level is a multifaceted process that is organized through several instruments that coexist simultaneously. What draws attention, based on the research carried out on the Brazilian case, is how such a complex environment as the one created by the practice of corruption manages to coordinate different forms of action. Corrupt schemes develop sophisticated forms of organization that survive and update themselves to continue acting under the radar. The various mechanisms that were identified show how the logic of corruption manages to be agile to avoid being discovered and seems to be ahead of inspection and control instruments. Studies on corruption in the field of research on local power are still starting. The case study on Brazil shows how deeply rooted this process is in public administration.
Lobiranje kao aktivnost kod mnogih ljudi često biva percipirano kao „loša pojava” jer se poistovećuje sa podmićivanjem, korupcijom, trgovinom uticaja od strane onih koji imaju moć da deluju u političkom društvu. Zapravo, naješće se sve navedene pojave doživljavaju kao sinonimi. Međutim, istraživanja sa više aspekata pokazuju da lobiranje i korupcija nisu ista stvar. U poslednje dve decenije ova tema postaje veoma značajna na prostoru Evrope, pogotovo u bivšim komunističkim zemljama centralne i istočne Evrope (danas većine članica EU), kao i zapadnog Balkana. Pri tome su pogledi i interesovanja usmereni na uređenost ove aktivnosti u jednoj zakonsko-pravnoj regulativi, iako lobiranje kao delatnost na nivou EU ima deregulativni karakter. No, primarno pitanje jeste da li lobiranje, posebno u kontekstu njegove zakonske regularnosti, može biti efikasan alat u smanjenju korupcije, ili pak i njegova neregularnost ima potencijala da smanji korupciju. U radu ćemo pokušati da ukažemo na to da lobiranje u priznatoj zakonskoj formi umnogome postaje protivteža korupciji. Njegova regularnost u pravno-zakonskoj proceduri, kroz veći stepen transparentnosti u kanalima uticaja, pospešuje aktere na veću odgovornost. Osim što postaje poželjnije od korupcije, takođe doprinosi jednom prosperitetnom i zdravom razvitku društva, dok sa druge strane daje prostor širem građanstvu da ovu delatnost ne poistovećuje sa korupcijom. Stoga, smatramo da lobiranje u zakonski uređenoj formi ima snagu da suzbije korupciju.
This paper deals with how to make international law more de facto effective. There are countless conventions on topics such as human rights, environmental law, or, in our case, corruption prevention. The central thesis is that lawyers and policymakers can make existing treaties more effective using a multidisciplinary approach. It consists of the empirical studies of other science fields, including behavioural economics, sociology, and criminology. This approach is compatible with international law, specifically with the rules of interpretation laid out in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (hereinafter — VCLT), through an evolutionary interpretation. An effective anticorruption policy needs to be tailor-made for the specific country’s condition. The assumption that a successful approach in one state in one specific situation will necessarily be successful in another is flawed. This paper presents different policy concepts to curb corruption: rational choice, self-concept maintenance, principal-agent theory, and collective action problem. The concepts are evaluated through the lens of empirical studies. To exemplify this approach an application of the criterion “culture” will be shown. G. Hofstede discovered in his research different cultural dimensions: power distance, individualism, masculinity, and uncertainty avoidance. Each dimension has a unique interaction with corruption. These interactions explain why the same approach does not yield the same result. For example, a state that has a very high-power distance would not benefit as strongly from a principal-agent theory approach. In high-power distance countries the average citizen has little to no influence on the state’s politics. The accountability of principles, however, is one of the key elements of the principal-agent approach. On the contrary such an approach would certainly backfire. Giving principals more money and monitoring powers, as the approach suggests, would only consolidate existing structures. In a state with high accountability (low-power distance) this approach would strengthen the fight against corruption.
