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Banana or fruit? Detection and recognition across categorical levels in RSVP
Abstract
Pictured objects and scenes can be understood in a brief glimpse, but there is a debate about whether they are first encoded at the basic level (e.g., banana), as proposed by Rosch et al. (1976, Cognitive Psychology) , or at a superordinate level (e.g., fruit). The level at which we first categorize an object matters in everyday situations because it determines whether we approach, avoid, or ignore the object. In the present study, we limited stimulus duration in order to explore the earliest level of object understanding. Target objects were presented among five other pictures using RSVP at 80, 53, 27, or 13 ms/picture. On each trial, participants viewed or heard 1 of 28 superordinate names or a corresponding basic-level name of the target. The name appeared before or after the picture sequence. Detection (as d') improved as duration increased but was significantly above chance in all conditions and for all durations. When the name was given before the sequence, d' was higher for the basic than for the superordinate name, showing that specific advance information facilitated visual encoding. In the name-after group, performance on the two category levels did not differ significantly; this suggests that encoding had occurred at the basic level during presentation, allowing the superordinate category to be inferred. We interpret the results as being consistent with the claim that the basic level is usually the entry level for object perception.
... It takes our brain ≈13 milliseconds [248] to process a visual image (α, β, γ and δ movements, and φ-phenomenon). Therefore, a continuum of visual images is physiologically impossible. ...
... As just indicated, physics models the physical world as a continuous world probably because we sensorially perceive it as a continuous world. The problem is that this perceived continuity is actually illusory because of the way our brain constructs the images we see: it lasts a time greater than zero (≈13 ms [248]) to process each visual image (α, β, γ and δ movements, and φ-phenomenon), so that a continuum of visual images is physiologically impossible, they will always be separated by a time interval greater than zero. In the same way that a movie is a discontinuous sequence of images perceived as a continuum, natural motion could also be a discontinuous sequence of changes of position that, for the same reason as in a film, is perceived as continuous by our brain. ...
Motivated by the formal inconsistency of the actual infinity hypothesis, and based on a single inductive principle (the Principle of Directional Evolution, which establishes the evolution of the universe in the same constant direction of increasing its entropy), this book proves a set of formal elements (theorems and corollaries) that could be used as the foundation of a new cosmology based on a finite and discrete space and time.
... Ashby & Maddox, 2011) and/or intercategory boundaries (or category range; e.g., Goldstone & Kersten, 2003). This conceptual similarity has been confirmed by the recent finding that set characteristics are perceived implicitly and automatically , just as objects are categorized implicitly and automatically at their basic category level (Potter & Hagmann, 2015;Rosch, Mervis, et al., 1976). Finally, it has been suggested that determining whether a group of objects in a scene belong to the same category may actually depend on their characteristics that allow them to be seen as a set (Utochkin, 2015). ...
... In contrast, by their very nature, categories are learned over a lifetime of experience, and with this knowledge, we can know immediately to what category a group of objects, or even a single object belongs. In fact, one of the defining characteristics of "basic" categories is that these are the names given to single objects (e.g., cat, car, fork, apple; Potter & Hagmann, 2015;Rosch, Mervis, et al., 1976). The situation with categorization is unlike that with sets, where we derive the set mean, on the fly, as we are presented with set members. ...
A bombardment of information overloads our sensory, perceptual and cognitive systems, which must integrate new information with memory of past scenes and events. Mechanisms employed to overcome sensory system bottlenecks include selective attention, Gestalt gist perception, categorization, and the recently investigated ensemble encoding of set summary statistics. We explore compensatory cognitive processes focusing on categorization and set ensemble summary statistics that relate objects sharing properties or function. Without encoding individual details of all individuals, (or as a shortcut to representing these details), observers perceive category prototype and boundaries or set mean and range, and perhaps higher order statistics as well. We found that observers perceive set mean and range, automatically, implicitly, and on-the-fly, for each presented set sequence, independently, and we found matching properties for category representation, suggesting a similar computational mechanism underlies the two phenomena. But categorization depends on a lifetime of learning about categories and their prototypes and boundaries. We now developed novel abstract “amoeba” forms, which are complex images similar to categories, but have simple ultrametric structure that observers can categorize on-the-fly (rather than depending on pre-learned categories). We find that, not only do observers learn the amoeba categories on-the-fly, they also build representations of their progenitor (related, but not equivalent, to set “mean” or category prototype), as well as category boundaries (related to set range and inter-category boundaries). These findings put set perception in a new light, related to object, scene and category representation.
... Ashby & Maddox, 2011) and/or intercategory boundaries (or category range; e.g., Goldstone & Kersten, 2003). This conceptual similarity has been confirmed by the recent finding that set characteristics are perceived implicitly and automatically , just as objects are categorized implicitly and automatically at their basic category level (Potter & Hagmann, 2015;Rosch, Mervis, et al., 1976). Finally, it has been suggested that determining whether a group of objects in a scene belong to the same category may actually depend on their characteristics that allow them to be seen as a set (Utochkin, 2015). ...
... In contrast, by their very nature, categories are learned over a lifetime of experience, and with this knowledge, we can know immediately to what category a group of objects, or even a single object belongs. In fact, one of the defining characteristics of "basic" categories is that these are the names given to single objects (e.g., cat, car, fork, apple; Potter & Hagmann, 2015;Rosch, Mervis, et al., 1976). The situation with categorization is unlike that with sets, where we derive the set mean, on the fly, as we are presented with set members. ...
