(PDF) The Rwandan Genocide: A Case Study

THE UNITED STATES NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT

CNC&S/NSC 2012 Contemporary Operations

Examination

The Rwandan Genocide: A Case Study

Eric J. Shaw

Joint Military Operations Department

May 2012

CONTENTS

A Note to the Reader.................................................................................................. viii

Introduction ................................................................................................................... 1

Rwandan Geography ..................................................................................................... 3

Origins of Hutus and Tutsis .......................................................................................... 3

The First Revolution ..................................................................................................... 8

Early Rwandan Politics ............................................................................................... 10

The Revolutionary Patriotic Front .............................................................................. 11

Party Proliferation ....................................................................................................... 16

The Media ................................................................................................................... 19

The Arusha Accords ................................................................................................... 21

Hutu Power ................................................................................................................. 23

The AMASASU ...................................................................................................... 23

The Akazu ................................................................................................................... 24

Le Clan de Madame ................................................................................................ 24

Enter the United Nations ............................................................................................. 26

UNAMIR CONOPS.................................................................................................... 28

Rules of Engagement .............................................................................................. 29

Other Problems in the United Nations ........................................................................ 31

NGOs ...................................................................................................................... 32

South of the Border ..................................................................................................... 34

Sliding Towards Chaos ............................................................................................... 35

Habyarimana‟s End ..................................................................................................... 38

End Game? .................................................................................................................. 41

Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 43

BIBLIOGRAPHY ....................................................................................................... 47

APPENDIX A Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of

Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front A-1

APPENDIX B Selected United Nations Security Council Resolutions B-1

APPENDIX C UN Charter Chapters VI and VII C-1

ILLUSTRATIONS

Figures

1. Map of the Great Lakes Region, Central Africa 5

2. Map of Rwanda 6

3. LGEN Romeo Dallaire 28

4. RPF-Held Territory as of 31 March 1994 29

5. Paul Kagame 45

Table

1. UNHCR Refugee Estimates 44

ABBREVIATIONS

BBTG Broad-Based Transitional Government. Called for in the Arusha Accords to

transition from the Habyarimana regime to a democratically elected government.

CDR Coalition pour la Defense de la Republique. Extremist Hutu splinter party off of

the MRND. Not part of the transitional government because of this stance.

Violently and openly anti-Tutsi.

CONOPS Concept of Operations

DPKO United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations

DPA United Nations Department of Political Affairs

DSP Zaire‟s President Mobutu Sese Seko‟s Division Speciale Presidentielle.

FAR Forces Armees Rwandaises, Rwanda military. Consists of the Rwandan Army,

Gendarmerie (National Police) and the Presidential Guard. Now more commonly

known as the Rwandan Government Forces (RGF).

FRONASA Uganda President Museveni‟s 1973 Front for National Salvation.

ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross

ICTR International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda

IDP Internally Displaced Persons

MRND Mouvement Reolutionnaire National pour le Developpement (National

Revolutionary Movement for Development). Was ruling party in Rwanda.

MRND(D) Mouvement Republicain pour le Democratie et le Developpement (National

Revolutionary Movement for Democracy and Development). Hutu extremist

party.

MDR Mouvement Democratique Republicain (Democratic Republican Movement).

Main opposition party to MRND. Party split, some participating in the genocide,

some victims of it.

NDC Conseil National du Developpment or the National Development Council.

Created by President Habyarimana, its purpose was to stimulate national

development

NEO Non-Combatant Evacuation Operation

NRA National Resistance Army. Ugandan insurgent force under the later Ugandan

President Musveni.

OAU Organization of African Unity

PDC Parti Democrate Chretien (Christian Democratic Party). A moderate party led by

Jean-Nepomucene Navinzira.

PDI Islamic Democratic Party

PL Liberal Party

PSD Parti Social Democrate (Social Democratic Party). Moderate, “the intellectuals‟

party.” Led by moderate Hutus, Frederic Nzamurambaho, Felicien Gatabazi, and

Theoneste Gafarange. Based largely in Butare.

RGF Rwandan Government Forces. Consists of the Rwandan Army, Gendarmerie

(National Police) and the Presidential Guard. Also Forces Armees Rwandaises

(FAR).

ROE Rules of Engagement

RPF Rwandan Patriotic Front

RRWF Rwandese Refugee Welfare Foundation

RTLMC Radio Television Libre des Mille Collines. Extremist pro-Hutu radio station.

Also abbreviated as RTLM.

SRSG Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General.

UNAMIR United Nations Assistance For Rwanda

UNAR Union Nationale Rwandese. Early Tutsi extreme party.

UNCIVPOL United Nations police unit

UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNOMUR United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda

UNSC United Nations Security Council

UPR Union du Peuple Rwandais. One of the first alternate parties created. Formed in

exile in Brussels by Silas Majyambere.

A Note to the Reader

This monograph includes three appendices containing the Arusha Accords, selected

United Nations Security Council Resolutions, and selected chapters of the United Nations

charter. These are provided to the reader for later research and reference. They are not required

for the successful completion of the contemporary operations examination nor are they expected

to have been read for it. All material required for the examination is contained within the main

text.

1

Introduction

Add 6 April 1994 to dates that live in infamy. On that day an aircraft carrying the

presidents of Rwanda and Burundi crashed on its approach to Kigali airport. Most observers

came to the consensus that the aircraft was shot down by one, or more likely, two surface-to-air

missiles. There is no agreement as to who did this. Both major belligerents, the Rwandan

Patriotic Front (RPF) and the Rwandan Government Forces (RGF), had plausible reasons for

wanting Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana dead. Regardless of why he was killed,

Habyarimana‟s death unleashed a new wave of murder in a country that already had seen

repeated massacres that quickly descended into genocide.

Most readers will be aware of Rwanda‟s 1994 genocide. Most will remember that it

involved Hutus and Tutsis. Who killed who and for what reasons may be harder to recall. By

most estimates, over 800,000 Rwandans were murdered and many more times over were

displaced or became refugees outside of the country.

1

Only the 1970s killings in Cambodia and

the 1971 Genocide in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) saw a greater level of genocide. Taken as

a percentage of population, however, the Rwanda genocide easily surpasses East Pakistan‟s,

leaving it second only to the Cambodian genocide.

2

Like most complex humanitarian disasters the Rwandan genocide had many pressures

that created a flashpoint. These included over-population, pre-existing conflict between factions,

economic stagnation, ecological decay, and more general regional conflict. In 1994, Rwanda was

1

Credible estimates still range from between 500,000 to over one million people killed.

2

Jared Diamond. Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed (New York: Viking, 2005), 313.

the most densely populated country in Africa. The two major factions, Hutus and Tutsis, had a

historical enmity that dated back to the colonial period and before. Until the late 1980s, coffee

prices were controlled by a quota system, much as oil prices can be dictated by OPEC today. In

1989, financial emergencies in many coffee-growing countries caused an abandonment of the

system and the dumping of coffee on the world market, leading to a collapse of coffee prices.

3

Rwanda, which enjoys some of the best coffee-growing conditions—volcanic soil, light and

regular rains, and high altitudes—was severely affected, cutting earnings in half. Population and

agricultural pressures produced severe erosion, over-taxing of arable land, deforestation, and

other ecological problems. Exasperating the short-term economic situation were International

Monetary Fund-imposed measures and a collapse of the tin market, a main Rwandan export. As

will be explored below, Rwanda was also nearly surrounded by neighboring states that had their

own conflicts or were for their own reasons willing to support those in Rwanda.

Any one or even all of these pressures do not, however, explain the planned, organized,

systemically conducted, and widespread atrocities Rwanda experienced. For Rwandans the

proximate cause was a hard line subset of the ruling class that saw genocide as the way to protect

leadership roles in the government. Political theorist Hannah Arendt wrote of the banality of

evil. Her thesis was that the great atrocities in history were not conducted by megalomaniacs or

sociopaths but instead by ordinary people. Her ideas apply in many ways to Rwanda where

much of the genocide was carried out by loosely formed militias or the general population.

3

Akiyama Takamasa, “Coffee Market Liberalization since 1990.” In Commodity Market Reforms: Lessons

of Two Decades, Donald F. Larson, Takamasa Akiyama, Panos Varangis, and John Baffes, eds. (New York: World

Bank, 2001), 86.

Nonetheless, these “Power Factions” purposefully provoked and deliberately motivated the hate

that propelled the genocide. There was nothing banal about their motivation or actions.

Rwandan Geography

Rwanda sits in central Africa and the Great Lakes region (See Figure 1). It is land-

locked with Lake Kivu on its northwest border. Elevation generally slopes down from the

highland Virunga Mountains towards the southeast. The terrain is mostly grassy uplands and

hills. Most Rwandan observers comment on its undulating topography made up of small hills,

most topped by a village. It is a rich and verdant land that were it not for overgrazing, over-

cultivation, and over-population would be nearly idyllic. The country enjoys two rainy seasons

in February and April and while its climate is for the most part mild, frost and snow are possible

in the mountains.

Rwanda borders four other countries (See Figure 2). In the north is Uganda. To the

east is the United Republic of Tanzania. To the south is Burundi. On the west Rwanda borders

what is now known as the Democratic Republic of the Congo. During the period covered by this

case study it was known as Zaire and will be referred to as such here. While Tanzania played an

important role in attempting to arrange a peace agreement before the atrocities and to have a

positive effect on Rwanda, each of the three other neighboring countries were deeply and

negatively involved in Rwanda‟s situation.

Origins of Hutus and Tutsis

Seeds for the genocide can be traced to the Berlin Conference of 1885. Hosted by Otto

von Bismarck, it sought to resolve conflicting European claims to African territory for colonies.

Germany left the conference table with German East Africa, which in 1899 absorbed Rwanda.

Today German East Africa would encompass the states of Rwanda and Burundi. It should be

noted that while many of the colonies in central Africa were artificial states created by the

colonial powers, this was not true of both Rwanda and Burundi. Both were kingdoms dating

back several hundred years before being claimed by European powers. After World War I

German holdings in Africa were split between the United Kingdom and Belgium, later becoming

UN mandates. Rwanda became a colony of Belgium. Both the U.K. and Belgium were aloof

colonialists, interested more in what could be extracted from their respective states than ruling

them. Belgian indirect rule left much of the administration of the state to extant institutions and

people.

4

This meant keeping in place the minority rule of the Tutsis who made up about fourteen

percent of the population. Their domination of the majority Hutus was further reinforced when

at the Belgians‟ request Tutsis served as overseers of Hutu forced laborers on Belgian projects.

This domination continued up to 1959.

How did the minority Tutsis come to be in charge during the colonial era? An answer

requires exploration of the history of both Tutsis and Hutus. There are two competing versions

of this history circulating today. The first version, favored by the Hutus, claims that ethnic

differences existed before the colonists‟ arrival. The other version supporting the government‟s

desire for national unity, states ethnic differences did not exist.

Most historians and anthropologists believe today that the predecessors of Hutus and

Tutsis began to populate the region over a period of approximately 2,000 years.

4

Stephen Metz, “Disaster and Intervention in Sub-Saharan Africa: Learning from Rwanda (Carlisle

Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute), 1994.

Figure 1. African Great Lakes Region

Figure 2. Rwanda

These people came to share a common language, Kinyarwanda, which is the principle language

in Rwanda today.

5

They also shared common religious beliefs and culture.

As today, most of these people were cultivators. While they may have had small

livestock or even a cow or two, they were principally farmers. A smaller group, the pastoralists,

looked down on farming and relied upon large herds of cattle for their sustenance. This created a

tension over land use between the two groups. Readers are excused if American Western movies

with plots featuring conflict between farmers or sheepherders and ranchers come to mind.

By the time Rwanda emerged as a major state in the 1700s, rulers measured their might

by the number of cattle they owned. Pastoralists were in charge. Yet, in the following century,

cultivators, who were more adept at the conduct of war and able to mobilize large numbers of

forces, rose to lead the state. By the end of the nineteenth century both sources of power—cattle

and military capability—became consolidated in one group, the Tutsis.

The term, “Tutsi” apparently originally meant one who was rich in cattle. It came to refer

to the elites as a whole. “Hutu” originally meant “subordinate.” It later evolved into meaning

both subordinate and one who follows a powerful person. By the time the first Europeans

established their colonial rule around the beginning of the twentieth century Tutsi pastoralists

were identified as the power-holders and the Hutu cultivators as their subjects.

Over generations the striation of the culture between the elites and subordinates meant

most married from within their own cultural position. Because of this, today there remain

general physical differences between the aggregate Tutsi and Hutu. Tutsis have been described

as being generally taller, thinner, and more narrowly featured. Hutus are described as being

5

French and English are also official languages. Additionally, Kiswahili (Swahili) is prevalent in

commercial centers.

shorter, stronger, and with broader features. Unusual but not unheard of, intermarriage did

happen. This became rarer under colonial rule and into the twentieth century, but became more

common after the overthrow of Tutsis in the 1959 revolution. The increase in mixed marriages in

recent decades means the physical lines between Hutu and Tutsi have blurred. During the

genocide Hutus were murdered because they appeared to be Tutsi.

While there still remains some debate as to whether the Hutu and Tutsi differentiation is

one of race, ethnicity, culture, or one of caste, there is a third part of the population of Rwanda

that is clearly ethnically distinct, the Twa. The Twa make up about one percent of the Rwandan

population. Often described as a pygmy group, the Twa are smaller in size and were originally

hunter/gatherers from the forested region. In the last half of the twentieth century they began to

move closer to the Hutu and Tutsi populations, serving as laborers and servants. The more

flexible social boundaries between Hutu and Tutsi did not extend to the Twa and they remain a

small and distinct minority. Twa were for the most part neither party to nor victims of the

genocide and so will not receive further attention in this study.

The First Revolution

The Tutsi remained in charge under the aegis of the Belgian colonial administration up to

the 1950s. Under pressure from the United Nations which served as a trustee supervising the

administration of Rwanda, Belgium began its withdrawal. Part of the pressure imposed by the

United Nations was for Belgium to include more of the majority Hutus in responsible positions

within the government. Belgian overseers did so and also began to admit more Hutus into the

secondary school system. Incremental though they were, the changes made were enough to

alarm the Tutsis while at the same time being seen by the Hutus as too small to be acceptable.

As independence neared, Tutsis became more fearful of the possibility of the imposition of

majority rule and sought to remove the Belgians before its imposition. On the other hand,

hardline Hutus hoped to gain control of the political system before independence was

established. Amidst the polarizing partisans there were also moderates from both sides who

hoped to establish a combined Hutu-Tutsi government. They, however, lost ground to the more

radical political branches of the respective groups. For the Hutus this was the Parti du movement

de l’emancipation des Bahutu, known as the Parmehutu. On the Tutsi side the extreme party was

the Union Nationale Rwandese, or UNAR. Hopes for gain by the moderate causes were dashed

when in November 1959 several Tutsis assaulted a low-level Hutu official. Hutu groups

attacked Tutsi officials and the Tutsis responded with escalating violence against Hutus. Before

the Belgian administration could restore order, several hundred people had been killed. The

Belgians reacted to the incident by replacing Tutsis with Hutus in close to half of the local

administrations. With these new Hutu administrators the Parmehutu easily won the first

elections held in 1960 and 1961. This is what came to be known as the 1959 “Hutu Revolution.”

Used for propaganda purposes, this incident was conflated by Hutus throughout the lead up to

and during the genocide. It subsequently became a myth whose centrality was the danger

inherent in the Tutsi population. Another component of this myth was the natural superiority of

the Hutu that led to their rise to power through the electoral process.

During this “Hutu Revolution” thousands of Tutsis were killed and more than 150,000

were driven out of the country over the next several years. Those who fled the country were

driven into exile in neighboring countries. Most fled to Uganda and Zaire. By 1964, estimates

held that up to 70 percent of all Rwandan Tutsis were refugees. These displaced Tutsis often

fought back from refugee positions outside the borders and into Rwanda. Hutus responded

forcefully and later used these attacks to continue to promote the idea that the Hutu Revolution

had been a long and protracted fight that had earned the Hutu leadership their place at the top of

the political pyramid. The Tutsi population continued to decline within the borders of Rwanda,

either through their murder, flight, or finding ways to re-identify themselves as Hutu. In 1952,

Tutsis made up 17.5 percent of the population. By 1991 that had decreased to 8.4 percent.

Early Rwandan Politics

The emergence of the dominant Parmehutu party was not without contestation. Over

time, its leaders were able to eliminate Hutu rivals and create what was for all intents and

purposes a single party state. Yet, the Parmehutu leadership that was based in the south had not

fully repressed the Hutu northern opposition. The split between northern and southern Hutus

grew and the result was formation of “Public Safety Committees” and other like organizations.

Both the northern and southern Hutu groups used Tutsi intimidation as a demonstration of their

power and right to govern. At the same time each Hutu side charged the other with violence

against Tutsis. These would become the seeds for politically-aligned militias that would become

the instruments of the genocide.

July 1973 saw a bloodless coup d’état place the senior Army officer, General Juvenal

Habyarimana, in charge of the Rwandan government. Two years later Habyarimana declared

Rwanda officially a single party state under the Movement Revolutionnaire National pour le

Developpement (MRND). The MRND under Habyarimana‟s leadership was soon able to cement

its (and his) grip over the entire country for nearly twenty years. Generally, this was a period of

relative stability and one of at least marginal safety for the Tutsi population.

Over time, recognition of failed economic policies and continually mounting levels of

corruption within the government fueled resistance to MRND rule. Calls for a multi-party

system reflected the demand for political reform throughout much of Africa. By July of 1990

Habyarimana was willing to discuss change. In September, a group of leaders from civil society,

intellectuals, and other representatives proposed the return to a multi-party system. Habyarimana

agreed to establish a commission to examine political reform. As the political picture just began

to hint at a brighter future, Rwanda was attacked by the Revolutionary Patriotic Front.

The Revolutionary Patriotic Front

With the majority of the Tutsi population no longer present, Hutu factions turned against

one another. Northern Hutus believed the central government favored southern factions. Each

side of the Hutu fight blamed the other as having been influenced by the Tutsis. This came to a

head in 1973 in the form of violence in Burundi where there was a massive slaughter of Hutu by

the minority Tutsi government there.

6

This served to cement fear of the possibility of Tutsi

violence within Rwanda and was leveraged by the Rwandan Hutus as a propaganda tool against

any Tutsis remaining within its borders.

With the exception of Tanzania, where Rwandan refugees were encouraged to assimilate,

the Tutsi Diaspora faced nearly continuous pressure from their “host” nations to return to

Rwanda. At the same time refugees were repelled from doing so by the Hutu-dominated

government within Rwanda. For example, in 1982 Uganda attempted to expel thousands of

Rwandan refugees back into Rwanda only to have them rejected and return a short time later.

The overall pattern was a net loss of Tutsis from within Rwandan borders. By the end of the

1980‟s estimates hold that approximately 600,000 Tutsi Rwandans lived outside the country.

In 1986, the Rwandan government declared the country too overpopulated to accept the

return of Tutsi refugees. During a series of meetings in Washington, D.C. to discuss this in the

late 1980‟s to July 1990, including the formation of a Rwandan commission on the matter, some

progress seemed to be made. Any perceived progress, however, wasn‟t fast enough for the

6

Organization of African Unity. “International Panel of Eminent Personalities to Investigate the 1994

Genocide in Rwanda and the Surrounding Events” Art. 3.21, accessed 01 August 2000, http://www.oau-

oua.org/Document/ipep/ipep.htm.

Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). This force of between 7,000 and 10,000 fighters was primarily

comprised of the children of Rwandan refugees who had grown up inside Uganda. Many of the

RPF senior leadership had not been in Rwanda since their infancy. Members of the RPF grew up

with the constant reminder that Rwanda was their homeland and their return had been a long held

dream. While in Uganda many RPF members gained military experience as well as political

support from the Ugandan government under its president, Yoweri Museveni. This doesn‟t

come as a surprise given that Museveni himself was a product of Rwandan rejection and cross-

border migration. A Tutsi, Museveni achieved the presidency in 1986 amidst Uganda‟s own

internal conflicts with the help of several thousand Tutsi Rwandan guerrillas. These later

assumed key roles within Museveni‟s National Resistance Army (NRA) and later the Ugandan

armed forces. Among these insurgents at the beginning of Museveni‟s efforts in 1981 was the

future leader of the RPF, Paul Kagame, who had been the deputy head of intelligence for the

NRA.

Over the previous ten years the Rwandan return effort had matured through several steps.

In 1979, the Rwandan refugees in Uganda formed the Rwandese Refugee Welfare Foundation

(RRWF) to aid political repression victims within Uganda after the fall of Idi Amin. The next

year the RRWF became the Rwandese Alliance for National Unity (RANU) and in the

conversion became more militant in its cause of a return to Rwanda. Between 1981 and 1986

RANU served in a more or less dormant state exiled in Nairobi, Kenya. By the end of 1987 it

had reinvigorated itself and morphed into the Rwandese Patriotic Front dedicated to the use of

force, if required, to return exiles to Rwanda.

It should again be noted that Juvenal Habyarimana did attempt some level of reform after

he became president of Rwanda. During the twenty years of his regime, the Hutu-Tutsi conflict

was generally calm, the administration of the government relatively even-handed, and in

comparison to several of its neighbors, competent. Habyarimana attempted to portray an almost

apolitical approach to governance. While clearly marginalized, Tutsi citizens were at least

generally not antagonized during the early part of this period. Nonetheless, as an example of the

lingering marginalization, below the federal government representatives in regional and local

politics, the regional sous-prefets and prefets de prefectures (leaders of prefectures) and local

bourgmestres (burgomeisters, “town mayor,” or local government official) were entirely Hutu.

There was not a single Tutsi representative. In addition to the government, the Catholic Church

also played a stabilizing if not biased role. Considered a strong supporter of the Habyarimana

regime, there was little if no semblance of a separation of church and state. Although 60 percent

of Rwandans were Catholic and the majority of the clergy in Rwanda were Tutsi, seven of the

nine Rwandan bishops were Hutu at the start of the genocide. The archbishop of Kigali, the

capital, was Monsignor Vincent Nsengiyumva. A northern Hutu, Nsengiyumva was a confidant

of Habyarimana, the personal confessor of his wife, Agathe (more of whom will be discussed

below), and a member of the central committee of the MRND. His role in the committee did

however come to an end in 1989 when pressure from the Vatican forced his resignation.

7

This followed the past pattern of Catholic involvement with the ruling Rwandan

governments. It and many other Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) succumbed to the

myth that those in power, be it Tutsi or Hutu, were somehow aristocratic and benevolent

overseers of the rural population. Harkening back through several generations, this also played

on a natural proclivity in Rwandan society for and willingness to be part of an ordered society

regardless of ethnic makeup or who was in charge. This made Rwanda an attractive repository

for international aid. Nations appreciated a struggling nation that while poor enjoyed low crime

rates, a hard-working peasantry, and a thankful response to external assistance. In a region that

suffered extreme abuses, Rwanda at least on the surface looked to be worthy of assistance.

Belgium was the leading contributor but was closely followed by Germany, the United States,

7

OAU Eminent Personalities, Art. 4.14.

Canada, and Switzerland.

8

With falling coffee, tea, and tin revenue, the country became

increasingly dependent on this aid.

Here one should note that during the Habyarimana regime France gradually supplanted

Belgium as the leading contributor to Rwanda, and particularly to its military. As a Francophone

nation, Rwanda was seen by France as naturally falling within its sphere of influence in Africa.

In The Rwanda Crisis, Gerard Prunier cites France‟s perception of Africa as the battleground for

Francophones verses Anglophones. This modern, African-based “Great Game” was another

driver for this crisis.

9

France‟s increasing involvement in the Rwandan situation lends credence

to this theory.

At the same time there was growing discord at the federal level among the Hutus.

Moderate members of the government were becoming further marginalized in the face of

growing factions of hard-line “Hutu Power” parties (see below). Habyarimana continued with

his attempts to de-politicize and moderate the federal government. This slowed the

representational process. It was eight years into his regime that he formed a parliament of sorts.

November, 1981 saw the creation of what was called the Conseil National du Developpment or

the National Development Council (NDC). With the singular purpose of national development

and under the control of Habyarimana, the NDC considered politics a wasteful sideline

enterprise. In 1983 and then again in 1988 Habyarimana, as the single candidate from the

MRND and under the aegis of the NDC, was re-elected president with over 99 percent of the

vote.

8

Gerard Prunier. The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide (London: C. Hurst & Co. (Publishers) Ltd.,

1995), 81.

9

According to Gerard Prunier, President Habyarimana “held a major trump card—the French fear of an

„Anglo-Saxon‟ erosion of their position on the African continent . . .” Prunier, 99. Like the U.S. Monroe Doctrine,

the French had for Africa what it called a policy of le pre carre, “our own back yard.” One should also note here

that the RPF was an English speaking force.

By the end of the 1980‟s the pressures both external and internal cited earlier—the

collapse of the global coffee market, overpopulation, soil erosion and deforestation, etc.—took

hold and precipitated a new chapter in the conflict. On 01 October 1990 an RPF force of

approximately 10,000 troops crossed the border from Uganda into Rwanda.

10

This force was

repelled by the Rwandese military, the Forces Armees Rwandaises (FAR), with active support of

military forces from France, Belgium, and Zaire. The French government also quickly came to

lead the support to the FAR.

11

When French President Francois Mitterrand heard of the invasion

he ordered French troops to support the FAR and on 04 October 150 personnel of the French

2eme Regiment Etranger Parachutiste left their barracks in the Central African Republic and

flew to Kigali where they took positions around its airport. This force would in the next several

days swell to 600. Quickly following were 400 Belgium paratroopers, arriving directly from

Brussels. Looking to ingratiate himself with these two prior colonial powers, Zaire‟s President

Mobutu Sese Seko sent in his elite Division Speciale Presidentielle (DSP). On the second day of

fighting, the RPF‟s leader, Fred Rwigyema [who with Paul Kagame hailed from Museveni‟s

1973 Front for National Salvation (FRONASA), and its time as an exile organization based in

Tanzania] was killed by a sniper.

12

Kagame was immediately recalled from the United States where he was studying at the

U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Upon returning to

Rwanda, Kagame found confusion amongst the RPF. Initially retreating from Rwanda back

10

The official name of the military branch of the RPF was the Rwandese Patriotic Army (RPA). Despite

this differentiation early in the activities of the RPF/RPA, contemporary actors and following commentators used

RPF for both the political and the military organizations. This convention will hold here.

11

FAR is today more commonly referred to as the RGF. See the glossary on both entries.

12

Or not. Long steeped in secrecy, many believe Rwigyema was killed by his own chief of staff, Major

Banyingana. Banyingana favored a lightning strike into Kigali while Rwigyema‟s plan was for a more conservative

approach employing guerrilla tactics to erode the Habyarimana regime. More likely is that he was the victim of not a

sniper‟s bullet but a lucky shot. This version has Rwigyema observing the fleeing Rwandan government forces

when a retreating soldier turned and killed him with a single shot. Regardless, Rwigyema was the only casualty that

day.

towards the Ugandan border, the RPF soon found itself routed by the FAR. By 30 October the

government in Kigali could rightfully declare the conflict over. Kagame had a different

perception. For the ex-Marxist, this instead marked the beginning of a protracted struggle

against the Hutu regime.

Party Proliferation

Although temporarily defeated, the RPF‟s incursion into Rwanda started a political

firestorm in Kigali. Hardliners within the MRND called President Habyarimana soft on the RPF

and worse, denounced any Hutus with democratic leanings as accomplices to the RPF

specifically and to the Tutsis in general. This was at a time when Habyarimana had already

announced his desire to expand the political landscape within Rwanda and open the possibility

for a multi-party government. The first to sprout in the aftermath of the RPF incursion was the

Union du Peuple Rwandais (UPR). Formed in exile in Brussels, it was led by Silas Majyambere

who had been both an ally of Habyarimana and also had some involvement with the RPF. This

party, while an opening salvo against the regime, was short-lived.