Corruption often persists not only because public officials take bribes, but also because many citizens are willing to pay them. Yet even in countries with endemic corruption, few people always pay bribes. Why do citizens bribe in some situations but not in others? Integrating insights from both principal-agent and collective action approaches to the study of corruption, we develop and empirically evaluate an analytical framework for understanding selective bribery. Our framework reveals how citizens’ motivations, costs, and risks influence their willingness to engage in corruption. A conjoint experiment conducted in Ukraine in 2020 predominantly corroborates our pre-registered predictions. By shedding light on conditions that dampen citizens’ readiness to pay bribes, our findings offer insights into the types of institutional reforms that may reduce corruption and ultimately help countries to escape self-reinforcing corruption cycles.
Purpose
This study aims to explore and present discussions regarding the interconnectedness of procurement fraud, supply chain education, professional maturity and ethics, and their relevance to adopting a transcendence concept as well as proposing research directions thereof.
Design/methodology/approach
This study adopts a conceptual, intending to synthesize insights and propose a new conceptual framework that incorporates the transcendence framework and the process matrix. This generic framework provides a holistic view of the procurement and supply chain landscape at multiple levels – individual, team, organizational and industry.
Findings
This paper delves into the complex landscape of corruption within procurement, involving a diverse array of participants, including procurement professionals. The effectiveness of current corruption theories may be limited in this context. Despite the introduction of ethical training and anti-corruption initiatives, corruption remains widespread. The delivery of content and the design of the curriculum in supply chain education necessitate a reorientation to include not only moral education but also practical or hands-on delivery methods. In Kenya, sectors such as health and education exhibit a lack of recognition and professional maturity. When all the research constructs are examined separately, they do not provide a holistic understanding, thus underscoring the need for a comprehensive approach across the supply chain spectrum. This topic is ripe for further academic investigation with empirical evidence.
Research limitations/implications
This paper provides key insights for researchers and practitioners in the field of procurement and supply chain education, particularly in Kenya. However, it acknowledges the lack of empirical studies and the limitations of current research, including procurement fraud, the context-specific nature of the findings and the dynamic nature of corruption and procurement practices concerning the constructs. This paper calls for further research to address these gaps, validate its propositions and contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of public procurement and corruption in Kenya. It also emphasizes the need for continuous research due to the evolving nature of corruption and procurement practices.
Practical implications
This study has practical relevance for researchers, professionals and the procurement and supply chain ecosystem. It offers insights that can inform future research, professional advocacy and policy development regarding the shape of supply chain academia in Kenya. In addition, it contributes to the advancement of procurement and supply chain professionalism in the country.
Social implications
This study underscores the necessity for breaking the cycle of procurement fraud, enhancing procurement and supply chain education in Kenya, and fostering active engagement of professional associations in promoting maturity and specialization within the field.
Originality/value
This study holds distinctive value by uncovering previously unexplored dynamics among supply chain constructs within the context of a lower-middle-income economy, i.e. Kenya. Deconstructing and synergizing these concepts calls for a more robust theoretical and empirical comprehension of these constructs within Kenya's unique background.
Does the perception of corruption shape the willingness to bribe? This study evaluates the socio-psychological determinants of corruption by measuring how different types of messages influence the probability of engaging in corruption for access to public health, social programs, and official documents. This research uses the social norms approach to explore the link among messaging, perception, and behavior. An online experiment was conducted in Peru for two weeks between October and November 2021, using social media (Facebook) to recruit participants (n = 2584). The participants were divided into two treatment groups and one control group. Those in the treatment groups received informational displays on (i) the perception of corruption as widespread in the public sector (descriptive norm) or (ii) corruption as morally wrong (injunctive norm). The control group did not receive a message. Exposure to messages on corruption increased the overall probability of engaging in corruption. Unexpectedly, those in the injunctive norm group increased their willingness to bribe. Furthermore, this study also found significant differences in bribing behavior based on the different types of public service, gender, and age.
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to ascertain whether the combination of anti-corruption measures, with simultaneous impact on the institutional, economic and cultural dimensions, is associated with lower levels of corruption.