Two cognitive processes have been explored that compensate for the limited information that can be perceived and remembered at any given moment. The first parsimonious cognitive process is object categorization. We naturally relate objects to their category, assume they share relevant category properties, often disregarding irrelevant characteristics. Another scene organizing mechanism is representing aspects of the visual world in terms of summary statistics. Spreading attention over a group of objects with some similarity, one perceives an ensemble representation of the group. Without encoding detailed information of individuals, observers process summary data concerning the group, including set mean for various features (from circle size to face expression). Just as categorization may include/depend on prototype and intercategory boundaries, so set perception includes property mean and range. We now explore common features of these processes. We previously investigated summary perception of low-level features with a rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP) paradigm and found that participants perceive both the mean and range extremes of stimulus sets, automatically, implicitly, and on-the-fly, for each RSVP sequence, independently. We now use the same experimental paradigm to test category representation of high-level objects. We find participants perceive categorical characteristics better than they code individual elements. We relate category prototype to set mean and same/different category to in/out-of-range elements, defining a direct parallel between low-level set perception and high-level categorization. The implicit effects of mean or prototype and set or category boundaries are very similar. We suggest that object categorization may share perceptual-computational mechanisms with set summary statistics perception.
... Аналогичные результаты были получены и при решении других задач. Например, при быстром последовательном предъявлении зрительных стимулов обнаружение объектов, представленных категориями базового уровня, оказалось более эффективным, чем обнаружение объектов суперординатного и субординатного уровней (Potter, Hagmann, 2015). Помимо этого, в ряде исследований зрительного поиска было показано, что целевой стимул обнаруживается быстрее среди дистракторов, если они представлены категориями разных уровней (см., например: Lupyan, 2008). ...
There are a number of mechanisms for optimising information storage and processing in the cognitive system. Thus, in working memory, such optimisation is carried out, among other things, through the process of categorisation – grouping objects into categories. In its turn, a category has a number of levels, which determine the specificity and distinctness of the formed representation: subordinant, basic and superordinant. It is suggested that there is a categoricality effect: category levels influence the degree of working memory load and visual search efficiency. A particular example of a categoricality effect is the basic-level category superiority effect. This effect is that the speed and accuracy of object identification appears to be higher when given a basic level category (e.g., dog) compared to two others (e.g., dachshund or animal). The superiority effect of the basic-level category is related to the optimal ratio of specificity and distinctness of the representation. In turn, the quality of the formed representation is related to the attention template that is retained in working memory. Category level is expected to influence the attention template, and with it the level of load in working memory. The present study aimed to elucidate the neurophysiological mechanisms of representation formation under the influence of verbally given basic and superordinate level categories. The study was carried out in a visual search paradigm - subjects had to memorise verbally given target stimuli and then report the presence or absence of the target stimulus among distractors. Evoked potentials (EPs) were recorded and the N2pc and CDA components were analysed. The analyses yielded the specified EPs, indicating the formation of an attention template in the working memory system. However, the lack of differences between conditions indicates that there was no effect of verbally given target category level on the level of detailed attention template and working memory load.
... For their part, some philosophers such as G. W. F. Hegel [9,10,19,20,23,27] argued that change is an inconsistent notion; while others, such as J. M. E. McTaggart, came to the same conclusion as Parmenides [21] on the impossibility of change [18]. We now know that the problem of change is complicated by our perception of natural phenomena as continuous phenomena, when in fact that continuous perception is a delusion of our brain, which takes 13 milli-seconds to process any image that comes to it from the external world [22,7]. We see natural phenomena as continuous for the same reason that we see as continuous the action projected on a screen from the discontinuous sequence of the frames of the projected lm. ...
This article adds new details to the Schrödinger's cat argument that allow the development of a new argument from which 24 violations of the Second Law of logic are deduced. Schrödinger's cat argument is also examined from the perspective of the old problem of change, which has remained unsolved for 26 centuries, and which physics (the science of change in a changing physical world) has completely forgotten.
... 1 85 2 1 30 Grill-Spector & Kanwisher, 2005;Jolicoeur et al., 1984;Murphy & Smith, 1982;Potter & Hagmann, 2015;Rogers & Patterson, 2007 distinctiveness speci city Murphy & Brownell, 1985 Rosch Pansky Pilacinski et al. 2021 Skiba & Snow 2016 Barsalou, 1987;Elman, 2004 ad hoc category Barsalou, 1983 All Concept Are Ad Hoc Concept Casasanto & Lupyan, 2015Large et al., 2004Otsuka & Kawaguchi, 2013 Otsuka & Kawaguchi 2013 ...
In this study using the incidental-learning paradigm, we examine the relationships between object category at encoding and object memory performance and how the relationships change depending on the presentation context of target objects. The results suggest that, compared to both functional and basic categories, memory performance for superordinate categories was influenced by task context. Moreover, memory performance for functional and basic categories was higher than for superordinate categories in conditions where distractor and target objects were from different categories. These results indicate that, although functional categories are abstract in nature, they are less influenced by context because they are core concepts in the representation of artificial objects. This study elucidates the concept of function and highlights the importance of contextual information when investigating the conceptual processing of objects.
... And it has merit because motion, whether continuous or discrete, is always perceived by man as continuous. Although it is worth remembering that this continuity is a deceptive perception: our brain takes approximately 13 milliseconds to process each image that reaches us from the outside world [14,4]. Therefore, we only perceive a discontinuous succession of images separated from each other by 13 milliseconds. ...
After pointing out certain inadequacies and misunderstandings in the ordinary language used by physicists, and denouncing certain impossible mathematical relationships between discrete and continuous magnitudes, the emblematic Paradox of Achilles and the Tortoise is formally defined, and its immediate solution in discrete space and time is demonstrated, pointing the way that resolves all the paradoxes deduced from the continuums of densely ordered points and instants.
... It also seems reasonable to expect that quantum mechanics, the most discrete and successful branch of physics, will fit smoothly into this finite and discrete paradigm. But it also seems reasonable to expect many difficulties in the process of changing a very hegemonic stream of thought, such as the infinitist spacetime continuum model, which, moreover, agrees with our sensory perception of the physical world as a continuous reality, although, as the photograms of a movie, this continuity is simply a trick of our brain: the neural processing of each image takes about 13 milliseconds [6]. Reality could indeed be discrete, and motion could be a discontinuous process, in jumps, even if it is perceived as a continuous process. ...
