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Department of European & International Studies
King's College London
FILLING THE VACUUM?
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PARTISAN
RADICAL LEFT IN GERMANY, FRANCE AND
ITALY, 1989-2013
Paolo Chiocchetti
Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
14 November 2013
2
RD7 Declaration
Please submit to the Examinations Office with your thesis.
Has your thesis title changed since submission of the RD1: Yes No x
If you have exceeded the word limit for a thesis, as specified in the regulations, you
must obtain a suspension of regulations via the Learning and Teaching Support Office.
The examiners may reject a thesis exceeding the prescribed word limit. For further
details contact regulations@kcl.ac.uk.
DECLARATION: I confirm that the following thesis does not exceed the word limit
prescribed in the College regulations. I further confirm that the work presented in the
thesis is my own and all references are cited accordingly.
Supervisor name
Dr. Jim Wolfreys
Supervisor signature
Date
5 November 2013
Student name
Paolo Chiocchetti
Student ID number
0947962
School
Arts & Humanities
Intended date of
submission
14 November 2013
Word count of
thesis
93,591
Title of thesis
Filling the vacuum? The development of the partisan radical left
in Germany, France and Italy, 1989-2013
Student signature
Date
5 November 2013
3
ABSTRACT
This thesis charts the development of the parties of the contemporary European
radical left over the period 1989-2013. Its aim is to provide a convincing interpretative
framework on the topic and an innovative contribution to the scholarship on
comparative party analysis. The discussion will focus on three case studies (Germany,
France and Italy), selected for their central importance within the European Union and
for the diversity of their starting points and trajectories.
The analysis addresses three main research questions. Firstly, what is the relevance of
radical left parties within contemporary political systems and societies (their societal
weight) and what are the main determinants of their growth and decline? Secondly,
how can we make sense of the evolution of their political nature, namely the
transformations in their ideology, sociology, organisation and strategy? Thirdly, what
are the key drivers behind the tendencies to regroupment and fragmentation? I
answer to these interrogatives by placing the development of the contemporary
radical left firmly within the context of a process of neoliberalisation of Western
European societies and of an emerging vacuum of political representation of working
class and welfarist constituencies. Moreover, I show how an aggregate, multi-
dimensional and multi-level approach can help to further our understanding of radical
left dynamics and contradictions.
The first chapter will provide a theoretical conceptualisation of the radical left as a
political space defined by representational contents and by its relationship with the
moderate left. The second chapter will present an overview of its historical roots (since
1914) and of its broader Western European context. The central chapters (three, four
and five) will be devoted to an in-depth analysis of the three country studies. The final
chapter will explicitly compare the German, French and Italian trajectories, draw
together the main findings and illustrate their broader significance for political
research.
4
Table of contents
RD7 Declaration ....................................................................................................................................... 2
ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................................................ 3
Table of contents ..................................................................................................................................... 4
List of tables and figures .......................................................................................................................... 6
List of acronyms and abbreviations ......................................................................................................... 8
Acknowledgements ............................................................................................................................... 12
CHAPTER ONE. INTRODUCTION. TOWARD AN ANALYSIS OF THE CONTEMPORARY
RADICAL LEFT. ................................................................................................................. 13
1.1 Theoretical approach ....................................................................................................................... 16
1.2 The radical left political space ......................................................................................................... 20
1.3 Political nature................................................................................................................................. 26
1.4 Societal weight, fragmentation and regroupment .......................................................................... 33
1.5 Case studies and time frame ........................................................................................................... 35
1.6 Conclusions ...................................................................................................................................... 37
CHAPTER TWO. HISTORICAL AND GEOGRAPHICAL CONTEXT ........................................ 38
2.1 A secular overview ........................................................................................................................... 39
2.1.1 The inter-war period (1917-1939) ........................................................................................... 42
2.1.2 The welfare state period (1945-1991) ..................................................................................... 49
2.1.3 The neoliberal period (1991-present) ..................................................................................... 58
2.2 The Western European landscape ................................................................................................... 65
2.3 Conclusions ...................................................................................................................................... 79
CHAPTER THREE. THE GERMAN RADICAL LEFT: A SUCCESS STORY? .............................. 80
3.1 The national context ........................................................................................................................ 80
3.2 The making of a new German radical left ........................................................................................ 88
3.2.1 Societal weight ........................................................................................................................ 88
3.2.2 Regroupment and fragmentation ............................................................................................ 93
3.2.3 Political nature ......................................................................................................................... 95
3.3 Filling the vacuum: potential and limits of the radical left mobilisation ....................................... 103
3.4 Explaining radical left regroupment .............................................................................................. 131
3.5 The strategy of leftward pull ......................................................................................................... 136
3.6 Conclusions .................................................................................................................................... 143
CHAPTER FOUR. THE ITALIAN RADICAL LEFT: THE STORY OF A FAILURE? ................... 145
4.1 The national context ...................................................................................................................... 145
4.2 The making of a new Italian radical left......................................................................................... 152
4.2.1 Societal weight ...................................................................................................................... 152
4.2.2 Regroupment and fragmentation .......................................................................................... 158
4.2.3 Political nature ....................................................................................................................... 160
5
4.3 Filling the vacuum: potential and limits of radical left mobilisation ............................................. 170
4.4 Explaining rising fragmentation and failed regroupment.............................................................. 192
4.5 The strategy of leftward pull ......................................................................................................... 197
4.6 Conclusions .................................................................................................................................... 202
CHAPTER FIVE. THE FRENCH RADICAL LEFT: SUCCESS OR FAILURE? ............................ 207
5.1 The national context ...................................................................................................................... 207
5.2 The making of a new French radical left........................................................................................ 210
5.2.1 Societal weight ...................................................................................................................... 211
5.2.2 Regroupment and fragmentation .......................................................................................... 221
5.2.3 Political nature ....................................................................................................................... 225
5.3 Filling the vacuum: potential and limits of radical left mobilisation ............................................. 237
5.4 Explaining fragmentation and regroupment ................................................................................. 258
5.5 The strategy of leftward pull ......................................................................................................... 262
5.6 Conclusions .................................................................................................................................... 265
CHAPTER SIX. CROSS-COUNTRY COMPARISON AND CONCLUSION: FINDINGS AND
IMPLICATIONS. .............................................................................................................. 268
6.1 The meaning of the contemporary radical left. Incoherent adaptation, revival of left reformism or
a socialism for the Twenty-First Century? ........................................................................................... 269
6.2 Political nature: anti-neoliberal parties and troubled relationship with the moderate left ......... 276
6.3. Electoral mobilisation: discordant trends, underlying reasons and the "vacuum thesis" ............ 280
6.4 Institutional weight: a double-edged sword ................................................................................. 293
6.5 Organisational mobilisation: the crisis of the communist mass party model continues ............... 298
6.6 The case for regroupment and the reasons behind fragmentation .............................................. 310
6.7 Systemic influence: much ado about nothing? ............................................................................. 315
6.8 Concluding remarks ....................................................................................................................... 318
A. BIBLIOGRAPHY ...................................................................................................... 320
1. PRIMARY SOURCES AND SECONDARY LITERATURE .................................................................... 320
2. REFERENCE WEBSITES ................................................................................................................ 369
3. INTERVIEWS ................................................................................................................................ 371
B. STATISTICAL APPENDIX ......................................................................................... 373
GENERAL .............................................................................................................................................. 373
GERMANY ............................................................................................................................................ 377
ITALY .................................................................................................................................................... 389
FRANCE ................................................................................................................................................ 400
6
List of tables and figures
TABLE 1.1 MAJOR RADICAL LEFT PARTIES .................................................................................................. 36
TABLE 2.1 SOCIETAL WEIGHT, INTER-WAR PERIOD (1920-1939) ............................................................... 46
TABLE 2.2 SOCIETAL WEIGHT, GOLDEN AGE (1945-1988) ......................................................................... 54
TABLE 2.3 SOCIETAL WEIGHT, NEOLIBERAL AGE (1990-2013) ................................................................... 62
TABLE 2.4 RADICAL LEFT ELECTORAL RESULTS (EU15 SERIES) ................................................................... 69
TABLE 2.5 RADICAL LEFT ELECTORAL RESULTS, SELECTED YEARS (ALL SERIES) ......................................... 70
TABLE 2.6 GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION ................................................................................................. 73
TABLE 2.7 ELECTORAL FRAGMENTATION (EU15) ....................................................................................... 74
TABLE 2.8 GOVERNMENTAL PARTICIPATION OF RADICAL LEFT PARTIES, 1965-2013 ............................... 76
TABLE 3.1 SOCIETAL WEIGHT ..................................................................................................................... 88
FIGURE 3.2 SOCIETAL WEIGHT ................................................................................................................... 89
TABLE 3.3 FRAGMENTATION ...................................................................................................................... 93
TABLE 3.4 SOCIOLOGY OF MEMBERS ......................................................................................................... 98
TABLE 3.5 SOCIOLOGY OF VOTERS (COMPOSITION) .................................................................................. 99
FIGURE 3.6 SUPPORT FOR ESTABLISHMENT PARTIES .............................................................................. 107
FIGURE 3.7 LEFT-WING OPINION, SIZE ..................................................................................................... 108
FIGURE 3.8 LEFT-WING OPINION, NET BALANCE ..................................................................................... 108
FIGURE 3.9 ELECTORAL RESULTS, EAST/WEST ......................................................................................... 111
FIGURE 3.10 ELECTORAL RESULTS, SELECTED SOCIAL GROUPS ............................................................... 113
FIGURE 3.12 PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD THE PDS, EAST/WEST ........................................................... 119
FIGURE 3.13 MEMBERSHIP LEVELS .......................................................................................................... 123
FIGURE 3.14 INDICATORS OF INFLUENCE ................................................................................................ 130
FIGURE 4.1 ITALIAN RADICAL LEFT PARTIES ............................................................................................. 150
TABLE 4.2 SOCIETAL WEIGHT ................................................................................................................... 152
FIGURE 4.3 SOCIETAL WEIGHT ................................................................................................................. 153
TABLE 4.4 FRAGMENTATION .................................................................................................................... 158
TABLE 4.5 SOCIOLOGY OF VOTERS (COMPOSITION) ................................................................................ 164
TABLE 4.6 SOCIOLOGY OF VOTERS (PENETRATION)................................................................................. 165
TABLE 4.7 MACRO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS ............................................................................................ 171
TABLE 4.8 ELECTORAL RESULTS BY POLE AND IDEOLOGY ........................................................................ 175
FIGURE 4.9 ELECTORAL RESULTS (13 REGIONS) ....................................................................................... 179
TABLE 4.10 NET ELECTORAL FLUXES ........................................................................................................ 181
TABLE 4.11 ORIGIN OF VOTES .................................................................................................................. 181
FIGURE 4.12 INDICATORS OF LEFT-WING OPINION ................................................................................. 183
TABLE 4.13 EVOLUTION OF POST-COMMUNIST SELF-IDENTIFICATION AND PERCEPTION ..................... 184
FIGURE 4.14 MEMBERSHIP OF POST-COMMUNIST PARTIES ................................................................... 187
FIGURE 4.15 INDICATORS OF INFLUENCE ................................................................................................ 191
FIGURE 4.16 LABOUR CONFLICT............................................................................................................... 200
TABLE 5.1 SOCIETAL WEIGHT ................................................................................................................... 211
FIGURE 5.2 SOCIETAL WEIGHT ................................................................................................................. 212
FIGURE 5.3 ELECTORAL RESULTS .............................................................................................................. 214
TABLE 5.4 FRAGMENTATION .................................................................................................................... 221
TABLE 5.5 SOCIOLOGY OF VOTERS (COMPOSITION) ................................................................................ 228
TABLE 5.6 SOCIOLOGY OF VOTERS (PENETRATION)................................................................................. 229
TABLE 5.7 SOCIOLOGY OF THE PARTY-ORGANISATION, PCF (COMPOSITION) ........................................ 231
TABLE 5.8 MACRO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS ............................................................................................ 239
FIGURE 5.9 ELECTORAL RESULTS OF FRENCH PARTIES BY TYPE .............................................................. 242
FIGURE 5.10 LABOUR CONFLICT............................................................................................................... 244
FIGURE 5.11 ELECTORAL RESULTS OF RADICAL AND MODERATE LEFT ................................................... 247
FIGURE 5.12 INDICATORS OF LEFT-WING OPINION ................................................................................. 249
FIGURE 5.13 RADICAL LEFT MEMBERSHIP ............................................................................................... 250
FIGURE 5.14 INDICATORS OF INFLUENCE ................................................................................................ 253
FIGURE 6.1 ELECTORAL EVOLUTION OF THE WESTERN EUROPEAN RADICAL LEFT ................................. 274
TABLE 6.2 CLASS COMPOSITION .............................................................................................................. 278
TABLE 6.3 ELECTORAL WEIGHT ................................................................................................................ 280
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FIGURE 6.4 ELECTORAL WEIGHT .............................................................................................................. 281
TABLE 6.5 SELECTED SOCIOLOGICAL FEATURES OF VOTERS .................................................................... 283
TABLE 6.6 PARLIAMENTARY WEIGHT AND GOVERNMENTAL INVOLVEMENT ......................................... 293
TABLE 6.7 GOVERNMENTAL INVOLVEMENT AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL ................................................... 295
FIGURE 6.8 GOVERNMENTAL INVOLVEMENT: REGIONAL AND COMBINED ............................................ 295
TABLE 6.9 MEMBERSHIP EVOLUTION ...................................................................................................... 299
FIGURE 6.10 MEMBERSHIP EVOLUTION .................................................................................................. 299
FIGURE 6.11 FINANCES ............................................................................................................................. 306
TABLE 6.12 FRAGMENTATION .................................................................................................................. 311
8
List of acronyms and abbreviations
ABID Allgemeiner Behindertenverband in Deutschland
AC! Agir ensemble contre le chômage
ADF Aktion Demokratischer Fortschritt
ADS Alternative pour la Démocratie et le Socialisme
AfD Alternative für Deutschland
ALV Arbeitslosenverband Deutschland
ANPI Associazione Nazionale Partigiani d'Italia
APEIS Association pour l'emploi, l'information et la solidarité des chômeurs et des précaires
ARAC Association republicaine des anciens combattants et victimes de guerre
ARCI Associazione Ricreativa e Culturale Italiana
ARS Associazione per il Rinnovamento della Sinistra
ATTAC Association pour une taxation des transations financières pour l'aide aux citoyens
[since 2009: Association pour une taxation des transations financières et pour l'action
citoyenne]
AWO Arbeiterwohlfahrt
BdWi Bund demokratischer Wissenschaftlerinnen und Wissenschaftler
BWL Bundeswahlleiter
CAGR Compound Annual Growth Rate
CAP Convention pour une Alternative Progressiste
CCA Confederazione Comunisti/e Autorganizzati
CDSP Centre de Données Socio-politiques
CDU (Germany) Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands
CDU (Portugal) Coligação Democrática Unitária [alliance of PCP and PEV]
CEVIPOF Centre de recherches politiques de Sciences Po [before 2003 Centre d'études de la vie
politique française]
CGIL Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro
CGT Confédération générale du travail
CIUN Collectif national d’initiative pour un rassemblement antilibéral de gauche et des
candidatures communes
CNL Confédération Nationale du Logement
COBAS Cobas per l'Autorganizzazione
COCORECO Collectif de Coordination des Rénovateurs Communistes [after 1988 MRC, Mouvement
des Rénovateurs Communistes]
CP Confédération paysanne
CNP-M Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)
CSA conseil, sondage et analyse
CSU Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern
CU Movimento dei Comunisti Unitari
DAL Droit au logement
DARES Direction de l'animation de la recherche, des études et des statistiques
DD!! Droits devant!!
DESTATIS Statistisches Bundesamt
DFG-VK Deutsche Friedengesellschaft – Vereinigte KriegstdienstgegnerInnen
DFU Deutsche Friedensunion
DGB Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund
DGRV Deutscher Genossenschafts- und Raiffeisenverband
DIDF Demokratik Işçi Dernekleri Federasyonu
DIE LINKE. DIE LINKE.
DKP Deutsche Kommunistische Partei
DL Democrazia è Libertà – La Margherita
DMB Deutscher Mieterbund
DP Democrazia Proletaria
DS Democratici di Sinistra
FASE Fédération pour une Alternative Sociale et Écologique
FAUD Freie Arbeiter-Union Deutschlands
9
FdG Front de gauche
FDP Freie Demokratische Partei
FdS Federazione della Sinistra
FED Federazione dell'Ulivo
FGA Fédération pour une gauche alternative
FGW Forschungsgruppe Wahlen
FIOM Federazione Impiegati Operai Metallurgici
FN Front national
FNACA Fédération nationale des anciens combattants en Algérie, Maroc et Tunisie
FNMT Fédération nationale des mutuelles de travailleurs [after 1986 FMF, Fédération des
mutuelles de France]
FO Confédération générale du travail - Force ouvrière
FRG Federal Republic of Germany [West Germany]
FSGT Fédération sportive et gymnique du travail
FSU Fédération syndicale unitaire
GDF Göcmen Dernekleri Federasyonu
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GDR German Democratic Republic [East Germany]
GISTI Groupe d'information et de soutien des immigrés [before 1996 Groupe d'information
et de soutien des travailleurs immigrés]
GRÜNE Bündnis 90/Die Grünen
G.U. Gazzetta Ufficiale della Repubblica Italiana
GUE/NGL Gauche unitaire européenne/Gauche verte nordique [European United Left/Nordic
Green Left]
ICTWSS Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State Intervention and
Social Pacts [database]
IdV Italia dei Valori
IFOP Institut français d'opinion publique
IG Metall Industriegewerkschaft Metall
IMT International Marxist Tendency
INFAS Institut für angewandte Sozialwissenschaft
INFRATEST infratest dimap Gesellschaft für Trend- und Wahlforschung mbH
INSEE Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques
ISOR Initiativgemeinschaft zum Schutz der sozialen Rechte ehemaliger Angehöriger
bewaffneter Organe und der Zollverwaltung der DDR
IST International Socialist Tendency
ISTAT Istituto nazionale di statistica
ITANES Italian National Election Studies
IU Izquierda Unida
J.O.R.F. Journal Official de la République Française
KAPD Kommunistische Arbeiterpartei Deutschlands
KB Kommunistischer Bund
KKE Κομμουνιστικό Κόμμα Ελλάδας [Communist Party of Greece]
KLEMS EU KLEMS project
KOS Koordinierungsstelle gewerkschaftlicher Arbeitslosengruppen
KPD Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands
KPD-O Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands – Opposition
KPD-Ost Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands [1990]
L.PDS Die Linkspartei.PDS [shorthand: DIE LINKE.PDS]
LCR Ligue communiste révolutionnaire
LEGACOOP Lega Nazionale delle Cooperative e Mutue
LO Lutte Ouvrière
M5S MoVimento 5 Stelle
MAS Movimiento al Socialismo – Instumento Político por la Soberanía de los Pueblos
MDC Mouvement des citoyens [after 2003 MRC, Mouvement républicain et citoyen]
MJCF Mouvement Jeunes Communistes de France
MLPD Marxistisch-Leninistische Partei Deutschlands
MNCP Mouvement national des chômeurs et précaires
MoDem Mouvement démocrate
10
MpS Movimento per la Sinistra
MRAP Mouvement contre le racisme et pour l'amitié entre les peuples
MSPD Mehrheitssozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands
MUP Mouvement Unitaire Progressiste
NPA Nouveau parti anticapitaliste
OCI Organisation communiste internationaliste
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OKV Ostdeutsches Kuratorium von Verbänden
PAC Parti pour une alternative communiste
PBC Per il Bene Comune
PC (France) Parti communiste
PCd'I Partito Comunista d'Italia
PCF Parti communiste français
PCI Partito Comunista Italiano
PCI (France) Parti comuniste internationaliste
PCI M-L Partito Comunista Italiano Marxista-Leninista
PCL Partito Comunista dei Lavoratori
PD Partito Democratico
PdAC Partito di Alternativa Comunista
PdCI Partito dei Comunisti Italiani
PDS (Germany) Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus
PDS (Italy) Partito Democratico della Sinistra
PdUP Partito di Unità Proletaria per il Comunismo
PEL Party of the European Left
PG Parti de Gauche
PIRATEN Piratenpartei Deutschland
POI Parti ouvrier indépendant [before 2008 PT, Parti des travailleurs]
PRC Partito della Rifondazione Comunista
PSG Partei für Soziale Gleichheit [before 1997 BSA, Bund Sozialistischer Arbeiter]
PSI Partito Socialista Italiano
PSIUP Partito Socialista Italiano di Unità Proletaria
PSOP Parti socialiste ouvrier et paysan
PSU (France) Parti socialiste unifié
PSU (Italy) Partito Socialista Unitario
PSUV Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela
PT Parti des Travailleurs [after 2008 POI, Parti ouvrier indépendant]
PUP Parti d'unité prolétarienne
RC Rivoluzione Civile
RESF Réseau éducation sans frontières
RMI Revenu Minimum d'Insertion
RPR Rassemblement pour la République
RSB Revolutionär Sozialistischer Bund
RW Repräsentative Wahlstatistik [Bundeswahlleiter]
SA La Sinistra – L'Arcobaleno
SAPD Sozialistische Arbeiterpartei Deutschlands
SC Sinistra Critica
SD Sinistra Democratica
SED Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschland
SEGA Solidarité, Écologie, Gauche Alternative
SeL Sinistra e Libertà
SEL Sinistra Ecologia Libertà
SFIC Section française de l'Internationale communiste
SFIO Section française de l'Internationale ouvrière
SMIC Salaire minimum interprofessionnel de croissance
SOFRES Société française d'enquêtes par sondages
Solidaires Union syndicale Solidaires
SoVD Sozialverband Deutschland
SPD Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands
SPF Secours populaire français
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SUNIA Sindacato Unitario Nazionale Inquilini ed Assegnatari
SYRIZA Συνασπισμός Ριζοσπαστικής Αριστεράς - Ενωτικό Κοινωνικό Μέτωπο [Coalition of the
Radical Left – Unitary Social Front]
Treuhand Treuhandanstalt
UDF Union pour la démocratie française
UDI Unione Donne Italiane [after 2003 Unione Donne in Italia]
UDS Unione degli Studenti
UDU Unione degli Universitari
UFF Union des femmes françaises [after 1998 FS, Femmes solidaires]
UMP Union pour un mouvement populaire [before 2002 Union pour la majorité
présidentielle]
UNEF Union nationale des étudiants de France
UNRPA Union Nationale des Retraités et Personnes âgées
USFI Fourth International
USI-AIT Unione Sindacale Italiana
USPD Unabhängige Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands
VdK Sozialverband VdK (Verband der Kriegsbeschädigten, Kriegshinterbliebenen und
Sozialrentner Deutschlands)
Ver.Di Vereinte Dienstleistungsgewerkschaft
VKSG Verband der Kleingärtner, Siedler und Grundstücknutzer
VL Vereinigte Linke
VSP Vereinigte Sozialistische Partei
WASG Arbeit & soziale Gerechtigkeit - Die Wahlalternative
WEO World Economic Outlook [database of the International Monetary Fund]
12
Acknowledgements
This thesis would not have been possible without the help, the encouragement, the
patience and the moral and material support of many people: my supervisors Dr. Jim
Wolfreys and Dr. Stathis Kouvelakis; my parents Linda and Aldo; my girlfriend Teresa;
my grandparents Gisella and Tarcisio; my friends Giulia, Lorenzo P., Lorenzo F., Adam,
Marina, Jisun, Simon, Aude, Ffion, Tom, Daniele and Anselmo. To all of you goes my
heartfelt thanks.
I would also like to express my sincere gratitude for their assistance to the following
persons and institutions: the King's Continuation Scholarship award; the
KCLEURESEARCH group; the academic and administrative staff at the Department of
European & International Studies; the Interloans staff; all my interviewees; the DIE
LINKE.SDS group in Leipzig; Linda Santilli and Claudio Grassi of the PRC; Giovanni
Parrella of the PdCI; Uwe Michel of the Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung; Lothar Hornbogen
and Judith Dellheim of DIE LINKE; Dr. Viola Neu of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung;
Melanie Kipp of Infratest dimap; Tanja Seel of the Statistisches Bundesamt; Dr. Thierry
Choffat; Dr. Dominique Andolfatto; Pascale Arnaud; Sebastian Budgen; Guy Landais;
the Istituto Cattaneo in Bologna; the CDSP in Paris; the APB-Tutzing.
13
CHAPTER ONE. INTRODUCTION.
TOWARD AN ANALYSIS OF THE
CONTEMPORARY RADICAL LEFT.
The historic change represented by the fall of the Soviet bloc in 1989-1991 was
famously hailed by the neo-conservative scholar Francis Fukuyama (1989) as
representing "the end of history" and as paving the way for a shift toward a de-
ideologised, pacified and consensual policy-making built on the cornerstones of free-
market capitalism, liberal democratic institutions and technocratic neoliberal policies.
From the other hand of the political spectrum, social democratic political scientist
Herbert Kitschelt (1994) underlined the continuing importance of political competition
between left and right on cultural and post-materialist issues but agreed that the
success of the welfare state, the constraints of globalisation and the post-industrial
shift meant a substantial end of the traditional class and redistributive conflicts.
1
In the subsequent two decades, however, slow economic growth and attempts by
firms and governments to dismantle the achievements of the post-war social
compromise have brought the issues of class conflict and alternative developmental
models back to the forefront. Firstly, proposed policy reforms have regularly been met
with massive social mobilisations, leading in cases like France and Greece to a veritable
revival of labour militancy (Kouvelakis, 2007 and 2011). Secondly, resistance to
neoliberalism has led to the emergence of new waves of social movement activism and
connected intellectual efforts: for instance, the French-centred mouvements des sans
(Mouchard, 2009), the alter-globalist movement (Agricoliansky et. al., 2005; Della
1
The text is worth an extensive quotation: "traditional social democratic policies ought no longer be
pursued, because they cannot be successfully implemented in the socioeconomic and cultural
environment of advanced capitalism" (p. 5); "the new challenges of international market competition
and the fragmentation of occupational groups and industrial sector force the parties to give up far-
reaching objectives to change economic property rights and income equalization. What remains of
social democratic economic leftism is the defence of basic principles of the welfare state [...] Socialist
parties, however, are compelled to abandon demands for the nationalization of enterprises or for
workers' control of corporate investment decisions in order to remain electorally viable. Instead, social
democratic parties will embrace an agenda of economic policies that offers public investments to
enhance the capacity of private market participants to compete internationally. [...] In advanced
industrial democracies, parties can no longer offer voters stark alternatives on the distributive
dimension" (p. 297).
14
Porta, 2006) or more recent anti-crisis mobilisations of the youth such as the
indignados and occupy (Current Sociology, forth.). Thirdly, the diminishing goods and
prospects distributed by the mainstream of the political system have led to an
important decline of their legitimacy, appeal and electoral support (Mair, 2006) and
the rise of political disengagement and anti-establishment challengers.
Within this landscape the parties of the radical left have experienced a certain revival
of electoral support and of scholarly attention. With regard to the first point, the post-
1989 radical left has remained a medium-small party family weighing between 6% and
7% of the Western European electorate but has proved wrong the widespread
expectations of its inevitable demise and, in some countries at least, has experienced
significant phases of growth (see chapter 2). With regard to the second point, twenty
years ago the topic tended to be viewed as a marginal research object, rather a mere
curiosity, relic of the past or anachronism than a subject worthy of the attention of
political and social scientists. Progressively, however, interest has been growing and
has become embodied in a large of number of scholarly articles, monographs, book
chapters and edited volumes.
The attempts at a general synthesis have focused on three main aspects.
Firstly, the initial tendency toward a decline of overall electoral and societal relevance
of the radical left, especially as far as traditional communist parties are concerned
(Bell, 1993; Bull, 1994 and 1995; Moreau et al., 1998; Ramiro, 2003; Botella & Ramiro,
2003b).
Secondly, a profound transformation of the identity, ideology, programmes, image,
strategy, organisation, sociological profile and systemic role of most parties, either
through the mutation of former communist organisations, processes of regroupment
and the emergence of new forces (Marantzidis, 2003; March & Mudde, 2005; March,
2008 and 2011).
Thirdly, the tentative emergence, on the ruins of the old communist party family, of a
new "radical left" grouping which is certainly less coherent and radical of its
predecessor but at the same time reverses the trend toward decline, links up with
contemporary social mobilisation and often reaches new peaks of electoral and
political influence (Hudson, 2000 and 2012; Callinicos, 2002, 2008 and 2012; Brie &
Hildebrandt, 2005 and 2006; Pina, 2005; Backes & Moreau, 2008; March, 2008 and
15
2011; Hildebrandt & Daiber, 2009; Olsen et al., 2010; Bale & Dunphy, 2011; Videt,
2011; De Waele & Vieira, 2012; Ducange et al., 2013).
I intend to contribute to this body of literature by providing a detailed analysis of the
partisan radical left in the period 1989-2013 in three core countries of the European
Union: Germany, France and Italy. In the rest of the chapter I will outline my analytical
framework and the key theoretical and methodological choices.
16
1.1 Theoretical approach
A preliminary question needs to be addressed here: is the concept of a "contemporary
radical left" meaningful and useful? Are we talking of a coherent party family (Mair &
Mudde, 1998) or of a motley crew linked only by the fact of being to the left of the
mainstream socialist parties? Many facts seem to militate against the first perspective.
On the one hand, the parties commonly identified under this label seem to present a
marked degree of diversity and large ideological, relational and organisational
differences. A first symptom of this is the instability of definitions and connotations
used by parties and external observers alike
2
. A second problem is the different
ideological heritage of the parties, which ranges from left social democracy to
Trotskyism passing through Eurocommunism, orthodox communism, Maoism, eco-
socialism and various "new left" traditions. A third problem is the different degrees of
radicalism in their goals (from mild reformism to vocal anti-capitalism) and in their
parliamentary collocation (from governmental collaboration to anti-systemic
opposition). A final problem is the absence of any solid and inclusive form of
coordination at the supra-national level beyond the loose "technical" function of the
GUE/NGL European parliamentary group
3
. The best summary of this scepticism is
provided by Bull (1994): "the erstwhile fragmentation has become separation and […]
it will no longer be possible to generalise about these parties as a "family", nor fruitful
to study them within the same analytical framework". (p. 211)
On the other hand, there seem to be good arguments for either restricting the use of
the term to ideologically anti-capitalist and/or relationally intransigent parties (the
2
The most common term, "radical left", is rejected by some because it implies an exaggeration of the
ideological radicalism of these parties or because of its association with anti-systemic extremism
(especially in Germany). Popular alternatives have been "alternative left" (especially during the Nineties)
and, increasingly, "left" tout court. Other terms tend to focus on a smaller range of organisations, like
"post-communist left" or "far-left". Finally, some authors see a dichotomy between an "anti-neoliberal
(or radical) left" and an "anti-capitalist (or extreme) left" (March, 2011).
3
The late attempt to follow the lead of other party families by establishing a transnational EPF
(European Party Federation) led to the creation in 2004 of the Party of the European Left (PEL). The
coordination remains however loose and with a patchy coverage (Dunphy & March, 2012). More
stringent forms of cooperation tend to have a very narrow ideological basis and be limited to the various
Trotskyist internationals.
17
Trotskyist far left; orthodox communist parties; radicalised forces from a communist or
socialist background), thereby treating the more moderate and institutionalised
parties as social democratic satellites, or identifying two distinct party families: an anti-
capitalist (or revolutionary, antagonist) left and an anti-neoliberal (reformist, neo-
social democratic) left.
My opinion is that a specific and coherent, albeit contradictory, radical left space does
in fact exist and over-determines the behaviour of its component organisations, linking
them together in a common party family. Four key elements must here be spelled out.
Firstly, all radical left parties compete on a very similar political and electoral space and
their success is predicated on their ability to provide a credible representation to a set
of socio-economic issues which have been deserted by the mainstream political parties
(notably by the "new" social democracy). Secondly, they all share the same strategic
dilemmas: in particular, the tension between the defence of their anti-neoliberal
programme and the desire for a common front against the right (in the terminology of
the Italian PRC, the tension between radicality and unity). Thirdly, almost all parties
and sensibilities – some to a greater, other to a smaller degree – have indeed tended
to converge on a similar mid-term programme (an anti-neoliberal platform focusing on
working class, welfarist and left-libertarian issues), identity (left instead of communist)
and organisation (loose, inclusive and pluralist). Fourthly, the diversity of historical
traditions, ideological beliefs and practical orientations has tended to coexist within a
common organisational framework, either under the form of broad left parties (e.g.
PRC, PDS, DIE LINKE) or of semi-structured fronts or alliances (e.g. IU, Syriza, FdG,
Respect).
4
Radical left unity tended to be rational and profitable, so far as the diversity
of long-term goals was overshadowed by common short-term mobilisations and a
collocation in the opposition enabled a large margin of ambiguity; division, on the
other hand, tended to resurface only when faced with the hard choices with regards to
governmental participation.
5
4
Indeed, the tendency toward regroupment has involved most of the existing radical left organisation,
including the vast majority of Trotskyist groups. The IMT, for instance, has sought (outside Britain) to
build Marxist tendencies within post- and neo-communist parties; the IST has generally argued for the
establishment of broad left coalitions conceived as "united fronts of a special kind" (Rees, 2002;
Callinicos, 2004); the USFI has oscillated between a call for "broad left parties" (Smith, 2003) and that
for "broad anti-capitalist proletarian parties" with stricter delimitations (USFI, 2003).
5
Or when the leading radical left party was unwilling (Greece, Portugal) or unable (France) to provide a
reasonable working framework to its potential allies.
18
The analysis will be based on an understanding of political parties (and, by extension,
party families) primarily as specific tools enabling collective action and mediating
between society and public authoritative decision-making. In this sense, both the role
of parties as mechanisms of selection of political personnel and tendency toward
autonomisation and self-serving behaviour of specific groups, levels or entire
organisations must be considered as by-products of their primary function.
6
The thesis will focus on three broad research questions/themes.
The first one concerns the political nature of radical left parties. This point
encompasses the most virulent discussions on their character: anti-neoliberal or anti-
capitalist, working class or post-materialist, conciliatory or intransigent, integrated or
anti-systemic, electoral or social, useful or useless, moved by a coherent vision or by
passive reactions to their external environment, and so on. The use of a multi-
dimensional, multi-level, aggregate and comparative approach will facilitate the
identification of provisional answers to these debates which, albeit largely fuelled by
legitimate analytical differences, are partly due to a non-declared implicit focus on
specific parties, levels and dimensions to the detriment of the larger picture.
The second one concerns the societal weight of the radical left and an understanding
of its determinants, consequences, potential and obstacles.
The third one concerns the unifying features and contradictions of the radical left
space. The identification of the centripetal and centrifugal tendencies of this space will
help to explain the divergent trajectories of the three radical lefts in terms of
fragmentation and regroupment: the progressive breakup of the PRC in a myriad of
competing organisations in Italy; the preservation of a unitary framework in Germany;
an early and persistent competition followed by an abrupt late regroupment in France.
The analytical approach I will employ is characterised by three main characteristics: it
is aggregate, multi-dimensional and multi-level.
In contrast with the general tendency of the literature on the topic, I argue for the
superiority of an aggregate approach focusing on the radical left political space (or
6
An excellent discussion of political parties as sites of power struggles and the possible ways to theorise
power within political parties is provided by the PhD thesis of Danny Rye (forthcoming).
19
field), within which various party organisations and tendencies (big and small,
parliamentary and extra-parliamentary) operate and compete, over an ideographic
comparison of individual radical left parties. This procedure has two great advantages.
On one hand, it enables us to identify the general trends lying behind party-specific
idiosyncrasies. On the other hand, it improves the national and international
comparability of our findings: that is, with other national party families and between
the radical left of one country and those of other countries. For the same reason, the
discussion of measures of societal weight (e.g. membership, votes and finances) will
eschew from any threshold of relevance.
7
This choice makes little difference in cases of
a cohesive radical left (Germany) but greatly improves the results in cases of high
fragmentation (France and Italy).
I also stress the multi-dimensionality of the analysis. Existing research has tended to
focus on one or two dimension of party activity at a time: organisation (Bosco, 2000;
Bertolino, 2004; Keith, 2010); electoral results (Ramiro, 2003; March &
Rommerskirchen, 2011; De Waele & Vieira, 2012); ideological evolution (March &
Mudde, 2005; March, 2011); governmental participation (Hough & Verge, 2009;
Daiber, 2010; Daiber et al., 2010; Olsen et al., 2010; Bale & Dunphy, 2011; Dunphy &
Bale, 2011); role in the party system and political activity strictu sensu (most of the
case studies); civil society linkages (Andolfatto, 2008). My work will endeavour to
survey all relevant dimensions of party politics and put them in relation with each
other.
Finally, the individual radical left parties must necessarily be analysed within a multi-
level framework reproducing the connections and contradictions between the various
internal layers and external constraints of party activity. In particular, it is important to
differentiate between the party-organisation (e.g. leadership, activists, members,
collateral organisations), the party-constituency (e.g. financial supporters,
sympathising individual and organisations, voters), the external actors (potential allies
and adversaries) and the structural environment (e.g. political system, national
societies, international framework).
In the following paragraphs I will expand on each of these points.
7
Unlike March and Mudde (2005) and March (2009), which set it at 3% of the vote and one seat in at
least one parliamentary election, or De Waele and Vieira (2012), which set it at one parliamentary seat.
20
1.2 The radical left political space
1.2.1 Features and boundaries
At the heart of this research lies the hypothesis of the existence of a radical left
political space populated by a variety of different partisan organisations. What are its
features and boundaries?
Unlike the Twentieth Century communist movement, contemporary radical left parties
are not bound together by a strong organisational link (the Comintern in 1919-1943,
informal links to the Soviet Union afterwards), identity (communism) or ideology
(Marxism-Leninism). What unites this wide array of forces, ranging from those
advocating limited reforms within the capitalist system to those advocating an anti-
systemic opposition and the development of anti-capitalist alternatives, is their
continuing reference to the class cleavage at a time when the social democratic party
family has moved elsewhere. More specifically, they are characterised by a broadly
similar mid-term anti-neoliberal programme which can be summarised by a triple
claim: the appeal to a specific representation of wage earners' class interests; the
rejection of neoliberal policies; the advocacy of a more egalitarian social order (hence
the key value of "social justice").
This definition gives rise to two problems.
Firstly, is this not the classical definition of the traditional social democracy and, to a
less extent, of the left tout court? Indeed it is.
8
It is not accidental that most of the
parties in question are engaged precisely in an attempt to adopt a broad left posture,
8
Fülberth (2008: 153), for instance, defines the two functions of social democracy as "the
representation within capitalism of the interests of the people exclusively dependent from incomes
from wage-labour or from public transfers" and "the stabilisation and flexibilisation of the capitalist
system, particularly via infrastructure, social and demand policy and the integration of the lower
classes". Anthony Crosland similarly defined social democracy as "political liberalism + mixed economy +
welfare state + Keynesian economic policy + commitment to equality" (quoted in Moschonas, 2002: 15).
21
to rebrand themselves from communist or socialist to "left parties"
9
and to expunge
the moderate left from this framework with labels of "neoliberalism" or "social-
liberalism". In this sense we are witnessing a progressive shift of the whole political
system to the right, with the radical left taking on the role of a neo-social democracy.
Despite this ideological shift, however, two important factors tend to starkly
differentiate the post-1989 radical left space from the post-1945 social democratic
space, putting contemporary radical left parties in a position which is very different
from that of classical social democratic parties and more similar to that of far-left
organisations. On the one hand, the major mainstream left parties (the German SPD,
the Italian DS and the French PS) have largely "de-socialdemocratised" their outlook
and their social base, but have retained some memory of their traditional programme,
internal left-wing tendencies, an important working class electoral support and,
crucially, key links with the organised labour movement (Moschonas, 2002; Walter,
2011; Bellucci et al., 2000; Lefebvre and Sawicki, 2006). On the other hand, in the
current conjuncture the opposition to neoliberalism appears to have an almost anti-
systemic character (Kouvelakis, 2007).
10
Hence the small size of the partisan radical left
vis-a-vis the social and cultural left; hence the dilemma between competition with the
moderate left and the politics of united front; hence the appropriateness of the
"radical" left label despite the apparent lack of radicalism of many of its components.
Secondly, how should we interpret this refusal of neoliberal policies, given that many
contemporary radical left parties bear some responsibility for their very
implementation? In the name of lesser-evilism and damage reduction, some parties
have directly participated or externally supported centre-left governments while some
others have indirectly facilitated their conquest of a parliamentary majority through
9
In Germany the Party of Democratic Socialism renamed itself The Left Party (2005) and then The Left
(2007); in Italy the Party of Communist Refoundation almost dissolved itself into the Rainbow Left
alliance (2008); in France the French Communist Party entered the coalition Left Front (2009). This trend
is by no means limited to the less radical parties, as the cases of the Left Bloc in Portugal (1999) or
Critical Left in Italy (2007) prove.
10
Kouvelakis argues that "any serious anti-neoliberal approach, as demanded by the needs of the
present conjuncture, any measure which takes on, even partially, the dominant choices and which does
not pull back before its consequences, leads out of internal necessity to a general break with capitalism"
(p. 292) and that "the elaboration of an effective anti-neoliberal politics constitutes the principal
demarcation dividing, at every level, the social, intellectual and political forces in their entirety. Its
implementation by a majority popular bloc at the level of existing institutions (including governments)
cannot but lead in the short-term to class confrontation of large scope. Confrontations which will
inevitably lead to pose the question of the property of the main means of production, exchange and
communisation, as well as of the structure of power and of the state apparatuses" (p. 259-260).
22
electoral alliances or tactics. Should we exclude these conciliatory parties from our
definition of the radical left? This does not seem appropriate if we take into
consideration that those conjunctures are precisely the ones provoking an electoral
and identity crisis in these parties, which are deserted by their social constituency and
need to re-assert their autonomy either with a real shift to the opposition or with a
verbal shift toward a more confrontational stance. Instead of interpreting this
contradiction through the lenses of a trahison des clercs, it makes more sense to
interpret it as a further reflection of a real contradiction within the radical left
constituency, torn between the pursuit of its principles (values, interests) and the
pursuit of unity against the right centred on the largest left-of-the-centre party. Here
again, the boundaries of the radical left are largely determined by the nature of
contemporary social democracy, which prevents the formation of a clear-cut cleavage
between anti-neoliberal and anti-capitalist, conciliatory and intransigent forces.
This discussion leads us to the only possible conclusion: the empirical referent of the
term "contemporary radical left" is represented by all forces trying to represent left-
wing positions outside and to the left of moderate left parties. The concept is not just
an empty label but on the contrary delimitates an unstable but coherent political space
torn between the rejection of neoliberalism and the imperatives of centre-left unity.
An anti-capitalist pole is active within it but cannot be considered an independent
space, as its action is inscribed within the same field of forces and it largely coexist
within the a common organisational framework.
What are then the criteria to determine the belonging of a specific organisation to the
radical left?
Firstly, it needs to position itself outside and to the left of the main moderate left party
(the German SPD, the French PS, the Italian PD), i.e. the main left-of-the-centre party
characterised by a neoliberal programmatic and at the same time the maintenance of
a sizeable left-wing constituency. What about left-wing or Marxist tendencies
operating within these parties, though? My choice is to exclude them because, despite
the ideological belonging to the non-liberal left, their action responds to a completely
different set of constraints and presuppositions; would they succeed in influencing the
23
parties they operate in, they would in fact reconfigure the whole left landscape and
permanently either incorporate or marginalise the radical left.
Secondly, it must have as its priority the political representation of wage workers as
such, that is with a class appeal. We can thus generally distinguish the radical left from
class-less progressive post-materialist organisations (e.g. most ecologist parties),
progressive nationalist organisations (e.g. the SNP) and far-right organisations with
important working class support (e.g. the FN or the Lega Nord).
As a consequence the definition encompasses a large variety of organisations, from
conciliatory left-socialist parties (such as the Danish SF or the Italian SEL) to
revolutionary Marxist groups (such as the French LO and NPA). At the same time, the
boundaries are fairly clear-cut and the number of parties whose classification is
unclear is small and mostly transitional.
11
11
Uncertaintly boils down to two main groups. On the one hand, parties oscillating between the radical
left and the socialist family (e.g. the French MdC) or the green family (e.g. the Dutch GL, the Danish SF,
the Catalan ICV). These parties generally choose one way or the other after a brief transitional period.
On the other hand, left-wing nationalist parties (e.g. the Basque abertzale left and the Irish SF), which
have a mixed class/national appeal. They will be generally included in our definition.
24
1.2.2 Partisan and other components
In his masterly survey of the long-term evolution of the "class left" Bartolini (2012)
identifies two main components: a "political channel" (parties) and a "professional
channel" (trade unions). March and Mudde (2005), on their part, identify within the
radical left a political component (parties), a civil society component (non-party
organisations such as trade unions, associations or social movement networks) and a
sub-cultural component.
12
Raynaud (2006), similarly, explores the French far left from
the point of view of both political parties and their broad cultural environment
(intellectual production and trends). These welcome remarks remind us of the
pervasiveness and multi-dimensionality of political engagement, which can be lived in
a variety of ways and degrees: from passive reception to activism; from identification
with a specific organisation to belonging to a broad sub-culture; from election-oriented
to social or cultural work.
This work will be exclusively concerned with the partisan component of the radical left
and will examine the other components from the point of view of radical left political
parties.
My focus on political parties should not be taken as sanctioning conventional
separations between societal domains – the political and the economical, state and
civil society, public and private sphere – or as reducing political activity to party politics
or, worse still, to electoral and institutional politics.
13
Quite the contrary.
Firstly, political parties have historically made recourse to a large variety of avenues to
exert an influence on the political decision-making process: work within representative
and executive institutions; electoral mobilisation; cultural/ideological mobilisation;
workplace mobilisation; street mobilisation; military action, and so on. Moreover,
these activities have mainly targeted the state as a key centre of social power and
regulation, but have also often aimed at promoting social change without its
12
The use of the term by the authors is slightly confusing, as they seem to refer almost exclusively to
organised activist networks (the "new fringe"). It would be more appropriate to understand it more
traditionally as the broader constituency sharing with the parties specific sets of beliefs, values and
practices.
13
For a rich overview of the "essentially contested" character of politics see Leftwich (2004).
25
mediation, for instance by directly affecting the functioning of civil society institutions
(the company, the church, the family, etc.) or people's ideas and interpersonal
behaviour (the promotion of identities and values).
Secondly, the behaviour of non-party organisations (lobbies, professional associations,
churches, movement networks), social groups and individuals is directly political and
crucially affects the working of the state, whatever claim of apoliticity or autonomy
they might advance.
Thirdly, the morphological and teleological difference between political parties, civil
society organisations or institutions and informal groups is historically and
theoretically very thin; it was only under the impact of state legislation (Barbet, 1991)
and growing organisational requirements that a progressive differentiation and
specialisation was produced. Still, these different forms of social organisation routinely
entertain relations of paternity, interpenetration, division of labour and even
indistinction.
One of the interesting features of the parties of the radical left is precisely the fact that
they theorise and practice a broad conception of political activity including electoral
and non-electoral, parliamentary and extra-parliamentary, state-directed and civil
society-directed mobilisation, thus forcing us to rethink reductionist views of parties as
mere electoral/institutional organisations. As a consequence, the choice of the
partisan radical left as the object of this thesis must be conceived as a mere point of
entry or perspective to a larger complex web of social activities and relations.
26
1.3 Political nature
My first research question deals with the political nature of the radical left. How does
this concept fit in the scholarship on political parties and what are its characteristics?
Political parties have traditionally been analysed according to four key (and often inter-
related) dimensions: the ideological dimension, the sociological dimension, the
organisational dimension and the functional dimension.
The ideological dimension relates to the identity, political culture, goals and
programmatic of political parties.
An important line of research has focused on the collocation of parties along a linear
and uniform left-right continuum. This intuitive yet elusive notion has led to both
theoretical inquiries of a philosophical (Bobbio, 2004) and politological (Downs, 1957)
kind and empirical efforts of operationalisation and analysis. The Manifesto Research
Group/Comparative Manifestos Project (MRG/CMP)
14
represents the most advanced
attempt to quantify the left-right collocation of OECD parties through an analysis of
their party manifestos. This approach, despite its tremendous achievements, suffers
from three major flaws. Firstly, the party programmes rarely reflect the real policy
options of the parties. This is acknowledged by scholars of the topic, which consider
party programmes as a mere theoretical starting point of the analysis. Secondly, the
left-right scale is not necessarily a linear, continuous and coherent phenomenon, being
often marked by qualitative breaks and problems deriving from the aggregation of
unstable or incoherent individual preferences (Arrow, 1950). Thirdly, the left-right
divide has been repeatedly proven to be multi-dimensional (Kitschelt, 1994), but the
attempts to represent it in a bi-dimensional (e.g. class and religiosity, or economic
egalitarianism and cultural libertarianism) or multi-dimensional model only compound
the theoretical and geometrical problems of the simple one-dimensional model.
14
See Klingemann (1994, 2006) and Budge (2001). The database is available at
https://manifestoproject.wzb.eu/.
27
Another line of research has instead focused on the identification of a limited number
of party families (e.g. socialist, communist, Christian democratic, liberal, ecologist)
united by a common name, ideology/policy, origin/sociology or organisational link
(Mair & Mudde, 1998).
The sociological dimension relates to the ascriptive characteristics and constructed
identities of the different layers of people making up the living organism of a political
party. Research has thus focused on groups such as elected representatives,
cadres/delegates (Bordandini, 2013b), activists (Subilieau, 1981; Siméant & Sawicki,
2009), party members (Spier et al., 2011) and party voters. The electorate in particular
has been the most studied level of party research, producing both single-election post-
electoral analyses combining rich survey data and qualitative observation (e.g. ITANES,
2009; Perrineau & Ysmal, 2002; Gabriel et al., 2009)
15
and broader attempts at gauging
the long-term patterns of voting behaviour. Particularly interesting to this end is the
cleavage tradition (Rokkan & Lipset, 1967; Flora, 1999; Bartolini, 2012), which seeks to
explain the birth, consolidation, electoral success and patterns of alliances of the
different party families (see above) with reference to macro-historical processes, deep-
seated societal conflicts of interests and their mobilisation and structuring by political
entrepreneurs.
The organisational dimension has been fundamentally approached with the intent of
building broad diachronic typologies explaining the long-term change of party systems.
The analysis of Duverger (1951: 105-114) saw the Nineteenth and early Twentieth
Century process of democratisation and industrialisation reflected in the transition
between two party models: the cadre party (typically liberal and conservative, based
on the caucus, with a decentralised and not very articulated structure and
characterised by the quality of its support by social notables) and the mass party
(typically socialist and confessional, based on the branch, with a centralised and
articulated structure and characterised by the quantity if its support by the masses).
Two additional models, the (typically communist) cell-based party and the (typically
fascist) militia-based party, represented on the other hand a sort of developmental
15
Post-electoral surveys and electoral panels are regularly conducted by institutions such as ITANES in
Italy, CEVIPOF in France and Forschungsgruppe Wahlen in Germany.
28
dead-end characteristic of the inter-war period and largely overcome by the post 1945
liberal democratic stabilisation.
16
Kirchheimer (1966) weighted in by interpreting the
economic boom, full employment and welfare state expansion of the golden age of
capitalism as the cause of a transformation of the mass (social democratic and
Christian democratic) party into a catch-all or people's party (Volkspartei),
characterised by ideological de-radicalisation and convergence, inter-classism, an
increased electoral focus, and a growing autonomy of the leadership from the
membership. Panebianco (1982:481) pointed out to a further evolution toward the
model of electoral professional party based on the centrality of hired professionals,
weak vertical links, the primacy of a personalised public office leadership and financing
through interest groups and public subsidies, although he recorded the survival of
some mass bureaucratic parties (based on the centrality of party officials, strong
vertical links, the primacy of a collegial central office leadership and self-financing
through the membership). The growing signs of organisational crisis of all (especially
mass) Western parties which emerged since the late Seventies (Ignazi, 1996; Webb
2002: 2-3), however, pushed scholars to move beyond these classical models and to
engaged in a frantic search for a new paradigm, resulting in a proliferation of "new"
party models. Poguntke (1987)'s new politics party is characterised by the
organisational flexibility and by the upholding of Basisdemokratie principles. Koole
(1995: 298-9)'s modern cadre party combines mass (strong vertical links, financing
through members, internal democracy) and elitist (small membership, primacy of the
parliamentary party and hired professionals, large public financing) elements. Katz and
Mair (1995: 50-51) put forward the theory of the cartel party, indentified by
oligopolistic collusion, the fusion with the state (financing, personnel, access to the
media), the primacy of the public office leadership, a stratarchical structure and forms
of plebiscitary internal democracy. Hopkin and Paolucci (1999) further develop
Panebianco's model into the business firm party, created from scratch by political
entrepreneurs to further their own personal aims. Heidar and Saglie (2003)'s network
party underlines the growing tendencies toward organisational flexibility and
informality (thematic networks, participation of non-members, teledemocracy).