Design/methodology/approach
The authors have developed a research that seeks to find statistical evidence of the relationship between levels of corruption and combinations of anti-corruption measures. To test the hypotheses, the authors performed panel regression analysis using different panel estimation methods, namely, fixed effects (FE) models.
Findings
The results do not fully support the idea that the combination of anti-corruption measures with simultaneous impact on the institutional, economic and cultural dimensions has more impact on corruption levels than other measures taken singly, but rather that the most determining factor in preventing corruption lies in government effectiveness.
Originality/value
The relevance of this study lies in the shortcomings of this type of research applied to anti-corruption measures. Moreover, the development of panel data analysis makes it possible to approach the phenomenon from a double perspective, over time and in comparative terms between different countries, incorporating non-immediate effects and possible interactive effects between different anti-corruption measures.
In this article, it is argued that public policy studies found fertile ground in Mexico upon their arrival in the early 1990s. They stimulated Mexican scholars to discuss two notions that had been taken for granted in Western countries, but that turned out to be novel concepts in Mexico: policy-oriented governance and governing the public interest. The policy field in Mexico made further progress by considering three features that characterize the country’s political and administrative background. First, the salience of the State as the most important policymaking actor, which, paradoxically, lacks the institutional capacities to become a more effective one. Second, informal rules inherited from Mexico’s authoritarian period still strongly influence the behavior of people and organized groups. Finally, social inequality influences Mexico’s policymaking by demobilizing social sectors that could act in favor of the poor, preventing governments from enforcing the law, or letting street-level bureaucracies apply selective enforcement criteria in discretionary ways.
Why do citizens prefer to utilize personal connections (e.g. guanxi) with government officials to access public services? Conventional wisdom suggests that improvements in formal institutions can reduce the popularity of informal behaviors; however, limited research has explored the relevant roles of e-government and anti-corruption endeavors. Thus, based on survey data from 30 Chinese municipalities and multilevel regression designs, this study shows that citizens in cities with higher e-government development levels or who perceive governments' anticorruption efforts to be effective are less likely to perform guanxi practices. The negative effect of e-government is also more salient among individuals with political connections. Therefore, this study contributes to the ongoing discussion on the relationship between formal institutions and guanxi practices by revealing the specific ways in which e-government development and anticorruption efforts lessen indi-viduals' reliance on guanxi.
Political leadership and commitment to fight corruption at the highest levels is one of the most important preconditions for success in the fight against corruption. However, in some cases, anti-corruption reform processes with initial national political backing and donor support have come to a halt, because of domestic political opposition to it. In the case of Uganda, there was a tangible progress in establishing the legal and institutional framework to tackle corruption, but now political corruption scandals and the lack of political will to fight corruption is increasingly visible.
During the last decade corruption has become a topical issue in the international development policy debate. Research on corruption has also expanded rapidly, taking many different directions both within and across disciplines. This report provides an overview of contemporary research on corruption. The academic focus is on economic approaches, but perspectives from political science and social anthropology are also included. The presentation is mostly non-technical, although a few expositions of more analytically demanding matters are included. Relevance for development policy is the underlying guide for the selection of topics that are included in the study. The report should be useful for development practitioners and foreign aid officials, as well as for students and journalists interested in development issues.
The article analyzes the development of a global anti-corruption norm, and specifically its anit-bribery component, through the first two of three stages during the 1990s: (1) awareness raising, (2) institutionalization through the development of legal and policy instruments, and (3) global adoption, internalization, and adherence. A hegemonic actor explanation of norm development does not explain the failure of the norm in the 1970s in contrast to the relative success of norm development in the 1990s. The explanation lies in three processes: (1) the changing global environment, including the end of the Cold War and the spread of the principles of democracy and liberalism; (2) social interactions and the information revolution that contributed to wide-spread diffusion of new information about the causes and costs of corruption, as well as strategies to combat it; and (3) internal processes within the nation-state, from an explosion of NGOs and a freer, more investigative media, to changing calculations among political leaders about the costs of corruption. To reach the third stage of norm development will require both international organizations and domestic civil society actors to demand and monitor the implementation and enforcement of current commitments and to establish accountability.