This last article in the series proposes to consider the possibility of constructing new discrete models to explain the universe, models that could be based on cellular automata. In these finite and discrete models, the great mysteries of quantum mechanics, such as quantum entanglement or the measurement problem, could surely be explained.
... The first is our sensory perception of the physical world as a continuous world. Although it is a deceptive perception because the human brain takes a certain amount of time (≈13 milliseconds [29]) to process each image (the base of the well known α, β, γ and δ movements, and of φ-phenomenon [8]). Therefore, it can process only a finite number of images per unit of time, although that time is so short that we perceive the discontinuous succession of those images as if it were a continuous succession, just as we perceive the succession of frames in a movie. ...
A photon replaces Achilles and the Tortoise in a variant of the famous Zeno's paradox discussed in this paper. The discussion takes place in the infinitist scenario of the spacetime continuum. In this theoretical scenario, and thanks to the dense order of real numbers, the paradox becomes first a dichotomy and then a contradiction, of which there are only two coherent solutions: either the speed of light is not finite, or the Hypothesis of the Actual Infinity is not consistent. An inconsistency that would change almost everything in modern mathematics and then in the formal foundation of modern physics. The article ends by pointing to a new finite and discrete scenario for space and time in which this and many other contradictions and paradoxes dissolve immediately. But it also warns of the extraordinary difficulties that will be involved in exchanging the hegemonic infinitist paradigm of our days for an alternative based on the finitist discreteness of space and time.
... As just indicated, physics models the physical world as a continuous world probably because we sensorially perceive it as a continuous world. The problem is that this perceived continuity is actually illusory because of the way our brain constructs the images we see: it lasts a time greater than zero (≈13 ms [21]) to process each visual image (α, β, γ and δ movements, and ϕ-phenomenon [4]), so that a continuum of visual images is physiologically impossible, they will always be separated by a time interval greater The General Science Journal than zero. In the same way that a movie is a discontinuous sequence of images perceived as a continuum, natural motion could also be a discontinuous sequence of changes of position that, for the same reason as in a lm, is perceived as continuous by our brain. ...
This paper 6 of the series begins by recalling the old problem of change, one of the most basic problems of physics, but one that physics has not dealt with for centuries. First, the problem of change is posed in formal terms, and then it is proved that it has no solution in the spacetime continuum. It is formally demonstrated that, in effect, change is an impossible process in this continuum, the reason for this impossibility being the lack of immediate successiveness (adja-cency, contiguity) between the elements of the continuum (points and instants). A discrete model inspired by cellular automata (CALM) is then proposed where the problem of change could finally be solved. It will be the same model that in subsequent papers of this series will be proposed as an initial step in the search for a discrete and finitist model for the observable universe.
... And taking into account that ω is the least innite ordinal, if α is any other innite ordinal greater than ω, an αpartition of (a, b) will contain an inconsistent ω-subdivision of a subinterval (a, b ′ ) of (a, b) [36,Theorem 19]. So It takes our brain ≈13 milliseconds [54] to process a visual image (α, β, γ and δ movements, and ϕ-phenomenon [21]). Therefore, a continuum of visual images is physiologically impossible. ...
This paper confronts discreteness with continuity, and applied the confrontation to physical magnitudes, most of which are already defined as discrete magnitudes (quantum magnitudes). After recalling the pre-Socratic concept of the continuous (initially made of extensive points) and the modern spacetime continuum (which was proved to be inconsistent in article 3 of this series of articles), the inconsistent nature of the real numbers with infinitely many decimals is demonstrated when those sequences of decimals are considered as complete totalities. The inconsistency of the infinite division of space and time is then proved, a result of the greatest importance from the discrete perspective of space and time that will be developed in the subsequent articles of this series of articles. Finally, the lack of immediate successiveness (adjacency) in the continuum is used to introduce the problem of change, a pre-Socratic question still unsolved, not even by physics, the science of change.
... The problem is that this perceived continuity is illusory. In fact, our brain takes a time greater than zero (≈13 ms [316]) to process each visual image (the base of the well known α, β, γ and δ movements, and of φphenomenon), so that a continuum of visual images is physiologically impossible. The same illusory perception happens with motion when observed in a film. ...
This book analyzes the possibility that the relativistic deformations of space and time were only apparent, not real. He also introduces the concept of preinertia, a universal attribute of all physical objects that makes it impossible to detect absolute motion. Preinertia and discrete space and time are then used to propose an alternative to the theory of special relativity compatible with all its experimental support.
... One way of investigating human categorical knowledge is to examine how the brain distinguishes objects in the visual world. The human visual system can automatically categorise stimuli, from low-level visual features, to individual object identity, to increasingly abstract conceptual categories in fractions of a second (Cichy et al., 2014;Contini et al., 2017;Mohsenzadeh et al., 2018;Potter et al., 2014;Potter & Hagmann, 2015;Robinson et al., 2019). Categorical distinctions such as animacy are rapidly and subconsciously processed by the brain (Carlson et al., 2013;Cichy et al., 2014;Connolly et al., 2012;Contini et al., 2017;Grootswagers et al., 2018;Konkle & Caramazza, 2013;Ritchie et al., 2015). ...
The ability to perceive moving objects is crucial for threat identification and survival. Recent neuroimaging evidence has shown that goal-directed movement is an important element of object processing in the brain. However, prior work has primarily used moving stimuli that are also animate, making it difficult to disentangle the effect of movement from aliveness or animacy in representational categorisation. In the current study, we investigated the relationship between how the brain processes movement and aliveness by including stimuli that are alive but still (e.g., plants), and stimuli that are not alive but move (e.g., waves). We examined electroencephalographic (EEG) data recorded while participants viewed static images of moving or non-moving objects that were either natural or artificial. Participants classified the images according to aliveness, or according to capacity for movement. Movement explained significant variance in the neural data over and above that of aliveness, showing that capacity for movement is an important dimension in the representation of visual objects in humans.