Soon after a more important opposition group formed, the Mouvement Democratique

Republicain (MDR). This party directly evolved from the old Parmehutu. Recall that this was

the extremist anti-Tutsi organization that actively persecuted Tutsis between 1959 and 1961. In

an attempt at that time to soften its image it had tagged MDR (at that time standing for

“Mouvement Democratique Rwandais”) to its name to become MDR-Parmehutu. Despite the

attempted new image, the MDR-Parmehutu was outlawed in 1973 with the rise to power of

Habyarimana. The “MDR” link between the old party and this new one was both deliberate and

pointed. The new MDR came to stand for a virulent anti-Tutsi stance.

In response a third, more moderate party, the Parti Social Democrate (PSD) was created

from within a more liberal Rwandan prefecture, Butare. It was this region known in the colonial

period as Astrida that was the seat of Belgian power. The PSD tried to position itself with the

professional class as a slightly left of center party.

A counter to the PSD on the center-right was another newly-formed party, the Parti

Liberal (PL). Urban and designed to appeal to the business community, the PL included within

its ranks many well-off Tutsi as well as members of the Hutu whose claim to that ethnic status

might be called to question either by being a child of Hutu/Tutsi intermarriage or having married

a Tutsi.

Lastly, a fourth party emerged by the spring of 1991. This was the Parti Democrate-

Chretian (PDC). As it name indicates, this was a democratic Christian party. It was stymied in

its formation by the supportive nature of the relationship between the Catholic Church and the

Habyarimana government. While the Catholic Church by this time was no longer completely

supportive of the Habyarimana regime, it still traded a more general approval in exchange for a

free hand in its social and financial activities. Forming an opposition group like the PDC in the

face of this fairly cooperative atmosphere between the Catholic Church and the government was

difficult. Nonetheless, the PDC sought to be counted when in April 1991 the MRND voted to

accommodate these new parties in accordance with Habyarimana‟s stated goal of a multi-party

Rwandan governmental system. In response to the new political landscape, the MRND changed

its name to the Mouvement Revolutionnaire National pour le Developpement et la Democratie to

become the MRND(D).

After this, eleven other minor parties known as “The Eleven Pygmies” also formed but

would not play any major role in Rwandan politics until early 1993 when Habyarimana would

use them in an attempt to block ongoing peace initiatives.

The eleventh party to form, this one in early 1992, bears scrutiny. The Coalition pour la

Defense de la Republique (CDR) positioned itself to the far right of the MRND(D) and was

headed by leaders that represented the most extreme of the Hutu Power factions.

What followed in the intervening years between this political landscape and the attempt

to reach peace through what would come to be known as the Arusha Accords was a fitful attempt

to re-organize Rwandan central government into a parliamentary-style approach with

representation from the major factions or parties. There were two systemic impediments to this.

The first was the strong resistance from those in power to its sharing with anyone else. The

second was a self-serving attempt on the part of opposition members to capture that power for

themselves and their own purposes.

Against a backdrop of political “reform” there was a continuation of a limited civil war.

While the RPF had returned to Ugandan soil, it continued a series of hit-and-run attacks from

across the border. These were usually met handily by FAR forces with French support. Further,

against this was a series of what would in comparison to the 1994 events be smaller scale

massacres of Tutsis. Most of these seemed to be carried out by the local peasantry under the

orchestration of local authorities. These attacks on Tutsi populations, while locally conducted,

seemed to have been called for and coordinated from within the Rwandan Department of the

Interior or the cognizant prefet. Orders would come from above to organize an umuganda

(“work session”) and the bourgmestre in charge would begin to speak of a “bush clearing.”

13

This language would later be used more virulently during the genocide. An example is provided

below.

The combination of political pressures from the new parties and the need to somehow

control the massacres, the response to which were quickly spinning out to include terrorist

attacks within Kigali, meant that President Habyarimana had to accept a compromise. On 14

March 1992 he did so by signing an agreement to share power in the parliament. The largest

opposition party, the MDR, would gain the premiership. A genuine coalition cabinet would be

appointed. And, most importantly, peace negotiations with the RPF would commence.

13

Prunier, 138.

The Media

Along with the proliferation of parties, one of the most important outcomes of this

power-play was the multiplication of media outlets. Nearly every party created its own print

organ. For the MRND(D) it was Kamarampaka. A more strident newspaper representing

MRND(D) views was Interahamwe. The title came from the Kinyarwanda word meaning “those

who work together.” It would later become the term for the brutal quasi-military arm of the

MRND(D) that featured prominently in the genocide. Representing, or at least favorable to, the

positions of the MDR were Le Nation and Isobo (“Forward” in Kinyarwandan). Kingura

(“Wake him up!”) was the mouthpiece for the CDR, and as could be expected, was the most anti-

Tutsi of these periodicals.

Above and beyond any influence these print sources may have had was that of radio. In a

country where over 60 percent of the population could not read, one cannot over-emphasize the

power radio represented. Of the few radio stations broadcasting within Rwanda, none had a

greater role in the atrocities than Radio Television Libre des Mille Collines (RTLMC). As the

national government attempted to stagger towards democratic, multi-party processes the

Habyarimana-headed government had enjoyed a near monopoly on the story delivered to its

citizenry. One of Habyarimana‟s liberalization moves was to free RTLMC and its extremist

broadcasts from government control. It came to be controlled instead by journalists that drew

directly from the CDR; this “independent” station would serve to coordinate and goad on the

atrocities at the core of the 1994 Genocide. Equally culpable in this was the government-run

radio station Radio Rwanda. While there may on the surface seem to be no connection between

these two, both were in fact the instruments of the Akuza, a shadow government within the

government described in more detail below. Local, regional, and national authorities all

encouraged the population to listen to these broadcasts in order to understand “what was

expected of them.” What was expected of them was the targeting of Tutsis for eradication. Using

agricultural terms as euphemisms understood by all, the message was clearly transmitted. As an

example, one prefect leader broadcasted

. . . we ask that people do patrols, as they are used to doing, in their neighborhoods. They

must close ranks, remember how to use their usual tools [weapons] and defend

themselves . . . I would ask that each neighborhood try to organize itself to do communal

work [umuganda] to clear the brush, to search houses, beginning with those that are

abandoned, to search the marshes of the area to be sure that no inyenzi [cockroaches]

have slipped in to hide themselves there . . . so they should cut this brush, search the

drains and ditches . . . put up barriers and guard them, chosing [sic] reliable people to do

this, who have what they need . . .so that nothing can escape them.

14

“Tools” were for the most part machetes, easily available, usable, and effective. “Brush”

widely referred to the Tutsis as did “inyenzi.”

Despite all this activity within Rwanda, both negative in the form of the “limited”

massacres and positive in the attempts to liberalize and democratize the national government,

little was conveyed by the media to the world beyond Africa. Only one television news story

was carried before the beginning of the genocide, that by CNN. It wasn‟t until 24 April 1994—

almost two weeks after the most egregious atrocities started—that the first use of the term

“genocide” was made in regard to what was happening in Rwanda. This was reported by the

Non-Governmental Organization (NGO), Oxfam, which was in Rwanda doing relief work.

Genocide is a politically-charged phrase. The first article in the UN Convention on the

Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide requires all signatories to prevent and

punish genocide. This responsibility may explain the reluctance to invoke the term.

15

14

Alison Desforges. Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda (New York: Human Rights Watch,

1999), 191.

15

UN General Assembly Resolution 260 (III) of 9 December 1948.

The Arusha Accords

Along with everything else going on the country, Paul Kagame was having greater

success at the head of the RPF. Having inherited a disorganized and defeated force, Kagame

quickly turned it into one of the most capable forces in the region. Further, under his leadership

its rank and file became one of the most literate, as well. The RPF by 1993 was as capable a

fighting force as had been seen in the region. When compared to the Rwandan army forces, the

RPF looked even better. Plagued with low morale and discipline, corruption in the officer corps,

poor training, lack of pay, and other systemic issues within its ranks the RGF increasingly looked

less a match against the RPF. In the field the comparison bore true. Along with the new

professionalism came greater successes with each RPF foray into Rwandan territory. In

February 1993, Kagame and the RPF were able to launch an attack on the capital that nearly

achieved its capture. This demonstrated threat brought both the Rwandan government and the

RPF to the negotiation table. The result was the Arusha Accords that sought to demobilize both

the FAR and the RPF, continue moving Rwanda towards a multi-party democracy, and

reintegrate Tutsi refugees back into the mainstream of Rwanda. The immediate result was a

cease fire.

Negotiations had been ongoing for the previous year, but without an earnest effort on the

part of both parties. The RPF had been experiencing significant successes but now found itself

stretched thinly across its front and susceptible particularly to French counter-attack. For the

FAR, President Habyraimana had employed his own delaying maneuvers to avoid coming to

terms with the RPF. He, however, faced the pressure from France of its withdrawal of military

and diplomatic support. Even the most outspoken supporters of the FAR within the French

military were rattled at the success the RPF enjoyed in its thrust towards Kigali. By late July

most donor nations, France included and in concert with the World Bank, threatened cessation of

funding of the Habyarimana government without a signed treaty. The deadline given for this

was 09 August 1993.

This would become the first negotiated peace settlement under the auspices of the

Organization of African Unity (OAU). Tanzania offered its services as the lead facilitator and

France, Belgium, the United States, Germany, Senegal, Burundi, Uganda, and Zaire were

represented. The United Nations sent observers towards the end of the sessions. These parties

all promised to aid in the implementation of the peace treaty through a UN peacekeeping force.

The Accords covered a complex array of negotiated topics through a series of

agreements. It incorporated a cease-fire agreement (The N‟sele Ceasefire Agreement of 29

March 1991 and amended in Gbadolite that September). A Broad-Based Transitional

Government (BBTG) would be formed that would allow power sharing amongst the declared

parties, and primarily across three groups: the Habyarimana inner circle, the RPF, and a shared

block among the MDR, PSD, PL, and PDC parties. While Habyarimana would retain the

presidency, he would be stripped of most of his powers which would be ceded to a Council of

Ministers. Within that Council his MRND(D) would only hold five of the 21 seats rather than

the nine it held before. The RPF would gain five seats. More importantly, the RPF would have

the right to appoint a vice prime minister, a post newly created by the Accords. The MDR (4

portfolios), PL (3 portfolios), PSD (3 portfolios), and PDC (1 portfolio) would appoint the head

of eleven of the ministries. The MDR would select the prime minister. In a Transitional

National Assembly seats were distributed in a similar manner. The MRND, the RPF, the MDR,

the PSD, and the PL each had eleven seats. The PDC gained four seats. The eleven minor

parties—“The Eleven Pygmies”—would each get one seat.

To reintegrate the military, the Rwandan government would provide 60 percent of the

troops. However, it would have to split command of posts evenly with the RPF down to the

battalion level. The Rwandan army had at the time approximately 30,000 soldiers and the

national police (the Gendarmerie) added a force of another 20,000; the RPF also made up about

20,000 additional troops. The Arusha Accords called for a total force size for the Rwandan

Army of no more than 19,000 in the Army with another 6,000 in the national police. Both sides

would therefore necessarily face the demobilization of a minimum of half their military.

Lastly, the Accords included a protocol on the repatriation of refugees.

Hutu Power

Taken together, the gains made by the RPF within the Arusha agreement and doubts

concerning overall RPF objectives led to consolidation of what had been hardcore anti-Tutsi

factions among many of the Rwanda political parties. Elements that joined in the Hutu Power

movement came from within the MDR, MRND(D) and CDR, as well as Hutu members of the

PL.

This was in large part a result of efforts by Habyarimana. By splintering the major

parties opposing him and creating a new force in Hutu Power he achieved his objective of

limiting the importance of party politics. He also opened the possibility of his regaining some of

the power he was to lose within the Arusha Accords if he were able to place himself at the head

of this new movement. In order to gain control of the Power faction he had to both stand up to

the RPF as well as attack and annihilate their supporters, the Tutsi population.

The AMASASU

To aid in the accomplishment of his first objective, the Habyarimana government allowed

the formation of what was ostensibly a supplementary defense force against the RPF,

AMASASU. The acronym came from the quasi-military force‟s full title, “Alliance des

Militaires Agaces par les Seculaires Actes Sournois or the Alliance of Soldiers Provoked by the

Age-Old Deceitful Acts of the Unarists. While touted as a “popular” or “civilian” self-defense

force, AMASUSU served no other early purpose than to antagonize the Tutsi population. Led by

retired military officers, they were among the most active members participants in the killing of

Tutsis during the genocide.

The Akazu

One would be well tempted to ask how could such an organization such as the

AMASUSU could not only be allowed to form but to do so under the direction of the central

government. The answer lies in the existence of a shadow power structure within the

government. The Akazu was led by President Habyraimana and his wife, Agathe. It was an

informal organization of Hutu extremists positioned throughout the Rwandan government. Tied

to the Habyarimanas through tribal or at least geographic links, the Akazu members were

systematically placed in key positions throughout the government, as well as within military

leadership positions. Members included several cabinet ministers, the army chief of staff, the

heads of many of the political parties, as well as external leaders like prominent businessmen,

including the owners of critical enterprises like public radio. While the public face President

Habyarimana presented was one of moderation, including declared support for the Arusha

Accords, this was solely in support of his political survival. Behind this façade Habyarimana

and his wife were co-founders of an informal organization that planned, initiated, and directed

the genocide.

Le Clan de Madame

The Akazu was the natural development from another even more informal network.

Known as “Le Clan de Madame” it was as its name suggests centered on Agathe Habyarimana

and her family along with their close associates.

16

The main participants in the group were three

of her brothers, a cousin, and two other close associates. In addition there was a lower level of

16

Prunier, 85.

assistants; one of these minions bears closer scrutiny. This was Colonel Theoneste Bagosora

who would rise to an infamous role within the Akazu during the genocide. One of the most

extreme of the Hutu hard-liners, Bagosora was not without ambition. He had nothing less than

presidential aspirations, although his path to leading the country was not as smooth as he might

have hoped. As an intermediate goal, Bagosora sought unsuccessfully to become the chief of

staff of the FAR. While he was unable to meet that goal, he was able to wrangle a compromise

that placed him as Director of Services in the Ministry of Defense. This allowed him to be the

eyes and ears of the Akuza concerning everything happening in the Rwandan military.

Agathe hailed from a Hutu family that had ruled a principality within Rwanda

independently in the 1800‟s. Coming from an historically powerful—and large—clan meant that

President Habyarimana had a built-in network of well-connected and powerful supporters but at

the cost of requiring access to it through his spouse. The Rwandan president became more

reliant on Agathe and her Clan and eventually became susceptible himself to their machinations.

This became clear by the murder of Colonel Stanislas Mayuya in the first half of 1988.

Mayuya was a close friend and confidante of the president. Plausible rumors circulated that he

was being groomed by Habyarimana for an important position within his government, possibly

the vice-presidency, with the intent of grooming him as a successor. His murder was planned by

one of Agathe‟s “close associates” within Le Clan de Madame, Colonel Laurent Serubuga. The

army sergeant who fired the shot that killed Mayuya was later murdered in jail. The prosecutor

in the case was also murdered during the investigation.

17

Prunier, 87.

Shortly after the genocide commenced in earnest Madame Agathe was airlifted from

Kigali aboard a French military transport and brought to Paris as a safe haven.

18

Enter the United Nations

With the Arusha agreements negotiated between 10 July 1992 and 25 July 1993 and

signed on 04 August 1993 the United Nations entered the scene with the first order of business:

establishing an international military monitoring force. During the negotiations the RPF had

been relentless in their requirement that the French leave and be replaced by a United Nations

force.

For its part, the United Nations and many member nations who might otherwise have

been willing to participate were reluctant. The UN had recently undergone the debacle of

Somalia whose nadir was the killing of 18 U.S. service personnel in Mogadishu in October 1993.

Concerns of the UN Security Council (UNSC) were assuaged to a degree in that both sides of the

Rwandan situation approached in a joint delegation to request the peacekeeping force. This and

the detailed articles within the Arusha agreements convinced the UNSC that Rwanda may be an

opportunity for success in the peacekeeping realm.

That same detail set UN efforts behind from the beginning. The Accords called for a

peacekeeping mission to be in place 37 days after their signature. It was three weeks beyond that

before the UNSC passed the resolution creating the force. This may have been an indication of a

systemic issue within the UNSC in that there was no powerful patron to spur the Council into

action. France was eliminated by design. Somalia had left such a bitter legacy for peacekeeping

within the United States that it was severely reluctant to participate in any meaningful way.

Added to this was the fact that the US was at the time assessed 31 percent of the UN‟s

18

Philip Gourevitch. We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed With Our Families: Stories

From Rwanda. (New York: Farrar Straus and Giroux, 1998), 114.

peacekeeping costs and had seen a 370 percent increase in these expenses between 1992 and

1993.

19

Two previous “technical missions” (UN term for fact-finding mission) to Rwanda first

headed by a Canadian colonel, Cameron Ross, and the second by Maurice Baril, head of the

military branch of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), called initially for a

force size of 8,000 members; it was then downsized to a recommendation of 5,500. After

completing his own technical mission the Canadian general assigned to lead the peacekeeping

force, Lieutenant General Romeo Dallaire, determined his “ideal” recommendation to be 5,500

soldiers.

20

Talking later with Baril, Dallaire learned that these numbers never left the DPKO.

Dallaire‟s next “reasonably viable” option was for 2,500 personnel.

21

The US, Russia, and

France countered with 500. When the Security Council passed UNSCR number 872 establishing

the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) the force level was set at 2,548

troops.

22

When the call went out to the troop-contributing nations within the UN the only NATO

member to answer the call was Belgium, the ex-colonial power in Rwanda. General Dallaire

suspected a deal had been struck between Belgium and France for the Belgians to watch over

France‟s interest in Rwanda after French forces left.

23

The other nations to contribute troops

were Tunisia and Bangladesh. While the Tunisians arrived as an effective, trained, and equipped

force, when the Bangladeshi contingent arrived it became apparent that they were ill-equipped,

ill-trained, and for the majority of the situation recalcitrant to carry out orders given to them.

19

Desforges, 99.

20

Both Kagame and Dallaire attended command and staff colleges in the United States. As noted earlier,

Kagame left Fort Leavenworth early to return to Uganda and the RPF. Dallaire attended the U.S. Marine Corps

Command and Staff College.

21

LGEN Romeo Dallaire. Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda (Toronto:

Random House Canada, 2003), 75-76.

22

It‟s important to note that the peacekeeping mission title states it is “For” Rwanda and not simply “In”

Rwanda. Dallaire says he took the “I” from “Mission” to make the acronym UNAMIR. “UNAMFR did not sound

right.” Dallaire, 92.

23

Dallaire, 84.

Given this, the UN had already entered the Great Lakes region with the passing of UN

Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) number 846 on 22 June 1993 which established the UN

Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR). UNOMUR‟s mission was to monitor the

Uganda-Rwanda border in order to assure the Rwandan government that the RPF was not being

rearmed from Uganda. This was a strictly monitoring mission made up of 81 unarmed OAU

military observers operating on the Ugandan side of the border. UNOMUR would on 30

October 1993 become a sector sub-command of the Arusha-prompted peacekeeping force.

UNAMIR CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

Under the direction of the DPKO, Dallaire drafted his concept of operations for

UNAMIR. It called for four phases and treated the 2,458 troop level as an absolute maximum to

be deployed only if needed.

Phase One was to commence upon passing the

UNAMIR Resolution and last for 90 days. It required the

presence of 1,200 peacekeepers and had as its objective

providing security for the capital while ensuring the smooth

withdrawal of the French forces in accordance with Arusha.

Once that was accomplished Kigali would be turned into a

weapons-secure area where both the RGF and RPF would keep their weapons secured, only

moving them or any troops with UN permission and escort. Last, the UNOMUR monitoring

mission would expand to cover the ten prefectures of the country.

Phase Two was also planned to cover ninety days. This phase would require the entire

maximum force of 2,458 personnel. First, a battalion-sized force would move into the

demilitarized zone separating the RGF from the RPF. This zone was in the north and west of the

country and was approximately 120 kilometers long and had a depth of about 20 kilometers at its

Figure 3. LGEN Romeo Dallaire

widest point. These two sides would then withdraw to demobilization stations where all weapons

would be collected. Rather than the battalion envisioned by UNAMIR, it would be forced to

patrol the zone with 55 of the unarmed observers from UNOMUR along with a Tunisian

contingent of 60 lightly armed troops. This phase would require well-crafted ROE.

Phase Three was envisioned

to require ten months and would

contain the demobilization and re-

integration processes. It would also

create a new Rwandan entity, the

National Guard, that would

assimilate the RPF, RGF, and the

civilian national police in

accordance with the force limits

placed upon it by the Arusha

protocol.

The final phase would take

an estimated twelve months and would culminate in democratic elections. Once that occurred

UNAMIR would be disestablished.

These four phases were all to be conducted under the Chapter VI articles of the UN

Charter. It was to be a “simple” peacekeeping mission and one that could be accomplished in a

short period of time, with a minimum of forces and cost. Such was not to be the case.

Rules of Engagement

Careful crafting of Rules of Engagement (ROE) is imperative in any peacekeeping

mission. For UNAMIR, weapons were to be used for “self-defense purposes only.” The ROE

drawn up by UNAMIR further defined self-defense as “resistance to attempts by forceful means

Figure 4. RPF-held territory 31 March 1994

to prevent the Force from discharging its duties under the mandate of UNAMIR.” Minimum

force was to be applied and as such the Force was lightly armed.

UNAMIR Commander General Dallaire foresaw the possibility of the need to preserve

law and order. He specified that this would be the responsibility of the host nation constabulary

which might be assisted by the UN police unit assigned, UNCIVPOL. But he also noted the real

possibility that Force members may find themselves in the position that would require their

coming to the assistance of the national police and UNCIVPOL.

In probably his most prescient paragraph, Dallaire foresaw the possibility of UNAMIR

troops being confronted with crimes against humanity. The ROE states

There may be ethnically or politically motivated criminal acts committed during the

mandate which will normally and legally require UNAMIR to use all available means to

halt them. Examples are executions, attacks on displaced persons or refugees, ethnic

riots, attacks on demobilized soldiers, etc. During such occasions UNAMIR military

personnel will follow the ROE outlined in this directive in support of UNCIVPOL and

local authorities or in their absence, UNAMIR will take the necessary action to prevent

any crime against humanity.

24

Dallaire forwarded these interim ROE to UN headquarters, as well as to the capitals of

the nations contributing troops. A resounding silence was heard from nearly all parties. Dallaire

never received approval from the UN nor did he get comments from any nation other than

Belgium and Canada. Belgium expressed concerns regarding their soldiers being used for crowd

control. Canada thought the authorization of deadly force for the protection of UN property was

too broad. The ROE was amended to cover both these concerns and stood throughout the

conflict with one exception. By the fifth day of the genocide evacuations of the capital required

24

Quoted in Desforges, 100.

the modification of the ROE to permit UNAMIR forces to disarm belligerents and to intervene

with force after firing warning shots.

25

Other Problems in the United Nations

UNAMIR had the distinct impression that in the minds of the NGOs in country it was

considered one of the belligerents. The peacekeepers knew they needed a humanitarian

coordinator to work with these groups as well as the growing number of UN agencies becoming

involved in Rwanda. Dallaire approached the Special Representative of the Secretary-General

(SRSG) in country, Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh, a former Cameroonian diplomat and a friend of

the UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, with the need to establish such a function. He

was met by reticence on the part of Booh-Booh, a pattern that Dallaire indicates was Booh-

Booh‟s usual modus operandi. The two never reached a useful working relationship and Dallaire

reports that the SRSG often stonewalled or failed to forward many of the reports and requests he

had submitted to him for further consideration within the DPKO and above at the UN.

26

Despite

not receiving approval from the SRSG, Dallaire went ahead and formed a small humanitarian

section. He received assistance from the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, which gave

Dallaire permission to use all the food and material held in UN humanitarian warehouses

originally targeted for Rwandan and Burundi Internally Displaced Persons (IDP).

While the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs was helpful, within other parts of the

UN headquarters there were organizational issues that impeded both planning and the conduct of

UNAMIR‟s mission. For example, the relationship between the DPKO and the Department of

Political Affairs (DPA) was usually contentious. The DPA was a more powerful and respected

department within the UN than was the DPKO. As might be expected, the DPA was also a

25

Dallaire, 90, 290.

26

Dallaire, 118-119.

highly politicized office where connections—particularly to the Secretary-General—were

flaunted and leveraged. This often manifested in what the DPKO saw as inappropriate

meddling, maneuvering, and interference in its work. Add to this that at the time the DPKO was

responsible for 16 missions across the globe. Yet, for UNAMIR to succeed it was crucial for the

UN to coordinate its activities on both the diplomatic and military levels. This rarely happened

and both realms seemed often to be working at cross-purposes.

As a Chapter VI peacekeeping effort, UNAMIR was forbidden to have an intelligence

function. Yet, at the time of the genocide Rwanda held one of the rotating seats on the UNSC.

This provided the Rwandan government and the Akazu an insider‟s vantage denied UNAMIR.

While UNAMIR did in fact surreptitiously exercise at least limited intelligence efforts it was

never able to stay abreast of the unfolding events within the UN and the country as was the

Rwandan government.

NGOs

The previous example of friction within the UN demonstrated the need to coordinate the

activities of NGOs in the country. This bears further examination.

UNAMIR‟s first contact with NGOS came in the form of a visit from Bernard Kouchner,

a former French health minister and one of the founders of Medecins Sans Frontieres (Doctors

Without Borders). He was now the head of a Paris-based humanitarian assistance organization

and wanted to temporarily airlift a small number of orphans out of Rwanda. General Dallaire

was strongly opposed to this. He saw it as a palliative for the guilt the French people felt

regarding their participation in the current disaster.

27

This stance later became fodder for a tirade

from Colonel Bagosora who blamed Dallaire for the failure of the orphan evacuation plan.

Kouchner solicited and received Bagosora‟s pledge of assistance and announced such, earning

27

Dallaire, 368.

the interim government a public relations coup at the expense of UNAMIR. Eventually

Kouchner received the approval from UNAMIR to attempt his operation on the condition he

received approval from both warring parties. He did and about 50 children, many severely

injured, departed on board a Canadian C-130 transport on 04 June. Three days later the French

ambassador to Kenya called and wanted to discuss orphans. Dallaire writes

. . . I wondered what it was with the French and their obsession with orphans . . . I

thought the French were up to something and I needed to figure out what. I never would

have guessed at the time the extent to which the interim [Rwandan] government, the

RGF, Boutrous-Ghali, France and even the RPF were already working together behind

my back to secure a French intervention in Rwanda under the guise of humanitarian

relief.

28

Many NGOs were helpful and productive. For example, Medecins Sans Frontieres and

the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), kept hospitals open and running

throughout the genocide despite being targeted by the warring factions.

While there were other positive contributions made by NGOs there remained at the core a

dysfunctional relation between many of them and UNAMIR. Again, problems originated in

New York. As an example, the RPF held a meeting with the UNHCR and 16 NGOs about which

UNAMIR and its observers from the RPF were not informed. It was essential that any aid

provided to zones controlled by either the RGF or the RPF be completely transparent. General

Dallaire expressed concern over the possibility that aid in the RPF sector could be siphoned off

for the support of Kagame‟s troops. This became the start of a running contentious relationship

between UNAMIR and the offices of the UNHCR.

28

Ibid, 418.

South of the Border

Despite the complex interplay required between the three main factions of the

Habyarimana government, the RPF, and the political parties, as well as the need to appoint

leaders that could form a coherent government from the disparate and often antagonistic political

parties, plus the need to integrate the military, there was some hope that the Accords could carry

Rwanda into a stable and more peaceful future. This was looking even more assured with the

expected arrival of UNAMIR forces.

Any such hope was dashed by the assassination of Burundi‟s president, Melchior

Ndadaye, a Hutu, by Tutsi army officers on 21 October 1993. Burundi‟s population had a

similar makeup of Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa elements as had Rwanda. However, unlike Rwanda, in

Burundi the Tutsi remained in power after the exit of the colonial powers. Hutu elements

sporadically attempted to wrest control of that country only to be put down by the Tutsi-

dominated army. The most egregious episode was in 1972 when something on the order of

100,000 Hutu were killed. Further attempts by the Hutu were met with fiercer suppression by

the Burundi army until 1988 when repression along the Rwandan border forced thousands of

Hutu to flee north across it into Rwanda.