Finally, in Carty (2004)'s franchise party organisation is conceived as a franchise
16
Duverger (1951:113) conceived them as a sub-set of the mass party model tending toward the elite
party ("the marching wing, the spearhead, the 'most conscious part' [of the masses]").
29
between the central party (responsible for the brand, know-how and standards) and
autonomous local units (responsible for the localisation and marketing of the product),
with a resulting high degree of stratarchy and ambiguity.
Attempts to synthesise the richness of this tradition of research into a comprehensive
and coherent framework have been made (Wolinetz, 2002; Günther & Diamond, 2003;
Krouwel, 2006) but remain discordant and incomplete.
The functional dimension, finally, has been generally understood as the role played by
parties in ensuring the linkage between state and society (Lawson, 1980; Poguntke,
2002; Römmele et al., 2005; Dalton, Farrell & McAllister, 2011).
Three authors are particularly relevant to this discussion. Neumann (1956) categorised
parties according to their position in the conflicts around the broadening and
democratisation of the European liberal political systems, thus distinguishing between
individual representation parties (representing in the parliament the census elites of
the liberal age), democratic integration parties (integrating the masses in the
democratising political system) and the total integration parties (integrating the
masses against the broadening liberal democratic system).
17
Kirchheimer (1966)
identified three main functions of political parties: the selection and circulation of the
political class; the aggregation and articulation of popular consent; the democratic
participation of citizens. The emergence of the "catch-all (people's) party", which
aimed not at the moral integration of the masses but at the mere electoral success in a
non-ideological world, was looked upon with concern because, it threatened to restrict
the latter and leave an excessive say to the “functional power-holders in army,
bureaucracy, industry and labor”. Mair (1994) and Katz and Mair (1995), finally,
described the historical trajectory of Western political parties as moving from agents
of civil society (up to the Fifties), to brokers between civil society and the state (the
Fordist period), to agents of the state (after the Seventies).
As I already stated in the section 1.2, my understanding of political parties focuses on
their primary function as organisations mediating between society and the state. In
order to productively link political parties to their broader social and political
17
The classification mirrors that of Duverger but focuses on functional instead of on organisational
aspects.
30
environment and to reconcile the above-mentioned dimensions of party research into
a unitary framework, I propose to base my functional approach on the notion of the
political nature of parties.
This concept is defined by the interaction of three main dimensions: the social
constituency; the political project; and the organisational-strategic mediations.
The first dimension (social constituency) identifies the specific social groups a party
endeavours to offer political representation to. As Bartolini (2012:27) has remarked,
this representation has both a normative and an empirical face and, within the latter,
can be predominantly electoral or predominantly organisational. It is therefore
necessary to differentiate between three sub-dimensions: the ideological
interpellation of parties, their concrete electoral support and their organisational
encapsulation. The interaction between these sub-dimensions defines both the
boundaries of the specific coalition of social groups making up the social constituency
of a party (e.g. the middle and lower salaried strata) and the more precise internal
composition of it (e.g. a popular electorate led by an organisation of intellectuals).
The second dimension (political project) refers to the articulation of the interests of
their social constituency in a coherent set of long-term and short-term goals. As a
matter of fact, the same social constituency can be mobilised with very different
political project: the interests of a national bourgeoisie, for instance, can be
legitimately conceived in the framework of both a nationalist and an internationalist
developmental model.
The third level (organisational-strategic mediations), finally, refers to the type of
organisational solutions, means, strategies and tactics employed by parties in the
pursuit of the interests of their constituency and of their political vision. These can be
more or less coherent and more or less effective.
Some clarifications are here needed. Firstly, the social constituency of political parties
can be based on different kinds of appeal: on the traditional cleavages
(centre/periphery, state/Church, land/industry, owner/worker) identified by Lipset and
Rokkan (1967); on "new" post-industrial cleavages, such as materialist/post-materialist
values (Inglehart, 1977), authoritarian/left-libertarian (Kitschelt, 1988) or globalisation
winners/losers (Kriesi et al., 2006); on other socio-cultural (men/women, young/old,
natives/immigrants) or socio-economic (private/public sector, big/small enterprise,
31
old/new elite) conflicts; on specific issues (e.g. euro-scepticism); or on less defined and
more fleeting themes (e.g. anti-establishment populism). Secondly, both the
constituency and the project can be strongly or weakly structured and tend to shift
over time, being a site of struggle and compromise between party layers, social groups
and ideological tendencies, each with its own interests, understanding and normative
outlook. Thirdly, a political party – as any instrument – can prove more or less efficient
in performing its work, leading to innovation, substitution or abandonment. Finally,
political parties tend to shape social interests as much as they represent and serve
them.
The political nature of the communist movement in the early Twentieth Century was
identified by Bartolini (2012: 697-8) as a working class anti-systemic radicalism which
emerged in relatively backward or late-coming industrial societies where the class
cleavage overlapped with the anti-state and anti-Church conflicts and the perspectives
of an integration of the working class in the liberal democratic system appeared as not
very plausible and effective.
18
The post-war construction of a successful welfare state
largely blurred the division between anti-systemic and reformist socialism, as the
perspectives of a radical break were toned down (Pudal, 2002) and the competition
tended to revert on the ability of each organisation to defend and gradually expand
the social conquests won within the system. The neoliberal turnaround of the Eighties,
on the contrary, led to a general shift to the right of the political system but at the
same time started to de-integrate again the lower and middle sections of salaried
strata, which enjoyed diminishing material prospects and became increasingly
neglected by their traditional political representatives. What are the characteristics of
the political nature of the contemporary radical left? How does it differ from that of its
18
"Communism was the social expression of the combined support of advanced sectors of the industrial
working class of economically delayed or backward societies, of an intelligentsia of developing middle
classes and of considerable sectors of rural world which resisted or survived their complete
transformation in a capitalist commercial direction. This potential basis was not able to support a
communist split except when the socialist movement was characterised by a weak organisation, a weak
institutional integration and a weak coalition potential. [...] The ideological radicalism of a communist
type did not emerge from the class conflict as such, i.e. from the opposition on the market to the
interests of business and bosses, but only when a failed political-institutional integration led to the
overlap of this class cleavage (economics) to the anti-state (politics) and often anti-Church (culture)
cleavages."
32
Twentieth Century communist, socialist and far-left predecessors? Is it still primarily
linked with the class cleavage? These questions will be explored throughout the thesis.
33
1.4 Societal weight, fragmentation and
regroupment
My second research question deals with the societal weight of the radical left. The
concept refers to the ability of a political party (or group of political parties) to exert an
effect on its external environment in all its multifarious dimensions (electoral results,
waves of contention, national state policies, social relations of power within
institutions and between groups, ideological hegemony, content of
international/transnational regimes, and so on). It is therefore the end-result of the
activities of parties and their success in developing their internal organisation, their
strategies of electoral and social mobilisation, their parliamentary work and their
policy of political and social alliances.
The resources – raw material preconditions – of societal weight are in principle easily
identifiable and open to empirical operationalisation and quantitative measurement. I
will therefore collect, standardise, make available (see statistical appendix) and
analyse a wide range of statistical data, organised around the three macro-groups:
organisational resources (membership, finances, communication, collateral
organisations); institutional presence (parliamentary and executive offices); and social
constituency (electoral support and organisational linkages).
The assessment of the translation of abstract resources into concrete influence, on the
other hand, necessarily remains a more subjective and uncertain enterprise.
This caveat notwithstanding, the thesis will chart the evolution of the societal weight
of the radical left in the different domains, shed some lights on its determinants and
assess the internal and external obstacles to a further growth. Particularly interesting
is the question of its success or lack thereof in competing with the moderate left
("filling the vacuum") and/or in exerting an effect on the direction of the political
competition ("leftward pull").
My third question deals with the centripetal and centrifugal tendencies leading the
processes of fragmentation and regroupment of the radical left. What are the political,
organisational and environmental conditions for a unified radical left along the lines of
34
broad left parties (e.g. the Italian PRC or DIE LINKE) or of broad left coalitions (e.g. the
Spanish Izquierda Unida or the French Front de gauche)? What are, on the contrary,
the explanations of an internal split or of the emergence of new external competitors?
Again, the analysis of the three case studies will provide some answers to these
queries.
35
1.5 Case studies and time frame
The rationale for the selection of my case studies (Germany, France and Italy) is not
the relevance of the radical left in specific European countries: Cyprus, Greece,
Portugal, the Netherlands and Denmark would have made an ever better case from
this point of view. It is instead the central demographic, economic, political and
cultural position of the countries themselves within the European project (the
Eurozone and the EU), which lends to their radical lefts an objective weight, interest
and influence on other countries.
19
Moreover, the choice of Germany, France and Italy
will enable me to check for a broad variety of variables which characterise the
landscape of the Western European radical left: strong/weak, unified/fragmented,
Western/Eastern, national/regional. The three cases, however, do not capture the
whole complexity of this cadre
20
and the results are therefore not immediately
applicable to the rest of the continent.
The time-scale of the research covers the period from 1989 to 2013. The main
characteristics of the contemporary radical left are actually to a large extent the
product of processes well anterior to the fall of the Berlin Wall: in particular, the
cultural shift expressed by 1968 and by the emergence of the "new" social
movements; the post-Fordist and post-industrial shift of advanced capitalist economies
(Seventies); the erosion of the organisational power and militancy of the working class
(late Seventies-early Eighties); the ideological, organisational and electoral decline of
the traditional communist parties; the progressive turn of governing parties toward
wage restraint and neoliberal policy solutions. In this sense, 1989 merely acted as an
accelerator and detonator of long-term tendencies which had been going on since the
Seventies. It is however true that its immediate aftermath determined an historical low
19
In particular PRC, PDS/DIE LINKE, PCF and LCR/NPA have been among the most discussed "models"
and "anti-models" for the European radical left, have played a disproportionate role in transnational
mobilisations (social fora, counter-summits) and theoretical discussions (Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung) and
have assumed the leadership in the institutional pan-European coordination (GUE-NGL, PEL).
20
On one hand, the existence of independentist/regionalist (Euskadi, Scotland, Northern Ireland, Spain),
minority-based (Latvia, England) and orthodox communist (Greece, Portugal) radical left parties. On the
other hand, the peculiar features of Scandinavian and Hellenic parties, rooted in their distinctive
national histories and political economies.
36
point in the radical left influence and forced the communist parties out of their inertia,
leading to important ideological and organisational reforms and paving the way for the
emergence of new forces and unprecedented processes of regroupment.
As already stated, most of the discussion will centre on the interaction of all radical left
forces without discriminating for their parliamentary presence, electoral size or
societal relevance. The following table includes instead a list of the most important of
these parties, which will be singled out more regularly for a specific discussion of their
political nature and societal weight.
TABLE 1.1 MAJOR RADICAL LEFT PARTIES
NAME
SHORTHAND
PERIOD
GERMANY
Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands
SED
1946-1989
Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus
PDS
1989-2005
Arbeit & soziale Gerechtigkeit - Die Wahlalternative
WASG
2004-2007
Die Linkspartei.PDS
DIE LINKE.PDS
2005-2007
DIE LINKE
DIE LINKE.
2007-2009
ITALY
Partito Comunista Italiano
PCI
1921-1991
Democrazia Proletaria
DP
1978-1991
Partito della Rifondazione Comunista
PRC
1991-present
Partito dei Comunisti Italiani
PdCI
1998-present
Sinistra Ecologia Libertà
SEL
2009-present
FRANCE
Parti communiste français
PCF
1920-present
Lutte Ouvrière
LO
1956-present
Ligue communiste révolutionnaire
LCR
1966-2009
Nouveau parti anticapitaliste
NPA
2009-present
Parti de Gauche
PG
2008-present
Front de gauche
FdG
2008-present
Notes: in Italics are mentioned the main pre-1989 predecessors of the contemporary radical left parties.
37
1.6 Conclusions
The hypothesis of the emergence of a "new" radical left from the twin crisis of the
communist movement and of the social democratic left in a conjuncture marked by
slow growth and neoliberal reforms will be tested with reference to the case studies of
Germany, Italy and France.
The purpose of the enquiry is to shed light on the features and contradictions of what I
define the radical left space and, more precisely, to reach an improved understanding
of the political nature of these political parties, of the potential and limits of their
societal weight and of their dynamics of regroupment and fragmentation.
The analysis will have a predominantly aggregate, multi-dimensional and multi-level
character, thus avoiding the tendency of much of the literature on the topic to
generalise conclusions derived from the analysis of a single party, dimension or level.
The work is primarily intended as a contribution to the scholarship on the radical left
party family but, hopefully, it will also help to broaden our understanding of Western
European politics and of contemporary history.
The organisation of the thesis will be the following.
In the second chapter I will provide a historical and geographical contextualisation of
my topic. The development of the radical left in the three countries will be therefore
situated in the context of the long-term history of socialism in each nation-state and
the broader post-1989 Western European trends.
In chapters three to five I will discuss the trajectory of the German, Italian and French
radical lefts, showing the interplay of common dilemmas and nation-specific contexts
and characteristics.
In the sixth chapter I will offer a final comparative analysis of the three case studies
and spell out the overall findings and open questions.
38
CHAPTER TWO. HISTORICAL AND
GEOGRAPHICAL CONTEXT
In order to situate my three case studies in their historical and geographical context, it
may be useful to start my investigation with a discussion of its long-term roots and
precursors (since 1917) and of the broader landscape of the contemporary Western
European radical left (since 1989). This chapter will thus serve manifold purposes: to
pinpoint the key discontinuities between the old communist movement and the new
radical left galaxy; to illuminate the political, cultural and organisational legacies of the
Twentieth Century which continue to reverberate in the parties; to identify the
broader trends of success and failure and their objective and subjective determinants.
39
2.1 A secular overview
The history of European socialism has already been the object of a number of excellent
syntheses (Hobsbawm, 1978-1982; Sassoon, 1996 and 2010; Agosti, 1996; Eley, 2002;
Bartolini, 2012). In the present section I will limit myself to a sketch of the features
which are essential to understand this evolution and which are relevant to the
discussion of the contemporary radical left.
The analysis of the long-term evolution of the different strands of "class left" (Bartolini,
2012: 27) in Germany, France and Italy will be organised around three broad historical
phases, separated by key geopolitical breaks (the Second World War in 1939-1945 and
the fall of the Eastern bloc in 1989-1991).
The first period (1917-1939) was primarily characterised by the difficult integration of
the masses in the framework of industrialising capitalism and mass democratic politics
(Azéma & Winock, 1986; Hobsbawn, 1995; Winkler, 1998; Chabod, 2002; Overy, 2007).
The second period (1945-1988) was in large part marked the "golden age" of economic
development and the concomitant redistribution of the fruits of that growth in the
form of growing living and working standards and of the construction of developed
welfare states (Ginsborg, 1989; Hobsbawn, 1995; Gildea, 1996; Fülberth, 2007). The
third period (1991-present), on the contrary, covers the attempts at a neoliberal
reconfiguration of European societies (Harvey, 2005; Vail, 2010). In each period it is
necessary to single out the following elements: the historical context, the main
features of the radical left (political nature, societal weight and fragmentation) and the
legacies for the present.
First of all, however, I need to clarify how the boundaries of the "radical left" and its
relationship with moderate rivals or allies have changed over time.
In contrast with other types of left-leaning parties (of a liberal, Christian democratic or
ecologist type), the parties of the socialist left (of social democratic, labour, communist
or far-left leanings) have long shared a series of important commonalities. Firstly, they
trace their organisational or ideal origin in the pre-WWI socialist workers' movement,
famously defined by Kautsky (1908) as "merger of the workers' movement and
40
socialism". Secondly, until recently they all shared a formal commitment to the long-
term goal of some form of socialist society essentially conceived in terms of
redistribution, de-commodification, political and socio-economic democratisation.
Thirdly, they were the organic expression of a primarily working class constituency and
they maintain to this day key links with the organised labour movement. This
commonality of constituency (the handicraft, industrial and later post-industrial
proletariat) and of broadly-defined goals (democratic socialism) provided the grounds
for the collaboration between different ideological tendencies and, to a large extent,
for their coexistence within a common organisational framework (the First
International, the parties of the Second International, the socialist trade unions,
cooperatives and sub-cultural mass organisations).
Since WWI, however, the movement has been permanently split in at least two main
grouping: mainstream socialist, social democratic and labour parties versus radical
communist parties. Smaller intermediate or far-left groups have also featured from
time to time, although with a limited societal weight.
The initial reasons for the division were the crucial questions of internationalism and
socialist revolution. In August 1914 the Second International had crumbled like a house
of cards and the vast majority of "reformist" leaders had rallied to the war efforts of
their own national aristocracies and bourgeoisies; only the Bolshevik and small
"revolutionary" minorities continued to oppose it and worked for "the conversion of
the present imperialist war into a civil war" (Lenin, 1915); a growing number of
"centrists" took an intermediate position. As the war ended, the conflict shifted on the
attitude to be taken vis-a-vis the surge of pre-revolutionary ferment sweeping Europe
and the victorious Russian revolution. While the communists argued for the deepening
of movement and the replacement of existing state institutions by workers' councils,
the socialists tended contain it within the boundaries of partial democratic and social
reforms and, in some cases (Germany), did not shy from overt repression against the
radicals.
From the Twenties to the Eighties these original reasons maintained their importance
but their exact meaning shifted over time. On the first issue, the extent of the
accommodation of the socialists with the colonial and military policy of their own
nation-state varied, with frequent shifts from pacifist/neutralist to
nationalist/Atlanticist tendencies, while the communists increasingly conceived
41
internationalism as the alignment with the Soviet-led camp of "socialist" states. On the
second issue, the need of a stark choice between reforms and revolution became
salient only in period of acute crisis and social mobilisation (1919, 1936, 1945, 1968); in
"normal" periods the two could in principle be reconciled by a common struggle for
immediate or structural reforms. Thus, the relationship between socialists,
communists and other minor groupings oscillated between phases of collaboration
(the "united front" period in the mid-Twenties, the "popular front" period in the
Thirties, the anti-fascist coalitions of 1941-1947, the Italian alliance of the Fifties, the
French alliance of the Sixties and Seventies) and phases of acute conflict (the "social-
fascism" period of 1928-1934, the post-1947 Cold War years in Germany and France,
the Seventies repression of radicals in Germany and Italy). The "long boom" of 1947-
1973 provided the material common ground for an understanding centred on
redistributive labour struggles, the expansion of the welfare state and Keynesian
macro-economic policies.
Between the Eighties and the Nineties, finally, the relationship between radical and
moderate left fundamentally changed its nature. Up to this moment socialist parties
had de facto become integrated in the mechanism of liberal democratic capitalism,
although many of them had retained a formal long-term commitment to its
overcoming; nevertheless, they could be credited with significant efforts in "civilising"
it (Sassoon, 1996: 768), improving the working and living conditions of wage workers
and accompanying the democratisation of political and social relations. Afterwards, on
the other hand, they increasingly moved in the opposite direction. The reforms
championed by the modernist and "third way" socialist were more and more counter-
reforms which, while falling short of dismantling the achievements of the Fordist
period, tended to worsen the levels of social protection (labour flexibility, pension
reforms, welfare retrenchment, wage containment). The contemporary radical left was
thus reconstituted as the haven for all the opponents of this shift, ranging from reform
communists to left-wing socialists, Trotskyists, orthodox communists and "new left"
social movement activists.
42
2.1.1 The inter-war period (1917-1939)
The first half of the Twentieth Century was a period of wars, revolutions, social and
political upheavals and manifold crises (Hobsbawm, 1995; Carr, 2001; Overy, 2007).
The pre-war socialist workers' movement, which had been developing for decades
within a complex but mostly unified cadre, did not survive the shock of WWI. The
explosion of the Russian Revolution in 1917 sharpened this differentiation and
favoured the crystallisation of a long-term ideological and organisational split of world
socialism, with a growing integration of the moderate wings in the institutions of
liberal democratic capitalism and the rallying of the radical wings around the newly-
created Third Communist International – the Comintern – and its national sections
(Broué, 2003).
The young communist movement hoped to rapidly accomplish the task of a world
revolution and medium-sized communist parties were established and consolidated in
each country: the Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands (KPD) in Germany (Mallmann,
1995 and 1996; Weitz, 1997); the Parti communiste (PC) in France (Martelli, 2009 and
2010; Courtois & Lazar, 2000); the Partito Comunista d'Italia (PCd'I) in Italy (Agosti,
2000; Vittoria, 2006). However, the post-war revolutionary wave of 1917-1923 abated
leaving behind only one surviving proletarian state, Soviet Russia, and its allies pained
in adapting to a more long-term perspective of societal transformation.
On the one hand, the contradictions thrown up by the overlapping of class struggle,
geopolitical conflict, economic crises, mass politics and weak institutions continued to
prevent a stabilisation of the new political regimes, but ultimately benefitted not the
left but the right, leading to a rising wave of authoritarian and totalitarian right-wing
regimes.
On the other hand, the consolidation of a new state-socialist regime under Stalin
meant the partial subordination of the communist movement to the changing interests
of the Soviet diplomacy, foreshadowing the future competition between a capitalist
and a communist international camp.
In the end, these contradictions were solved through another devastating world war
(1939-1945). The post-war settlement laid the ground for a radically different Europe
and a radically different communist movement.
43
Political nature: the revolutionary wing of the workers' movement
The social constituency of the inter-war communist parties was firmly anchored in the
pre-war socialist sub-culture and did not differ much from that of their moderate
rivals. The industrial proletariat, encompassing skilled and unskilled manual workers
active in the modern industry and in the traditional handicraft production, held the
hegemony within this coalition. A more subordinate role was played by the rural
proletariat, sections of the peasantry (mostly sharecroppers – mezzadri, métayers,
Pächter – and small peasants) and the numerically small strata of urban non-manual
workers, artisans and intellectuals.
The political projects of communists and socialists were similar in their broad contours
but differed in important respects. Both parties wished to protect the short-term
interests of their constituency (working and living conditions, democratic freedoms),
were committed to a theory of class analysis and a practice of class struggle and held a
common long-term commitment to the establishment of socialism. On the contrary, at
least four key differences can be identified. Firstly, the precise contours of the future
socialist society remained largely fuzzy, as few concrete experiences of prefigurative
experimentation and economic and political management were at hand and
theoretical reflection was highly abstract and divided. On the political level, however,
the communists started to conceive it along Leninist (the replacement of the state
machinery by new organs of workers' power, the councils) and then Stalinist (the
monopoly of power to the communist parties) lines, while the socialists tended to view
it as an extension and reform of existing liberal democratic institutions. Secondly, the
former saw the question of the revolutionary transformation and of the building of
organs of workers' counter-power as an immediate and urgent task, while the latter
expounded more modest and gradual short-term goals. Thirdly, the former had a clear
internationalist outlook, while the latter wavered on national and colonial questions.
Fourthly, the moderate and conciliatory stance of the socialist leaders was presented
as a more realistic road to socialism, but their readiness to compromise on
programmatic and relational grounds often cast doubts on their actual intentions,
especially at times when their stabilising activity seemed to stand in the way of more
far-reaching transformations (e.g. Germany 1918-1923 and Italy 1919-1920).
44
Where the two strands really clashed was at the level of organisational-strategic
mediations. On the level of strategy, the socialists followed a parliamentary road and
were open to cross-class alliances (Esping-Andersen, 1985: 3-38) while the communists
were more intransigent on both questions. In particular, the goal of the "dictatorship
of the proletariat" tended to be conceived by the latter in a marked insurrectional and
monopolistic mould which, along the Russian example, tended to focus on seizing the
correct moment for the armed seizure of power while disregarding the pursuit of an
electoral majority and the rights of non-proletarian and non-communist oppositions.
On the level of organisation, the communists sought to forge disciplined, centralised,
combat organisations strongly anchored in the key industrial and urban centres
21
while
the socialists tended to carry on with their pre-war national traditions of more
uncoordinated, decentralised, electoral-oriented and pluralistic parties.
Societal weight: medium parties between hopes and marginalisation
In the period 1918-1939 communist parties managed to emerge in all three countries
and to build up a medium (Germany, France) or weak (Italy) level of social influence,
but remained everywhere dwarfed by their moderate socialist competitors (see TABLE
2.1).
A series of problems greatly limited their initial success: their emergence from small
pre-war radical minorities with weak positions within the recognised leadership of the
socialist workers' movement; their failure to win the battle for hegemony within the
traditional socialist parties (Germany, Italy) or their inability to retain it (France); their
late crystallisation as independent political parties (1920-1921), which took place as
the height of the post-war revolutionary wave was already abating. By 1925, when the
social and political situation was largely stabilised, the emerging communist parties
represented everywhere a not negligible but clear minority of the socialist camp.
21
The pursuit of efficacy ("democratic centralism") did not necessarily entail authoritarian internal
structures and a lack of internal differentiation. On the contrary, the early communist parties were born
of a confluence of heterogeneous traditions (revolutionary Marxism, left-wing socialism, syndicalism,
anarchism, pacifism) and developed a culture of healthy debate between different strategic and tactical
options. In time, however, a tendency toward ideological homogenisation and bureaucratic centralism
asserted itself and led to the departure or expulsion of all opponents of the international leadership
grouped around Stalin.
45
The effects of their modest starting point and of state repression were compounded by
a series of disastrous strategic and policy choices: the penchant for adventurist
insurrections in Germany
22
, sectarian attitudes toward social democrats and anti-
fascists (especially the early "ultra-left" course of the Italian and German parties and
the "third period" policies of 1928-1935) and narrow and authoritarian party-building
methods (e.g. the "Bolshevisation" and "Stalinisation" campaigns).
In the following years, their fortunes oscillated between brief periods of renewed
hopes and the threat of marginalisation. In Italy the weak influence of the PCd'I was
wiped out early by the fascist dictatorship (1922-1925). In Germany the well-organised
KPD was given a second chance after 1929, but was ultimately out-manoeuvred by the
National Socialists (1933). In France, finally, the PC experienced an extraordinary
revival in the mid-Thirties, characterised by the turn toward an organic alliance with
the Socialist Party, the general strike of Mai-June 1936 and the Front Populaire
governments (1936-1938). Even these advances, however, were largely obliterated in
1939-1940 by the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact and by the German invasion.
22
January 1919 in Berlin, April-May 1919 in Munich, March 1920 in the Ruhr area, March 1921 in
Sachsen-Anhalt, October 1923 in Hamburg.
TABLE 2.1 SOCIETAL WEIGHT, INTER-WAR PERIOD (1920-1939)
GERMANY
FRANCE
ITALY
Aver.
Max.
Min.
Aver.
Max.
Min.
Aver.
Max.
Min.
Radical left
KPD
PC
PCd'I
Votes
11.4%
16.9%
2.1%
11.2%
15.3%
8.3%
4.2%
4.6%
3.7%
1920-1933
Nov 1932
1920
1924-1936
1936
1932
1921-1924
1921
1924
MPs
11.5%
17.1%
0.9%
5.0%
11.8%
1.6%
3.2%
3.6%
2.8%
1920-1933
Nov 1932
1920
1924-1936
1936
1932
1921-1924
1924
1921
Members
153,147
282,571
118,661
85,099
269,000
28,825
23,739
42,956
9,000
1921-1932
1932
1929
1921-1938
1937
1933
1921-1925
1921
1923
Moderate left
SPD
SFIO
PSI+PSU
Votes
22.9%
29.8%
18.3%
19.6%
20.5%
18.0%
17.8%
24.7%
10.9%
1920-1933
1928
1933
1924-1936
1932
1928
1921-1924
1921
1924
MPs
23.4%
31.2%
18.5%
20.1%
24.4%
16.5%
18.6%
28.6%
8.6%
1920-1933
1928
1933
1924-1936
1936
1928
1921-1924
1921
1924
Members
1,001,795
1,261,072
806,268
127,338
286,604
49,174
ca. 160,000
-
-
1920-1933
1923
1925
1921-1938
1937
1922
1921
Sources: Votes and MPs: Gonschior; Corbetta and Piretti (2009); France politique. Members: KPD-Sozialgeschichte, SPD-Parteivorstand (2002), Martelli (2010b), Graham (2006: 46), Agosti (2000).
47
Fragmentation: "centrist" socialists, ultra-leftists and other dissidents
The inter-war period was characterised by a high degree of initial fragmentation on the
radical left, which by the mid-Twenties was however largely re-absorbed.
On the one hand, the battle for the hegemony within the socialist movement tended
to give birth not to two but to three groups: a "reformist" wing, a "revolutionary" wing
and an intermediate "centrist" wing. The latter group was supported by considerable
sections of the socialist leaders, members and voters: the tendencies of Faure in
France (SFIO) and of Serrati in Italy (PSI) maintained the control of the respective
socialist parties, while in Germany the pre-war leadership of the SPD (Haase, Kautsky,
Bernstein) established a short-lived but very influential autonomous Unabhängige
Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (USDP, 1917-1922)
23
. "Centrist" parties found
an international expression in the Vienna International (1921-1923) but their
collocation soon proved to be unstable and soon re-joined either the Second or the
Third International.
On the other hand, in the very same period significant syndicalist, anarcho-syndicalist
and left-communist groups remained active at the flanks or outside of the Comintern
(Gianinazzi, 2006; Bock, 1993). Particularly influential were for instance the Italian
Unione Sindacale Italiana (USI-AIT), the German Freie Arbeiter-Union Deutschlands
(FAUD) and the German Kommunistische Arbeiterpartei Deutschlands (KAPD).
24
As the
previous category, they rapidly lost ground as the post-war crisis abated.
In the following decades several dissident groups emerged from the growing purges of
the communist parties and from the radicalisation of socialist sectors: PUP and PSOP in
France, KPD-O and SAPD in Germany, the Trotskyist Fourth International in 1938.,
However, they always remained marginal grouplets and did not survive the
confrontations of WWII.
23
See Krause (1975). In the immediate post-war years the party almost overtook the reformist (M)SPD,
soaring in 1920 to 20.0% of valid votes (1920) and about 750,000 members.
24
With respectively, at their peak, 500,000 members (1920), 150,000 members (1922) and 80,000
members (1920).
48
Conclusions
The inter-war period left an important but contradictory legacy. The reconstruction of
the radical left after the caesura of fascism and war was largely undertaken within a
framework dominated by the theoretical and historical references, practices and
organisational and biographical continuities with this period: the hatred for the
betrayals of social democracy and the desire for unity on common labour or anti-
fascist fronts; Leninism and Stalinism; the Russian model of socialism; class versus
cross-class alliances; the experience of great social mobilisations (1918-1921, 1936,
1943-45). These elements continued to play a fundamental role well into the Eighties
and their re-interpretation still affect the identity and outlook of the contemporary
radical left. After the war, however, both the nature and societal weight of communist
parties changed dramatically. The following section will explain how.
49
2.1.2 The welfare state period (1945-1991)
Unlike its predecessor, the post-WWII settlement paved the way for the most
extraordinary period of growth of all history, the so-called "golden age" of capitalism
(1948-1973). The Cold War (Hobsbawn, 1995; Gaddis, 2005) repeatedly brought the
world on the brink of nuclear catastrophe and fed innumerable conflicts in the
periphery; in the countries of the core, however, economic development was
accompanied by an unprecedented expansion of living standards, an increase of social
equality and mobility and the creation of wide-ranging systems of social insurance and
welfare provision (Esping-Andersen, 1990).
The Fordist regime of accumulation started to reach its limits after 1967 (Gordon et al.,
1987), as growth slowed down, the international hegemony of the USA was challenged
and the national class compromises were shaken by mounting struggles of the
industrial working class, of the growing white-collar salaried strata, of students and of
every kind of oppressed minority. The Seventies, however, actually represented the
peak of the post-war developmental model – mixed economy plus welfare state – and
led to a further democratisation of European societies.
The Eighties, on the contrary, marked a turn of the tide. Production shifted toward a
post-Fordist and post-industrial regime of accumulation; slow growth, high
unemployment and stagnating wages prevailed; and a process of neoliberalisation
started a progressive reconfiguration of systems of regulation and of the state itself,
which would become pronounced after 1989 (Harvey, 2005; Brenner, 2006; Brenner et
al., 2010; Duménil & Lévy, 2011).
These enormous economic, social and political transformations radically changed the
environment within the inter-war workers' movement had developed. While
vigorously supporting the state-socialist model in the East and the South, communist
parties gave up the perspective of violent revolution in the West and rethought the
road to socialism as a long-term process of structural economic, social and political
reforms of the existing welfare states. The German KPD was severely affected by the
geopolitical context: its Eastern wing went on to become the ruler of the GDR under
the name of Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (SED, 1949-1990) while its
Western wing was rapidly marginalised (Herbst et al., 1997; Fülberth, 1990). The
50
Partito Comunista Italiano (PCI) in Italy and the Parti communiste français (PCF) in
France, on the contrary, managed to acquire a mass character and a clear
predominance on the left (Lazar, 1992). The three cornerstone of this construction –
the cohesion of the industrial working class, the alliance with the new white-collar
strata and the indirect influence of the Soviet Union – were however slowly
undermined during the Eighties by the changed social and economic environment.
With the fall of the Eastern Bloc in 1989-1991 the history of the Twentieth Century
communist movement was rapidly brought to an end and a quantitatively and
qualitatively different contemporary radical left had to take its relay.
Political nature: the radical wing of welfarism
The social constituency of the post-war communist parties was, as in the previous
period, overwhelmingly popular. Its internal composition, however, changed
significantly over time in response to the broader socio-economic trends: industrial
workers remained the most important, although declining, social group and were
especially prominent among the membership; the role of peasants rapidly declined
after the Fifties; the influence of the white-collar salaried strata rose rapidly in the
Sixties and afterwards. Another important trend was the rise of economically non-
active strata (housewives, pensioners and students), unemployed workers and
women.
25
This set-up was quite similar to that of continental or Northern social
democratic countries, while the weaker Italian and French socialist parties tended to
rely more on the relatively privileged strata of the working class (civil servants,
teachers, white-collar workers, public sector workers) and on non-salaried groups.
26
With the renunciation of insurrection, the acceptance of a gradual parliamentary way
to socialism and the rethinking of the goal of a Soviet-style socialist society as vague
long-term objective, the political project of communist parties lost its revolutionary
character and morphed into a radical version of welfarist project of the times. The
25
The latter could not be ignored anymore since the gain of the right to vote (1945 in Italy and France)
and their growing participation to the workforce. Communist membership and electorate, however,
remained significantly masculine.
26
On the French PS see Rimbert (1955), Cayrol (1975), Hardouin (1978), Garraud (1978), Saudon (1988),
Bergounioux (1989) and Bergounioux and Grunberg (2007).
51
fundamental fracture of the inter-war period was essentially overcome, as both
communist and socialists became the staunchest supporters of the republican-
democratic institutions while pursuing short-term ameliorative and mid-term
structural reforms (social security, welfare provisions, public services, nationalisations,
redistribution, state planning). What divided them in this respect was at most a certain
degree of radicalism and willingness to accept compromises, which was however
mostly a by-product of the clear-cut refusal of the rest of the political system – under
US pressure – to envisage any form of collaboration with the communists. As it was,
alliances were frequent at the local and even at the national level (Italy in 1945-1956,
France after 1962). Where a fundamental difference persisted was not on domestic
but on foreign policy, as the socialists tended to adopt an Atlanticist (and, in France,
pro-colonial) stance while the communists distanced themselves from the USSR only at
a snail's pace.
Important differences also remained on the level of organisational mediations, as the
shift toward mass communist parties did not entail a revision of the Stalinian modes of
organisations; PCF, PCI, KPD and DKP continued to reject the formalisation of internal
pluralism and to expel dissidents. On the level of strategic mediations, on the other
hand, the parties accepted the need of broad "anti-monopolistic" alliances including
socialist, liberal and Christian democratic forces.
Societal weight: the rise and fall of mass communism
The period 1945-1989 represented the historical peak of European communist parties
(see TABLE 2.2). While in countries such as West Germany their influence waned in the
early Fifties, in Italy and France they managed to retain a veritable mass influence and
a clear hegemony over the workers' movement, assuming a position analogous to that
of the Northern and Continental social democracy.
The immediate post-war years determined a qualitative change in the patterns of
communist influence, as the parties were the prime beneficiaries of the climate of anti-
fascist unity and the popular aspirations of social and democratic renewal. In the years
1944-1947 the PCI, the PCF and KPD all soared at a similar pace, following a path of
52
exponential growth of their membership, electoral results, organisational linkages and
institutional presence
27
.
The onset of the Cold War in 1947 represented a first setback. In Germany the division
of the country led to a consolidation of a SED-led dictatorship in the East but wiped out
the KPD in the West
28
(Fülberth, 1990). In Italy the Fronte Democratico Popolare
alliance (PCI, PSI and smaller left-wing parties) was severely defeated at the 1948
elections. In France the PCF limited the electoral losses but was permanently excluded
from power and lost its potential socialist ally (SFIO), which adopted a course of
centrist alliances.
During the late Fifties and early Sixties the parties tended to stagnate, preserving a
very important level of support but lacking allies and strategic perspectives. In Italy the
Socialist Party broke away from the alliance and slowly moved toward the option of
centre-left governments with the Christian Democrats (1956-1963); in France the
coming to power of Charles De Gaulle and the establishment of the Fifth Republic
(1958-1962) led to a significant downsizing of both the PCF and the other left forces,
but posed the preconditions for the future unity of the left.
The post-1968 decade, on the contrary, led to a sustained membership (France, Italy)
and electoral (Italy) growth of the communist parties, despite their often ambiguous
attitude toward the new wave of labour and social militancy. Only the re-established
German DKP (1968) failed to break through (Fülberth, 1990). The period also saw the
explosion of a significant "new left" of left-socialist (PSU, PSIUP), left-communist
(Trotskyists, Maoists, operaisti) and movementist type, which was partially re-
absorbed by the turn of the decade but left behind a rich cultural, social movement
and partisan legacy.
In 1978, finally, a process of more gradual (Italy) or rapid (France) erosion set in.
Economic crisis, productive restructuring and social change sapped the strength,
militancy and homogeneity of the labour movement; the experiences of communist
governmental participation (1976-1979 in Italy, 1981-1984 in France) provoked
27
As expressed among other things by the communist participation to the early national cabinets in Italy
and France (1944-1947) and to many regional governments in Germany (the five Eastern regions, Berlin
1945-1948, Bayern 1945-1946, Bremen 1945-1946 and Niedersachsen 1946-1948).
28
The KPD failed to enter parliament in 1953 and was outlawed in 1956. In the subsequent years it
continued to work illegally behind coalitions such as the Deutsche Friedensunion (DFU, 1961-1984) or
the Aktion Demokratischer Fortschritt (1968-1969). It was later re-established under the name of
Deutsche Kommunistische Partei (DKP, 1968-present).
53
widespread disillusionment; other political forces proved quite effective appealing to
the rising upper-middle strata of the white-collar wage workers (the PS in France, the
PSI in Italy) or to the shrinking lower strata of the blue-collar industrial proletariat (the
FN in France); the Soviet model, finally, rapidly lost its appeal. At the time of the events
of 1989-1991, the German radical left remained utterly marginal and the PCF
electorate had been halved. The PCI, on the contrary, had resisted quite well, but was
in the midst of a wide-ranging ideological revision which would soon lead it to a
complete rejection of its communist nature (Ignazi, 1992; Liguori, 2009).
TABLE 2.2 SOCIETAL WEIGHT, GOLDEN AGE (1945-1988)
GERMANY
FRANCE
ITALY
Aver
Max
Min
Aver
Max
Min
Aver
Max
Min
Radical left
KPD/DKP
PCF
PCI
Votes
1.2%
5.7%
0.0%
20.9%
28.3%
9.5%
25.5%
34.4%
15.5%*
1949-1987
1949
1945-1988
Nov 1946
1986
1946-1987
1976
1948
MPs
0.3%
3.7%
0.0%
14.8%
29.0%
1.7%
26.6%
36.2%
15.9%*
1949-1987
1949
1945-1988
Nov 1946
1958
1946-1987
1976
1948
Members
63,008
342,000
0
355,955
566,492
220,000
1,768,961
2,252,446
1,462,281
1945-1988
1947
1945-1988
1978
1952
1945-1988
1947
1988
Moderate left
SPD
SFIO/FGDS/PS
PSI
Votes
37.7%
45.8%
28.8%
21.3%
36.0%
12.5%
13.3%
20.7%
9.6%
1949-1987
1972
1953
1945-1988
1981
1962
1946-1987
1946
1972
MPs
39.2%
46.4%
31.0%
24.2%
54.2%
6.9%
13.3%
20.7%
9.0%
1949-1987
1972
1953
1945-1988
1981
1962
1946-1987
1946
1976
Members
795,400
1,022,000
586,000
164,579
355,000
68,000
581,353
860,300
437,458
1945-1988
1976
1954
1945-1988
1946
1968
1945-1988
1946
1965
Sources: Votes and MPs: www.bundeswahlleiter.de, www.france-politique.fr, elezionistorico.interno.it. Members: Kailitz (2004), SPD-Parteivorstand (2002), Martelli (2010b), Melchior (1993),
Simmons (1969), Ignazi and Ysmal (1998), Istituto Cattaneo.
Notes: * the party ran allied with the PS; the figure reported is half the result of the alliance (the real balance was probably slightly more favourable to the PCI).
55
Fragmentation: the "new left"
Despite moments of internal disarray and external criticism, the official communist and
socialist parties completely dominated the left camp in the first post-war decades.
29
The situation partially changes in the Sixties, as the growing radicalism of different
social sectors sought to find new expressions beyond and sometimes against the "old
left" parties. In particular, two kinds of "new left" milieus emerged and acquired a
small but not negligible societal weight. The first one was represented by left-socialist
splinters. In France the Parti socialiste unifié (PSU, 1960-1990)
30
opposed the official
socialist stance on Algeria and Gaullism and elaborated a radical, libertarian and
participatory brand of socialism (autogestion), remaining vital until 1981. In Italy the
Partito Socialista Italiano di Unità Proletaria (PSIUP, 1964-1972)
31
opposed the new
policy of centre-left governments and later split, strengthening both the PCI and the
far left. In Germany left-socialist currents were active within and outside the SPD but
never coalesced in autonomous political parties (Fichter & Lönnendonker, 1977; Arndt
et al., 1990). The second one was represented by the far-left grouplets which boomed
in the decade 1968-1978 (Bock, 1976; Billi, 2001; Koenen, 2002; Thomas, 2003;
Balestrini & Moroni, 2003; Bianchi & Caminiti, 2007-8; Artous et al., 2008). In France
they were predominantly Trotskyist: two of them, the Ligue communiste
révolutionnaire (LCR)
32
and Lutte Ouvrière (LO)
33
, had a long history behind them,
survived the subsequent downturn and re-emerged in the Nineties as important
components of the contemporary radical left. In Italy a variety of neo-communist and
operaisti groups populated the field: some of them, as il Manifesto/Partito di Unità
Proletaria per il Comunismo (PdUP, 1969-1984), were in time re-absorbed by the PCI;
some other chose an anti-parliamentary path and ended up in experiences of armed
struggle (Curcio, 2006) or retreated to the field of social movement activism (Mudu,
29
Attempts of dissident groups such as the Partito Comunista Internazionalista (PCInt, 1943-1952) and
the Movimento della Sinistra Comunista (1956-1965) in Italy or the Parti communiste internationaliste
(PCI, 1944-1952), the Rassemblement démocratique révolutionnaire (RDR, 1947-1949) and the Union
Communiste (UC, 1944-1949) in France to emerge failed miserably.
30
Tavernier and Cayrol (1969), Kernalegenn et al. (2010).
31
Miniati (1981), Pol (2006).
32
Turpin (1995), Salles (2005), Filoche (2007).
33
Choffat (1991).
56
2012); an intermediate group, Democrazia Proletaria (DP, 1975-1991)
34
, survived as a
parliamentary far-left force and in 1991 was one of the founding groups of the PRC.
The smaller German far left mostly remained anchored on a movementist stance;
some groups followed an insurrectional (Della Porta, 1995) or autonomist path
(Schwarzmeier, 2001; Schultze & Gross, 1997) while the rest formed the sub-culture
from which the ecologist party Die Grünen would emerge in 1980 (Klein & Falter,
2003).
The "new left", its cultural and social importance notwithstanding, failed to dent the
supremacy of the traditional left-wing parties and in the Eighties was largely re-
absorbed by them. Anti-authoritarianism, pacifist, feminist, environmental and self-
managerial themes were gradually adopted in a selective and de-potentiated form by
both the political system and by the logic of social and economic regulation (Boltanski
& Chiapello, 2005). The radicalism of the educated white-collar strata, on the other
hand, soon lost its force and partially reverted to the re-establishment of income,
wealth and status differences vis-a-vis the middle and lower sectors of the workforce
(late Seventies-early Eighties) and to the acceptance of the subsequent neoliberal turn.
Conclusions
The contemporary radical left directly takes the cue from the period 1945-1988. Its
organisations largely originated in the mass communist parties of the period (SED, PCF
and PCI) and in the post-1968 "new left"; the majority of its leaders were socialised
politically in the Sixties and Seventies;
35
its programmatic and theoretical references
remain firmly rooted in Marxist, welfarist and movementist elaborations of the
Seventies.
From the early Eighties onwards, however, all sections of the left entered into a
profound electoral, societal and identitarian crisis. The fall of the Soviet bloc in 1989-
1991 and the reconfiguration of international (unipolarism; European integration;
34
Billi et al. (1996), Gambetta (2010), Pucciarelli (2011).
35
Fausto Bertinotti (born in 1940), Arlette Laguiller (1940), Lothar Bisky (1941), Oskar Lafontaine (1943),
Robert Hue (1946), Gregor Gysi (1949), Jean-Luc Mélenchon (1951), Klaus Ernst (1954), Oliviero Diliberto
(1956), Pierre Laurent (1957), Franco Giordano (1957), Nicky Vendola (1958) and Paolo Ferrero (1960).
Older (George Marchais, 1920; Armando Cossutta, 1926) and younger (Olivier Besancenot, 1974; Katja
Kipping, 1978) generations were rarer.
57
neoliberal globalisation) and national regimes which followed it provided the basis for
a new dynamic of separation and regroupment, moulding the contemporary radical
left as we now know it.
58
2.1.3 The neoliberal period (1991-present)
The tendencies toward slower growth, liberalisation and reconfiguration of the welfare
state which had emerged in the Eighties experienced a sudden acceleration after the
fall of the Soviet bloc, marking the beginning of what we can term the present
neoliberal era.
The notion of neoliberalism has gained a widespread currency in the recent literature
but tends to remain poorly defined and ambiguously conceptualised (Mudge, 2008;
Thorsen, 2009).
36
Moreover, interpretations of it origin, nature, empirical development
and political implications differ strongly (Saad-Filho & Johnston, 2005; Harman, 2007;
Brenner et al., 2010; Cahill et al., 2012). While the emphasis of neo-Marxist accounts
(Harvey, 2005; Dumenil & Levy, 2011) on neoliberalism as a political project of the
capitalist class – in alliance with high-level managerial strata – to restore its power and
income share is quite convincing, other contentions of the critical literature, such as
the insistence on the "intellectual face" of this project (Austrian economics, German
ordo-liberalism, American monetarism) and its association with an alleged "roll back"
of the state, are not.
Contrary to the "shock therapies" experienced by many weak countries of the global
periphery, the paths to neoliberalisation in the advanced economies did not aim at a
return to a utopian "minimal state"; what was looked for was not so much a
retrenchment but rather a reconfiguration of the state in a context marked by
different priorities (the private sector, financial rent, international competitiveness)
and external constraints (slow growth, a more liberal and integrated international
regime). As Harman (2007) and Bellofiore (2013) have pointed out, states continue to
play a fundamental role in the processes of social reproduction and capitalist
accumulation. Far from being an ideologically-driven process led by market
fundamentalists, neoliberalisation was a highly pragmatic enterprise. The ideology of
the market and of competition was mobilised to drive through large privatisations, to
shift the burden of fiscal policies and the targets of state expenditures in favour of
36
It is true that, as the latter author argues, the "concept has become, in some quarters at least, a
generic term of deprecation describing almost any economic and political development deemed to be
undesirable" (p. 9).
59
capital incomes and to slow down the real growth of wages and welfare provisions; at
the same time, states continued to forcefully intervene to boost aggregate demand, to
subsidise companies, to improve national competiveness and to rescue ailing
corporations and banks, and the overall weight of state revenues and expenditures on
the GDP remained at historically peak levels.
In Germany, France and Italy neoliberalism was fairly successful in shifting the income
and wealth distribution upwards and in partially successful in restoring profit rates
(which however remained lower than the in the Sixties); it was on the other hand
incapable of reversing the slowing trajectories of accumulation, growth and global
economic ranking. The post-war model of mixed economy was largely dismantled in
Germany and Italy and seriously undermined in France by large-scale privatisations
(Mayer, 2006; Christiansen, 2011; Kowalski, 2013). The drive toward pension, welfare
and labour reforms, on the other hand, met with significant resistance in all three
countries and had more mixed results.
Political nature: the isolated welfarism
In an acceleration of the trends developing since the Seventies, the social constituency
of the radical left in this period lost much of its homogeneity.
Firstly, the leading weight assumed by a relatively homogeneous industrial working
class in previous periods (e.g. the Twenties or the Fifties) vanished and left behind a
more heterogeneous coalition of wage workers traversed by stronger distinctions of
gender, profession, employment status, sector, education, income, status, age and
unionisation.
Secondly, the weight of the economically non-active population rose significantly.
Thirdly, the class composition of the different levels of the parties somewhat reversed
its traditional set-up. The old communist parties had a membership with was more
"proletarian" (blue-collar workers, active wage workers) than their electorate; the
contemporary radical left showed the opposing tendency, with a particularly marked
over-representation of pensioners. Similarly, while the former endeavoured with a
certain success to ensure a large representation of ordinary workers within in their
central and elected office, for instance through developed policies of education and
60
promotion of the cadres (Pudal, 2002), the latter tend to be dominated by the strata
with a high cultural and social capital (teachers and professors, civil servants,
professionals, etc.).
As a consequence, the social constituency of the contemporary radical left should be
defined rather as welfarist than as working class, as it binds together all the social
groups having a stake in the defence of the social conquests of the Fordist period
("protected" wage workers in the civil service, public sector and in large private
enterprises; pensioners; students) or bearing the brunt of its restructuring (the
unemployed; the younger generations).
The political project of the contemporary radical left was centred on a mid-term anti-
neoliberal programme coupled with a variety of "new left" themes (environmentalism,
feminism, minority rights, etc.). Most of the parties
37
maintained a long-term formal
commitment to an anti-capitalist future society, but both its features and its link with
the former became vaguer. What was crucial, however, was the fact that this welfarist
project remained fairly powerless and isolated. While in the previous period the
socialist parties and even non-socialist forces stood behind projects of redistribution,
social protection and state ownership and planning, in the current period the radical
left remained alone to defend the legacies of the past while the consensus veered
toward neoliberal restructuring.
The organisational-strategic mediations also changed from the previous period. The
(Stalinist) monolithic understanding of pre-1989 communist parties was largely ditched
in favour of a pluralist collaboration between different traditions, sensibilities and
tendencies – in the form of either broad left parties or broad left alliances. The (social
democratic and communist) model of a close integration between party and sub-
cultural mass organisations was also replaced by a more unstable mode of
collaboration between autonomous entities. Finally, the weak influence and isolation
of the radical left forced it to a strategic rethinking. How could an anti-neoliberal turn
be produced? The moderate left, which in the previous phase had represented an
actual or potential ally, gradually shifted from being part of the solution to being part
of the problem.
37
But not all of them; see the counter-examples of the WASG in Germany and SEL in Italy.
61
Societal weight: a medium-sized galaxy in an uneven recovery
The decomposition and reorientation of the communist movement following the
events of 1989-1991 left behind itself a fragmented and contradictory landscape.
Altogether, the societal weight of the radical left parties was at its secular low point
(see TABLE 2.3).
The seemingly unstoppable decline of the early Nineties did not lead to the
disappearance of the radical left and soon made room for a pattern of stabilisation and
limited growth. Determinant to this outcome were three factors: (i) the programmatic
rightward shift and the decreasing capacity of integration of the main socialist, social
democratic and post-communist competitors (Vampa, 2009; Marlière, 2012;
Nachtwey, 2013); (ii) the shift of seating cabinets toward frontal attacks to the social
conquests of the post-war period; (iii) the connected revival of labour and social
counter-mobilisation (Kouvelakis, 2007).