... In the first experiment, stimuli were presented using brief durations and RSVP to limit the time available to process stimuli, and thus help distinguish serial and parallel processing predictions (Forster, 1970;Potter & Hagmann, 2015;Robinson, Grootswagers, & Carlson, 2019). The task was semantic object categorization, similar to the task used with words by White and colleagues (White et al., 2018). ...
Divided attention has little effect for simple tasks, such as luminance detection, but it has large effects for complex tasks, such as semantic categorization of masked words. Here, we asked whether the semantic categorization of visual objects shows divided attention effects as large as those observed for words, or as small as those observed for simple feature judgments. Using a dual-task paradigm with nameable object stimuli, performance was compared with the predictions of serial and parallel models. At the extreme, parallel processes with unlimited capacity predict no effect of divided attention; alternatively, an all-or-none serial process makes two predictions: a large divided attention effect (lower accuracy for dual-task trials, compared to single-task trials) and a negative response correlation in dual-task trials (a given response is more likely to be incorrect when the response about the other stimulus is correct). These predictions were tested in two experiments examining object judgments. In both experiments, there was a large divided attention effect and a small negative correlation in responses. The magnitude of these effects was larger than for simple features, but smaller than for words. These effects were consistent with serial models, and rule out some but not all parallel models. More broadly, the results help establish one of the first examples of likely serial processing in perception.
... Although the relationship is not evident, the difficulties posed by the problem of change could be related to the continuous perception of the physical world that our brain elaborates from discontinuous sequences of images. It takes approximately 0.013 seconds to elaborate one of such images [191], so human brain can only process a finite number of images per second (less than 77). From this discontinuous sequence of images, however, emerges our continuous perception of the physical world (phi phenomenon [84]), the same as with the projection of the frames of a film. ...
From different areas of mathematics, such as set theory, geometry, transfinite arithmetic or supertask theory, in this book more than forty arguments are developed about the inconsistency of the hypothesis of the actual infinity in contemporary mathematics. A hypothesis according to which the uncompletable lists, as the list of the natural numbers, exist as completed lists. The inconsistency of this hypothesis would have an enormous impact on physics, forcing us to change the continuum space-time for a discrete model, with indivisible units (atoms) of space and time. The discrete model would be a great simplification of physical theories, including relativity and quantum mechanics. It would also suppose the solution of the old problem of change, posed by the pre-Socratics philosophers twenty-seven centuries ago.
... Set perception includes mean and range (Ariely, 2001;Chong & Treisman, 2003, 2005Khayat & Hochstein, 2018;Hochstein et al., 2018), and categorization might rely on the related properties of prototype (or mean exemplar; e.g., Ashby & Maddox, 2011) and inter-category boundaries (or category range; e.g., Goldstone & Kersten, 2003). We confirmed this conceptual similarity, finding that set characteristics are perceived implicitly and automatically (Khayat & Hochstein, 2018), just as objects are categorized implicitly and automatically at their basic category level (Potter & Hagmann, 2015;Rosch, Mervis, et al., 1976). It has also been suggested that determining whether objects belong to a single category may depend on the same characteristics that define them as a set (Utochkin, 2015). ...
Perception, representation, and memory of ensemble statistics has attracted growing interest. Studies found that, at different abstraction levels, the brain represents similar items as unified percepts. We found that global ensemble perception is automatic and unconscious, affecting later perceptual judgments regarding individual member items. Implicit effects of set mean and range for low-level feature ensembles (size, orientation, brightness) were replicated for high-level category objects. This similarity suggests that analogous mechanisms underlie these extreme levels of abstraction. Here, we bridge the span between visual features and semantic object categories using the identical implicit perception experimental paradigm for intermediate novel visual-shape categories, constructing ensemble exemplars by introducing systematic variations of a central category base or ancestor. In five experiments, with different item variability, we test automatic representation of ensemble category characteristics and its effect on a subsequent memory task. Results show that observer representation of ensembles includes the group’s central shape, category ancestor (progenitor), or group mean. Observers also easily reject memory of shapes belonging to different categories, i.e. originating from different ancestors. We conclude that complex categories, like simple visual form ensembles, are represented in terms of statistics including a central object, as well as category boundaries. We refer to the model proposed by Benna and Fusi ( bioRxiv 624239, 2019) that memory representation is compressed when related elements are represented by identifying their ancestor and each one’s difference from it. We suggest that ensemble mean perception, like category prototype extraction, might reflect employment at different representation levels of an essential, general representation mechanism.
... The problem is that this perceived continuity is illusory. In fact, our brain takes a time greater than zero (≈13 ms [14]) to process each visual image (the base of the well known α, β, γ and δ movements, and of ϕ-phenomenon), so that a continuum of visual images is physiologically impossible. The same illusory perception happens with motion when observed in a film. ...
Physics, the science of change, has managed to discover and to explain a large number of qualitative and quantitative aspects of a large number of natural changes, but change itself remains unexplained since we first faced it, over twenty-seven centuries ago. This paper proves, in terms of transfinite arithmetic, that change is inconsistent within the infinitist framework of the spacetime continuum, were all solutions have been tried until now. It then proposes a consistent solution within the finitist framework of the discrete spacetimes of cellular automata like models, proving the factor that convert between continuum and discrete spacetimes has the algebraic form of the relativistic factor of Lorentz transformation, which could be reinterpreted as an operator to translate between a consistent discrete reality and an inconsistent continuous reality.
... Moreover, search performance is strongly influenced by hierarchical category levels. Subordinate-level cues (e.g., police car) yield faster and more accurate search, relative to superordinate-level cues (e.g., vehicle) in both array-based search (Maxfield & Zelinsky, 2012) and RSVP identification (Potter & Hagmann, 2015). Basic-and superordinate-level categorical search cues may not provide observers with specific details with which to guide search. ...