This met with condemnation by the international community along with internal domestic

pressure and as a result, reforms were put in place. These culminated in what was widely

regarded as a free and fair election in June 1993 that saw Ndadaye elected as Burundi‟s first

Hutu president. As a moderate he immediately appointed as his prime minister a Tutsi from the

opposition. Nonetheless, the coup in which he and leading members of his government were

killed sparked a Hutu retaliation in which thousands of Tutsi were killed.

This inflamed the situation in Rwanda. Tutsis read from the Burundian debacle that their

fears of slaughter at the hands of Hutu extremists were well-founded. The moderate Hutu

perspective that had hoped to use Burundi as an example of the path to moderation and power-

sharing between Hutu and Tutsi instead faced hard-line MRND(D) and CDR members who saw

the assassination as sure proof that Tutsis were coordinating efforts to dominate the region.

This turn of events created its own challenges for UNAMIR. Its ability to ensure security

in Kigali and peaceful demobilization of the demilitarized zone was predicated on a peaceful and

stable southern region. The Burundi coup eliminated that assumption.

Sliding Towards Chaos

By the end of 1993 UNAMIR had approximately 1,300 soldiers in theater. It was able to

escort the RPF‟s civilian leaders and about 600 of their troops into Kigali as was pre-arranged.

While UNAMIR continued to execute its CONOPS, the real impetus for what would

happen next fell onto the Rwandans. The government in power had the requirement to stand up

the BBTG and from there move towards elections. Instead, its leaders challenged nearly every

possible interpretation of the Arusha Accords. President Habyarimana received aid in this from

the Hutu Power blocks of the PL and MDR parties. It was his desire to see their assured

placement in ministerial posts and to obtain a seat in the transitional assembly for the CDR. The

overall goal was to reach the minimum number of votes needed to stop any major decisions such

as impeachment proceedings. Countering each of these moves was the RPF, creating a deadlock.

During the next three months ominous signs were detected that preparations were being

made by those in power to assure their continued hold on power. Two of the political parties, the

MRND(D) and the CDR, had formed youth organizations that were designed to build pride and

solidarity in Hutu youth. Both would later become major instruments in the conduct of the

genocide. The MRND(D) group was the Interahamwe—recall that this was the name of the

MRND(D) newspaper and translated as “Those who work together.” Note that the translation

can also yield “those that stand together” and “those who fight together. The CDR youth group

was the Impuzamugambi—“Those who have the same goal.” There were other youth groups, but

these two were the largest with something on the order of 50,000 members between them.

Violent demonstrations were held by the groups while the national police observed and

did nothing to stop them. The RTLMC radio station put out broadcasts for Hutus to defend

themselves to the last man. It spouted venom against UNAMIR and accused the Belgian troops

participating in it as wanting to turn over the country to the Tutsis. The Human Rights Watch

documented arms flow into Rwanda. UMAMIR received tips of weapons caches in Kigali, a

violation of the accords. Assassins murdered the minister of public works who was also the head

of the PSD party. A UNAMIR contingent sent to rescue a judge was fired upon. Reports from

rural areas indicated that school teachers were calling rolls to ascertain the accuracy of their

categorization of Tutsi students. The Belgian ambassador met with the secretary of the MDR, a

Hutu Power faction member, who reported that the Interahamwe were to launch a civil war using

hostility against Belgians as a driving force.

Despite the crippling restriction on intelligence operations placed on UNAMIR, its

leadership was aware of these escalating activities and duly reported them to the UN

headquarters through the SRSG. This sometimes was done around Booh-Booh if UNAMIR

leaders thought the information was too important to allow its being waylaid. Outside of the

responses sent from the DPKO, UNAMIR rarely heard a response.

An example of the frustration felt by UNAMIR with regard to direction it received from

UN headquarters was over weapons caches. Informants would report the possible existence of

hidden arms and their locations. General Dallaire reported to the UN in New York that he

planned to seize the arms quickly. The next day he received a response signed by a subordinate

on behalf of Kofi Annan, the head of the DPKO (and later the secretary-general of the UN),

stating that the UANIR mandate did not cover operations against arms caches. Dallaire was

instructed only to inform President Habyarimana of their possible existence, as well as the

ambassadors of Belgium, France, and the U.S.

On the evening of 21 January 1994 a French DC-8 landed surreptitiously at the Kigali

airport with ninety boxes of 60 mm mortars. UNAMIR successfully diverted the shipment as it

was in violation of the Accords and placed the arms under joint Rwandan Army-UNAMIR

control. Dallaire again appealed to New York for a broadening of the mandate to allow detection

and pursuit of illicit arms flow and storage. After several more appeals, Dallaire sent a cable to

New York. In it he stated,

We can expect more frequent and more violent demonstrations, more grenade and armed

attacks on ethnic and political groups, more assassinations and quite possibly outright

attacks on UNAMIR installations . . . Each day of delay in authorizing deterrent arms

recovery operations will result in an ever deteriorating security situation and may if the

arms continue to be distributed result in an inability of UNAMIR to carry out its mandate

in all aspects.

29

The immediate response within the UN to Dallaire‟s appeals was that he needed to be

tightly reined. The UN leadership, and this apparently included the secretary-general, placed

more credence in the reports coming from the SRSG, Booh-Booh. The SRSG reported a high

opinion of Habyarimana and presented optimistic assessments of the Rwandan leader‟s abilities

to handle the situation.

Dallaire‟s predictions held true. Assassinations continued at a faster rate, RTLMC

stepped up its broadcasts of anti-UNAMIR/Belgium propaganda and expanded its attacks on

moderate Rwanda political leaders. Attacks on Tutsis grew in number and scale.

The U.S., France, and Belgium continued to follow the rapidly deteriorating situation and

worked through the UN in attempts to continue implementation of the Arusha Agreement. As

the only nation of the three with troops in the field, Belgium attempted to gain further support

from other nations, yet none of the three changed stances or policies despite the ominous signals

that disaster was in the offing.

29

Quoted in Desforges, 123.

Meanwhile, Security Council members were losing patience regarding the inability to

establish the BBTG. On 06 April the UNSC passed UNSCR 909. The Resolution granted a six-

week extension of UNAMIR; however, if the BBTG was not in place by then the mission would

be “reviewed.” In diplomatic parlance all understood this meant it would end. With the passing

of UNSCR 909, DPKO immediately asked UNAMIR for its withdrawal plans.

Habyarimana’s End

On the same day that the UNSC passed Resolution 909, 6 April 1994, President

Habyarimana died when his plane was shot down on return from a trip to Dar es Salaam. Also

on the plane were the president of Burundi and the chief of staff of the Rwandan army, as well as

several others. All perished. The most reliable assessments agree that the plane was brought

down by surface to air missiles. The question of who was responsible remains open.

The RPF had reason to want Habyarimana dead. They may have feared that he was

continuing to stonewall the implementation of the Arusha Accords with a final goal of ensuring

they would never be put in place. An opposite and equally plausible explanation is that the RPF

feared he would execute the Accords immediately, preventing the RPF from continuing the

military action that was almost inevitably leading them to a full victory.

Moderate Hutus are also suspect. There were reports that they had discussed

assassination as a method of preempting the violence being planned by others in the government.

The president‟s own close advisors may also have been the culprits. For them,

Habyarimana‟s visit to Museveni in early March and his return from Dar es Salaam may have

signaled his intent to immediately place the Accords into effect. With the real possibility of the

installation of the new government the Hutu Power members may have felt a need to launch the

violence immediately, if prematurely.

Almost immediately after word was received of Habyarimana‟s death his Presidential

Guard began its slaughter of Tutsis and other civilians. The RPF responded by coming out of

garrison and engaging the RGF. The war and the genocide were on.

With Habyarimana and the Army chief of staff dead along and the minister of defense out

of the country, a vacuum existed. Into it Colonel Bagosora firmly placed himself. He

immediately convened a meeting of the top army staff remaining and placed himself in charge

despite being a retiree. Bagosora‟s first order of business was to attempt to appoint an interim

chief of staff of his liking. His nominee was not accepted by the others but another weak officer

was selected, one that would not muster a challenge to Bagosora or the inner circle to which he

belonged.

Next, Bagosora proposed a military takeover of the government. This suggestion was also

rebuffed and this may be due to Dallaire‟s promise to retract UNAMIR if it happened. Dallaire

was present at this meeting and several times argued against Bagosora‟s plans. There had been

no love lost between these two since the beginning of UNAMIR‟s presence in Rwanda. When

Dallaire instead several times suggested that the military make contact with the prime minister to

ensure an orderly continuation of the civil government, Bagosora argued against the position

vehemently. Booh-Booh, the SRSG, concurred with Dallaire and a compromise was reached

when Bagosora accepted Booh-Booh‟s proposal that an MRND candidate replace the president.

That night the prime minister, Agathe Uwilingiyimana (Note this is not Madame Agathe

Habyarimana), was killed. She had earlier struck down the ethnic quota system within education,

thus earning the enmity of the Hutu hardliners.

Kigali streets quickly descended into chaos. Members of the Interahamwe were out in

force. Rwandan soldiers took 15 UNAMIR peacekeepers hostage. The five that were Ghanaians

were eventually led away to safety. The ten Belgians faced furious soldiers who had been fed

through RTLM broadcasts the story that the Belgians had aided the RPF in shooting down the

president‟s plane. These ten peacekeepers were beaten to death. An informant had earlier

reported to UNAMIR a plan to target Belgian soldiers as a way of forcing western powers‟

withdrawal from Rwanda similar to what had happened to the U.S. in Somalia.

The situation in the capital continued to deteriorate. Important government officials

under the protection of UNAMIR were abducted by the Presidential Guard and militias and

killed. Withdrawing UNAMIR troops reported seeing Presidential Guard and Interahamwe

members going door-to-door with lists, breaking in and murdering occupants.

UNAMIR soldiers found it increasingly difficult to maneuver in the city. Makeshift road

blocks were everywhere and UNAMIR troops found their passage through them increasingly

challenged.

Meanwhile, UNAMIR tried desperately to maintain its force posture and negotiate with

all sides. Nations were initiating evacuation operations and doing so with no regard to

UNAMIR‟s position or needs. The French launched Operation Amaryllis, its Non-Combatant

Operation (NEO) for expatriates. Dallaire reports that its commander, a Colonel Poncet, was

“curt” and “showed no interest in co-operating” with UNAMIR.

30

Belgium inaugurated

Operation SILVERBACK, its NEO. This force was stripped out from UNAMIR by Brussels

without consulting UNAMIR, further weakening its strength. The United States, which still

receives wide-spread condemnation for its lack of response, did send about 250 U.S. Marines.

They were, however, diverted from their intended landing location of Kigali airport and instead

were diverted to Bujumbura, Burundi. How this happened is unclear, but most sources including

the UN believed these Marines were intended to both protect U.S. citizens and to reinforce

UNAMIR. Had the French offered to cooperate with UNAMIR, had the Belgian forces

remained under UNAMIR, and had the U.S. Marines been in Kigali working with UNAMIR

there might have been hope to stem the atrocities that were only then gaining momentum.

30

Dallaire, 282.

The RPF concentrations outside of Kigali (not part of the initial component brought in

under the Arusha Agreement) continued to advance towards Kigali but indirectly. With little

effort Kagame‟s troops had effectively neutralized several RGF battalions in the Hutu heartland

of Ruhengeri. He was now advancing his forces in two prongs east and west of the city instead

of directly toward it, a path that offered little resistance. It was clear that Kagame‟s intent was to

completely envelop the capital; his unstated conclusion was that this would create the most

favorable position from which he could force the RPF accession to political leadership. By also

traversing the broad territory outside of Kigali, Kagame also gained the best chance to seize the

entire country, and not only the capital. The difficulty with this scheme of maneuver was that

while he had what amounted to a clear direct path to the heart of the country, Kagame‟s choice to

continue these maneuvers meant a much slower pace towards victory. Meanwhile, even more

Tutsis behind the RGF lines were being killed.

End Game?

Credible estimates of the Rwandan death toll suggest that by the end of April 200,000

people had died. At the end of May this estimate reached 500,000. During this time both the

Interahamwe and the Impuzamugambi had clearly demonstrated the efficiency with which they

could organize and conduct the genocide. Recall that both of these groups were political youth

organizations attached to Hutu Power-led parties. For both of these main militia forces the

“weapon” of choice was the ibitero (singular form, igitero). These were bands of civilians—

often children—who were equipped with machetes and other farm implements and told to use

them to exterminate the Tutsis in their villages. They operated either singly or in bands of up to

a dozen members.

It wasn‟t until 25 May that the UNSC reacted concretely to the ever worsening-situation.

That day it passed UNSCR 918 authorizing what became known as UNAMIR 2. This signaled a

shift of UNAMIR‟s mandate from Chapter VI peacekeeping operations to Chapter VII peace

enforcement efforts. The resolution also called for the immediate deployment of another 5,500

troops. This was not to be. By 19 June when UNAMIR should have had 4,600 soldiers on the

ground, it had only 503. The secretary-general of the UN estimated it would take another three

months before UNAMIR 2 would be operational.

Complicating matters was yet another French intervention. Independent of UNAMIR 2,

the French had established Operation TURQUOISE. This was to be a separate effort patterned

on Restore Hope, the U.S. operation in Somalia with the objective of ensuring the security of

IDP and civilians deemed at risk within Rwanda. It was given a mandate by the UNSC under

UNSCR 929 as a separate Chapter VII mission. It was to be temporary in duration (60 days) and

to be in effect only until UNAMIR 2 could stand up. It was immediately met with

commendation by the Prime Minister Designate Faustin Twagirmungu (who had filled the

position after the murder of Agathe Uwilingiyimana). RTLMC broadcast that the French were

coming to aid them in fighting the RPF. Before UNSCR 929 had passed, the French were already

arriving via Goma, Zaire. Of concern to LGEN Dallaire was his identification of several leaders

in Operation TURQUOISE who had been French military advisors to the RGF before the start of

the war. Further, the French troops assigned were said to be “aggressive.”

31

By this time the RPF had entered Kigali and taken both the Kigali airport and a large

military base in the city. Two days after the passing of Resolution 918 leaders of the militias and

their followers fled the city. While there were still pockets of RGF troops holding parts of the

city, the RPF continued its offensive, taking Nyabisindu and Kabayi (in the vicinity of Gitirama),

approximately 20 miles west of Kigali. While the RGF counterattacked with its forces, the

militias and other irregulars, the RPF handily routed them, pushing on to Gitirama. Even as the

RPF advanced without challenge the killing of Tutsis continued in advance of the RPF path. On

2 July 1994 the RPF captured the capital.

31

Daillare, 427-8.

Those who had supported the government streamed out of the city and to the south

towards a Zone Humanitaire Sure, or Humanitarian Safe Zone, the French had created to avoid

anticipated retribution at the hands of the RPF. This fear was primarily a creation of the RTLMC

and Radio Rwanda propaganda broadcasts. After only a few days approximately 1.5 million

people had arrived within the Zone. Another 1.5 million had fled into the Ruhengeri and Gisenyi

prefectures to the northwest. RTLMC, having stopped broadcasting from Kigali on 3 July,

moved to Gisenyi and began re-broadcasting on 10 July.

32

Before the RPF‟s arrival and taking of

Gisenyi on 18 July local government leaders used weapons and shots fired into the air to push

the estimated one million refugees into Zaire. The town of Goma across the border in Zaire

became the new epicenter for misery. A massive cholera epidemic broke out, killing 600 a day,

a number that eventually grew to thirty thousand dead.

Conclusion

Eight hundred thousand dead doesn‟t begin to convey the wretchedness Rwanda

experienced in the three months following the Habyarimana plane crash. What followed

included a mass exodus of huge proportions. Estimates again vary. Medecins Sans Frontiere‟s

estimates were lowest at 1.3 million refugees crossing the borders out of Rwanda. The U.S.

Committee for Refugees cited a figure of 1.7 million. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees

(UNHCR) put the figure at 2.1 million, breaking it down to the locations in Table 1.

32

Prunier, 296.

The refugee camps in and around Goma, Zaire became the next flash point. The cholera

epidemic raged. Within each refugee camp the old Rwandan government structures remained

intact and active, with local and regional authorities from the Rwandan territories continuing to

exercise their control and foment hate against Tutsis. The UNHCR and the NGOs including the

ICRC were powerless in the face of the ruthlessness of the political apparatchik in the camps and

the docility of the people they ruled. Paradoxically, the Western powers woke to the disaster and

one of the largest problems for the camps was the flooding of the area with relief supplies,

workers, and efforts. The situation was bad enough to foster black humor. UNHCR workers

cynically joked that their acronym stood for “Hauts Criminels Rassasies”—“Well-fed Top

Criminals.”

33

Caring for and eventually repatriating these refugees would be a herculean task.

Drawing this case to a conclusion is a difficult exercise as in many ways it is still

ongoing. Internal investigations and legal proceedings continue in Rwanda. The UNSC created

the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) by Resolution 955 of 8 November 1994.

It was established for the prosecution of persons responsible for genocide and other serious

33

Prunier, 315.

Points of Concentration

Estimated Figures

Northern Burundi

270,000

Western Tanzania

577,000

Southwestern Uganda

10,000

Goma, Zaire

850,000

Bukavu, Zaire

332,000

Uvira, Zaire

62,000

Table 1. UNHCR Refugee Estimates

Source: UNHCR Special Unit for Rwanda and Burundi, Rwanda and Burundi

Information Meeting, Geneva (16 November 1994)

violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda between 1

January 1994 and 31 December 1994. The Tribunal may also deal with the prosecution of

Rwandan citizens responsible for genocide and other such violations of international law

committed in the territory of the border states during the same period. To date the tribunal

completed 50 trials and convicted 29 accused persons. Another eleven trials are in progress.

Fourteen individuals are awaiting trial in detention. Thirteen others are still at large, some

suspected to be dead. The ICTR's Completion Strategy established in UNSCR 1503 required all

first-instance trials to be complete by the end of 2008. This date was later extended to the end of

2009. All work was to be completed by the end of 2010. Recent discussions held that these goals

were not realistic. The United Nations Security Council then called upon the tribunal to complete

its work by 31 December 2014, and to prepare for its closure and transfer of responsibilities to

the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals which will begin functioning for

the ICTR on 1 July 2012.

Rwanda itself successfully emerged from this dark history.

Under the presidency of Paul Kagame it now enjoys an annual seven

percent economic growth, almost universal health insurance and

aggressive anti-corruption laws. No African country has done more to

curb corruption; ministers have been jailed for it. Transparency

International ranks Rwanda 49th in the world in its corruption index,

ahead of Italy (69) and Greece (80); however, participation in the

economy by companies owned by the ruling party is far greater than

others.

34

In addition, the elections that keep Kagame in power are

34

Transparency International Corruption Perception Index. http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2011/results/,

accessed 07 April 2012.

Figure 5. Paul Kagame

widely regarded as a sham. Yet, Kigali is remarkably clean and relatively safe. Some 40 percent

of Rwandans own cell phones. National identity cards now identify people as "Rwandan," and

not Hutu or Tutsi.

35

The same cannot be said about Rwanda‟s neighboring countries. The Legatum Institute,

a London-based non-partisan policy institute, reports “Rwanda‟s neighbours are „less than

ideal.‟” “Uganda is corrupt; Burundi a basket-case; the Democratic Republic of Congo (Zaire),

worse.”

36

The Great Lakes Region is ripe for another catastrophe, one that will challenge the will

of the United States and the capabilities of its African Command.

35

Anne Applebaum. “The Rwandan Experiment: Can the African Nation have Peace and Prosperity

without Freedom? Slate Magazine, accessed 7 April 2012.

http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/foreigners/2011/09/the_rwanda_experiment.html, accessed 7 April

2012.

36

Economist.com. “Business in Rwanda, Africa‟s Singapore? A country with a bloody history seeks

prosperity by becoming business-friendly” Feb 25th 2012 from the print edition.

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1

Appendix A

Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese

Patriotic Front

The Government of the Republic of Rwanda on the one hand, and the Rwandese

Patriotic Front on the other;

Firmly resolved to find a political negotiated solution to the war situation confronting

the Rwandese people since 1st October, 1990;

Considering and appreciating the efforts deployed by the countries of the Sub-region

with a view to helping the Rwandese people to recover peace;

Referring to the numerous high-level meetings held respectively at Mwanza, United

Republic of Tanzania, on 17th October, 1990, in Gbadolite, Republic Zaire, on 26th October,

1990, in Goma, Republic of Zaire, on 20th November, 1990, in Zanzibar, United Republic of

Tanzania, on 17th February, 1991, in Dar-es-Salaam, United Republic of Tanzania, on 19th

February, 1991 and from 5th to 7th March, 1993;

Considering that all these meetings aimed first and foremost at establishing a

ceasefire so as to enable the two parties to look for a solution to the war through direct

negotiations;

Noting the N‟SELE Ceasefire Agreement, of 29th March, 1991 as amended in

GBADOLITE on 16th September, 1991 and at ARUSHA on 12th July, 1992;

Reaffirming their unwavering determination to respect principles underlying the Rule

of Law which include democracy, national unity, pluralism, the respect of fundamental freedoms

and rights of the individual;

Considering that these principles constitute the basis and consistency of a lasting

peace awaited by the Rwandese people for the benefit of the present and future generations;

Noting the Protocol of Agreement on the Rule of Law signed at Arusha on 18th

August, 1992;

Considering that the two parties accepted the principle of power-sharing within the

framework of a Broad-Based Transitional Government;

Noting the Protocols of Agreement on Power-Sharing signed at ARUSHA

respectively on 30th October, 1992, and on 9th January, 1993;

Appendix A

A-2

Considering that the conflictual situation between the two parties can only be brought

to an end through the formation of one and single National Army and a new National

Gendarmerie from forces of the two warring parties;

Noting of the Protocol of Agreement on the integration of Armed Forces of both

Parties, signed at Arusha on 3rd August, 1993;

Recognizing that the unity of the Rwandese people cannot be achieved until a

definitive solution to the problem of Rwandese refugees is found and that the return of Rwandese

refugees to their country is an inalienable right and constitutes a factor for peace and national

unity and reconciliation;

Noting the Protocol of Agreement on the repatriation of Rwandese refugees and the

Resettlement of Displaced Persons, signed at ARUSHA on 9th June, 1993;

Resolved to eradicate and put a definite end to all the root causes which gave rise to

the war; Have, at the conclusion of the Peace Talks held in Arusha, United Republic of

Tanzania, between 10th July, 1992 and 24th June, 1993 as well as Kinihira, Republic of Rwanda

from 19th to 25th July, 1993 under the aegis of the Facilitator, His Excellency Ali Hassan

MWINYI, President of the United Republic of Tanzania, in the presence of the Representative of

the Mediator, His Excellency, MOBUTU SESE SEKO, President of the Republic of Zaire as

well as Representatives of the Current Chairmen of the OAU, His Excellency Abdou DIOUF,

President of the Republic of Senegal, and Hosni MUBARAK, President of the Arab Republic of

Egypt, the Secretary General of the OAU, Dr. Salim Ahmed SALIM, the Secretary General

of the United Nations, Dr. Boutros Boutros GHALI and Observers representing Federal Republic

of Germany, Belgium, Burundi, the United States of America, France, Nigeria, Uganda and

Zimbabwe;

Calling the International Community to witness;

Hereby agree on the following provisions:

Article 1

The war between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese

Patriotic Front is hereby brought to an end.

Article 2

The following documents are an integral part of the present Peace Agreement

concluded between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic

Front:

Appendix A

A-3

I. The N‟SELE Ceasefire Agreement of 29th March, 1991 between the

Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front, as amended in

GBADOLITE on 16th September, 1991 and at Arusha on 12th July, 1992;

II. The Protocol of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of

Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on the Rule of Law, signed at Arusha on 18th

September, 1992;

III. The Protocols of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of

Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on Power-Sharing within the Framework of a

Broad-Based Transitional Government, signed at Arusha respectively on 30th October,

1992 and on 9th January, 1993;

IV. The Protocol of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of

Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on the Repatriation of Refugees and the

Resettlement of Displaced Persons, signed at Arusha on 9th June, 1993;

V. The Protocol Agreement between the Government of the Republic of

Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on the integration of Armed Forces of the two

parties, signed at ARUSHA on, 3rd August, 1993;

VI. The Protocol of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of

Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on Miscellaneous Issues and Final Provisions

signed at Arusha on 3rd August, 1993. These entire documents are attached as Annex.

Article 3

The two parties also agree that the Constitution of 10th June, 1991 and the Arusha

Peace Agreement shall constitute indissolubly the Fundamental Law that shall govern the

Country during the Transition period, taking into account the following provisions:

1. The following Articles of the Constitution shall be replaced by the provisions of

the Peace Agreement relating to the same matters. The Articles in question are: 34, 35, 38, 39,

40, 41, 42, 4,3, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, .50, 51, 52, ,54, 55, .56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 63, 65, 66, 67, 68,

70, 71, 73, 74, 75 paragraph 2, 77 paragraphs 3 and 4, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88 paragraph 1,

90, 96, 99, 101.

2. In case of conflict between the other provisions of the Constitution and those of the

Peace Agreement, the provisions of the Peace Agreement shall prevail.

3. The Constitutional Court shall verify the conformity of Laws and Orders in

Council with the

Appendix A

A-4

Fundamental Law thus defined. Pending the enactment of the law on the Supreme

Court, the existing Constitutional Court shall remain composed of both the Court of Cassation

and the State of Council. The Presiding Judge of the Constitutional Court shall assume the

presidency.

Article 4

In case of conflict between the provisions of the Fundamental Law and those of other

Laws and Regulations, the provisions of the Fundamental Law shall prevail.

Article 5

The Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front

undertake to make every possible effort to ensure that the present Peace Agreement is respected

and implemented. They further undertake to spare no effort to promote National Unity and

Reconciliation.

Article 6

The two parties agree on the appointment of Mr. TWAGIRAMUNGU Faustin as

Prime Minister of the Broad-Based Transitional Government, in accordance with Articles 6 and

51 of the Protocol of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the

Rwandese Patriotic Front on Power-Sharing within the framework of a Broad-Based Transitional

Government.

Article 7

The Transitional Institutions shall be set up within thirty seven (37) days following

the signing of the Peace Agreement.

Article 8

The current Government shall remain in Office until the Broad-Based Transitional

Government is established. The maintenance of that Government does not mean that it can

encroach on the mandate of the Broad-Based Transitional Government being established. The

current Government shall, in no case, take decisions which may be detrimental to the

implementation of the Broad-Based Transitional programme.

Article 9

The “Conseil National de développement” (CND) shall remain in Office until the

Transitional National Assembly is established. However, as from date of signing the Peace

Agreement, it shall not enact laws.

Article 10

Appendix A

A-5

The present Peace Agreement is signed by the President of the Republic Rwanda and

the Chairman of the Rwandese Patriotic Front, in the presence of:

- The Facilitator, His Excellency, Ali Hassan MWINYI, President of the

United Republic of Tanzania;

- His Excellency, Yoweri Kaguta MUSEVENI, President of the Republic of

Uganda, Observer country;

- His Excellency Melchior NDADAYE, President of the Republic of Burundi,

Observer country;

- The Representative of the Mediator, His Excellency Faustin BIRINDWA,

Prime Minister of Zaire;

- Dr. Salim Ahmed SALIM, Secretary General of the OAU;

- The Representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations;

- The Representative of the Current Chairman of the OAU;

- The Representatives of other Observer countries: Germany, United States of

America, France, Nigeria and Zimbabwe;

- The delegations of the two parties.

Article 11

The present Peace Agreement shall come into force upon its signing by parties.

Done at Arusha, on the 4th day of the month of August, 1993 both in and English

languages, the original text being in French.