This recovery, however, was highly unstable and uneven. From a chronological point of
view, phases of success (mid-Nineties, mid-Noughties) alternated with phases of
decline (early Noughties, late Noughties). From a spatial point of view, the upward
trajectory of the German left contrasted with a tendential decline of the Italian and
French ones. From a dimensional point of view, finally, partial successes on the
electoral level coexisted with a continuing decline of membership and organisational
linkages.
TABLE 2.3 SOCIETAL WEIGHT, NEOLIBERAL AGE (1990-2013)
GERMANY
FRANCE
ITALY
Aver
Max
Min
Aver
Max
Min
Aver
Max
Min
Radical left
all parties
all parties
all parties
Votes
6.5%
11.9%
2.4%
9.2%
12.1%
7.5%
6.5%
8.6%
4.5%
1990-2012
2009
1990
1993-2012
1997
2002
1992-2013
1996
2008
MPs
6.3%
12.2%
0.3%
3.5%
5.9%
1.7%
5.1%
9.0%
0.0%
1990-2012
2009
2002
1993-2012
1997
2012
1992-2013
2006
2008
Members
108,835
305,382
68,885
182,015
355,139
86,184
116,262
136,323
77,448
1990-2012
1990
2004
1990-2012
1990
2012
1992-2012
2006
2012
Moderate left
SPD
PS
PDS-DS-
FED-PD
Votes
33.2%
40.9%
23.0%
23.8%
29.4%
17.6%
23.4%
33.2%
16.1%
1990-2013
1998
2009
1993-2012
2012
1993
1992-2013
2008
1992
MPs
35.7%
44.5%
23.5%
31.4%
48.2%
9.5%
28.5%
46.5%
17.0%
1990-2013
1998
2009
1993-2012
2012
1993
1992-2013
2013
1992
Members
681,649
885,958
489,638
ca.190,000
-
-
652,629
769,944
534,358
1992-2011
1992
2011
1992-2011
1992-2011
1992
2002
Sources: Votes and MPs: www.bundeswahlleiter.de, www.france-politique.fr, elezionistorico.interno.it. Members: Niedermayer (2013), Martelli (2010b), PS, Videt (2011), PRC, PdCI, SEL,
Istituto Cattaneo.
63
Fragmentation: conciliatory vs. intransigent attitudes
The internal crisis and external decline of the communist movement paved the way for
a fundamental reconfiguration of the radical left, which tended to pursue a confluence
of different historical traditions and programmatic sensibilities into "broad left" parties
opposed to neoliberalism.
This process of regroupment started in some countries already in the late Eighties
(Spain, Greece and the Netherlands) and was greatly accelerated by the fall of the
Soviet bloc. Both in Italy and in Germany unitary radical left parties were established in
1990-1991; in France a larger coalition was envisaged in the early Nineties but failed to
be pursued decisively by the PCF.
In time, however, this model was strained by question of the relationship with the
moderate left. As the votes and seats of the radical left became increasingly crucial for
the formation of centre-left governmental majorities, the parties tended to explode in
competing conciliatory or intransigent faction or to open up the space for alternative
challengers. In the case of Germany, this outcome was averted by the strict policy of
the SPD against any collaboration with the PDS at the national level. In the case of
Italy, the PRC progressively fragmented in a myriad of rival grouplets. In the case of
France, the governmental participation of the PCF (1997-2002) led to a rise of the
Trotskyist far left and the permanence of a structural fragmentation, which was
temporarily resolved only in 2012.
64
Conclusions
The contemporary radical left regrouped through the confluence of different
traditions: neo-communist tendencies, far-left grouplets, left-wing socialist splinters
and social movement organisations.
This organisational and ideological renewal stopped the tendency toward an
inexorable decline which had been exhibited by the communist movement in the
Eighties and early Nineties; however, it did not provide the bases for a sustained
reconstruction of its societal weight. The radical left remained a mid-sized political
area, dwarfed by its moderate rivals and programmatically isolated.
65
2.2 The Western European landscape
If the previous section has introduced the historical roots of the radical lefts of my
three case studies (Germany, France and Italy), I will now situate them within the
broader landscape of the Western European radical left.
A full examination of the evolution of the contemporary radical left across Western
Europe falls outside the scope of this work. Good surveys and attempts to
generalisations from a medium number of cases have already been provided by March
(2011), Hudson (2011) and Ducange et al. (2013); the more detailed small-N analysis
that I undertake in this thesis will serve precisely to illuminate dimensions (e.g.
organisational, functional and systemic aspects), mechanisms (e.g party activities,
tactics and competition) and nuances that tend to be underestimated by this strand of
the literature.
However, in order to understand the significance of my case studies and identify the
benchmarks for their comparison it is necessary to relate their specific national
trajectories with the international trends of this political area. While a comparison of
many dimensions of societal weight is hampered by the availability of quantitative
data
38
, electoral data are easily exploitable for comparative purposes. I will therefore
sketch the main features of the broader Western European context (fifteen countries)
relying mainly on an analysis of electoral movements.
38
For instance, figures on party membership and finances are limited and often unreliable and
information on organisation, social linkages and strategies/tactics is hard to operationalise.
66
Overall electoral trends
Observers of the radical left have strongly disagreed on how to judge the overall
direction of its electoral evolution since 1989. Focusing on the results of
communist/post-communist parties, the majority of commentators had consistently
pronounced their irreversible decline (Bell, 1993; Moreau et al., 1998; Ramiro, 2003).
When broadening the analysis to other "new" radical left forces, verdicts of stagnation
(March & Mudde, 2005) have coexisted with ones of recovery (March, 2011). The
volatility of the results of many radical left forces and marked national differences
have thus prompted a variety of appreciations.
The recent contribution of De Waele and Vieira (2012) represents an interesting
attempt to define more precisely the overall electoral evolution of the electoral
support of the Western European radical left. Their data (10-year averages for
legislative elections across the EU-15 countries) tend to relativise the widely-held claim
of a decline of this party family. Firstly, the fall from the "golden age" of the Sixties
(12.7%) to the trough of the Nineties (7.1%) is indeed significant, but leaves way in the
Noughties to a significant recovery (8.0%). Secondly, in most of the countries the entity
of the decline is much removed from the nightmare scenarios of the Italian PCI and
French PCF, which heavily inform many of the existing assessments. Thirdly, the
contemporary radical left remains a significant electoral force – and, in legislative
elections, stronger than the ecologist family.
Their methodology, however, is problematic. Firstly, they seem to exclude the
countries and elections where the radical left obtained no seats from the calculation.
Secondly, they introduce a threshold of significance (the gain of at least one
parliamentary seat) which penalises countries with a fragmented radical left or with
highly majoritarian electoral systems. Thirdly, they focus on unweighted averages,
therefore assigning the same weight to countries with extremely large differences in
population sizes.
39
The net result is an overestimation of both the overall levels and
the extent of the recovery of the Noughties. I will therefore provide my own
calculations and interpretation of the results.
39
Luxembourg (about 185,000 valid votes) and Germany (about 46.8 million valid votes) thus bring the
same contribution to the final results.
67
Methodology
The database of electoral results was built in the following way.
Geographically, it covers traditional fifteen Western European member states of the
EU (EU15), excluding later accessions to the European Union (EU27) and other non-EU
Western European countries
40
. The comparability of pre-1989 and post-1989 results
requires considering slight variations of the sample. While the analysis of post-1989
developments will be conducted on the original panel (series EU15), long-term
consistency require the exclusion of the East German regions (series EU15WG).
Moreover, because of the disproportionate weight of the pre-1989 Italian Communist
Party – around half of the total radical left votes – and its sudden "exit" in 1991 it is
important to check the robustness of the results by excluding Italy as well (series
EU15WG-ITALY).
Contrary to previous studies (March & Mudde, 2005; March, 2009; March &
Rommerskirchen, 2011; De Waele & Vieira, 2012) I choose to include the results of all
radical left parties without thresholds of significance, as the exclusion of the votes
received by small or extra-parliamentary parties seriously distorts the overall picture.
41
A limited number of borderline cases where the attribution of a party to the radical left
or to another (green, regionalist) political family is uncertain do exist. The Danish SF,
the Irish SF and the Basque HB have been included, the Dutch GL not.
The data refer to the electoral results of the radical left in national legislative elections.
The decision to prefer these over elections for the European Parliament, which have
the advantage of being synchronised, derives from their nature of first-order elections
(Reif & Schmitt, 1980) with the highest stakes – the composition of the parliament and
40
The first category includes ten former Soviet-bloc states (accessed in 2004 and 2007), one former
Yugoslavian country (accessed in 2004), Cyprus and Malta (accessed in 2004). The radical left is here
significant only in Cyrpus, East Germany, the Czech Republic and Estonia, while is marginal or absent in
all other countries. The second category includes, leaving aside some micro-states, Norway, Iceland and
Switzerland; the radical left is significant in the first two cases.
41
Particularly in countries with significantly restrictive electoral systems (France, UK) and with weak and
fragmented radical lefts.
68
the formation of a governmental majority – and levels of participation. The only
problem is presented by France and its peculiar semi-presidential system: legislative
election remain the crucial ones from the point of view of policy, but participation is
lower than in presidential elections and, especially since the 2002 alignment, their
outcome tend to be heavily influenced by the result of the former. I have chosen to
use legislative data also in this case; the radical left would fare batter with the opposite
choice.
Instead of 10-year averages (De Waele & Vieira, 2012) I use yearly rolling averages.
42
That enables a very precise identification of conjunctural movements and turning
points, although the fact that legislative elections are not synchronised means that the
resulting figures probably lag a couple of years behind the real shifts of public opinion
(as they refer on average to elections held about two years before).
Finally, thee main figures will be provided: the total number of votes; the simple
average of the shares of valid votes (%); and the aggregate share or weighted average
(%).
43
The most appropriate measure for determining the overall development of the
radical left is the latter, as it attributes more weight to the largest countries. Attention
must nevertheless be paid to cases when the aggregate changes are essentially
determined by the trend in one or two large countries: this phenomenon can be
gauged by the discrepancy between weighted average and simple average.
42
On any given year, the average of the 15 countries is calculated on the electoral results of that year or
of the nearest past electoral year.
43
The two definitions are equivalent. The measure can be calculated by dividing the total number of
radical left votes by the total number of valid votes (aggregate vote share) or by weighing the national
vote shares for the valid votes of each country (weighted average).
69
Evolution and periodisation
The results are provided in the following tables (FIGURE 2.4 and TABLE 2.5).
TABLE 2.4 RADICAL LEFT ELECTORAL RESULTS (EU15 series)
Sources: my calculations from official national results.
Notes: legislative elections, shares of valid votes, 15 Western European countries, rolling averages.
The study of the long-term evolution of the radical left (EU15WG series) points to
three well-defined developmental stages.
The first stage (from the late Seventies to the early Nineties) confirms the reality of a
generalised decline of the radical left. The weighted average shows a dramatic
retrenchment (13.03% in 1979, 9.70% in 1989 and 4.87% in 1993). If we exclude the
peculiar case of Italy
44
the tendency is attenuated but remains clear (8.48% in 1979,
5.25% in 1989 and 4.70% in 1993).
44
The Italian Communist Party followed a totally divergent path from the rest of the Western European
radical left: firstly, it preserved an incredibly large electoral constituency, declining only marginally
during the Eighties (still 28.24% in the late Eighties, which translated into 56.3% of the aggregate
EU15WG radical left vote); secondly, it was the only Western communist party which after 1989
abandoned the radical left party family for the social democratic one. The two points are of course
related, as it was precisely the absence of a large socialist party in Italy which made this course possible
(similarly to Eastern Europe and unlike the rest of Western Europe).
TABLE 2.5 RADICAL LEFT ELECTORAL RESULTS, selected years (all series)
1979
1989
1993
1999
2004
2007
2012
AVER.
1992-2001
AVER.
2002-2011
AVER.
1992-2013
1a) EU15WG
Total votes
25,349,775
19,339,863
9,923,355
13,376,827
9,874,737
13,582,427
13,825,368
11,463,371
11,758,431
11,783,176
Simple %
10.51%
8.22%
5.51%
7.38%
6.04%
7.82%
9.03%
6.33%
7.09%
6.93%
Weighted %
13.03%
9.70%
4.87%
6.60%
4.92%
6.71%
6.96%
5.67%
5.88%
5.87%
1b) EU15WG WITHOUT ITALY
Total votes
13,389,926
8,447,318
7,721,927
10,163,079
7,379,995
10,468,866
12,202,296
8,769,848
9,4888,588
9,364,699
Simple %
8.94%
6.78%
5.50%
7.30%
5.99%
7.80%
9.35%
6.28%
7.17%
6.96%
Weighted %
8.48%
5.25%
4.70%
6.16%
4.51%
6.37%
7.52%
5.34%
5.82%
5.73%
2) EU15
Total votes
10,950,094
15,467,227
11,381,301
15,935,445
16,102,118
13,197,586
13,841,228
13,705,449
Simple %
5.65%
7.65%
6.23%
8.08%
9.24%
6.56%
7.33%
7.15%
Weighted %
5.12%
7.25%
5.40%
7.50%
7.76%
6.21%
6.61%
6.51%
3) COUNTRIES
AUSTRIA
0.96%
0.72%
0.55%
0.48%
0.64%
1.06%
0.81%
0.39%
0.83%
0.58%
BELGIUM
3.30%
2.08%
0.67%
0.87%
0.49%
1.43%
1.97%
0.46%
0.96%
1.09%
DENMARK
11.84%
14.45%
9.96%
10.26%
8.77%
15.20%
16.04%
10.12%
11.14%
11.48%
FINLAND
18.00%
9.39%
10.30%
11.77%
11.20%
9.61%
8.56%
11.15%
10.41%
10.44%
FRANCE
23.89%
11.68%
10.96%
12.46%
7.64%
8.03%
7.89%
11.78%
7.84%
9.38%
W. GERMANY
0.44%
0.04%
0.31%
1.13%
1.08%
4.89%
8.30%
0.88%
4.77%
3.20%
GERMANY
2.45%
5.12%
4.00%
8.84%
11.97%
4.30%
8.14%
6.05%
GREECE
12.34%
11.33%
7.65%
15.45%
11.50%
13.93%
31.85%
11.91%
12.51%
15.53%
IRELAND
1.79%
6.79%
5.06%
6.31%
7.71%
8.20%
12.75%
5.68%
7.97%
8.24%
ITALY
32.61%
28.24%
5.61%
8.57%
6.72%
8.16%
4.45%
7.11%
6.47%
6.49%
LUXEMBOURG
4.90%
4.40%
4.40%
3.30%
2.80%
2.80%
4.70%
3.07%
3.75%
3.31%
NETHERLANDS
2.99%
0.57%
0.57%
3.59%
6.37%
16.58%
9.65%
2.15%
9.68%
7.77%
PORTUGAL
23.38%
15.38%
11.19%
12.50%
10.70%
15.27%
14.89%
11.40%
15.13%
13.50%
SPAIN
15.01%
11.97%
10.64%
11.38%
5.04%
5.04%
7.10%
11.16%
4.96%
7.31%
SWEDEN
6.00%
5.84%
4.15%
11.99%
8.50%
5.87%
5.63%
8.17%
7.15%
7.05%
UK
0.26%
0.35%
0.27%
0.67%
1.40%
1.21%
0.82%
0.54%
1.30%
0.84%
Sources: my calculations from official national results.
Notes: legislative elections, 15 Western European countries, rolling averages. Simple % = simple average of shares of valid votes. Weighted % = weighted average of shares of valid votes. EU15WG
excludes East Germany and Berlin, EU15 includes them.
71
The twin electoral and identity crisis affected all countries but was most significant in
the traditional strongholds of Western European communism, where existing
communist parties either strongly declined (France, Portugal, Finland, Spain and
Greece) or altogether abandoned the party family (Italy).
The second stage (mid-to-late Nineties), on the other hand, shows a recovery which is
strong and similarly generalised. The trend concerned all countries with only one
exception (Denmark) and, in seven cases, went beyond the pre-1989 results. In 1999
the weighted average figure rose to 6.60%, excluding Italy 6.15%. The shock of the fall
of the Soviet bloc thus did not ultimately lead to the disappearance of the communist
party family but rather to its revival under a new guise.
The third stage (from 2000 onwards), finally, sees a break-down of common trends and
a coming to the fore of national specificities and trajectories. The overall development
is slightly upwards but present violent oscillations (down to 4.92% in 2004, up to 6.71%
in 2007 then stable to 6.96% in 2012). Similarly, national series are extremely volatile,
booming to unprecedented peaks (31.85% in Greece, 16.58% in the Netherlands,
16.05% in Denmark, 12.75% in Ireland, 8.29% in Western Germany) and collapsing to
unheard-of troughs (3.88% in Spain, 4.45% Italy, 5.63% in Sweden, 7.64% in France).
Altogether, the average 1990-2013 legislative results of the radical left qualify it as a
mid-sized political force (5.87%). What in the late Nineties seemed to be a uniform
tendency toward growth fragmented into a variety of national trajectories, influenced
in particular by the ability of each party in posing as a credible electoral representative
of significant social grievances and mobilisations (workers' rights, unemployment,
economic crisis, anti-EU mood) and by the constraints of alliance and coalition policies.
The study of the EU15 series (which includes Eastern Germany) shows a very similar
dynamics, but with significantly higher levels (1993: 5.12%; 2007: 7.50%; 2012: 7.76%;
average: 6.51%).
Only if we look at simple averages the setbacks (1999-2004) are attenuated and the
growth becomes less cyclical and more powerful (1993: 5.65%; 2007: 8.08%; 2012:
9.24%; average: 7.15%).
72
Geography
The geography of this new radical left is partially different from that of the old
communist left (see TABLE 2.6).
As far as electoral strength is concerned, the contemporary radical left consistently
fared well (more than 9%) in five countries – the traditional strongholds Greece,
Portugal, Denmark, Finland and France; it remained fairly immaterial (below 2%) in
three countries – the traditionally weak Austria, UK and Belgium; and oscillated at
intermediate levels in the remaining seven countries. The latter group embraces the
most surprising developments, i.e. the decline of the Spanish and Italian radical lefts
and the rise of the German, Dutch and Irish ones. As far as weight is concerned, the
absolute dominance of the Italian Communist Party gave place to a more polycentric
set-up where the declining Italian, French and Spanish and the rising German, Greek
and Dutch radical lefts vied for prominence.
The combined weight of the German, French and Italian radical left declined from an
absolute predominance before 1989 (74.32% of the total radical votes in 1979, 71.15%
in 1989), to much lower levels in the period 1992-2013 (on average 58.08%). This was
the consequence of the decline of the French Communist Party in the Eighties and of
the defection of the Italian Communist Party in 1991, which were hardly compensated
by the subsequent growth of the German PDS/DIE LINKE.
TABLE 2.6 GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION
WEIGHT
1979
1989
1993
1999
2004
2007
2012
AVER.
1992-2001
AVER.
2002-2011
AVER.
1992-2013
AUSTRIA
0.2%
0.2%
0.2%
0.1%
0.3%
0.3%
0.2%
0.1%
0.3%
0.2%
BELGIUM
0.7%
0.7%
0.4%
0.3%
0.3%
0.6%
0.6%
0.2%
0.5%
0.4%
DENMARK
1.5%
2.5%
2.9%
2.3%
2.6%
3.3%
3.5%
2.6%
3.0%
2.9%
FINLAND
2.1%
1.4%
2.6%
2.0%
2.7%
1.7%
1.6%
2.3%
2.1%
2.1%
FRANCE
26.5%
14.8%
25.5%
20.4%
17.3%
13.1%
12.7%
22.6%
14.7%
18.0%
GERMANY*
0.7%
0.1%
10.4%
16.3%
16.8%
26.2%
32.2%
15.7%
27.5%
22.5%
GREECE
2.5%
3.9%
4.8%
6.8%
7.1%
6.3%
12.2%
6.1%
6.4%
6.9%
IRELAND
0.1%
0.6%
0.8%
0.7%
1.3%
1.1%
1.8%
0.8%
1.2%
1.1%
ITALY
47.2%
56.3%
20.1%
20.8%
21.8%
19.5%
10.1%
20.4%
16.4%
17.6%
LUXEMBOURG
0.0%
0.0%
0.1%
0.0%
0.1%
0.0%
0.1%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
NETHERLANDS
1.0%
0.3%
0.5%
2.0%
5.4%
10.2%
5.7%
1.4%
7.8%
4.8%
PORTUGAL
5.4%
4.4%
5.7%
4.3%
5.0%
5.3%
5.0%
4.8%
5.8%
5.3%
SPAIN
10.6%
12.7%
22.9%
18.4%
12.3%
8.2%
10.9%
18.3%
9.2%
13.4%
SWEDEN
1.3%
1.6%
2.3%
4.1%
3.9%
2.0%
2.1%
3.3%
2.7%
2.9%
UK
0.3%
0.6%
0.8%
1.3%
3.2%
2.1%
1.5%
1.3%
2.3%
1.8%
EU15
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
Sources: my calculations from official national results.
Notes: legislative elections, 15 Western European countries, rolling averages. Country's shares of total radical left votes.
74
Fragmentation
This political area also shows a significant level of fragmentation (see TABLE 2.7), which
partly derives from the legacy of historical divisions (e.g. orthodox communists vs.
heterodox or new left grouplets) and partly from more actual cleavages (e.g.
conciliatory vs. intransigent stances, regionalism, post-materialism).
TABLE 2.7 ELECTORAL FRAGMENTATION (EU15)
COUNTRY
NATIO
NAL
LISTS
(MAX.)
SIGNIFICANT PARTIES
(>0.50% votes)
EFFECTIVE NUMBER OF ELECTORAL PARTIES
(LAAKSO-TAAGEPERA index)
WEIGHT OF
LEADING
PARTY
AVER.
1990-2013
MIN.
MAX.
Austria
2
1 – KPÖ
1.07
1.00 (sev.)
1.28 (2002)
96.81%
Belgium
3
1 - PVDA/PTB
1.88
1.55 (2010)
2.32 (2007)
66.57%
Denmark
2
2 - SF, EL
1.65
1.32 (2007)
1.95 (2011)
72.42%
Finland
4
1 – VAS
1.13
1.03 (1995)
1.26 (2003)
94.01%
France
3
3 – PCF/FdG, LO, LCR/NPA
1.88
1.29 (2012)
2.73 (2007)
72.33%
Germany
1
1 - PDS/L.PDS/DIE LINKE
1.01
1.00 (2002)
1.03 (2005)
99.34%
Greece
9
3 - KKE,
KKE(e)/SYN/SYRIZA, DIKKI
2.15
1.09 (1990)
3.09 (1996)
*39.63%
Ireland
3
3 - SF, DL, SP
1.94
1.38 (sev.)
2.95 (1997)
63.86%
Italy
4
3 - PRC, SEL, PdCI
1.47
1.00 (sev.)
2.14 (2013)
*63.79%
Luxembourg
2
2 - DEI LENK, KPL
1.59
1.00 (1999)
1.86 (2004)
*58.14%
the Netherlands
3
1 – SP
1.05
1.00 (sev.)
1.27 (1994)
97.93%
Portugal
4
3 – PCP/CDU, BE,
PCTP/MRPP
1.91
1.52 (1991)
2.25 (2011)
64.21%
Spain
4
1 – IU
1.13
1.03 (2004)
1.23 (2000)
93.98%
Sweden
4
1 – V
1.01
1.00 (sev.)
1.03 (2002)
99.65%
United Kingdom
0
1 – SF
2.31
1.34 (1992)
3.19 (2001)
63.57%
AVERAGE
3.20
1.80
1.55
1.17
1.97
76.42%
Notes: "national lists" refers to the maximum number of radical left list present at a legislative election of the period; parties
present in less than half of the constituencies are excluded (France and the UK are particularly affected); * indicate that the
leading party ran at least one election as part of a coalition (computed separately), the reported share thus being lower than
expected. Italy: 1992-2013.
On average, the effective number of electoral parties (ENEP) index is 1.55 and the
leading party gathers 76.42% of the votes. While in six countries the radical left is
represented by one virtually unchallenged party, the remaining nine countries see the
competition of two or three viable organisations, often resulting into a whirlwind of
splits, mergers, electoral coalitions, new party creations and overtakings.
45
45
It is notably the case of three strong (Greece, France, Portugal), two mid-sized (Ireland, Italy) and
three weak (the United Kingdom, Belgium, Luxembourg) radical lefts. Only in Denmark two radical left
parties coexisted for the whole period at a fairly stable ratio.
75
Political nature
As far as origins, ideology and organisational solutions are concerned, the
contemporary radical left shows a much greater pluralism and diversity than the old
communist movement (March, 2011). A predominant profile does exist but several
parties have preserved more distinctive characteristics.
The majority of forces have their origin in traditional communist parties,
46
have
maintained a loose long-term commitment to a post-capitalist future while developing
a more modern programmatics centred on a mid-term programme of defence of the
welfare state, political representation of wage workers and promotion of left-
libertarian values and have sought to favour the cohabitation under a common
organisation of different political traditions and sensibilities, often in the form of semi-
permanent electoral coalitions (e.g. IU, SYN/SYRIZA, FdG) or full-fledged mergers (e.g.
VAS, PRC, EL, BE, DIE LINKE, SEL).
47
Explaining growth and decline
Is it possible to identify the main drives of the electoral growth and decline of the
radical left?
March and Rommerskirchen (2011:200), on the basis of a tobit regression model, point
to the positive influence of "previous representation in parliament; high opposition to
the EU; high unemployment; an absence of an electoral threshold; whether the RLP
[radical left party] operates in a former communist country; the absence of competing
radical right and green parties; higher multipartism and, finally, higher voter turnout".
My more limited analysis provides the following results.
46
Others, on the other hand, have a predominantly Trotskyist (BE, LO, LCR/NPA, the Irish SP), Maoist
(the Dutch SP, PVDA/PTB, PCTP/MRPP), left social democratic (DIKKI, sections of DIE LINKE and of the
FdG) or left nationalist (the Irish SF) background.
47
Again, many smaller parties have instead maintained a more clear-cut commitment to distinctive
ideological mindsets (e.g. the communist KKE, the Trotskyist LO, the Maoist PVDA/PTB and PCTP/MRPP).
76
Firstly, the increasing involvement of radical left parties into centre-left governmental
coalitions proved to be a serious obstacle to their further growth (see TAB 2.8).
TABLE 2.8 GOVERNMENTAL PARTICIPATION OF RADICAL LEFT PARTIES, 1950-2013
COUNTRY
PARTY
PERIOD
TYPE
DENMARK
SF
SF
SF
EL
SF
EL
1966-1968
1971-1973
1993-2001
1996-2001
2011-present
2011-present
external support
external support
external support
external support
governmental participation; 2013 ex. support
external support
FINLAND
SKDL
SKDL
SKDL
VAS
VAS
1966-1970
1975-1976
1977-1982
1995-2003
2011-present
governmental participation
governmental participation
governmental participation
governmental participation
governmental participation
FRANCE
PCF
PCF
1981-1984
1997-2002
governmental participation
governmental participation
GREECE
SYN
1989-1990
governmental participation
IRELAND
DL
1994-1997
governmental participation
ITALY
PCI
MCU
PRC
PdCI
PRC
PdCI
1976-1979
1995-1996
1996-1998
1998-2001
2006-2008
2006-2008
external support
external support
external support
governmental participation
governmental participation
governmental participation
PORTUGAL
PCP
MDP
1974-1976
1974-1976
governmental participation (military cabinets)
governmental participation (military cabinets)
SPAIN
IU
BNG
2004-2008
2004-2008
external support
external support
SWEDEN
V
1994-2006
external support
While between 1950 and 1988 the governmental involvement of communist or post-
communist parties was severely limited by geopolitical and national consideration (five
countries, 21 years), the participation of the parties of the new radical left since 1989
significantly increased both quantitatively (nine countries, 53 years) and qualitatively
(more instances of direct governmental participation). This change was the product of
multiple factors: the loss of salience of anti-communist vetoes; the more competitive
nature of many national party systems, where the seats of the radical left often
became necessary for the establishment of a centre-left parliamentary majority; the
moderate and conciliatory path taken by several radical left parties, which preferred
pragmatic "lesser-evilism" to an anti-systemic stance. These experiences (Olsen et al.,
2010; Bale & Dunphy, 2011), however, were highly damaging and tended to provoke
large vote losses, splits and internal crises.
48
Some of them (Italy 2008, France 2002)
even turned into a nightmare scenario, where the governing radical left party
48
The average loss of share of votes was 22.68% for cases of direct participation and -11.94% for cases
of explicit external support. The most damaging episodes were those of Italy 2006-2008 (-62.25%),
Sweden 1998-2006 (-51.21%) and France 1997-2002 (-50.21%). The only positive experience was the
case of external support in Sweden 1994-1998 (+94.33%).
77
simultaneously lost votes to its left and to its right. In brief, the very electoral success
of radical left parties tended to force them to enter into centre-left coalitions, thereby
breaking their ascent.
Secondly, however, the lack of governmental involvement did not automatically
translate into successes. The adoption of a policy of frontal criticism toward the main
social democratic party currently in office generally tended to increase the vote share
of the radical left, but with numerous exceptions
49
. Similarly, the radical left tended to
benefit from the left-wing discontent against seating right-wing cabinets, but again
with numerous exceptions
50
. Both the greatest increases (e.g. Greece 2012, the
Netherlands 2006, Germany 2005, Sweden 1998) and the greatest losses (e.g. Spain
2000, the Netherlands 2010, Portugal 2011) occurred in every kind of governmental
constellation. Thus, while governmental participation and external support seem to be
to be an unquestionably bad choice for radical left parties, their opposition to great
coalitions, centre-left and centre-right cabinets (in this order) does not yield uniform
results: although mostly favourable, it leads to strong gains in only a minority of cases
and it can sometimes accompany significant losses.
Thirdly, the radical left involvement into wide-ranging social mobilisations (such as
strike waves or large anti-governmental campaigns) seems to be one of the main
preconditions for big electoral gains. The presence of large general strikes, waves of
industrial action and protest movements in the years leading up to the general election
appears as a crucial factor in helping to catalyse the popular dissatisfaction toward the
radical left, rather than toward other opposition parties. While not always decisive
(e.g. Portugal 2011 or France 2007, where large movements were followed by severe
defeats or stagnations), it was indeed there in all ten instances of significant radical left
surges
51
.
Fourthly, the fragmentation of the radical left has a serious impact on its overall social
and political impact but not on its electoral results. Large splits which disrupted the
organisation, activist base and public perception of a party were regularly followed by
49
Six out of eighteen cases: Finland 2007, Germany 2002, Greece 2000 and 2004, Portugal 2002 and
2011.
50
Eight out of twenty-six cases: Finland 2011, France 2012, Greece 1993 and 2009, Portugal 1995, Spain
2000 and 2004, Sweden 2010.
51
Defined by a gain of at least 40% of vote share: the Netherlands 2006, Greece May 2012, Germany
2005 and 2009, Denmark 2007, Ireland 2011, Italy 1996, Portugal 2005, Spain 2011 and Sweden 2008.
78
short-term losses (e.g. Ireland 1992, Greece 1993, Italy 2001 and Luxembourg 2004). In
the long-term, instead, the competition of several radical left parties (especially if of a
minimum size and parliamentary presence) tended to be neutral or even favourable.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the analysis confirms the reality of both a long and almost generalised
decline of Western European communism, which set in at the end of the late Seventies
and exploded in a terminal electoral and existential crisis with the fall of the Soviet
bloc (Ramiro, 2003), and of the new beginning of a transformed radical left from the
mid-Nineties onwards. The recovery was however limited, unsteady and uneven.
With regard to the first point, weighted average electoral results of the radical left
during the entire period 1992-2013 were 5.87% (excluding the former East Germany)
or 6.51% (including it), still much lower than the communist scores of the late Eighties
(9.70%). Even if we exclude Italy, which plays a disproportionate role in the sample,
the results become only barely superior to those before 1989.
With regard to the second point, party-specific and country-specific results remained
highly volatile and liable to sudden upturns and downturns
52
.
With regard to the third point, the internal geography of the Western European radical
left was constantly reconfigured, as many of the countries with the strongest
communist traditions continued to slide or stagnate (Spain, France, Italy and Finland),
some with weak traditions grew rapidly (Western Germany, the Netherlands and
Ireland) and one specific country (Greece) boomed to unprecedented levels.
52
The average relative standard deviation was 38.86% and reached in some countries (the Netherlands,
Germany, Belgium, Greece, the United Kingdom) more than 50%. From one election to another the
result could rise by 160.28% (the Netherlands 2006) or 14.06 percentage points (Greece 2012) and fall
by 46.57% (Spain 2000) or 6.76 percentage points (the Netherlands 2010).
79
2.3 Conclusions
The present chapter has set the stage for the discussion of the specific national
trajectories of the contemporary German, French and Italian radical lefts by analysing
their historical roots and their broader geographical context.
The exceptional importance that their precursors (SED, PCF and PCI) had in the in post-
WWII period was replaced by a more marginal and uncertain role after 1989;
nevertheless, the three case studies retained a central position within the landscape of
the Western European radical left. Moreover, the electoral recovery of the mid-
Nineties from the deep crisis of the years 1989-1993 seemed to provide the
foundations for a renewal of this political family and its shift toward new features and
dynamics.
The following chapters (three, four and five) will see whether this was indeed the case.
80
CHAPTER THREE. THE GERMAN
RADICAL LEFT: A SUCCESS STORY?
3.1 The national context
The developmental path of the contemporary German radical left has aroused
considerable interest from commentators and political scientists alike. And, indeed, its
history presents many enticing features for a student of contemporary politics.
Firstly, the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS)
53
was one of the few former Soviet bloc
ruling parties which successfully survived the post-1989 democratic transition as a
radical leftist parliamentary force. This simple anomaly was transformed into a political
enormity by the 1990 incorporation of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in the
Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), which thereby transferred a piece of communist
history in a country with deep anti-communist traditions.
Secondly, the developments of the period 2003-2009 remain to this day the clearest
example of success of the radical left in a large European nation. Against the
background of massive discontent toward the policies of the Schröder government, a
new splinter movement emerged (the Electoral Alternative Labour and Social Justice,
WASG)
54
, allied itself with the PDS in the 2005 federal elections and finally merged with
the latter in 2007 (The Left, DIE LINKE). The new entity represented the most
significant European case of a breakup of the "new" social democracy: while in other
European countries the radical left tended to win over only marginal figures and
tendencies, in Germany it could count on the leadership of Oskar Lafontaine, the
53
A legal continuation of the GDR ruling party Socialist Unity Party of Germany (Sozialistische
Einheitspartei Deutschlands, shorthand SED), it was renamed SED-PDS on December 1989 and then
Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus (shorthand PDS) on February 1990. It changed again its name in
The Left Party.PDS (Die Linkspartei.PDS, shorthand Die Linke.PDS) on July 2005. It will be henceforth
referred to simply as PDS.
54
The group was established in July 2004 as an association (Wahlalternative Arbeit & soziale
Gerechtigkeit e.V.) and transformed in January 2005 in a party (Arbeit & soziale Gerechtigkeit – Die
Wahlalternative, shorthand WASG).
81
former social democratic candidate for chancellor (1990) and party chairman (1995-
1999). Moreover, DIE LINKE managed to establish a foothold in areas where it started
almost from scratch (the Western regions of the country) and made large inroads
among the general public and in particular among the former social democratic
electorate.
Thirdly, this electoral success had the effect of destabilising the overall dynamics of the
German party system. Whereas the rise of the Greens in the Eighties had gradually
transformed the traditional "two-and-a-half-party system" (Blondel, 1968) into a
bipolar competition between centre-right and centre-left coalitions, the emergence of
a fifth relevant party threatened to prevent both camps from reaching a majority
55
,
thus ushering in an era of unstable left-right coalitions. The party system has been
unravelling ever since, with an ailing SPD facing the stark dilemma between a grand
coalition with the CDU (its choice in 2005-2009), permanent exclusion from power or
an unprecedented red-red-green experiment, officially rejected but frequently hinted
at by pundits and second-line politicians (Jesse, 1997; Neu, 2001; Hirscher, 2001; Spier,
2009; Hough, 2010; Raschke & Tils, 2010).
Fourthly, the German radical left has arguably become a sort of role model for its
brother parties across the EU. The PDS has played a central role both in coordinating
the radical left group within the European Parliament (GUE/NGL) and in establishing
the transnational Party of the European Left (PEL) in 2004; its political foundation
Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung has become an important site of theoretical debate; the
experience of DIE LINKE, finally, has inspired projects of left regroupment in a variety
of other countries such as Italy and France.
How can we understand and explain this seemingly unlikely success story?
Historical shocks
The emergence of the post-1989 German radical left cannot be understood but in the
context of three major historical "shocks" which destabilised the traditional alignments
55
The threat became a reality twice, in 2005 and 2013.
82
between individual citizens, social organisations and political parties and creating
fertile grounds for social eruptions and partial de-alignments.
The first shock was the crisis of the GDR in 1989/1990, its rapid incorporation in the
FRG and the lasting consequences of reunification.
In the Eighties the GDR regime started to show increasing signs of economic and
legitimacy crisis, which rapidly accelerated since 1988 and morphed into a full-fledged
political revolution in the autumn of 1989 (Föster & Roski, 1990; Lohmann, 1994;
Gehrke & Hürtgen, 2001; Dale, 2004 and 2006; Segert, 2009; Steiner, 2010). The
movement briefly propelled at its helm a variety of predominantly intellectual left-
wing civic organisations (Bürgerbewegungen) but the mood soon shifted in favour of
centre-right forces, which triumphed at the 18 March 1990 Volkskammer elections and
paved the way for the subsequent currency union on 1 July and unification on 3
October.
The successive developments, however, did not entirely live up to the hopes of
"blossoming landscapes".
56
From a socio-economic point of view, the East German
economy was thoroughly de-industrialised and large swathes of its populations were
plunged into unemployment, early retirement and internal migration; at the same
time, a huge influx of public transfers investments avoided a recession and ensured a
large improvement of monetary living standards (Roesler, 1994; Wiesenthal, 2003;
Burda, 2013). From a socio-political point of view, the modalities of the unification
process elicited a growing dissatisfaction. While the discontent was initially largely
limited to the downardly-mobile former bureaucracy, more and more Ossis
(Easterners) came to resent the "colonisation" by Western institutions and personnel,
57
their status as "second class citizens", the devaluation of their titles and biographies
and the disregard for their specific values and interests (Abromeit, 1993; Wollmann,
1996; Bürklin & Rebenstorf, 1997; Wiesenthal, 1998; Fuchs, 1999; Brie, 2000; Neller &
Thaidigsmann, 2002; Goedicke, 2003; Kunze, 2008; Hodgin & Pearce, 2011). The
former GDR thus came to occupy a peculiar place within the landscape of the new
56
In German blühende Landschaften (Kohl, 1990).
57
By the mid-Nineties Westerners owned 80% of the whole privatised sector and made up more that
40% of the top layer of the elite of the neue Bundesländer.
83
Berlin republic and acquired specific economic, social, political and cultural features
which persist to this day.
The extent of the dissatisfaction reached its apex in 1992-1993, when a large wave of
industrial and street mobilisation erupted in response to the privatisation of the
Eastern state-owned sector by the Treuhand, which resulted not in the revitalisation
but in the winding-up of much the former state-owned sector (Roesler, 1992; Garms,
1994; Gehrke, 1997). It was in this context that the initially discredited and declining
PDS managed to revive its fortunes as a left-wing regional party, claiming the sole
representation of East German interests against the "Bonn parties".
The second shock was the return to power of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) in
1998, after sixteen years of opposition, and the neoliberal course staunchly pursued by
it in its seven years of office (Beck & Scherrer, 2005; Nachtwey, 2013).
The open turn away from traditional values and solutions became soon apparent, as
exemplified by the replacement of the Keynesian Oskar Lafontaine as Minister of
Finance (1999), the Kosovo military mission (1999), the tax reform (2000) and the
pension reform (2001). During the first term, however, dissatisfaction remained
confined to left-wing activist circles and did not result in heavy electoral losses. It was
only in March 2003, when the re-elected Schröder cabinet unveiled its ambitious plans
for a reform of the labour market (Agenda 2010), that discontent acquired mass
dimensions. A rift opened within the traditional constituency of the SPD (members,
voters and collateral organisations) and in 2003-2004 the biggest wave of street
mobilisations since unification occupied for two years the forefront of the political
scene (Rucht & Yang, 2004; Lahusen & Baumgarten, 2006). Although the movement
failed to prevent the implementation of the reform, it provided the backdrop for the
formation of a new radical left challenger (WASG) and for the electoral successes of
the radical left along the whole 2005-2009 electoral cycle.
The third shock was the great financial crisis of 2008-2009.
While milder than in other European countries, the crisis has further undermined the
stability of the German party system. At the electoral level, in 2009 the number of valid
votes fell to 69.8% of the electorate and both partners of the outgoing grand coalition
(CDU/CSU and SPD) collapsed to their lowest vote share since 1949. The following
84
period remained characterised by an extreme volatility, with the emergence of new
parties (PIRATEN, Alternative für Deutschland) and large oscillations in opinion poll
ratings and local election results.
58
Moreover, the country witnessed another
impressive wave of contentious politics: the student movement of autumn 2009
(Himpele, 2009; Sergan, 2009); the huge environmental mobilisations of 2009-2011
(Roose, 2010; Schlager, 2010; Rucht, 2010); and a variety of smaller movements
(Hildebrandt & Tügel, 2010).
Was the radical left able to seize the opportunities offered by these historic turns to
embark on a path of renewal and growth?
Radical left responses
The starting situation of the Eighties was not favourable to the emergence of a strong
radical left. In the West communist and far-left groups had always been quite
marginal; the extra-parliamentary left largely collapsed in 1989-1990
59
while the left-
wing tendencies in the SPD (Walter, 2007) and Greens (Klein & Falter, 2003) also lost
weight. In the East socialist ideas remained monopolised by the authoritarian practices
of the ruling Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED)
60
while oppositional groups
remained small and isolated.
The crisis of 1989-90 had the unlikely outcome of leading to the convergence of many
of these groups around a reformed rump of the SED, the PDS (Bortfeldt, 1992; Gerner,
1993).
61
The pressure from the streets forced the SED through a rapid process of
adaptation. After a long internal battle, the new organisation opted for an interesting
mix of continuities and discontinuities couched around a radical-democratic version of
"democratic socialism". The legacy of the past made the party unpalatable in the West
58
See http://www.wahlrecht.de/umfragen/index.htm.
59
See Fülberth (1990) on the orthodox Deutsche Kommunistische Partei (DKP), Steffen (2002) on the
Maoist Kommunistischer Bund (KB); Jünke (2001) on the Trotskyist/Maoist Vereinigte Sozialistische
Partei (VSP); Schultze and Gross (1997) and Schwarzmeier (2001) on the Autonomen.
60
Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands.
61
See also the stimulating witness accounts of Gysi and Falkner (1990), Eckhoff (2005) and Segert
(2008).
85
and not very appealing in the East; however, its gain of parliamentary representation
and the efforts of its new modernising leadership transformed it into a key future
point of reference for all kinds of disaffected left-wingers. In the following years (1991-
1998) the PDS consolidated as a sizeable force in the East (Brie et al., 1995;
Neugebauer & Stöss, 1996; Barker, 1998; Brie & Woderich, 2000; Oswald, 2002; Gerth,
2002). The party survived the initial attempts of political and economic strangulation
and, by 1992, experienced a turnaround in its electoral fortunes, intercepting the
disparate grievances of large sectors of the Eastern population. It thus embarked on a
path of constant growth which brought it from 2.4% of valid votes in 1990 (East 11.1%,
West 0.3%)
62
to 5.1% in 1998 (East 21.6%, West 1.2%). The former Stalinist ruling party
had become a successful regional socialist party.
The PDS, however, was not able to fully profit from the tensions produced by the
neoliberal orientation of the Schröder government (Olsen; 2002; Hough, 2002;
Bortfeldt, 2003; Brie, 2003; Meuche-Mäker, 2005; Thompson, 2005). Despite
promising gains in the preceding European and regional elections, in 2002 it collapsed
to 4.0% (East 16.9%, West 1.1%) and its representation was reduced to only two MPs.
The outcome was unexpected and was largely the product of a last-minute swing
toward the SPD in response to extraordinary circumstances (Stöss & Neugebauer,
2002).
63
Moreover, its disastrous governmental experiences in Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern (1998-2006) and Berlin (2001-2011) weakened the local branches and
tarnished the global image of the party as an alternative and consequently anti-
neoliberal force.
The tide turned again with the 2003-2004 wave of social mobilisation, which led to the
resurgence of the PDS the East and the rise of a new potential challenger or ally in the
West: the WASG. Sagely, the initially competitive relationship between the two radical
left groups was rapidly steered toward an electoral alliance in Spring 2005 and a full-
blown merger in June 2007 (Brie et al., 2005 and 2007; Heunemann, 2006; Hübner &
62
When not otherwise stated, in this chapter the terms will be used with reference to the former
Federal Republic of Germany territory plus West Berlin (West) and the former German Democratic
Republic plus East Berlin (East) – and not to the division between old and new Länder of the FRG.
63
The key factor was probably the sudden rise of the popularity of Schröder in the East following its
opposition to the Iraq war and its skilful management of the Elbe floods. The temporary retreat of Gysi
from the political scene is also likely to have had an important impact.
86
Strohschneider, 2007; Spier et al., 2007; Hough et al., 2007; Fülberth, 2008; Jesse &
Lang, 2008; Patton, 2011).
The new party, DIE LINKE, was able to capitalise the wave of revulsion toward the SPD
and boomed to unprecedented levels, reaching 8.7% in 2005 (East 25.4%, West 4.9%)
and 11.9% in 2009 (East 28.5%, West 8.3%).
The largest capitalist crisis since 1929, finally, did not favour DIE LINKE. Firstly, Merkel's
CDU strongly increased its consent thanks to the quick economic recovery and a
cautious and non-divisive style of governance. Secondly, the return of the SPD to the
opposition changed the patterns of political competition and enabled it to recover
some of the consent it had lost while in government. Thirdly, the lack of tangible short-
term results and strategic perspectives of the radical left led to a demobilisation of its
electorate and its defection to mainstream or alternative "protest" options (Piraten,
Green and AfD). Fourthly, labour and anti-crisis protests were quickly superseded by
mobilisations on "post-materialist" themes (e.g. environmental problems). Finally,
internal infighting around the issue of governmental participation and the retreat of
Oskar Lafontaine from the political frontline compounded the above-mentioned
problems. Since 2011 the party has been credited by pollsters with a mere 6-8% of the
voting intentions, ultimately winning 8.6% of votes (East 22.7%, West 5.6%).
Outline
The present chapter will analyse in more detail this trajectory.
In section 3.2 I will map out the contours of the German radical left over the last 25
years. First of all, I will track the evolution of its societal weight and the imbalances
between electoral growth, organisational decline and lack of governmental weight.
Secondly, I will underline the remarkably low level of fragmentation of this political
area and its capacity to initiate significant processes of regroupment, such as the shift
from regional (PDS) to all-German (DIE LINKE) foundations. Thirdly, I will examine the
transformation of its political nature, as the initial national specificities (e.g. the roots
of the PDS within the milieu of former East German communist cadres and
87
bureaucrats) were gradually watered down and the typical features of the
contemporary Western European radical left came to the forefront.
In section 3.3 I will discuss the validity of the "vacuum thesis" with reference to the
German case. Did the neoliberal shift of the mainstream parties and their turn away
from their traditional welfarist policies and values open up a political space which new
parties could reasonably hope to fill? What potential and what limitations existed for
the growth of the radical left?
In section 3.4 I will identify the factors which favoured the cohesion and regroupment
of the German radical left parties and which prevented its fragmentation in competing
organisations.
In section 3.5 I will try to determine if the "strategy of leftward pull" of the German
radical left was at all successful in influencing the dynamics of competition within the
party system and in counterbalancing or reversing the rightward shift of its main
competitors (SPD and Greens).
In section 3.6, finally, I will offer summarise the main findings and offer some
concluding remarks.
88
3.2 The making of a new German radical left
3.2.1 Societal weight
The evolution of the societal weight of the German radical left in its various key
dimensions is summarised below (TABLE 3.1 and FIGURE 3.2). The almost entirety of
the totals is attributable to one subject only: the PDS up to 2005; the PDS-WASG
alliance in 2005-2006; DIE LINKE from 2007 onwards. The weight of other far-left
organisations (mainly DKP, MLPD and PSG) always remained extremely marginal.
TABLE 3.1 SOCIETAL WEIGHT
AVERAGE
1990-2013
PERIOD I
1990-2004
PEROD II
2005-2013
ELECTORAL WEIGHT
NATIONAL
2,916,005 votes
6.32%
1,914,888 votes
4.00%
4,584,534 votes
10.21%
REGIONAL
1,971,500 votes
5.22%
1,567,769 votes
3.96%
2,644,386 votes
7.30%
EUROPEAN
(1994-2013)
1,727,074 votes
6.14%
1,631,884 votes
5.39%
1,843,417 votes
7.06%
PARLIAMENTARY WEIGHT
NATIONAL
38 seats
6.04%
23 seats
3.38%
65 seats
10.47%
REGIONAL
145 seats
5.18%
126 seats
4.34%
178 seats
6.58%
GOVERNMENTAL INVOLVEMENT
NATIONAL
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
REGIONAL
4.28%
3.96%
4.81%
ORGANISATIONAL WEIGHT
MEMBERSHIP
(1990-2012)
108,835
6.18%
124,616
6.46%
79,246
5.65%
YEARLY INCOMES
(1991-2010)
24,743,971 euro
5.32%
24,222,835 euro
5.15%
25,959,954 euro
5.69%
MEDIA OUTREACH
Weak
Weak
Weak
ORGANISATIONAL LINKAGES
Weak
Weak
Weak
Notes - Absolute figures and shares (of valid votes, total seats, total population, total party members, total party incomes).
Averages: rolling figures calculated on all years. Regional: weighted by regional population. Governmental involvement: time in
government (participation or external support); at least one radical left party. National: Bundestag. Yearly incomes: real 2010
euro.
89
FIGURE 3.2 SOCIETAL WEIGHT
Notes: rolling averages of national and regional values. Shares of total valid votes, total seats (weighted), total party members,
total party incomes, total population administered.
The overall picture is one of a medium-small player within the national political
system, with all but one quantifiable dimensions of oscillating around average values
ranging between 4.3% and 6.5%. The German radical left did reasonably well and
followed a growth path at the electoral, parliamentary and financial level; it struggled
more on the other levels.
90
The electoral dimension was without doubt the most successful and followed a general
trajectory of growth mirroring two of the three above-mentioned shocks: the post-
reunification crisis (1993-1999), when the PDS consolidated itself as an Eastern
regional party, and the post-Hartz IV reforms period (2003-2009), when DIE LINKE
established itself as a national force making inroads in the traditional social democratic
constituency. From 1990 to 2013 the electoral weight of the radical left grew in
absolute terms from 1,138,174 to 3,784,482 votes and in relative terms, from 2.45% to
8.65% of valid votes.
The parliamentary dimension roughly mirrored the previous one, with a presence
slightly inferior but fairly proportional to the electoral results. The radical left enjoyed
at all times a presence in the national parliament, although in the period 2002-2005 it
was reduced to only two MPs. The presence in regional parliaments was geographically
highly differentiated. The PDS has a strong anchoring in the East but always failed to
gain a foothold in the West. DIE LINKE did better and since 2009 has had an
intermittent presence in many of the Western parliaments, being represented at its
peak (2011) in seven of the ten regions.
The governmental dimension points to a very weak presence of the German radical left
in governmental majorities and executives, in a very interesting deviation from the
pattern of its Italian and French counterparts.
Neither the PDS nor DIE LINKE was ever involved in parliamentary coalitions at the
national level, despite some willingness on the part of their leadership to open
discussions for an external support to a red-red-green majority. The refusal of SPD and
Greens has so far been adamant and whenever the left support was vital to form a
"red-red-green" majority (2005) the Social Democratic Party preferred to it a "grand
coalition" with the CDU/CSU.
At the regional level the picture was somewhat different. While still limited to few and
not very populous regions (on average just 4.3% of the German population),
experiments of external support (Tolerierung) and direct governmental participation
have indeed taken place in the Eastern regions. Three cases belong to the first group:
the majority SPD cabinet in Brandenburg (1994-1999), the minority SPD-Greens then
SPD cabinets in Sachsen-Anhalt (1994-2002) and the transitional minority SPD-Greens
91
cabinet in Berlin (2001). Three cases fall under the second group: the SPD-PDS/DIE
LINKE cabinets in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (1998-2006), Berlin (2002-2011) and
Brandenburg (2009-present).