When observers search for multiple (rather than singular) targets, they are slower and less accurate, yet have better incidental memory for non-target items encountered during the task (Hout & Goldinger, 2010). One explanation for this may be that observers titrate their attention allocation based on the expected difficulty suggested by search cues. Difficult search cues may implicitly encourage observers to narrow their attention, simultaneously enhancing distractor encoding and hindering peripheral processing. Across three experiments, we manipulated the difficulty of search cues preceding passive visual search for real-world objects, using a Rapid Serial Visual Presentation (RSVP) task to equate item exposure durations. In all experiments, incidental memory was enhanced for distractors encountered while participants monitored for difficult targets. Moreover, in key trials, peripheral shapes appeared at varying eccentricities off center, allowing us to infer the spread and precision of participants’ attentional windows. Peripheral item detection and identification decreased when search cues were difficult, even when the peripheral items appeared before targets. These results were not an artifact of sustained vigilance in “miss” trials, but instead reflect top-down modulation of attention allocation based on task demands. Implications for individual differences are discussed
... Comparing our results to the precueing condition of Experiment 1 of Potter et al., we find that our d' values are similar to what they reported at 13 ms, but are considerably less than they reported at 80 ms. The target names used in our study were more generic than those used by Potter et al., and this might have contributed to this difference (Potter & Hagmann, 2015). Additionally, unlike the Potter et al. study, in our study observers did not receive feedback on their accuracy, and this may have further reduced d' at the longer durations. ...
The human visual system has the remarkable ability to rapidly detect meaning from visual stimuli. Potter, Wyble, Hagmann, and McCourt (Attention, Perception, & Psychophysics, 76, 270-279, 2014) tested the minimum viewing time required to obtain meaning from a stream of pictures shown in a rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP) sequence containing either six or 12 pictures. They reported that observers could detect the presence of a target picture specified by name (e.g., smiling couple) even when the pictures in the sequence were presented for just 13 ms each. Potter et al. claimed that this was insufficient time for feedback processing to occur, so feedforward processing alone must be able to generate conscious awareness of the target pictures. A potential confound in their study is that the pictures in the RSVP sequence sometime contained areas with no high-contrast edges, and so may not have adequately masked each other. Consequently, iconic memories of portions of the target pictures may have persisted in the visual system, thereby increasing the effective presentation time. Our study addressed this issue by redoing the Potter et al. study, but using four different types of masks. We found that when adequate masking was used, no evidence emerged that observers could detect the presence of a specific target picture, even when each picture in the RSVP sequence was presented for 27 ms. On the basis of these findings, we cannot rule out the possibility that feedback processing is necessary for individual pictures to be recognized.
The same object can be described at multiple levels of abstraction (“parka”, “coat”, “clothing”), yet human observers consistently name objects at a mid-level of specificity known as the basic level. Little is known about the temporal dynamics involved in retrieving neural representations that prioritize the basic level, nor how these dynamics change with evolving task demands. In this study, observers viewed 1080 objects arranged in a three-tier category taxonomy while 64-channel EEG was recorded. Observers performed a categorical one-back task in different recording sessions on the basic or subordinate levels. We used time-resolved multiple regression to assess the utility of superordinate-, basic-, and subordinate-level categories across the scalp. We found robust use of basic-level category information starting at about 50 ms after stimulus onset and moving from posterior electrodes (149 ms) through lateral (261 ms) to anterior sites (332 ms). Task differences were not evident in the first 200 ms of processing but were observed between 200–300 ms after stimulus presentation. Together, this work demonstrates that the object category representations prioritize the basic level and do so relatively early, congruent with results that show that basic-level categorization is an automatic and obligatory process.
The influence of temporal characteristics of mask presentation on performance in basic and superordinate image categorization tasks was investigated in young healthy subjects using a forward masking model. The masks could be congruent, noncongruent, or semantically neutral to the stimulus images. In the first series of experiments, the influence of stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA, the time interval between the onset of the mask and the onset of the stimulus) was studied. SOA varied from 100 to 350 ms in steps of 50 ms, whereas mask duration remained unchanged and equaled 100 ms. In the second series, the influence of mask duration was investigated. It varied from 100 to 250 ms in steps of 50 ms, while SOA remained constant at 250 ms. It was found that superordinate categorization was performed faster. This could be due to the fact that superordinate categorization involves a low-frequency information of stimulus description that is rapidly transmitted through the magnocellular visual pathway. The basic categorization was more sensitive to the temporal properties of the mask and its category. Changes in SOA had a stronger effect than those in mask duration. Assuming that SOA changes affect the early perceptual phase of stimulus processing, the sensitivity of this phase to irrelevant information seems to be reflected in the stronger influence of SOA changes on basic categorization compared to superordinate categorization.
p>Categorization is the process by which objects are combined according to a certain principle, which provides more efficient and cost-effective information processing. One of the topical areas of research in this field is the study of the categorical effect in perceptual tasks, for example in the task visual search task. The present study investigated the effect of the role of category (basic or superordinate) on the time of guidance - the search for a target stimulus and verification - the time of identification of a target stimulus in a hybrid search task. Subjects had to find certain objects on the screen, which could be specified either as basic-level categories (e.g., cars) or superordinate-level categories (e.g., transport vehicles). An eye-tracking method was used to separate the entire hybrid search process into a guidance and a verification. A significant effect of category level was found on the rate of guidance, but not on the rate of verification.</p
This paper proves in formal terms a quality of all points of the continuum geometrical space that is often explicitly or implicitly assumed: points have neither size nor shape. It also highlights the contradiction of, on the one hand, denying the reality of a physical space, which continues to be (together with time and spacetime) just an illusion for most contemporary physicists, and, on the other hand, accepting that this unreal space is continuously undergoing intrinsic deformations, accelerated intrinsic expansions, and propagation of its own deformations (gravitational waves), as if something that is not real, that is just an illusion, had the actual physical ability to warp, expand, vibrate and transmit its own vibrations. If, on the contrary, the physical reality of space (together with time and spacetime) is assumed, almost insoluble problems arise related to the modeling of spacetime through a four-dimensional infinitist continuum of points without size or shape or duration. As a counterpoint, this work considers the structure and functioning of CALMs, where, apart from being free of the inconsistencies related to infinity proved in the papers 3, 4 and 5, none of these problems arise, and where it is possible to envisage a theory of gravity in which spacetime warps are unnecessary.