Major-General Justenal Habyarimana

President of the Republic of Rwanda

Colonel Alexis Kanyarengwe

Chairman of the Rwandese Patriotic Front

In the presence of the Facilitator

Ali Hassan Mwinyi

President of the United Republic of Tanzania

In the presence of the Representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations

Vladimir Petrovsky

Under-Secretary General

Director General of the United Nations Office at Geneva

In the presence of the Secretary General of the OAU

Salim Ahmed Salim

Appendix A

A-6

N’sele Cease-fire Agreement between the Government of the Rwandese Republic

and the Rwandese Patriotic Front

As amended at Gbadolite on 16 September 1991 and at Arusha on 12 July 1992.

We, the representatives of the Government of the Rwandese Republic and of the

Rwandese Patriotic Front:

Mindful of the unfortunate incidents that have occurred between the Rwandese and

have affected peace and public order in the country;

Referring to the Communiqués issued by the Heads of State of the Region, meeting in

Mwanza (Tanzania) on 17 October 1990, in Gbadolite (Zaire) on 26 October 1990 and in Goma

(Zaire) on 20 November 1990;

Considering that all these Summit meetings specifically emphasized the prior need

for a ceasefire;

Considering the acceptance of the ceasefire in principle by President Juvenal

HABYARIMANA in Zanzibar on 17 February 1991 following his meeting with Presidents

Yoweri MUSEVENI of Uganda and Ali Hassan MWINYI of Tanzania;

Mindful of the fact that Presidents Pierre BUYOYA of Burundi, Juvenal

HABYARIMANA of Rwanda, Ali Hassan MWINYI of Tanzania, Yoweri MUSEVENI of

Uganda and Prime Mininster Lunda BULULU of Zaire, assisted by the Secretary-General of the

OAU and a delegate of the UN High Commission for Refugees adopted the Dar-Es-Salaam

Declaration of 19 February 1991 mandating President Mobutu SESE SEKO of Zaire to take

urgent and immediate steps to usher in dialogue which should culminate in a formal ceasefire

agreement between the Government of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front; Mindful of

the fact that the ceasefire should facilitate the establishment of negotiations between the

Rwandese Government and the Rwandese Patriotic Front aimed at national reconciliation and

restoration of lasting peace;

Considering that the two Parties reaffirmed their political will during their meeting in

Paris from 6th to 8th June 1992 to find through negotiations a solution to the current conflict as

well as related problems;

Considering that both parties are committed to conduct direct negotiations:

Mindful of the fact that both parties reaffirmed the validity of the ceasefire agreement

signed at N‟sele on 29th March 1991 and as amended on 16th September 1991 in Gbadolite

subject to up-dating the agreement by making necessary amendments;

Have on this 12th day of July 1992, agreed on and accepted the following provisions

with respect to the ceasefire:

Appendix A

A-7

Article I

1. A cease-fire is hereby established throughout the territory of the Republic of

Rwanda, between the Government Forces and those of the Rwandese Patriotic Front. The cease-

fire shall enter into force at midnight (Rwanda time) on 31st July 1992 at the same time as the

deployment of the Neutral Military Observer Group.

2. The entry into force of the cease-fire shall be preceded by a truce, that is, the

cessation of fighting, which shall enter into force at midnight (Rwanda time) on 19th July 1992.

3. The present Cease-fire Agreement is the first stage of a peace process which shall

culminate in a Peace Agreement to be signed at the conclusion of the political negotiations.

Article II

The cease-fire shall imply:

1. The cessation of all hostilities for the purpose of dialogue and serious negotiations

between the two parties under the auspices of the Mediator or a Facilitator;

2. The suspension of supplies of ammunition and weaponry to the field;

3. The supply of non-lethal logistical needs to the military forces in the field;

4. The release of all prisoners-of-war; the effective release of all persons arrested

because and as a result of this war within five days following the entryinto force of the Cease-

fire Agreement;

5. The possibility of recovering the remains of the dead;

6. The withdrawal of all foreign troops after the effective deployment of the Neutral

Military Observer Group (NMOG) except for Military Officers serving in Rwanda under

bilateral Cooperation Agreements;

7. A ban on infiltration of troops and on the conveyance of troops and war material to

the area occupied by each party;

8. A ban on any mine-laying operations or the hindering of operations to remove the

mines;

9. The establishment of the Neutral Corridor separating the areas occupied by the two

respective forces. This corridor meant to facilitate the monitoring of the cease-fire by the Neutral

Appendix A

A-8

Military Observer Group shall be determined in consideration of the front-lines of both armies.

The demarcation on the field shall be established by the representatives of the two armies in the

presence of the Neutral Military Observer Group.

Article III

1. The verification and control of the cease-fire shall be conducted by the neutral

military observer group under the supervision of the Secretary-General of OAU.

2. The Neutral Military Observer Group shall be composed of:

10 Officers from Nigeria;

10 Officers from Senegal;

10 Officers from Zimbabwe;

10 Officers from an African country to be chosen by the current Chairman

of the OAU in collaboration

with the President of the United Republic of Tanzania;

5 Officers from the Government of Rwanda;

5 Officers from the Rwandese Patriotic Front;

3. The Neutral Military Observer Group shall report any violation of the cease-fire to

the Secretary-General of OAU and a joint political military commission.

4. The Neutral Military Observer Group shall set up the organs and machinery

required for the control and verification of the cease-fire. It shall draft its own rules of procedure.

It shall enjoy a status that would enable it to perform its mission as provided in the Cease-fire

Agreement; including privileges and immunities enjoyed by the OAU personnel as enshrined in

the general agreement.

5. The Neutral Military Observer Group shall have full communication and other

equipment it deems necessary to perform its mission. The NMOG officers may have specific

uniforms with insignia for easy identification, and light weapons for self-defence.

Article IV

1. A Joint Political Military Commission composed of 5 representatives of the

Rwandese Government and 5 of the Rwandese Patriotic Front is established;

2. The OAU and the following countries are invited to participate, as observers, in the

Joint Commission: Burundl, United Republic of Tanzania, Uganda, Zaire, Belgium, France and

the United States of America;

3. The Joint Commission shall have the following mandate:

- To ensure the follow-up of the implementation of the Cease-fire Agreement;

- To ensure the follow-up of the implementation of the peace Agreement to be

signed at the conclusion of the political negotiations;

Appendix A

A-9

4. The Joint Commission shall be based at the OAU Headquarters in Addis Ababa,

Ethiopia. The Commission‟s Headquarters may be moved upon agreement by both parties;

5. The Joint Commission shall hold its inaugural meeting not later than 26th July

1992.

Article V

The signatories of the present agreement accept the following principles whose

modalities of implementation shall be specified during the political negotiations:

1. Establishment of the rule of law, that is, based namely on national unity,

democracy, pluralism, and respect for human rights;

2. Formation of a national army consisting of Government forces and those of the

Rwandese Patriotic Front;

3. Establishment of power-sharing within the framework of a broad-based transitional

government.

Article VI

The political negotiations culminating in the peace agreement shall proceed pursuant

to the following calendar:

1. Commencement of the political negotiations: 10th August 1992;

2. Completion of the political negotiations and signing of the peace agreement: not

later than 10 October 1992;

3. Completion of the implementation of the mechanisms and conclusions agreed upon

pursuant to the peace Agreement: not later than 10 January 1993.

Article VII

In the present Agreement:

1. “Cease-fire” shall mean the cessation of all hostilities between the forces of

the Government of the Rwandese Republic and those of the Rwandese Patriotic Front

(RPF) throughout the national territory of Rwanda.

Appendix A

A-10

2. “Cessation of hostilities” shall mean the end of all military operations, all

harmful civil operations and denigrating and unfounded propaganda through the mass

media.

3. “Violation of the Cease-fire” shall mean the non-observance of one of the

points mentioned in Article II.

4. “Violation of the Cease-fire Agreement” shall mean the non-observance of

any provision of the agreement.

Done in Arusha on 12th July 1992.

For the Rwandese Government:

(Signed) Boniface NGULINZIRA

Minister for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation

For the Rwandese Patriotic Front:

(Signed) Pasteur BIZIMUNGU

Member of the Executive Committee for Information and Documentation

For the Facilitator (the United Republic of Tanzania)

(Signed) Hon. Ahmed Hassan DIRIA (MP)

Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation

In the presence of the Representative of the Secretary-General of the OAU

(Signed) M. T. MAPURANGA

Assistant Secretary-General in Charge of Political Affairs

Protocol of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and

the Rwandese Patriotic Front on the Rule of Law

Signed at Arusha on 18 August 1992.

PREAMBLE:

The Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front,

Reaffirming that the Rule of Law, the principle of the establishment of which was

agreed upon by the signatories of the present Protocol of Agreement, in accordance with Article

V of the N‟sele Agreement, as amended in Gbadolite, on the 16th of September, 1991 and in

Arusha on the 12th of July, 1992, shall characterize the political life in our country;

Appendix A

A-11

Considering that the Rule of Law implies that nobody, including the authorities, is

above the law and that-the laws must respect the fundamental rights of the citizens;

Reaffirming that the Rule of Law does not mean merely a formal legality which

assures regularity and consistency in the achievement and enforcement of democratic order, and

which is first and foremost and fundamentally characterised by justice based on the recognition

and full acceptance of the supreme value of the human personality and guaranteed by institutions

providing a framework for its fullest expression;

Convinced that the Rule of Law:

- is the best guarantee of national unity, the respect of the fundamental

freedoms and rights of the

Individual;

- is a concrete manifestation of democracy;

- hinges on national unity, democracy, pluralism and respect for human rights;

Have agreed as follows:

Chapter I: National Unity

Article 1

National unity must be based on equality of all citizens before the law, equal

opportunities in all fields including the economic field and respect for fundamental rights as

stipulated, notably, in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in the African Charter on

Human and Peoples‟ Rights.

Article 2

National unity implies that the Rwandese people, as constituent elements of the

Rwandese nation, are one and indivisible. It also implies the necessity to fight all obstacles to

national unity, notably, ethnicism, regionalism, integrism and intolerance which subordinate the

national interest to ethnic, regional, religious and personal interest.

Article 3

National unity entails the rejection of all exclusions and any form of discrimination

based notably, on ethnicity, region, sex and religion. It also entails that all citizens have equal

opportunity of access to all the political, economic and other advantages, which access must be

guaranteed by the State.

Appendix A

A-12

Article 4

The two parties acknowledge that the national unity of the people of Rwanda cannot

be achieved without a definitive solution to the problem of Rwandese refugees. They recognize

that the return of the Rwandese refugees to their country is an inalienable right and represents a

factor of peace, unity and national reconciliation. They undertake not to hinder the free exercise

of this right by the refugees.

Chapter II: Democracy

Article 5

Democracy is founded on the idea that sovereignty belongs to the people. It is

expressed, notably, through regular, free, transparent and fair elections. Popular representation

must be the authentic expression of the will of citizens.

Article 6

The two parties accept the universality as well as the implications of the following

fundamental principles of democracy:

- sovereignty of the people;

- government based on the consent of the people expressed through regular,

free, transparent and fair elections;

- separation of the legislative, the executive and the judiciary powers;

- independence of the Judiciary;

- guarantee for the fundamental rights of the individual as provided for in the

Universal Declaration of Human Rights as well as in the African Charter on Human and

Peoples‟ Rights, among others, freedom of speech, enterprise and of political, social and

economic association;

- laws and regulations based on the respect of fundamental human rights;

- equality before the law;

- respect of laws and regulations by all;

- Constitution which respects the principles enunciated above, organises the

State powers and defines the powers and limitations of the Institutions of the Republic;

Appendix A

A-13

- multipartism, social and economic pluralism.

Article 7

The two parties recognize that multipartism entails the legitimate existence of a

democratic opposition and consider, as legitimate, the aspiration of any Rwandese citizen to

accede to power through democratic process.

Article 8

The two parties resolutely reject and undertake to fight:

- political ideologies based on ethnicity, region, religion and intolerance which

subordinate national interest to the ethnic, regional, religious or personal interest;

- any form of coup d‟état as being contrary to the democratic system as

described above.

Article 9

In order to promote and consolidate the democratic system as described above, the

two parties undertake to work for social, economic and cultural development of the country and

to fight hunger, ignorance, poverty and disease.

Article 10

Elections shall be organised in such a way that transparency is guaranteed and fraud

eliminated through the establishment of efficient supervision mechanisms including, if the need

arises, enlisting the assistance of International Observers.

The prior and full explanation of the citizens‟ rights and civic duties including the

issues at stake in the elections is their inalienable right as a way of avoiding any form of political

manipulation.

Article 11

The two parties accept to promote, in national political life, a democratic culture

based on the principles enunciated above.

Article 12

The broad-based transitional government provided for in Article V of the N‟sele

Agreement, as amended in Gbadolite, on 16th September, 1991 and in Arusha on 12th July,

1992, shall lead the country to a democratic system as defined above.

Appendix A

A-14

To this end, the two parties note that a political process has been initiated by the

Rwandese people to ensure the progress of democracy and reaffirm the need to build together a

society founded on the Rule of Law as stipulated in the present Protocol.

Chapter III: Pluralism

Article 13

The two parties recognise that a democratic society is also founded on pluralism

which is the expression of individual freedoms and must respect national unity and the

fundamental rights of the citizen.

Chapter IV: Human Rights

Article 14

The two parties recognise the universal nature of human rights and should express

concern when these rights are violated anywhere and by anybody.

They also recognise that the International Community would be justified in

expressing concern in the event that these rights are violated by anybody on Rwandese territory.

These rights should be guaranteed by the Constitution and the laws of the Republic of Rwanda.

Article 15

The two parties agree that a National Commission on Human Rights shall be

established. This institution shall be independent and shall investigate human rights violations

committed by anybody on Rwandese territory, in particular, by organs of the State and

individuals in their capacity as agents of the State or of various organisations.

The investigation work of the Commission shall not be limited in time.

The Commission shall be provided with the necessary means, especially legal means,

to efficiently accomplish its mission. It shall utilise its findings to:

a) sensitize and educate the population about human rights;

b) institute legal proceedings, where necessary.

Article 16

The two parties also agree to establish an International Commission of Enquiry to

investigate human rights violations committed during the war.

Appendix A

A-15

Conclusion

Article 17

The two parties concur that national unity, democracy and peace are invaluable and

solemnly undertake to do everything possible so as to preserve these values in the interest of the

present and future Rwandese generations.

Done at Arusha, the 18th day of August, 1992 in French and English, the French

version being the original.

For and on behalf of the Government of the Republic of Rwanda:

Boniface Ngulinzira

Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation

For and on behalf of the Rwandese Patriotic Front:

Pasteur Bizimungu

Member of the Executive Committee and Commissioner for Information and

Documentation

For and on behalf of the Facilitator (United Republic of Tanzania):

Benjamin Mkapa

Minister for Science, Technology and Higher Education

In the presence of the Representative of the Current Chairman of the OAU:

Papa Louis Fall

Ambassador of Senegal to Ethiopia, Tanzania and the OAU

In the presence of the Representative of the Secretary General of the OAU

Dr. M.T. Mapuranga

Assistant Secretary General in charge of Political Affairs

Protocol of Agreement on Power-Sharing within the Framework of a Broad-

Based Transitional Government between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and

the Rwandese Patriotic Front

The Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front:

Agree on the following provisions which are an integral part of the Protocol of

Agreement on Power-sharing:

Appendix A

A-16

Chapter 1: General Principles

Article 1

The two parties reaffirm the acceptance of the principle of power-sharing within the

framework of a Broad-Based Transitional Government, in conformity with Article V.3. of the

N‟sele Ceasefire Agreement, as amended at GBADOLITE on 16th September, 1991 and at

ARUSHA on 12th July, 1992. The modalities of implementation of this principle are the object

of the present Protocol of Agreement on Power-sharing.

Article 2

The two parties agree that those modalities shall consist of:

(a) the maintenance of the current structure of the Coalition Government with

appropriate adjustments to be mutually agreed upon in this Protocol, with a view to

making room for the participation of the RPF and other political forces in the country;

(b) appropriate adjustments to be mutually agreed upon in this Protocol, to be

made at the level of the State powers with a view to enabling the RPF and other political

forces in the country to participate in and make for the efficient management of the

transition, in compliance principle of separation of powers.

Chapter II: Transitional Institutions

Article 3

During the Transitional Period, the State institutions shall be:

(i) The Presidency of the Republic;

(ii) The Broad-Based Transitional Government;

(iii) The Transitional National Assembly;

(iv) The Institutions of the Judiciary.

Chapter III: The Executive Power

Article 4

The Executive power shall be exercised collectively through decisions taken in

Cabinet meetings, by the President of the Republic and by the Government.

Section 1: The President of the Republic and Head of State

Article 5

Appendix A

A-17

Upon the signing of the Peace Agreement, the incumbent President of the Republic

and Head of State shall remain in office until the outcome of elections to be held at the end of the

Transitional Period.

Article 6

As Head of State, the President of the Republic shall have the following prerogatives:

(a) He shall nominate the Prime Minister and other members of the Cabinet

within three days following their appointment by the relevant bodies. After this period,

the Prime Minister shall assume office and appoint other Members of the Cabinet.

Modalities for the appointment of the Prime Minister and other Members of

the Cabinet shall be

provided for in this Peace Agreement;

(b) He shall nominate and accredit Ambassadors, Plenipotentiaries and

Extraordinary Envoys abroad, after their appointment by the Cabinet. He shall receive

credentials of Ambassadors and Extraordinary Envoys from abroad, after their approval

by the Cabinet;

(c) He shall represent the Rwandese State in its relations with other States;

(d) He shall sanction and promulgate, without any right of veto, bills passed

by the National Assembly and Orders in Council adopted in the Cabinet meetings within

ten days following the date of receipt of the ruling on their constitutionality. After this

period, Orders in Council shall be sanctioned and promulgated by the Prime Minister,

and the bills shall be sanctioned and promulgated by the Speaker of the Transitional

National Assembly;

(e) He shall declare war and sign armistice upon the decision of the Cabinet

and after authorization by the National Assembly. To this end, he shall bear the title of

Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces.

The Army and other security forces shall be accountable to the Cabinet, in accordance

with the modalities specified in the Peace Agreement.

Article 7

The President of the Republic shall have the right to include any issue of national

interest on the agenda of Cabinet meetings.

Appendix A

A-18

Article 8

The President of the Republic may, if he so wishes, attend meetings of the Cabinet. In

this case, he shall chair the Cabinet meetings.

Article 9

Executive Orders by the President of the Republic, shall be discussed and adopted by

the Cabinet. Since the President of the Republic shall have the right to be involved in decision-

making in the Cabinet, he shall have no right of veto on decisions regularly taken by the Cabinet,

in particular, draft Presidential Orders when these are submitted to him by the Prime Minister for

signature. This signature officializing the Presidential Orders adopted in the Cabinet, shall be

effected within ten days following the day of receipt of the said Orders at the Presidency of the

Republic. After this period, the decision shall come into force by way of a Prime Ministerial

Order.

Article 10

Legal Acts by the President of the Republic shall be countersigned by the Prime

Minister and by relevant Ministers and Secretaries of State.

Article 11

In pursuance of the decisions of the Cabinet and in conformity with the procedure

defined under Article 9 of the present Protocol, the President of the Republic shall sign

Presidential Orders with regard to the following:

1. the prerogative of mercy;

2. the minting of currency;

3. award of the National Orders:

4. the implementation of laws, when he is so required;

5. the appointment and termination of services of the following senior civil

servants:

the Principal Private Secretary to the President of the Republic;

the Chancellor for National Orders;

the Governor of the National Bank of Rwanda;

the Rector of the National University of Rwanda;

Ambassadors;

the Secretary to the Cabinet;

the Personal Secretary to the President of the Republic;

Advisors in the Presidency of the Republic;

Principal Private Secretaries in Ministries;

Advisors in Ministries;

Appendix A

A-19

Head of the Prosecution Department at the Supreme Court;

6. Ratification of International Treaties, Conventions and Agreements. However,

Peace Treaties,

Treaties of Alliance, Treaties which may entail altering national borders or affect the

rights of sovereignty, Treaties on the association of the Republic with one or several other

States, as well as Treaties, Conventions and Agreements with financial implications not catered

for in the budget, shall be implemented only after their approval by way of a law. The federation

of the Republic of Rwanda with one or several other democratic States must be approved

through a Referendum.

Article 12

The President of the Republic shall address messages to the Nation, the content of

which shall be decided upon by the Cabinet.

Section 2: The Broad-based Transitional Government

Article 13

The current structure of the Government, namely, the number and appellation of

Ministries, shall remain unchanged. However, a Secretariat of State in the Prime Minister‟s

Office in charge of Social Rehabilitation and Integration shall be established.

It shall be responsible for:

1. Repatriation and social and economic reintegration of the Rwandese

refugees who may wish to go back home;

2. A Post-War Rehabilitation Programme as defined under Item 23.D of the

present Protocol.

Article 14

The political parties participating in the Coalition Government established on 16th

April, 1992 as well as the Rwandese Patriotic Front shall have the responsibility to set up the

Broad-Based Transitional Government.

They shall decide, by consensus, on the other political formations which may

participate in that Government.

Article 15

Appendix A

A-20

The Government shall be composed of the Prime Minister, the Deputy Prime

Minister, Ministers and Secretaries of State.

Sub-section 1: The Powers of the Government:

Article 16

The Government shall be responsible for the management of the country. It shall

determine and implement national policy. In so doing, the Government shall:

1. Be responsible for the implementation of laws and regulations;

2. Negotiate and conclude international Treaties, Conventions and

Agreements;

3. Discuss and adopt draft bills and present them to the National Assembly;

4. Discuss and adopt Orders in Council, in situations of emergency or when

the National Assembly is unable to seat, and transmit them to the President of the

Republic for promulgation;

5. Appoint and dismiss civil servants.

6. Discuss and adopt Presidential, Prime Ministerial and Ministerial Statutory

Orders on the

implementation of laws.

Article 17

The Government shall be the guarantor of national sovereignty and national unity.

Sub-section 2: The Prime Minister

Article 18:

The Prime Minister shall:

1. In accordance with the Peace Agreement and in consultation with the

political forces, prepare the Government programme;

2. In conformity with the modalities provided for in the Peace Agreement,

select the other members of the Cabinet;

3. Present the Government programme and the Ministerial team responsible

for its implementation to the National Assembly;

Appendix A

A-21

4. Lead Government business, convene and chair Cabinet Meetings. He shall

prepare the agenda for cabinet meetings, in consultation with the other members of the

Government. The Prime Minister shall communicate the agenda to the President of the

Republic and to the other members of the Government, at least two days before the date

of the meeting.

5. Determine the functions of the Ministers and Secretaries of State as well as

the nature and extent of powers of the services under them.

The Ministers and Secretaries of State shall be delegated powers by the Prime

Minister for the

management of the duties of their departments. The Prime Minister shall determine

the extent of this delegation of power.

6. In pursuance of the decisions of the Cabinet, sign Prime Ministerial Orders

for the appointment and termination of services of the following senior civil servants:

- the Principal Private Secretary to the Prime Minister;

- Deputy Governors of the National Bank of Rwanda;

- Vice-Rectors of the National University of Rwanda;

- Advisers and “Chefs de Service” in the Prime Minister‟s Office;

- the “Préfets de Préfecture”;

- Director in Public Enterprises;

- Directors General in the Ministries;

- Planning and Coordination Officers in Public Enterprises;

- Directors in Public Enterprises and Representatives of the Government in

Parastatals;

- Directors and Heads of Division in the Ministries:

- “Sous-Préfets”;

- Bourgmestres;

- Deputy Directors of Public Prosecution at the Supreme Court;

- Head of the Prosecution Department of the Courts of Appeal;

- Deputy Directors of the Courts of Appeal;

- Head of the Prosecution Department at the Courts of First Instance;

- Assistant State Attorneys.

Upon delegation of power by the Cabinet,

(a) the Minister responsible for the Civil Service shall sign Ministerial Orders

with regard to

appointments and termination of services of Civil Servants from the rank of

chief Clerk or

equivalent and lower-level posts.

Appendix A

A-22

(b) The Minister of Justice shall sign Ministerial Orders for the appointment

and termination of

services of Judicial staff other than magistrates.

(c) In Public Enterprises, senior staff shall be appointed by the Board of

Directors and the rest of

the staff by the relevant Director.

7. Countersign, after their promulgation by the President of the Republic, bills

passed by the National Assembly as well as Statutory Orders in Council adopted by the

Cabinet.

8. By way of Orders decided upon during cabinet meetings, implement laws

and regulations when he is required to do so.

9. Address messages to the Nation whose content shall be decided upon by the

Cabinet.

10. May, under exceptional circumstances, after a decision taken by the

Cabinet and on consultation with the Bureau of the National Assembly and the Supreme

Court, declare a State of Siege or a State of Emergency.

Article 19

Legal acts by the Prime Minister shall be countersigned relevant Ministers and

Secretaries of State.

Sub-section 3: Functions of the Deputy Prime Minister

Article 20

The Deputy Prime Minister shall:

1. Upon formal delegation of power, replace the Prime Minister in the event

of his absence or hindrance.

2. Act as Prime Minister when the post falls vacant, until a new Prime

Minister is appointed, following modalities provided for in the Peace Agreement.

3. In addition, hold a Ministerial Portfolio.

Sub-Section 4: Mode of Decision-Making within the Government

Appendix A

A-23

Article 21

Prior to the deliberations, the Cabinet meeting shall adopt its agenda.

Cabinet decisions shall be taken by consensus. Where consensus is not reached, the

issue at hand shall be returned to the relevant Minister for further study.

Consensus on the issue shall once again be required subsequent discussions, and if no

consensus is reached, a decision shall be taken on the basis of a partial consensus of a 2/3 of the

members of the Government present.

For the following issues, however, consensus shall be mandatory:

- amendment to the Peace Agreement;

- declaration of war;

- exercise of the prerogative of mercy and mitigation of sentence;

- defence and security matters.

Article 22

For each Cabinet Meeting, minutes and a summary of decisions shall be written. The

summary shall be approved and signed by members who attended the said meeting.

Sub-Section 5: Outline of the Broad-based Transitional Government Programme

Article 23

The Broad-based Transitional Government shall implement the programme

comprising the following:

A. Democracy

1. Consolidate the democratic process by establishing the necessary mechanisms for

the implementation of the provisions of the Protocol on the Rule of Law.

2. Prepare and organise general elections to be held at the end of the Transition

Period.

B. Defence and Security

1. Consolidate peace by taking the necessary measures for the eradication of the

causes of war,

especially those stemming from the non-respect of National Unity, Human Rights and

Democracy.

Appendix A

A-24

2. Ensure internal and external security.

3. Take the necessary measures for guaranteeing the security of all the people and

their property.

4. Organise defence and security institutions.

C. National Unity and National Reconciliation

1. Restore national unity, in particular and as a matter of urgency by:

a) Setting up efficient mechanisms aimed at eliminating all types of discrimination

and exclusion;

b) Working out appropriate legislation in this regard;

c) Establishing a recruitment system for senior government posts, for all other posts,

and for admission to schools, based on fair competition giving equal opportunity to all

citizens.

2. Organise a national debate on National Unity and National Reconciliation.

D. Post-war Rehabilitation Programme

1. Provide humanitarian assistance, especially through the supply of foodstuffs, seeds

and some building materials in a bid to contribute in the resettlement of those displaced as a

result of the war and social strife encountered since the outbreak of the war, in their original

property.

2. Rehabilitate and rebuild the areas devastated by war and social strife encountered

since the outbreak of war, especially through mine-clearance and rebuilding of socio-educational

and administrative facilities.

3. Set up a programme of assistance to the victims of war (both civilian and military)

and of social strife encountered since the outbreak of the war, to the physically handicapped,

orphans, widows and widowers.

4. Set up appropriate programmes for the economic and social integration of the

demobilised military personnel.

E. Repatriation and Reintegration of Refugees

Appendix A

A-25

Repatriate and reintegrate all Rwandese refugees who may wish to go back home,

following the

modalities specified in the Peace Agreement.

F. The Economy

1. Stimulate the economy by, as a priority, orienting economic programmes towards

the disadvantaged regions and social strata.

2. Review the country‟s priorities with the aim of promoting food security

(application of selected seeds and fertilizers, storage, etc.)

3. Diversify export products.

4. Encourage small and medium scale industries.

5. Draw up and apply strategies for better utilization of the country‟s resources

(natural and human).