The progressive electoral rise of the PDS and of DIE LINKE has however made the
problem of crafting viable parliamentary centre-left coalitions more and more acute. In
the East the party tends to be vital in the majority of cases; the SPD has here
progressively evolved toward a fairly open attitude, but continues to consider as its
preferred option a grand coalition with the CDU. In the West the issue has emerged
only after 2007 and the response of centre-left parties has been so far quite
reluctant.
64
The organisational dimension, finally, did not match the electoral successes and
tended to follow a stagnating or declining path.
Membership levels, which can be tracked with precision, followed a rapidly declining
trajectory - with the exception of the period 2005-2009. The transition from SED to
PDS (1988-1990) meant a loss of almost 90% of members, from 2.3 million to 280,882.
This was followed by another three years (1990-1993) of heavy losses, which halved
the membership to 131,406. In the subsequent eleven years (1993-2004) the PDS
continued on a path of slower but sustained decline, halving again to a historical low
point of 61,385. The establishment of the WASG and then of DIE LINKE led to a period
of expansion, as the further losses in the East were more than compensated by an
impetuous growth in the West; by 2009 the party had reached a peak of 78,046
members. The revival was however short-lived and by 2011 the membership had fallen
back to 69,458 members. The decline was less accentuated in terms of shares of all
party members (11.7% in 1990, 6.6% in 1993, 4.0% in 2004, 5.6% in 2009 and 5.2% in
2011) but meant a shift from a membership-heavy to a membership-light party, with
the index of encapsulation (M/V) falling from the incredibly high levels of 1990 (24.7%)
64
In the five cases when the support of DIE LINKE was needed, its potential partners chose to "get
creative" three times (CDU-Greens, CDU-FDP-Greens and CDU-SPD coalitions) and the remaining two
times built short-lived minority SPD-Green coalitions: the one in Hessen failed to obtain the required
majority, due to SPD dissidents, and never entered into office; the one in Nordrhein -Westfalen (2010-
2012) refused to reach a programmatic agreement with DIE LINKE and was seated thanks to its
unrequited abstention, later looking for variable majorities on a case-by-case basis. DIE LINKE abstained
on the 2010 and 2011 budgets and voted against on the 2012 one, thereby triggering early elections.
92
to medium-low (6.0% in 1994, 3.7% in 1998 and 2002) and very low (1.8% in 2005,
1.5% in 2009) levels.
From a financial point of view, the initial period of crisis linked to the seizure of SED
assets (1990-1993)
65
was followed by a very stable situation, with real annual incomes
oscillating around 24 million euro, around 5.3% of the total income of parliamentary
parties.
The two remaining sub-dimensions cannot be quantified with precision.
As far as the media outreach was concerned, party-controlled forms of communication
(e.g. membership-based campaigning, party-owned media, broadcasting of
parliamentary debates, paid advertising) had a significant impact in the Eastern regions
but remained sporadic in the West. The mass media, on the other hand, tended to
provide a hostile and weak (Hansen et al., 2010; Jandura, 2011) coverage of the PDS
and DIE LINKE, which tended to be treated either as irrelevant forces or as a danger for
democracy.
As far as organisational linkages were concerned, the parties of the German radical left
pained at translating their growing electoral appeal into more stable forms of indirect
influence. Altogether, the influence was confined to the organisations representing the
interests of the former bureaucracy (e.g. the Ostdeutsches Kuratorium von Verbänden,
OKV), the far-left scene (e.g. squatter, anti-fascist, communist, Turkish and Kurdish
groups), the pacifist movement and the alter-globalist milieu (e.g. ATTAC, Sozialforum
in Deutschland). The presence among the cadres and leaders of the dense German civil
society (trade unions, associations, churches, charities), with the exception of sections
of the East German associationism, remained on the other hand quite small: the
relationship warmed up, moments of collaboration took place, but the political
allegiance of mass organisations remained firmly, if critically, aligned with their
traditional sub-cultural representatives (SPD, CDU and, to a lesser extent, Greens).
65
Nominal incomes collapsed from 816.5 million DM (first half 1990) to 72.9 million DM (second half
1990) and 22.5 million DM (1992), before rising to 34.3 million DM in 1994. The net assets inherited
from the SED and not voluntarily given up amounted in 1990 to 1,277 million DM but were administered
by a state commission (UKPV); in the end they were almost entirely seized, leaving in 1994 a net wealth
of just 20 million DM. For a discussion of the legal, practical and ethical issues surrounding the fate of
the SED assets inherited by the PDS see the opposite views of Behrend (2006) and Bräutigam (2010).
93
3.2.2 Regroupment and fragmentation
Unlike its French and Italian counterparts, the German radical left presents a
remarkably small degree of organisational fragmentation (see TABLE 3.3).
TABLE 3.3 FRAGMENTATION
Votes
1990
1994
1998
2002
2005
2009
AVER.
PDS
99.2%
99.4%
99.5%
99.9%
-
-
66.4%
L.PDS/DIE LINKE
-
-
-
-
98.5%
99.3%
33.0%
Others
0.8%
0.6%
0.4%
0.1%
1.5%
0.7%
0.7%
Members
1990
1994
1998
2002
2005
2009
AVER.
PDS/L.PDS
96.1%
92.5%
90.4%
90.2%
74.9%
-
74.0%
WASG
-
-
-
-
15.6%
-
2.6%
DIE LINKE
-
-
-
-
-
91.8%
15.3%
Others
3.9%
7.5%
9.6%
9.8%
9.5%
8.2%
8.1%
MPs
1990
1994
1998
2002
2005
2009
AVER.
PDS/L.PDS
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
77.8%
-
79.6%
WASG
-
-
-
-
22.2%
-
3.7%
DIE LINKE
-
-
-
-
-
100.0%
16.7%
Fragmentation
index
1990
1994
1998
2002
2005
2009
AVER.
Votes
1.02
1.01
1.01
1.00
1.03
1.01
1.01
Members
1.08
1.16
1.21
1.21
1.68
1.18
1.25
MPs
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.53
1.00
1.09
The moment of potential crisis actually abounded: in 1989-1990 the SED seemed
briefly oriented toward dissolving itself and paving the way for the establishment of
several left-wing parties (Gysi & Falkner, 1990; Bortfeldt, 1992; Segert, 2008); in 2002-
2003 the clash between left-wing and right-wing tendencies of the PDS menaced to
split it along ideological lines (Behrend, 2006); in 2004-2005 the emergence of the
WASG seemed to announce a period of destructive competition and the subsequent
process of alliance and full-blown merger (2005-2007) was repeatedly threatened by
local incidents
66
(Heunemann, 2006; Spier et al., 2007; Hough et al, 2007); in 2010-
2012 the clash between Western radicals around Oskar Lafontaine and Eastern
pragmatists around Dietmar Bartsch again prompted many to claim that the merger
had not worked and that each side should go its separate way.
In the end, however, the party not only never split, but also managed to co-opt or
marginalise potential external challenges and to become the centre of successive
waves of radical left regroupment. In 1990 the Linke Liste/PDS project (Meuche-
66
In particular, the local WASG branches in Berlin and Mecklenburg-Vorpommern decided to run against
the PDS in the 2006 regional elections.
94
Mäker, 2005: 15-16; Eckhoff, 2005; Neugebauer & Stöss, 1996: 46) was an electoral
failure but succeeded in co-opting significant sections of the existing far-left groups in
the East (VL, Die Nelken) and West (DKP, KB, VSP). In 2004-2007, then, the alliance
with the WASG enabled it to finally set a solid foothold in the Western side of the
country.
The far-left groups which refused to join the PDS and DIE LINKE (e.g. DKP, MLPD, KPD-
Ost, PSG and RSB) remained tiny and not very influential. Their total membership has
been oscillating since 1993 between 7,000 and 10,000 members; their total electorate
reached, at its peak in 2005, just 60,843 votes (0.10%).
67
67
Kailitz (2004), BdI (1991-2012).
95
3.2.3 Political nature
The political nature of German radical left parties was characterised, as in the rest of
Western Europe, by the transition from the legacies of the Twentieth Century
communist movement to the dilemmas and possibilities of the contemporary radical
left landscape. In the case of Germany, the origins of the PDS in a former ruling party
of the Soviet bloc provided for marked specificities vis-à-vis its French and Italian
counterparts.
Ideologically, the German radical left was quick in ditching the legacy of the
bureaucratic socialism represented by the GDR in favour of an eclectic "radical left"
programmatic.
Within the SED, socialism was conceived as a state-led process of accumulation and
redistribution through the means of state ownership, economic planning and party
dictatorship (Roesler, 1992; Dale, 2004; Steiner, 2010). When this model unravelled in
1989-1990 under the impact of an economic, political and geopolitical crisis, it was not
clear which left-wing vision might replace it. Both the civic movements
(Bürgerbewegungen) and the PDS initially advanced the idea of a reformed socialist
GDR (Kamenitsa, 1998; Riegel, 2002; Segert, 2009), but the extent and type of reforms
to be undertaken remained vague and controversial. After the victory of right-wing
pro-unification forces in the March 1990 Volkskammer election, these debates were
swept away and East Germany swiftly proceeded toward a quick and thorough
adaptation to the institutional realities of the FRG (Abromeit, 1993; Wollmann, 1996).
The response of the PDS was an original theorisation of "modern socialism" or
"democratic socialism" (Land & Possekel, 1995; Klein & Brie, 2007; Segert, 2008; Land,
2010). This was conceived as a "third way" between market capitalism and state
socialism characterised by: (a) a wide-ranging democratisation of both state and the
economy; (b) a mixed economy with a multiplicity of property forms (private, state,
cooperative). The vision was appealing but rather indeterminate, as the relative weight
of the three theoretical poles of state intervention, market competition and (workers'
and users') self-management was not spelled out in detail. It could lend itself to a
variety of interpretations, as the internal debates of the PDS would soon amply
96
demonstrate (Land, 1995b; Brie, 2000; Chrapa, 2000; Sturm, 2000; Behrend, 2006;
Prinz, 2010).
De facto, the programmatic of the PDS focused on two key areas: on the one hand, a
broad anti-neoliberal catalogue of progressive measures mixing welfarist, left-
Keynesian and post-materialist themes; on the other hand, a particular attention to
the defence of cross-class Eastern interests against the perceived economic, political
and cultural marginalisation of the area in the new German republic (PDS, 1990b, 1993
and 2003).
The WASG avoided any commitment to a post-capitalist future but its short-term
socio-economic programme overlapped with that of the PDS and even had a more
radical edge (WASG, 2005). The party sought to work toward a "new alternative social
bloc of labour and knowledge" (Krämer, 2005) against the intellectual hegemony of
neoliberalism and came up with a coherent programme of welfarist and left-Keynesian
reforms.
DIE LINKE, finally, worked toward a synthesis of the main concerns of the two
constituent parties: working and living conditions, the expansion of the welfare state,
democratisation, socio-ecological restructuring, pacifism, Eastern interests and the
long-term aim of democratic socialism (PDS, 2007 and 2011).
Sociologically, the German radical left has until recently significantly diverged from the
Western European norm (see TABLE 3.4 and TABLE 3.5). Most contemporary radical
left parties tend to have a quite heterogeneous social composition, encompassing in
various proportions employed wage workers, pensioners and other inactives, students,
unemployed and professionals. Moreover, the organic links with the organised
workers' movement tend to follow a declining parable. Nevertheless, employed blue-
collar and white-collar tend to remain largely over-represented among their ranks and
the main target of their organising efforts.
The PDS, on the contrary, had from the start a different core constituency: the highly
educated but downward-mobile sections of the former GDR elite. The party never
managed to gain a stable foothold in the Western regions, which made up at most less
than 5% of its members and less than 22% of its voters. As a consequence of its nature
of successor party of the SED, it also elicited a strong initial hostility from blue-collar
workers, which had been among the key protagonists of the 1989-90 revolution
97
(Gehrke & Hürtgen, 2001; Dale, 2006). This gap was partially mended through the role
of the party in the 1992-1993 wave of industrial struggle but never entirely
disappeared. Altogether, PDS members remained overwhelmingly over-60 pensioners
with a bureaucratic or intellectual background, while PDS voters represented a fairly
balanced cross-section of the Eastern population (except for blue-collar workers) with
the addition of a small Western appendix (skewed toward wage workers and
unemployed).
The post-2005 shift has significantly changed this situation, partially re-aligning the
sociology of DIE LINKE with the broader radical left standards. The Western regions,
although still much weaker than the Eastern ones, have seen their weight rise to 37.9%
of the members and 55.5% of the voters (2009). The new Western members were
predominantly employed wage workers or unemployed and thus rejuvenated the
overall profile of the party. Blue-collar workers became more likely to vote for DIE
LINKE than the rest of the population. These developments, however, were mostly
determined by the dynamism in the West; indeed, the party remains a largely dual
entity. In the West it represents a development of the WASG: a dynamic point of
attraction for broad left forces (former SPD, PDS, Greens and far-left supporters),
dominated by men of the central age cohorts, with an over-representation of lower
class backgrounds. In the East it remains a renamed PDS, with a declining membership
dominated by gender-balanced and aging former SED members and a composite
electorate mirroring the local population.
98
TABLE 3.4 SOCIOLOGY OF MEMBERS
PDS 1991
PDS 1998
PDS 2000
DIE LINKE 2009
N.
172,579
94,627
83,478
78,046
GENDER
adm
adm
adm
adm
Male
56.1%
54.0%
54.4%
62.8%
Female
43.9%
46.0%
45.6%
37.2%
AREA
adm
adm
adm
adm
East
99.7%
96.7%
95.1%
62.0%
West
0.3%
3.1%
4.7%
37.9%
Other
0.0%
0.2%
0.2%
0.1%
AGE
poll
poll
adm
poll
18-30
10.6%
1.8%
31-60
49.7%
31.2%
61+
39.7%
67.0%
18-34
2%
7%
35-49
13%
17%
50-64
25%
30%
65-79
52%
31%
80+
8%
16%
EDUCATION
poll
poll
poll
poll
Below 10 years
32.2%
40%
30.3%
37%
Secondary
5.1%
5%
4.2%
17%
University
62.7%
54%
65.3%
46%
PROFESSION
poll
poll
poll
poll
Active population
24.5%
Employed wage worker
19.3%
21.2%
28.9%
Blue-collar
4.4%
3.9%
6.5%
White-collar
14.5%
6.9%
10.9%
Civil servant
0.4%
10.4%
11.6%
Unemployed and
assimilated
26.9%
5.0%
6.5%
8.0%
Independent
7.2%
1.9%
5.5%
Employer and
self-employed
3.4%
1.4%
4.1%
Professional
3.8%
0.5%
1.4%
Inactive
46.6%
73.0%
68.9%
58.0%
Pensioner
41.3%
70.0%
63.8%
53.0%
Student
-
1.0%
2.8%
4.0%
Other
5.3%
2.0%
2.3%
1.0%
RELIGION
poll
poll
Catholic
1%
7%
Protestant
2%
11%
Other
1%
3%
None
97%
79%
ACTIVISM (subjective)
poll
poll
Very active
4%
8%
Fairly active
28%
28%
Not very active
52%
48%
Not active
16%
16%
Sources: my elaboration from ISDA (1991), Chrapa and Wittich (2001), Spier et al. (2011) and Niedermayer (2012).
Notes: adm: administrative data. Poll: poll data.
99
TABLE 3.5 SOCIOLOGY OF VOTERS (COMPOSITION)
PDS
1990
PDS
1994
PDS
1998
PDS
2002
L.PDS
2005
DIE LINKE
2009
N.
1,129,578
2,066,176
2,515,454
1,916,702
4,118,194
5,155,933
GENDER
poll
poll
poll
rw
rw
rw
Male
56.1%
49.9%
50.0%
51.6%
54.5%
54.2%
Female
43.9%
50.1%
50.0%
46.4%
45.5%
45.8%
AREA
adm
adm
adm
adm
adm
adm
East
90.3%
83.7%
83.0%
78.5%
56.4%
44.5%
West
9.7%
12.3%
17.0%
21.5%
43.6%
55.5%
AGE
poll
poll
poll
rw
rw
rw
18-24
16.7%
25-29
12.9%
30-39
21.6%
40-49
17.0%
50-59
12.4%
60+
19.4%
18-24
12.0%
11.0%
7.5%
7.3%
7.0%
25-34
22.8%
18.0%
11.2%
10.5%
10.3%
35-44
19.7%
24.0%
20.0%
20.4%
16.0%
45-59
24.7%
26.0%
28.8%
33.3%
36.5%
60+
20.8%
21.0%
32.5%
28.6%
30.2%
EDUCATION
poll
poll
poll
Below 10 years
58.3%
66.7%
64.9%
Secondary
16.7%
15.6%
19.1%
University
25.0%
17.7%
16.0%
PROFESSION
poll
poll
poll
poll
Active population
Employed wage
worker
49.9%
48.4%
52.6%
50.9%
Blue-collar
17.9%
19.3%
23.5%
22.5%
White-collar
29.4%
25.7%
26.6%
25.7%
Civil servant
2.6%
3.5%
2.5%
2.6%
Unemployed
12.0%
11.6%
16.1%
8.0%
Independent
5.1%
5.3%
3.7%
5.1%
Inactive
33.0%
34.7%
27.6%
36.0%
Pensioner
21.0%
26.3%
20.0%
Other
12.0%
8.4%
16.0%
RELIGION
poll
poll
poll
poll
Catholic
6.6%
7.3%
13.7%
18.7%
Protestant
14.4%
20.8%
26.3%
30.8%
None
79.0%
71.9%
60.0%
50.5%
Sources: my elaboration from BWL (2002, 2005, 2009) and FGW (1990, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2005, 2009).
Notes: adm: administrative data. Poll: poll data. Rw: representative Wahlstatistik.
100
Organisationally, the PDS and DIE LINKE are exemplary models of the shifts undertaken
by most European radical left parties: a complete overhaul of internal democracy and
pluralism; the winding-up of workplace-based forms of organisation; the loss of
members and membership density; the move from a hegemonic toward a
collaborative attitude toward social movements and civil society organisations; the
consolidation of the influence of the party in public office vis-à-vis that in central
office.
The key features of the SED organisation (Herbst et al., 1997) were quickly dismantled
in the immediate post-1989 years, leaving behind a largely transformed party (Gerner,
1994; Neugebauer & Stöss, 1996). The PDS was re-organised along the principles of
delegate democracy, with regular competitive selections of congress delegates (every
two years) and electoral candidates by the members, plus elements of direct (binding
referenda) and network (thematic groups, non-members participation) democracy. It
also adopted a "broad left" model aimed at integrating the widest possible spectrum
of traditions and sensibilities, chose to privilege pluralism and tolerance over political
coherence and institutionalised wide-ranging rights of individual members and of
political or thematic tendencies. It dissolved paramilitary and workplace cells and
replaced them with neighbourhood-based territorial cells.
These changes, both a spontaneous reaction to the oppressive nature of Stalinist
bureaucratic centralism and a necessary adaptation to the West German laws and
practices, largely failed to make the party attractive as a place of activist engagement:
most young and middle-aged members left in the 1990-1993 crisis; the remaining
membership was dominated old cadres – now mostly pensioners – organised in close-
knit cells which proved remarkably unsuitable for new recruits. For the same reason,
the party was largely cut off from any meaningful avenue of trade union and
workplace intervention. At the same time, the discipline, commitment and local
embeddedness of its remaining activists made them a fundamental resource for the
electoral, institutional and societal representation of the diffuse interests of the East
German population.
The establishment of DIE LINKE represented in this sense a qualitative shift: the party
finally managed to gain the (thin) coverage of the Western regions which had eluded
its predecessor; its Western structures, based not on local cells but on district
branches, were less active and effective but more welcoming to new recruits; the links
101
with trade unions and social movements were strengthened. This notwithstanding, the
balance between electoral and social rootedness became more and more skewed
toward the former, as membership growth remained small and did not keep up the
huge gains in votes.
Strategically, the politics of the PDS, WASG and DIE LINKE were all predicated on the
idea of contributing to the establishment of a large anti-neoliberal counter-hegemonic
coalition which, through a combination of electoral, parliamentary and extra-
parliamentary pressures, would in the mid-term pull the mainstream centre-left
parties (SPD and Greens) to the left and create the conditions for a new progressive
centre-left alliance and a "change of direction" (Richtungswechsel) in socio-economic
and foreign policy (Brie, 2000, 2003 and 2007; Krämer, 2004). This strategy was
confronted with the familiar dilemma of the contemporary European radical left. On
the one hand, the strengthening of the radical left was primarily dependent on a direct
competition with the (rightward moving) moderate left over its traditional left-wing
supporters: i.e. on "filling the vacuum" left by its adaptation to neoliberalism, first by
gaining the confidence of the East German population and then by encroaching on the
Western working class and post-materialist constituencies. On the other hand, this
risked either to benefit the "greater evil" of the right (if no centre-left alliance could be
established) or to dent the anti-neoliberal credentials of the radical left (if the latter
agreed to support centre-left governments which did not move toward a more
progressive path).
In the case of Germany, the parties of the radical left have largely been shielded from
the need to make the kind of hard tactical and strategic choices which have so
damaged their Italian and French counterparts. Up to 1998 the PDS mainly presented
itself as a lone opposition against the Western-dominated, neoliberal and militaristic
policies embraced by the mainstream parties. At the same time, it was careful to
minimise the pressure of an anti-right tactical voting by claiming that a growth of the
party was the best way to ensure a "pressure from the left" on the political system
(PDS, 1994 and 1998) and by hinting that, if the situation would require it, it would not
102
stand in the way of a minority SPD-Green governmental alternative.
68
From 1998 to
2009 PDS, WASG and DIE LINKE had a relatively easy game in pointing out the
"betrayals" of the SPD leadership and exploiting the dissatisfaction against its most
unpopular decisions. Only after 2009 the terrain became more delicate, as the tension
between hostility toward the SPD and the aspiration toward a common front of the
centre-left became more acute.
The dual image of a party of coherent yet non-sectarian anti-neoliberal opposition,
providing a useful leftward pull on the mainstream left, was preserved by two lucky
factors. Firstly, the national SPD always remained adamant in its refusal to seat to the
bargaining table with the PDS and DIE LINKE for the purpose of the establishment of a
red-red-green governmental majority. Secondly, the radical left never actually proved
determinant to form a centre-left governmental majority, with one exception.
Although they rarely won a majority of the valid votes (with the exception of 1990),
both the centre-right bloc (1994 and 2009) and the centre-left one (1998 and 2002)
generally managed to win an independent parliamentary majority, thanks to a
combination of the effects of the 5% electoral threshold and of the possibility of
obtaining overhang seats (Überhangmandate) through the constituency vote.
69
The
only situation when the support of the radical left was mathematically needed to form
a centre-left majority obtained in 2005: this possibility, however, was quickly ruled out
by the SPD which went on to form a grand coalition with its conservative rival CDU-
CSU. Thus, PDS and DIE LINKE were prevented from ever being sucked into actual
experiences of governmental participation at the national level, which proved so
destructive for its French (1981-1984 and 1997-2002) and Italian (1997-2001 and 2006-
2008) counterparts, while at the same time being able to shift the blame for the failed
co-operation on the stubbornness of the SPD.
68
The often employed formula was that a change will "not fail because of us" (an uns nicht scheitern),
signalling a readiness to provide an initial external support; for one of the earliest instances see Spiegel
(28.03.1994).
69
The latter mechanism was declared inconstitutional and removed before the 2013 election.
103
3.3 Filling the vacuum: potential and limits of the
radical left mobilisation
The hopes of the German radical left, as elsewhere in Europe, were pinned on the so-
called "vacuum thesis" (Abromeit, 1992 and 1993; Neugebauer & Stöss, 1998, 1999,
2002; Brie, 2000 and 2007; Patton, 2006; Nachtwey & Spier, 2007; Nachtwey, 2009).
The general political, social and intellectual climate had been unfavourable to the left
since the late Seventies and the aftershocks of the crisis and collapse of the Soviet bloc
had accentuated this condition, affecting to various degrees both the established
communist parties and the non-Stalinist far left. The roots of this long-term decline are
to be found in the defeat and recuperation of the post-1968 wave of labour militancy
and in the inability of the left to respond effectively to the concomitant restructuring
of the productive system.
This notwithstanding, the mid-Nineties seemed to pave the way for a recovery based
on the brutality of neoliberal reforms, growing discontent and resistance against them
and a quick rightward shift of the established centre-left parties, which allegedly left a
political vacuum of political representation of traditional left-wing themes and
constituencies. In the German context several themes seemed to lend themselves to a
mobilisation on the part of the radical left, as the discrepancy between significant
popular interest and disregard by the mainstream political system presented potential
"representation gaps" (Vertretungslücken) to be exploited.
The first one was the issue of East German interests. As Heidrun Abromeit (1992 and
1993) has convincingly shown, the mechanics of the 1990 unification led to a structural
disregard for the peculiar problems and concerns of the population of those regions,
which could hardly find a voice through the ("Bonn") mainstream parties. A regional
left-wing party such as the PDS could provide a logical corrective to this situation
(Neller & Thaidigsmann, 2002).
The second one was social justice. This was the traditional core issue of the SPD,
encompassing both working class interests and broader welfare state provisions. As
the party sharply turned to the right after the first year in office (1999) and again after
104
the 2002 electoral victory, this could provide the opportunity for the establishment of
a significant radical left force in the Western regions.
Finally, the issue of pacifism was deeply felt on both sides of the country and the post-
1990 turn toward an activist military politics (in particular the 1999 Kosovo war and
the 2001-present Afghanistan war) represented another promising area to win over
disaffected ecologist and social democratic supporters.
How did the German radical left fare in this respect? Did the vacuum theory make
sense? To what extent and why were the parties able to fill the relevant
representation gaps? What were the limits of this strategy?
The following section will explore these questions by discussing the empirical contours
of the alleged vacuum on the left (sub-section 3.3.1) and the results of the electoral
(sub-section 3.3.2) and organisational (sub-section 3.3.3) mobilisation of the parties of
the German radical left.
105
3.3.1 Contours of the vacuum
There is no doubt that the German political system, like its main European
counterparts, has been evolving since the Eighties in a clear rightward direction.
Firstly, state-owned corporations – always comparatively weaker than in Italy or
France – were gradually dismantled and/or aligned with shareholder models of
corporate governance (Rösler, 1994; Mayer, 2006; Beyer & Höpner, 2003) while the
number of state employees was significantly reduced.
The process of privatisation of state-owned companies was started in the mid-Eighties
by the centre-right (VEBA, Volkswagen and Lufthansa). The 1990 unification led to its
sudden acceleration. In the East, the Treuhandanstalt oversaw in four years the
restructuring and privatisation of the near-totality of the local industrial sector; its
follow-up organisms (BvS, TLG and BVVG), carried on with the gradual sale of Eastern
real estate and agricultural land. In the West, centre-right and centre-left governments
went on to partially or entirely privatise most of the remaining state-owned
enterprises, including the key service providers Deutsche Post and Deutsche Telekom.
Since the late Noughties only one large enterprise remains under full state ownership
(Deutsche Bahn)
70
; minority participations exist in other important companies (KfW,
Deutsche Post and Deutsche Telekom). The role of regional and local governments,
however, remains strong in the banking sector, with Landesbanken and Sparkassen
retaining about a third of the market share.
More generally, since unification the public sector employment has also been
drastically reduced. This number reached its peak in 1990, when the two German
states employed more than 7 million people, but was cut to 5.4 million in 1995 and 4.6
million in 2005, stabilising afterwards (DESTATIS, 2013).
Secondly, welfare state reform followed a path of "managed austerity" (Vail, 2010)
involving both a preservation of overall state provisions and their selective
rationalisation and neoliberal recalibration. Key measures were the pension reforms of
1992, 2000 and 2006 and the labour market reforms of 2003-2005 (Agenda 2010). It is
70
The 1994 railway reform transferred most of the personnel of the sector from public to private
employment contracts, but the new company (Deutsche Bahn AG) remained 100% controlled by the
state. The planned privatisation was shelved in 2008 due to the adverse financial climate.
106
notable that all but the first were drafted by social democratic ministers, either in
centre-left or in grand coalition cabinets (Beck & Scherrer, 2005; Nachtwey, 2013).
Thirdly, the traditional restraint of the country in military foreign policy was reversed
in the early Nineties by a more assertive stance (Meiers, 2010), which led to the
participation to a series of minor NATO operations and to two full-fledged armed
conflicts (Kosovo in 1999 and Afghanistan from 2001 onwards). Both the SPD in 1992
and the Greens in 1998 abandoned their previous opposition to out-of-area military
missions – in the second case by breaching one of their founding values, pacifism.
Fourthly, and most importantly, existing political parties have been less and less able
to rely on the main promise of the German market economy, i.e. the fact that an
embedded liberal capitalism could be harnessed to distribute the benefits of the
economic growth to all sectors of the population.
The issue of mass unemployment, which skyrocketed for the first time with the 1982
crisis, was never satisfactorily tackled. The unemployment rate rose to 7-8% of the
active population in the Eighties and to 9-12% in the following fifteen years. Only after
2006 did it start to significantly improve.
71
GDP growth continued to slow down from the very high levels of the Sixties and
Seventies to a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 2.7% in the business cycle
1982-1993, 1.5% in 1993-2003 and 0.7% in 2003-2009. Wages did worse, moving from
slow growth in the first two periods (CAGR 1.1% and 0.7%) to stagnation/decline after
2003 (-0.2%).
Overall, the unbalances of the reunification, high unemployment and deregulating
labour market reforms led to a sharp decline of the share of wages on the GDP, a
tendential stagnation of average labour incomes, a growth of real and perceived
inequalities (Glatzer, 2009) and a dualisation of the labour market, with an enormous
expansion of low-wage and precarious employment (Eichhorst & Marx, 2009).
Core left-wing themes – social justice, state regulation, pacifism – were increasingly
neglected, rejected or redefined in the propaganda of the SPD and Greens (Walter,
2007; Klein & Falter, 2003; Nachtwey, 2013); the traditional social democratic
constituencies – industrial workers, lower-middle social strata – did not seem to gain
much from their term in office; the East bore the brunt of mass unemployment and
71
Largely because of the shift of many former unemployed toward a mix of irregular jobs and welfare
subsidies.
107
labour market reforms. This seemed indeed to be a fertile terrain for the emergence of
new left-wing challengers.
A shift of the political system, however, does not necessarily create a representation
gap. On the one hand, the change might simply reflect or accompany a similar shift in
public opinion – in our case, the strengthening of a new neoliberal hegemony. On the
other hand, it might result in a passive acquiescence of the population, which either
sees the developments as inevitable or cannot envisage meaningful ways to counter it.
Existing electoral and opinion poll data seem to indicate that, in fact, the disconnection
between sectors of the German population and the party system did grow and was at
least in part due to a growing dissatisfaction "on the left".
Firstly, the support for "establishment" parties (CDU-CSU, SPD and FDP) has been
constantly eroding since the early Eighties, with particularly steep declines in the
periods 1983-1993 and 2005-2009 (TABLE 3.6). Their share of the total electorate fell
from 86.0% in 1980 to 49.8% in 2009, to the benefit of abstentions and of new parties,
while their capacity to develop a feeling of identification (GESIS poll data) followed the
same trend, from 78.8% in 1980 to 47.5% in 2011.
FIGURE 3.6 SUPPORT FOR ESTABLISHMENT PARTIES
Sources: my elaboration from Bundeswahlleiter and GESIS.
Notes: share of total electorate.
Secondly, the weight of traditional left-wing beliefs, far from decreasing, was rather on
the rise (TABLE 3.7 and 3.8).
108
FIGURE 3.7 LEFT-WING OPINION, SIZE
Sources: my elaboration from GESIS.
FIGURE 3.8 LEFT-WING OPINION, NET BALANCE
Sources: my elaboration from GESIS.
Notes: positive minus negative responses.
The difference between people identifying as left-of-the-centre and their opponents
shifted from negative values in the Eighties (1983: -8.0%) to positive values afterwards
(2006: +12.4%). Germans became more and more likely to consider existing social
differences as unfair rather than fair (1984: +3.2%; 2008: +45.2%) and socialism as "a
good idea badly implemented" rather than a bad idea (1992: -11%; 2007: +22%).
Crucially, the difference between those supporting an expansion of the welfare state
and those wishing its cut-back tended to be largely positive (1990-2007 average:
+13.4%), with the only exception in the period 2000-2004. Other questions of the
109
ALLBUS
72
survey point out to a post-1989 trend toward growing perceptions of social
injustice and conflicts of interests, criticism of capitalism and support for welfarist and
redistributive measures (Petersen 2007; Glatzer, 2009; Köcher, 2012).
Both developments reached an extremely pronounced extent in the former GDR area,
as social grievances overlapped with regional ones.
Thus, a growing area of dissatisfaction around socio-economic grievances could be
identified among the middle-lower strata of German society. It was up to the radical
left to offer them a credible perspective, winning them over from either traditional
support for the status quo or political disengagement.
72
Questions V150, V155, V156, V160, V163, V175, V176, V177, V178, V179, V180, V181, V211.
110
3.3.2 Electoral mobilisation
To what extent was the attempt of the German radical left to fill the electoral
dimension of the vacuum successful?
Successes
Over the whole period 1990-2009 the main parties of the radical left (PDS, WASG and
DIE LINKE) followed a path of sustained growth, soaring from 1,129,578 votes (2.4% of
valid votes; 1.9% of the total electorate) to 5,155,933 votes (11.9% and 8.3%). It is easy
to show that this happened precisely because they managed to partially fill
"representation gaps" which had opened between the established parliamentary
parties and specific sectors of the population: the East/West conflict and the issue of
social justice (Brie, 2000 and 2007).
Schematically, this development followed two distinct phases. In the Nineties the PDS
recovered a mass support in the East, benefitting from the adverse consequences of
the CDU-led reunification process. In the Noughties, on the other hand, the PDS-WASG
alliance and then DIE LINKE managed to win a mid-sized support in the West,
exploiting the rift of Schröder's SPD with its traditional working class constituency
(FIGURE 3.9).
In the first phase (1990-1998) the gains of the PDS were concentrated on the former
GDR territory, where the party doubled its December 1990 votes and became a well
rooted political force; in the West its influence remained very small (Meuche-Mäker,
2005).
At the first free Volkskammer elections on 18 March 1990 the party obtained 16.4% of
valid votes. While facing a marked hostility from most social categories – especially
from the industrial working class, which had been at the forefront of the anti-SED
revolution (Gehrke & Hürtgen, 2001; Dale, 2006) – it could still muster the support of
large sections of the former bureaucracy and of former SED members, which had
111
benefitted from the old regime and viewed its downfall as a threat of severe
downward social mobility (Jung, 1990; Solga, 1995; Goedicke, 2003).
FIGURE 3.9 ELECTORAL RESULTS, EAST/WEST
Sources: Bundeswahlleiter.
Notes: shares of valid votes and absolute number of votes. V1990: votes obtained in the March 1990 Volkskammer election (GDR).
The aftershocks of the local revolutionary process and the prospect of unification
seemed to doom the party to a quick disappearance. In the following months its share
of votes slid to 14.6% on 9 May (local elections), 12.7% in October-December (regional
elections) and 11.1% on 2 December (Bundestag election). Since 1992, however, the
fortunes of the party revived. It recovered its support among the former bureaucracy
(now active in white-collar professions, early-retired or unemployed), which was
indeed being significantly discriminated against in the new republic. It also managed to
112
reach out to broader layers of the Eastern population, which started to feel deceived
by the contrast between the early promises of a rapid socio-economic improvement
and the realities of a permanently under-developed area. In particular, the
involvement of the PDS in the massive 1992-1993 wave of workplace and public outcry
against the policies of the Treuhand (Garms, 1994; Gehrke, 1997) markedly improved
its image, partially mending its antagonistic relationship with the local working class.
By 1998 the party reached its temporary high point (2,054,773 votes, 21.6%),
recovering the early losses to the SPD and scoring significant gains from CDU-CSU and
new voters.
In the second phase (1998-2009), on the other hand, the gains of the radical left were
concentrated in the West, among traditional SPD voters.
Despite promising conditions, the PDS initially failed to profit from the rightward shift
of the seating centre-left cabinet and actually suffered a heavy setback in the 2002
elections. The subsequent events, however, changed this situation. The labour market
reforms of the second Schröder cabinet provoked a rift between the SPD leadership
and its traditional working class constituency, which found its expression in vigorous
public criticism, a cycle of mass street mobilisation and the establishment of a new
left-wing splinter party, the WASG. The PDS-WASG electoral alliance, led by Oskar
Lafontaine, massively profited from this climate and soared to 4,118,194 votes (8.7%)
in the 2005 elections. This upward trend continued during the following legislature,
when the merger of the two groups into a new party (DIE LINKE) could boast its role as
the only "social" opposition against the policies of the CDU-SPD grand coalition and
further rose to 5,155,933 votes (11.9%).
This represented a qualitative shift for the German radical left. Firstly, the East/West
imbalance persisted but was largely attenuated and DIE LINKE became a small but real
political alternative to the SPD in the Western regions. Secondly, the atypical social
profile of the PDS was replaced by a more typical radical left one, with strong results
among blue-collar workers and incredible scores among the unemployed (TABLE 3.10).
113
FIGURE 3.10 ELECTORAL RESULTS, SELECTED SOCIAL GROUPS
Sources: my elaboration from FGW (1998, 2002, 2005 and 2009).
Thirdly, the main electoral competitor switched from the CDU to the SPD, again
aligning with a more typical European pattern of intra-left competition. In the period
2002-2009, for instance, the net electoral exchange between PDS/DIE LINKE and SPD
marked a shift of almost 2.1 million voters toward the former (TABLE 3.11).
In 2013, however, DIE LINKE fell back roughly to the levels of 2005 with 3,755,699
votes (8.6%).
TABLE 3.11 NET ELECTORAL FLUXES
PDS
V1990
PDS
1990
PDS
1994
PDS
1998
PDS
2002
L.PDS
2005
DIE LINKE
2009
CHANGE
1990-2009
Votes
1,892,329
1,129,578
2,066,176
2,515,454
1,916,702
4,118,194
5,155,933
+4,026,355
GERMANY
SPD
-241,000
236,000
80,000
-290,000
970,000
1,100,000
2,096,000
Greens
6,000
110,000
40,000
0
240,000
140,000
530,000
CDU-CSU
-46,000
183,000
90,000
-50,000
280,000
40,000
543,000
FDP
-66,000
109,000
10,000
-20,000
100,000
-20,000
179,000
Other
6,000
77,000
-50,000
20,000
90,000
0
137,000
VOTERS
-341,000
715,000
170,000
-340,000
1,680,000
1,260,000
3,485,000
Abstention
-440,000
153,000
190,000
-260,000
430,000
-300,000
213,000
Replacement
46,000
69,000
60,000
-40,000
80,000
30,000
199,000
Migration
-28,000
2,000
10,000
-10,000
10,000
30,000
42,000
NON-VOTERS
-422,000
224,000
260,000
-310,000
520,000
-240,000
454,000
TOTAL
-763,000
939,000
430,000
-650,000
2,200,000
1,020,000
3,939,000
EAST
SPD
-253,000
178,000
50,000
-310,000
380,000
320,000
618 000
Greens
-61,000
76,000
30,000
-10,000
30,000
30,000
156 000
CDU-CSU
-47,000
163,000
130,000
-40,000
100,000
-30,000
323 000
FDP
-69,000
94,000
10,000
-20,000
30,000
-10,000
104 000
Other
12,000
41,000
-40,000
10,000
10,000
10,000
31 000
VOTERS
-418,000
552,000
180,000
-370,000
550,000
320,000
1 232 000
Abstention
-446,000
112,000
160,000
-160,000
200,000
-330,000
- 18 000
Replacement
15,000
49,000
20,000
-50,000
20,000
-30,000
9 000
Migration
-30,000
-2,000
-20,000
-30,000
0
10,000
- 42 000
NON-VOTERS
-461,000
159,000
160,000
-240,000
220,000
-350,000
- 51 000
TOTAL
-879,000
711,000
340,000
-610,000
770,000
-30,000
1 181 000
WEST
SPD
12,000
58,000
30,000
20,000
590,000
780,000
1 478 000
Greens
67,000
34,000
10,000
10,000
210,000
110,000
374 000
CDU-CSU
1,000
20,000
-40,000
-10,000
180,000
70,000
220 000
FDP
3,000
15,000
0
0
70,000
-10,000
75 000
Other
-6,000
36,000
-10,000
10,000
80,000
-10,000
106 000
VOTERS
77,000
163,000
-10,000
30,000
1,130,000
940,000
2 253 000
Abstention
6,000
41,000
30,000
-100,000
230,000
30,000
231 000
Replacement
31,000
20,000
40,000
10,000
60,000
60,000
190 000
Migration
2,000
4,000
30,000
20,000
10,000
20,000
84 000
NON-VOTERS
39,000
65,000
100,000
-70,000
300,000
110,000
505 000
TOTAL
116,000
228,000
90,000
-40,000
1,430,000
1,050,000
2 758 000
Source: My elaboration from INFAS (1990, 1994), INFRATEST DIMAP (2002, 2005, 2009).
115
Limitations
Despite these undeniable successes, the radical left managed to tap only a small
portion of the theoretical vacuum opened up by the rightward shift of the SPD. Three
sets of data hint to this.
The first option is to compare of the total results of DIE LINKE to a variety of indicators
for left-wing opinion. In 2009 the party obtained 5.2 million of votes, 8.3% of the total
electorate (including abstentions and invalid votes). This share remained slightly lower
than that of people identifying as far-left or left-wing (10.6%) and less than a third of
that of people supporting an expansion of the welfare state (26.5%).
The second clue is provided by an analysis of the net electoral fluxes of the SPD in the
period 1998-2009 (TABLE 3.11). During that decade the SPD lost 10.2 million votes,
more than half of its initial total. Only 17.6% of the losses accrued to DIE LINKE; the
large majority went instead to the parties of the right (35.5%), to abstentions (24.2%),
to the Greens (14.8%) and to other kinds of change (7.8%).
The third possibility is to look at the sociological composition of the radical left
electorate (FIGURE 3.10). Despite the gains of the period the "natural" target
constituency of the left, i.e. employed wage workers, became only marginally more
likely than the rest of the population to support the radical left; the success among
blue-collar workers, in particular, was not matched by the results among white-collar
workers (which remained slightly below-average) and civil servants (which became
more and more hostile).
All indicators suggest that the potential electoral constituency of the party remained
much larger than its actual voters, particularly among people oscillating between a
centre-left vote (SPD and Greens) and abstentionism.
116
Intepretation
The interpretation of the electoral evolution of the German radical left is fairly
straightforward. The PDS first and DIE LINKE at a later stage succeeded in exploiting
two representation gaps which the establishment parties were less and less able to
cover: at first, a regionalised social cleavage in the East around the issues of socio-
economic marginalisation of the former bureaucracy and of large sectors of the
employed and welfare-dependent population (1990-1998); later, a nationalised social
cleavage across the country around the issues of social justice and defence of the
welfare state (1998-2009). Despite its limitations, it managed to expand its electoral
influence and grow from a small-sized regional force to a medium-sized national
challenger of the SPD.
The preconditions of this growth were largely not of its own making.
The gaps depended on a series of external factors over which radical left parties had
no influence: German unification, general trends in political economy and the
"neoliberal" turn of the SPD after 1998. The growing socio-economic grievances of
both East Germans and the Western working class were largely the result of the slow
rates of economic growth of the period, a hasty unification process, deliberate state
policies geared at containing wages and turning away from full employment and
redistributive aims and an overall weakness of the workers' response. The party which
was best placed to benefit from these developments was the SPD, the traditional party
of the working class and of socio-economic redistribution. And, indeed, it initially did
so, gaining over the period 1990-1998 4.6 million votes (7.5 percentage points) – with
particularly hefty gains in the former GDR territory –and coming to power in 1998. It
was only through its long period in office (1998-2009) that the party gradually
squandered its left-wing credentials and alienated large sections of its lower- and
middle- class support, thereby creating a significant space for the rise of other left-
wing competitors.
Given their fundamental socio-economic choices, there was not much that either the
CDU-CSU or the SPD could do to relieve the plight of the social groups which were
deserting them. Nevertheless, the extent of their losses could have been reduced by
117
more skilful policies. The SPD, in particular, repeatedly missed the chance of
neutralising the rising competition on its left. In 1990 large sections of the SED/PDS
were ready to join hands with the Eastern social democrats (SDP/SPD), but the refusal
of the latter to accept former SED members prevented the further disarticulation of
the newly-born PDS and provided the basis for its subsequent consolidation. In 2003-
2005 the party proved excessively intransigent in its defence of the Agenda 2010 in
face of a growing public opposition, thus giving the WASG an ample breathing space to
emerge and consolidate. The key mistake, however, was made in 2005: instead of
reviving its left-wing credential through a spell in the opposition it went on to form a
grand coalition with the CDU, which resulted four years later in its lowest score ever
(23.0%).
The fact that the radical left did manage to exploit, at least in part, these openings was
the outcome of the interplay of both external and internal factors. Part of it depended
on the behaviour of the SPD: in particular, the dogged refusal of the latter to envisage
any collaboration with it at the national level helped to preserve the social and
oppositional credentials of the party while minimising the blame for the failed co-
operation. Part of it was the result of the 29 September 1990 sentence of the
Constitutional Court (BVerfGE 82, 322) which, by introducing a temporary exception to
the 5% electoral threshold (to be calculated separately for the East and for the West),
enabled the PDS to acquire the crucial advantage of a representation in the national
parliament. On the other hand, the core leadership group of the PDS (in particular
Gregor Gysi, Lothar Bisky and the Brie brothers) can claim a significant amount of
credit for this success, as it proved capable to ensure the survival of the party during
the 1989-90 transition, endow it with an attractive broad left programme, preserve its
unity (1990-91, 2003, 2010-2012), develop a constructive relationship with the social
movements (1992-1993, 2003-2005) and invest its resources in broader projects of left
regroupment (1990, 2005-2007).
What prevented the German radical left from exploiting more fully the disillusionment
with the traditional mass parties and, in particular, from replacing the SPD as the main
left-wing party?
118
A first factor was the nature of the PDS as the legal successor of the SED, which
inevitably connected it with the historical legacy of that discredited authoritarian
regime.
73
While the efforts of the party to critically assess the GDR experience and to
distance itself from its negative aspects were sustained and broadly sincere, its
opponents had an easy task in pointing out to the continuities in the biographies of
party leaders and members (notably, the issue of past contacts with the Stasi) and to
its tight relations with the milieu of the former bureaucracy. Although attempts to
mobilise anti-communist biases against the PDS fell flat in the East they remained quite
effective in the West, contributing to its highly negative image among the population
(see FIGURE 3.12).
74
A second factor was the lack of roots of the PDS in the West (Neu, 2000; Meuche-
Mäker, 2005). This proved to be an insurmountable obstacle for the party which, by
failing to attract any significant number of Western members and activists, always
remained "spiritually, politically and socially a foreign body" in the region (Brie, 2000:
12), reaching at its peak in 1998 just 442,136 votes (1.2%). This was by no means a
small achievement, as it went well beyond anything that the West German far left had
done since the mid-Sixties; it represented however an upper ceiling which proved
impossible to break and which left little hope of benefitting from the emergence of
disaffected SPD or Green voters. The creation of the WASG (2004) and the merger in
DIE LINKE (2007) for the first time enabled the radical left to appear as a small but
credible political force in the Western regions, and this shift led to growing electoral
successes in the period 2005-2009: in general elections the party soared to almost
three million votes (8.3%) while in regional elections it managed to cross the 5%-
threshold in six of the ten Western regional parliaments. The roots of the new party,
however, remained tenuous, exposing it to rapid changes in the behaviour of its more
peripheral recent supporters.
73
This dimension is eviscerated at length in a highly hostile strand of scholarly (Moreau et al., 1994;
Moreau, 1998; Lang, 2003; Neu, 2004; Jesse & Lang, 2008) and popular (Knabe, 2008) literature.
74
In the East, negative opinions of the party rapidly fell from 61.3% in 1991 to 43.6% in 1994, stabilising
afterwards; in the West, they never fell under 62% (2008). Similarly, positive opinions of the party
reached around 40% in the East (since 1994) but in the West never exceeded 11% for the PDS (2001)
and 19.8% for DIE LINKE (2008). The high levels of extremely negative opinions point to the fact that the
much of this rejection was not so much programmatic but rather of a more fundamental and emotive
nature.
119
FIGURE 3.12 PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD THE PDS, EAST/WEST
Source: my elaboration from GESIS.
Notes: opinion polls.
120
The key element, however, was probably what I would call the "weight of tradition".
Lipset and Rokkan (1967) were the first to point out to the tendential "freezing" of
European party systems around the cleavage structure of the Twenties; subsequent
research (Rose & Urwin, 1970; Mair, 1993; Drummond, 2006) has discussed the
hypothesis of a "de-freezing" since the Eighties, while confirming that "old" parties are
generally fairly successful in adapting to new circumstances and that radical change
does not occur but in exceptional moments of social and political crisis (e.g. the 1992-
1994 crisis in Italy). In the German case, we should point out to three factors
counterweighing the tendency toward the decline of the traditional parties.
Firstly, a natural wariness of people to give up long-lasting political allegiances forged
in the formative period and consolidated by the subsequent experience of an effective
ideal and material representation. While undeniably not very effective in securing
economic growth and social welfare in the neoliberal era, traditional parties can
nevertheless still draw much delayed benefit, especially among the older age cohorts
75
,
from their past policies and their long-term effects.
Secondly, the dense networks of sub-cultural organisations and clienteles which the
major parties created over decades are without doubt rapidly losing their political
coherence, size and influence but nevertheless remain a brake against change. In the
case of the SPD, the fact that almost the entirety of the leadership of the traditional
workers' movement (the trade union DGB, the mass organisations AWO, VdK, SoVD,
KOS and DMB, part of the cooperative umbrella DGRV) stood by the party during its
recent crisis – albeit in an often critical manner – is of a great immediate and
perspective political importance, as it provides a good foundation for a future
recovery.
Thirdly, by virtue of their position and resources the two main parties (CDU-CSU and
SPD) are still partially able to "polarise" the competition as a choice between only two
realistic programmes and candidates for chancellor, thereby rallying around them a
large number of wavering potential supporters which just want to bar the way to the
larger evil. Moreover, while the scope for consolidating their support while in office
75
The share of valid votes of CDU-CSU, SPD and FDP fell by 27.7 percentage points between 1972 and
2009 (99.1% to 71.4%). The decline is however stronger among the younger generations and weaker
among the older ones: -39.5 points among voters aged 18-25 (99.1% to 59.6%), -31.6 points among
voters aged 45-60 (98.8% to 67.2%), -17.0 points among over-60 voters (98.9% to 81.9%).
121
with redistributive policies is decreasing, the parties are still able to regain part of the
lost votes through a shift to the opposition. True, the emergence of stable (FDP,
Greens) or potential (PDS/DIE LINKE) allies has gradually reduced their room for
manoeuvre in this sense, as disaffected voters may now opt for a smaller alternative
without the risk of favouring the rival camp. However, a veritable collapse of their
electorates occurred only in 2005-2009, when they de-emphasised the left-right divide
by entering a grand coalition. The subsequent restoration of the traditional pattern of
competition is likely to at least in part make up for the lost ground.
So long as it remains a minor player with shallow civil society roots, therefore, the
German radical left will be exposed to the danger of swift oscillations of its support
toward the SPD (tactical voting) or toward abstentionism (disengagement). The
improvement of 1990-1998 among these two categories, for instance, was almost
entirely wiped out in 2002; the gains of the period 2002-2009, similarly, were partially
reversed by the 2013 setback.
122
3.3.3 Organisational mobilisation
While the German radical left was fairly successful in expanding in the electoral
dimension of the vacuum which opened up among the deceived traditional
constituencies the SPD and, in the Eastern regions of the country, of the CDU (Eastern
blue-collar workers), the same cannot be said for the organisational dimension of the
vacuum. The dense societal linkages of the German mass parties (Volksparteien) have
been eroding more rapidly than their own electorate; this notwithstanding, the
German radical left has failed to provide a solid alternative. The following section is
devoted to the discussion of the two key facets of this issue, party membership and
social linkages.
Party membership
Like their counterparts in Western Europe, the German mass parties have suffered a
strong long-term decline in their membership levels which set in during the Eighties,
continued in the Nineties (with the brief exception of 1990, due to the massive influx
of new Eastern members) and accelerated after 1999 (FIGURE 3.13). Over the period
1990-2011, for instance, the CDU-CSU lost 34.4% of its members and the SPD 48.1%.