This paper discusses the consequences (on the physical space) of some of the formal results proved in the precedent papers, namely the Theorem 5.5 of Formal Dependence and the inconsistencies of the actual infinity and the infinite divisibility. The consequences are almost immediate and very clear, space would have to be finite, discrete and physical, i.e. real, which obviously contrast with the usual concept of space in contemporary physics. A model based on Cellular Automata Like Models is then proposed to start the discussions on the foundational basis of a new finitist and discrete paradigm of physical space.
Paper 8 of this series of papers on discrete cosmology examines the Aristotelian infinite regress of arguments, and extends it to definitions and causes. Infinite regress then becomes a very serious limitation of human knowledge, much more serious than Gödel's famous incompleteness theorems. But at the same time, and also considering the inconsistency of the actual infinity and the infinite divisibility, it suggests the way we should go to explain the physical world by clearly setting out what can and cannot be explained in formal terms. In particular, it is proved here that any history either has an initial instant or it is inconsistent.
After a short introduction to discrete magnitudes, some significant results on the finiteness of lengths and distances, as well as on the existence of indivisible units of space and time, are proved. An inductive principle is then introduced: the Principle of Directional Evolution, which has the highest empirical evidence and theoretical support. This Principle, which establishes the evolution of the universe in the direction of increasing entropy and decreasing temperature, makes it possible to prove the Theorem of the Consistent Universe and nine other subsequent results that clearly point to the discrete nature of space and time. It is shown that space and time, whether real or not, can only be considered as consisting of minimal indivisible units arranged in an adjacent manner. A conclusion incompatible with the spacetime continuum and compatible with certain discrete models such as CALMs (Cellular Automata Like Models), which will be introduced in the article 6 of the series.
Abstract.-This is the first in a series of 17 articles that aim to open a debate on the foundation of a new finitist and discrete cosmology. All the articles in the series have already been written, and will be published weekly from the last week of October 2022. The objective of this first article in the series is to expose a set of fundamental problems of logic, mathematics and physics that have not been properly resolved, and that presumably will not be, because at the base of all of them is an inconsistency directly related with the old Hypothesis of the Actual Infinity. An inconsistency that contemporary mathematics and physics insist on ignoring, despite its catastrophic consequences in the development of physical theories, particularly of cosmological theories.
Categories broader than the basic categories (e.g., pens) are referred to as superordinate categories (e.g., stationery). Broader categories that reflect the function of an object (e.g., things to write with) are recognized faster than superordinate categories. However, previous studies did not reveal the process of activation for functional categories. This study aimed to examine the relationship between stimulus presentation time and recognition of a functional category. We conducted a category verification task in which we manipulated the time of the stimulus presentation and the category level to clarify the process of the activation of functional category recognition. The results of the reaction time analysis confirmed the superiority of the functional category as compared to the superordinate category. However, there were no interactions between presentation time and category conditions; the time taken to process the stimuli had no effect on the activation of the category. This suggests that the activation of knowledge about man-made objects occurs in parallel, and access for broader categories does not necessarily have to occur via activation of the basic category.
Résumé
Les recherches menées ces dernières années dans le domaine de la cognition spatiale font état d’observations empiriques originales dont l’approche « traditionnelle » parvient parfois difficilement à rendre compte. L’une des contributions majeures de ces observations a été d’inviter à repenser la perception de scènes, considérant que celle-ci bénéficierait à ne plus être appréhendée comme étant centrée principalement sur la modalité sensorielle considérée. À ce titre, le Modèle multisource de la perception de scènes (Intraub et al.) offre un cadre théorique alternatif, selon lequel la perception de scènes serait structurée autour d’un cadre spatial égocentrique, complété par différentes sources d’information (externe, interne). Toutes travailleraient de concert de façon à créer une simulation des régions environnantes probables, intégrant la vue perçue dans un contexte spatial plus large. Cette revue de question se propose notamment de présenter comment l’une des avancées du modèle d’Intraub est d’unifier différents champs de la cognition jusqu’alors appréhendés isolément.
In a prior study of object recognition, Rosch and colleagues (1976) argued that within the hierarchical structure of categories, from superordinate (e.g., stationary), basic (e.g., pen) and to subordinate categories (e.g., red pen), basic-category objects are recognized first. However, their prior study did not investigate the higher concept of function. Accordingly, in this study, we examine the role of functional categories(e.g., something to cut with)within the object-recognition system in terms of access speeds for the relevant concepts. The results from Experiments 1 and 2 indicate that object recognition based on functional categories is executed faster than recognition based on superordinate categories. In Experiment 3, which employed the rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP) detection task, the performance differences for the functional and basic categories were not significant, but detection results were higher for functional categories compared to superordinate categories. These results suggest that functional categories are recognized during the initial stages of object recognition and that this concept plays an important role in the recognition of man-made objects.
In order to improve the accuracy and stability of fruit and vegetable image recognition by single feature, this project proposed multi-feature fusion algorithms and SVM classification algorithms. This project not only introduces the Reproducing Kernel Hilbert space to improve the multi-feature compatibility and improve multi-feature fusion algorithm, but also introduces TPS transformation model in SVM classifier to improve the classification accuracy, real-time and robustness of integration feature. By using multi-feature fusion algorithms and SVM classification algorithms, experimental results show that we can recognize the common fruit and vegetable images efficiently and accurately.