G. National Ethics

1. Establish a mechanism for guaranteeing a professional code of ethics, integrity and

patriotism.

2. Establish a system for the eradication of all forms of corruption.

3. Evaluate and clean up all the State administrative institutions.

Chapter IV: Specialised Commissions

Article 24

In addition to the Commissions already agreed upon in the previous Agreements, the

following broad-based specialised Commissions shall be established:

A. Commission for National Unity and National Reconciliation

This commission, which reports to the Government, shall be responsible for:

1. Preparing a national debate on national unity and national reconciliation.

2. Prepare and distribute information aimed at educating the population and achieving

national

Appendix A

A-26

unity and national reconciliation.

B. Legal and Constitutional Commission

This Commission shall be responsible for:

1. Drawing up a list of adaptations of national legislation to the provisions of the

Peace Agreement, in particular those provisions relating to the Rule of Law.

2. Prepare a preliminary draft of the Constitution which shall govern the country after

the Transitional Period.

C. Electoral Commission

This Commission shall be responsible for the preparation and organisation of local,

legislative and presidential elections.

Chapter V: The Judiciary

Section 1: General Principles

Article 25

1. The powers of the Judiciary shall be exercised by courts, tribunals and other

jurisdictions. The Judiciary is independent of the Legislature and the Executive.

Justice shall be rendered on the territory of the Republic in the name of the people.

Section 2: Jurisdictions

Article 26

The following ordinary jurisdictions shall be recognized:

- Canton Courts, Courts of First Instance, Courts of Appeal and the Supreme Court.

The following military jurisdictions shall also recognized:

- Court Martials and the Military Court.

The law may establish any other specialized courts. However, no special courts may

be established.

Appendix A

A-27

Section 3: The Supreme Court

Article 27

The Supreme Court shall particular exercise the following functions:

(a) direct and coordinate the activities of the courts and tribunals of the Republic. It

shall be the

guarantor of the independence of the judiciary. To this effect, it shall be responsible

for the professional code of ethics;

(b) ensure the constitutionality of laws and Orders in Council. In so doing, it shall

ensure their

constitutionality before promulgation;

(c) give a ruling on the petition for annulment of regulations, orders and decisions

issued by administrative authorities:

(d) ensure the regularity of popular consultations;

(e) provide, upon request, legal opinions on the regularity of draft Presidential, Prime

Ministerial and Ministerial orders as well as on other draft public administration regulations;

(f) give the authentic interpretation on customary practice in case written law is silent

thereon;

(g) give a ruling on appeals to the Court of Cassation to have a new trial ordered and

on transfer of cases from one Court to another;

(h) arbitrate on institutional conflicts between various State organs;

(i) judge the accounts of all public institutions;

(j) have criminal jurisdiction over the President of the Republic, the Speaker of the

National Assembly, the Presiding Judge of the Supreme Court, the Prime Minister, the Deputy

Prime Minister, Ministers, Secretaries of State, the Deputy-Presiding Judges of the Supreme

Court, Deputies in the National Assembly, the Presiding Judges of the Courts of Appeal, the

Public Prosecutors and Deputy Directors of the Supreme Court and of the Courts of Appeal.

On first trial, the above-listed officials shall be tried by the Court of Cassation. On

appeal, they shall be judged by the Supreme Court, in the presence of all the Jurisdictional

sections, with at least eleven Judges without including the Judges of the Bench of the Court of

Cassation who gave a ruling on the case on the first trial.

Appendix A

A-28

Article 28

The Supreme Court shall comprise the following five sections:

(a) The Department of Courts and Tribunals;

(b) The Court of Cassation;

(c) The Constitutional Court;

(d) The Council of State;

(e) The Public Accounts Court.

Article 29

The Supreme Court shall be chaired by a Presiding Judge assisted by five Deputy

Presiding Judges. The Presiding Judge and the Deputy Presiding Judges shall be selected by the

National Assembly from a list presented by the Government based on two candidates for each

post. Each Deputy Presiding Judge shall also be Head of one of the sections of the Supreme

Court.

The services of the Presiding Judge and Deputy Presiding Judges of the Supreme

Court shall be terminated by the National Assembly voting by a 2/3 majority, either upon its

initiative, or upon the proposal of the Government. The instruments of appointment and

termination of the services of the Presiding Judge and Deputy Presiding Judges shall be signed

by the President of the Republic.

Article 30

Candidates for the post of Presiding Judge and Deputy Presiding Judges of the

Supreme Court must meet the following requirements:

1. Hold at least a University Degree in Law.

2. Give proof of at least five years‟ practical experience in the field of Law.

Article 31

Judges of the Supreme Court, of the Court of Appeal as well as the Presiding Judges

of the Courts of first instance must hold at least a Degree in Law or equivalent.

Article 32

Upon the decision of the Supreme Council of the Magistrates, the Presiding Judge of

the Supreme Court shall sign the Instruments of appointment and termination of services of

Judges of the Bench.

Appendix A

A-29

Article 33

An organic law shall determine the powers, the organisation and the rules of

procedure of the Supreme Court.

Pending the adoption of the said law, the legislation in force relating to the powers,

organisation and the rules of procedure of these Courts shall remain in force.

Section 5: Relationship between the Supreme Court and the Government

Article 34

The Government shall delegate one or several Commissioners to one or all sections of

the Supreme Court to represent it and to avail any required information.

The Government Commissioners shall participate in discussions on matters for which

they have been designated but as non-voting members.

Article 35

The implementation of the decisions by the Supreme Court, as well as the financial

management of, and other administrative measures concerning the Supreme Court shall be

vested in the Government. However, the law organizing of the Supreme Court shall define the

administrative measures coming under its jurisdiction.

Article 36

In matters relating to the organization of the Judiciary, the Supreme Court may

submit to the Government any reform proposals which, in its opinion, are of general interest.

Section 6: The Supreme Council of Magistrates

Article 37

The Supreme Court of Council of the Magistrates shall comprise:

- The Presiding Judge of the Supreme Court as Chairman;

- the Deputy-Presiding Judges of the Supreme Court;

- two Judges of the Bench of the Supreme Court;

- a Judge of the Bench from each Court of Appeal;

- a Judge of the Bench from Courts of First Instance under the Jurisdiction of each

Court of Appeal;

- a Magistrate of Canton Court under the Jurisdiction of each Court of Appeal.

Appendix A

A-30

The Government Commissioners to the Department of Courts and Tribunals shall

attend meetings of the Supreme Council of Magistrates as non-voting members.

The Council shall elect from its members a Vice-Chairman and a Rapporteur.

Article 38

With the exception of the Presiding Judge and the Deputy-Presiding Judges of the

Supreme Court, members of the Supreme Council of Magistrates shall be elected by their peers

of the same level of jurisdiction.

Applications shall be submitted to the Supreme Court at least one month before the

date of elections. Each candidate shall give proof of at least five years‟ practical experience in

the field of Law.

Elections shall be organized by the Supreme Court.

Article 39

The Supreme Council of the Magistrates shall have the following powers:

(a) Decide on the appointment and termination of services and, in general, the

administration of the career of Judges of the Bench other than the Presiding Judge and Deputy-

Presiding Judges of the Supreme Court.

(b) Give advisory opinion upon its own initiative or upon request, on any proposal

relating to the

Judicial staff regulations within its jurisdictions.

(c) Give advisory opinion, upon its own initiative or upon request, on any matter

concerning the

administration of Justice.

Chapter VI: Other Areas of Agreement

Article 40

The initiative of laws shall be vested in the Cabinet and the National Assembly.

Article 41

The Constitution which shall govern the country after the Transition Period shall be

prepared by the Legal and Constitutional Commission comprising national experts referred to

Appendix A

A-31

under Article 24.B of this Protocol. This Commission, which shall be under the National

Assembly, shall prepare, after an extensive consultation with all the strata of the population, a

preliminary draft Constitution which shall be submitted to the Government for advice, before

submitting it to the National Assembly which shall finalise the draft Constitution, to be

submitted to a Referendum for adoption.

Article 42

The National Assembly shall exercise control over the Government‟s activities, in

line with the mechanisms provided for by the law.

Article 43

The National Budget shall be prepared by the Government and voted by the National

Assembly. Where the budget is not voted in time, the Prime Minister shall, upon the decision of

the Government, pass a decree authorising the disbursement of monthly provisional expenditure.

Article 44

The “Office Rwandais d‟Information” (ORINFOR) shall fall under the Ministry

responsible for Information and the “Office du Tourisme et des Parcs Nationaux” (ORTPN)

under the Ministry responsible for Tourism.

Article 45

In criminal matters the responsibility of the President of the Republic, the Speaker of

the National Assembly, the Presiding Judge of the Supreme Court, the Prime Minister, the

Deputy Prime Minister, Ministers, Secretaries of State, the Assistant Presiding Judges of the

Supreme Court and Deputies, shall be individual.

However, they shall not be subjected to custody. They may appear before Justice

through their proxies. They shall be judged by the Supreme Court.

Deputies shall not be prosecuted or sued as a result of opinions expressed or votes

cast in the exercise of their duties.

Article 46

As a matter of urgency and priority, the Broad-based Transitional Government shall

rid the administrative apparatus of all incompetent elements as well as authorities who were

involved in the social strife or whose activities are an obstacle to the democratic process and to

national reconciliation.

Appendix A

A-32

In any case, all local authorities (Bourgmestres, Sous-Préfets, Préfets de Préfecture)

shall have been either replaced or confirmed within three months after the establishment of the

Broad-based Transitional Government.

Done at Arusha, on this 30th day of October, 1992 in French and English, the French

text being the original.

For the Rwandese Government:

Boniface Ngulinzira

Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation

For the Rwandese Patriotic Front:

Pasteur Bizimungu

Member of the Executive Committee and Commissioner for Information and

Documentation

In the presence of Representative of Facilitator (United Republic of Tanzania):

Ahmed Hassan Diria Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation

In the presence of the Representative of Chairman of the OAU:

Papa Louis Fall

Ambassador of Senegal to Ethiopia, Tanzania and the OAU

In the presence of Secretary General of the OAU

Dr. M.T. Mapuranga

Secrétaire Général Adjoint, chargé des Affaires politiques

Protocol of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and

the Rwandese Patriotic Front on Power-Sharing within the Framework of a Broad-Based

Transitional Government

(Continuation of the Protocol of Agreement signed on 30th October, 1992)

The Government of the Republic of Rwanda on the one hand, and the Rwandese

Patriotic Front on the other;

Agree on the following provisions which are an integral part of the Protocol of

Agreement on Power-Sharing:

Appendix A

A-33

Chapter VII: New Areas of Agreement

Section 1: Provisions relating to the Executive Power

Sub-Section 1: Replacement of the President of the Republic during the Transitional

Period

Article 47

In the event of a temporary impediment or incapacity of the President of the Republic

to carry out his duties, the Speaker of the Transitional National Assembly shall assume the

interim until the incumbent President resumes office.

Article 48

In the event of resignation or death, permanent impediment or incapacitation of the

President of the Republic:

1. The office shall be declared vacant by the Supreme Court upon request by the

Broad-Based

Transitional Government.

2. The interim Presidency shall be assumed by the Speaker of the Transitional

National Assembly.

3. The replacement of the President of the Republic shall be conducted in the

following manner:

a) The party of the former President of the Republic shall present two candidates to

the Bureau of the Transitional National Assembly within three (3) weeks of the declaration of the

vacancy.

b) Within the fourth week, the election of the President of the Republic shall be

conducted in a

joint session of the Broad-Based Transitional Government and the Transitional

National Assembly. The respective members of the two institutions shall elect the President of

the Republic by secret ballot and by an absolute majority. The election shall be

supervised by the

Speaker of the Transitional National Assembly.

Appendix A

A-34

c) If the Party of the former President of the Republic, for one reason or another, is

not willing to

present a candidate or cannot present any candidate, or if the President of the

Republic has

resigned from his party in the meantime, each political force represented in the

Transitional

National Assembly may submit one (1) candidate within six (6) weeks after the

declaration of

the vacancy. The election shall be conducted during the seventh week, at the latest,

following the

modalities provided for in point (b) above.

d) If the vacancy is declared three (3) months or less before the expiry of the

transitional period,

the Speaker of the Transitional National Assembly shall assume the interim

Presidency of the

Republic until the end of the Transition.

Article 49

The candidate to the Presidency of the Republic should be at least thirty-five (35)

years of age. Once elected, the President cannot perform any military or other remunerative

activity.

Article 50

The new President of the Republic shall be sworn in within eight (8) days after his

election, by the Presiding Judge of the Supreme Court, before the National Transitional

Assembly.

Sub-Section 2: Appointment of the Prime Minister, Ministers and Secretaries of State

Article 51

The candidate for the post of Prime Minister shall be presented by the political

formation designated to that effect. He shall be presented to the two parties to the negotiations

for approval. He should be known before the signing of the Peace Agreement.

Article 52

The Prime Minister shall, in consultation with each political force called upon to

participate in the Government, select candidates for the portfolios distributed among the various

political forces. He shall present them to the President of the Republic for appointment as well as

Appendix A

A-35

to the Transitional National Assembly, in accordance with Article 18, paragraph 3 of the

Protocol of Agreement signed on 30th October, 1992.

Sub-Section 3: Replacement of the Prime Minister, Ministers and Secretaries of State

Article 53

The vacancy of the post of Prime Minister shall be declared by the Supreme Court

upon request by the Broad-Based Transitional Government. The political force of the former

Prime Minister shall submit a candidate within fifteen (15) days of the declaration of the

vacancy. Political formations participating in the Broad-Based Transitional Government shall,

under the coordination of the Deputy Prime Minister, hold consultations for the approval of the

candidate.

Once a consensus is reached, the Deputy Prime Minister shall present the candidate to

the President of the Republic for appointment within three (3) days.

Article 54

The Prime Minister, in consultation with the political force of the Minister or

Secretary of State to be replaced, shall present a candidate to the President of the Republic for

appointment.

Sub-Section 4: Distribution of Ministerial Portfolios within the Broad-Based

Transitional Government

In accordance with the provisions of Article 14 of the Protocol of Agreement signed

on 30th October, 1992, the numerical distribution of the portfolios among political forces called

upon to participate in the Broad-Based Transitional Government shall be as follows:

MRND: 5 portfolios

RPF: 5 portfolios

MDR: 4 portfolios (including the post of Prime Minister)

PSD: 3 portfolios

PL: 3 portfolios

PDC: 1 portfolio

Article 56

Nominative distribution of portfolios shall be as follows:

MRND

1. Ministry of Defence;

Appendix A

A-36

2. Ministry of Higher Education, Scientific Research and Culture;

3. Ministry of Public Service;

4. Ministry of Planning;

5. Ministry of Family Affairs and Promotion of the Status of Women.

RPF

1. Ministry of Interior and Communal Development;

2. Ministry of Transport and Communications;

3. Ministry of Health;

4. Ministry of Youth and Associative Movement;

5. Secretariat of State for Rehabilitation and Social Integration.

MDR

1. Prime Minister;

2. Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation;

3. Ministry of Primary and Secondary Education;

4. Ministry of Information.

PSD

1. Ministry of Finance;

2. Ministry of Public works and Energy;

3. Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock Development.

PL

1. Ministry of Justice;

2. Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Cottage Industry;

3. Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs;

PDC: Ministry of Environment and Tourism

Article 57

The two parties further agree that:

- With reference to Article 5 of the Protocols of Agreement signed on 30th October,

1992, the Presidency of the Republic shall go to the MRND party;

- one of the holders of the five (5) ministries allocated to the RPF shall bear the title

of Deputy Prime Minister in accordance with Article 20, paragraph 3 of the Protocol of

Agreement signed on 30th October, 1992.

Appendix A

A-37

Article 58

In case one of the political forces called upon to participate in the Broad-based

Transitional Government as provided for under Article 14 of the Protocol of Agreement signed

on 30th October, 1992, defaults, the portfolios which had been allocated to that force shall be

distributed among the remaining political forces. The possibility of opening to political forces

other than those mentioned under Articles 55 and 56 above shall be agreed upon by consensus in

accordance with Article 14 cited above.

Article 59

Permanent impediment rendering the President of the Republic, Ministers and

Secretaries of State incapable of carrying out their duties shall be declared by the Supreme Court

following their resignation, death or physical incapacitation certified by a medical commission

established by the Government for that purpose, and also following dismissal as a result of final

sentencing for criminal offences.

Section 2: Transitional National Assembly

Article 60

The Transitional National Assembly shall, except in the case as provided for in

Article 63 of this Protocol of Agreement, be normally composed of seventy (70) members called

“Deputies to the Transitional National Assembly”. The “Deputies” shall be appointed by their

own political forces and their mandate shall cover the whole Transitional Period. The

Transitional National Assembly shall make its own rules of procedure.

Article 61

All the political parties registered in Rwanda at the signing of this Protocol as well as

the RPF shall be represented in the Transitional National Assembly, on condition that they

adhere to and abide by the provisions of the Peace Agreement. To that effect, all these parties

and the RPF should, prior to the establishment of the Broad-Based Transitional National

Assembly and the Broad-Based Transitional Government, sign a Political Code of Ethics whose

principles are spelt out in Article 80 of this Protocol.

Since the RPF and the political parties Participating in the current Coalition

Government are automatically, directly or indirectly bound, as a result of the Protocol of

Agreement on the Rule of Law signed by the two parties to the negotiations, the political parties

which do not participate in the said Government should, from the time of the signing of the

Protocol of Agreement on Power-Sharing, demonstrate their commitment to abide by the

principles governing the Protocol of Agreement on the Rule of Law, to support the peace process

and to avoid engaging in sectarian practices and in any form of violence. Such commitment shall

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constitute a prerequisite for their participation in the Transitional National Assembly and it is

incumbent upon the two

parties to the negotiations to see to it that such commitment is real.

Article 62

The numerical distribution of seats in the Transitional National Assembly among the

political forces, subject to the implementation of the previous Article, shall be as follows:

MRND: 11 seats

RPF: 11 seats

MDR: 11 seats

PSD: 11 seats

PL: 11 seats

PDC: 4 seats

The other registered parties shall have one (1) seat each.

Article 63

a) The maximum number of members of the Transitional National Assembly shall

become the total number of seats of the remaining political forces if, for one reason or another,

one or several political forces do not participate in the forming of the Transitional National

Assembly, or withdraw from that assembly, provided that the total number is not reduced to less

than two-thirds of the number stipulated under Article 60 of this Protocol of Agreement.

b) If one or several political forces do not participate, or cease to participate in the

Transitional National Assembly, and the number of Deputies falls below that stipulated in the

above paragraph, the remaining political forces participating in the Transitional National

Assembly shall consult and agree on the modalities for the composition of the new National

Assembly.

Article 64

A “Deputy” may resign. In this case, his political party shall replace him in

consultation with the Bureau of the Transitional National Assembly.

Article 65

All compulsory mandates shall be null and void. The right of the “Deputies” to vote

shall be individual.

Article 66

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The first session of the Transitional National Assembly shall be devoted to

administering the oath of the “Deputies” and to electing the Bureau of the Transitional National

Assembly.

Article 67

The Bureau of the Transitional National Assembly shall be composed of the Speaker,

the Deputy Speaker and a Secretary.

Article 68

The PSD and PL political parties shall each present one (1) candidate for the post of

Speaker of the Transitional National Assembly. The political party that will not have taken the

post of Speaker shall present two (2) candidates for the post of Deputy Speaker of the

Transitional National Assembly.

The PDC and other political parties which do not hold any ministerial portfolio in the

current Coalition Government shall each present one (1) candidate for the post of Secretary.

Voting for the above-mentioned posts shall be by secret ballot and on the basis of an

absolute majority of the “Deputies” present.

Article 69

The Transitional National Assembly shall automatically hold, each year, three (3)

ordinary sessions of three months each, followed each time by a one (1) month parliamentary

leave. When circumstances may so require, the Transitional National Assembly shall hold

extraordinary sessions.

The first ordinary session shall begin 15 days after the “Deputies” to the Transitional

National Assembly have taken oath of office.

The Transitional National Assembly shall be convened by the Speaker. It may be

convened in extraordinary session upon the initiative of the President of the Republic, The

Speaker, the Prime Minister or following the decision taken by its members on the basis of an

absolute majority.

When it is convened in extraordinary session, the Transitional National Assembly

shall deal with only those issues that motivated its convening Whenever an ordinary or

extraordinary session of the Assembly is convened, the agenda and venue shall be indicated.

Before any proceedings, the Transitional National Assembly shall adopt its agenda and decide on

the urgency of the matters to be discussed. A “Deputy” or the Prime Minister may request the

urgent consideration of an item. When the request is made by the latter, the matter in question

shall automatically be considered as urgent.

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Article 70

The status of a Deputy shall be incompatible with the holding of a Ministerial

portfolio and the exercise of any other remunerative activities.

Article 71

Members of the Transitional National Assembly who may be finally sentenced by

Courts for criminal offences shall automatically lose their seats. In this case, they shall be

replaced in accordance with the provisions of Article 62 of this Protocol.

Article 72

The legislative power shall be exercised by way of laws passed by “Deputies” in the

Transitional National Assembly as well as by Orders in Council passed by the Broad-Based

Transitional Government in cases of emergency or when the Transitional National Assembly, is

unable to convene.

Article 73

Ordinary laws shall be passed on the basis of an absolute majority of the Deputies

present. Organic laws shall be passed on the basis of a 3/5 majority.

Article 74

For any lawful seating to be held, a quorum of 2/3 of the members of the Transitional

National Assembly shall be required.

Article 75

Sessions of the Transitional National Assembly shall be public; the minutes of the

debates shall be published.

However, upon request of the Speaker, or the Prime Minister or of one third of its

members, the Assembly may, by an absolute majority, decide to sit in camera.

Section 3: Relationship between the Transitional National Assembly and the Broad-

Based Transitional Government

Article 76

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The Prime Minister, upon a decision of the Cabinet and after consultations with the

Bureau of the Transitional National Assembly, may request the President of the Republic to

dissolve the Transitional National Assembly.

The dissolution cannot take place within the last three months of the Transition.

Article 77

Replacement of the members of the Transitional National Assembly shall be done as

per the numerical distribution of seats referred to under Article 62 above.

The replacement of each of the members of the Bureau of the Transitional National

Assembly shall be made by election in accordance with Article 68 of this Protocol of Agreement.

Article 78

The Transitional National Assembly shall be endowed with the following means of

control over government activities:

- Oral Questioning

- Written Questioning

- Committee Hearing

- Commission of Inquiry

- Interpellation

- Motion of censure.

An organic law shall determine the conditions and procedure for this control.

Article 79

The Transitional National Assembly may question the conduct of the Broad-Based

Transitional Government as well as that of a Minister or Secretary of State, by voting on a

motion of censure against the Prime Minister or any other member of the Government.

Such a motion is not admissible until after questioning and unless it is presented by at

least one fifth of the members of the Transitional National Assembly in the case of a Minister or

a Secretary of State, and by one third of the members in the case of the Government.

The motion of censure shall be adopted by secret ballot and by a 2/3 majority of the

“Deputies” present.

The vote of a motion of censure against the Prime Minister shall entail his resignation

and that of the Government. In this case the replacement of the Prime Minister shall be made in

accordance with Article 53 of this Protocol of Agreement. The outgoing Government shall

dispose of the day-to-day matters until a new Government is formed.

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Section 4: Political Code of Ethics binding the Political Forces called upon to

Participate in the Transitional Institutions

Sub-Section 1: Fundamental Principles

Article 80

In a declaration signed by their authorised representatives, the political forces called

upon to participate in the Transitional Institutions shall undertake to:

1. Support the Peace Agreement and work towards its successful

implementation;

2. Promote national unity and national reconciliation of the Rwandese people:

3. Abstain from all sorts of violence and inciting violence, by written or verbal

communication, or by any other means;

4. Reject and undertake to fight any political ideology or any act aimed at

fostering discrimination based mainly on ethnic, regional, sexual or religious differences;

5. Promote and respect the rights and freedoms of the human person;

6. Promote political education among their members, in accordance with the

fundamental principles of the Rule of Law;

7. Work towards a system whereby the political power serves the interests of

all the Rwandese people without any discrimination;

8. Respect the secularism of the Rwandese State;

9. Respect national sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the country.

Article 81

The Commission on National Unity and National Reconciliation shall ensure that

each political force respects the principles spelt out under Article 80 above.

Article 82

Any political force violating the provisions of Article 80 shall be liable to a sanction

of exclusion from the Transitional Institutions, without prejudice to other legal or statutory

provisions on the matter.

This measure shall be taken by the Supreme Court upon request of the Government,

acting on the Commission‟s report.

The request to the Supreme Court shall be preceded by a warning by the Government

to the political party concerned; when the warning has not been heeded.

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Sub-Section 2: Additional Duties of the Commission for National Unity and National

Reconciliation.

Article 83

The two parties agree that the Commission on National Unity and National

Reconciliation, in addition to the duties specified under Article 24 A of the Protocol of

Agreement signed on 30th October, 1992, shall see to it that each political force respects the

principles spelt out in the Political Code of Ethics binding the political forces to participate in the

Transitional Institutions.

Section 5: Miscellaneous Provisions

Sub-Section 1: Modalities of Appointment within the Judiciary.

Article 84

In order to maintain the independence of the Judiciary, posts in the Judiciary shall not

be subjected to sharing among political forces. Therefore, applications for the posts of Presiding

Judge and Deputy Presiding Judge of the Supreme Court, referred to under Article 30 of the

Protocol of Agreement signed on 30th October, 1992, shall be considered without any reference

to political parties, in order to better ensure the neutrality of magistrates.

Article 85

The Supreme Council of Magistrates shall, in conjunction with the Broad-Based

Transitional Government, take all necessary and adequate measures to facilitate the integration

of competent, experienced or qualified Rwandese nationals who have not worked or evolved in

the current legal system of Rwanda.

Sub-Section 2: Redeployment of the Deputies to the CND

Article 86

The Broad-Based Transitional Government shall take the necessary steps to find, to

the extent possible, a new placement for the Deputies to the CND in their former sectors of

activity. In so doing, the Broad-Based Transitional Government shall take into account the

qualifications and experience of each “Deputy”.

Sub-Section 3: Local Elections as a Solution to Social Tensions

Article 87

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Local elections shall normally be held within six (6) months before the expiry of the

transition. In the meantime, the replacement of local authorities shall be made through

nomination. However, the Broad-Based Transitional Government shall decide on the opportune

moment for organizing partial local elections if adequate security conditions allow for the

holding of such elections and if it has the legal instruments to organize them.

Sub-Section 4: National Conference

Article 88

The National Conference shall consist of a general discussion to focus solely on

national unity and national reconciliation, as provided for in Article 23.C.2 of the Protocol of

Agreement signed on 30th October, 1992.

This discussion shall be prepared by the Commission on National Unity and National

Reconciliation provided for under Article 24 of the Protocol of 30th October, 1992. The

Commission shall report to the Broad-Based Transitional Government.

Done at Arusha, this 9th day of the month of January, 1993, in the French and

English languages, the French text being the original.

For the Government of the Republic of Rwanda:

Boniface Ngulinzira

Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation

For the Rwandese Patriotic Front:

Pasteur Bizimungu

Member of the Executive Committee and Commissioner for Information and

Documentation

In the presence of the Facilitator (United Republic of Tanzania):

Hon. Ahmed Hassan Diria

Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation

In the presence of the Current Chairman of the OAU:

Papa Louis Fall

Ambassador of Senegal to Ethiopia, Tanzania and the OAU

For the Secretary General of the OAU

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Dr. M.T. Mapuranga

Assistant General Secretary of the OAU in charge of Political Affairs

Protocol of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and

the Rwandese Patriotic Front on the Repatriation of Rwandese Refugees and the

Resettlement of Displaced Persons

The Government of the Republic of Rwanda on one hand, and the Rwandese Patriotic

Front on the other;

Agree on the following provisions on the repatriation of Rwandese refugees and the

resettlement of displaced persons.

Chapter I: Repatriation of Rwandese Refugees

Section 1: Voluntary Return and Repatriation

Sub-Section 1: Basic Principles

Article 1

The return of Rwandese refugees to their country is an inalienable right and

constitutes a factor of peace, national unity, and reconciliation.