Unlike the Greens, the PDS/DIE LINKE did not benefit from this situation and did even
worse than its rivals, falling in absolute terms by 75.3% (from 280,882 members in
1990 to 69,458 in 2011). In terms of penetration ratios (members over voters, M/V),
they thus shifted from a membership-dense (1990: 24.9%) to an intermediate (2002:
3.7%) and thin (2009: 1.5%) kind of party formation. Other radical left organisations,
such as the orthodox DKP, followed the same trend.
76
76
According to intelligence data (Kailitz, 2004; BdI, 1991-2012), the fairly large DKP membership of the
late Eighties (42,000 in 1986, 34,000 in 1989) melted away after during fall of the Soviet bloc, leaving
behind only 8,000 members in 1992. After that year the decline continued at a slower but relentless
pace to 3,500 in 2013.
123
FIGURE 3.13 MEMBERSHIP LEVELS
Source: Niedermayer (2012).
The root of these problems lay in the origins of the PDS in the mass communist party
par excellence, the SED, which in 1988 encompassed 2.3 million members, around
18.5% of the GDR population. The initial choice to renew the party instead of
dissolving it enabled the PDS to preserve a core of dedicated activists, but was
followed only by a small fraction of its predecessor's members (280,882 in 1990;
131,406 in 1993). As it was, the remaining members were overwhelmingly over-50
pensioners or inactives coming from the former mid-ranking intelligentsia or
bureaucracy; ordinary members deserted the party and never came back. Since 1993,
thus, the main factor of the decline has been the natural process of aging and death of
its initial membership. Simultaneously, their replacement with new members has been
hindered by a series of factors: on the one hand, the general reluctance of the new
generations of the Western European population to join political parties, which are
seen as an outmoded form of political engagement and do not confer anymore the
ideational (sense of purpose and community) and material (policies, patronage)
benefits of the past; on the other hand, the distinctive organisational (tightly-knit small
124
"cells"), sociological (aged former bureaucrats) and geographical (overwhelmingly
Eastern) set-up of the party, which are not very welcoming and interesting for
newcomers.
A very important additional factor in decline has been the existence of widespread
institutionalised and informal practices of discrimination, whereby retaining or
acquiring the membership of an "extreme" party such as the PDS could be highly
detrimental for one's private life and career prospects. In the West, far-left members
were thoroughly purged from civil service by the Radikalenerlass of 1972 (Braunthal,
1990) and political vetting of new applicants and existing civil servants, albeit gradually
loosened after 1995, remains in place in many public institutions. In the East, after the
reunification the 2.1 million state employees were similarly vetted for the role they
played in the fallen regime (Keller & Henneberger, 1992; McAdams, 2001; Crossley-
Frolick, 2007). Although the number of people explicitly fired on political grounds,
because of past collaborations with the Stasi, appears to be small – only 42,062 cases
according to McAdams (2001) –, card-carrying PDS civil servants were singled out in
the waves of lay-offs, outsourcings and early retirements which rapidly downsized the
Eastern public sector workforce to 1,592,546 (1991), 861,155 (2001) and 722,602
(2008) employees.
77
More generally, the party continued to be categorised as
borderline "extremist" by the state authorities and therefore subjected to a constant
surveillance by the federal and regional political intelligence agencies
(Verfassungsschutz).
Despite serious efforts, these drawbacks proved to be insurmountable.
Even at times when PDS sympathisers and voters grew rapidly (1993-2001, 2003-
2007), its Eastern members continued to follow an inexorable decline.
The Western branches of the radical left parties were less burdened by the legacy of
the SED and did experience a general trend of modest membership growth,
78
peaking
at 4,708 members (2002) in the PDS, 11,250 members (2005) in the WASG and 29,551
members (2009) in DIE LINKE. The former mostly recruited among a small and
scattered far-left milieu; the latter for the first time managed to create a thin layer of
structures covering almost all Western administrative districts and to become
77
DESTATIS (2011), excluding people employed in Berlin.
78
With the exception of the periods 2003-2004 and 2010-2012.
125
attractive for significant numbers of far-leftists, social movement activists and
disaffected social democratic and green voters. The "successes", however, were of an
altogether limited magnitude. Firstly, while being more dynamic both in size and in
socio-demographic composition, Western branches organised a much lower ratio of
voters (PDS 1998: 0.68%; DIE LINKE 2009: 1.00%) than their Eastern counterparts.
Secondly, their growth was generally not strong enough to compensate the decline of
the rest of the party. As a consequence, total party membership increased only in
2004-2009 (from 61,385 of the PDS to 78,046 of DIE LINKE) and decline set in again
afterwards, wiping out almost the entire gains of the period (64,761 members in
2012).
Societal linkages
The crisis of the traditional mass parties was not restricted to their membership
decline, but also entailed a deep crisis of their traditional sub-cultural networks of
collateral and friendly organisations (von Winter, 2007).
This process had three dimensions: (i) a loss of members and supporters of the mass
organisations; (ii) their progressive autonomisation vis-à-vis their traditional political
references, leading to a less partisan and politicised public discourse; (iii) a loosening of
their ties with their own memberships, reflected in their decreased capacity to
command identification and to orient behaviour.
A good example is provided by the example of the trade union confederation DGB,
whose leadership was traditionally very close to the SPD. With regard to the first point
the DGB, after a momentary revival in 1991 when millions of Eastern workers swelled
its ranks, suffered a dramatic membership decline, falling from 11.8 million (1991) to
6.1 million (2010) members in absolute terms and from 35.5% to 18.3% of the
employed workforce in relative terms.
79
With regard to the second point, in 2002 the
confederation discontinued the traditional practice of offering explicit voting advice for
the SPD and at times (e.g. in 2003-2004) assumed fairly critical attitudes toward the
79
Visser (2013). As 15-20% of union members are not employed wage-workers (e.g. unemployed,
pensioners and students), the actual share should be even lower.
126
latter. With regard to the third point, the capacity of union leaders to mobilise their
followers also seems to be declining. On the industrial front, in 2003 the metalworkers'
union suffered the first defeat in a strike in fifty years (Schmidt, 2003). On the political
front, while the vast majority of union leaders and cadres are still card-carrying SPD
members the same cannot be said of union members, who since 1998 have left the
social democratic electorate at a faster pace than the rest of the population (from 56%
in 1998 to 33.5% in 2009).
The same dynamics have been at play in the array of SPD-friendly charities (AWO),
specialised associations (VdK, SoVD, DMB, KOS), companies (part of the DGRV
cooperative movement, the party press) and other friendly networks and organisations
– which encompass several hundred thousands of professional and semi-professional
collaborators and several million members.
The German radical left, despite its electoral surge, was not able to expand its
positions within civil society and social movement organisations and to become a
serious competitor of the SPD in this domain. The network of organisational linkages of
the PDS was largely destroyed in 1989-1991; subsequent efforts at strengthening the
ties with existing or new civil society organisations had real but limited positive results.
The gigantic network of mass organisations controlled by the SED largely dissolved
itself or merged with their Western counterparts, completely escaping to the influence
of the PDS and aligning with the new dominant parties CDU and SPD. In particular, the
influence of the party among the organised labour movement was shattered by the
consequences of revolution and of unification (Wilke & Müller, 1991; Loeding &
Rosenthal, 2001). The only notable exception was the charity Volkssolidarität (Winkler,
2010), which adopted a cross-party stance but remained politically quite close to the
PDS. Although rapidly declining (853,000 members in 1991; 538,000 in 1994; 276,000
in 2009), the organisation remained a social and economic powerhouse and gradually
came to dominate the German confederation of non-confessional charities (Der
Paritätische Wohlfahrtsverband, DPW).
The PDS did manage to forge close links with a series of new organisations created to
represent the interests and ideals of the former socialist bureaucracy (e.g. the ISOR),
which were strategically important for their dense legal and cultural work but never
gathered more than 40,000 members. Outside this milieu, the efforts of the party
127
tended to fall flat. Friendly Eastern civil society organisations
80
remained fairly small
and not very influential. Networks set up by the party to spearhead specific
mobilisations also tended to be not very successful and failed to institutionalise
themselves into significant social movement organisations. In 1992 the party created
together with a group of political and social notables the Komitees für Gerechtigkeit to
protest against the socio-economic plight of the former GDR, but the organisation was
wound up before the end of the year (Fieber & Reichmann, 1995). In 1997
personalities from various strands of the German left (SPD, Greens, PDS, DKP and
independents) came together to sign the Erfurter Erklärung, calling for a united front
of all left-wing parties, a common left-Keynesian programme and a strong extra-
parliamentary movement (Dahn, 1997). The declaration gathered 45,000 signatures
and led to the establishment of a DGB-linked coordination (Aufstehen für eine andere
Politik) and to the organisation of a mid-sized demonstration in Berlin (60,000
participants); the momentum, however, did not survive the 1998 election and the
coming to power of the centre-left. Finally, the influence of the party within the old
West German (now all-German) civil society organisations remained very low. In
particular, the sharp rise of the sympathy of Eastern unionised workers toward the
party after 1992 did not translate into significant gains within the union apparatus,
which remained solidly controlled by the SPD. Only in Thüringen was the PDS able to
win the confidence of some high-level union cadres
81
.
The emergence of the WASG represented a gain of a significant number of trade union,
social movement and political activists. However, their influence was largely limited to
the smallish alter-globalisation galaxy.
82
The WASG played a key role in the various
coordinating bodies of the 2003-2004 protests against the Agenda 2010, but these
failed to coalesce into permanent social movement organisations. Within the trade
union movement, supporters of the new party remained fairly isolated and limited to
low- or mid- ranking positions. Within other SPD-friendly organisations, which in the
80
Such as the city gardening association VKSG, the unemployed association ALV and the handicapped
association ABID.
81
Such as the DGB chairman Frank Spieth (1992-2006) and the HBV chairman Bodo Ramelow (1992-
1999).
82
ATTAC Deutschland, for instance, had only 14,001 members in March 2004. While refusing to formally
align itself with the new party, the organisation maintained a strong informal proximity to the WASG
(ATTAC, 2005; Speth, 2006: 96). Other alter-globalist organisations which became quite close to the
WASG or the PDS (the pacifist DFG-VK, the academic BdWI, the far-left Turkish/Kurdish GDF and DIDF)
had altogether less than that number of members.
128
period 2003-2009 showed heavy signs of dissatisfaction toward the party (SoVD, VdK,
DMB), the WASG made practically no inroads.
DIE LINKE inherited the organisational linkages of its predecessors and experienced a
certain growth of its civil society roots. However, its influence among the leaders and
cadres of mass organisations still remains feeble, much weaker than its electoral
influence and much smaller than that of the SPD, which continued to command the
(more or less critical) allegiance of large majority of left-leaning civil society
organisations. The example of the trade union movement is indicative. While 17.1% of
trade union members voted for DIE LINKE in 2009 (32.1% in the East, ahead of the CDU
and SPD), the 1,805 union cadres who signed the appeal "Wir wählen links!" almost
exclusively consisted of low-ranking officials
83
and the doors of top union organs
remained closed to card-carrying LINKE supporters
84
. As far as social movement
networks were concerned, the party played a central role in the 2007 G8 counter-
summit at Heiligendamm and in the post-2009 anti-crisis protests (Wir zahlen nicht für
eure Krise! in 2009-2010 and Blockupy in 2012-2013) but, as for previous experiments,
no notable organisational legacy was left once the movement ebbed.
83
The only high-ranking figures were Renate Licht (secretary of the DGB sub-district of Thüringen) and
two retired unionists: Horst Schmitthenner, for two decades member of the IG-Metall executive (1989-
2009), and Sybille Stamm, secretary of the Ver.di district of Baden-Württenberg (2001-2007).
84
The 5-person DBG executive, for instance, was composed by three SPD, one CDU and one Green
member. The larger executives of individual trade unions did not include any single LINKE member
either, although Hans-Jürgen Urban of the IG-Metall was broadly sympathetic toward the party.
129
3.3.4 Conclusions
The German radical left was fairly successful in filling the electoral vacuum left by the
neoliberal shift of traditional mass parties (SPD and CDU-CSU).
In the Nineties the PDS consolidated its support among the downward-mobile former
Eastern bureaucracy, markedly improved its image and results among other Eastern
social strata (workers, inactives, employees) and saturated the small Western far-left
opinion. A key obstacle preventing it from becoming a credible contender to the SPD,
i.e. the lack of any organisational root in the West, was removed in the period 2003-
2007. The unpopularity of Schröder's labour market reforms and the massive wave of
protest which followed them provoked the emergence of a small but significant new
radical left group (the WASG) and the defection of important social democratic figures
(Oskar Lafontaine). The alliance (2005) and subsequent merger (2007) of the two
parties in DIE LINKE created the best possible conditions for filling the representation
gap between mainstream parties and their traditional working class and welfarist
constituencies, and the results met or even exceeded the expectations.
Altogether, in the period 1990-2009 the German radical left gained more than four
million votes, soaring from 1.9% to 8.3% of the total electorate and from 2.4% to
11.9% of valid votes. Although this rise did not fully compensate for the post-1998
collapse of the SPD and was somewhat fragile, as the 2002 and 2013 setbacks clearly
proved, the electoral balance sheet was nothing short of extraordinary.
However, the gains obtained at the levels of generic sympathy and voting behaviour
did not spill over to the level of organised social strength (FIGURE 3.14).
The overall membership of the PDS/DIE LINKE collapsed up to 2004 and barely grew
afterwards, as the gains in the West were largely wiped out by the continued decline in
the East. The radical left thus remained dwarfed by the SPD which, while in crisis, still
organised more than half a million members.
130
FIGURE 3.14 INDICATORS OF INFLUENCE
Notes: share of the total electorate. Sympathisers: people declaring a proximity with the party (GESIS polls).
The influence among civil society organisations and social movements experienced a
moderate growth since the historical trough of 1990-1991, when the PDS was faced
with an overwhelming hostility outside the milieu of the former GDR bureaucracy.
Nevertheless, the sympathy won among left-wing activists in the Nineties and above
all in the Noughties remained limited to small radical circles (e.g. the pacifist and alter-
globalist movement) and not very influential currents (e.g. strands of the union left),
while the bulk of civil society and social movement cadres tended to confirm an (albeit
critical) allegiance to the traditional parties (SPD, CDU and to a less extent Greens).
131
3.4 Explaining radical left regroupment
As already remarked, one of the peculiarities of the development of the German
radical left was its organisational unity. Instead of suffering from a destructive
competition between different organisations (as in France) or from successive
debilitating splits (as in Italy), the PDS managed to preserve its hegemonic status on
the radical left spectrum and even to initiate significant waves of radical left
regroupment, absorbing important far-left and left social democratic currents. How
was this possible?
This achievement can be explained by the interplay of a series of socio-political,
institutional, relational and subjective factors.
The preconditions for the processes of regroupment of the German radical left were
provided by a series of socio-political factors: (i) the post-1989 crisis of the radical left,
which reduced the salience of many of the old dividing lines, favoured processes of
opening and renewal and encouraged the pooling together of strengths and resources;
(ii) the neoliberal transformation of the SPD, which left increasing sectors of its
traditional intellectual, working class and welfarist constituencies in search of
alternatives; (iii) the dynamics of left-wing extra-parliamentary mobilisation which,
unlike in most European countries, reached their peak in a protracted wave of protest
on social issues and against a seating centre-left government (2003-2005).
Further incentives to radical left regroupment and safeguards against party splits were
provided by institutional and relational factors: (iv) the electoral system, which
discouraged splits and new party formations and encouraged the collaboration of
disparate currents to overcome the 5% electoral threshold; (v) the attitude of potential
allies; by excluding the PDS from the participation to national cabinets and limiting its
involvement at the regional level, the SPD defused the conflict between conciliatory
and intransigent tendencies and helped to preserve the anti-neoliberal credential of
the PDS in the eyes of its core electorate.
A final subjective factor was nevertheless crucial: (vi) the non-sectarian and far-sighted
attitude of the major player, the PDS, which proved capable of creating a working
132
framework ensuring considerable political autonomy and generous material incentives
to prospective allies.
The first two factors are common to the all Western European countries and constitute
the main drivers of the general tendency to craft, from the ruins of the Twentieth
Century orthodox, euro-communist and far-left organisations, new "broad left"
formations
85
able to appeal to the traditional communist constituency, to the
disaffected social democratic supporters and to newly-politicised layers of the
population. In this matter the German case has no claim to exceptionality.
The third factor, on the other hand, played a vital role in provoking the break-away to
the radical left of a small number of former social democratic cadres
86
and the
emergence of the WASG. Although the contemporary radical left has assiduously
courted left-wing social democratic tendencies, results have tended to be limited. The
case of the WASG remains to this day one of the few examples, and arguably the most
successful one, of leftward splits of the European social democratic party family.
87
The
explanation of this outcome lies precisely in the fact that discontent toward the
neoliberal turn of the SPD was magnified and accompanied by a long cycle of public
protest and mass mobilisation against its policies in government, while in other
countries anti-neoliberal protests have tended to flare up against right-wing cabinets
and abate when the left is in office.
85
The most important examples of this pattern are the Spanish Izquierda Unida (1986), the Greek
Synaspismos, the Dutch GroenLinks, the Danish Enhedslisten and the German Partei des
Demokratischen Sozialismus (1989), the Swedish Vänsterpartiet and the Finnish Vasemmistoliitto
(1990), the Italian Partito della Rifondazione Comunista and Partito Democratico della Sinistra (1991),
the Dutch Socialistische Partij (Nineties), the Portuguese Bloco de Esquerda (1999), the Greek SYRIZA
(2004), the German DIE LINKE (2007) and the French Front de Gauche (2009). A few of them (Dutch GL
and Italian PDS) later abandoned the radical left party family.
86
Oskar Lafontaine and some second- and third- rank politicians and unionists (Ulrich Maurer, Frank
Spieth, Klaus Ernst, Thomas Händel).
87
Other examples are the French MDC/MRC (1993), the Greek DIKKI (1995), the French PG (2009), the
shift of former PASOK politicians to SYRIZA (2012) and the shift of former PDS politicians to the PRC (all
along); in the latter case, however, all forces involved (Lucio Magri, Pietro Ingrao, Aldo Tortorella, Piero
Folena, Cesare Salvi) had a communist background.
133
The lack of any significant split from the radical left, both to its left and to its right, and
the non-emergence of notable competitors had on the other hand much to do with
the effect of institutional factors.
The political isolation to which the SPD subjected the PDS first and DIE LINKE later
helped to cement its cohesion and hegemony on the radical left. Right-leaning
tendencies could hardly hope to find a welcoming environment within the traditional
centre-left parties, where justified hostility toward the SED, more questionable anti-
communist instincts and competitive rivalries ran deep.
88
Left-leaning tendencies, on
the other hand, for the same reason lacked serious political reasons to leave. As the
PDS and DIE LINKE appeared to support a radical and coherent anti-neoliberal
programme and their involvement in experiences of governmental participation was
limited to a few regions, the establishment of a more radical competitor would
necessarily appear as incomprehensible to both voters and activists, as electoral
results repeatedly proved.
89
Moreover, the fact that the party was never faced with the
hard choice of supporting a minority centre-left government at the national level (in
2005 the SPD ruled out this option and in all other elections its votes were never
needed) further helped to minimise the possibility of defections and splits.
The effects of the electoral system, similarly, provided a large incentive to pool
together the strength of each organisation and sensibility with the aim of overcoming
the 5%-threshold and obtaining parliamentary representation. In fact, through the
alliance with the PDS even tiny radical left groups could hope to obtain national,
regional and local elected representatives;
90
conversely, by going alone the chances
were near to nil. This represented the most important factor in explaining the
magnetic pull of the PDS on other radical left forces, the success of the alliance and
merger with the WASG and the absence of any significant party split.
88
The initial refusal of the Eastern SDP (the initial name of the social democratic party of the GDR) to
accept former SED members, and notably the important PDS faction of Wolfgang Berghofer, marked the
tone of the relationship. While a few high-profile PDS politicians later switched to the SPD (Angela
Marquardt in 2008, Sylvia-Yvonne Kaufmann in 2009), they did it individually and with meagre personal
and political rewards.
89
Both orthodox and movementist challenges to the party had desultory electoral outcomes. The
situation could be different at the local level, when radical challenges to unpopular SPD-PDS regional
governments had more space to emerge. The dissident Berlin branch of the WASG, for instance,
obtained a decent 2.9% of valid votes in 2006.
90
This applied both to Western leftists (e.g. Ulla Jelpke, Winfried Wolf and Eva Bulling-Schröter) in the
period 1990-2002 and to former WASG members in the post-2005 period.
134
Finally, the central leadership of the PDS proved remarkably flexible and skilful in
encouraging the coexistence of different tendencies within a unified framework and
enticing potential partners to join.
First of all, the ideological and organisational renewal of the party was organised from
the start on open, pluralistic and tolerant "broad left" bases which were conducive to
the coexistence and integration of the widest possible spectrum of different political
traditions and sensibilities. Organised factions
91
and thematic groups
92
were allowed
official recognition and granted political and financial resources; formal and informal
tendencies
93
were involved inclusively in the decision-making process and in the
allocation of internal and public offices; individual and group dissent
94
was amply
tolerated. As the party provided a favourable living and working environment to a wide
range of positions, it reduced the incentives to split and formed a powerful pole of
attraction toward smaller (mainly far-left) organisations and (former far-left, SPD or
Green members) individuals. Secondly, each internal crisis (in 1989-91, around the
dissolution of the SED; in 2002-2003 and in 2010-12 around the relationship with the
SPD; in 2006, around governmental participation in Berlin and Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern) or problem (the drawn-out conflict with the neo-Stalinist KPF in 1993-
2003) was ultimately settled with compromise solutions which discouraged the
departure of the defeated wing. Thirdly, the party was prepared to make enormous
concessions to prospective partners. Although the Linke Liste/PDS project (Meuche-
Mäker, 2005: 15-16; Eckhoff, 2005; Neugebauer & Stöss, 1996: 46) in 1990 was an
91
In the PDS, formalised factions (Plattformen) tended to emerge only during periods of heated internal
battle and disband or lose significance afterwards: Plattform 3. Weg, Plattform WF, Plattform
Demokratischer Sozialismus, Sozialdemokratische Plattform and Kommunistische Plattform in the period
1989-1991; Geraer Dialog (GD), Forum Zweite Erneuerung (F2E) and Netzwerk ReformLinke (NRL) in the
period 2002-2003. In DIE LINKE, on the other hand, old and new factions – Kommunistische Plattform
(KPF), Sozialistische Linke (SL), Forum Demokratischer Sozialismus (FDS) – assumed a permanent
character and a more central place.
92
Thematic groups (Zusammenschlüsse, also called Arbeitsgemeinschaften, AG) reached the maximum
number of 31 in the PDS (2004) and 20 in DIE LINKE (2012).
93
Beyond the above-mentioned formal factions, many looser sensibilities existed. Within the PDS, Brie
(1995, 2000) identified four main groupings (reformist socialists; reformist pragmatics; orthodox
socialists and radical democrats) while Behrend (2006) focused on the conflict between a leadership-
based "right-wing", a membership-based "centre" and a fragmented "left" (KPF, Marxistisches Forum,
Western leftists). Within DIE LINKE, internal debate was structured around formal and semi-formal –
Antikapitalistische Linke (AKL), Netzwerk ReformLinke (NRL) and Emanzipatorische Linke (Ema.Li.) –
factions and other informal groupings (e.g. former PDS vs. former WASG, Western radicals vs. Eastern
moderates).
94
From 1999 to 2012, for instance, only three expulsions of members were ever confirmed by the
internal arbitration court. Similarly, the presence of outspoken oppositional groups (e.g. the orthodox
KPF or Trotskyist entryist organisations) was sometimes attacked but ultimately always accepted.
135
abysmal failure, the Western leftists who subsequently joined the PDS were raised to
positions absolutely disproportionate to their weight on the ground. In 2005-2007, the
alliance and merger with the WASG (Heunemann, 2006; Spier et al., 2007; Olsen, 2007;
Hough et al., 2007; Lees et al., 2010; Ernst et al., 2012; Patton, 2013) was similarly
eased by an array of safeguards which boosted the influence of the smaller partner
and gave it a long-term equal say in the life of the future party.
In conclusion, so long as DIE LINKE will remain in the comfortable position of being a
parliamentary party excluded from national government, no significant change in the
level of radical left fragmentation is to be expected. On the other hand, a change in the
attitude of the SPD would inevitably expose it to the key dilemma of the contemporary
radical left and fuel the kind of relational-based fragmentation between conciliatory
and intransigent currents which is typical of other European countries (most evidently
in France and Italy).
136
3.5 The strategy of leftward pull
In the previous section I have dissected in detail some key elements of the evolution of
the contemporary German radical left: the development of the different dimensions of
its societal weight; the success of a strategy of growth based on the exploitation of the
representation gaps opening between traditional parties and growing sections of their
social constituencies; the preservation of its cohesion and the results of successive
waves of regroupment. The final missing element of the analysis is an assessment of
the strategy connecting immediate activity, mid-term anti-neoliberal and long-term
anti-capitalist goals.
The German radical left chose to follow, particularly since the mid-Nineties, a variant
of what I define as a strategy of (mixed) leftward pull, which can be schematically
summarised in three steps.
95
In the short term, party activity was geared to a double
aim: sustaining the growth of their overall societal weight and affecting the broader
social and ideological balance of forces. In the mid-term, this combination of friendly
and hostile, parliamentary and extra-parliamentary pressures was supposed to affect
the course of the moderate left parties (SPD and Greens) and force them to undertake
a left turn. This would create the conditions for the establishment of a progressive
centre-left alliance, its electoral victory and a policy shift away from neoliberalism
(Politikwechsel). In the long-term, the successful incremental implementation of
progressive reforms would lead the way toward a deeper kind of social transformation
toward a democratic socialist society.
Was this strategy coherent, and what were its results?
95
For clear formulations see the late programmes of the parties (PDS, 2003; DIE LINKE, 2005, 2007 and
2011) and the reflections of the party thinkers Michael Brie (2000, 2003 and 2007) and Ralf Krämer
(2004).
137
3.5.1 Party efforts
Several kinds of pressure can be analytically distinguished in the activity of the parties
of the German radical left.
The first element was the pressure on the political system exerted by the electoral
growth of the party and its possible influence on the "direction of competition"
(Sartori, 1976). As I have already shown in section 3.3, the German radical left did
follow an overall path of electoral growth. Until 2004, however, the threat was limited
by the medium-small size of the PDS, by its inability to expand in the Western areas of
the country and by the composition of its gains (which damaged the centre-right
parties equally or more than the centre-left ones). It was only after that date that DIE
LINKE came to represent a direct and serious competitor for the SPD.
The second element was the pressure on prospective allies exerted by means of
electoral, parliamentary and governmental alliances. The overview in section 3.2 has
clarified that this tool, while often being a distinct eventuality in the run-up of general
elections (1998, 2002, 2005, 2009 and 2013), became relevant only once, during the
2005-2009 legislature. Since 2005, however, the electoral growth of DIE LINKE
drastically reduced the chances of the traditional centre-left parties (SPD and Greens)
to ever obtain an autonomous parliamentary majority, increasing the urgency of a
rethinking of their coalition policy (Switek, 2010; Raschke & Tils, 2010). Moreover,
while insisting on its primarily oppositional outlook, the German radical left
consistently signalled its openness to bargain its support in exchange for policy
concessions, thus further impelling its potential allies to change.
The third element was the broader pressure exerted by public debate, alliance-building
and extra-parliamentary activities on the ideological and social balance of forces.
While the radical left was fairly isolated within the party system, it could find several
allies on specific issues and social mobilisations, notably East German interests,
pacifism and the defence of the welfare state.
138
A direct dialogue with the internal left-wing tendencies of the SPD and of the Greens
was repeatedly undertaken, concretising in intellectual collaborations such as the first
Crossover project (1993-1999), the Erfurter Erklärung and its follow-ups (1997-2000),
the second Crossover debate (2007-2009) and the Institut Solidarische Moderne (2010-
present).
96
This kind of activity had however few political repercussions.
The experiences of local governmental collaboration also helped to improve the
acceptance of the party and the quality of the left-left dialogue, but proved to be a
double-edged sword. Given the relative strength of the radical and moderate left and
the institutional and budgetary constraints of regions and communes, more often than
not this kind of co-operation tended to de-radicalise the former rather than to
radicalise the latter. In particular, the red-red coalitions in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern
and in Berlin significantly damaged the credibility of the PDS as a coherent anti-
neoliberal force, as they forced it to accept significant cuts of the local welfare and to
enable the approval of significant counter-reforms in the Bundesrat.
97
The involvement within social mobilisations, on the other hand, was more significant.
Although neither the PDS and the WASG nor DIE LINKE had the capabilities to initiate
or sustain large-scale protests and campaigns, as they lacked both a mass membership
and the proximity of mass civil society and social movement organisations (see section
3.3.3), they did play an important role in three of the five major cycles of contentious
politics which have emerged in the country over the period 1989-2012 (1992-1993;
1997-1998; 2002-2005), in other important contentious events (e.g. the 2007 G8
counter-summit at Heiligendamm) and in a multiplicity of less prominent struggles and
campaigns.
The latter element is worth a more detailed discussion.
The first and most important wave was the 1989-1990 peaceful revolution in the
German Democratic Republic (Lohmann, 1994; Gehrke & Hürtgen, 2001; Dale, 2006).
The mobilisation of millions of citizens in gigantic demonstrations, direct actions and
labour conflicts dealt a death blow to the ruling communist regime, forcing it to
sweeping reforms and ultimately forcing its removal from office. The PDS played here
96
See http://www.sf-rheinland.de/crossover and http://www.solidarische-moderne.de/.
97
Behrend (2006: 96-118), Hildebrandt and Brie (2006).
139
an ambiguous role, being both the main target of the protesters and an actor of
renewal, which self-reformed and accompanied the process of democratic transition
(Gysi & Falkner, 1990; Segert, 2008 and 2009). Altogether, these efforts were mainly
perceived as insincere and the outcome of the revolution left the party in tatters,
enfeebled and politically isolated.
The second wave was the 1992-1993 movement against the negative repercussions of
the unification process (Abromeit, 1992; Roesler, 1994; Garms, 1994; Fieber &
Reichmann, 1995; Gehrke, 1997). Mass unemployment and the de-industrialisation
policy of the Treuhandanstalt came particularly under fire, resulting in a proliferation
of local strikes, occupations, demonstrations and hunger strikes. Some attempts to
coordinate the protests were made (the Komitees für Gerechtigkeit and the
Ostdeutsche Initiative der Betriebs- und Personalräte) but the movement failed to gain
the support of mainstream parties and trade unions and slowly died out in a swarm of
localised defeats or settlements. While not very successful in industrial terms, the
movement had a significant impact on the political climate, contributing to a long-
lasting shift of the East German electorate away from the CDU and toward the PDS and
SPD.
The third (and smaller) wave was represented by the disparate anti-Kohl mobilisations
of unemployed, students, leftists and trade unionists in 1997-1998 (Dahn, 1997;
Brandt, 1998; Lahusen & Baumgarten, 2006; Himpele, 2009). Often explicitly conceived
as or bent to the needs of the upcoming electoral campaign, the protests were
smallish and not very effective but offered an important contribution to the
subsequent victory of the centre-left coalition and to the acceptance of the PDS as a
peculiar but viable left-wing corrective.
The fourth wave covered the years 2002-2005 and was characterised by a generalised
revival of social movements. The most important struggle was the one against the
Agenda 2010/Hartz IV labour market reform of the Schröder government, which
brought to the streets hundreds of thousands of people for a whole summer of
decentralised "Monday demonstrations", several central marches and a host of smaller
protest actions (Rucht & Yang, 2004; Lahusen & Baumgarten, 2006; Rink & Phillips,
2007; De Grazia et al., 2007; Burger, 2008). But labour (Schmidt, 2003), pacifist
(Walgrave & Rucht, 2010) and alter-globalist (Rucht & Roth, 2008) struggles were
prominent as well. Despite their sometimes impressive proportions all mobilisations
140
ended without tangible results but had a large political resonance, providing the
foundations for the rapid electoral growth of the radical left (Nachtwey & Spier, 2007)
and for a significant shift to the left of the public opinion.
The fifth and final wave covered on the period 2009-2011 and was opened by anti-
crisis and student protests (Hildebrandt & Tügel, 2010; Kolisang, 2013) and continued
with massive environmental mobilisations (Rose, 2010; Schlager, 2010; Brettschneider
& Schuster, 2013). Unlike most of their predecessors, these were partially successful,
leading for instance to the abolition of university tuition fees in all but one region and
to a confirmation of the phasing out of nuclear energy by 2022. While DIE LINKE
benefitted from the early phase of the cycle, its late phase favoured on the other hand
Greens and SPD.
To sum up, most of the period of this analysis (1992-2009) was characterised by
medium-sized social mobilisations developing on favourite radical left issues. This fact
helped the PDS, the WASG and DIE LINKE to enhance their public profile and electoral
influence of the radical left, thereby raising the pressure on the moderate left parties
to modify its policy outlook.
It is therefore clear from the above-mentioned discussion that the various kinds of
pressure exerted by the radical left on the German political system were significant but
limited, becoming truly worrying only after 2004. It was only in this latter period that
the radical left managed to break through the boundaries of the former German
Democratic Republic, to acquire a mid-sized electoral and extra-parliamentary weight,
to turn into an attractive alternative for the centre-left electorate and to become a key
player for the success of a left parliamentary alternation.
3.5.2 Systemic effects
Did the pressures of the radical left succeed in exerting a leftward pull on German
politics and society? Three kinds of effects must be distinguished: (i) those on non-
governmental actors; (ii) those on official governmental policies; (iii) those on the
programmatic outlook of political parties, in particular the moderate left ones (SPD
and Greens).
141
With regard to the first point, the activity of the radical left had practically no effect.
Within the workplaces, for instance, radical left activists were few, devoid of a
coherent strategy of intervention and not very influential. Thus, the growth of the
sympathy toward the radical left failed to produce positive effects on the terrain of
unmediated class struggle: labour militancy remained very low, union density
continued to fall and working conditions (wages, contracts, unemployment and
precarious jobs) significantly worsened.
With regard to the second point, the pressures of the radical left had few direct effects
but may have had some indirect ones. What is certain is that its mobilisation failed to
prevent the implementation of the key counter-reforms of the period (e.g. the
privatisations of the early Nineties and the Agenda 2010 labour market reform), did
not produce any explicit policy concession and did not stop or reverse the overall trend
toward neoliberalisation. On the other hand, it may have contributed to prevent
heavier setbacks and produce more covert forms of compensation.
With regard to the third point, finally, the growth of the radical left had some
repercussions on the broader political debate, raising the profile of its core issues, but
has so failed to produce a clear turn to the left of the party system. The SPD, in
particular, continues to cling to the legacy of the Schröder government and to reject
the idea of a broad centre-left coalition with the Greens and DIE LINKE. While the
electoral defeat of 2005 did not bring about any change of course, the much larger
defeat of 2009 did however produce some rethinking and repositioning, strengthening
the weight of the internal left and leading to the adoption of some minimal but clear
left-wing proposals (such as a € 8,50 minimum wage).
Altogether, the idea of a wide-ranging turn by the moderate left from neoliberal to
neo-Keynesian policies appears as a far-fetched and uncertain prospect. There are two
possible explanations for this outcome.
The first one is grounded on the subjective failure of the radical left to exert a
sufficient level of leftward pull. At its peak in 1998, the PDS represented only about 5%
of the valid votes and a mere hypothetical threat to the governmental prospects of the
142
SPD, which could reasonably hope to see it miss the electoral threshold (as it indeed
happened in 2002) or to offset the losses by winning new centrist votes. Since 2005,
when DIE LINKE turned into a much more insidious competitor, tangible results
remained scarce but some doubts and cracks in the outlook of the mainstream parties
began to appear. It is therefore certainly possible that the failure was due to a lack of
electoral and extra-parliamentary weight and that, in case of a stronger growth, the
outcome would be different.
The evidence, however, also points to an extreme reluctance of the SPD and more in
general of the Western European "new" social democracy to effectively renege on
their current policy outlook. The roots of their neoliberal shift seem to run much
deeper than mere electoral expediency, having become constitutive to the nature of
those parties and very resistant to any prospect of "re-socialdemocratisation". The
testing of such a hypothesis lies beyond the scope of the present research; the case of
Greece however lends it a significant prima facie credibility, as even the combination
of a huge electoral shift to the left (with the radical left soaring 31.9% of valid votes
and the PASOK collapsing to 12.2%) and unprecedented social mobilisations has so far
failed to produce a fundamental turnaround within the Greek Socialist Party.
3.5.3 Conclusions
Despite a successful intensification of its pressure on the German political system, the
radical left has so far failed to move closer to the intermediate step of its strategy –
breaking the hegemony of neoliberalism and paving the way for a political change of
direction. Its activity remains predominantly propagandistic and incapable to
overcome the threshold of effectiveness, winning tangible concessions for its own core
constituency and proving its usefulness in the eyes of broader social layers.
143
3.6 Conclusions
The post-1989 evolution of the German radical left represents a fairly successful
example within the Western European panorama. Its careful analysis, however, reveal
a more nuanced picture of light and shade.
On the positive side, this political area followed a trajectory of almost uninterrupted
electoral growth which pushed it from 1.1 million (1990) to 5.2 million (2009) valid
votes. It preserved its organisational cohesion and successfully aggregated around the
PDS successive layers of far-left activists, new and non-voters and disgruntled centre-
left supporters. And it enriched the terms of the public debate, providing a visible
political representation to themes (the specificity of the Eastern regions, social justice,
pacifism, critique of capitalism) and interests (the former GDR bureaucracy,
unemployed and employed wage workers, the strata benefitting most from the
welfare state) which had tended to become increasingly neglected by the mainstream
parties.
On the negative side, however, it proved unable to translate this growth into tighter
and more effective forms of allegiance and mobilisation. Its activists and members
continued to shrink, its influence within civil society and social movement
organisations remained low and its capacity to launch or steer significant extra-
parliamentary campaigns was limited. Moreover, its attempts to exert a leftward pull
on the political system yielded few tangible results. Finally, its electoral gains did make
up only a small section of the losses of the moderate left parties and remained
vulnerable to the dangers of de-mobilisation and tactical voting, as the deceiving
results of the 2002 and 2013 general elections clearly proved.
In a nutshell, both the growth potential and the capacity of influence of the radical left
seem to ultimately run up against insurmountable ceilings, linked to internal
(organisational, strategic and political) shortcomings and external (material and
ideological) constraints. Neoliberal policies are increasingly questioned and contested,
but no credible perspective of an alternative is on the agenda. The "new" SPD is
weakened, but its electoral, institutional and extra-parliamentary hegemony on the
144
left remains solid. The radical left is an effective thermometer of these trends, but is
not yet able to become the protagonist of their reversal.
145
CHAPTER FOUR. THE ITALIAN
RADICAL LEFT: THE STORY OF A
FAILURE?
4.1 The national context
The contemporary Italian radical left can boast exceptionally strong historical roots
and its post-1989 development made it a far from marginal force within Italian and
European politics. On the one hand its electoral and parliamentary weight, although
fluctuating around mid-range levels well below the successes of other Western
European counterparts (e.g. Greece, Portugal and France), was big enough to make it a
vital element for the formation of centre-left majorities and entrusted it with a
disproportionate amount of governmental weight at both regional and national levels.
On the other hand its major party, the Party of Communist Refoundation (PRC), has
played a key role for the reorientation of the European radical left, both as a role
model and as a liaison agent.
98
Despite its promising beginnings, however, the Italian radical left has failed to
consolidate its positions and has progressively fallen prey to strategic helplessness,
damaging splits, growing fragmentation and a recent (post-2008) severe drop in
support and overall influence.
In the present chapter I will chart the evolution of the parties of the Italian radical left
and explain the reasons for their weaknesses and ultimate failure.
98
For instance, in the establishment of the transnational Party of the European Left (2004) and in the
coordination of the alter-globalist movement (1999-2004). In particular, the PRC was the only political
party in the world to be allowed to sign the final declaration of the first World Social Forum in 2001 and
was instrumental in organising its largest European mobilisations (the Genoa counter-summit in 2001
and the Florence European Social Forum in 2002).
146
Historical challenges
The societal context of the period 1989-2012 was marked by a series of wide-ranging
shifts and upheavals, to which the Italian radical left struggled to respond adequately.
A detailed analysis of the socio-economic, institutional and political transformations of
the last 25 years will be carried out in section 4.3. The four main developments were
the progressive degradation of the productive/macro-economic conditions of Italian
capitalism, the neoliberalisation of the state and of public policies, the crisis and
reconfiguration of the political system and the shift of the majority of the Italian
Communist Party (PCI) from Eurocommunism toward a peculiar variation of the "new"
or "market" social democracy.
Economically, the country suffered and proved unable to measure up to the challenges
of global competition, European integration and the progressive weakening of its
traditional competitive advantages and support mechanisms (low wages, state
ownership and subsidies, deficit spending, currency devaluations). Real gross domestic
product growth declined from the high levels of the Sixties and Seventies to low ones
in the Nineties and Noughties and collapsed after 2008. Most large companies, with
the partial exception of the banking system and of the "pocket multinationals" (Colli,
2002), struggled to withstand international competition and were often forced to
downsize or to sell to foreign groups. It was the Italian working class that suffered the
most: in the period 1993-2009 unemployment remained high (9.1%); real wages
stagnated (yearly +0.2%); large swathes of the young and not-so-young potential
workforce had to resort to the precarious conditions of informal employment and of
the new atypical contracts introduced by labour market reforms; welfare provisions for
the unemployed and for the poor remained patchy and mostly delegated to the
support of the enlarged family.
At the level of the political system, the early Nineties swept away the established
actors, rules and patterns of competition of the so-called "First Republic" (1945-1992)
147
and gave way to the unstable set-up of the so-called "Second Republic" (1994-2011).
99
The traditional mass political parties were superseded by new ones with shallower
social roots; the existing non-selective proportional representation was replaced by an
electoral system with strong elements of disproportionality and incentives to the
establishment of pre-electoral governmental coalitions; the regime of blocked
competition (a permanent centrist majority of the DC and its allies) gave way to a
prevailing pattern of bipolar alternation between broad centre-left and right-wing
alliances (with frequent interludes of transitional technocratic cabinets)
100
. In the early
2010s, however, the system teetered again on the brink of collapse, perhaps
anticipating the transition to a new "Third Republic".
This political transition was accompanied by a deeper transformation of the role of the
state from dirigisme to neoliberalism. As in other Western European countries, this
adjustment did not mean a significant reduction of the economic centrality of the state
within capitalist reproduction
101
but rather the retreat from a direct productive role
and a change of the means and goals of its intervention. This shift, however,
represented a veritable earthquake which largely dismantled the large state-owned
sector (privatisations and liberalisations), revolutionised the labour market, public
services and welfare provisions (especially pensions) and entrenched important
elements of free-market competition, budgetary restraint, financialisation and
commodification.
The Italian Communist Party, finally, set on a course of wide-ranging modernisation
and progressive drift to the right. In the early Nineties it renamed itself Party of the
Democratic Left (PDS), joined the Socialist International, aggressively supported the
majoritarian reform of the electoral law and unsuccessfully sought to come to power
at the head of a broad left-wing alliance. After 1995 it cut a deal with large sections of
the old establishment, joined a broad centre-left alliance and became the main actor
99
See Gundle and Parker (1996) and Grilli di Cortona (2007). Unlike in France, the definition does not
indicate a wide-ranging constitutional change. The shift of 1992-1994 interested the electoral
legislation, the units of the political system (parties) and the dynamics of competition but the formal
constitutional framework, the form of state and the form of government did not change.
100
Amato I (1992-1993), Ciampi (1993-1994), Dini (1995-1996), Monti (2011-2012).
101
In the period 1993-2009 state revenues (45.2% of GDP), expenditures (49.1% of GDP) and gross debt
(110.8% of GDP) remained at historical peak levels.
148
and supporter of the pro-European neoliberal modernisation of the country; it also
merged with smaller left-wing forces in the Left Democrats (DS). In the mid-Noughties,
finally, it merged with its Christian democratic and centrist allies into generic centre-
left vessels: the Olive Tree Federation (FED) in 2004 and the Democratic Party (PD) in
2007 (Bordandini et al., 2008).
Radical left responses
All these developments represented dramatic setbacks for the traditional interests,
values and projects of the left-wing constituency. At the same time, the swift
rightward drift of the political system could reasonably be expected to create a
sizeable political vacuum on the left, offering interesting opportunities of recovery and
expansion to renewed radical left partisan organisations. As I will show in section 4.3,
these hopes were not entirely unfounded but at the same time proved to be overly
optimistic. The attempts of the radical left to fill the gap of political representation of
working class/welfarist interests had to face a long series of structural and subjective
obstacles and ultimately failed, plunging this party family in a state of organisational
fragmentation, political disarray and unprecedented societal weakness (2008-present).
Unlike the parties of other communist strongholds (France, Portugal and Finland), the
Italian Communist Party (PCI)
102
had withstood the Eighties with relative grace. While
in decline from its historical climax in 1976 (12,616,650 votes - 34.4% of valid votes -
and 1,814,154 members), by 1987 it could still boast an impressive number of voters
(10,250,644 votes, 26.6%) and members (1,508,140), local governmental presence and
friendly mass organisations (the trade union CGIL, the Legacoop cooperative
movement, the ARCI recreational network). Its crisis was less a material one than one
of identity. As the Berlin Wall fell, the party went through a process of wide-ranging
renewal which led it to abandon the communist party family for the social democratic
102
Partito Comunista Italiano.
149
one, changing its name to Democratic Party of the Left (PDS)
103
and becoming a
modern, moderate and coalitionable left-of-the-centre party (Ignazi, 1992; Bellucci,
Maraffi & Segatti, 2000; Liguori, 2009; Magri, 2009).
The Italian far left was also the strongest in Europe. Despite the decline of the number
and impact of its activists, a large number of local groups remained active on the
ground and its electoral expression, Proletarian Democracy (DP)
104
, maintained a non-
negligible electoral support (1987: 1.7%) and above all an independent parliamentary
representation (Billi et al., 1996; Balestrini & Moroni, 2003; Gambetta, 2010;
Pucciarelli, 2011).
Against this background, in 1991 a large variety of sensibilities on the left and to the
left of the old PCI which opposed its change of name and nature decided to give birth
to a new neo-communist force, the Party of Communist Refoundation (PRC). This
experiment, which promised to offer an original solution to the crisis of Twentieth
Century communism, was unique in Western Europe
105
as it was the only successful
radical left party to emerge through a split from a former communist party.
The new party proved to be a significant political player. It was however immediately
faced with a key dilemma which would determine its entire subsequent evolution:
what attitude was it supposed to take toward the emerging centre-left pole of the new
bipolar competition of the so-called "Second Republic"? Should it accept or reject its
integration within the centre-left camp, including the need to support externally or
directly participate in centre-left governments? The PRC has proved incapable of
coping with this problem, as the choice of the latter option has regularly produced
large defections of its elected representatives and damaging right-wing splits (1995,
1998 and 2009) while the choice of the former one has invariably shattered its anti-
neoliberal credibility and demobilised its voters and members. Thus, the party failed to
consolidate its hegemony over the Italian radical left and progressively fragmented in a
variety of competing organisations (see FIGURE 4.1).
103
Partito Democratico della Sinistra. In 1998 it fused with smaller progressive groups in the Left
Democrats (Democratici di Sinistra) and in 2007 it merged with most remaining centre-left forces
(notably the Christian democrats of DL) to form the Democratic Party (Partito Democratico).
104
Democrazia Proletaria. In 1991 it dissolved and contributed to the birth of the PRC.
105
Some parallels exist only in Eastern Europe.
150
FIGURE 4.1 ITALIAN RADICAL LEFT PARTIES
The Party of Communist Refoundation (PRC)
106
is relatively well-studied and has been
the object of a number of historiographical and politological monographs (Dormagen,
1996; Valentini, 2000; Dalmasso, 2002; Bertolino, 2004; Cannavò, 2009; Favilli, 2011).
Two other radical left parties have since survived and played a significant role in the
national political system. The Party of Italian Communists (PdCI)
107
was established in
1998 as a break-away PRC faction which refused to withdraw its support to the Prodi I
government. The party still lacks a complete history, but interesting analyses are
provided by Cossu (2004) and Bordandini and Di Virgilio (2005 and 2007). Left Ecology
Freedom (SEL),
108
on the other hand, was created in 2009 by the merger of various
106
Partito della Rifondazione Comunista.
107
Partito dei Comunisti Italiani.
108
Sinistra Ecologia Libertà.
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
DP
PCI
COBAS
PRC
PdCI
PdCI
SEL
PRC
SEL
PDS
DS
PD
PD
CCA
CU
SD
PdAC
PCL
SC
151
left-wing splinter groups determined to reconcile different cultures (neo-communism,
left socialism, environmentalism) in a common organisation freed from the communist
label and firmly positioned within a broader centre-left alliance. Its recent history has
been well analysed by Romano (2009), Damiani (2011) and Bordandini (2013).
All other right-wing (CU) and left-wing (COBAS, CCA, PdAC, PCL and SC) splits of the
PRC have been short-lived and devoid of a veritable societal weight.
In short, the initial emergence and consolidation of the "new" Italian radical left (1992-
1996) has gradually given way to a long period of roller-coaster oscillations (1996-
2008) followed by an unprecedented phase of crisis and helplessness (2008-present).
How and why did this happen?
A tentative answer to these interrogatives will be provided in the rest of the chapter,
following the narrative and analytical structure already employed in the previous one.
In section 3.2 I will illustrate the trajectory of the Italian radical left along its three key
dimensions (societal weight, fragmentation and regroupment and political nature)
over the period 1992-2012.
In section 3.3 I will discuss the validity of the "vacuum thesis" with reference to the
Italian case. Why did the PRC and its successor parties ultimately fail to profit from the
ideological de-radicalisation, political neoliberalisation, centrist alliances and electoral
failures of the PDS/DS/PD?
In section 3.4 I will identify the factors which determined the progressive
fragmentation of this party family and the failure of the counter-processes of
regroupment.
In section 3.5, finally, I will draw a balance sheet of the efforts of the radical left in
influencing the course of Italian politics and society; in particular, the failure of its
"strategy of leftward pull" to affect the political evolution of the moderate left
competitors.
152
4.2 The making of a new Italian radical left
4.2.1 Societal weight
The following tables (TABLE 4.2 and FIGURE 4.3) provide a good overview of the
different dimensions of the overall societal weight of the parties of the Italian radical
left over the period 1991-2013. Three parties account for the vast majority of the
totals: the PRC (1991-present), the PdCI (1999-present) and SEL (2010-present). Pre-
1989 data for their communist and far-left predecessors (PCI and DP) are also included
for reference.
TABLE 4.2 SOCIETAL WEIGHT
AVERAGE
1991-2013
REF: PCI+DP
late Eighties
PERIOD I
1991-2007
PERIOD II
2008-2013
ELECTORAL WEIGHT
NATIONAL
(1992-2013)
2,451,164 votes
6.55%
10,892,545 votes
28.24%
2,741,280 votes
7.26%
1,677,521 votes
5.09%**
REGIONAL
(1995-2013)
2,113,952 votes
7.06%
8,594,207 votes
22.19%
2,256,445 votes
7.41%
1,805,219 votes
6.31% **
EUROPEAN
(1994-2013)
2,219,866 votes
6.69%
10,048,008 votes
28.87%
2,202,061 votes
6.85%
2,261,411 votes
7.29% **
PARLIAMENTARY
WEIGHT
NATIONAL
25.7 seats
4.09%
185 seats
29.37%
32.6 seats
5.18%
6.2 seats
0.98%
REGIONAL
55.5 seats
5.27%
248 seats
24.43%
55.5 seats
5.34%
55.5 seats
5.06%
GOVERNMENTAL
INVOLVEMENT
NATIONAL
34.8%
0.0%
47.1%
0.0%
REGIONAL
29.8%
14.6%
26.7%
38.7%
ORGANISATIONAL
WEIGHT
MEMBERSHIP
(1991-2012)
116,262
6.3%*
1,472,591
35.2%
121,942
6.7%*
96,951
5.0%*
YEARLY INCOMES
(1997-2011)
€ 14,536,222
-
€ 15,393,065
€ 12,179,902
MEDIA OUTREACH
Weak
Strong
Weak
Weak
ORGANISATIONAL
LINKAGES
Weak
Strong
Weak
Weak
Notes - Absolute figures and shares (of valid votes, total seats, total population, party members, party incomes). Averages: rolling
figures calculated on all years. Regional: weighted by regional population. Governmental involvement: time in government
(participation or external support); at least one radical left party. National: Camera dei deputati. Yearly incomes: real 2010 euro;
central level only. REF: national 1987; regional 1990; European 1989; membership 1988.