Humans can detect target colour pictures of scenes depicting concepts like picnic or harbour in sequences of six or 12 pictures presented as briefly as 13 ms, even when the target is named after the sequence. Such rapid detection suggests that feedforward processing alone enabled detection without recurrent cortical feedback. There is debate about whether coarse, global, low spatial frequencies (LSFs) provide predictive information to high cortical levels through the rapid magnocellular (M) projection of the visual path, enabling top-down prediction of possible object identities. To test the “Fast M” hypothesis, we compared detection of a named target across five stimulus conditions: unaltered colour, blurred colour, greyscale, thresholded monochrome, and LSF pictures. The pictures were presented for 13–80 ms in six-picture rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP) sequences. Blurred, monochrome, and LSF pictures were detected less accurately than normal colour or greyscale pictures. When the target was named before the sequence, all picture types except LSF resulted in above-chance detection at all durations. Crucially, when the name was given only after the sequence, performance dropped and the monochrome and LSF pictures (but not the blurred pictures) were at or near chance. Thus, without advance information, monochrome and LSF pictures were rarely understood. The results offer only limited support for the Fast M hypothesis, suggesting instead that feedforward processing is able to activate conceptual representations without complementary reentrant processing.
The visual system is exquisitely adapted to the task of extracting conceptual information from visual input with every new eye fixation, three or four times a second. Here we assess the minimum viewing time needed for visual comprehension, using rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP) of a series of six or 12 pictures presented at between 13 and 80 ms per picture, with no interstimulus interval. Participants were to detect a picture specified by a name (e.g., smiling couple) that was given just before or immediately after the sequence. Detection improved with increasing duration and was better when the name was presented before the sequence, but performance was significantly above chance at all durations, whether the target was named before or only after the sequence. The results are consistent with feedforward models, in which an initial wave of neural activity through the ventral stream is sufficient to allow identification of a complex visual stimulus in a single forward pass. Although we discuss other explanations, the results suggest that neither reentrant processing from higher to lower levels nor advance information about the stimulus is necessary for the conscious detection of rapidly presented, complex visual information.
Estimatingd′ from extreme false-alarm or hit proportions (p = 0 orp = 1) requires the use of a correction, because thez score of such proportions takes on infinite values. Two commonly used corrections are compared by using Monte-Carlo simulations.
The first is the 1/(2N) rule for which an extreme proportion is corrected by this factor befored′ is calculated. The second is the log-linear rule for which each cell frequency in the contingency table is increased by
0.5 irrespective of the contents of each cell. Results showed that the log-linear rule resulted in less biased estimates ofd′ that always underestimated populationd′. The 1/(2N) rule, apart from being more biased, could either over- or underestimate populationd′.
Categorizations which humans make of the concrete world are not arbitrary but highly determined. In taxonomies of concrete objects, there is one level of abstraction at which the most basic category cuts are made. Basic categories are those which carry the most information, possess the highest category cue validity, and are, thus, the most differentiated from one another. The four experiments of Part I define basic objects by demonstrating that in taxonomies of common concrete nouns in English based on class inclusion, basic objects are the most inclusive categories whose members: (a) possess significant numbers of attributes in common, (b) have motor programs which are similar to one another, (c) have similar shapes, and (d) can be identified from averaged shapes of members of the class. The eight experiments of Part II explore implications of the structure of categories. Basic objects are shown to be the most inclusive categories for which a concrete image of the category as a whole can be formed, to be the first categorizations made during perception of the environment, to be the earliest categories sorted and earliest named by children, and to be the categories most codable, most coded, and most necessary in language.
Classic research on conceptual hierarchies has shown that the interaction between the human perceiver and objects in the environment specifies one level of abstraction for categorizing objects, called the basic level, which plays a primary role in cognition. The question of whether the special psychological status of the basic level can be modified by experience was addressed in three experiments comparing the performance of subjects in expert and novice domains. The main findings were that in the domain of expertise (a) subordinate-level categories were as differentiated as the basic-level categories, (b) subordinate-level names were used as frequently as basic-level names for identifying objects, and (c) subordinate-level categorizations were as fast as basic-level categorizations. Taken together, these results demonstrate that individual differences in domain-specific knowledge affect the extent that the basic level is central to categorization.
A pictured object can be readily detected in a rapid serial visual presentation sequence when the target is specified by a superordinate category name such as animal or vehicle. Are category features the initial basis for detection, with identification of the specific object occurring in a second stage (Evans & Treisman, 2005), or is identification of the object the basis for detection? When 2 targets in the same superordinate category are presented successively (lag 1), only the identification-first hypothesis predicts lag 1 sparing of the second target. The results of 2 experiments with novel pictures and a wide range of categories supported the identification-first hypothesis and a transient-attention model of lag 1 sparing and the attentional blink (Wyble, Bowman, & Potter, 2009).
Since the pioneering study by Rosch and colleagues in the 70s, it is commonly agreed that basic level perceptual categories (dog, chair...) are accessed faster than superordinate ones (animal, furniture...). Nevertheless, the speed at which objects presented in natural images can be processed in a rapid go/no-go visual superordinate categorization task has challenged this "basic level advantage".
Using the same task, we compared human processing speed when categorizing natural scenes as containing either an animal (superordinate level), or a specific animal (bird or dog, basic level). Human subjects require an additional 40-65 ms to decide whether an animal is a bird or a dog and most errors are induced by non-target animals. Indeed, processing time is tightly linked with the type of non-targets objects. Without any exemplar of the same superordinate category to ignore, the basic level category is accessed as fast as the superordinate category, whereas the presence of animal non-targets induces both an increase in reaction time and a decrease in accuracy.
These results support the parallel distributed processing theory (PDP) and might reconciliate controversial studies recently published. The visual system can quickly access a coarse/abstract visual representation that allows fast decision for superordinate categorization of objects but additional time-consuming visual analysis would be necessary for a decision at the basic level based on more detailed representations.