Article 2

The return is an act of free will on the part of each refugee. Any Rwandese refugee

who wants to go back to his country will do so without any precondition whatsoever.

Each person who returns shall be free to settle down in any place of their choice

inside the country, so long as they do not encroach upon the rights of other people.

Article 3

For purposes of settling returnees, the Rwandese Government shall make lands

available, upon their identification by the “Commission for Repatriation” so long as they are not

currently occupied by individuals.

The Commission shall be at liberty to explore and choose, without any restriction,

resettlement sites throughout the national territory. The selection of sites, their occupation and

farming shall take due consideration of the protection of endangered animal species, especially

the mountain gorilla. Depending on the protection requirements and the planned farming

development activities, the transfer of those species into compatible ecosystems is

recommended.

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Article 4

The right to property is a fundamental right for all the people of Rwanda. All refugees

shall therefore have the right to repossess their property on return.

The two parties recommend, however, that in order to promote social harmony and

national reconciliation, refugees who left the country more than 10 years ago should not reclaim

their properties, which might have been occupied by other people. The Government shall

compensate them by putting land at their disposal and shall help them to resettle.

As for estates which have been occupied by the Government, the returnee shall have

the right for an equitable compensation by the Government.

Article 5

The repatriation exercise shall aim at achieving a harmonious and definitive

integration.

Article 6

The repatriation process must mesh with the economic changes underway in the

country.

Article 7

The principle of dual citizenship is hereby accepted. The laws governing the

Rwandese citizenship shall be reviewed accordingly.

Sub-Section 2: The Beneficiaries of the Programme for the Return and Repatriation

Article 8

The Programme for the Return and the Repatriation shall be designed solely for

Rwandese Refugees.

Shall qualify as a Rwandese refugee:

1. Anyone in possession of documents issued by the Office of the United Nations

High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), testifying that the bearer is a Rwandese refugee;

2. Any Rwandese national who declares himself to be a Rwandese refugee, but who is

not registered with the Office of the UNHCR.

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Sub-Section 3: Repatriation Procedures

Article 9

Upon the recommendation of the Secretariat of State for Rehabilitation and Social

Integration, the Broad-Based Transitional Government shall set up a Commission for

Repatriation composed of Government, UNHCR, OAU and Refugee representatives.

Article 10

The Commission shall have, as a general mandate, to finalize and to implement a

programme for the repatriation and reintegration of returnees.

The concrete missions of the Commission shall be as follows:

1. Conduct a socio-economic survey of refugees;

2. Organize a pre-repatriation census and registration of returnees;

3. Conduct an information and sensitization campaign both to the refugee community

and the population within the country

4. Identify settlement sites, supervise the distribution of plots and establishment of

basic infrastructures such as Reception Centres, Health Centres, Educational Centres, etc.;

5. Make travel arrangements for all returnees, where necessary, and arrangements for

the transport of their property;

6. Supervise all kinds of assistance for the returnees, such as food aid, farming tools,

building materials, domestic items, seeds, etc.;

That Commission may set up Committees, where necessary, for the execution of

some of its missions.

Article 11

For border crossings, a list of items subject to an export ban in the country of asylum

and to an import ban in Rwanda shall be communicated in advance to refugees opting for

repatriation.

Property and assets of returnees shall be exempted from all import duties and taxes,

except for commercial goods.

The exchange regulations shall be communicated to returnees and facilitated by the

appropriate authorities.

Customs formalities shall also be specified by the country of asylum and by Rwanda.

The Secretariat of State for Rehabilitation and Social Integration, in coordination with

Immigration and Emigration Services, shall provide facilities at border posts and at the

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International airport, for the reception of returnees who shall have opted to go back home with

their own means.

Sub-Section 4: Assistance

Article 12

The repatriation funding programme shall provide for provisional accommodation

centres on the settlement sites in rural or in urban areas, in existing or those to be built, on

condition that the latter are built for ultimate use.

Returnees at that time shall be fully taken care of, including an initial free medical

check-up.

Article 13

Returnees shall provisionally be accommodated in shelters built on plots allocated to

them, but they shall rapidly be given a set of building materials to enable them to build their own

houses and design them in accordance with model development schemes drawn up by the

Commission for Repatriation.

Article 14

Upon their arrival in the country, repatriates shall each be paid a small amount of

money to enable them to meet vital needs not catered for by the aid programme.

Article 15

With the assistance of the International Community, the Rwandese Government shall

provide assistance to the returnees, in the following areas:

1. food aid;

2. domestic items;

3. farming tools;

4. building materials;

5. health;

6. education.

The same assistance shall equally be provided to those returnees who may go back to

their places of origin.

Article 16

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Food aid shall be provided for a period of at least 15 months, after which conditions

for the continued supply of that aid shall be reviewed.

Article 17

Each family of returnees shall be provided with basic items such as kitchen utensils

and bed and beddings.

Article 18

The programme for the settlement of returnees shall also avail a set of farming tools

and seeds, preferably selected to meet the soil and climate requirements in the area. In so doing,

it shall enable the repatriated farmers to undertake farming activities as soon as possible.

Article 19

The repatriation programme shall also include the supply of medicines and various

equipment for the existing or newly established Health Centres.

Vulnerable groups, i.e. women, children, the aged people and the handicapped shall

be specifically taken care of.

Article 20

A programme of assistance for children admitted in the educational system shall be

established and tailored in such a way as to cater for school fees, funds for the purchase of

uniforms and school equipment for two academic years.

Article 21

The returnees who shall take up activities other than farming, but are not able to take

care of themselves, shall each benefit from some of the assistance programmes mentioned above

especially:

1. Accommodation and food aid for a period of 6 months;

2. basic items such as kitchen utensils, bed and beddings

The Rwandese Government shall establish, through the Ministry of Labour and Social

Affairs and the Secretariat of State for Rehabilitation and Social Integration, mechanisms for the

orientation and follow-up of job seekers.

Sub-Section 5: Integration Modalities

Article 22

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Returnees may benefit from opportunities availed by the Development Projects

designed for the enhancement of employment in the public and private sectors, in the same

conditions as residents.

Article 23

The Rwandese Government shall undertake negotiations with international funding

institutions, within the framework of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), so that the

absorption capacities of the Public Sector could be enhanced.

There are certain sectors, however, which already hold out employment opportunities,

such as Education, Health and the Judiciary.

A returnee who shall be integrated in the public sector shall be employed at the level

to be determined on the basis of their qualification and professional experience.

Employment shall not be subjected to any precondition and criteria other than the age

for employment and retirement.

Article 24

Returnees who have contributed to the Social Security in Rwanda may claim their

dues, either for themselves or their beneficiaries.

As for those who have been contributing to the Social Security abroad, the Rwandese

Government shall negotiate with the countries concerned so as to arrange for the compensation

or transfer of their dues.

Article 25

Lack of knowledge of Kinyarwanda or French shall not constitute an obstacle to

employment and discharge of duties within the public sector.

During the first three years of service, with effect from the date of appointment, the

returnees shall use those languages they are most familiar with, and shall take intensive French

or Kinyarwanda courses. At the end of that period, consideration of this facility shall be re-

examined in order to determine whether it would be maintained or not.

To that effect, a programme of linguistic support as well as translation and

interpretation services shall be organized, according to the needs, soon after the establishment of

the Broad-Based Transitional Government, using funds provided for in the Plan of Action for

returnees or any other funds.

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Article 26

The existing Commissions on the Equivalence of diplomas shall include qualified

personnel among returnees and shall pay special attention to that problem.

Diplomas and certificates internationally recognised shall be considered for purposes

of employment in the educational institutions or appointment to professional posts, in accordance

with the UNESCO grading regulations and systems.

Article 27

The access to employment opportunities in the Private Sector and the establishment

of new enterprises in the country have been liberalized within the framework of the Structural

Adjustment Programme (SAP). They shall be open to returnees without any preconditions, and

under the same conditions as residents.

Government role in that field will be to reactivate support to existing firms, promote

new investments and simplify formalities required to get started in the Private Sector. The Plan

of Action shall also include a Guarantee Security Fund, so as to facilitate access to loans by

returnees.

Article 28

The Commission for Repatriation shall develop settlement sites. The sites shall be

provided with basic socioeconomic infrastructures such as schools, Health Centres, water, access

roads, etc.

The Housing scheme in these areas shall be modelled on the “village” grouped type

of settlement to encourage the establishment of development centres in the rural area and break

with the traditional scattered housing.

Article 29

The programme for the reintegration of returnees shall provide additional school

facilities, by expanding existing schools or creating new infrastructures to accommodate the

returnee children already at school or of school age.

Article 30

For purposes of ensuring a smooth integration into the educational system in the

country, and avoiding that students interrupt their studies and suffer adverse effects, a number of

measures shall be taken:

1. During the first year, education should be provided in the language used in the

country of asylum.

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2. Within the first three months, intensive French courses should be organised for

teachers and students, especially for students in the senior level of primary school and for

students in secondary schools and institutions of higher learning, from the anglophone countries.

3. Some of the aspects of adaptation may be catered for in the private educational

system. 4. The Plan of Action for Rwandese refugees shall take in charge students in their last

two years of the primary, secondary schools and institutions of higher learning who may wish to

stay behind and complete their studies in the host countries, if the educational systems in which

they were studying are not available in Rwanda. Their certificates shall be recognized in

accordance with the UNESCO system of equivalence of diplomas, certificates, etc.

However, special attention shall be given to the writing and reading of Kinyarwanda

through additional remedial lessons, to enable new pupils and any other who might experience

similar difficulties to catch up with those who are more conversant with the language.

Sub-Section 6: Implementation of the Overall Programme of Repatriation

Article 31

In accordance with the mandate entrusted to them by the Dar es Salaam Summit of

19th February, 1991, the UNHCR and the OAU shall organize, within six (6) months after the

establishment of the Broad-Based Transitional Government, a Donors‟ Conference for the

financing of projects earmarked in the Plan of Action for the Rwandese refugees.

In addition to other internal sources of funding, the Rwandese Government shall also

rely on bilateral cooperation to support the Repatriation Programme.

Article 32

The implementation, at the political and administrative level, of the Repatriation

Programme shall be supervised by the Secretariat of State for Rehabilitation and Social

Integration.

For the technical implementation of the various components of the Repatriation

Programme, the Government of Rwanda and the UNHCR shall preferably resort to those NGOs

with an established reliability, taking also their respective specialization into account. As such,

one or several NGOs shall undertake site development activities, building activities, and the

distribution of food aid.

Sub-Section 7: Timetable for Repatriation

Article 33

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All the returnees having the means to settle themselves without recourse to

Government assistance may do so, soon after the signing of the Peace Agreement.

To that end, Rwandese Embassies shall issue travel documents to all Rwandese

refugees who wish to go back to Rwanda.

Article 34

With respect to repatriation in groups, the following programme of sequence is

envisaged:

1. Within six (6) months after the establishment of the Broad-Based Transitional

Government, the UNHCR and the OAU shall organize a Donors Conference on the financing of

the Repatriation Programme.

2. Within six (6) months after the establishment of the Broad-Based Transitional

Government, tripartite agreements between Rwanda, the UNHCR and individual countries in the

Region and the UNHCR shall have been concluded on issues pertaining to the repatriation of

refugees. 3. Within Six (6) months after its establishment, the Broad-Based Transitional

Government shall

undertake operations for the preparation of settlement sites.

4. Within nine (9) months following the establishment of that Government, the

repatriation of the first batch of returnees may begin.

Section 2: Other Repatriation Solution: Settlement in the Host Country

Article 35

The Broad-Based Transitional Government shall take and implement measures,

including through bilateral agreements, for the protection of the Rwandese nationals who shall

have opted to settle in the host countries as immigrants.

Those immigrants shall fully enjoy the same rights as all other Rwandese citizens.

Chapter II: Return of Persons Displaced by War and Social Strifes

Section 1: Preparatory Measures

Article 36

The organized return of persons displaced as a result of war and social strife shall be

done after the following preparatory measures have been taken:

1. Deployment of the International Neutral Force.

2. Disengagement of Forces in the war zones.

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3. Establishment of the Broad-Based Transitional Government.

4. Clearance of mines in the war zones.

5. Planning and provision of humanitarian assistance in essential services.

Section 2: Administration and Security in the War Zones

Article 37

The administration entities established before the outbreak of war shall be

reconstituted.

Article 38

The socio-economic services established before the outbreak of war, especially in the

educational, health, justice, youth, trade, agricultural and animal husbandry sectors at the level of

administration entities in the war zones shall resume their activities.

Article 39

The Broad-Based Transitional Government shall determine mechanisms of

appointing local authorities in these zones.

Article 40

The clearance of mines in the zones shall be conducted by the International Neutral

Force, in collaboration with the Army Command High Council.

Article 41

Security shall be ensured by the local police to be provided with adequate means and

assisted, where necessary, by the National Gendarmerie.

Section 3: Humanitarian Assistance

Article 42

Humanitarian Aid shall be distributed by the Secretariat of State for Rehabilitation

and Social Integration, assisted by the Humanitarian Agencies.

Article 43

The humanitarian aid shall consist of:

1. Food aid;

2. Domestic items;

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3. Farming tools;

4. Building materials;

5. Health care and Medicines;

6. Education (School equipment, uniforms, school fees for a period of two years);

7. Transport to their places of domicile for those who cannot afford it;

8. Labour costs for the construction of houses;

9. Seeds;

10. Establishment of temporary shelters.

Section 4: Timetable and Modalities for Return

Article 44

As soon as the preparatory measures spelled out in Article 36 of the present Protocol

are put in place, the Broad-Based Transitional Government shall issue directives for the return of

displaced persons.

Article 45

The return of war displaced persons to their homes shall, as much as possible, be

coordinated with the return of the refugees who left the country during the war, as well as that of

persons displaced as a result of social strife.

Done at Arusha, the 9th day of June 1993 in both French and English Languages, the

French text being the original.

For the Government of the Republic of Rwanda:

Landoald Ndasingwa

Minister of Labour and Social Affairs

For the Rwandese Patriotic Front:

Pasteur Bizimungu

Member of the Executive Committee and Commissioner for Information and

Documentation

In the presence of the Representative of the Facilitator (The United Republic of

Tanzania):

Ami R. Mpungwe

Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation

In the presence of the Current Chairman of the OAU:

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Papa Louis Fall

Ambassador of Senegal to Ethiopia, Tanzania and Representative to the OAU

In the presence of the Representative of the OAU Secretary General

Dr. M.T. Mapuranga

Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs

Protocol of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and

the Rwandese Patriotic Front on the Integration of the Armed Forces of the Two Parties

The Government of the Republic of Rwanda on the one hand, and the Rwandese

Patriotic Front on the other;

Agree on the following provisions on the integration of the Armed Forces of the two

parties.

Chapter 1: The National Army

Section 1: Missions and Principles

Article 1

Subject to modalities and principles mutually agreed upon between the two parties in

the present Protocol of Agreement, for the formation of the National Army, the latter shall fulfil

the following missions and shall be guided by the principles below:

A. Missions

1. Defend the national territorial integrity and the sovereignty of the country;

2. Participate, within the framework established by laws and regulations and in

consultation with

relevant authorities, in operations of maintenance and restoration of law and order as

well as in the execution of laws;

3. Participate in relief operations in the event of natural calamities;

4. Contribute to the development of the country, especially through reconstruction

and production activities.

B. Principles

1. As an institution, the National Army shall be governed by the laws and regulations

of the country;

2. The National Army shall be at the disposal of the Government and shall be

subordinated to its

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authority, the two institutions abiding by the Fundamental Law as defined in the

Peace Agreement, laws, democratic principles and the Rule of Law;

3. The National Army shall be non-partisan;

4. The National Army shall be a regular Army, composed solely of volunteer

Rwandese citizens

recruited on the basis of their competence. It shall be open to any Rwandese

Nationals, irrespective of their ethnic group, region, sex, religion or language;

5. Members of the National Army shall have the right to be informed about the socio-

political life of the country. They shall benefit from civic and political education. To that effect,

the Government shall set up a programme for the civic and political education of servicemen;

6. Members of the National Army shall not be affiliated to political parties or to any

other association of a political nature. They shall neither take part in activities or demonstrations

of political parties or associations. They shall not portray their political allegiances in public;

7. Members of the National Army shall exercise their right to vote. Given the type of

the current organization of the Army, however, its members cannot participate in local elections;

8. Members of the National Army may present their candidature for political elective

posts, on condition that they resign from the Army.

Section 2: Size, Structure and Organization

Article 2

The strength of the National Army (Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers, Corporals

and Privates) shall be thirteen thousand (13,000) men.

The ratio between the various categories with respect to the whole size of the Army,

shall be 6% for Officers, 22% for Non-Commissioned Officers and 72% for men.

Sub-Section 2: Structure

Article 3

The National Army shall comprise:

1. An Army Command High Council;

2. The Army Headquarters;

3. Four (4) Territorial Brigades;

4. Specialised Units under the Army Headquarters;

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5. Support and Service Units under the Army Headquarters.

The Organizational Chart indicating the structure of the National Army is reproduced

as Annex I of the present Protocol and is an integral part of it.

Sub-Section 3: Organization

Paragraph 1: The Army Command High Council

Article 4

An Army Command High Council (ACHC) is hereby established and shall, in line

with the policy set by the Government, be the highest military organ of consultation and

decision-making for matters related to defence and the organization of the Army. It shall be

accountable to the Government through the Minister of Defence.

Article 5: Composition

The Army Command High Council shall be composed of:

The Chief of Staff of the National Army: Chairman

The Deputy Chief of Staff of the National Army: Vice-Chairman

Brigade Commanders (4): Members

Second in Command of Brigades (4): Members

Article 6: Functions

The Army Command High Council shall exercise the following functions:

1. Study modalities of implementing the Government policy in matters of defence.

2. Ensure the execution of the defence policy of the country.

3. Set up, in line with the Government general policy, a doctrine of utilization of the

Army by establishing mechanisms and strategies for the defence of the national territory as

well as the maximum utilization of resources.

4. Approve plans for the utilization of the Army.

5. Draw guidelines for the organization of the supply of logistics.

6. Provide advice, either on its own initiative or upon the request of the Minister of

Defence, on defence policy plans, the overall organization of the Army, the state of military

service and on any military issue of general concern.

7. Ensure the implementation of the organisation plan of the Army.

8. Study major issues confronting the Units and take decisions to be implemented by

the Army headquarters or make recommendations to the Minister of Defence for appropriate

action.

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9. Supervise the process of formation of the National Army.

Article 7: Meetings

The Army Command High Council shall meet once a month in an ordinary session

upon convocation by its Chairman.

The Chairman may call for an extraordinary session when and as needed, and

especially 6n instruction from the Minister of Defence, or at the request of anyone of its

members. The agenda of the meeting shall be specified upon notification to attend.

Article 8: Mode of Decision-Taking

Decisions shall be taken by consensus and communicated to the Minister of Defence.

Decisions or recommendations by the Army Command High Council shall be

conveyed to the echelons concerned through the Army Chief of Staff.

Article 9: Rules of Procedure

The Army Command High Council shall establish its own rules of procedure.

Paragraph 2: The Army Headquarters

Article 10: Functions of the Army Headquarters

The Army Headquarters shall have the following functions, exercised in conformity

with directives of the Army Command High Council:

1. Day-to-day administration and command of the Army;

2. Co-ordinate the activities of Army and those of the Army Headquarters;

3. Implement decisions of the Army Command High Council;

4. Liaise, at the administrative level, between the Army - as an Institution - and the

Government,

through the Ministry of Defence;

5. Conduct, under the supervision of the Army Command High Council the process

of formation of the National Army, and participate, within the framework of implementation of

the Peace Agreement, and in collaboration with the International Neutral Force or the NMOG, in

the demobilization process, taking the respective missions and status of those Institutions into

consideration.

Article 11: Command of the Army Headquarters

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The Army Headquarters shall be under the command of the Chief of Staff, assisted by

the Deputy Chief of Staff.

The Chief of Staff shall be responsible for the Army Headquarters. However, all the

decisions shall be taken upon mutual agreement between the Chief of Staff and the Deputy Chief

of Staff.

The Deputy Chief of Staff shall be especially responsible for the supervision of

activities of Departments 2 and 3 of the Army Headquarters. He shall be accountable to the Chief

of Staff. He shall replace him in all the matters, in the event of his absence or impediment.

Article 12: Organization and Functions of Army Headquarters Departments

The Army Headquarters shall be composed of four Departments with the following

functions: 1. Department 1 (G1): Management of personnel.

2. Department 2 (G2): Security and Military Intelligence.

- Security of the personnel and equipment of the National Army;

- Gathering and utilization of Intelligence.

3. Department 3 (G3): Organisation, training, operations, civic and political

education. - Set up of the doctrine of utilization of the National Army;

- Proposal on the organizational structure and deployment of the Units;

- Military training and education;

- Civic and political education;

- Elaboration of military defence plans;

- Planning of daily and periodic activities of the National Army.

4. Department 4 (G4): Logistics.

- Participation in preparing the budget;

- Providing Units with supplies;

- Management of the National Army patrimony.

Paragraph 3: Territorial Brigades

Article 13

Territorial Brigades shall be made up of three Battalions each and deployed as

follows: - 1st Brigade to cover Byumba Prefecture;

- 2nd Brigade to cover Kigali, Kibungo and Gitarama Prefectures;

- 3rd Brigade to cover Butare, Gikongoro and Cyangugu Prefectures;

- 4th Brigade to cover Kibuye, Gisenyi and Ruhengeri Prefectures.

Paragraph 4: Specialized Units under the Army Headquarters

Article 14

There are Specialized Units under the Army Headquarters, namely:

- A Para-commando Battalion;

- A Reconnaissance Battalion;

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- A Military Police Battalion whose detachments shall be deployed in the various

Brigades, with only two Companies remaining in Kigali.

Paragraph 5: Support and Service Units under the Army Headquarters

Article 15

There are Support and Service Units under the Army Headquarters, namely:

- An Engineering Battalion;

- A Field Artillery Battalion;

- An Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battalion;

- An Air Force Squadron;

- A Logistics Center;

- Medical Services;

- An Army Band Company;

- The Training Center in Bugesera;

- The Commando Training Centre in Bigogwe.

Paragraph 6: Schools

There are also schools under the Ministry of Defence, namely:

- “Ecole Supérieure Militaire” (ESM) - Staff College

- “Ecole des Sous-Officiers” (ESO) - Military Academy.

Programmes of study followed in these Schools shall be worked out by a Commission

set up by the Government at the proposal of the Minister of Defence and shall be composed of

Officers designated by the Army Command High Council and the Command Council of the

National Gendarmerie as well as representatives of other concerned Departments. These

programmes shall be approved by the Government.

Section 3: Service within the National Army

Sub-Section 1: The Military Service

Article 17: Principle

Military service shall be exercised under contract or permanent terms. Men as well as

Non-Commissioned Officers with the rank of Sergeant and Staff Sergeant shall serve under

contract terms. The Contract shall be valid for seven (7) years renewable once and applicable to

the category of servicemen aged between 18 and 40.

Other servicemen shall serve on permanent terms.

Article 18: Military Ranks

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Military ranks within the National Army shall fall under three categories and follow

each other as indicated below:

Category1: Men

- Private

- Private 1st Class

- Corporal.

Category 2: Non-Commissioned Officers

- Sergeant

- Staff Sergeant

- Sergeant Major

- Warrant Officer Class II

- Warrant Officer Class I

Category 3: Officers

1. Junior Officers:

- Second Lieutenant

- Lieutenant

- Captain

2. Senior Officers:

- Major

- Lieutenant-Colonel

- Colonel

3. General Officers:

- Brigadier

- Major-General

- Lieutenant General

Ranks of Premier Sergent-Major, “Adjudant Principal” and “Commandant” are

abolished. Servicemen currently holding these ranks shall maintain them until they are promoted

to higher ranks. They shall be the last ones to hold those ranks. New Ranks of Private 1st Class

and Brigadier are hereby established.

Article 19: Correspondence between Military, Functions and Ranks

The correspondence between military functions and ranks shall be as follows:

A. The National Army Headquarters

Functions: Ranks:

Chief of Staff: Major-General, Brigadier, Colonel.

Deputy Chief of Staff: Major-General, Brigadier, Colonel.

Head of Department in the National Colonel, Lieutenant -Colonel, Major.

Army Headquarters:

Assistant Head of Department in the National Colonel, Lieutenant -Colonel, Major.

Army Headquarters:

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Head of a Department Section in the National Lieutenant-Colonel, Major,

Commandant Captain.

Army Headquarters:

Deputy Head of a Department Section in the Lieutenant-Colonel, Major,

Commandant, Captain.

National Army Headquarters:

Head of Sub-Section of a Department Captain, Lieutenant, 2nd Lieutenant.

Section in the National Army

Headquarters or Staff Officer in the

National Army:

Units in the National Army

Brigade Commander: Brigadier, Colonel, Lieutenant-Colonel.

Second in Command of a Brigade: Brigadier, Colonel, Lieutenant-Colonel, Major

Battalion Commander: Lieutenant-Colonel, Major, Commandant, Captain.

Second in Command of a Battalion: Lieutenant-Colonel, Major, Commandant,

Captain. Section Commander in a Brigade Headquarters: Lieutenant-Colonel, Major,

Commandant, Captain.

Company Commander: Commandant, Captain, Lieutenant.

Second in Command of a Company: Commandant, Captain, Lieutenant.

Section Commander in a Battalion Headquarters: Commandant, Captain, Lieutenant.

Platoon Commander: Lieutenant, 2nd Lieutenant.

Deputy Platoon Commander: Warrant Officer Class II, Premier Sergent-Major,

Sergeant Major, Staff Sergeant.

Non-Commissioned Officer of a Brigade: Warrant Officer Class I,

Adjudant Principal, Warrant Officer Class II

Non-Commissioned Officer of a Battalion: Adjudant Principal,

Warrant Officer Class H

Non-Commissioned Officer of a Company: Premier Sergent-Major

Sergeant -Major, Staff Sergeant

Section Commander: Staff Sergeant, Sergeant

Deputy Commander of Section: Corporal

Team Leader: Corporal or Private 1st Class

Gunman for special weapon or support arm: Private 1st Class

Rifleman: Private

Military Schools Command

“Ecole Superieure Militaire” (ESM)

- Commander of ESM: Brigadier, Colonel, Lieutenant-Colonel.

- Second in Command of ESM: Colonel, Lieutenant-Colonel.

“Ecole des Sous-Officiers” (ESO):

- Commander of ESO: Colonel, Lieutenant-Colonel.

- Second in Command of ESO: Colonel, Lieutenant-Colonel, Major.

Other Functions

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In addition to the functions mentioned above, there are other functions within the

administrative, logistic and technical Army services, which may be exercised by servicemen

holding various ranks provided for in the Army.

Article 20: Appointment of Members of the Army Command High Council

Members of the Army Command High Council shall be appointed by the Cabinet and

Orders of their appointment shall be signed by the President of the Republic, in accordance with

the provisions of Article 9 of the Protocol of Agreement signed on 30th October, 1992.

Article 21: Appointment of General Officers and Senior Officers and their Promotion

in Ranks and Functions General Officers and Senior Officers shall be appointed and promoted in

ranks functions by the Cabinet, upon recommendation of the Army Command High Council.

Orders of their appointment shall be signed by the President of the Republic, in accordance with

the provisions of Article 9 of the Protocol of Agreement, signed on 30th October, 1992.

Article 22: Appointment of Junior Officers and their Promotion in Ranks and

Functions

Junior Officers shall be appointed and promoted in ranks and functions by the

Cabinet, upon recommendation of the Army Command High Council. Orders of their

appointment shall be signed by the Prime Minister.

Article 23: Appointment of Non-Commissioned Officers employed under Permanent

Terms and their Promotion in Ranks and Functions

Non-Commissioned Officers employed under permanent terms shall be appointed and

promoted in ranks and functions by the Army Command High Council, convened under the

chairmanship of the Minister of Defence, who shall be the one to sign orders of their

appointment.