* = indicative figures (unreliable data) ** = the radical left ran lists together with non-radical organisations (Verdi, IdV, PSI); the
resulting levels are therefore somewhat inflated.
153
FIGURE 4.3 SOCIETAL WEIGHT
Notes: rolling averages of national and regional values. Shares of total valid votes, total seats (weighted), total party members,
total population administered.
The Italian radical left initially inherited only a small fraction of the strength of its main
predecessor, the Italian Communist Party: one tenth of its membership, one fourth of
its voters, one fifth of its parliamentary weight, and very little of its institutionalised
influence within mass civil society organisations. From 1992 to 2008 it nevertheless
managed to develop into a mid-sized political area, with most quantifiable variables
averaging between 5% and 7% and a key role for the purposes of government
formation. The devastating electoral defeat of 2008, however, for the first time
154
excluded it from parliament and determined a sharp drop in all indicators, threatening
its long-term significance and perspectives. The most recent period, despite some
timid countertrends, remains marked by a state of crisis and disarray.
109
I will briefly
review each dimension below.
The electoral weight of the radical left was mid-sized: on average 2,541,164 votes
(6.6% of valid votes) in parliamentary elections and of a similar magnitude in other
kinds of elections.
The peaks were reached in 1996 (8.6%) and 2007 (8.2%), the troughs in 1992 (5.6%),
2001 (6.7%), 2008 (4.5%) and 2013 (5.7%). In the latter two cases the real weight of
the radical left was even lower, as the parties ran within electoral list including non-
radical partners.
110
The share of the PRC steadily declined from 100.0% (1996) to 71.6% (2006) to less than
a third of the total (2013)
111
, to the benefit of its own successive right-wing and left-
wing splits. Geographically the results were fairly well distributed across the national
territory, with strongholds in Toscana, Umbria, Marche and Eastern Liguria (but not
Emilia-Romagna) and an extreme weakness in the North-East and in Sicilia.
112
The aforementioned level of electoral support translated into a still mid-sized but
significantly lower share of seats within the first chamber of parliament (4.1%) and
regional assemblies (5.3%).
This squeeze was due to the highly negative working of the electoral legislation (4%
electoral threshold; first-past-the post constituency seats; majority premiums) on
smaller and non-aligned forces; it was however mitigated by a general policy of centre-
left alliances which avoided a much worse outcome. The values peaked in 2006-2007
109
The 2009 European elections marked a vigorous electoral recovery but no representation, as both
main lists failed to overcome the 4%-threshold. In 2013, on the contrary, the radical left managed to re-
gain a sizeable representation in the national parliament (37 seats), thanks SEL's choice of centre-left
alliance, but its electoral results barely improved compared to 2008 (from 4.5% to 5.7%).
110
The Greens in 2008, the Greens and Di Pietro's crumbling IdV in 2013.
111
In 2008 the PRC ceased to run for office independently and chose instead to participate in short -lived
broad left electoral fronts: the Rainbow Left (SA) in 2008; the Federation of the Left (FdS) in 2009-2012;
Civil Revolution (RC) in 2013. It is therefore not possible to ascertain its precise electoral weight as a
party; the weight of the fronts has fallen from 69.3% in 2008 to just 39.2% in 2013.
112
Since 2008, however, the parties have lost ground in the whole Centre-North and recovered only in
the Centre-South.
155
(national 9.0%; regional 7.3%) and had their troughs in 2001-2002 (national 3.3%;
regional 6.0%) and 2010-2012 (national 0.0%; regional 4.1%).
Radical left elected representatives tended to be more moderate than the party
memberships and quite undisciplined, repeatedly providing the backbone of large
right-wing splits (1995, 1998, 2009).
A major event was the defeat of 2008, when the SA electoral list failed to overcome
the 4%-threshold and therefore the entry into parliament. This trauma had wide-
ranging effects, as it drastically reduced the visibility and financial resources of the
member parties and rippled over on all other indicators.
The electoral and parliamentary weight of the radical left assumed a disproportionate
importance in the context of the tight bipolar competition, providing an indispensable
contribution to the formation of centre-left governmental majorities at the national
and regional level. While large sections of the radical left were sceptical toward an
organic alliance with the centre-left, considered to be subservient to neoliberal
ideologies, centrist parties and the socio-economic establishment, its evolution
followed a path of growing governmental involvement.
At the national level, the radical left contributed to the survival of six cabinets (about
the third of the total time): Dini in 1995-1996 (CU); Prodi I in 1996-1998 (PRC); D'Alema
I, D'Alema II and Amato II in 1998-2001 (PdCI); Prodi II in 2006-2008 (PRC, PdCI, SD,
SC). The degree of involvement also steadily increased over time, beginning with an
external support of PRC dissidents in 1995 and ending with a full governmental
participation of all major parties in 2006-2008.
At the regional level, the evolution was even more impressive: the radical left
supported (directly or externally) regional cabinets administering 29.8% of the national
population, with an incredible peak of 65.4% in 2005-2007 which included the
presidency of one region (Puglia with Nichi Vendola, PRC).
The organisational dimension, finally, is more difficult to quantify but oscillated
between medium and low values.
The membership of radical left parties was on average 116,262 members or around
6.3% of total party membership, with peaks in 1997 (130,509) and 2006 (136,323) and
troughs in 1991 (112,835), 2002 (115,824) and 2012 (77,448). The figure was broadly
156
proportional to and synchronised with the electoral weight and remained remarkably
stable until 2006, as the general contemporary tendency of European parties to
decline and age was counterbalanced by a continuous influx of new and young
members; the subsequent events (governmental participation, fragmentation,
electoral losses), however, initiated a stark decline which continues to this day.
Finances experienced a much larger oscillation. The central accounts of the parties had
on average a real yearly income of €14,536,222, with a peak of €28,896,969 in 2007
and a trough of just €3,640,874 in 2011.
113
The financial "bubble" of the mid-
Noughties, fuelled by perfectly proportional and increasing amounts of state financing,
had important political side-effects, as it tended to create a dependency and
encourage an atrophy of the fundraising and militant capabilities of the party
membership. The dramatic fall after 2008, on the other hand, was mainly the result of
an introduction of high thresholds for the public financing of general and European
elections which the parties failed to overcome.
Media outreach tended to be weak. The PRC daily newspaper Liberazione (1995-2011),
for instance, sold on average only around 10,000 copies, represented a heavy financial
burden for the party and was finally closed down in 2012. Other forms of direct party
propaganda were significant but tended to be progressively disorganised by the
continuous splits and defections of popular leaders and cadres. The main channel of
political communication of the parties gradually became the mass media, where
charismatic leaders (Fausto Bertinotti, Nichi Vendola) often enjoyed a large coverage
but were also exposed to the hidden agendas of the media owners.
Paradoxically, the presence within civil society and social movement organisations was
one of the weakest points of the radical left parties. True, the PRC was a key
protagonist of the coalitions behind the alter-globalist mobilisations of 1999-2004, the
anti-war movement in the same period and of several other popular campaigns (e.g.
the 1995, 2003 and 2011 referenda). However, the party and its successive splits failed
to consolidate their influence within the activists and apparatuses of mass civil society
organisations and to transform a generic sympathy into a close collaboration. Mass
civil society organisations (e.g. the CGIL trade union) remained solidly, albeit
somewhat critically, aligned with the PDS/DS/PD; their left-wing tendencies stagnated;
113
The data are not comparable internationally, as they exclude the accounts of all local instances of the
parties.
157
and smaller and more radical organisations (e.g. the independent trade union
confederations or the centri sociali) remained weak and restive.
In conclusion, the dynamics of radical left societal weight can be usefully divided in
three distinct sequences.
A first ascending period (1991-1997) covered the emergence of the PRC under the
"First Republic" and its consolidation under the "Second Republic". The party
cultivated an image of externality and antagonism toward the rest of the political
system while duly participating to broad left (1994) and centre-left (1996) electoral
alliances geared at defeating the right. The victory of the latter and the creation of the
first organic centre-left cabinet of the Second Republic (Prodi I, 1996-2001), which the
PRC supported externally, rapidly highlighted the ambiguity of the party's positioning
and increased the centrifugal pressures on it, leading to the crisis of 1998 and opening
a new phase.
The second period (1998-2007) was characterised by a significant organisational
fragmentation, a pro-cyclical oscillation at high levels and a growing integration of the
parties within the centre-left. The radical left space was now occupied by two main
organisations (PRC and PdCI), which lost weight while in office and almost entirely
recovered while in opposition to centre-right governments. The PdCI was from the
start a loyal partner of the centre-left. The PRC, despite the apparent radical turn of
1998-2003, did not resist the political and material incentives provided by a tactics of
centre-left alliances and was also increasingly involved in local and national
governmental participations. Attempts of radical left regroupment all failed on
strategic or organisational issues.
The third period (2008-present), finally, was characterised by an overall lack of
influence and existential uncertainty. The inevitable consequences of the
governmental experience (an unprecedented level of disillusionment and of strategic
and organisational division) traumatised the radical left, leading to heavy electoral
losses and to the exclusion from parliament (2008). The further loss of resources,
visibility, members and presence on the national territory made a recovery very
difficult. Two rival projects of regroupment emerged: on the one hand SEL, on the
other hand the Left Federation (FdS). Both, however, remained weak and essentially
dependent on alliances with the PD for their survival. SEL progressively drifted toward
158
the role of semi-external appendage of the latter while PRC and PdCI suffered a
progressive marginalisation.
4.2.2 Regroupment and fragmentation
Contrary to Germany, in Italy the initial organisational regroupment of disparate
radical left forces within a unified radical left party (the PRC) gradually left place to a
situation of a growing fragmentation.
As TABLE 4.4 clearly shows, the panorama of the radical left thus became increasingly
complex as time went by: from the initial predominance of one "big church" neo-
communist organisation in 1991-1997 (PRC); to the limited competition between a
more radical and a more moderate neo-communist force in 1998-2006 (PRC and PdCI);
to the explosion of the PRC into several fragments after 2006 (PRC, PdCI, SEL, PCL, SC
and other minor groups) and the failure of all subsequent attempts to regroup the
weakened surviving forces.
TABLE 4.4 FRAGMENTATION
Votes
1992
1994
1996
2001
2006
2008
2013
AVER.
PRC
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
74.9%
71.6%
-
-
63.8%
PdCI
-
-
-
24.9%
28.4%
-
-
7.6%
SA (cartel)
-
-
-
-
-
69.3%
-
9.9%
RC (cartel)
-
-
-
-
-
-
39.2%
5.6%
SEL
-
-
-
-
-
-
55.9%
8.0%
Other far left
-
-
-
0.2%
-
30.7%
4.9%
5.1%
TOTAL
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
Members
1992
1994
1996
2001
2006
2008
2012
AVER.
PRC
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
77.8%
68.4%
69.5%
40.7%
79.5%
PdCI
-
-
-
22.2%
31.6%
28.6%
16.1%
14.1%
SEL
-
-
-
-
-
-
42.0%
6.0%
Other far left
-
-
-
-
-
2.0%
1.3%
0.5%
TOTAL
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
MPs
1992
1994
1996
2001
2006
2008
2013
AVER.
PRC
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
55.0%
71.9%
-
-
65.4%
PdCI
-
-
-
45.0%
28.1%
-
-
14.6%
SEL
-
-
-
-
-
-
100.0%
20.0%
TOTAL
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
Fragmentation
index
1992
1994
1996
2001
2006
2008
2013
AVER.
Votes
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.61
1.69
1.95
2.14
1.48
Members
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.53
1.76
1.77
2.72
1.54
MPs
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.98
1.68
-
1.00
1.28
Notes: shares of radical left votes, members, MPs (Camera); Laakso-Taagepera index.
159
In all cases, the increase of the fragmentation was due to splits of the PRC around the
issue of the relationship to be had with the moderate left and, notably, of
governmental participation at the national level. The position of the PRC within the
radical left space thus declined from absolutely hegemonic (until 1997) to clearly
minoritarian (since 2009). Every time that the party seemed to refuse an alliance, right-
wing minorities broke away and formed their own short-lived (CU, 1995) or long-
lasting organisations (PdCI, 1998; MpS
114
and its successor SEL in 2008-2009); every
time that the party came to support a centre-left cabinet, smaller left-wing minorities
did the same (CCA, 1998; PCL, PdAC and SC, 2006-2007). The former were
unquestionably more damaging, with particularly heavy losses of elected
representatives and high-ranking cadres, while the latter tended to be non-starters or
to wither away after a short wave of enthusiasm.
Fragmentation was not necessarily damaging from the point of view of overall (e.g.
electoral) results, but tended to limit the external influence and bargaining power of
each individual actor.
Thus, a series of regroupment schemes were devised over time to counteract the
dispersion of forces and reach over to other potential allies (left-wing currents of the
PDS/DS; the ecologists; social movement activists). All early attempts to build a broad
"radical left pole" failed to materialise; the belated experiment of 2008, when all
radical left parties came together in the Rainbow Left (SA) electoral cartel, led to a
catastrophic defeat. A very high level of fragmentation has persisted in the subsequent
years: the more conciliatory elements have merged into a new non-communist
organisations (SEL) and drifted toward the PD; the PRC and PdCI have oscillated
between alternative projects of regroupment (the FdS federation in 2008-2012; the RC
electoral front in 2013), hopes of autonomous recovery and an increasing
marginalisation; the far-left groups have rapidly declined.
114
Nichi Vendola's Movement for the Left (Movimento per la Sinistra) split after the 2008 congress and
became one of the major partners of the SEL project.
160
4.2.3 Political nature
The analysis of the political nature of the Italian radical left requires a separate
treatment of each main dimension: ideology, sociology, organisation and strategy.
Ideology
The parties of the Italian radical left shared all the ideological trends and
contradictions which characterise the contemporary Western European radical left.
Firstly, the theoretical, cultural and identity references of the parties have tended to
oscillate between traditionalism and innovation, the appeal to the history of Twentieth
Century communism and the search for a broader and more modern radical left
identity.
The legacy of Italian communism in its multi-faceted complexity had been at the core
of the establishment of the PRC in 1991 (Dormagen, 1996 and 1998) and this reference
continued to retain a strong emotional power in the following decades (Cossu, 2004;
De Nardis, 2009). At the same time, the parties were conscious that their success
required a creative re-interpretation and innovation of that tradition (Bertolino, 2004;
Transform!, 2004). Throughout the Nineties and the early Noughties the PRC claimed
to be working, as its name indicated, at a refoundation of communism leading to "a
new mass communist party, a new workers' movement and a new alternative political
alliance" (PRC, 2011). In fact, this task was rarely taken seriously and was soon
degraded to a weapon for the internal factional battle, while the day-to-day practice of
the party was dominated by issues of tactical positioning and electoral alliances.
Moreover, it gradually became clear that this communist identity represented more an
obstacle than a resource in the dialogue with other critical cultures (ecologism,
feminism, third-worldism, left Catholicism, alter-globalism, pacifism, post-operaismo,
movementism) and in the attempts to forge an enlarged radical left pole with potential
partisan and civil society allies.
161
In the end, these two opposing tendencies reached an impasse. On the one hand the
aspirations to refound communism failed to arrive at a concrete synthesis and the PRC,
instead of being nourished by these endeavours, progressively fragmented in a variety
of organisations, each carrier of a different kind of communist identity: modernist and
conciliatory in the case of the CU and SEL; traditionalist and conciliatory in the case of
the PdCI; elusive in the late PRC; intransigent in the case of the far-left splits, which
remained nevertheless divided by very specific ideological interpretations (Trotskyist,
movementist, orthodox and so on).
Secondly, the long-term goals of the parties have until recently all maintained a clear
reference to the overcoming of capitalism and to the attainment of a future socialist or
communist society in their statutes and programmatic documents. For the PRC this
involved "the transformation of capitalist society in order to achieve the liberation of
women and men through the establishment of a communist society" (PRC, 2011); for
the PdCI the "fight for socialism and communism" (PdCI, 2011); for the PCL the
"achievement of communism as a superior form of civilisation" (PCL, 2011). Only the
most recent creation, SEL, has carefully avoided any such mention and claimed to work
toward a generic "alternative to modern capitalism" (SEL, 2010).
However, as in most of the contemporary radical left thinking, the exact contours of
this project and its links with day-to-day political activity remained unclear. Politically,
the substitution of the Soviet model with references to democracy, pluralism and self-
management fell short of a model of social decision-making clearly alternative to
liberal democracy. Economically, the key question of the socialisation of the means of
production and of the ways to avoid the pitfalls of bureaucratic planning and state
capitalism were rarely addressed. Strategically, the assertion of the failure of both
Stalinism and social democracy in transforming capitalism did not lead to a serious
reflection on the features and problems of a realistic path toward a post-capitalist
future
115
.
Thirdly, the mid-term programmatic of all parties – what the PRC called the
"alternative of society" (PRC, 2002) – focused on an eclectic yet coherent assemblage
115
More specifically, the generic rhetoric on democratisation replaced the need to take a reasoned
stand on the classic issues of parliamentarism, revolutionary violence and grassroots self-organisation.
162
of contemporary radical left themes depicting a break with neoliberalism: the
protection of the immediate interests of the salaried population (employment,
salaries, working time, pensions, job security); the defence and expansion of the
welfare state; a renewed economic intervention of the public hand to further industrial
growth and redistribution, curb rents and unproductive expenses and encourage
sustainability; the reform of the international order (peace, solidarity, a social Europe);
the expansion of democracy (proportional representation, industrial democracy, civic
participation) and minority rights (women, LGBT, migrants). In this field, what
distinguished the parties was not so much real programmatic disagreement but rather
their closeness to power: while groups which were comfortable with waging a long-
term opposition (PCL, SC, at times the PRC) could push for the whole package of radical
reforms, including nationalisations, groups which wanted to be accepted as loyal
partners of the centre-left (PdCI, SEL, the PRC at other times) were forced to moderate
or fudge their demands, turning them into generic values or nebulous pleas.
Sociology
From a sociological point of view, the Italian radical left had a profile quite similar to
most of its European counterparts and was mainly characterised by the following
points: a strong decline of the weight of the industrial proletariat to the benefit of non-
industrial workers, the unemployed and the inactive population; a lingering over-
representation of the employed and unemployed salaried strata, in particularly the
lowest ones; a weak penetration among employers and self-employed, over-60 and
housewives; excellent results among the non-religious and weak ones among the
practicing Catholics and other practicing believers; a slightly masculine profile.
The analysis of the radical left electorate (TABLES 4.5 and 4.6) returns both similarities
and differences with that of the Italian Communist Party of the late Eighties.
The first difference is the strong decline of blue-collar workers, whose weight almost
halved in the in the early Nineties as a result of employment trends and political
disengagement and who represented on average less than 20% of contemporary
163
radical left voters. The weight of all employed and unemployed wage workers
remained on the other hand stable around 48.8%, a very low level compared with
international standards and a reflection of the historical weakness of Italian capitalism.
The second divergence is a loss of influence in the "red area" of central Italy to the
benefit of the centre-south. The third dissimilarity is a strong process of rejuvenation
and strong gains among students and young people. The fourth contrast is a reversal of
the educational composition, with excellent results among university graduates and
low ones among voters with little or no education. The fifth change is a doubling of the
weight of non-believers.
The analysis of the radical left membership is instead hampered by the lack of frequent
and complete data for all parties (Chiocchetti, 2013). Altogether, the profile seems to
be fairly similar to that of the electorate: a geographical concentration in the "red
regions" and the centre-south, with a growing predominance of the latter since the
late Nineties; a good presence of the under-35 (around 30%); a "popular" educational
profile (secondary and primary certificate holders predominate) which, while
decreasing over time, sets these parties apart from the profile of their German and
French counterparts; a cross-class sociological composition with small deviations from
the general population (except for the over-representation of students); a weak
feminine presence (20-30%).
164
TABLE 4.5 SOCIOLOGY OF VOTERS (composition)
R.L.
1987
R.L.
1996
R.L.
2001
R.L.
2006
R.L.
2008
AVERAGE
1996-2008
N.
10,892,545
3,213,748
2,494,762
3,113,591
1,623,072
GENDER
Poll
Poll
Poll
Poll
Poll
Male
58.1%
54.9%
60.6%
56.4%
66.0%
59.5%
Female
41.9%
45.1%
39.4%
43.6%
34.0%
40.5%
AREA
Adm
Adm
Adm
Adm
Adm
North-West
26.6%
26.8%
28.8%
26.5%
27.6%
27.4%
North-East
8.0%
7.8%
9.0%
8.1%
9.8%
8.7%
Red area
29.1%
23.1%
23.1%
22.0%
21.4%
22.4%
Centre-South
36.3%
42.3%
39.1%
43.4%
41.2%
41.5%
AGE
Poll
Poll
Poll
Poll
Poll
18-24
13.8%
20.6%
14.2%
15.8%
20.2%
17.7%
25-64
71.9%
74.3%
73.3%
71.3%
69.1%
72.0%
>64
14.3%
5.1%
12.5%
12.9%
10.6%
10.3%
EDUCATION
Poll
Poll
Poll
Poll
Poll
5 years
57.4%
22.9%
20.5%
22.8%
8.5%
18.6%
8 years
25.9%
45.1%
37.5%
24.8%
43.6%
37.8%
13 years
13.9%
25.1%
31.1%
40.6%
30.9%
32.0%
University
2.8%
6.9%
10.8%
11.9%
17.0%
11.6%
PROFESSION
Poll
Poll
Poll
Poll
Poll
Employer and self-
employed
10.2%
6.9%
8.0%
9.0%
7.4%
7.8%
Manager
0.9%
2.3%
2.9%
5.0%
1.1%
2.8%
Employed wage
worker
44.7%
41.1%
41.1%
36.0%
40.4%
39.7%
Blue-collar
34.0%
18.9%
23.4%
17.0%
19.1%
20.1%
White-collar
10.7%
22.3%
17.7%
19.0%
21.3%
19.6%
Unemployed and
atypical
3.7%
7.4%
7.9%
10.0%
11.7%
9.1%
Inactive
40.5%
42.3%
40.6%
40.0%
39.4%
40.6%
Student
1.9%
16.0%
10.9%
9.0%
17.0%
13.2%
Pensioner
22.8%
12.0%
22.9%
21.0%
17.0%
9.1%
Other
15.8%
14.3%
6.9%
10.0%
5.3%
18.2%
"WORKING CLASS"
48.4%
48.6%
48.6%
46.0%
52.1%
48.8%
RELIGION
Poll
Poll
Poll
Poll
Poll
Practicing Catholic
31.9%
30.8%
30.2%
33.3%
21.5%
29.0%
Semi-practicing
Catholic
38.1%
32.5%
26.2%
29.4%
14.0%
25.5%
Non-practicing
Catholic
19.5%
8.9%
20.9%
24.5%
30.1%
21.1%
Other religion
1.0%
2.4%
7.0%
4.9%
3.2%
4.4%
Non-believer
9.5%
25.4%
15.7%
7.8%
31.2%
20.0%
Source: my elaboration ITANES (1987, 1996, 2001, 2006, 2008).
Notes: "WORKING CLASS": employed wage worker plus unemployed.
165
TABLE 4.6 SOCIOLOGY OF VOTERS (penetration)
R.L.
1987
R.L.
1996
R.L.
2001
R.L.
2006
R.L.
2008
AVERAGE
1996-2008
RESULT
28.2%
8.6%
6.7%
8.2%
4.5%
7.0%
GENDER
Poll
Poll
Poll
Poll
Poll
Male
30.6%
8.7%
8.0%
9.1%
5.6%
7.8%
Female
25.5%
8.4%
5.4%
7.2%
3.2%
6.1%
AREA
Adm
Adm
Adm
Adm
Adm
North-West
27.2%
8.3%
7.2%
8.0%
4.6%
7.0%
North-East
18.9%
5.5%
5.1%
5.4%
3.6%
4.9%
Red area
43.6%
10.7%
8.5%
9.8%
5.2%
8.5%
Centre-South
24.7%
8.7%
6.2%
8.3%
4.3%
6.9%
AGE
Poll
Poll
Poll
Poll
Poll
18-24
34.2%
12.4%
9.1%
10.9%
8.8%
10.3%
25-64
28.0%
8.6%
7.0%
8.2%
4.6%
7.1%
>64
25.1%
3.7%
4.5%
6.0%
2.0%
4.1%
EDUCATION
Poll
Poll
Poll
Poll
Poll
5 years
33.6%
6.4%
5.9%
10.7%
2.6%
6.4%
8 years
27.0%
9.9%
7.2%
5.9%
4.4%
6.8%
13 years
19.3%
8.1%
6.4%
8.9%
4.6%
7.0%
University
18.2%
17.0%
8.1%
9.1%
6.2%
10.1%
PROFESSION
Poll
Poll
Poll
Poll
Poll
Self-employed
20.1%
4.3%
4.0%
5.4%
3.2%
4.3%
Manager
19.5%
6.6%
8.4%
16.1%
2.0%
8.3%
Employed wage
worker
34.4%
11.2%
9.0%
8.9%
5.8%
8.7%
White-collar
20.0%
10.9%
7.0%
7.7%
4.7%
7.6%
Blue-collar
44.5%
11.6%
11.3%
10.8%
7.8%
10.4%
Unemployed and
atypical
35.5%
8.7%
6.9%
9.6%
8.2%
8.4%
Inactive
25.6%
8.1%
5.9%
7.7%
3.5%
6.3%
Student
30.0%
13.6%
10.4%
11.0%
8.7%
10.9%
Pensioner
25.7%
5.1%
6.1%
7.8%
2.7%
5.4%
Other
24.9%
8.4%
3.3%
5.9%
1.8%
4.8%
"WORKING CLASS"
34.5%
10.7%
8.6%
9.1%
6.2%
8.7%
RELIGION
Poll
Poll
Poll
Poll
Poll
Practicing Catholic
15.9%
4.7%
4.0%
5.4%
1.8%
4.0%
Semi-practicing
Catholic
39.3%
9.9%
6.5%
8.2%
2.9%
6.9%
Non-practicing
Catholic
54.0%
10.9%
9.1%
15.0%
8.8%
11.0%
Other religion
65.8%
24.5%
17.5%
13.5%
4.4%
15.0%
Non-believer
50.6%
26.1%
27.2%
14.6%
17.3%
21.3%
Source: my elaboration from ITANES (1987, 1996, 2001, 2006, 2008).
Notes: "WORKING CLASS": employed wage worker plus unemployed.
166
Organisation
Created in the early Nineties by the merger of disparate neo-communist factions, the
PRC inherited little of the organisational legacies of the Italian Communist Party and
therefore bypassed most of the features and tendencies of the Twentieth Century
mass party model.
The mixed territorial branch/workplace cell organisation was almost entirely
superseded by a territorial model; bureaucratic centralism was replaced by a strong
membership-based internal democracy; centralisation of resources and decision-
making within a homogeneous central apparatus gave way to a decentralised and
stratarchical organisation, leaving large autonomy to each territorial and hierarchical
level, to the party in public office and to organised internal factions; the leadership
became less collegial/bureaucratic and more personalised/charismatic (Calise, 2006;
Newell, 2010; Gerbaudo, 2011; Damiani, 2013); the parties became highly dependent
from external actors, from the state (party financing and other perks) to professional
consultants and the mass media.
This had both positive and negative long-term consequences.
On the positive side, the organisational models of the Italian radical left remained
flexible, adaptable and capable of renewal, as attested by their ability to of each party
to attract a large initial membership (PRC in 1991, PdCI in 1999 and SEL in 2009), to
continuously renew their ranks (many young people and few pensioners) and to
respond efficiently to favourable external conditions. In particular, they escaped the
common tendency of former communist parties to shrink and age.
On the negative side, the parties remained comparatively fragile, not very disciplined
and with a declining penetration of their party-constituency. The membership density
index (M/V), a useful synthetic expression of the strength of the organisational linkage
between party-organisation and party-constituency, points to medium-weak and
declining values: on average 4.87% for the whole radical left, 4.58% for the PRC, 4.05%
for the PdCI, 3.02% for SEL and 0.63% of the far-left groups. While parties have been
able to recover rapidly from the organisational crisis of 1998, the defeats of 2008-2009
167
have instead plunged them into a state of disarray from which no recovery is yet in
sight.
More detailed party-specific analyses are already available for the PRC (Bertolino,
2004; Transform!, 2004; PRC, 2007; Calossi, 2007), the PdCI (Bordandini & Di Virgilio,
2005 and 2007; Calossi, 2007) and SEL (Romano, 2009; Bordandini, 2013; Damiani,
2013).
Strategy
The major divergence between the individual parties of the Italian radical left can be
found at the level of their strategic elaboration and politics of alliances.
All parties shared a similar analysis of the conjuncture, characterised by an
unfavourable balance of forces between classes, the predominance of neoliberal
policies and a rapid rightward shift of the Italian political system. They also observed
that the transformation of the PDS/DS/PD offered an important opportunity for the
radical left, which could expect to find a large audience by filling the vacuum and by
reclaiming the traditional redistributive and welfarist themes of once expounded by its
competitor. Finally, they all believed that the appropriate mix of parliamentary,
electoral and extra-parliamentary pressures, alone and in alliance with other social and
political forces, could exert a leftward pull on the political system and pave the road to
the successful implementation of their mid-term anti-neoliberal programme.
The identification of the correct strategy required to reach their common goal,
however, produced disagreements and differentiations. The most radical groups and
tendencies considered the moderate left as a direct adversary and obstacle which had
irreversibly sold out to the camp of the bourgeoisie and therefore insisted on the
establishment of an autonomous anti-capitalist pole and a strategy of anti-capitalist
alternative; all other groups (most of the PRC, SEL and the PdCI), while moderately or
strongly critical of the centre-left, nevertheless believed that a strategy of leftward pull
could in due time influence the latter and lead to its "re-socialdemocratisation",
thereby turning it into a useful ally.
168
Moreover, the parties differed in their readiness to accept tactical compromises in the
short term. The far-left currents had a fairly intransigent attitude, refusing most
hypotheses of governmental participation and electoral alliance with the centre-left
116
;
the right-wing ones had a conciliatory attitude, believing that an organic alliance with
the centre-left was inevitable to defeat the right and to prevent a greater evil; the
centrist ones oscillated between the two perspectives.
The majority group of the PRC was particularly affected by the dilemma between the
need to emphasise its autonomy and the desire not to antagonise its future potential
allies, trying to steer a middle course of "radicality and unity" (PRC, 1996): radicality in
the anti-neoliberal demands and image; unity with the centre-left to defeat the right.
At the practical level this entailed convoluted tactics involving, for instance, offering an
electoral but not a governmental alliance (1996, 2001, 2013), providing external
support to a centre-left government but being prepared to topple it if demands were
not met (1996-1998) or compensating an hostile relation at the national level by
strengthening or preserving the local ones (1998-2004; 2008-2013). Only in the period
2004-2008 the party turned toward a policy of generalised alliances with the centre-
left, justifying it with over-optimistic arguments on the strength and influence of the
social movements (PRC, 2005).
The position of the PRC was an attempt to respond to the deep-seated contradictory
tendencies present within the (actual and potential) radical left constituency. It was
however hard to sustain and soon degenerated into an incoherent succession of
abrupt tactical shifts and internal lacerations. Every time that the moment arrived
when a clear choice between supporting and toppling a centre-left government was
required (1995; 1996-8; 2006-2008), the unity of the party exploded and large sections
of its electorate scattered in the direction of abstentionism, lesser-evilism and protest.
116
The national congresses of the PRC were dominated by these issues. The various far-left motions all
rejected organic alliances with the centre-left, but were often more pragmatic on softer forms of
indirect assistance (such as the unilateral withdrawal in key constituencies). The Sinistra Critica
tendency, in particular, strongly attacked the Unione alliance (2004-2008) but its few MPs did not have
the heart to topple the Prodi II government, deploying for two years all kind of parliamentary
strategems to mark their public dissent while ensuring the cabinet's survival. The events are well
documented – albeit with some positive spin – by one of their protagonists (Cannavò, 2009).
169
The successive left-wing and right-wing splits of the PRC tried to cut the Gordian knot
by choosing one or the other possible options: to wage a vocal opposition of principle
or to become a loyal and responsible, albeit critical, left of government. Neither was
however very successful. The organisations choosing the former option (COBAS, CCA,
PdAC, PCL and SC) were invariably quickly marginalised. Those opting for the latter
possibility (CU, PdCI and SEL), however, never went beyond deceiving electoral scores
(2-3%); in the long term, they were either absorbed by the moderate left or forced to
re-radicalise. SEL currently finds itself precisely in this situation, torn between the
constraints of its organic alliance with the PD (and the hypothesis of a merger) and its
objective collocation as the largest left-wing opposition to the "grand coalition"
cabinets of Mario Monti and Enrico Letta (2011-2013).
170
4.3 Filling the vacuum: potential and limits of
radical left mobilisation
As in Germany, the political and economic trends of the post-1989 decades sketched a
worrying picture for the radical left but simultaneously offered important chances of
revival and growth.
The growing economic problems of the country, which hit heavily the medium-low
salaried strata and the new generations, shook the popular confidence in the ability of
Italian capitalism to ensure an adequate growth and a wide distribution of material
welfare. The policy responses of the state, marked by a mix of austerity (deficit control,
pension reforms, wage containment) and neoliberal solutions (privatisations,
liberalisations, labour market flexibility), were primarily shouldered by the same
categories and failed to counteract the decline. Finally, the crisis of the party system of
the "First Republic" and the rapid rightward shift of the majority of the former Italian
Communist Party created the legitimate expectation that a representation gap had
emerged and was waiting for the radical left to fill it.
The present section will analyse more in detail the contours of the problem, the
response of the radical left and the results of its electoral and organisational
mobilisation.
4.3.1 Economic stagnation and neoliberal shift
The underlying weaknesses of Italian capitalism (low concentration and centralisation
of capital, low productivity and innovation, focus on low-intermediate segments of the
productive ladder, inefficient state) were masked from 1970 to 1992 by a massive
increase of deficit spending and by frequent currency devaluations. In the Nineties, as
these policy tools were gradually neutralised by the participation of the country to the
process of further European integration, the country was thus plunged into prolonged
economic stagnation.
171
TABLE 4.7 MACRO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS
REF
1982-1993
1993-2003
2003-2009
1993-2009
Real GDP annual growth (CAGR)
2.2%
1.7%
-0.1%
1.0%
Real wages annual growth (CAGR)
1.1%
-0.1%
0.6%
0.2%
Wage share of GDP (average)
49.2%
45.1%
45.4%
45.2%
Unemployment rate (average)
11.0%
10.2%
7.2%
9.1%
Current account balance/GDP (average)
-0.9%
1.1%
-1.5%
0.1%
1993
2003
2009
Italy's share of global GDP (average)
4.1%
4.0%
3.7%
Gross public debt/GDP (average)
115.0%
104.1%
116.4%
Sources: my elaborations from WEO (2013 April), ISTAT, KLEMS.
Notes: Periodisation according to the economic cycles (trough to through). CAGR: compound annual growth rate.
The selected macro-economic indicators summarised in TABLE 4.7 are telling. Growth
rates progressively deteriorated and came to a standstill after 2003. The gains of the
feeble expansions (2004-2007, 2010) were completely wiped out by severe recessions
(2008-2009, 2012); public debt soared; the loss of international competitiveness and
de-industrialisation advanced (Gallino, 2006; De Cecco, 2007). The biggest losers of
these trends were the different sections of the Italian working class.
Employed wage workers were severely hit by the tripartite July Agreements of 1992-
1993, which abolished the existing wage-indexation mechanism and replaced it with a
formalised corporatism (concertazione) geared toward wage restraints (Simoni, 2010).
The effect was two decades of real wage stagnation (+0.2% yearly growth) and a
significant fall of aggregate wages and income equality.
The rate of unemployment, which had exploded from around 5% in the Sixties to
12.0% in 1989, remained high throughout the Nineties and declined in the Noughties
only thanks to a shift toward precarious employment. At the same time, the rate of
inactivity rarely dropped below 50% of the working-age population. As the traditionally
patchy coverage of welfare provisions in this domain was never expanded, these
categories of unemployed, semi-employed and discouraged workers remained largely
bereft of public safety nets and had to rely on alternative forms of support to survive
(the enlarged family, the informal economy, private charities).
The most penalised, however, were the youngest generations of the workforce, which
were disproportionally hit by unemployment, labour precarisation and the long-term
effects of pension reforms.
172
The effects of the faltering growth were accentuated by the brutal shift of the Italian
state from a (crony) dirigiste welfare state toward austerity and neoliberalisation
(Barca, 1997; Amyot, 2003). Under the pressure of the fiscal and currency crisis of
1992, the old post-war settlement was progressively dismantled in the decade 1992-
2002 and the readjustment proceeded with up and downs to this day.
Firstly, a large process of privatisations and liberalisations led to the dismissal of much
of the state-owned industrial and financial corporations, which had previously
controlled a majority share of the national economy (Mediobanca, 2000; Valle, 2002;
Mucchetti, 2003; Barucci & Pierobon, 2007). Privatisations helped to fuel the
speculative stock exchange bubble of the Nineties but did little to improve the
efficiency of Italian capitalism; in fact, the only successful "national champions" which
emerged from the process were paradoxically groups where public or quasi-public
subjects retained a controlling share (ENI, ENEL, Finmeccanica, Unicredit, Intesa
Sanpaolo), while many other important industrial companies failed to survive the end
of state support and often ended up being sold to their foreign competitors.
Secondly, the growth of public employment – both a traditional source of patronage
and an important outlet for university graduates – stopped and inverted its course,
leading to a loss of almost 9% of the workforce in the period 1998-2010.
Thirdly, wide-ranging reforms and budgetary cuts curbed the upward trend of social
security and welfare expenditures and planned drastic reductions of services for the
long term. The main area of welfare retrenchment was that of pensions, where a series
of reforms
117
steeply increased the retirement age and decreased future contributions
(Ferrara & Jessoula, 2007; Aben, 2011). While partially safeguarding rights of existing
pensioners and older workers, these measures will have disturbing effect on the
retirement age and levels of treatment of the central and youngest generations of the
workforce.
Fourthly, labour market reforms
118
steeply increased the precariousness of
employment and working conditions (Accornero, 2006; Gallino, 2007; Choi & Mattoni,
2010).
117
One was withdrawn (Maroni in 1994) and six were successfully implemented (Amato in 1992, Dini in
1995, Prodi in 1997, Maroni in 2004, Prodi in 2007 and Fornero in 2011).
118
Major changes were notably introduced by Ciampi (1995), Treu (1996-1997), Maroni (2003) and
Fornero (2012).
173
Finally, a policy of monetary and fiscal discipline was introduced and institutionalised
through EU instruments (the Maastricht criteria of 1992, the delegation of monetary
creation to the European Central Bank in 1999, the Fiscal Compact of 2012). While
failing to address the long-term Italian debt problem
119
, these measures compounded
the economic and social difficulties of the country.
The neoliberal shift produces important changes also outside the strict socio-economic
field.
At the level of democratic institutions, the constitutional framework of the "First
Republic" survived almost intact but was partially subverted by a hosts of
transformations: the wide-ranging changes in the electoral legislation, which forced a
bipolar straightjacket on the fragmented partisan landscape and strongly penalised
smaller and non-aligned parties; the replacement of the traditional political ideologies
(Christian democracy, communism, socialism, republicanism, liberalism) with vaguer
post-modern identities (reformism, populism, neoliberalism and neo-conservatism,
localism/secessionism); the permanent conflict between the leader of one of the main
governing coalitions, Silvio Berlusconi, and the judiciary; moves toward regionalisation.
At the level of international relations, the end of the Cold War order was the occasion
for a turn toward a more activist foreign policy (Ignazi et. al., 2012). While Italy had
been prevented to deploy troops abroad until 1970 by the Paris Treaty of 1947 and
had started participating to peace-keeping missions only in 1982, since 1990 the
country has intervened in a long series of foreign military interventions (Iraq in 1990;
Somalia in 1992-1993; Albania, 1997; Kosovo, 1999; Afghanistan, 2001-ongoing; Iraq,
2003-2006; Libya, 2011). Constitutional constraints (De Fiores, 2003) and the
widespread pacifist sentiment among the population (Roccato & Fedi, 2007) failed to
act as a significant brake on this new military activism.
119
From its peak of 121.1% in 1994 the gross debt/GDP was slowly reduced to 103.9% in 2003 but then
stagnated and rose again during the global financial crisis, reaching 120.1% in 2011.
174
4.3.2 The "Second Republic" and the potential representation gaps
The neoliberal transformation of the country was accompanied by veritable
earthquakes at the level of political representation.
Firstly, the dominant party blocks were twice discredited by corruption scandals,
severe economic crises and unpopular policies, suffering veritable electoral and
organisational collapses to the benefit of new anti-establishment parties and political
disengagement (see FIGURE 4.8).
In the first case (1992-1994) the old centrist ruling coalition (pentapartito) completely
fell apart, fuelling the rise of a new regroupment of right-wing forces headed by Silvio
Berlusconi (Waters, 1994; Bartolini & D'Alimonte, 1995; Nelken, 1996; Revelli, 1996;
Gundle & Parker, 1996; Ginsborg, 2001). In the second case (2006-2013) the two
centre-left and right-wing blocs of the existing bipolar alternation entered into a
severe crisis and a new uncertain period of partisan reconfiguration opened up – so
far, mainly to the benefit of the populist 5 Star Movement (M5S)
120
(De Sio et al., 2013;
Bordignon & Ceccarini, 2013).
Secondly, even during the period of relative electoral and systemic consolidation of the
"Second Republic" (1994-2006) the support for governmental forces remained
somewhat shaky.
The winning coalition of each general election always stopped short of 50% of valid
votes and 41% of the total electorate; these values further plummeted to their lowest
point of the 2013 elections, when the plurality obtained by the centre-left coalition
consisted in just 29.5% of valid votes and 21.4% of the total electorate. Moreover, an
important section of the support for both centre-left and centre-right coalitions was
motivated merely by mutual hatred (not political identification or policy agreement)
and evaporated as soon the enemy was defeated; thus, Italian governments always
lost the subsequent general election and were often toppled mid-term by internal
defections (1995, 2001, 2008 and 2011).
120
MoVimento 5 Stelle.
175
TABLE 4.8 ELECTORAL RESULTS BY POLE AND IDEOLOGY
Sources: my elaborations from Ministero degli Interni.
Notes: share of the total electorate, Camera. First figure: aggregation by actual electoral coalitions. Second figure: aggregation by
party ideology.
The shallow social roots of the new party system are revealed even more forcefully by
the figures on party membership.
121
The crisis of the old parties in the early Nineties
was accompanied by a collapse of the number of total party members, which fell from
4.4 million in 1990 to just 1.5 million in 1996. The data for the following years are fairly
unreliable but indicate, at best, a small recovery to 1.7-1.8 million members.
121
Data on total party membership are fairly reliable up to 1992, less so until 2003 and largely
inconsistent afterwards, in particular after 2006. The figures provided in the text are my estimated
based on the data of the Istituto Cattaneo and other sources.
176
To sum up, the traditional ruling parties of the "First Republic" lost their popular
support and legitimacy almost overnight but the new parties of the "Second Republic"
failed to adequately replace them and after a while, under the impact of the global
depression, entered in turn into a deep systemic crisis.
From the point of view of the radical left this situation represented, in abstracto, an
unprecedented opportunity of electoral and social growth.
Firstly, the collapse of the dominant centrist bloc in 1992-1994 might have been
expected to benefit the forces emerged from the traditional main opposition (the
Italian Communist Party): the PDS and the PRC. This was however not the case, as the
left-wing alliance of the Progressisti was thrashed at the 1994 general election by the
alliance of new right-wing populist forces: the neo-regionalist Northern League
122
, the
post-fascist National Alliance
123
and Berlusconi's Forward Italy
124
(Bartolini &
D'Alimonte, 1994).
Secondly, the electoral rise of the right-wing bloc did not consolidate into a long-term
dominance of the country; on the contrary, each right-wing cabinet had to face a
revitalised left-wing constituency, large-scale protests and swiftly declining approval
ratings. Several waves of left-leaning contentious politics came into being.
125
The first
and second Berlusconi government, in particular, were confronted by veritable mass
movements involving oceanic demonstrations and general strikes (1994-1995, 2001-
2004); the contestation of the third Berlusconi government was more dispersed but
nevertheless included important student and anti-governmental mobilisations (2008-
2009). The radical left was in a good position to exploit this discontent, due to its clear
programmatic stance on the salient themes (welfare reform, economic policy,
globalisation, peace) and its prominent involvement in the movements.
Thirdly, the rapid rightward shift of the moderate left also offered a promising avenue
of growth. At a symbolic level, the choice of the majority wing of the Italian Communist
122
Lega Nord.
123
Alleanza Nazionale.
124
Forza Italia.
125
Baccaro (2003), Della Porta et al. (2003, 2006), Mirra (2005), Roccato and Fedi (2007), Ferrara and
Jessoula (2007), Ghezzi and Guiducci (2007), Della Porta and Piazza (2008), Andruccioli (2008), Ceri
(2009), Newell (2009), Fusaro and Hansen (2010), De Cindio and Peraboni (2010).
177
Party to abandon any reference to communism (1991), ally with its former socialist and
Christian democratic adversaries (1993-1996) and ultimately merge with them into
generic centre-left subjects (2004-2007) was troubling for the old communist
constituency (Bordandini et al., 2008). More importantly, the rapid transition of the
PDS/DS/PD from Eurocommunism to a Blairite "new" social democracy and a US-style
left-of-the-centre force reversed all the traditional policy positions of the party and
turned it into the strongest supporter of the neoliberal modernisation of the country.
Ironically, the main actors of the dismantlement of the post-war Italian social model
were not the right-wing cabinets but centrist/technocratic governments supported by
the post-communist left (1993-1994, 1995, 2011-2013) or proper centre-left
governments (1996-2001 and 2006-2008).
126
While the wild neoliberal rhetoric of the
right often concealed political actors incapable or unwilling to undertake major policy
reforms, the agency of the moderate left and its collateral trade union CGIL were vital
for the implementation of most of the transformations of the period: wage restraint,
welfare retrenchment, labour market flexibilisation, fiscal rigour, privatisations,
electoral and constitutional reform, EU integration, foreign wars. The radical left, thus,
could reasonably hope to benefit from progressively picking up those traditional left-
wing themes that the Left Democrats were progressively discarding.
Was the radical left able to fill the gap of representation of labour/welfarist interests
opened up by the crisis or rightward shift of the traditional political parties? If not,
why?
126
The first group includes the cabinets Ciampi, Dini and Monti, the second group the cabinets Prodi I,
D'Alema I and II, Amato II, Prodi II. The cabinet Amato I (1992-1993) was formally opposed by the PDS
but with little conviction, as the left-wing trade-union confederation failed to mobilise against its
austerity measures and lent a grudging support to Amato's economic policy and industrial relations
reform (the July 1992 agreement). A few years later Amato was co-opted as one of the main leaders of
the centre-left coalition.
178
4.3.3 Electoral mobilisation
The assessment of radical left mobilisation at the electoral level reveals both partial
successes and important limitations.
Successes
The best way to gauge with precision the electoral success of the radical is the study of
results in all kinds of elections (lower chamber, regional, European) over a territory
where data are comparable (13 regions representing 80.8% of the total Italian
electorate)
127
. The evolution is reported in the figure below (FIGURE 4.9).
In complex, the Italian radical left enjoyed a mid-sized electoral support (average 7.1%,
standard deviation 1.3%) with cyclical oscillations around a slightly parabolic central
trend. The electoral development can be subdivided in three main phases.
In the first period (1991-1994) the left-wing currents which refused the dissolution of
the Italian Communist Party and gave birth to the PRC managed to emerge and
consolidate as a force weighing 6.3% of the valid votes (s.d. 0.4%). This new radical left
electorate was just about a fifth of the old communist one but the development can
nevertheless be regarded as a first important success.
In the second period (1995-2007) the parties of the radical left were forced to adapt to
the socio-political landscape of the new "Second Republic" and its system of bipolar
competition. There is no doubt that this produced significant, albeit unstable, further
gains. Average results rose to 7.9% (s.d. 0.9%), with frequent peaks around 8-9% of the
valid votes (1995-1997; 2002-2006). Even in the period of relative crisis following the
experience of the Prodi I government and the split of the PdCI (1998-2001) results
remained higher than in the previous phase.
127
The regions are those holding synchronised regional elections. The resulting values for the radical left
are slightly higher than the real results.
179
FIGURE 4.9 ELECTORAL RESULTS (13 REGIONS)
Sources: my elaboration from Ministero dell'Interno.
Notes: 13 regions: Piemonte, Liguria, Lombardia, Veneto, Emilia-Romagna, Toscana, Umbria, Marche, Lazio, Campania, Puglia,
Basilicata, Calabria.
In the third period (2007-present), on the contrary, the radical left collapsed to its
historical low point. The average results (5.8%, s.d. 1.1%) were only slightly inferior to
the initial ones but represented a significantly smaller own electorate, as the radical
left parties regularly ran within composite electoral lists including significant partners
with different origins and orientations (Verdi always; the PSI in 2009; the IDV in 2013).
The 2008 general election was particularly destructive, with the total plunging to 4.5%
and the forces involved in supporting the Prodi II government (the Rainbow Left list)
gathering just 3.1% of valid votes; the subsequent recovery was altogether weak and
unstable.
The graph already provides several indications with regards to the reasons for the
growth and decline of the radical left.
Firstly, the evolution appears to be strongly linked with choices of political positioning.
On the one hand, the radical left slowly grows while in opposition (1992-1996; 2001-
2006; 2008-2009) and is severely punished while in government (1996-1999; 2006-
2008). On the other hand, however, its best results are generally obtained when
running as part of a centre-left coalition (1995-1996; 2005-2006) while a choice of
isolation (PRC in 1999-2001; FdS/RC in 2009-2013) tends to produce sub-standard
results. Altogether, the movement shows an impressive parallelism with that of the
180
centre-left as a whole, with the hopes built during periods of right-wing government
regularly betrayed after the electoral victory.
Secondly, the curve also appears to be related to trends in social mobilisation, with
electoral peaks (1995-1996; 2004-2006) neatly following the aftermath of large left-
wing contentious movements.
The electoral results of the radical left by social category presented above (TABLE 4.6)
also show a certain capacity to fare well among the sectors at the receiving end of the
stick of neoliberal reforms: between 1996 and 2006, on average, it won the vote of
11.2% of blue-collar workers, 11.7% of students and 10.8% of under-25 people (but
only 8.6% of white-collar workers and 8.4% of the unemployed).
A final element of interpretation is offered by the study of electoral fluxes (TABLE 4.10
and TABLE 4.11). Unfortunately, the data are incomplete and not very reliable; they
may suggest some tendencies but cannot provide definite conclusions.
128
With these
caveats in mind, it seems possible to confirm that the votes from and toward the
radical left followed two main directions: on the one hand, the former Italian
Communist Party and its successors (PCI/PDS/DS/FED/PD); on the other hand,
abstentionism. In 1992, around 86% of the votes of the PRC came from the former. In
the period 1994-2006, the radical left gained 1.3 million votes from the PDS/DS and
lost 0.4 million to abstentions. In 2008, finally, the electoral defeat was
overwhelmingly due to heavy losses in both directions: 0.7 million votes went to the
PD and 0.6 million votes were lost to abstentions.
128
The source data of the ITANES post-electoral surveys mislabel the radical left in 1994 (it is not
possible to distinguish between PRC and PDS voters) and returns a very small sample in 1992 (22 radical
left voters). In 2008 the question makes reference exclusively to the Rainbow Left list but, as far-left
respondents did not have an alternative choice and are likely to have selected that option (the poll
results of SA are unusually high compared to the real ones), results can be here cautiously interpreted as
referring to the whole area. The data for 2013 have not yet been made public. The figures reported are
my own estimates; due to statistical error, the large discrepancy between survey data and effective
results and the need to introduce many hypotheses in the elaboration their value is only indicative.
181
TABLE 4.10 NET ELECTORAL FLUXES
1987
1992
1994
1996
PARTY
DP
R.L.
R.L.
R.L.
Real votes
641,901
2,201,428
2,343,946
3,213,748
Net flux:
PCI/PDS/DS/Ulivo/PD
1,659,528
603,620
Other parties
-218,625
147,059
Abstention
118,902
119,123
Total
1,599,528
869,802
2001
2006
2008
2013
PARTY
R.L.
R.L.
R.L.
R.L.
Real votes
2,494,762
3,113,591
1,623,072
1,949,768
Net flux:
PCI/PDS/DS/Ulivo/PD
309,282
-159,067
-688,388
Other parties
-702,192
734,894
-203,766
Abstention
-331,319
43,003
-598,366
Total
-724,229
618,830
-1,490,520
Source: Ministero dell'Interno; my elaboration from ITANES (1992, 1996, 2001, 2006).