Studies have suggested attention-free semantic processing of natural scenes in which concurrent tasks leave category detection unimpaired (e.g., F. Li, R. VanRullen, C. Koch, & P. Perona, 2002). Could this ability reflect detection of disjunctive feature sets rather than high-level binding? Participants detected an animal target in a rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP) sequence and then reported its identity and location. They frequently failed to identify or to localize targets that they had correctly detected, suggesting that detection was based only on partial processing. Detection of targets was considerably worse in sequences that also contained humans, presumably because of shared features. When 2 targets were presented in RSVP, a prolonged attentional blink appeared that was almost eliminated when both targets were detected without being identified. The results suggest rapid feature analysis mediating detection, followed by attention-demanding binding for identification and localization.
People are generally faster and more accurate to name or categorize objects at the basic level (e.g., dog) relative to more general (animal) or specific (collie) levels, an effect replicated in Experiment 1 for categorization of object pictures. To some, this pattern suggests a dual-process mechanism, in which objects first activate basic-level categories directly and later engage more general or specific categories through the spread of activation in a processing hierarchy. This account is, however, challenged by data from Experiment 2 showing that neuropsychological patients with impairments of conceptual knowledge categorize more accurately at superordinate levels than at the basic level—suggesting that knowledge about an object's general nature does not depend on prior basic-level categorization. The authors consider how a parallel distributed processing theory of conceptual knowledge can reconcile the apparent discrepancy. This theory predicts that if healthy individuals are encouraged to make rapid categorization responses, the usual basic > general advantage should also reverse, a prediction tested and confirmed in Experiment 3. Implications for theories of visual object recognition are discussed.
A tight temporal coupling between object detection (is an object there?) and object categorization (what kind of object is it?) has recently been reported (Grill-Spector & Kanwisher, 2005), suggesting that image segmentation into different objects and categorization of those objects at the basic level may be the very same mechanism. In the present work, we decoupled the time course of detection and categorization through two task manipulations. First, inverted objects were categorized significantly less accurately than upright objects across a range of image presentation durations, but no significant effect on object detection was observed. Second, systematically degrading stimuli affected categorization significantly more than object detection. The time course of object detection and object categorization can be selectively manipulated. They are not intrinsically linked. As soon as you know an object is there, you do not necessarily know what it is.
WHEN an object such as a chair is presented visually, or is represented by a line drawing, a spoken word, or a written word, the initial stages in the process leading to understanding are clearly different in each case. There is disagreement, however, about whether those early stages lead to a common abstract representation in memory, the idea of a chair1-4, or to two separate representations, one verbal (common to spoken and written words), and the other image-like5. The first view claims that words and images are associated with ideas, but the underlying representation of an idea is abstract. According to the second view, the verbal representation alone is directly associated with abstract information about an object (for example, its superordinate category: furniture). Concrete perceptual information (for example, characteristic shape, colour or size) is associated with the imaginal representation. Translation from one representation to the other takes time, on the second view, which accounts for the observation that naming a line drawing takes longer than naming (reading aloud) a written word6,7. Here we confirm that naming a drawing of an object takes much longer than reading its name, but we show that deciding whether the object is in a given category such as `furniture' takes slightly less time for a drawing than for a word, a result that seems to be inconsistent with the second view.
Subjects in five experiments read nine-digit memory lists from a cathode ray tube for immediate recall. Reading aloud always produced a localized and reliable advantage for the last item, compared to reading silently. Two experiments on whispered and mouthed lists, with or without simultaneous broadband noise, falsified expectations derived from the theory of precategorical acoustic storage. Three additional experiments showed no enhancement of recency in the silent conditions when the digits were drawn or spelled gradually on the screen, a result that is inconsistent with the changing-state hypothesis. The classic auditory-visual modality effect is large and reliable, but still poorly understood.
In order to identify an object sensory input must somehow access stored information. A series of results supports two general assertions about this process: First, objects are identified first at a particular level of abstraction which is neither the most general nor the most specific possible. Time to provide names more general than “entry point” names is predicted by the degree of association between the “entry point” concept and the required name, not by perceptual factors. In contrast, providing more specific names than that corresponding to the “entry point” concept does require more detailed perceptual analysis. Second, the particular entry point for a given object covaries with its typicality, which affects whether or not the object will be identified at the “basic” level. Atypical objects have their entry point at a level subordinate to the basic level. The generality and usefulness of the notion of “basic level” is discussed in the face of these results.
A new hypothesis about the role of focused attention is proposed. The feature-integration theory of attention suggests that attention must be directed serially to each stimulus in a display whenever conjunctions of more than one separable feature are needed to characterize or distinguish the possible objects presented. A number of predictions were tested in a variety of paradigms including visual search, texture segregation, identification and localization, and using both separable dimensions (shape and color) and local elements or parts of figures (lines, curves, etc. in letters) as the features to be integrated into complex wholes. The results were in general consistent with the hypothesis. They offer a new set of criteria for distinguishing separable from integral features and a new rationale for predicting which tasks will show attention limits and which will not.
The Psychophysics Toolbox is a software package that supports visual psychophysics. Its routines provide an interface between a high-level interpreted language (MATLAB on the Macintosh) and the video display hardware. A set of example programs is included with the Toolbox distribution.
What is the sequence of processing steps involved in visual object recognition? We varied the exposure duration of natural images and measured subjects' performance on three different tasks, each designed to tap a different candidate component process of object recognition. For each exposure duration, accuracy was lower and reaction time longer on a within-category identification task (e.g., distinguishing pigeons from other birds) than on a perceptual categorization task (e.g., birds vs. cars). However, strikingly, at each exposure duration, subjects performed just as quickly and accurately on the categorization task as they did on a task requiring only object detection: By the time subjects knew an image contained an object at all, they already knew its category. These findings place powerful constraints on theories of object recognition.
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