Article 24: Employment Posting and Promotion of Servicemen under Contract Terms

All contracts for servicemen employed under contract terms shall be signed by the

Minister of Defence. To be recruited, servicemen must pass a national competitive examination

supervised by the Army Command High Council. Upon successful completion of the training

programme, they shall be posted in Units by the Army Command High Council at the proposal

of the Army Headquarters. Thereafter, promotions shall be made by the Army Headquarters at

the proposal of the Brigade or Autonomous Unit Commanders under the Army Headquarters.

Article 25: Modalities of Promotion

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Modalities of promotion in ranks shall be decided upon by the Government.

Servicemen may move from a lower category to an upper category, especially after passing a test

organized for that purpose.

Article 26: Commissioning

Conditions and modalities of commissioning to senior ranks and functions shall be

specified by the Government.

Article 27: Transfers

Transfers from a Unit or Service to another Unit or Service and which do not affect

the power of appointment entrusted to other authorities shall be made by the Chief of Staff, upon

delegation of powers by the Army Command High Council, and in consultation with the Unit

Commanders or those in charge of Services.

Transfers within Units which do not affect the power of appointment entrusted to

other authorities shall be made by Commanders of those Units and the Chief of Staff shall be

informed.

Article 28: Secondment, Detachment and Transfer

Members of the National Army may be seconded, detached or transferred to another

Service. The authority vested with the power of nomination to military ranks and functions shall

take adequate measures to make available the servicemen concerned by secondment, detachment

or transfer.

Article 29: Termination of Service

Resignation, leave without pay, dismissal as well as pensioning off shall be decided

upon by the authority vested with the power of appointment or promotion.

Article 30: Age of Retirement

The age of retirement shall be:

- 45 years for Non-Commissioned Officers employed under contract terms and for

Junior Officers;

- 50 years for Senior Officers;

- 55 years for General Officers.

Upon reaching the retirement age, servicemen employed under permanent terms, and

exercising specialized functions may, however, benefit from a service extension and be

employed under contract terms. In this case, they cannot expect to be promoted.

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Sub-Section 2: Disciplinary Regime, Military Courts and the Criminal Investigation

and Prosecution

Department (Auditorat)

Paragraph 1: Principles

Article 31

Breaches of discipline by servicemen shall be liable to punishment by disciplinary

committees and various echelons of the military hierarchy empowered to inflict disciplinary

punishments provided for.

Infringements of penal laws by servicemen shall be punished by the competent

Military Courts which shall hand down the corresponding sentences provided in the said laws.

Disciplinary punishments and the final criminal sentences shall entail disciplinary

measures affecting the career of servicemen concerned.

Paragraph 2: Disciplinary punishments

Article 32

Breaches of discipline which, according to the penal laws, fall short of offences, shall

entail disciplinary punishments. The military disciplinary regulations shall specify the conduct of

servicemen.

Disciplinary punishments shall be aimed at redressing the behaviour of individual

servicemen with a view to maintaining harmony and discipline within the Units and Services. It

shall therefore be forbidden to transform disciplinary punishments into a means of harassment.

Article 33: Disciplinary Committees

Disciplinary Committees are hereby set up within each unit to rule on breaches of

discipline. Within the Battalion, which constitutes a part of a Brigade, a Disciplinary Committee

shall be set up to give ruling on cases involving Non-Commissioned Officers, Corporals,

Privates First Class and Privates deployed within the Battalion.

A Disciplinary Committee within the Brigade shall rule on cases involving Officers

of the said Brigade, except those involving Battalion Commanders and their Second in

Command. The Disciplinary Committee of the Brigade shall also give its ruling on appeals

against decisions by disciplinary Committees of Battalions under its jurisdiction.

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Disciplinary Committees within Autonomous Battalions and Companies shall be set

up at two levels:

- A Disciplinary Committee made up of Officers to rule on cases involving Officers

of the said Battalion or Company, except those involving the Battalion Commander and his

Second in Command, and the Company Commander and his Second in Command.

- A Disciplinary Committee made of Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers and Rank

and File to rule on cases involving Non-Commissioned Officers, Corporal, Privates First Class

and Privates deployed within the said Battalion or Company.

Rulings given by that Disciplinary Committee shall not be subject to an appeal before

the Disciplinary Committee giving rulings on cases involving Officers.

Article 34: Competence of the Army Command High Council with regard to

Discipline

The Army Command High Council shall give its ruling on cases involving Brigade

Commanders and their Second in Command, Officered and Autonomous Battalion Commanders

and their Second in Command, and Autonomous Company Commanders and their Second in

Command. The Army Command High Council shall also rule on cases of appeals against

disciplinary punishments handed down to Officers by disciplinary Committees of Brigades,

autonomous Battalions and Companies.

Article 35: Appointment of Disciplinary Committee Members

Members of the Disciplinary Committees shall be appointed by the Army Command

High Council for an indefinite period. The Army Command High Council may replace them

whenever it deems it necessary.

Members of the Disciplinary Committees shall be fully independent in the execution

of their duties. They shall independently assess cases referred to them and take decisions on case

warrants without being subjected to any external pressure. They cannot be given any order or

injunction, especially from their immediate superiors.

Article 36: The Competence of the Military Hierarchy with regard to Discipline

Officers responsible for order and discipline within their Units shall be empowered to

inflict punishment to defaulting Non-Commissioned Officers and Men, such as cleaning fatigues

(cleaning of sanitary facilities, etc.) and non exhausting physical exercises (push-ups, hopping,

long-distance running, etc.).

Punishments inflicted by the military hierarchy shall not be put on record in the

personal file of the punished serviceman and, therefore, shall not entail disciplinary measures.

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Furthermore, Unit Commanders shall have the power of provisional arrest, not

exceeding 48 hours, over any defaulting serviceman under their authority. The competent

Disciplinary Committee shall also be a forum to give ruling on appeals lodged against

punishments inflicted by the hierarchy.

Article 37: Disciplinary Punishments Applicable to Officers

1. The Admonition: Written warning reprimanding the addressee.

2. Arrests with Access: maximum 21 days. Under such arrests, the party concerned

shall be under obligation to stay confined within his residence, without possibility of leaving,

except for performing his duties, taking his meals and carrying out duties approved by the

Command. The punishment derision shall specify whether visitors are allowed or not.

3. Arrests without Access: maximum 15 days. Under such arrests, the party

concerned shall be dispensed from any services. He shall be suspended from all military duties

and forbidden to leave his residence, except for taking his meals, or performing duties approved

by the Command. He shall be formally barred from receiving visitors, except as the service may

require. This suspension shall not be taken into account when pension is calculated.

Article 38: Disciplinary Punishments applicable to Non-Commissioned Officers

1. Open Arrests: maximum of 21 days.

This punishment does not exempt the party concerned from performing his military

duties. It shall consist in barring the party concerned from leaving the quarters, except for

attending to his duties and performing tasks approved by the Command, participating in any

collective recreation or attending any entertainment which may be organized within his quarters

or using the mess and the canteen.

2. Close Arrest: maximum of 21 days.

This punishment does not exempt the party concerned from performing his dutie s.

The party shall be under obligation to stay indoors without the possibility of leaving, except to

attend to his duties and other tasks approved by the Command. No visitors shall be allowed. In

the case of single Non-Commissioned Officers, meals shall be taken to them by those who are on

week duty in the camp.

3. Military Confinement: maximum of 15 days.

Under such arrests, the party concerned shall be exempted from any services. The

punishment shall consist of continued detention in the cell for the whole duration of the

punishment. The serviceman serving out such a punishment may, however, be compelled to

carry out exercises and work within the quarters; may use whatever time is strictly necessary for

carrying out duties approved by the Command and must be subjected to a daily compulsory

constitutional walk of 30 minutes.

Article 39: Disciplinary Punishments Applicable to Men

1. Open Arrests: maximum of 21 days.

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This punishment does not exempt the party concerned from performing his military

duties. It shall consist in barring the party concerned from leaving the quarters, except for

attending to his duties and performing tasks approved by the Command, participating in any

collective recreation or attending any entertainment which may be organized within his quarters,

or using the canteen.

2. Arrests in the Guardhouse: maximum of 21 days.

Under such arrests, the party concerned shall not be exempted from performing his

duties; He shall be forbidden to leave the quarters, except for attending to his duties and

performing tasks approved by the Command;

He shall be forbidden to participate in any collective recreation or attend any

entertainment organized in the quarters;

He shall be forbidden to go to the canteen and compelled to stay within the

guardhouse from evening till the reveille on week days, and the whole day on Sundays and

public holidays, except when performing certain duties approved by the Command;

The party concerned shall be compelled to take a daily constitutional walk of 30

minutes during the period of seclusion.

3. Military Confinement: maximum of 15 days.

To be sentenced to military confinement shall exempt the party concerned from all

duties. The punishment shall consist of continued detention in the cell for the whole duration of

the sentence. However, the serviceman serving out one of these punishments may be compelled

to carry out exercises and work within the quarters;

may use whatever time is strictly necessary for carrying out duties approved by the

Command, and must be subjected to a daily compulsory constitutional walk of 30 minutes.

Article 40: Deduction of a 1/4 of the Salary

Concurrently with a disciplinary punishment, servicemen guilty of failing to maintain,

causing the deterioration, loss, theft or total or partial destruction of items or other material

belonging to the State may have a quarter of their salaries deducted until the costs of the damage

are recovered in full.

Paragraph 3. Disciplinary Measures

Article 41: Principles

Any serviceman having been liable to a disciplinary punishment or penalty meted out

by a competent Court may be subject to a disciplinary measure to be specified by relevant

organs. No disciplinary measure can be inflicted as long as the facts of the case have not been

ascertained, either by the disciplinary committees or the Military Courts, as the case may be.

Disciplinary measures serve as a warning and may entail delay in promotion, removal

from function or office, on a temporary or permanent basis.

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Disciplinary measures shall be inflicted by the authority vested with the powers of

appointment and promotion.

Article 42: Disciplinary, Measures falling under the Government‟s Competence

Disciplinary measures applicable to Officers shall be decided upon by the Cabinet at

the proposal the Army Command High Council. Relevant Orders shall be signed, as the case

may be, either by the President of the Republic or by the Prime Minister.

Article 43: Disciplinary, Measures falling under the Competence of the Minister of

Defence and the Army Command High Council

The Army Command High Council, convening under the chairmanship of the

Minister of Defence, shall give its ruling on cases involving Non-Commissioned Officers and

decide on disciplinary action to be taken against them.

The Minister of Defence shall sign the Order relating to the agreed disciplinary

measures. Article 44: Disciplinary Measures falling Under the Competence of the Army

Headquarters

The Army Headquarters shall rule on cases involving Corporals, Privates first class

and privates, and shall adopt the required disciplinary measures.

The Chief of Staff shall sign Acts containing the disciplinary measures adopted by the

Army Headquarters. The Act containing the disciplinary measure terminating the contract shall,

however, be signed by the Minister of Defence.

Article 45: Disciplinary Measures applicable to Officers

1. Delay in Promotion

Disciplinary punishments applicable to Officers of all ranks shall entail the following

delays in promotion:

- Three (3) months for one (1) admonition;

- Six (6) months for one (1) punishment consisting of an arrest with access;

- Nine (9) months for one (1) punishment consisting of an arrest without access.

Any officer sentenced to a term of imprisonment not exceeding six (6) months, shall

have his promotion held up for a period between six (6) and twelve (12) months.

2. Suspension of Military Duties

Any officer sentenced to a term of imprisonment not exceeding six (6) months shall

be suspended from all military duties for a period corresponding to the duration of the sentence.

3. Automatic Dismissal and Removal from Office

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Any officer sentenced to a term of imprisonment exceeding six (6) months shall

automatically be dismissed or removed from office. In any case, he shall be removed from Office

if he was sentenced by a Criminal Court.

Article 46: Disciplinary Measures applicable to Non-Commissioned Officers

1. Delay in Promotion

Disciplinary punishments applicable to Non-Commissioned Officers of all ranks shall

entail the following delays in promotion:

- Three (3) months for one (1) punishment consisting in a close arrest or two (2)

punishments consisting in open arrests;

- Six (6) months one for (1) punishment consisting in military confinement;

- Nine (9) months for two (2) punishments consisting in military confinement;

- Twelve (12) months for three (3) punishments consisting in military confinement.

Any Non-Commissioned Officer sentenced to a term of imprisonment not exceeding

six (6) months, shall have his promotion held up for a period between six (6) and twelve (12)

months. 2. Suspension of all Military Duties

Any Non-Commissioned Officer sentenced to a term of imprisonment not exceeding

six (6) months shall be suspended from all military duties for a period corresponding to the

duration of the sentence.

3. Automatic Dismissal and Removal from Office

Any Non-Commissioned Officer sentenced to a term of imprisonment exceeding six

(6) months shall automatically be either dismissed or removed from Office. In any case, he shall

be removed from Office if he was sentenced for a criminal offence.

4. Termination of Contract

The contract shall be terminated for any Non-Commissioned Officer employed under

Contract terms, sentenced to a term of imprisonment exceeding six (6) months.

Article 47: Disciplinary Measures applicable to Men

1. Delay in Promotion

Disciplinary punishments applicable to Rank and File shall entail the following

delays in promotion:

- Three (3) months for one (1) punishment consisting in an arrest in the guardhouse or

two (2) open arrests;

- Six (6) months for one (1) punishment consisting in military confinement;

- Nine (9) months for two (2) punishments consisting in military confinement;

- Twelve (12) months for three (3) punishments consisting in military confinement.

Any man sentenced to a term of imprisonment not exceeding six (6) months, shall

have his promotion held up for a period between six (6) and twelve (12) months.

These delays in promotion shall be effective after the concerned party has passed a

promotion test.

2. Suspension of all Military Duties

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Any Rank and File sentenced to a term of imprisonment not exceeding six (6) months

shall be suspended from all military duties for a period corresponding to the duration of the

sentence. 3. Termination of Contract

The contract shall be terminated for any Private, Private and 1st Class or any

“Corporal” sentenced to a term of imprisonment exceeding six (6) months.

Paragraph 4: The Commission Responsible for the Drafting of Disciplinary

Regulations

Article 48

An Ad Hoc Joint Drafting Committee is hereby set up to prepare the integral text of

the disciplinary regulations for the National Army.

The Committee shall be expected to start its work before 15th August, 1993 and

complete it by 31st August, 1993. The Commission shall base its work on draft texts of

disciplinary regulations worked out by each party.

The Joint Committee shall work under the chairmanship of the Commander of the

Neutral Military Observer Group or a person appointed by him; the latter shall be in touch with

the two parties so as to set up a working timetable.

Regulations drafted by the Joint Committee shall constitute the temporary

disciplinary regulations for the National Army, pending their adoption by the Broad-Based

Transitional Government, through a Presidential Decree.

Paragraph 5: Military Courts and Criminal Investigation and Prosecution Department

[Auditorat]

Article 49

Military Courts shall be empowered to pass judgement on offences committed by

servicemen and provided for by penal laws.

In accordance with Article 26 of the Protocol of October 30, 1992, the recognised

Military Courts shall be: the War Councils and the Military Court. The Court of Cassation shall

take cognizance of appeals against decisions

by the Military Court.

The Court of Cassation shall be empowered to pass penal and first degree judgement

on the Chairman and Deputy Chairman of the Army Command High Council and General

Officers. On appeal, their cases shall be heard in the forms specified in Article 27 of the Protocol

of 30th October, 1992.

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The Magistrates of Military Courts shall be fully independent in the exercise of their

judicial functions. They shall independently assess cases referred to them and take decisions

without being subjected to external pressure. They cannot be given any order or injunction,

especially from their immediate superiors.

The Magistrates of Military Courts shall be appointed, for a renewable period of

twelve months, by the Cabinet at the proposal of the Army Command High Council and the

Command Council of the Gendarmerie, referred to in Article 87 of the present Protocol, meeting

in a joint session convened and chaired by the Minister of Defence. The Act of appointment shall

be signed by the Prime Minister. The authority vested with the power of appointment may, at any

moment, terminate the judicial functions of Magistrates of Military Courts deemed

incompetent or unworthy of their posts.

The procedure followed for appointments shall be abided by in the termination of

judicial functions of Magistrates of the Military Courts.

Article 50

A Military Criminal Investigation and Prosecution Department is hereby established

and shall play the role of the Public Prosecution Department in Military Courts.

Section 4: Formation of the National Army

Sub-Section 1: Process of the Formation of the National Army

Article 51

The process of formation of the National Army shall be conducted in the following

stages: - Establishment of the Army Command High Council;

- Establishment of the Neutral International Force;

- Disengagement of forces;

- Integration operations;

- Training of servicemen;

- Deployment of troops in the Units.

Paragraph 1: Establishment of the Army Command High Council

Article 52

The Army Command High Council shall be established concomitantly with the

Transitional Institutions.

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Paragraph 2: The Neutral International Force

Article 53: Composition

The Neutral International Force shall be under the responsibility and command of the

United Nations and shall be composed of contingents provided by countries selected by the

Secretary General of the United Nations.

Before deciding on a definite list of those countries, he shall require the approval of

the two parties. The Neutral Military Observer Group (NMOG) may, with certain arrangements

between all the parties concerned, be partly or entirely integrated into the Neutral International

Force, or perform certain duties specifically entrusted to the Neutral International Force.

Article 54: Missions

The Neutral International Force shall have the following missions:

A. Overall Mission

The Neutral International Neutral Force shall assist in the implementation of the

Peace Agreement, more especially through the supervision of the implementation of the Protocol

of Agreement on the Integration of Armed Forces of the two parties as well as the provision of

all kinds of assistance to the competent authorities and organs.

B. Security Missions

1. Guarantee the overall security of the country and especially verify the maintenance

of law and order by the competent authorities and organs.

2. Ensure the security of the distribution of humanitarian aids.

3. Assist in catering for the security of civilians.

4. Assist in the tracking of arms caches and neutralization of armed gangs throughout

the country.

5. Undertake mine clearance operations.

6. Assist in the recovery of all weapons distributed to, or illegally acquired by the

civilians. 7. Monitor the observance by the two parties of modalities for the definite cessation

of hostilities,

provided for in the Peace Agreement.

C. Missions of Supervising the Process of Formation of the National Army

1. Undertake the demarcation of Assembly Zones and identify places for the

establishment of Assembly and Cantonment points.

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2. The Neutral International Force shall be responsible for the preparation of

Assembly and Cantonment

points. It shall take in and manage all the equipment and financial resources required

for the performance of that duty.

The Military barracks may serve as Assembly or Cantonment points, on condition

that the two parties be informed. These camps shall be subjected to the monitoring of the Neutral

International Force and to requirements of other Assembly or Cantonment points.

3. Determine security parameters for the City of Kigali, in line with the objective of

making it a neutral zone.

4. Supervise:

- operations for the disengagement of forces, especially the movement of troops

towards Assembly points, and servicemen moving to the Cantonment points for purposes of

depositing heavy weapons;

- the transformation of military barracks into Assembly or Cantonment points;

- verifications following these operations.

5. Ensure that rules of discipline by servicemen inside and outside assembly points

are observed.

6. Cross-check inventories of armaments and ammunitions of the two parties and

monitor operations for the separation of heavy from light weapons.

7. Keep watch on cantonment points and participate in the guard of light weapons and

ammunition magazines located in Assembly points.

8. Supervise operations for the identification of the military personnel to be carried

out in the various Assembly points.

9. Supervise operations for the supplies to the troops in the Assembly points, it being

understood that the supplies shall be confined to non-lethal items.

10. Participate in the programme designed for the training of members of the new

Armed Forces and cater for the security of Training Centres.

11. Supervise the operations for the demobilization of servicemen and gendarmes not

eligible to constitute the new Armed Forces.

12. Assess the status of implementation of the formation process and make

recommendations to the Broad-Based Transitional Government, the Army Command High

Council and the Command Council of the National Gendarmerie.

Paragraph 3: Disengagement of Forces. Definitions.

Article 55: Definitions

An Assembly zone is a portion of the national territory within which the Assembly

and Cantonment points of each of the two parties shall be located Assembly points are centres

where specific groups of servicemen of the two Forces shall be confined and their identification

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conducted. Those centres shall be the starting point of the formation, integration and

demobilization process that shall be conducted under the supervision of the Neutral International

Force.

Cantonment points are places identified for the storage of heavy weapons outside the

Assembly points.

Article 56: Demarcation of Assembly Zones

The demarcation of Assembly zones shall be undertaken by the United Nations

Reconnaissance Mission in collaboration with the NMOG, on the basis of the current positions

of the two Forces. During this demarcation exercise, care will be taken to ensure that the

following conditions are fulfilled:

1. The two assembly zones be separated by a demilitarized zone whose width shall be

superior to the range of heavy artillery used in the conflict;

2. Each Assembly zone shall contain all the Assembly and Cantonment points of the

party concerned;

3. Within the Assembly zones, the Assembly points shall be located in such a way as

to avoid clustering;

4. The Assembly and Cantonment points shall be located in such a way to allow the

population to use its

habitual property and facilities;

5. The Assembly zones sha ll be demarcated so as to avoid encirclement of one force

by another.

Article 57: Identification of Assembly Points

Assembly points shall be identified by the International Neutral Force, in

collaboration with each party within its Assembly zone. These points shall, as much as possible,

be located on Government‟s Estates or Estates belonging to collectivities, and shall be located far

from built-up areas.

In identifying an Assembly point, account shall be taken of viability requirements

(availability of water, hospitable climate, etc.) and facilities for an easy organization of supplies,

it being clearly understood that supplies refer to non lethal items.

Article 58: Movement of Troops towards Assembly Points

The Neutral International Force, in collaboration with the Army Command High

Council, shall specify the date whereby elements of the two sides shall move towards the

Assembly points after having deposited heavy weapons in the Cantonment points.

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All the elements of the two Forces should join the Assembly points, except the

administrative and support staff, whose composition and size shall be determined by the Neutral

International Force, in collaboration with the Army Command High Council.

Article 59: Command of the Assembly Point

Each assembly point shall be under a Military Commander appointed by the party

concerned. The Military Commander shall be answerable to the Command to which he is

accountable and to the Army Command High Council, with regard to the following:

- Staff discipline;

- Observance of the Peace Agreement by the troops, especially provisions relating to

the definitive cessation of hostilities;

- Observance of directives and orders emanating from the Army Headquarters;

- Control of armaments, ammunition and other equipment belonging to Units within

the Assembly point.

The Military Commander shall forward to the Army Headquarters a daily situation

report specifying the personnel, equipment and ammunition in the Assembly point and relevant

activities carried out in conformity with directives issued by the National Army Headquarters.

The Military Commander shall liaise the Command to which he is accountable and

the Neutral International Force. The latter may, however, appoint its own liaison Officer.

Article 60: Security of Assembly Points

The security of Assembly points shall be jointly ensured by contingents amounting to

10% of the total strength of those points and whose minimal size should be one hundred and

twenty (120) men, and by members of the Neutral International Force.

The personnel of those contingents shall carry individual weapons only, and shall

strictly be deployed within the Assembly points.

Additional security measures to be taken in each Assembly point shall be decided

upon by mutual agreement between the Commander of the Assembly point and the Neutral

International Force, taking into account the specificities of each Assembly point.

Article 61: Guard of Arms, Ammunition and Military Equipment in the Assembly

Points Once the troops arrive in the Assembly points, each party shall undertake

identification of its troops and make an inventory of armaments and ammunitions.

The Army Command High Council and the Neutral International Force shall cross-

check the inventory of arms and ammunition as well as the identification of servicemen.

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All the troops confined in these points shall be deprived of their light or personal

arms to be kept in magazines located in the same Assembly points under the joint guard of the

Neutral International Force and the Force concerned. Light weapons required for training

exercises in the Assembly point may, however, be put at the disposal of the Commander of the

Assembly point, by the Neutral International Force when and as necessary These exercises shall

be carried out in accordance with a programme known to the Army Command High Council and

the International Neutral Force. The weapons utilized shall be returned to the depot upon

completion of each round of exercise.

The Army Command High Council and the Neutral International Force shall specify

the date for the storage of arms and ammunition. The same date shall apply for the storage of

arms and ammunition in all Assembly points.

Article 62: The Personal Identification File

A personal identification file shall be opened for each serviceman as soon as they

report to the Assembly point. The file shall include the following particulars:

Family name and First name; Rank; Years of Service within the Rank; Regimental

Number; Sex; Date of Birth; Marital Status; Being a Rwandese national; Type and Serial

Number of Weapon;

Specialization; Military or Civilian Diploma, Certificate or Brevet, Blood Group.

Shall be regarded as a Rwandese citizen any individual who considers himself to be

Rwandese and whose parents or ancestors, or one of them, may be localized as a member of the

national community dwelling in the territory recognized today as Rwanda.

The Army Command High Council may decide to include additional elements of

identification such as a passport size photograph.

Article 63: Troops‟ Activities in Assembly Points

Troops may notably undertake the following activities in Assembly Points.

- Physical exercises and cultural and leisure-time activities;

- Activities planned within the framework of the first phase of the military training

programme;

- replenishment of food, fuels, lubricants and medical supplies;

- maintenance and repair of equipment;

- infrastructure improvement and clearance of mines in their assembly point.

The Neutral International Force shall monitor the observance of this provision by

each party.

Article 64: Incidents or Ceasefire Violations

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In the event of incident or Ceasefire violation, Commanders of each echelon shall

take immediate and appropriate action with regard to their troops, so as to put an end to that

incident or violation.

Any Commander informed of an incident or violation shall immediately issue a

warning to the perpetrators and, if they belong to his Unit, take adequate disciplinary action.

Without prejudice to any disciplinary action to be taken by the Unit Commander, the

authors or those responsible for the incident or violation shall be liable to punishments specified

by the Army Headquarters.

The Military Commander shall also be duty bound to report any incident or violation

to his immediate superior, the Neutral International Force and the Army Headquarters.

In the event of incident or violation, Units shall refrain from taking any retaliatory

action and shall strive to avoid any action that may trigger escalation.

The Neutral International Force shall be informed of any incident or violation and

shall track down the perpetrators.

Article 65: Movement outside the Assembly Point

Servicemen in an Assembly point shall be forbidden to move outside that Assembly

point without the permission of the Commander of the Assembly point. In any case, they shall be

strictly forbidden to move about armed.

The Neutral International Force shall monitor the observance of this provision by

each party.

Article 66: Identification of Cantonment Points

There shall be several Cantonment points located in the respective Assembly zones.

Their ultimate number and their location shall be decided upon by the Commander of the Neutral

International Force, after seeking the approval of the party concerned. Cantonment points shall

be distant enough from Assembly points.

Article 67: Definition of Heavy Weapons

All weapons shall be considered as heavy weapons except pistols, UZZI sub-machine

guns, sub-machine guns, rifles, light machine-guns (6.25 mm), medium machine guns (7.62 mm)

and general-purpose machine guns (7.62 mm).

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Armoured vehicles such as personnel carriers, tanks etc. helicopters and other

military aircraft belong to the category of heavy weapons.

Upon the request of the Army Command High Council and the Command Council of

the National Gendarmerie, the Neutral International Force or the expanded NMOG may

authorize the use of those vehicles and aircraft for specified missions.

Article 68: Guard and Maintenance of Arms within the Cantonment Points

The Cantonment points shall be under the only control of the Neutral Internal Force.

Some members of the respective parties shall, however, be authorized by the Neutral

International Force to visit the Cantonment points for purposes of servicing heavy weapons.

Article 69: Ownership of Arms and Military Equipment in the Assembly and

Cantonment Points

The Military equipment based in Assembly or Cantonment points and stored in

magazines located in the Assembly points shall be verified and an inventory and record kept.

This equipment shall remain the property of either party until the completion of the integration of

the two forces. Thereafter, the Broad-Based Transitional Government shall, at the proposal of the

Army Command High Council, decide on the fate of those arms, ammunition and military

equipment.

Article 70: Determining the Types of Light weapons for the National Army and the

National Gendarmerie

The Army Command High Council and the Command Council of the National

Gendarmerie shall determine the type of light weapons for the National Army and the National

Gendarmerie. Those weapons should be available at the training sites at the start of the

integration process of the forces.