This study compares the evolution of the state-of-the-art in research and analysis of anticorruption and transparency with World Bank practice. The first part of the paper reviews the theoretical and empirical approaches that have influenced the World Bank’s and the donor community’s thinking on how to diagnose and fight corruption. Also covered are interventions and diagnostic tools that have been developed to improve governance and assess corruption, as well as recent Bank-supported international initiatives to curb grand corruption.
Thereafter, the paper analyzes experiences from the Bank’s engagement in anti-corruption, drawing on the results of 19 country case studies covering developing and transitional countries. From the country cases it appears that anti-corruption measures are too often proposed by the Bank without considerations of the political economy and without clear strategies to win the support of a critical mass of key leaders who would help overcome the inevitable opposition of vested interests.
Evidence from the country cases are used to highlight past pitfalls and propose directions for future support to governance and anti-corruption reforms. First, the Bank needs to do more to understand corruption in the particular country context. The priorities for anticorruption efforts need to be based on an assessment in each country of the types of corruption most harmful to development. Second, direct measures to reduce corruption, such as the establishment of anti-corruption commissions, rarely succeed since they often lack the required support from political elites and the judicial system. Third, linking governance work with visible public service improvements may help build the credibility of reforms as from the point of view of citizens and government. Fourth, sustaining efforts to reduce corruption have better prospects when they emphasize making information public and building systems to reduce the opportunities for corruption.
This study was prepared as part of the Independent Evaluation Group’s evaluation of World Bank support for public sector reform. The evaluation focuses on World Bank experience in the period 1999-2006, but also looks further back in the 1990s to cover the full trajectory of World Bank support for these reforms. The valuation report Public sector reform: What works and why? can be downloaded from IEG’s website
http://www.worldbank.org/ieg/
This chapter begins by tracing the origins of the global anti-corruption agenda, which emerged in the mid-1990s from the US government’s perception of foreign corruption as a commercial and security threat. The World Bank and the IMF repackaged their policy advice, prescribing deregulation to reduce opportunities for officials to collect bribes. Founded by a former World Bank official in 1993, Transparency International began to publish a corruption perception index to raise awareness about the problem. Economists seized on such quantifications of corruption (despite their problematic methodology), to produce econometric studies in support of the largely neoliberal global agenda.
This article focuses on analyzing political will as it relates to the design, initiation, and pursuit of anti-corruption activities. The article elaborates an analytic framework for political will that partitions the concept into a set of characteristics/indicators, and elaborates the external factors that influence the expression and intensity of political will in a particular situation. The conceptual model identifies the links among the characteristics of political will and these external factors, and traces their resulting influence on the support for, design of, and outcomes of anti-corruption reforms. The conceptual framework for political will draws upon analysis and held experience with implementing policy change in a variety of sectors, including anti-corruption. The article closes with recommendations on the practical applications of the framework. Copyright (C) 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Can decentralization reduce a democratic deficit? Can decentralization make public administration more efficient and act as a safeguard against corruption? What can we learn from India's experience from its extensive decentralization reforms so far? In this book, Sten Widmalm adopts comparative and empirical approaches to examine how decentralization is connected to social capital and corruption. Using evidence from in-depth field studies in Madhya Pradesh and Kerala, and analyzing it against historical cases from around the world, he presents theoretical perspectives and policy suggestions. Widmalm's journey takes him to ancient Rome, Greece and India, as well as to the West, China, Latin America, and Russia of more recent times.