TABLE 4.11 ORIGIN OF VOTES
1987
1992
1994
1996
PARTY
DP
R.L.
R.L.
R.L.
Real votes
641,901
2,201,428
2,343,946
3,213,748
Origin:
Radical left
4.5%
58.7%
PCI/PDS/DS/Ulivo/PD
86.4%
20.3%
Other parties
0.0%
12.8%
Abstention
9.1%
8.2%
Total
100.0%
100.0%
2001
2006
2008
2013
PARTY
R.L.
R.L.
R.L.
R.L.
Votes
2,494,762
3,113,591
1,623,072
1,949,768
Origin:
Radical left
70.4%
47.4%
70.4%
PCI/PDS/DS/Ulivo/PD
20.3%
20.2%
9.9%
Other parties
5.7%
19.9%
11.1%
Abstention
3.5%
12.5%
8.6%
Total
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
Source: Ministero dell'Interno; my elaboration from ITANES (1992, 1996, 2001, 2006).
From the above-mentioned elements it is therefore possible to conclude that, in its
best moments (1991-1993;
129
1995-1996; 2004-2006), the Italian radical left did
manage to expand its support; it also predominantly fished among the former
communist electorate, the industrial working class and the precarised youth. These
129
After its initial success at the 1992 general election (5.6%), the local elections of 1993 hinted to a
further strong upward tendency, especially in the big cities (e.g. 14.6% in Torino, 11.4% in Milano, 8.9%
in Napoli, 8.6% in Genova, 7.0% in Roma). The expected growth, however, did not materialise at the
subsequent 1994 general election (6.1%).
182
dates coincide with periods of opposition to unpopular centre-right or centrist
governments, strong left-wing extra-parliamentary mobilisations and a visible shift to
the left of public opinion
130
.
Limitations
This success had however very clear limits.
Firstly, all post-1992 gains were cyclically wiped out by sudden negative swings (1993-
1994, 1997-1999, 2007-20008) and, after 2009, left place to a slow but continuous
decline.
Secondly, both in terms of absolute levels and of relative gains these results were
comparatively weak by European standards. The electoral peak of 1996 (8.6% of valid
votes, +2.5 percentage points) is not very impressive if compared to the best results of
the radical left of other countries (Greece 2012: 31.9%, +19.0% points; Netherlands
2006: 16.6%, +10.2 points; Denmark 2007: 15.2%, +5.8 points; Portugal 2002-2009:
19.3%, +8.6 points; Germany 2002-2009: 12.0%, +8.0% points).
Thirdly, the votes of the radical left were well below its potential. I have already shown
(TABLE 4.10) that the net gains from disaffected PDS/DS/PD voters were significant in
the early Nineties but practically ceased after 1998. More generally, the radical left
conquered only a small fraction of the total left potential: 15%-30% of the old
communist electorate
131
; 23%-29% of the total vote for left parties; 23%-31% of all
people positioning themselves on the left (FIGURE 4.12).
130
The average self-positioning of voters (1=left, 10=right), which otherwise gravitates around the
perfect middle of the political spectrum (5.50), jerked to 4.74 in 1996 and 5.07 in 2006 (see ITANES
surveys).
131
A question of the 2001 ITANES survey provides a further interesting glimpse on the patter. People
declaring to have voted for the PCI at least once in the past (38% of the sample) had the following voting
behaviour in 2001: PRC 12.1%; PdCI 3.6%; DS 37.8%; DL 11.4%; FI 18.3%; other parties 7.2%; abstained
9.6%.
183
FIGURE 4.12 INDICATORS OF LEFT-WING OPINION
Source: Ministero dell'Interno; my elaboration from ITANES (1992, 1996, 2001, 2006, 2008)
Notes: RADICAL LEFT = PRC, PdCI and SA. LEFT = the above plus PDS/DS. SELF-POSITIONING: 1-10 left-right scale, included no
responses; radical left = 1; left = 1-3. COMMUNIST VOTE OF 1987: PCI + DP.
The period 2001-2006 was particularly deceiving. Radical left parties played a
prominent role in the extra-parliamentary movements of those years; their trademark
issues (peace, alter-globalism, labour rights) acquired a large visibility; public
participation to left-leaning mobilisations reached unheard-of levels. Just to mention a
few examples: in 2003 almost a fifth of the electorate actively participated to anti-war
protests
132
and 10.5 million people (about 28% of a typical general election electorate)
voted yes to the unsuccessful referendum on the extension of safeguards against
dismissal for workers of companies below fifteen employees. In both cases, the radical
left was the main protagonist of the mobilisation, supported by small political allies
(Verdi, IdV, DS left) and important sections of the left-leaning and Christian
associationism (CGIL, ARCI, Rete Lilliput, etc.) but in opposition to the official line of the
moderate left parties (DS and DL). The majority of pacifist and labour-friendly voters,
however, chose not to vote the radical left in the subsequent 2006 general election
and the results of the latter remained below those of 1996.
132
20.4% declared to have hung out a peace flag from their balcony and 16.5% to have walked in anti-
war demonstrations (Roccato & Fedi, 2007).
184
Explanation
Where did the strategy of exploiting the symbolic (communist identity) and political
(neoliberal policies and centrist or conservative alliances) vacuum created by the
rightward drift of the moderate left go wrong? The answer is likely to depend on three
kinds of reasons.
Firstly, the population seems to a great extent to have followed or accompanied the
political-ideological shift to the right of the political system. In terms of ideological self-
positioning, the overall trend of the Italian electorate is cyclical but clearly tends to the
right (TABLE 4.12). The voters of the PDS/DS/PD, in particular, after some initial
uneasiness have followed the cue of their party and moved to the right in synch with it
(TABLE 4.13).
TABLE 4.13 EVOLUTION OF POST-COMMUNIST SELF-IDENTIFICATION AND PERCEPTION
1994
1996
2001
2006
2008
SELF-POSITIONING
ALL VOTERS
4.74
5.48
5.07
5.46
PDS VOTERS
2.53
3.10
-
3.68
PRC VOTERS
1.80
2.12
2.05
2.37
POSITIONING PDS
ALL VOTERS
2.50
2.89
2.78
3.95
PDS VOTERS
2.62
2.83
-
3.68
PRC VOTERS
3.10
3.44
2.95
4.43
Source: my elaboration from ITANES (1996, 2001, 2006, 2008).
Notes: 1-10 left-right scale (1=left)
In terms of actual voting, the periodic dissatisfaction toward both old (pentapartito)
and new (bipolar coalitions) political system has indeed fed strong anti-establishment
swings, but right-wing (Northern League, Forward Italy, National Alliance) or generic
(Five Star Movement) populism benefitted much more than any left-wing variety of it.
Secondly, as the main left-of-the-centre political force and the heir of an organisation
with a long tradition and strong social roots, the PDS/DS/PD successfully deployed a
variety of mechanisms to retain the allegiance of a majority of the left-wing electorate.
Some (especially in the Nineties) remained out of traditionalism and loyalty for the
glorious communist past. Some others were convinced by the ability of the party to
project a "differentiated image" to each specific segment of the electorate (e.g.
185
appearing as a reasonable organisation promoting wage restraint and budgetary
discipline to the moderates while remaining the friend of the CGIL and of the anti-
fascist partisans to the radicals). Another group stayed thanks to the pull of the
weakened but still imposing network of ex-communist collateral organisations, which
continued to offer an outspoken albeit critical support to the party: notably, the CGIL
trade union confederation, the cooperative movement (Legacoop) and the ARCI
associationism. A final group was made up of leftists fearing the victory of the right-
wing bloc and willing to vote tactically for the lesser evil challenger most likely to
defeat it. The working of bipolarism and anti-Berlusconism favoured the moderate left
all along the period 1994-2008 but the effect of tactical voting was particularly visible
in the 2008 election, when 55.9% of self-identified radical left voters preferred the
avowedly centrist Democratic Party to other more coherent options (ITANES, 2008)
Thirdly, the radical left failed to fully exploit the opportunities which presented
themselves to it.
The big problem was here the growing enmeshing of the parties in the dynamics of
bipolar competition and their participation to centre-left governmental coalitions. The
general weakness of the centre-left camp meant that the help of the radical left was
generally indispensable to win the elections and to form a governmental majority.
Programmatically, there was little ground of agreement between the two sides. A long
list of important reasons, however, pushed in this direction: the strongly-felt rejection
of the right among the radical left members and voters; the fear to be squeezed by an
anti-right tactical voting in case of the choice an excessively intransigent stance (which,
indeed, in part explains the defeat of the SA in 2008); the pressure of radical left
elected representatives, many of whom owed their parliamentary seats and
governmental or other offices to a policy of alliances and who were often prepared to
jump ship to retain them (as indeed happened in 1995, 1998 and 2009); an over-
optimistic view of the possibility to influence the centre-left landscape from the inside.
In the end, the conciliatory line progressively gained ground.
This had two consequences. On the one hand, the radical left greatly undermined its
long-term credibility in campaigning against neoliberal reforms (for the
implementation of which it was partially responsible) and precluded itself the chance
of growing through an aggressive campaign against both centre-left and centre-right
186
poles (which the 1992-1994 and 2008-2013 conjunctures might have offered). On the
other hand, the gains made during periods of ferment and extra-parliamentary
mobilisation against right-wing governments (1996; 2006) were regularly wiped out
after its participation to centre-left majorities (1998; 2008).
Could different tactical and strategic choices have yielded different results?
The answer to this question remains uncertain. On the one hand, it can be argued that
the unprecedented level of governmental involvement of the parties in the years 2006-
2008 (direct participation to the national cabinet and to the cabinets of fourteen
regions, ruling over 65.4% of the Italian population) was the main cause of the
subsequent collapse in 2008. A more radical stance of anti-systemic opposition might
have put the radical left in a better position to exploit the fallouts of the global
financial crisis and the rise of anti-establishment revulsion against both traditional
blocs.
On the other hand, it is not sure that this course was actually viable. All attempts to
create a more radical alternative to the left of the PRC (1996-1998; 2006-2009) were
short-lived and of little consequence. The choice of running alone and outside of a
centre-left alliance might lead to some mid-term gains (as the 1998-2003 course of the
PRC suggests) but meant the immediate short-term forfeiture of the voters most
sensible to the need to defeat the right and inevitable organisational splits. Finally, the
squeeze due to an anti-right useful vote proved to be serious enough in 2001, 2008
and 2013 but would have probably been much stronger after periods of unpopular
right-wing government, threatening the ability of the parties to gain parliamentary
representation.
In conclusion, it seems that the Italian radical left was both the victim of an
unfavourable political environment and an agent of its own demise. Its main weak
point was its inability to pursue a coherent politics of alliances, which progressively
disoriented its own constituency and led to a growing organisational fragmentation
(Cannavò, 2009). The scope for an autonomous stance, however, was significantly
narrowed by the post-1993 electoral laws (with its 4%-threshold, its pre-electoral
coalition formation and its majoritarian incentives) and the strong polarisation of the
political competition.
187
4.3.4 Organisational mobilisation
The results of radical left mobilisation at the organisational level were largely inferior
to the electoral ones. Like the rest of the European radical left, the Italian parties were
incapable to respond effectively to the crisis of the Fordist organisational models and
to turn a vague popular sympathy toward their political programmes into more intense
forms of attachment and activism.
The results in terms of membership were lukewarm.
As already remarked, the total number of members of Italian political parties suffered
a veritable collapse in the early Nineties (from 4.5 million members in 1990 to 1.5
million in 1995) but somewhat recovered afterwards (between 1.7 and 2.0 million). In
the case of the PCI/PDS/DS/PD, the party halved from 1990 (1,273 thousand) to 1993
(690 thousand) and continued a slower decline to this day (2012: 505 thousand), with
the exception of an extraordinary but short-lived bout of enthusiasm provoked by the
establishment of the Democratic Party in 2007. Despite this opportunity (see FIGURE
4.14) the parties of the radical left gained very little until 2007 and drastically declined
afterwards.
FIGURE 4.14 MEMBERSHIP OF POST-COMMUNIST PARTIES
188
On the positive side, the radical left membership avoided the early decline and aging
typical of all traditional and post-communist parties (including the DS) and remained
fairly responsive to changes in its electoral influence, growing in 1991-1993, 1996-1997
and 2002-2006 and declining in 1994, 1998-2000 and 2007-present.
On the negative side, it remained dwarfed by its post-communist competitor and (with
the exception of the founding period in 1991-1992) it failed to attract significant
numbers of its disaffected members and activists.
The results in terms of organisational linkages were as well not particularly positive.
In Italy the networks of collateral mass civil society organisations did not generally
follow the collapse of their traditional political referents and usually managed to
reinvent themselves as less politicised interest groups and service providers. This is
notably the case of the trade union confederations CGIL, CISL and UIL, which lost
following and legitimacy in the workplaces but compensated for it by growing in
absolute terms, thanks to the massive influx of pensioners, and by preserving or
expanding their role in the system of industrial relations.
133
In this context, the
influence of the PRC started from weak initial positions and tended to stagnate or
wane over time.
Within the main left-wing trade union confederation CGIL, the PRC had at its moment
of maximum influence in 1996 the support of 13.7% of union members and no
secretariat members; conversely, the PDS could boast 44.9% of the former and 75% of
the latter.
134
The trade union left, which embraced cadres loyal to the radical left, the
PDS left and other extra-parliamentary groups, remained relatively weak (10-25% of
congress votes), fragmented in rival tendencies
135
and jealous of its autonomy from
any partisan intervention (Cremaschi, 2000; Ghezzi & Guiducci, 2007; Andruccioli,
133
The ICTWSS database (Visser, 2013) estimates a drop of "net" union density from a peak of 50.5% in
1976 to 38.8% in 1990 and 33.2% in 2006, followed by a small recovery in the following period of
economic crisis. In absolute terms, however, the three major confederations (CGIL, CISL, UIL) grew from
8.2 million members in 1976 to 10.1 million in 1990 and 12.2 million in 2010.
134
The secretariat did generally include at least one member of the minority left-wing tendency, but this
tended to be either a member of the DS left (1991-1996) or an independent (1998-2007; 2010-present).
Dalmasso (2002: 66) also reports a figure of 470 card-carrying PRC officials of the CGIL in 1997 (2.9% of
the total 16 thousand).
135
The main groups were the following: Fausto Bertinotti's Essere Sindacato (1991-1996), Gianpaolo
Patta's Alternativa Sindacale (1996-2000) and Lavoro Società (2000-2007), Ferruccio Danini's Area dei
Comunisti (1996-2000), Giorgio Cremaschi's Rete28Aprile (2005-present), and the left-wing majority of
the FIOM (1997-present).
189
2008; Lacoppola, 2010). The parties, in turn, failed to define a coherent union policy
and to launch with their union allies effective industrial or political mobilisations.
The situation was similar in other sectors. On the one hand, the former ancillary
organisations of the PCI, the pacifist and environmental movement, the world of
charities and NGOs remained largely dominated by bureaucracies faithful to the
moderate left parties (PDS/DS, DL and PD). On the other hand, the more radical galaxy
of post-operaist grassroots trade unions and centri sociali (Mudu, 2004 and 2012; Choi
& Mattoni, 2010) was friendlier but numerically limited, fragmented and easily
alienated.
136
The only field where the PRC did make a breakthrough was the alter-
globalist and pacifist movement: here the party managed to play a dominant role and
to win a large sympathy among the activist community (Della Porta et al., 2003 and
2006)
137
. Even in this case, however, the success was short-lived. The party member
Vittorio Agnoletto was indeed selected as spokesperson of the Genova Social Forum
(2001) and of the Italian Social Forum (2002-2004), two loose consensus-based
national coordinating bodies which encompassed most of the centre-left spectrum of
Italian civil society. The individual member organisations however (most of whom
dominated by the DS or DL) never relinquished much control to it and, as the
movement ebbed in 2004-2005, the centrality of the radical left rapidly evaporated
leaving behind few traces.
In a nutshell, the radical left failed to exploit the crisis of the mass parties of the "First
Republic". Its membership levels and organisational linkages remained medium-weak
and no match for its post-communist rival.
As for the electoral dimension the radical left failed to offer a convincing solution to
the widespread dissatisfaction of the "people of the left" which, instead of radicalising,
turned to lesser-evilism or resignation and disengagement. The good relations of
sympathy and collaboration developed at the peak of the alter-globalist and pacifist
movement with mass organisations (FIOM, CGIL, ARCI, UDS/UDU), thematic networks
(Genova Social Forum and Italian Social Forum, Tavola della Pace, Forum del Terzo
136
Several groups were quite friendly to the PRC in the early Nineties and early Noughties but broke
with it during its periods of governmental participation: e.g. the leadership teams of the grass-roots
unions SLAI COBAS, RdB/USB and Conf. COBAS.
137
A survey conducted during the Genova counter-summit, for instance, returned a strong proximity of
respondents with the PRC (63.5%) and a low one for the DS (10.2%).
190
Settore) and party-political groups (the left-wing tendencies of DS and DL) could not
trump traditional post-communist and Christian democratic allegiances and the call of
anti-Berlusconism: at every critical juncture both apparatuses and members either
refused to jump ship, falling back to the Left Democrats and the Democratic Party
138
,
or left disillusioned.
139
The radical left thus remained weakly rooted in the strategic
sites of class struggle (notably, the workplaces and the trade unions), incapable of
igniting mass mobilisations against the centre-left governments (whereas the CGIL
continued to be able to undermine right-wing ones) and prisoner of big and small
autonomous civil society bureaucracies.
4.3.5 Conclusion
The "Bolognina turn" of 1989-1991 (Ignazi, 1992; Liguori, 2009) marked the end of the
history of Twentieth Century communism in Italy, one of the countries where this
tradition had obtained the largest societal weight and the best policy results.
The neo-communist currents which came together in 1991 to form the PRC managed
to carve up a medium-small political area from its ruins; in the medium-long term,
however, they failed to revive the prospects of an anti-capitalist alternative and to
profit from a series of negative but potentially favourable developments: the collapse
of the traditional political parties (1991-1995); the transformation of their post-
communist cousins (1991-2007); the renewed crisis of the party system (2008-
present); a context marked by economic stagnation and neoliberal reforms.
138
The example of the CGIL is indicative. In 1989 four out of seven communist members of the
secretariat were against the Bolognina turn and close to the left-wing Ingrao minority, but none joined
the PRC in 1991. In 2006, again, four out of nine DS members of the secretariat sympathised with the
left-wing Mussi minority, but by 2008 no member of Sinistra Democratica remained.
139
The two classic examples are the end of the PCI in 1989-1993 (at least 600,000 members were lost
and did not continue to be active either in the PDS or in the PRC) and the revulsion against concertative
line of the official trade unions in 1992-1995 (these lost hundreds of thousands of active members but
very few switched over to the radical grass-roots unions).
191
As indicated in FIGURE 4.15, the societal weight of the radical left followed a pattern of
very moderate growth until 2006 but suffered a serious setback afterwards
140
. This is
unlikely to change in the short term.
FIGURE 4.15 INDICATORS OF INFLUENCE
Notes: share of the total electorate
140
It must be here reminded again that the electoral data for the last two elections are somewhat
overstated, as the list computed included non-communist allies (Greens in 2008; Greens and IdV in
2013).
192
4.4 Explaining rising fragmentation and failed
regroupment
The Italian radical left followed a trajectory which brought it from an initial period of
regroupment and hegemony of the PRC (1991-1994) to a progressively growing
organisational fragmentation (1995-2013). How can this development be explained?
Like their European counterparts, the Italian radical parties were faced by one major
and one minor dilemma.
The first dilemma was the relationship to be taken toward the centre-left camp.
Should the radical left embrace a clear-cut attitude, choosing to be strategically
independent and alternative or on the contrary to be a constituent part of it? Should it
instead pragmatically choose on a case-by-case basis, oscillating between tactical
alliances and temporary breaks? Politically, the gulf between the anti-neoliberal or
anti-capitalist aspirations of the former and the modernisation project of the latter
was huge and never ceased to grow, projecting a farcical light on the idea of a
programmatic alliance. Radical and moderate left advanced diametrically opposite
solutions to all major policy choices faced by the country: state economic intervention
vs. disengagement; wage push vs. restraint; welfare expansion vs. retrenchment;
military neutralism vs. intervention. Attempts to reach a substantial compromise and
govern together (1995-2001; 2006-2008) were inevitably marred by continuous
frictions and ambiguities and only survived thanks to the choice of sections of the
radical left to give up their demands, engage in degrading efforts to mitigate or spin
the scope and pace of neoliberal reforms and resign themselves to support the "lesser
evil". On the other hand, good political reasons pushed for some sort of alliance: a) the
determination to defeat the right-wing coalition which, because of its history,
ideological positions and social foundations, elicited a widespread and fierce rejection
among the left-wing constituency; b) the desire not to cut one's ties with those
important sections of the centre-left constituency which shared some or many anti-
neoliberal values; c) the hope (or wishful thinking) in one's ability to outmanoeuvre the
193
leadership of the moderate left and pressure it into significant concessions.
141
This
issue was the source of most internal conflicts between radical left tendencies and
organisations.
The second dilemma was represented by the tension between ideological and
organisational self-sufficiency and radical left regroupment. Was the PRC and its
project to "refound communism" adequate to hegemonise the political space of the
radical left and to exploit the emerging gaps of political representation on the left of
the centre-left bloc? Or, on the contrary, did a further expansion and regroupment of
the radical left necessitate a broader image and a front with other political cultures
and organisations, including the downplaying or abandonment of its communist
identity? From the point of view of a mid-term anti-neoliberal programme the
communist characterisation was fairly insubstantial and proved to represent an
obstacle to the dialogue with potential allies. At the same time, it was a key and
emotionally-charged element of symbolic identification for an organisation born in the
fire of the battle against the change of name of the Italian Communist Party in 1989-
1991.
What made these dilemmas particularly intractable was the tremendous pressure
(unusual in other European countries) exerted by the new post-1993 political system.
On the one hand, the new electoral laws
142
which replaced the previous system of
almost perfect proportional representation severely punished smaller non-aligned
forces and strongly encouraged the establishment of a bipolar competition between
heterogeneous centre-left and centre-right alliances. Key elements of the lower
chamber legislation were the following: a medium-sized electoral threshold (4%) for
independent parties; the possibility to establish pre-electoral alliances; large
majoritarian incentives to the "winning" coalition at the constituency (1994-2005) or
141
For instance through parliamentary blackmail, an alliance with social movements and the DS-left or,
more recently, the tool of open primary elections.
142
For general elections see L. 276.1993 and L. 277/1993 (Mattarellum) and L. 270/2005 (Porcellum).
The reformed laws on regional (L. 43/1995) and local (L. 81/1993) elections also introduced majoritarian
and pro-coalition mechanisms.
194
national (2006-present) level
143
; strong incentives to small parties to join one of these
coalitions
144
; a strong moral pressure on the same not to play the part of the "spoiler".
On the other hand the weakness of the left, in primis the post-communist DS, made
the contribution of both centrist forces (DL, RI, UDEUR) and of the radical left vital for
the electoral victory and parliamentary survival of centre-left governing coalitions. The
radical left, therefore, could not afford itself the luxury of abstaining from the main
bipolar competition and carry on a frontal opposition to both centre-right and centre-
left cabinets: this choice was possible, but it would have automatically implied a long-
term political hegemony of Berlusconi's right-wing coalition.
The PRC sought to respond to this situation by devising complex tactics which could
make the victory of the centre-left possible while maintaining a degree of political
independence and alternative profile. One option was to reach merely technical pre-
electoral alliances, such as mutual (desistenza, 1996) or unilateral (non-belligeranza,
2001) standing-down agreements in the constituency seats; this possibility was
scrapped by the electoral reform of 2005 and, anyway, in case of an electoral victory of
the centre-left a subsequent parliamentary support was still likely to be required to
build a viable governmental majority. Another option was not to join the centre-left
cabinets directly but to support them externally on a case-by-case basis (CU in 1995,
PRC in 1996-1998, PRC rebels in 2006-2008); this fiction, however, had sooner or later
to give way to the hard choice between voting unpalatable policies, thus demoralising
its own constituency (e.g. the PRC in 1996-1998 and 2006-2008), or toppling the
government, thus exposing itself to a public outcry and the charge of letting the right-
wing back in power (e.g. the PRC in 1998 or SC in 2007-2008).
In the end, the centrifugal pressures originating within the radical left constituency and
in the broader political environment produced their inevitable outcome: painful right-
143
The Mattarellum attributed 75% of the seats to first-past-the-post single-member constituencies; the
Porcellum had instead a more proportional framework with a variable coalition premium at the national
(Camera) or regional (Senato) level. Depending on the electoral results, this could oscillate from low to
very high levels: it amounted to 5.3% of first chamber seats in 2006, 8.3% in 2008 and 29.7% in 2013.
144
The Mattarellum offered the opportunity to bargain with the potential partners and be granted
"safe" constituency seats. The Porcellum, on the other hand, offered to parties within a coalition lower
and more accessible electoral thresholds (2% of valid votes; in addition, the "best loser" of each
coalition was granted representation regardless of its results) and the proportional sharing-out of the
majority premium.
195
wing or left-wing organisational splits at every crucial turn (1995, 1996, 1998, 2006 and
2008) and a progressive separation of the different sensibilities, which in other
countries managed to pull off a more or less civil coexistence (e.g. Germany with DIE
LINKE or more recently France with the Front de gauche), in rival parties and grouplets.
The unfortunate fate of the various projects of regroupment was also largely tributary
of the above-mentioned centrifugal pressures. Time and time again attempts were
made to unite the PRC and other radical left tendencies (its own dissidences, the DS
left, the Greens and various civil society and social movement actors) under a common
organisational framework. The most important were the following: (i) the Costituente
per l'Alternativa (1993) promoted by the recent PDS defectors Pietro Ingrao and
Fausto Bertinotti together with il Manifesto newspaper; (ii) the 1999 talks between il
Manifesto, the PRC and other recent DS runaways (Lucio Magri, the ARS of Aldo
Tortorella and Giuseppe Chiarante), which led to the establishment of the journal of
debate Rivista del Manifesto (1999-2004); (iii) the half-hearted attempts (2001-2004)
of Vittorio Agnoletto, Luca Casarini and Fausto Bertinotti to transform the alter-
globalisation movement into a full-fledged political subject; (iv) the attempt of the
Lavoro e Libertà association (2003), promoted by Tortorella (ARS), Gian Paolo Patta
(CGIL left), Gianni Rinaldini (FIOM) and Cesare Salvi (DS left), to give a political outlet to
the labour mobilisations of the period; (v) the Forum Programmatico per una
Alternativa di Governo (2003-2004), promoted by Gian Paolo Patta (CGIL left), which
sought to federate PRC, PdCI, Verdi and DS left; (vi) the Camera di Consultazione della
Sinistra (2004-2005), promoted by the ex-DS professor Alberto Asor Rosa, which had
the same goal; (vii) the Sezione italiana della Sinistra Europea (2004-2007), promoted
by Fausto Bertinotti (PRC), which sought to combine PRC, the group of Pietro Folena
(DS left) and social movement activists; (viii) the Costituente della Sinistra (2007-2008),
promoted by the girotondino professor Paul Ginsborg, which again aimed at
regrouping all radical left parties in a joint electoral cartel; (ix) the Sinistra Arcobaleno
(2008), which for the first time succeeded in regrouping all above-mentioned subjects
under a common electoral cartel but resoundingly crashed at the general election and
fell apart soon afterwards.
196
While the programmatic commonalities between these groups were large, an agreed-
upon strategic line proved to be elusive. The main stumbling block to unity was, of
course, the question of its collocation vis-à-vis the centre-left coalition.
In the period 1998-2003 few groups were tempted by an alliance with the PRC, locked
in an attitude of hostility toward the national centre-left. It was only after its decision
to re-join the alliance (2004-2008) that the projects of co-operation could become
more credible and concrete, ultimately leading to the (short-lived) experience of the
Rainbow Left electoral coalition. After 2008, finally, the division between more
"conciliatory" and more "intransigent" wings resurfaced with force both between and
within each party, contributing to the general organisational crisis of the area.
Cannavò (2009) correctly underlines the responsibility of the leadership of the PRC in
sabotaging all attempts of the second period and in agreeing to the alliance too late
and at the worst possible moment, when a favourable external mood had already
given way to a the climate of disillusionment toward the Prodi II government (2006-
2008). A united radical left coalition between 2004 and 2006 might indeed have
experienced a stronger growth of electoral weight and influence; the collapse at the
subsequent 2008 election, however, would have been equally likely.
197
4.5 The strategy of leftward pull
The final topic I wish to analyse is the success of the radical left in exerting an actual
influence of Italian politics and society. Were the party successful in creating the
conditions for an implementation of their mid-term anti-neoliberal and long-term anti-
capitalist goals?
As elsewhere in Europe most of the parties (PRC, PdCI, SEL) followed a strategy of
leftward pull, attempting to use a growth of their support and a broadening of their
alliances to influence the political line of the moderate left and gradually push it to
revert to its traditional post-war social constituency, values and policy planks. Only the
small far-left grouplets tended to envisage a strategy of anti-capitalist alternative
where working class self-organisation and mobilisation would by-pass the centre-left
and lead to the conquest of power and a rupture with capitalism.
As I already showed in section 4.2.3, each party adopted a distinctive vision of the
kinds of pressures and devices most likely to lead to the wished-for aim. Under the
leadership of Fausto Bertinotti, the PRC followed a path of dynamic leftward pull which
foresaw sharp tactical turns, moments of alliance followed by moments of
contraposition and a strong reliance on extra-parliamentary mobilisations (Cannavò,
2009). It was also fairly optimistic on the possibility of reversing the rightward shift and
alliances of the DS, bringing about a "new reform course" (PRC, 1996) and the first
elements of an "alternative of society" (PRC, 2005) and paving the way for the
subsequent stage of the "transformation of capitalist society" (PRC, 2005). The PdCI,
on the contrary, followed a rather pessimistic strategy of conciliatory leftward
pressure, convinced of the inescapable necessity of a long-term support to the centre-
left as a "trench" (PdCI, 2008) against the greater evil and as the most advanced
political landscape for the pursuit of realistic compromises. SEL, finally, shared a similar
strategic view but for most of its existence gambled on a friendly leveraged buy-out of
the centre-left through the participation of its popular leader Nichi Vendola and other
personalities close to the party to the mechanism of open primary elections
(Venturino, 2007; Damiani, 2011; Fiorini & Venturino, 2011; Corbetta & Vignati, 2013).
198
Unfortunately, none of the parties managed to turn its mobilisation into tangible
political influence. The post-communist "cousins" of the PDS, far from being pulled to
the left by their more radical allies and competitors, have continued on a steady
rightward trajectory which has included not only the support of neoliberal
governments (1993, 1995, 1996-2001, 2006-2008) and an alliance with centrist and
technocratic forces but sometimes went as far as embracing the model of "grand
coalition" with the opposing right-wing camp (the Bicamerale commission of 1997-
1998, the Monti and Letta cabinets of 2011-2013). The activity of the radical left
parties within the successive governing coalition has failed to achieve any significant
policy turn and has on the contrary eroded the credibility and support of their
proponents; at the same time, the choice of a more radical stance of opposition to
centre-left cabinets (COBAS and CCA in 1996-1998; PRC in 1998-2001; PCL and PdAC in
2006-2008) has not yielded better results in the short term, as the exertion of effective
extra-parliamentary pressures was paralysed by the fear of the trade union
apparatuses and even of many radical activists to weaken "their" governments. The
hypothesis of the conquest of the centre-left through the mechanism of the open
primaries, finally, has failed to produce significant results at the national level.
145
What was the reason of this generalised failure?
Clearly, the most important explanatory factor is the insufficient amount of electoral,
parliamentary and extra-parliamentary pressure that the radical left parties were able
to deploy.
With an average of 6.6% and a peak of 8.6% of valid votes (general elections), their
electoral results were unpleasant for the centre-left but never threatened its position.
The PDS/DS in particular realised that, firstly, the weight of its radical allies always
remained inferior to that of its centrist ones and, secondly, the losses to its left could
be fairly easily compensated by gains on its right. Unlike some of its European
145
In 2005 Fausto Bertinotti (PRC) stopped at 631,592 votes (14.7%); in 2012 Nichi Vendola (SEL)
stopped at 485,689 votes (15.6%). At the local level, where stakes, participation and controls were
lower, radical left and other "outsider" personalities did better: Nichi Vendola (PRC then SEL) won twice
the primary for the presidency of the Puglia region in 2005 and 2010 and the primaries for big cities
mayoralties in 2011 returned a few surprise victories for candidates close to SEL (Cagliari, Milano,
Genova).
199
counterparts, the Italian radical left never managed to feed on the corpse of a
discredited centre-left (e.g. forcefully opposing unpopular left-leaning governments)
but rather tended to rise and fall together with it.
The use of electoral and parliamentary tactics seemed a more promising avenue, as
the radical left effectively played the role of one of the kingmakers of the centre-left
coalition and its support was indispensable for the victory and survival of centre-left
governments. This card, however, was partially undermined by the extreme reluctance
in its ranks to push the bargaining up to a point of rupture. Whenever the PRC
leadership chose to topple a centre-left cabinet (Dini in 1995 and Prodi in 1998),
dissidents within its parliamentary group broke ranks, ensured its survival and formed
a break-away organisation. Moreover, the fear to be perceived as the "spoiler" and be
squeezed by tactical voting (up to the loss of parliamentary representation) was
exaggerated but not without grounds.
Extra-parliamentary pressures, finally, proved to be effective in influencing the political
agenda only when they managed to involve the trade unions in large-scale
mobilisations against seating right-wing governments. Two cases of this kind stand out:
1994, when the three confederations forced the Berlusconi I cabinet to backtrack on a
proposed pension reform and ultimately led to its downfall few months later (Ferrera
& Jessoula, 2007), and 2002-2003, when the CGIL effectively stopped a reform of the
safeguards against unfair dismissal.
146
When the unions were not on board, however,
the movements tended to be absent or ineffective. And this was precisely the biggest
problem for the radical left as the CGIL, tightly controlled by a DS-friendly leadership,
always refused to mobilise against seating centre-left/centrist governments and gave
its consent to all their landmark neoliberal policies: in particular, the highly damaging
and unpopular July Agreements of 1992-1993, pension reforms of 1995, 2007 and
2011 and labour market reforms of 1997 and 2012. While the radical parties loudly
complained against these developments, they did not have the means to transform
the widespread unease on the ground into organised resistance.
147
146
The article 18 of the Workers' Statute (L. 300/1970). An experimental 3-years reform was agreed in
principle by the government with the rival trade union confederations (Patto per l'Italia, 5 July 2002) but
never implemented in practice.
147
The contestation against the official trade union policies peaked in the period 1992-1995, when
union leaders were regularly hit by missiles during public rallies and union referenda returned a minority
yet quite strong opposition (26.1% in 1993; 37.5% in 1995). However, the two natural outlets of this left-
200
More specifically, the Italian radical left has been incapable to contribute to the
renewal and revival of class struggle at the point of production, retreating toward the
easier but less effective terrains of electoral, institutional, cultural and street
mobilisation.
Following the defeats of the late Seventies-early Eighties workplace conflict has
continued its long-term downward trend (see FIGURE 4.16).
FIGURE 4.16 LABOUR CONFLICT
Source: my elaboration from ISTAT.
Notes: index, 1976 = 100.
According to ISTAT data
148
the average yearly number of working hours lost for strikes
has collapsed over the last three decades: from 162.8 million (1969-1976) and 86.9
million (1977-1983) to 24.7 million (1984-1990) and just 6.6 million (1991-2009). While
the traditional forms of organisation and conflict within medium-large industrial
companies have gradually lost their strength, the diffuse and fragmented workforce of
wing dissatisfaction (the new grass-roots trade unions and the left tendencies of the CGIL) both failed to
fully benefit from the conjuncture and ultimately remained fragmented and confined to small fringes of
the workforce. The latter never got more than a quarter of the votes at the CGIL national congresses.
The former encompassed in 2011-2012 in their stronghold, the public services, only 2.4% of union
members and 3.9% of voters in professional elections (RSU works councils).
148
The methodology is known to exclude political conflicts and to strongly underreport the overall levels
of conflict. The bias is also likely to have grown over time. The general trend, however, is not in
question.
201
small companies, of the tertiary sector and with atypical employment contracts has yet
to find effective ways to pursue its collective interests (Choi & Mattoni, 2010).Until
these trends will be reversed, there is little hope of a significant leftward shift of either
the social or the political relations of force. The contribution of the radical left to this
task, however, has been limited and of decreasing value.
202
4.6 Conclusions
The analysis of the contemporary Italian radical left has highlighted the large breaks
which separate its member parties from its pre-1989 predecessors.
The transformations of advanced capitalist economies and societies, the crisis and
collapse of the Soviet model of state socialism, the defeats and fragmentation of the
traditional labour movement and the shift to the right of the political-ideological
climate have had important consequences. Following a different path in each Western
European country, a "new" radical left has tentatively emerged from the ruins of the
Twentieth Century left of communist, socialist and gauchiste persuasion. The
discontinuities – ideological, sociological, organisational, strategic and systemic – have
generally been stronger than the elements of continuity.
From the point of view of their political nature, the parties of the Italian radical left can
be characterised as predominantly anti-neoliberal parties.
Until recently all parties have re-affirmed their communist and anti-capitalist identity
(with the exception of SEL, whose links with this party family are gradually loosening
and who might soon join the European Socialist Party). This choice, however, has rarely
had much concrete bearing on their political activity, which has essentially focused on
reconciling two kinds of appeal: the representation of the interests of broad salaried
strata in the defence and expansion of the legacies of the post-war Fordist-welfarist
compromise and the promotion of post-1968 left-libertarian values (feminism,
environmentalism, minority rights and solidarity). This mid-term anti-neoliberal
programme was broadly confirmed by the parties' socio-demographic composition,
which attracted a broad spectrum of social groups but saw an over-proportional
weight of the social categories which were supposed to benefit most from their
proposals: traditional manual workers and state employees, students and the
precarious youth and university graduates. The parties have however showed a
marked difficulty in reaching out to the fragmented workforce of the post-Fordist small
enterprise, to the long-term unemployed and to women.
203
From the point of view of their societal weight, the balance sheet of more than two
decades of political activity is mixed. The Italian radical left has gravitated, with cyclical
oscillations, around a roughly parabolic trajectory: from an initial phase of growth
(until 1996) to one of stagnation and finally of decline (after 2006). The gains won
during periods of parliamentary opposition and large social mobilisation against the
right (1992-3, 1994-1996, 2001-2004) have been regularly wiped out by the
bewilderment which followed its support to centre-left governments. The electoral
and organisational supremacy of the other post-communist organisation (PDS/DS/PD)
on the left camp has never been seriously threatened or dented. Their overall weight
(electoral, parliamentary, governmental and organisational) has never gone beyond
that of a medium-small political area.
From the point of view of fragmentation, the initial regroupment of different
tendencies around the PRC has gradually given way to a fragmentation in a variety of
rival organisations separated by strategic, ideological and material disagreement and
whose regroupment is unlikely to take place anytime soon.
The efforts to fill the vacuum created by the rightward shift of the main left-of-the-
centre party (PDS/DS/PD) and of the rest of the political system have been rewarded
by some limited short-term success but have failed in the long term. Why?
The analysis of section 3.3 clearly reveals that two factors have an immediate influence
on the success of the radical left: the presence of strong (especially labour-based) left-
wing extra-parliamentary mobilisations plays a positive role while the involvement in
centre-left governmental coalition plays a negative one. On these certain foundations
it is possible to develop a broader, albeit more conjectural, interpretation of its
historical trajectory.
On the one hand, the weakest point of the Italian radical left has clearly been its
increasing cooptation within the centre-left pole of the new bipolar competition. This
development, in particular the ever growing involvement in the external support or
direct participation to national and local centre-left governmental coalition, has
undermined the credibility of its cultural-political battles in favour of the defence and
expansion of the traditional welfare state and its anti-establishment profile, leading to
a long-term loss of political profile and popular support.
204
Although this outcome is in part the result of strategic mistakes of the leadership of
the different parties, which have underestimated the strength of the neoliberal drive
and overestimated their capacity of exerting an influence on state policies, it was also
largely over-determined by the constraints and incentives of the post-1994 political
system.
The experience of other European countries shows that leading a radical opposition
against an unpopular centre-left government can – under certain conditions – help to
consolidate the radical left and increase its electoral support. The problem in Italy was
that a left victory might have never occurred without the contribution of the more
radical forces and that these were exposed to stronger environmental pressures and
had less room for manoeuvre than most of their Western European counterparts. The
fundamental dilemma between programmatic coherence and anti-right unity could
not be defused or fudged; the centre-left coalition always required their electoral and
parliamentary support if it wanted to have any chance of coming to power (unlike
France) and in general actively requested it, thus laying the blame for an eventual
defeat squarely at their door (unlike Germany). Moreover, the majoritarian electoral
system placed a heavy material price on an eventual isolationist choice, including the
risk of losing its parliamentary representation. Finally the appeal of anti-Berlusconism,
which was very strong among its actual and potential constituency, further pulled it
toward a conciliatory strategy.
The immediate roots of the current crisis of the Italian radical left are clearly related to
its unprecedented level of governmental involvement in the mid-Noughties, both at
the national (Prodi II cabinet, 2006-2008) and at the regional level. In the public
perception it thus became fully responsible for the deceiving policies of the centre-left
and part of the political establishment, with the effect of demobilising its own
constituency and paving the way for the emergence of new populist parties. The
leadership of the PRC bears heavy responsibilities for this outcome; its progressive
return toward a politics of centre-left alliances after the break of 1998-1999 (in 2000 at
the local level and in 2003-2004 at the national level) prevented a consolidation of the
party on a line of radical opposition to both main poles. It cannot be stated for certain,
however, if an intransigent strategy would have been actually viable at that time,
205
when the pressures toward left unity and the threat of the "useful vote" were at their
strongest.
149
On the other hand, the radical left has not been able to channel the non-negligible
degree of dissatisfaction against the neoliberal transition into effective forms of
collective resistance.
At an electoral-parliamentary level, both conciliatory and intransigent strategies
seemed incapable to exert any meaningful influence on the pace and direction of the
reforms (the latter more than the former). At the level of political extra-parliamentary
mobilisations, the trade union movement repeatedly proved to be the only social
subject which could wage large-scale and successful campaigns (1994-1995, 2002-
2003). However, the hold of the PDS over its collateral trade union confederation CGIL
meant that the latter showed militancy under right-wing cabinets but was glad to
accept demoralising compromises under centre-left or centrist ones. Radical unionists
proved entirely powerless in contrasting this moderate course (in particular, the 1992-
1993 turn toward wage moderation). At the level of immediate class conflicts, neither
the moderate nor the radical trade unionists managed to find a way to reach out to the
fragmented workforce of the small industry and tertiary services, focusing on
minimising the damages for their core constituency in the big companies and in the
public sector. The brief flares of left-wing contestation of neoliberalism thus tended to
rapidly turn not toward radicalisation but rather toward demoralisation,
disengagement, diminishing expectations and, in the worst cases, the pursuit of
populist scapegoats (Southerners, migrants, politicians).
Again, it is probable that a different outcome was out of the reach of the small forces
of the radical left, depending as it does on structural features of advanced capitalist
development and the long-term effects of the labour defeats of the late Seventies.
Could a stronger emphasis on workplace politics and a clearer trade union strategy
have helped the parties to act as a break to some negative tendencies? Their
progressive shift of focus away from labour activism and the fragmentation and
149
The movements of 2001-2004 had induced a widespread rejection of the seating right-wing
government but had generally failed to obtain concrete results and to provoke its downfall; all
expectations were therefore pinned on an electoral alternation. The new electoral law of 2005
(Porcellum), moreover, was explicitly designed to encourage broad alliances and to punish non-aligned
forces.
206
indiscipline of their trade unionists certainly did not help. A unique window of
opportunity was probably represented by the years 1992-1995, when the large
grassroots opposition to wage and pension reforms might have led to important
organisational developments. In this occasion the union left proved to be indecisive
and divided
150
and the dissent was quickly controlled and neutralised (Baccaro, 2006;
Leonardi, 2013).
In conclusion, the efforts of the Italian radical left to survive, to thrive and to exert a
leftward pull on the political and social relations of force proved self-defeating. Despite
some limited and short-lived successes, this political area failed to become a serious
competitor of the moderate left and ultimately followed it on its course of societal
weakening, identity crisis and political moderation. In 2008, after almost two decades
of existence, it ceased to be a medium-small but relevant national political player and
drifted toward fragmentation and marginality. It does not seem in a condition to
recover its role anytime soon.
150
In particular, the division between supporters of the emerging radical grass-roots unions and those
who chose to fight a factional battle within the CGIL (Essere Sindacato) proved extremely damaging.
.
207
CHAPTER FIVE. THE FRENCH
RADICAL LEFT: SUCCESS OR
FAILURE?
5.1 The national context
The French radical left is simultaneously the strongest and the most fragmented of the
three case studies.
Orthodox communism and its heterodox variants have left a deep mark on the
electoral, social and intellectual history of the country (Cahiers Leon Trotsky, 79/2002;
Becker & Candar, 2005; Martelli, 2009 and 2010). While the golden age of 1936-1979,
with its mass influence and defining moments (the Popular Front, the Resistance, May
1968), gave way to a steep crisis and decline during the Eighties, the post-1989
developments nevertheless remain the object of much interest and of an immense
bibliography.
151
This attention is not entirely unwarranted, as the radical left has
repeatedly proven to retain an important weight in electoral and institutional politics,
in the intellectual debate and in extra-parliamentary mobilisations.
Despite the absence of a clear organisational break in the period 1989-1991, the face
of the contemporary French radical left has steadily changed over time.
The hold of the French Communist Party (PCF)
152
over this political area has
progressively waned to the benefit of far-left and other alternative organisations
(Courtois & Lazar, 1995; Lavabre & Platone, 2003; Andolfatto, 2005; Pudal, 2007;
Martelli 2010 and 2012).
151
See Souillard and Carreau (2011) for the PCF and Lanuque et al. (2011) for the Trotskyist far left.
152
Parti communiste français.
208
The party has mainly suffered from the growing competition by a series of Trotskyist
groups: Workers' Struggle (LO)
153
(Ubbiali, 2002; Barcia, 2003; Choffat, 1991 and 2012);
the Communist Revolutionary League (LCR) and later the New Anticapitalist Party
(NPA)
154
(Turpin, 1997; Johsua, 2004 and 2013; Krivine, 2006; Filoche, 2007;
Bonnemaison, 2012); to a less extent, the organisations of the Lambertist tendency
155
(Landais, 2004).
Less important electorally but more influential within representative institutions is a
second group of heterogeneous radical left organisations: an "eco-socialist" milieu
mainly composed of former PSU and PCF activists
156
; the communist, ex-communist
and left-independentist parties of the overseas territories
157
; and left-wing socialist
dissidences, in particular Jean-Pierre Chevènement's now moribund Citizens'
Movement (MdC)
158
(Verrier, 2003) and Jean-Luc Mélenchon's more recent Left Party
(PG)
159
(Alemagna & Alliès, 2012; Escalona & Vieira, 2012).
The evolution of this complicated landscape is made more interesting by it external
socio-political context, which was characterised by an unparalleled resistance to
neoliberalism (Wolfreys, 2003, 2006 and 2008; Kouvelakis, 2007). On the one hand
public sector workers, students and to a less extent private sector workers and
153
Lutte ouvrière.
154
Ligue communiste rèvolutionnaire (until 2009) and Nouveau parti anticapitaliste (since 2009).
155
The current repeatedly changed its name: from OCI (Organisation communiste internationaliste) in
1965 to PCI (Parti communiste internationaliste) in 1981, MPPT (Mouvement pour un parti des
travailleurs) in 1985, PT (Parti des travailleurs) in 1991 and POI (Parti ouvrier indépendant) in 2008.
Despite its electoral weakness (never more than 0.5% of valid votes), it has sometimes had a significant
influence within mass organisations such as the student union UNEF-US/UNEF-ID and the trade union
FO.
156
The Parti socialiste unifié formally dissolved in 1990. Among the most important organisations of this
area, all very small from the point of view of membership and voters, the following must be mentioned:
Pierre Juquin's Nouvelle gauche (NG) in 1988-1989; the Alternative rouge et verte (AREV) in 1989-1998
then Les alternatifs (1998-present); the Convention pour une alternative progressiste (CAP) in 1994-
2012; the Fédération pour une alternative sociale et écologique (FASE) since 2008.
157
Notably, the Parti communiste réunionnais (PCR), Parti communiste guadeloupéen (PCG), Parti
progressiste démocratique guadeloupéen (PPDG), Mouvement indépendantiste martiniquais (MIM),
Parti communiste martiniquais (PCM) and Mouvement de décolonisation et émancipation sociale
(MDES). Once close allies of the PCF, the "colonial" communist parties have drifted away during the
Eighties in an intermediate position between PCF and Socialist Party. Despite their often very relevant
local presence (PCR and MIM are at times the biggest parties of their respective islands), these parties
remain very little studied, with the exception of Gauvin (2000).
158
Mouvement des citoyens (1993-2002). Born as a left-wing dissidence of the socialist party, it later
oscillated between PS, radical left and "neither left nor right" nationalism and fragmented in a variety of
smaller groups.
159
Parti de gauche (2008-present).
209
marginalised strata (the unemployed, the poor, migrants, post-colonial citizens) were
at the forefront of large-scale extra-parliamentary mobilisations which contested
proposed reforms or advanced alternative demands (1986-1988, 1993-1995, 2002-
2003, 2005-2006, 2009-2010). On the other hand the critique of neoliberalism had a
strong influence on the political climate, leading to the "no" victory in the 2005
European Constitution referendum (Crespy, 2008; Dufour, 2010) and a significant shift
in mainstream discourses, if not policies (Wolfreys, 2008; Crespy, 2010; Desbos &
Royall, 2011).
The present chapter will therefore offer the opportunity to chart the development of
the French radical left parties within a very interesting environment. Section 5.2 will
provide an overview of the evolution of their key dimensions: societal weight,
regroupment and fragmentation and political nature. Section 5.3 will place them in the
context of the shift from the post-war social settlement to the era of neoliberal
transformation and assess the successes and limitations of their electoral and
organisational mobilisation. Section 5.4 will analyse the reasons behind the trend
toward increasing fragmentation during the Nineties and Noughties and the partial
regroupment in the early 2010s within the Left Front (FdG) alliance
160
. Section 5.5,
finally, will discuss their effort to exert a leftward pull on French politics and society.
160
Front de gauche.
210
5.2 The making of a new French radical left
France was one of the few Western European countries where the landscape of the
partisan radical left was not radically transformed by the collapse of the Soviet bloc in
1989-1991. Only one player of the previous historical period disbanded (the left-
socialist PSU). The parties of the French radical left active in the Nineties and
Noughties had thus all a long history and tradition behind themselves: the French
Communist Party (PCF) had been established in 1920 as the French section of the
Communist International (Courtois & Lazar, 1995; Martelli, 2012); Workers' Struggle
(LO) traced its roots to the Trotskyist group founded in 1939 by Barta and had an
uninterrupted organisational existence since 1956 (Ubbiali, 2002; Barcia, 2003); the
Communist Revolutionary League (LCR) assumed its current name in 1974 but its
predecessors went back in time to at least 1944 (Filoche, 1996; Salles, 2005; Krivine,
2006).
Despite this formal continuity, the Eighties and early Nineties brought about wide-
ranging discontinuities at all levels: societal weight, fragmentation, ideology, sociology,
organisation, strategy... The "new" radical left of the contemporary neoliberal period
was thus quite different from the "old" communist and extreme left of the Seventies,
although elements of continuity lingered. This chapter will provide an overview of the
most relevant features and trends.
211
5.2.1 Societal weight
The different dimensions of societal weight of the French radical left for the period
1990-2012 are summarised in the following tables (TABLE 5.1 and FIGURE 5.2). They
define a political area with a medium-sized electoral weight (10%-12% of valid votes), a
rather strong organisation and governmental involvement and a weaker parliamentary
presence.