Those weapons shall be made available by the ACHC and the CCNG and shall

belong to the National Army and the National Gendarmerie respectively.

Article 71: Uniforms and Insignia

The uniforms and insignia of the National Army and the National Gendarmerie shall

be determined by the Army Command High Council and the Command Council of the National

Gendarmerie respectively.

Article 72: Security Arrangements for the Establishment of Transitional Institutions

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In general, security shall be catered for by the Neutral International Force and, in case

of delay in its deployment, by the expanded NMOG of which the United Nations assumes

responsibility in accordance with Article 53 of this Protocol.

The establishment of transitional institutions shall take place after the deployment of

the Neutral International Force or the expanded NMOG and after the withdrawal of foreign

troops. The withdrawal of foreign troops shall be implemented in accordance with modalities

defined in the March 7, 1993 Dar es Salaam Communiqué.

In consultation with the Neutral International Force or the Expanded NMOG and the

Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF), the Coalition Government shall make available accommodation

for RPF personalities who will be members of the transitional institutions.

In consultation with the Neutral International Force or the expanded NMOG, the

Broad-Based Transitional Government shall provide accommodation and offices affording

suitable security conditions to the members of the Army Command High Council and the

Command Council of the National Gendarmerie. The members of these organs shall also be

consulted.

In order to participate in catering for the security of its personalities, the RPF shall

bring to Kigali a security unit whose size is equivalent to one (1) Infantry Battalion of six

hundred (600) troops.

Paragraph 4: Integration Operations

Article 73: Criteria for the Selection of Servicemen in the National Army

The selection of servicemen to constitute the National Army by each party and those

to be demobilized shall be carried out in the Assembly points. Servicemen to constitute the

National Army should meet the following criteria:

1. Officers

They should:

- be volunteers;

- be serving as Officers;

- be Rwandese Nationals.

- be physically fit, i.e. they should obtain a certificate of physical fitness from a

registered physician.

- The war-wounded and handicapped shall, however, remain eligible for Army

service, according to their specializations, unlike the disabled servicemen who shall be

demobilized but

assisted. This shall apply to all categories of servicemen.

- be at least 21 years of age.

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2. Non-Commissioned Officers

They should:

- be volunteers;

- be serving as Non-Commissioned Officers;

- be Rwandese Nationals;

- be physically fit;

- be at least 18 years old.

3. Troops

They should:

- be volunteers;

- be serving in the Army;

- be Rwandese Nationals;

- be physically fit;

- be at least 18 years old.

For all 3 categories of servicemen, a cross-check shall be made out in case of any

doubt concerning personal particulars, as per criteria spelled out above.

Each party shall determine independently the rank and seniority of each member of

its force.

Article 74: Proportions and Distribution of Command Posts

During the establishment of the National Army, the proportions and distribution of

Command posts between the two parties shall abide by the following principles:

1. The Government forces shall contribute 60% of the forces and the RPF 40% of the

forces for all levels apart from the posts of Command described below.

2. In the chain of Command, from the Army Headquarters to the Battalion, each party

shall have a 50% representation for the following posts:

Chief of Staff, Deputy Chief of Staff, Heads of Departments at the Army General

Headquarters

(G1, G2, G3, G4), Brigade Commanders, Seconds in Command of Brigades, Heads

of Sections

at Brigade Headquarters (S1, S2, 53, S4), Battalion Commanders and Seconds in

Command of

Battalions, Commanders and Seconds in Command of Specialized Units, namely:

Paracommando, Reconnaissance, Military Police Battalions, and of Support Units,

Engineering,

Field Artillery, Anti-aircraft Artillery Battalions and the Logistics Center;

Commanders and

Seconds in Command of the Schools - ESM and ESO - and Commanders and

Seconds in

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Command of the Training Centres in BIGOGWE and BUGESERA.

3. All top posts described above shall be distributed among the Officers of the

Rwandese Government and those of the RPF in accordance with the principle of alternation.

Thus, the Rwandese Government forces and the RPF forces shall supply an equal

number of Brigade and Battalion Commanders, of Seconds in Command of Brigade and

Battalion, of Heads of Department at the Army Headquarters, of Heads of Section at Brigade

Headquarters; of Commanders and Seconds in Command of Specialized and Support Units, of

Schools and Training Centers described above.

However, neither force can hold at the same time the posts of Commander and

Second in Command within the same Unit.

4. Without prejudice to Article 73, the proportions of the two forces in all the

structures of the National Army shall be affected by no prerequisite condition in terms of

accessibility. Thus, adequate training shall be given to the servicemen retained without fulfilling

all the necessary requirements in accordance with the modalities determined by the Army

Command High Council.

5. The post of Chief of Staff of the National Army shall be held to the Government

party and the one of Deputy Chief of Staff to the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF).

Article 75: Specific Case of Officer Trainees in ESM and Non-Commissioned Officer

Trainees in ESO

The Trainees still following their studies in the Schools of the Armed Forces as well

as servicemen undergoing short term training abroad shall be considered as active members of

the Armed Forces.

The recruitment within the Armed Forces shall be frozen until the end of the

Transition Period. The Broad-Based Transitional Government may, however, decide, after

seeking advice from the Army Command High Council and the Command Council of the

National Gendarmerie to resume admission to the School of Armed Forces before the end of the

Transition Period.

Paragraph 5: Training of the National Army

Article 76

Elements of each Force selected to constitute the National Army shall undergo

training for purposes of harmonizing techniques and achieving harmonious integration of

servicemen.

Article 77: Training Phases

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The training shall be carried out in two phases:

Phase 1: The separate training of servicemen of the Rwandese Armed Forces and the

Rwandese Patriotic Army shall be conducted in their respective zones. This phase shall be aimed

at preparing servicemen of both parties to live together in their future Units so as to constitute a

single Army and do away with the spirit of antagonism nurtured by the war. The duration of the

separate training shall be one month.

Phase 2: The joint training of the Units to constitute the National Army shall be

dispensed to servicemen from the two Forces, in the same training centres.

That training shall be dispensed to servicemen to constitute the National Army and

selected by each party, in accordance with the criteria spelled out under Article 73 of the present

Protocol. It shall, as much as possible, begin after the designation of servicemen within their

Units. This phase shall be aimed at harmonizing techniques of the two armies, nurturing the

team spirit,

enhancing the patriotic spirit and that of reconciliation. Such training shall be

organized in training centres in three (3) batches composed of more or less than four thousand

and four hundred (4,400) men.

Each batch shall undergo a two-month training in the centres.

The duration of the joint training shall be 7 months, i.e. two (2) months training for

each batch, and 2 x 15 days of preparation between the batches. Servicemen who will not be

selected for the first batch shall be waiting in the Assembly points for their turn.

The Army Command High Council shall decide on the overall training programme as

well as on the sequence of rotations in training centres.

The programme and calendar of training are attached of the present Protocol as

Annex II and are an integral part of this Protocol.

Article 78: Instructors

For all the training phases, recourse shall be made to Rwandese instructors provided

by the two parties and foreign instructors. The latter shall be provided by countries to be agreed

upon by the two parties as well as the Neutral International Force. The number of instructors

shall amount to 10% of the number of servicemen to be trained in each batch.

The joint training of Rwandese instructors shall be undertaken, as much as possible,

before the separate training of servicemen from both parties.

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Article 79: Joint Commission of Programmes

An Ad Hoc Joint Commission of Programmes is hereby set up and shall be

responsible for the elaboration of syllabuses relating to all subjects to be taught during the

separate and joint training periods. Those syllabuses should be made available before the

disengagement of the forces of the two parties.

The said Commission shall start its work before 15th August, 1993 and shall be

expected to be through by 31st August, 1993.

The draft syllabuses elaborated by each party shall constitute the basis for the work of

the Commission.

The Commission shall work under the Chairmanship of the Neutral Military Observer

Group Commander or a person appointed by him. The latter shall come into touch with the two

parties so as to set up the calendar of work.

Paragraph 6: Deployment of Troops in the Units

Article 80

The posting of Servicemen in the respective Units shall be carried out upon

completion of the training of each batch.

After integration, the Army, composed of elements from the two parties, shall be

called the “National Army”.

Paragraph 7: The Responsibility of the Broad-Based Transitional Government with

regard to the Integration of Forces

Article 81

The Broad-Based Transitional Government shall take all necessary measures to

ensure the integration of the armed forces from the two parties.

Upon its establishment, the Broad-Based Transitional Government shall assume its

responsibility towards the forces of the two parties in terms of Command, logistics, supply and

welfare. To this end, the two parties shall provide numbers and names of the members of their

respective forces.

The Neutral International Force or the expanded NMOG shall, as soon as possible,

verify those names and numbers.

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The two forces, for whom the Broad-Based Transitional Government assumes

responsibility, shall fall under its authority. The RPF shall then be considered as a political party

or its equivalent.

Chapter II: The National Gendarmerie

Section 1: Definition, Missions and Principles

Article 82: Definitions

The National Gendarmerie is an armed force established to ensure the implementation

of laws with a view to maintaining public order and security.

Article 83: Missions

The National Gendarmerie shall fulfil the following missions:

1. Maintain and restore public order;

2. Prevent offences;

3. Trace offences and their perpetrators;

4. Carry out arrests in conformity with the law;

5. Perform police duties within the administration;

6. Perform, within the limits established by the law, prosecution and criminal

investigation duties;

7. Enforce laws and regulations for which it was directly mandated;

8. Perform police duties in Courts and Tribunals;

9. Ensure the protection of people and property;

10. Rescue and provide assistance to people in danger or distress;

11. Intervene in the event of disaster or calamity;

12. Perform traffic police duties throughout the national territory;

13. Ensure the security of airports;

14. Collaborate, within the framework of bilateral cooperation, with INTERPOL and

counterpart

Institutions of foreign countries;

15. Participate, within the framework established by the law, in the defence of the

national territory

Article 84: Principles

1. The National Gendarmerie, as an institution, shall be governed by laws and

regulations of the country. In its functioning and the performance of its duties, it shall observe

the spirit and letter of International Conventions to which the Republic of Rwanda is a party.

2. The National Gendarmerie shall be at the disposal of the Government and shall be

subordinated to its authority, the two institutions abiding by the Fundamental Law, the laws,

Democratic principles and the Rule of Law.

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3. The National Gendarmerie shall, in line with its mission to ensure public order and

internal security within the limits of the principles enunciated above, act spontaneously and

independently organize its activities, so as to fulfil that mission. It shall, therefore, be answerable

to the Government with regard to internal security of the country.

4. The National Gendarmerie shall submit reports to the administrative authority of

the Area where it operates and shall regularly inform the latter about its activities.

5. The National Gendarmerie shall be a non-partisan force. To this end, it shall

always be guided, in the performance of its duties, by the supreme interest of the State and the

public good, and shall perform its duties in an unbiased manner.

6. Members of the National Gendarmerie shall solely be recruited among Rwandese

volunteer citizens, on the basis of their competence. The National Gendarmerie shall be open to

any Rwandese nationals, irrespective of their ethnic group, region, sex and religion.

7. Each member of the National Gendarmerie should be easily identifiable by the

public, by wearing insignia bearing either their name or regimental number, or both. Gendarmes

usually wearing civilian clothes, because of their duties, should be able to produce their service

cards to prove that they are gendarmes, whenever they are so required while performing their

duties. Members of the National Gendarmerie should be strictly courteous and polite in their

relations with the public.

In the fulfilment of their mission, they shall not impose cruel, inhuman and degrading

treatment on the public.

8. Members of the National Gendarmerie shall have the right to be informed on the

socio-political life of the Country. They shall receive civic and political education.

9. Members of the National Gendarmerie shall not be affiliated to political parties or

any other association of a political nature. They shall neither take part in activities or

demonstrations of political parties or associations. They shall not portray their political

allegiances in public.

10. Members of the National Gendarmerie shall exercise their right to vote. Given the

type of the current organization of the National Gendarmerie, however, its members shall not

participate in local elections.

11. Members of the National Gendarmerie may stand for political elective posts, on

condition that they resign from the Gendarmerie.

Section 2: Size, Structure and Organization

Sub-Section 1: Size

Article 85

The strength of the National Gendarmerie (Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers,

Corporals and Gendarmes) shall be six thousand (6,000) men. The ratio between the various

categories shall be 6% for Officers, 24% for Non- Commissioned Officers and 70% for

Corporals and Gendarmes.

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Sub-Section 2: Structure

The National Gendarmerie shall comprise:

1. A Command Council;

2. The Gendarmerie Headquarters;

3. A Security Committee;

4. Territorial Units;

5. Specialized Units;

6. Support and Service Units.

The Organizational Chart of the National Gendarmerie is attached to the present

Protocol as Annex III, and is part and parcel of this Protocol.

Sub-Section 3: Organization of the National Gendarmerie

Paragraph 1: Command Council of the National Gendarmerie

Article 87

A Command Council of the National Gendarmerie (C.C.N.G.) is hereby established

and shall, within the framework of the policy outlined by the Government, constitute an organ of

consultation and decision-making in matters related to the organization and coordination of the

activities of the National Gendarmerie. It shall be accountable to the Government through the

Minister of Defence.

Article 88: Setting up of the Command Council of the National Gendarmerie

The Command Council of the National Gendarmerie shall be put in place at the same

time as the Transitional Institutions.

Article 89: Composition

The Command Council of the National Gendarmerie shall be composed of:

- The Chief of Staff of National Gendarmerie: Chairman

- The Deputy Chief of Staff of the National Gendarmerie: Deputy Chairman

- Commanders of “Groupements" ( 11 ): Members

Article 90: Functions

The Command Council of the National Gendarmerie shall exercise the following

functions: 1. Work out modalities for the implementation of the Government policy with regard

to public security in the country;

2. Ensure that the country‟s public security policy is implemented;

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3. Decide, in line with the general policy of the Government, on the doctrine of

utilization of the

National Gendarmerie, through the establishment of mechanisms and strategies for

the maintenance of law and order, and security as well as the best utilization of resources;

4. Establish guidelines for the organization of the supply of logistics;

5. Provide advice, either on its own initiative or upon the request of the Minister of

Defence, on policy plans for the maintenance of public and order and security, the overall

organization of the National Gendarmerie, the state of service of Gendarmes and any issue of

general concern confronting the National Gendarmerie;

6. Ensure efficient organization and administration of the National Gendarmerie;

7. Study major issues confronting the Units and take decisions to be implemented by

the National Gendarmerie Headquarters or make recommendations to the Minister of Defence

for appropriate action;

8. Supervise the conduct of the process of formation of the National Gendarmerie.

Article 91: Meetings

The Command Council of the Gendarmerie shall meet once a month in an ordinary

session, upon convocation by its Chairman. The Chairman may call for an extraordinary session

when and as needed, and especially on instruction from the Minister of Defence, or at the request

of anyone of its members. The agenda of the Meeting shall be specified upon notification to

attend.

Article 92: Mode of Decision-Making

Decisions shall be taken by consensus and communicated to the Minister of Defence.

Decisions or recommendations by the Command Council of the National

Gendarmerie shall be conveyed to the echelons concerned through the Chief of Staff.

Article 93: Rules of Procedure

The Command Council of the Gendarmerie shall work own out its own rules of

procedure.

Paragraph 2: The National Gendarmerie Headquarters

Article 94: Missions of the Headquarters

The Headquarters shall be an organ liaising between the National Gendarmerie, as an

institution, and the Executive power. It shall be responsible for the day-to-day administration and

command of the National Gendarmerie. It shall implement decisions by the Command Council

of the National Gendarmerie and coordinate activities of the National Gendarmerie, in

accordance with directives issued by the Command Council.

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Article 95: Functions of the Headquarters of the National Gendarmerie

The Headquarters of the National Gendarmerie shall have the following functions:

1. Day-to-day administration and command of the National Gendarmerie;

2. Coordinate activities of the National Gendarmerie;

3. Implement decisions by the Command Council of the Gendarmerie and Security

Committee;

4. Liaise, at the administrative level, the National Gendarmerie, as an institution, with

the Government, through the Ministry of Defence;

5. Conduct the process of formation of the National Gendarmerie and participate in

the demobilization process within the framework of implementing the Peace Agreement, in

collaboration with the Neutral International Force and under the supervision of the Command

Council of the National Gendarmerie.

Article 96: Command of the National Gendarmerie Headquarters

The Headquarters shall be under the Command of the Chief of Staff, assisted by the

Deputy Chief of Staff.

The Chief of Staff shall be responsible for the National Gendarmerie Headquarters.

However, all decisions shall, be taken upon mutual agreement between the Chief of Staff and the

Deputy Chief of Staff.

The Deputy Chief of Staff shall especially be responsible for the supervision of

activities entrusted to Departments 2 and 3 of the Headquarters. He shall be accountable to the

Chief of Staff. He shall replace the Chief of Staff and dispose of all the matters in the event of

the latter‟s absence or impediment.

Article 97: Organization and Functions of the Departments of the National

Gendarmerie Headquarters

The National Gendarmerie Headquarters shall be composed of (four) 4 Departments

with the following functions:

1. Department 1 (G1): Management of personnel.

2. Department 2 (G2): Security and intelligence.

- Security of personnel and equipment of the National Gendarmerie

- Gathering and use of intelligence relating to the Corps of the National Gendarmerie.

3. Department 3 (G3): Organization, training, education, operations, civic and

political education.

- Work out the doctrine of utilization of the National Gendarmerie;

- Proposal on the organisational structure and deployment of Units;

- Education and training;

- Civic and political education;

- Elaboration of plans for the maintenance of public order and security;

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- Planning of daily and periodic activities within the National Gendarmerie.

4. Department 4 (G4): Logistics

- Participation in preparing the budget;

- Providing Units with supplies;

- Management of the National Gendarmerie patrimony.

Paragraph 3: Security Committee of the National Gendarmerie

Article 98

A Security Committee is hereby established and shall constitute, within the

framework of the management of internal security, an organ of consultation and decision-making

in matters related to internal security within the National Gendarmerie.

Article 99: Composition

The Security Committee shall be composed of the following:

- The Chief of Staff of the National Gendarmerie: Chairman

- The Deputy Chief of Staff of the National Gendarmerie: Deputy Chairman

- The Chief of Criminal Investigation Service: Member

- The Chief of Specialized Intelligence Service: Member

- The Commander of the “Groupement” of Kigali City “Prefecture”: Member

Article 100: Functions

The Security Committee of the National Gendarmerie shall study all major issues

relating to the Internal Security of the country, and take decisions to be implemented by the

National Gendarmerie Headquarters or make recommendations to the Command Council of the

National Gendarmerie for appropriate action.

Article 101: Meetings

The Security Committee of the National Gendarmerie shall meet once a week upon

convocation of its Chairman, and when and as needed. The agenda of the meeting shall be

specified in the notification to attend.

Paragraph 4: Territorial Units

Article 102: Principle

Each “Prefecture” shall have a Territorial Unit of the National Gendarmerie, referred

to as “Groupement”. The “Groupement” shall be deployed in Territorial Companies and the

latter shall be deployed in stations of the National Gendarmerie.

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Article 103: Deployment

The Command Council of the National Gendarmerie shall undertake the deployment

of the National Gendarmerie, taking especially into account the prevailing security situation.

In any case, each “Sub-Prefecture” entity, or 3 to 4 “Communes” where there is no

such “Sub-Prefecture” entity, shall be served by a Territorial Company.

In a like manner, a permanent station of the Gendarmerie shall be established in each

Commune and/or each important rural centre. The Command Council of the National

Gendarmerie shall draw a plan for the establishment of those permanent stations.

Paragraph 5: Specialized Units

Article 104

The National Gendarmerie shall be composed of the following Specialised Units:

1. A Criminal Investigation Service responsible for criminal investigation and

technical police;

2. An Intervention Group to keep watch on sensitive or vital places in the country,

intervene in the event of riots and neutralize armed gangs;

3. A Specialized Intelligence Service to gather and make use of intelligence relevant

to public order and internal security;

4. A Republican Guard responsible for the security and protection of civilian

authorities and

personalities in the country and those from abroad. It shall also be responsible for the

Guard of honour;

5. A Mobile Brigade responsible for motorized patrols, the pursuit and interception of

criminals; 6. A Road Safety Unit to perform traffic police duties;

7. A Unit for the Security of Airports, responsible for the security of airports, airports

installations and the security of passengers;

8. A Fire Brigade to intervene in the event of fire, disaster and calamity;

9. A Dog Section responsible especially for the detection of drugs and explosives;

10. A Military Police to oversee the observance of discipline by Gendarmes.

Paragraph 6: Support and Service Units

Article 105

The National Gendarmerie shall be composed of the following Support Units and

Service Units:

1. A General Headquarters Company;

2. A Logistic Services Group;

3. A Band Unit;

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4. Medical Services.

Paragraph 7: School of the National Gendarmerie

There is a School of the National Gendarmerie under the Gendarmerie Headquarters

(EGENA).

Section 3: Service within the National Gendarmerie

Sub-Section 1: Terms of Service

Article 107: Principle

The service of a gendarme shall be under contract or permanent terms. Men as well as

Non-Commissioned Officers with ranks of Sergeant and Staff Sergeant shall be employed under

contract terms. The contract shall be valid for seven (7) years renewable once and applicable to

the category of gendarmes aged between 18 and 40. Other gendarmes shall be employed under

permanent terms.

Article 108: Ranks

Ranks within the National Gendarmerie shall fail under three categories and follow

each other as indicated below:

Category I: Men

- Gendarme

- Corporal

Category 2: Non-Commissioned Officers

- Sergeant

- Staff Sergeant

- Sergeant Major

- Warrant Officer Class I

- Warrant Officer Class II

Category 3: Officers

1. Junior Officers

- Second Lieutenant

- Lieutenant

- Captain

2. Senior Officers

- Major

- Lieutenant-Colonel

- Colonel

3. General Officers

- Brigadier

- Major-General

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- Lieutenant General

Ranks of “Premier Sergent-Major”, “Adjudant Principal” and “Commandant” are

abolished. Gendarmes currently holding these ranks shall maintain them until they are promoted

to higher ranks. They shall be the last ones to hold them. A new rank of Brigadier is hereby

established.

Article 109: Correspondence between Functions and Ranks within the National

Gendarmerie

The correspondence between functions and ranks of Gendarmes shall be as follows:

A. The National Gendarmerie Headquarters

Functions: Ranks:

1. Chief of Staff: Major-General, Brigadier, Colonel.

2. Deputy Chief of Staff: Major-General, Brigadier, Colonel.

3. Head of Department in the National Gerdarmerie Headquarters: Colonel,

Lieutenant-Colonel, Major.

4. Assistant Head of Department in the Colonel, Lieutenant-Colonel, Major,

National Gendarmerie Headquarters: Commandant, Captain.

5. Commander of a Department Section in Lieutenant-Colonel, Major, Commandant,

the National Gendarmerie Headquarters: Captain

6. Deputy Commander of a Department Major, Commandant, Captain, Lieutenant.

Section in the National Gendarmerie Headquarters:

7. Commander of Sub-Section of a Captain, Lieutenant, 2nd Lieutenant

Department Section in the National Gendarmerie Headquarters or Staff

Officer in the National Gendarmerie:

B. Units of the National Gendarmerie

1. Commander of a “Groupement”: Colonel, Lieutenant-Colonel, Major

Commander of the Intervention Group: Colonel, Lieutenant-Colonel, Major

Commander of the Republican Guard: Colonel, Lieutenant-Colonel, Major

2. Second in Command of a “Groupement”: Lieutenant-Colonel, Major,

Commandant,

Captain. Second in Command of the Intervention Group: Second in Command of the

Republican Guard:

3. Commander of the Logistic Services Group:

4. Second in Command of the Logistic Services Group: Colonel, Lieutenant-Colonel,

Major Lieutenant-Colonel, Major, Commandant

5. Chief of Specialized Intelligence Service: Colonel, Lieutenant Colonel, Major,

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Commandant

6. Deputy Chief of Specialized Intelligence Service: Lieutenant Colonel, Major,

Commandant,

Captain

7. Head of the Criminal Investigation Service: Colonel, Lieutenant-Colonel, Major,

Commandant.

8. Assistant Head of Criminal Investigation Service: Lieutenant-Colonel, Major,

Captain. 9. Military Police Commander: Major, Commandant, Captain.

Airport Security Unit Commander:

Road Safety Unit Commander:

Mobile Brigade Commander:

General Headquarters Commander:

Fire Brigade Commander:

10. Assistant Military Police Commander: Commandant, Captain, Lieutenant

Assistant Airport Security Unit Commander:

Assistant Road Safety Unit Commander:

Assistant Mobile Brigade Commander:

Assistant General Headquarters Commander:

Assistant Fire Brigade Commander:

11. Band Company Commander: Commandant, Captain

12. Assistant Band Company Commander: Captain, Lieutenant

13. Commander of the Headquarters Section in: Commandant, Captain, Lieutenant.

- the “Groupement”:

- the Intervention Group:

- the Republican Guard:

14. A Commander of a Company in a battalion or Commandant, Captain, Lieutenant

Section Commander of the:

- Specialized Intelligence Services:

- Criminal Investigation Service, or

- Logistic Services Group:

15. Second in Command of the Company in a

Battalion or Assistant Section Commander of the

- Specialized Intelligence Service,

- Criminal Investigation Service,

- Logistics Service Group: Commandant, Captain, Lieutenant.

16. Head of a Department of the Fire Brigade: Lieutenant, Second Lieutenant.

17. Dog Section Commander: Captain, Lieutenant.

18. Deputy Dog Section Commander: Lieutenant, Second Lieutenant.

19. Platoon Commander: Lieutenant, Second Lieutenant.

20. Non Commissioned Officer of a “Groupement”, Warrant Officer Class I, Warrant

II, Adjudant Principal.

Non Commissioned Officer of the Intervention Group,

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Non Commissioned Officer of the Republican Guard:

21. Non-Commissioned Officer of a Company: Premier Sergent Major, Sergeant

Major, Sergeant.

22. Gendarmerie Station Commander: Sergeant Major, Staff Sergeant, Sergeant

23. Section Commander: Staff Sergeant, Sergeant.

24. Assistant Section Commander: Corporal.

25. Team Leader: Corporal.

26. Judiciary Police Agent: Corporal, Gendarme.

C. School of the National Gendarmerie (EGENA)

1. Commander of the School of the Colonel, Lieutenant-Colonel

National Gendarmerie:

2. Second in Command of the School of the Lieutenant-Colonel, Major.

National Gendarmerie:

D. Other Functions

In addition to the functions mentioned above, there are other functions within the

administrative, logistic and technical services of the National Gendarmerie which may be

exercised by gendarmes holding various ranks provided for in the National Gendarmerie.

Article 110: Appointment of Members of the Command Council of the National

Gendarmerie

Members of the Command Council of' the National Gendarmerie shall be appointed

by the Cabinet, and Orders of their appointment shall be signed by the President of the Republic,

in accordance with the provisions of Article 9 of the Protocol of Agreement, signed on 30th

October, 1992.

Article 111: Appointment of General Officers and Senior Officers and their

Promotion to Ranks and Functions

General Officers and Senior Officers shall be appointed and promoted to ranks and

functions by the Cabinet, upon recommendation of the Command Council of the National

Gendarmerie.

Orders of their appointment shall be signed by the President of the Republic, in

accordance with the provisions of Article 9 of the Protocol of Agreement signed on 30th

October, 1992.

Article 112: Appointment of Junior Officers and their Promotion to Ranks and

Functions

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Junior Officers shall be appointed and promoted to ranks and functions by the

Cabinet, upon recommendation of the Command Council of the National Gendarmerie. Orders of

their appointment shall be signed by the Prime Minister.

Article 113: Appointment of Non-Commissioned Officers employed under Statutory

Terms and their Promotion to Ranks and Functions

Non-Commissioned Officers shall be appointed and promoted to ranks and functions

by the Command Council of the Gendarmerie, meeting under the chairmanship of the Minister of

Defence, who will be the one to sign Orders of their appointment.

Article 114: Employment, Posting and Promotion of Gendarmes Under Contract

Terms

All co

The Rwandan Genocide: A Case Study

Abstract and Figures