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Bo Rothstein explores how social capital and social trust are generated and what governments can do about it. A 'social trap' is a situation where individuals, groups or organizations are unable to cooperate owing to mutual distrust and lack of social capital, even where cooperation would benefit all. Examples include civil strife, pervasive corruption, ethnic discrimination, depletion of natural resources and misuse of social insurance systems. Much has been written attempting to explain the problem, but rather less material is available on how to escape it.
In the later decades of the 20th century, Africa plunged into political chaos. States failed, governments became predators, and citizens took up arms. In When Things Fell Apart, Robert H. Bates advances an explanation of state failure in Africa. In so doing, he not only plumbs the depths of the continent's late-century tragedy, but also the logic of political order and the foundations of the state. This book covers a wide range of territory by drawing on materials from Rwanda, Sudan, Liberia, and Congo. Written to be accessible to the general reader, it is nonetheless a must-read for scholars and policy makers concerned with political conflict and state failure.
Corruption flouts rules of fairness and gives some people advantages that others don’t have. Corruption is persistent; there is little evidence that countries can escape the curse of corruption easily–or at all. Instead of focusing on institutional reform, Uslaner suggests that the roots of corruption lie in economic and legal inequality and low levels of generalized trust (which are not readily changed) and poor policy choices (which may be more likely to change). Economic inequality provides a fertile breeding ground for corruption–and, in turn, it leads to further inequalities. Just as corruption is persistent, inequality and trust do not change much over time in my cross-national aggregate analyses. Uslaner argues that high inequality leads to low trust and high corruption, and then to more inequality—an inequality trap and identifies direct linkages between inequality and trust in surveys of the mass public and elites in transition countries. Eric M. Uslaner is Professor of Government and Politics at the University of Maryland–College Park, where he has taught since 1975. He has written seven books including The Moral Foundations of Trust (Cambridge University Press, 2002), and The Decline of Comity in Congress (University of Michigan Press, 1993). In 1981-82 he was Fulbright Professor of American Studies and Political Science at the Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel and in 2005, he was a Fulbright Senior Specialist Lecturer at Novosibirsk State Technical University, Novosibirsk, Siberia, Russia. In 2006 he was appointed the first Senior Research Fellow at the Center for American Law and Political Science at the Southwest University of Political Science and Law, Chongqing, China.
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Corruption has become an issue of major political and economic significance in recent years. This has led to a resurgence of interest in analysing the phenomenon and the diverse forms that it assumes in developing countries with an expectation that democratisation and economic liberalisation offer potential routes to dealing withthe problem. Anti-corruption strategies range from institutional reforms through to concerted efforts at the international level, but the efficacy of these approaches has not been subject to careful empirical research.
this paper we will be especially concerned with ratings of the performance of the central government bureaucracy. Keefer and Knack (1993) use ratings by the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) and by Business and Environmental Risk Intelligence (BERI) of "corruption in government" and "bureaucratic delays," respectively; Mauro uses ratings by Business International (BI) of "corruption" and "bureaucracy and red tape;" and Knack and Keefer (1995) and Easterly and Levine (1996) use an ICRG rating of "bureaucratic quality" in their indices of institutional quality. Keefer and Knack find that better performance on both of their variables is positively and significantly associated with growth in per capita income, Mauro finds that better performance on both of his variables is positively and significantly associated with the private investment share of GDP, and Knack and Keefer and Easterly and Levine find positive and 2 significant effects of their institutional quality indices on growth in per capita income. While the cross-country statistical evidence reinforces the idea that differential governmental performance may have an impact on economic growth, it tells us little about what kind of institutional characteristics are associated with lower levels of corruption or red tape. If the findings just listed are meaningful, it is worth identifying which characteristics of government bureaucracies lead to good ratings from the ICRG, BERI, and BI on the variables cited above. This is our aim in the present paper. In a companion paper (Evans and Rauch 1997) we examine the direct impact of bureaucratic structure on economic performance. To achieve this aim required a major data collection effort. Although it is increasingly recognized that without the help of the central gov...
There has been an explosion of interest in corruption in the past 10 years and the literature on the causes, consequences and control of corruption is now substantial. But there has not been a corresponding concern with the concept of corruption and how it can be defined and refined. Dissatisfaction with the approaches used in earlier decades has, in the 1990s, encouraged many analysts to turn to other, primarily economic, concepts. This article explores how the concept of corruption has evolved in contemporary social science and examines whether the new concepts constitute an important advance on the approaches used in earlier studies. It concludes that the new concepts are attempts to explain the circumstances most likely to give rise to corruption rather than original ways of defining it.
High levels of corruption limit investment and growth and lead to ineffective government. Developing countries and those making a transition from socialism are particularly at risk, but corruption is a worldwide phenomenon. Corruption creates inefficiencies and inequities, but reforms are possible to reduce the material benefits from payoffs. Corruption is not just an economic problem, however; it is also intertwined with politics. Reform may require changes in both constitutional structure and the underlying relationship of the market and the state. No single "blueprint" is possible, but the primary goal should be to reduce the gains from paying and receiving bribes, not simply to remove "bad apples."
Individuals attempting to supply themselves with public goods face well-known free-rider problems. Since at least Hobbes, social scientists have claimed that an `external agent' is necessary to check these problems and thus sustain efficient outcomes in political economies. Contributors to the relevant literature frequently characterize these agents as supplying efficiency-enhancing services (e.g. enforcement) in return for a share of associated efficiency gains. Any incentive scheme that eliminates moral hazard in the other players, however, must create moral hazard in the external agent. That is, the external agent has an incentive to increase its own share, to the detriment of overall efficiency. As a result, unless an external agent can credibly commit against opportunistic behavior, prospective subjects to its authority have a reduced incentive to `enter the game'.
In the mid-1990s an international consensus in development discourse has emerged: democratisation, public sector down-sizing, and economic deregulation are desirable goals in themselves, but they also reduce the extensive corruption in monopolistic state agencies. This study examines these issues with reference to the politics and practicalities of anti-corruption strategies in several African societies. It is argued that although down-sizing the state and political liberalisation are desirable goals in many African countries, they are necessary rather than sufficient conditions for the reduction of corruption. Extensive public sector corruption can coexist with democratic or quasi-democratic politics (as in Nigeria in the 1980s). Economic liberalisation can also create opportunities for corruption, through the sales of parastatals in dubious circumstances, and the creation of new, corrupt markets, as can the political liberalisation of previously authoritarian regimes such as Kenya in the 1990s. For short-term anti-corruption strategies to be effective in African societies, more attention needs to be devoted to questions of sequencing, the detail of reform and its sustainability in very poor societies, and the exceptional political and managerial commitment necessary to promote and maintain reform.
Curbing corruption is now a major focus of institutional reform. In the context of endemic corruption, reforming institutions might contribute to short-term success, but this needs to be complemented by what one might call sustainable corruption control, making corruption an incidental problem over the long term. The first section aims to justify and define this goal and to suggest a set of useful indicators. The following contribution draws attention to three criteria for achieving nd maintaining low levels of corruption, the stakeholders, the feasibility and credibility of the process and the international dimension of control.
I. The isolation paradox and the assurance problem, 112. — II. Optimum savings, 116. — III. The rate of discount, 120. — IV.
Rich they, poor us, 121. — V. Conclusions, 122.
We exploit differences in European mortality rates to estimate the effect of institutions on economic performance. Europeans adopted very different colonization policies in different colonies, with different associated institutions. In places where Europeans faced high mortality rates, they could not settle and were more likely to set up extractive institutions. These institutions persisted to the present. Exploiting differences in European mortality rates as an instrument for current institutions, we estimate large effects of institutions on income per capita. Once the effect of institutions is controlled for, countries in Africa or those closer to the equator do not have lower incomes. (JEL O11, P16, P51).