TABLE 5.1 SOCIETAL WEIGHT
REF:
1978
REF:
1988
RADICAL LEFT
1990-2012
PCF
1990-2012
LO + LCR/NPA
1990-2012
ELECTORAL
WEIGHT
PRESIDENTIAL
-
3,417,919 votes
11.24%
3,808,463 votes
12.20%
1,610,693 votes
5.25%
1,699,475 votes
5.46%
LEGISLATIVE
6,709,191 votes
23.88%
2,854,826 votes
11.68%
2,516,377 votes
9.89%
1,871,707 votes
7.38%
460,657 votes
1.79%
REGIONAL
-
3,188,680 votes
11.47%
1,872,963 votes
7.90% *
1,109,968 votes
4.56% *
657,499 votes
2.88%
EUROPEAN
4,777,705 votes
23.60%
1,843,684 votes
10.16%
1,914,418 votes
10.68%
1,209,053 votes
6.72%
617,836 votes
3.48%
PARLIAMENTARY
WEIGHT
NATIONAL
86 seats
17.52%
25 seats
4.33%
24 seats
4.20%
24 seats
4.20%
0 seats
0.0%
REGIONAL
-
155 seats
8.74%
158 seats
8.99%
148 seats
8.39%
6.0 seats
0.34%
GOVERNMENTAL
INVOLVEMENT
NATIONAL
0.0%
0.0%
21.7%
21.7%
0.0%
REGIONAL
-
8.2%
48.1%
46.8%
0.0%
ORGANISATIONAL
WEIGHT
MEMBERSHIP
569,942
378,387
182,015
172,056
ca. 8,000
YEARLY INCOMES
(2003-2010)
-
-
€ 41,479,693
19.40%
€ 35,544,391
16.60%
€ 5,935,302
2.81%
MEDIA OUTREACH
strong
strong
medium
medium
weak
ORGANISATIONAL
LINKAGES
strong
strong
medium
medium
weak
Notes - Absolute figures and shares (of valid votes, total seats, total population, party members, party incomes). Averages: rolling
figures calculated on all years. Regional results are weighted by regional population. Electoral results refer to the whole national
territory (including overseas regions). Governmental involvement: time in government (participation or external support); at least
one radical left party. Membership: PCF, LO, LCR, PG. National: Assemblée Nationale. Yearly incomes: real 2010 euro. REF 1978:
European 1979. REF: 1988: European 1989. FdG: legislative and European votes attributed to the PCF, presidential votes not. * =
figures are lowered by the frequent choice of the PCF to run within centre-left lists.
212
FIGURE 5.2 SOCIETAL WEIGHT
Notes: rolling averages of national and regional values (electoral: legislative and presidential). Shares of total valid votes, total
seats (weighted), total party incomes, total population administered.
From the analysis of these data a few striking elements immediately emerge.
Firstly, the timing of the decline of the old communist left was relatively precocious.
The French radical left suffered an early electoral collapse in the period 1979-1986 but
stabilised afterwards. Indeed, the shock of 1989 did have little impact in this respect,
with the contemporary values being roughly equivalent to those of the late Eighties.
Secondly, the results in each category are quite uneven. The positive legacies of the
past determined extraordinary levels of membership and income; in those categories
the PCF played in the same league as the major mainstream parties of the left (PS) and
the right (RPR/UMP). Governmental involvement at the regional level was also
extremely high. Parliamentary weight, on the contrary, was weak. The divergence
213
between national and sub-national levels is particularly interesting. If the radical left
was fairly marginal in the national government (only one spell in 1997-2002), the
presence of the PCF within sub-national executive organs (regional and local
governments, mayors) was quite significant.
Thirdly, the role of the PCF was also very unbalanced: an overwhelming predominance
in most categories was contrasted by difficulties at the electoral level. Here the party
progressively lost the capacity to represent the radical left milieu to the benefit of
other candidates (Arlette Laguiller, Olivier Besançenot, Jean-Luc Mélenchon and
others) and organisations (LO, LCR/NPA, PG). In presidential elections, the most
extreme case, it dropped from a healthy 8.6% of valid votes in 1995 (Robert Hue) to
3.4% in 2002 (Robert Hue) and 1.9% in 2007 (Marie-George Buffet). This rapid and
irreversible electoral weakening was the foundation for the 2008 turn and the creation
of a loose coalition with other political forces, the Left Front (FdG). Conversely, far-left
(LO, LCR/NPA) and other radical left (PG) organisations were often successful from an
electoral point of view but remained weak or negligible in all other respects.
A more detailed analysis of each dimension provides further elements for the
assessment of the overall evolution of the French radical left.
From an electoral point of view the French radical left has hovered at fairly high levels
(on average, around 10.7% of valid votes), experiencing cyclical oscillations around a
slight downward trend (see FIGURE 5.3).
161
161
The results of the MdC and the overseas communist or post-communist parties are included only
when explicitly allied with the PCF. Their overall impact is generally minimal, with the exceptions of the
MdC in the 1994 European election (2.54%) and 2002 Presidential election (5.33%); both results have
not been included.
FIGURE 5.3 ELECTORAL RESULTS
1.5%
1.1%
2.4%
0.4%
2.0%
1.3%
1.8%
2.7%
5.3%
2.5%
5.2%
10.4%
2.7%
3.3%
5.7%
3.4%
6.1%
1.7%
1.0%
9.5%
10.3%
6.8%
11.3%
7.7%
8.1%
8.9%
6.9%
8.6%
9.6%
6.8%
3.4%
4.8%
5.9%
1.9%
4.3%
6.5%
11.1%
6.9%
11.3%
11.5%
11.2%
11.7%
10.2%
9.3%
11.0%
9.8%
13.9%
12.5%
12.0%
13.8%
7.6%
9.2%
9.0%
8.0%
12.6%
12.8%
7.9%
0.0%
2.0%
4.0%
6.0%
8.0%
10.0%
12.0%
14.0%
16.0%
L1986
R1986
P1988
L1988
E1989
R1992
L1993
E1994
P1995
L1997
E1999
P2002
L2002
E2004
P2007
L2007
E2009
P2012
L2012
Far left
PCF
Front de gauche
Others
RADICAL LEFT
Sources: Ministère de l'Intérieur
Notes: shares of valid votes. Regional elections after 1992 have been excluded as the results of the PCF cannot be separated by those of the broad centre-left lists it often participated to.
215
The radical left obtained its single best result in the 1995 presidential election
(4,248,012 votes, 13.9% of valid votes) and its worst one in the 2002 legislative
election (1,974,711 votes, 7.6%). In general, presidential scores (average: 12.2%) were
clearly better than those in other kinds of electoral competition.
162
The very weak
results in regional elections were largely due to the tactical choices of the PCF, which
often forwent the presentation of autonomous lists and chose instead to participate to
left unity lists with the socialists, greens and radicals, thereby maximising the chance
to increase its parliamentary weight and governmental influence.
163
The periodisation and interpretation of this trajectory is pretty straightforward: a
negative underlying long-term tendency (the weakening of the communist sub-culture)
and temporary adverse factors (governmental participations, the squeeze of anti-right
tactical voting) were periodically balanced-out by favourable factors (the opposition to
unpopular centre-right cabinets and large left-wing extra-parliamentary mobilisations).
The first period of stability at high levels (1986-1988) was probably the product of a lull
in the crisis of the PCF provided by the unpopularity of the seating centre-right cabinet
of Jacques Chirac and the successful social mobilisations against it. The second period
of decline (1988-1992) reflected the shock of the fall of the Soviet bloc but was
remarkably small and short. The third period of surge (1992-1995) was produced by
the growing opposition to the centre-right cabinet of Balladour and a radicalisation of
the public opinion, which would anticipate and prepare the great strike wave of
autumn 1995. The stability at high levels of the fourth period (1995-2002) hid an
enormous internal shift from the PCF, whose governmental participation was
destructive, to the far left, which benefitted from challenging it.
The shock of 21 April 2002 (Perrineau & Ysmal, 2003) marked the beginning of the fifth
period (2002-2007). The elimination of the socialist candidate Lionel Jospin from the
second round of the 2002 presidential election, which turned into a duel between the
162
The first round of presidential elections offers an extraordinary campaigning platform to
organisations with strong ideas and personalities but weak national roots, and the small far-left groups
have managed to exploit this opportunity to the full.
163
This happened in all 22 metropolitan regions in 1998, in 14 regions in 2004 (61.2% of the potential
electorate) and in 8 regions in 2010 (28.5% of the potential electorate). It is also a frequent practice in
municipal elections.
216
right-wing incumbent Jacques Chirac and the far-right leader Jean-Marie Le Pen, was
partially due to an unprecedented dispersion of the total left vote on a variety of far-
left, radical left and moderate left candidates. The unintended consequences of their
voting behaviour pushed a significant number of radical left voters to adopt a new
attitude and tactically converge from the first round on the socialist candidate. The
radical left thus suffered a tight squeeze which almost halved its scores, prevented it to
benefit from the significant extra-parliamentary campaigns of the period and produced
a long stagnation at unusually low levels.
In the sixth and final period (2009-present), at last, the dynamism generated by mass
mobilisations and two competing projects of radical left regroupment – Besancenot's
NPA and Mélenchon's FdG – finally paved the way for an electoral recovery, but the
results of the 2012 legislative elections indicate that the memory of 2002 have not yet
been completely effaced.
Looking at the results of individual parties, the PCF more or less held its own until 1997
but collapsed during the period of participation to the Jospin government (1997-2002)
and proved incapable to recover afterwards. The far-left organisations, on the
contrary, started out from a small capital of support (1-2%) carried over from their
golden age in the Seventies but experienced an unparalleled period of growth between
1993 and 2009; the main beneficiary was LO up to 2002 and the LCR/NPA after 2002.
Other forces have generally remained fairly marginal - with the recent exception of
Mélenchon's PG, whose independent electoral weight was never properly tested but
can be estimated at least at 2% (Chiocchetti, 2010). Since 2009, finally, the Left Front
has gradually but steadily hegemonised the radical left landscape, incorporating the
vast majority of the players of the previous period and marginalising the rest (LO and
the intransigent wings of the NPA).
If the electoral results of the French radical left have been the best of all three
countries, their translation into parliamentary weight has been quite complicated.
Shares of total seats have remained much lower than the shares of valid votes: 4.2% in
legislative, 9.0% in regional and 7.9% in European assemblies.
The effects of the electoral legislation were here determinant. In legislative and
departmental elections, the two-round majoritarian system tended to strongly depress
the representation of the radical left to the benefit of the Socialist Party; only the
217
presence of localised historical strongholds where the PCF remained the strongest left
party (mostly in Ile-de-France, Nord, PACA, Picardie, Auvergne, Haute-Normandie and
Centre) prevented a complete wipe-out and preserved a reduced contingent of
communist MPs. In European, regional and municipal elections, on the other hand, the
very high electoral thresholds (5% to 10%) tended to waste the almost totality of far-
left votes and part of the communist ones; these losses were however partially
compensated, especially in regional election, by parallel gains of the PCF.
Altogether, far-left organisations have been virtually denied any kind of parliamentary
representation
164
while the PCF has had to counter the negative effects of the electoral
legislation through a variety of electoral tactics: in sub-national elections, frequent
common lists with the PS from the first round; in legislative elections, some limited
experiments of constituency-sharing with other left parties and the reliance on the
local rootedness and personal popularity of "red notables" (generally mayors).
Despite its parliamentary weakness, the governmental involvement of the French
radical left was far from marginal.
The far left, as already remarked, was generally absent from legislative assemblies and,
when present, generally chose to remain in the opposition and defy both centre-right
and centre-left governments.
165
The situation of the PCF, on the contrary, was very different. The once famous
"municipal communism" (Martelli, 2010) was weakened but not destroyed; across the
period the party continued to lead on average 878 communes (4.2 million people,
7.2% of the French population) and two or three departments (4.0%).
166
Moreover, its
policy of centre-left governmental alliances led to a growing presence in coalition
governments at a regional level: from two regions in 1992 (8.2% of the French
population) to 18 in 2004 (86.9%). At the national level, finally, it fully participated to
the Jospin cabinet (1997-2002) while it maintained an intermediate attitude of case-
164
The only exceptions are a handful of regional deputies in 1998 (LO 20, LCR 2) and 2010 (NPA, 2),
European deputies in 1999 (LO 3, LCR 2) and municipal councillors throughout the period (peaking at 79
LO councillors in 2008).
165
Rare exceptions can be found at the municipal level, where some far-left councillors did contribute to
centre-left majorities (e.g. LO in 2008-2013).
166
Val-de-Marne (always), Seine-Saint-Denis (until 2008) and Allier (1998-2001 and 2008-present)
218
by-case support toward the minority socialist cabinets of Rocard, Cresson and
Beregovoy (1988-1993) and the majority cabinet of Ayrault (2012-present).
167
The organisational level offered the most contradictory developments.
The average figure of 182,015 radical left members represents a very large share of the
total party membership, which in France has always been quite low.
168
The evolution in
absolute terms was however strongly negative. The PCF continued its steep and
inexorable decline from 355,139 members in 1990 to 86,184 in 2012. Other radical left
parties, on the other hand, grew but not enough to compensate the communist
decline.
Coherent financial data are available only after 2003. Surprisingly, this appears to be
the strongest dimension of the radical left, with yearly incomes averaging 41,479,693
real 2010 euro (19.40% of all party incomes). This feat was the result of large albeit
selective influxes of state financing
169
and, above all, a strong capacity of self-financing
through membership fees, contributions of elected representatives, public fundraising
and commercial activities (e.g. literature sales or organisation of festivals).
The evolution of the parties' media outreach was also uneven. The reach of the
communist press steeply declined over time: the PCF daily newspaper l'Humanité, for
instance, had in the Noughties a distribution of around 49,000 copies (against 107,000
in 1986) while its network of local and specialised press was largely wound down in the
Eighties and early Nineties. The decline of membership levels also reduced the
potential for daily face-to-face propaganda. On the other hand, the parties continued
to be able to directly reach significant sections of the population in a more
intermittent form: for instance through the PCF's yearly festival (Fête de l'Humanité)
167
In the two periods the party escaped a neat classification into majority or opposition
168
French membership figures are notoriously unreliable. An excellent series for the PCF can be
reconstructed on the basis of the contribution of Martelli (2009) and, after 2000, figures on due-paying
members (the number of declared members was artificially kept stable). A good series on the LCR is also
available (Videt, 2011). All other parties – including LO – provide only selective and largely inflated
numbers. Depending on the estimates, the PCF alone might encompass between a quarter and a third of
the total.
169
The matter is mainly regulated by the Loi 88-227; for good overviews see Clift and Fischer (2004) and
Lehingue (2008). The thresholds of access are quite low: for general party financing, at least 1% of votes
in at least 50 legislative constituencies; for the full reimbursement of campaign costs, 3% of votes in
European elections and 5% in other kinds of elections. The distribution of funds is however significantly
non-proportional, as 50% of the general financing is reserved for parliamentary parties only and
allocated proportionally to their number of MPs.
219
and LO's network of bi-weekly workplace leaflets (bulletins d'entreprise), both of which
have a declared reach of around half a million people, and with electoral campaign
activities (posters, leafleting, public rallies, etc.). The coverage of the mainstream press
and television was highly skewed toward the two major governmental parties but
offered from time to time a large audience to radical left forces, especially during
presidential campaigns.
The strength of the organisational linkages of radical left parties, finally, suffered a
drawn-out but very profound decline.
The PCF could once boast a massive network of collateral or friendly mass
organisations for all major social categories and interests, which embraced several
million communist and non-communist members.
170
The electoral decline of the party
during the Eighties was accompanied by a crisis of these organisations, which at first
saw their members leave and drift toward the Socialist Party or the right and then
went ahead with a delayed adaptation to the new political realities, reducing their links
with the PCF and depoliticising their activities. The best example of this process is
provided by the CGT, the largest French trade union confederation. Between 1978 and
1995 the union suffered a veritable haemorrhage, plunging from 1.3 million to a mere
480 thousand members (-64.6%). Simultaneously, support for communist presidential
candidates among its members collapsed from 57% (1981) to 49% (1998), 35% (1995),
18% (2002) and 7% (2007). As a reaction, in the decade 1993-2002 its leaders Louis
Viannet and Bernard Thibault undertook a slow but decisive process of autonomisation
from their former political patron (Andolfatto, 1997, 2003 and 2005). The union has
since almost entirely ceased to act as a relay for radical left policies and identification,
although many of its leaders and officials (including all its general secretaries) are still
card-carrying PCF members.
The decline of this traditional working class sub-culture was not compensated by the
development of new radical left sub-cultures, such as the milieu of the "new social
170
The most important ones organised wage-workers (the trade union confederation CGT and the
teachers' union FSU), sportspeople (FSGT), veterans (ARAC, FNACA), volunteers (SPF), pensioners
(UNRPA), tenants (CNL), women (UFF) and the youth (MJCF). In-depth analyses are provided by
Mouriaux (1985 and 2008), Borrel (1999), Fayolle (2005), Mischi (2010), Andolfatto and Labbé (2011),
Brodiez (2013) and Bellanger and Mischi (2013).
220
movements" or of alter-globalism.
171
On the one hand, the new organisations have
generally remained weakly and informally structured, devoid of veritable mass roots
and unable to exert much influence beyond a small stratum of highly educated and
highly politicised citizens.
172
On the other hand, the relationship between radical left
parties and sympathetic civil society organisation has followed a different pattern:
despite many concrete ideological and personal links, the fragmentation of interests
and causes and organisational pride tended to prevail over an overarching sense of
identification in a common purpose and movement.
171
Good representatives of this world are the organisations focusing on migration and racism (GISTI,
MRAP and RESF), unemployment (APEIS, MNCP, AC!), housing rights and exclusion (DAL, DD!!), HIV/AIDS
(ACT UP), anti-fascism (RAS L'FRONT) and alter-globalism (ATTAC) or the new radical trade unions
(Solidaires, CP). The bibliography on the topic is extremely rich: see in particular Siméant (1993),
Mouchard (2002, 2002b and 2009), Ancelovici (2002 and 2008), Sommier (2003), Monzat (2003), Cadiou
(2004), Ubbiali (2004), Agrikoliansky et al. (2005), Pechu (2006), McNevin (2006), Waters (2006), Crettiez
& Sommier (2006), Boumaza & Hamman (2007), Mathieu (2007 and 2012), Poliak (2008) and Morena
(2013).
172
At its peak in 2008 the alternative union Solidaires had about 80,000 members; still a dwarf
compared to the weakened formerly communist union CGT in the same year (620,000). Figures for other
organisations are even lower: ATTAC had at most 30,000 members (2003); the CP around 10,000; AC!,
RAS L'FRONT and DD!! were informal networks of local collectives without a clearly defined
membership. At another level, the poor performance of Josè Bové in the 2007 presidential elections
(483,008 votes, 1.32%) was an eloquent reflection of the limits of the alter-globalist movement.
221
5.2.2 Regroupment and fragmentation
The trajectory of the French radical left was characterised by a movement from
medium-low initial levels of organisational fragmentation to a progressive
pulverisation in the period 1997-2007, followed by a partially successful process of
regroupment in the subsequent years (TABLE 5.4).
TABLE 5.4 FRAGMENTATION
Votes
(presidential)
1988
1995
2002
2007
2012
AVER
90-12
N.
3,417,919
4,248,012
3,933,773
3,300,254
4,598,832
4,020,218
PCF
60.2%
62.0%
24.4%
21.4%
0.0%
26.95%
LO
17.7%
38.0%
41.4%
14.8%
4.4%
24.66%
LCR/NPA
0.0%
0.0%
30.8%
45.4%
8.9%
21.28%
FdG
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
86.7%
21.66%
Other
22.1%
0.0%
3.4%
18.4%
0.0%
5.44%
Votes
(legislative)
1988
1993
1997
2002
2007
2012
AVER
90-12
N.
2,854,826
2,788,058
3,156,698
1,974,711
2,091,084
2,046,578
2,411,426
PCF
96.9%
80.8%
77.2%
62.7%
53.4%
87.6%
72.33%
LO
0.0%
8.1%
13.4%
15.4%
10.4%
6.2%
10.70%
LCR/NPA
0.0%
1.2%
2.3%
16.2%
25.6%
6.2%
10.29%
FdG
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.00%
Other
3.1%
9.9%
7.2%
5.7%
10.6%
0.0%
6.69%
Members
1988
1993
1995
1997
2002
2007
2012
AVER
90-12
N.
378,387
302,423
282,519
233,435
121,971
95,686
86,184
187,036
PCF
99.2%
98.9%
97.1%
96.6%
93.0%
89.4%
74.5%
91.58%
LO
0.4%
0.7%
2.5%
3.0%
5.7%
7.8%
8.1%
4.65%
LCR/NPA
0.4%
0.4%
0.4%
0.4%
1.2%
2.8%
3.5%
1.45%
FdG
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.00%
Other
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
13.9%
2.32%
MPs
1988
1993
1997
2002
2007
2012
AVER
90-12
N.
25
23
35
22
18
10
21.6
PCF
100.0%
95.7%
94.3%
90.9%
83.3%
70.0%
86.84%
LO
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.00%
LCR/NPA
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.00%
FdG
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.00%
Other
0.0%
4.3%
5.7%
9.1%
16.7%
30.0%
13.16%
Fragmentation
index
1988
1993
1995
1997
2002
2007
2012
AVER
90-12
Votes
(presidential)
2.33
1.89
3.06
3.37
1.31
2.41
Votes
(legislative)
1.06
1.50
1.62
2.25
2.69
1.29
1.87
Members
1.02
1.02
1.06
1.07
1.15
1.24
1.72
1.21
MPs
1.00
1.09
1.12
1.20
1.38
1.72
1.09
Notes: shares of radical left votes, members, MPs (Assemblée Nationale); Laakso-Taagepera index.
222
The PCF had always held an absolutely hegemonic position within this area, although
the party had been challenged since the Seventies by small but not negligible far-left
and alternative (PSU) organisations. The decline of the Eighties did not affect its
position in terms of members and elected representatives but depressed its share of
votes in presidential elections, where far-left (Arlette Laguiller) and dissident (Pierre
Juquin) candidates rose to around 40% of the total. The further decline which followed
its governmental turn in 1997 increased the levels of radical left fragmentation to
unheard-of peaks: by 2007 the weight of the party had plunged to 21.4% in
presidential and to 53.4% in legislative elections. None of the competitors, however,
managed to decisively impose itself and replace the PCF as the dominant player: on
the one hand, they remained a plurality of competing organisations; on the other
hand, the soaring popularity and presidential support of their figureheads, Arlette
Laguiller (LO) and Olivier Besancenot (LCR), was not matched by parallel gains of
members, parliamentary influence and organisational linkages.
Faced with this problematic situation, calls emerged in favour of processes of broader
radical left regroupment.
Up to 1994 the debate remained mainly academic. The PCF was determined to ignore
both the challenge of the far left and the successive dissidences of the communistes
critiques, rénovateurs, reconstructeurs and réfondateurs (Dreyfus, 1990; Mermat,
2005). LO, similarly, was adamant in its rejection of any alliance which fell short of a
possible "pole of revolutionaries" including only explicitly Trotskyist organisations. The
LCR was the only national organisation interested in crafting a "pole of anti-capitalist
alternative" beyond the PS and PCF, but all attempts in this sense never concretised,
failed or were rapidly absorbed by the moderate left parties (Greens and PS).
173
The results of the 1995 presidential election and the great social movement of 1995
changed the situation on the ground. LO sought to capitalise its electoral scores and
173
The following must be mentioned: (i) the debate on the "anti-capitalist alternative" in 1984-86 (with
PSU, FGA, PAC and Verts); (ii) the participation to the Juquin committees in 1988 (with COCORECO, PSU,
FGA, PAC); (iii) the experience of the Convention pour une Alternative Progressiste (CAP) in 1994-1997
(with the Communist réfondateurs, ADS and others).
223
turn into a veritable mass party. The réfondateur minority of the PCF launched the idea
of regrouping the whole radical left, other political partners (MDC, Greens) and social
movement organisations into a "pole of radicalism" (pôle de radicalité) which could act
as a counter-weight within the centre-left alliance on the making (gauche plurielle).
Pierre Bourdieu and other social movement activists, finally, pushed for a regroupment
of the social component of the radical left with uncertain political implications
(Laguiller, 1995; Bell, 1998; Poulet, 1999; Mermat, 2005; Martelli, 2012). Again, little
came out of these projects. The new reforming leadership of the PCF under Robert
Hue embraced the idea of regroupment but continued to believe that this could be
achieved as a simple enlargement of the PCF into a renewed and more open neo-
communist organisation.
The term of the Jospin cabinet (1997-2002) exacerbated the split between conciliatory
organisations, which fully participated to it, and intransigent ones, which led an
increasingly vocal extra-parliamentary opposition. The idea of a PCF-centred radical
left regroupment was overshadowed by the electoral surge of anti-governmental far-
left forces (LO and LCR). These oscillated between the temptation of a "pole of
revolutionaries" in the 1999 European elections and their own separate ways in the
2001 municipal, 2002 presidential and legislative elections (Kouvelakis, 2007).
The subsequent period of renewed opposition (2002-2007) contained both centripetal
and centrifugal tendencies. On the one hand, a chastened PCF was tempted to
repudiate its governmental mistakes and to work with more humility toward a
veritable regroupment of the radical left. On the other hand, the various organisations
remained strongly divided on political questions (notably, the politics of alliances with
the PS at the national and local level) and organisational jealousies (who was to take
the lead of a possible coalition). The project of a "pole of revolutionaries" remained
controversial but was put to test again in the 2004 regional and European elections; it
proved to be a failure, as the shock of 21 April 2002 and the growing anti-right mood
provoked a massive swing in favour of the Socialist Party and its allies. This was
followed by the project of a broader "anti-liberal regroupment" unifying the whole
radical left around a common candidate for the 2007 presidential elections. Pushed by
the successful campaign for a "left no" to the 2005 European referendum and by the
pressure of intellectuals and grassroots collectives (Fondation Copernic, Collectifs du 29
Mai, CIUN), the process could not withstand the internal tensions and ultimately broke
224
down, leaving the PS-left and LO aside and producing not one but three presidential
candidates: Oliver Besancenot (LCR), Marie-George Buffet (PCF) and José Bové (Crespy,
2008; Geay & Willemez, 2008; Kouvelakis, 2012; Martelli, 2012).
The aftermath of this abysmal failure, where both the radical left and the PCF obtained
their lowest presidential scores ever, paved the way for the successful period of
regroupment (Coustal, 2009; Chiocchetti, 2010; Bonnemaison, 2012; Kouvelakis, 2012;
Martelli, 2012; Grond, 2012; Escalona & Vieira, 2012; Salles, 2012; Marlière, 2012b).
The LCR launched the process of its self-dissolution into the NPA (2008-2009) but failed
to convince potential organised partners and, after some initial encouraging signs,
entered a spiral of decline and marginalisation. A crucial role was played instead by the
left-wing socialist Jean-Luc Mélenchon who in the same period, in a sort of replay of
the German example of Oskar Lafontaine, belatedly split from the PS, created its own
organisation (the Parti de Gauche), convinced the PCF to forge a balanced mid-term
alliance under (the Front the gauche) and won its endorsement as future presidential
candidate. The FdG progressively out-manoeuvred the NPA, won over its more unitary
tendencies and other smaller groups
174
and soared from the mediocre results of the
2009-2010 election cycle (slightly above 6%) to the triumph of the Mélenchon's 2012
presidential campaign (11.1%).
The success of the FdG effectively led to a sharp drop in the electoral fragmentation of
the French radical left, reconciling the former communist, far-left and alternative
electorates under a common roof and marginalising the far left, which plunged well
below the levels of the Eighties. The question of its future prospects of consolidation,
however, remains open. The member organisations have so far failed to move toward
a merger and even to institutionalise their decision-making processes, which remain
dominated by the PCF. The unity of the coalition, moreover, is severely put to test
every time that the electoral legislation and the lure of power (regional, departmental,
municipal, to a less extent legislative elections) provide strong incentives to broad
centre-left alliances.
174
The LCR/NPA lost to it important sections of its historic leaders and cadres: the Gauche Unitaire
(March 2009), Convergences & Alternatives (February 2011) and the Gauche Anticapitaliste (July 2012).
Other groups which joined included the FASE (ex-PCF), R&S (ex-MDC), the Maoist PCOF and the eco-
socialist Alternatifs.
225
5.2.3 Political nature
As in the rest of Western Europe, the contemporary French radical left is characterised
by a significant break with the characteristic features of the Twentieth Century
communist movement and a – still unachieved – effort of renewal and reconfiguration.
Ideology
The PCF radically modernised its ideological outlook in the period 1994-2002, marked
by Robert Hue's "mutation" (mutation) (Andolfatto, 2001 and 2005; Pudal, 2002;
Mermat, 2005).
The long-term goals remained rooted in an anti-capitalist vision centred around a
"communism which will free mankind" (1994 and 2001 party statutes). The precise
contours of this vision, however, became increasingly fuzzy. The party had already
formally disassociated itself from the dogmas of one-party rule (1961), the
insurrectional seizure of power (1964) and the dictatorship of the proletariat (1976)
during its past aggiornamento of the Sixties-Seventies, replacing them with the
theorisation of a French road to socialism based on gradual reforms and the medium-
term acceptance of liberal democratic institutions, political pluralism and a mixed
economy. In the Nineties it repudiated the Soviet model in its entirety but failed to
replace it with a clear alternative model of the desired organisation of production, of
the state and of society. The references to Marxism, working class agency and the
socialisation of means of production were de-emphasised (at times disappearing) and
were replaced by vaguer statements of humanistic and progressive values
175
.
The mid-term programme conformed to the typical anti-neoliberal catalogue of the
contemporary radical left centring on demands of redistribution, social protection, job-
175
In the 1994 statute "democracy", "a fairer and freer society", "the human being [...] at the centre"; in
the 2001 statute "the emancipation of each man and woman, the social control, the pooling and sharing
of knowledge, powers and wealth", the "full autonomy and the full enjoyment of each woman and men"
and the overcoming of "every social form of exploitation, domination and alienation".
226
creation, defence of the welfare state and of the mixed economy and democratic and
left-libertarian issues.
The links between the two, finally, were left indefinite.
The modernisation of the LCR was more superficial (Ubbiali, 2008; Bonnemaison, 2012;
Johsua, 2013).
The organisation progressively downplayed its references to revolutionary
communism, Trotskyism and the Fourth International (which were formally dropped
with the 2009 transition to the NPA) and renewed its style and discourse. On the other
hand, its traditional long-term goals and strategy remained clearly recognisable behind
the various stylistic innovations. The LCR continued to call for a revolutionary rupture
with capitalism, the establishment of a future socialist society (albeit with explicit
"Twenty-First Century", "democratic", "ecological" and "feminist" qualifiers), the
socialisation of the means of production and workers' power and self-management.
Its mid-term demands, similarly, were much less radical than in the past but with a
continued insistence on their transitional value: not so much feasible packages of anti-
neoliberal reforms but rather objectives encouraging the extra-parliamentary
mobilisations and paving the way for a large-scale clash with the capitalist system.
This evolution was coherent with the defining trait of the organisation dating at least
back to 1983: a continuous effort to open up toward different political traditions
(other socialist variants, ecologism, pure movementism, alter-globalism)
counterbalanced by a strong attachment to the fundamentals of revolutionary
Marxism (Turpin, 1997; Rizet, 2007). This attitude enabled it to remain vital and
responsive to its external environment. At the same time, it created strong internal
tensions: the enthusiastic participation to united fronts and projects of radical left
regroupment regularly ended with a withdrawal and the loss of large numbers of its
activists.
LO, on the contrary, changed little of its political culture and ideology. While its public
profile was predominantly characterised by a radical workerist and populist discourse,
the organisation remained openly and proudly attached to its distinctive conception of
Trotskyism.
227
Its long-term goals and language did not deviate from the traditional Marxist-Leninist
footprint: proletarian revolution, dictatorship of the proletariat, transition toward a
communist society through democratic planning, workers' control, the abolishment of
wage labour and the withering away of the state (LO, 2003).
Its mid-term goals, in the same vein, were framed around transitional demands
centred on employment, pay, working time and conditions, welfare provisions and
control on company accounts and decisions. What differentiated these demands from
typical radical left programmes and even from those of other far-left organisations was
the absolute priority of material and working class issues over left-libertarian ones.
The Front de gauche, finally, marked the logical outcome of this long transition (FdG,
2012). Firstly, language and ideological references were refashioned to broaden the
electoral appeal of the coalition: communism, socialism, Marxism and the critique of
capitalism were replaced by humanistic themes ("Human first!), the opposition to
"neoliberalism" and "financial capital", democratisation ("civic revolution") and left-
wing republicanism ("the Sixth Republic"). Secondly, the focus shifted entirely from
long-term to short-term goals, i.e. a coherent and detailed programme of anti-
neoliberal democratic, social, economic and ecological reforms. Thirdly, as in the case
of DIE LINKE in Germany, the oppositional collocation and the belligerent tones and
attitudes of the campaigns lent to these proposals a radical allure which the PCF
previously lacked.
228
Sociology
The main change in the sociology of the contemporary French radical left compared to
its predecessor of the Seventies is a partial loss in specificity and in particular an over-
proportional decline among its traditional core constituency: manual workers, the
broader working class and the youth (TABLE 5.5, TABLE 5.6 and TABLE 5.7).
TABLE 5.5 SOCIOLOGY OF VOTERS (composition)
R.L.
1978
(legislat.)
R.L.
1988
R.L.
1995
R.L.
2002
R.L.
2007
MELEN.
2012
AVERAGE
1995-
2007
SOURCE
CDSP
SOFRES
CDSP
CDSP
CDSP
CSA
N.
6,712,265
3,417,919
4,248,012
3,933,773
3,300,254
4,598,832
3,827,346
GENDER
Male
52.8%
54.2%
42.9%
50.6%
49.2%
Female
47.2%
45.8%
57.1%
49.4%
50.8%
AGE
18-24
35.8%
29.9%
20.4%
21.3%
23.9%
25-64
50.3%
63.5%
66.3%
61.2%
63.7%
>64
13.9%
6.6%
13.3%
17.5%
12.5%
EDUCATION
5 years
14.0%
4.9%
30.8%
16.6%
8 years
55.3%
52.4%
41.9%
49.9%
13 years
12.3%
17.4%
12.9%
14.2%
15 years
7.7%
12.9%
8.0%
9.5%
15+
10.6%
12.3%
6.4%
9.8%
PROFESSION
Employer and self-
employed
3.7%
2.1%
0.8%
1.5%
1.5%
Upper profession
3.8%
6.8%
6.5%
4.9%
6.1%
Employed wage
worker
49.9%
44.9%
56.9%
50.2%
50.7%
Intermediate prof.
11.7%
12.7%
17.2%
11.6%
13.8%
White-collar
13.4%
15.7%
20.9%
20.1%
18.9%
Blue-collar
24.9%
16.5%
18.8%
18.5%
17.9%
Unemployed
7.3%
8.9%
6.5%
7.5%
7.6%
Inactive
35.2%
37.3%
29.4%
36.1%
34.3%
Student
3.3%
6.4%
7.4%
8.5%
7.4%
Pensioner
12.6%
22.0%
14.1%
20.1%
18.7%
Other
19.3%
8.9%
7.8%
7.5%
8.1%
"WORKING CLASS"
57.3%
53.8%
63.4%
57.7%
58.3%
RELIGION
Practicing Catholic
3.0%
3.0%
5.1%
3.6%
3.9%
Semi-practicing
Catholic
8.1%
6.8%
10.6%
-
-
Non-practicing
Catholic
54.6%
46.6%
36.9%
42.1%
-
Other religion
2.0%
2.1%
4.3%
5.4%
3.9%
Non-believer
32.3%
41.5%
43.0%
48.8%
44.5%
Source: my elaborations from CDSP (1978, 1995, 2002, 2007), SOFRES (1988), CSA (2012)
Notes: "WORKING CLASS": employed wage worker plus unemployed.
229
TABLE 5.6 SOCIOLOGY OF VOTERS (penetration)
R.L.
1978
(legislat.)
R.L.
1988
R.L.
1995
R.L.
2002
R.L.
2007
MELEN.
2012
AVERAGE
1995-
2012
SOURCE
CDSP
SOFRES
CDSP
CDSP
CDSP
PSA
N.
23.9%
11.2%
13.9%
13.8%
9.0%
11.1%
12.0%
GENDER
Male
25.8%
15.4%
12.7%
9.5%
12.1%
12.4%
Female
22.0%
12.6%
14.8%
8.5%
10.1%
11.5%
AGE
18-24
39.4%
13.6%
12.5%
16.8%
15.0%
16.1%
15.1%
25-34
29.0%
11.7%
16.3%
15.8%
7.0%
10.1%
12.3%
35-44
23.6%
13.6%
16.3%
14.8%
10.0%
12.1%
13.3%
45-64
20.9%
8.8%
10.5%
13.8%
12.0%
12.1%
12.1%
65+
12.5%
8.8%
9.6%
11.8%
6.0%
8.1%
8.9%
EDUCATION
5 years
14.7%
11.9%
9.2%
10.1%
11.5%
8 years
14.0%
15.5%
10.0%
11.1%
12.6%
13 years
16.1%
14.5%
8.6%
13.1%
13.1%
15 years
11.0%
12.9%
8.1%
10.1%
10.5%
15+
13.3%
9.9%
5.7%
9.1%
9.5%
PROFESSION
Employer and self-
employed
8.1%
-
4.7%
4.2%
3.5%
-
4.1%
Upper profession
18.2%
5.8%
16.1%
11.0%
7.2%
7.1%
11.4%
Employed wage
worker
33.0%
-
19.2%
19.1%
10.9%
-
16.4%
Intermediate prof.
27.8%
15.6%
17.3%
16.0%
8.6%
14.1%
14.0%
White-collar
26.0%
13.6%
18.0%
19.4%
10.7%
12.1%
16.0%
Blue-collar
43.2%
16.6%
22.6%
22.7%
13.3%
14.1%
19.5%
Unemployed
38.2%
-
18.0%
17.2%
16.0%
-
17.1%
Inactive
19.4%
-
10.5%
9.4%
7.3%
-
9.1%
Student
32.2%
-
13.9%
15.4%
9.2%
-
12.8%
Pensioner
16.2%
-
9.3%
6.9%
6.9%
-
7.7%
Other
20.8%
-
11.0%
13.5%
6.7%
-
10.4%
"WORKING CLASS"
33.6%
-
19.0%
18.9%
11.3%
-
16.4%
RELIGION
Practicing Catholic
2.5%
3.9%
6.2%
4.0%
4.7%
Semi-practicing
Catholic
10.4%
7.3%
8.2%
-
-
Non-practicing
Catholic
23.4%
14.5%
13.2%
6.8%
-
Other religion
13.5%
9.7%
10.3%
7.9%
9.3%
Non-believer
47.0%
26.9%
22.5%
14.7%
21.3%
Source: my elaborations from CDSP (1978, 1995, 2002, 2007), SOFRES (1988), CSA (2012)
Notes: "WORKING CLASS": employed wage worker plus unemployed.
If we compare the legislative vote of 1978 with the average presidential scores of the
last two decades, the results are eloquent The radical vote across the French
population halved from 23.9% to 12.0% (-11.9 points, -50.0%). The decline was
however significantly stronger among blue-collar workers (from 43.2% to 19.5%; -23.6
points; -54.7%), the entirety of the active working class
176
(from 33.6% to 16..4%; -17.2
points; -51.2%), students (from 32.2% to 12.8%; -19.4 points; -60.2%), people aged 18-
176
Here defined as blue-collar workers, white-collar workers, intermediate professions and the
unemployed, excluding upper professions.
230
24 (from 39.4% to 15.1%; -24.3 points; -61.7%) and people aged 25-34 (from 29.0% to
12.3%; -16.7 points; -57.6%). Indeed, the radical left cut its losses only among the
categories where it had historically been weak (people over 65 year old, professionals,
self-employed) and among white-collar workers (from 26.0% to 16.0%; -9.9 points; -
38.3%)
177
.
Most of this transformation was already achieved by 1988, before the beginning of the
period of my study: this clearly derived from the incapacity of the PCF to offer a
coherent perspective to its traditional electorate and prevent its dispersion in all
directions (the rising Socialist Party, political disengagement and the far-right).
178
The
period 1995-2002 pushed against the tide and led to a partial "re-proletarisation".
After 2002 however, scores among the employed wage workers have dropped again
below the levels of 1988: in 2012 Mélenchon fared 14.1% among intermediate
professions, 12.1% of white-collar workers and only 14.1% among blue-collar workers
– barely above his average results.
The trend was much more evident at the levels of radical left members and elected
representatives (TABLE 5.7).
The 1979 and 1997 surveys of the PCF membership (Platone, 1985; Platone & Ranger,
2000) enable a fairly reliable comparison. If the total members of the party more than
halved in the period, from 540,565 to 225,394 (-58.3%), blue-collar workers suffered a
veritable collapse (-78.8%) and their weight declined from 32.1% to 16.3% of the total
membership. The social categories which had reduced losses were those farthest from
the historic working class identity of the party: professionals (-27.6%), pensioners (-
34.1%) and other inactives (-36.4%). The subsequent period, when the due-paying
membership (cotisants) of the party liquefied reaching an all-time low of 64,184 in
2012 (-71.5%), is likely to have deepened on this tendency.
177
The latter exception was entirely determined by the 1995 and 2002 elections, a reflection of the
ability of the Trotskyist candidates to capture the sympathies of the "highly feminised [...] lower end of
the service sector", both public and private (Sperber, 2010). All other elections (1988, 2007 and 2012)
presented much lower scores.
178
A question of the 1988 French electoral panel (CDSP, 1998) is extremely interesting in this regard. Of
the 20.8% of French voters who declared to have voted for the PCF in the past now 42.5% chose
Mitterrand, 9% the abstention, 5.8% the centre-right and 5.7% the far right. Shifts toward abstentions
and the FN are however likely to be strongly underestimated by the methodology of the survey.
231
TABLE 5.7 SOCIOLOGY OF THE PARTY-ORGANISATION, PCF (composition)
Valid votes
(1978)
Members
(1979)
MPs
(1978)
N.
28,098,115
540,565
86
GENDER
Male
48.8%
65.0%
86.0%
Female
51.2%
35.0%
14.0%
AGE
18-30
23.9%
24.5%
0.0%
30-59
52.9%
59.9%
79.1%
60+
23.2%
15.6%
20.9%
Average age
44.8 years
42.6 years
51.4 years
PROFESSION
Employer and self-employed
11.0%
5.9%
2.3%
Upper profession
5.0%
3.4%
12.8%
Employed wage worker
36.2%
59.8%
63.9%
Intermediate prof.
10.1%
10.2%
23.3%
White-collar
12.3%
17.6%
8.1%
Blue-collar
13.8%
32.1%
32.6%
Inactive and unemployed
47.8%
30.9%
21.0%
Retired
18.6%
15.5%
19.8%
Other
29.2%
15.4%
1.2%
Valid votes
(1995)
Members
(1997)
MPs
(1997)
N.
30,462,633
225,394
34
GENDER
Male
47.6%
60.0%
88.2%
Female
52.4%
40.0%
11.8%
AGE
18-30
22.8%
10.5%
0.0%
30-59
49.9%
65.1%
76.5%
60+
27.3%
24.4%
23.5%
Average age
45.9 years
48.7 years
55.4 years
PROFESSION
Employer and self-employed
7.3%
2.5%
0.0%
Upper profession
5.8%
5.9%
14.7%
Employed wage worker
33.7%
43.6%
70.6%
Intermediate prof.
10.4%
10.3%
47.1%
White-collar
12.9%
17.1%
8.8%
Blue-collar
10.4%
16.3%
14.7%
Inactive and unemployed
53.2%
48.0%
14.7%
Retired
26.4%
24.5%
14.7%
Other
26.8%
23.5%
0.0%
Source: my elaborations from CDSP (1978, 1995), Platone (1985), Platone & Ranger (2000), www.assemblee-nationale.fr
The membership of the other radical left organisations always remained numerically
quite limited and thus exerts little impact on the overall picture; statistical details are
also scarce and imprecise. Excellent studies are nevertheless available for LO (Choffat,
1990 and 2012) and the LCR/NPA (Johsua, 2004 and 2013). A common feature of both
organisations was the very low level of inactives and the converse preponderance of
employed wage workers; the precise composition of the latter, however, differed. LO
232
made constant efforts to entrench itself not in the student and intellectual milieus
typical of post-1968 gauchisme but among the core sectors of the working class. The
resulting membership composition has been largely dominated by blue- and white-
collar workers up to the early Nineties; during the last two decades the weight of these
categories has remained comparatively high but, due to quantitative and qualitative
difficulties, seems to have lost some ground to teachers and pensioners.
179
The social
profile of the LCR, on the other hand, remained similar to an inverted pyramid, with an
overwhelming concentration of members belonging to the intermediate and upper
strata of the workforce, of intellectuals, of students and of professionals.
180
A similar evolution interested the social composition of the top layers of the party-
organisations. The example of the PCF deputies at the National Assembly, for instance,
confirms the rapid disappearance of elected representative with a background as
industrial or agricultural workers (32.6% in 1979, 14.7% in 1997, 0.0% in 2012) to the
benefit of intermediate and upper professions (36.1% in 1979, 71.8% in 1997, 71.4% in
2010) and pensioners, and a marked aging of the parliamentary group (on average
51.4 years old in 1979, 55.4 in 1997 and 61.7 in 2012).
To sum up, the roots of the radical left in the workers' movement gradually tended to
loosen their grip. The middle-lower strata of the working class
181
continued to
represent a stable majority of the radical left electorate (58.3%) but not of their
declining membership (43.6%), where they lost ground to pensioners, the
economically inactive and professionals. They remained more present within the
radical left than among the general population (with an index of 133.0% for their
electorate and 129.4% for their membership), but to a much lower extent than in the
179
The estimates of Choffat (2012) indicate for the late Eighties an almost complete predominance of
blue-collar workers (44%) and white-collar employees (45%), mostly of the lower-central age cohorts
and with a not weak share of women (38%); by 2009 the proportions would have changed to 26% blue-
collar workers, 38% employees, 24% teachers and 9% pensioners, increasingly belonging to upper-
central age cohorts.
180
The figures of Johsua (2004) indicate in 2002 very few manual workers (7.1%), more white-collar
employees (15.3%) and many intermediate professions (19.9%), teachers/professors (23.0%), students
(11.8%) and professionals (11.6%).
181
Electoral figures encompass the categories of blue-collar, white-collar, intermediate professions and
the unemployed (excluding a section of upper-level managerial or intellectual wage-workers).
Membership figures cover the same categories with the exclusion of the unemployed and are therefore
lower.
233
past. Their internal barycentre shifted upwards from manual workers to white-collar
and intermediate professions (32.7% of the electorate and 27.4% of the membership).
Finally, the radical left support among the industrial working class and wage workers in
general dropped from large to medium levels.
Organisation
The transition from mass working class parties (a large and disciplined membership, a
tight network of collateral extra-parliamentary organisations, deep roots in a well-
defined social sub-culture, a significant workplace organisation and intervention) to
light electoralist organisations was slower and less pronounced in France than in
Germany and Italy but had nevertheless important consequences.
Between 1994 and 2002 the PCF discarded the Stalinist element which had
characterised most of its history (bureaucratic centralism, monolithism, strict
discipline) and embraced internal pluralism and democracy; at the same time, it
wittingly or unwittingly lost most of the traditional silver linings of that type of
organisation. Workplace cells were progressively abandoned; collateral organisations
asserted their autonomy and slowly de-politicised their activities; internal power
groups (e.g. the elected representatives), tendencies and individual members lost their
discipline and stopped following uniform central directives; the voluntarist policy of
schooling and promotion of members with a humble social background to positions of
responsibility and leadership, perhaps the single most defining characteristic of French
communism, ceased to function altogether (Pudal, 2002 and 2009; Ethuin, 2003 and
2006; Mischi, 2003, 2003b, 2007 and 2010).
These reforms completely failed to delineate a viable alternative to the old model and
to stop the organisational decline of the party, probably ending up accelerating its
decay. Throughout the last two decades the PCF maintained a remarkably high M/V
ratio, a sign of the persistence of the old legacies and of a close-knit sub-culture: 10.1%
of communist voters in legislative elections (and 12.0% in presidential elections) were
234
also due-paying members of the party.
182
It was however an inexorably shrinking
constituency, which evaporated at a roughly similar speed in all dimensions (members,
voters, organisational linkages).
The two far-left organisations came from a different story: on the one hand, parties of
activists (Lenin's "cadre party") rather than of passive members; on the other hand,
unlike their Bolshevik model, largely isolated from the masses due to the stronghold of
the traditional workers' parties and distinctive defects of the Trotskyist movement. The
conspiratorial and hyper-activist modus operandi required by the LCR (pseudonyms,
probation membership, ideological formation and discussion, round-the-clock
commitment, supervision of changes of residence and work) was strongly relaxed in
1998 and 2009 (Salles, 2003; Johsua, 2004 and 2013; Rizet, 2007). LO continued to
cling to all the above-mentioned trappings, including a long process of training and
probation to move from sympathiser to full member with voting rights and a semi-
clandestine leadership and operation (Ubbiali, 2002).
This kind of avant-garde organisation had traditionally proven quite effective in
ensuring the survival and reproduction of the groups, in conducting extra-
parliamentary and electoral campaigns and in intervening within fronts and external
bodies. It was however incapable to pass the test of the period 1993-2009, failing to
exploit the unprecedented levels of sympathy and electoral support as a springboard
for the crucial transition from small group to solid national force. The forays into mass
organisations did not turn into institutionalised linkages. The electoral upsurges were
accompanied by bouts of membership growth but their magnitude remained
altogether limited – at best 2,640 members for the LCR (2007), around 7-8,000 for
LO
183
, 9,123 for the NPA (2009). M/V ratios became very low: 0.4% (LCR) and 0.6% (LO)
in presidential and 1.2% (LCR) and 2.2% (LO) in legislative elections. And electoral
results themselves remained unstable and highly dependent on the personal appeal of
their presidential figurehead.
182
As a reference, the respective figures for the PS are just 2.3% (legislative) and 1.9% (presidential).
183
The figure refers to total members; full members were only one or two thousands.
235
Strategy
As in Italy, the organisational fragmentation of the French radical left was largely
driven by strategic differences.
The PCF pained to adapt to the supremacy conquered during the Eighties by
Mitterrand's PS and by the moderate drift of the latter since 1982-1983. It thus
oscillated from periods of rapprochement (1981-1984), hostility (1977-1981, 1984-
1988) and uncertainty (1988-1993). In the mid-Nineties, however, Robert Hue's
renewal was accompanied by a decisive turn toward a policy of organic centre-left
alliances: the party became an organic component of the gauche plurielle and a
governmental force at the national level (Jospin cabinet, 1997-2002) and in most
regional and local administrations. Here it led a conciliatory strategy of leftward
pressure, hoping to influence the coalition from the inside with dialogue and
bargaining. The participation was a political and organisational failure; the PCF failed to
obtain many policy results and was paid dearly its choice with a collapse of both its
electoral support and its membership (Bell, 1998; Boyd et al., 2003; Bergounioux &
Grunberg, 2005; Becker, 2005).
LO coherently defended a strategy of anti-capitalist alternative coupled with an
extremely intransigent attitude toward the moderate left, refusing any support to the
"bourgeois" PS and presenting itself as the only representative of wage workers
against the two poles of the bourgeois alternation. Uniquely for the French far left,
since the mid-Seventies it also generally refused to appeal to a left vote in the second
round of elections.
184
The line of the LCR/NPA was similar but more flexible. The organisation's main goal
was the creation of an anti-capitalist pole breaking with the "social-liberalism" of the
PS but its boundaries were left fluid (depending on the moment they could refer to an
enlarged far left, the far left and dissident tendencies of the PCF or the whole radical
184
The only exception since 1981 was the period 2007-2008, when the party called for a support for
Ségolène Royal in the second round and later decided to build joint centre-left lists in several small
communes.
236
left) and tactical alliances to defeat the right were not entirely ruled out. On the
contrary, the organisation generally called to vote for the left in the second round.
185
The aftermath of 2002 remained marked by the legacy of the Jospin government. The
PCF sought to regain credibility by radicalising its discourse and electoral tactics but
never fully questioned the need of establishing a new "union populaire" of all centre-
left forces (Buffet, 2006) and its strategy of widespread governmental involvement at
the sub-national level. LO remained firm on its principles, but the intransigent strategy
which had worked so well in the previous period suddenly lost all appeal when faced
with a realisation of its possible short-term consequence, i.e. the success of the right
and of the far-right over a divided left. The LCR/NPA oscillated between the desire of a
broad anti-neoliberal regroupment and the critique to the PCF.
A temporary solution to these dilemmas was finally offered after 2009 by the rise of
the Left Front. This alliance did not resolve the inherent contradictions of the
contemporary radical left: anti-neoliberal coherence vs. centre-left unity against the
right; concrete anti-neoliberal programmatic vs. vague anti-capitalist aspirations. It
managed however to paper them over with a powerful radical discourse and an
intelligent strategy of mixed leftward pull, which marked its distance from the PS and
from governmental participation while supporting it against the right.
185
The limited exceptions were mainly due to the pressure of LO.
237
5.3 Filling the vacuum: potential and limits of
radical left mobilisation
5.3.1 The (obstructed?) neoliberal transition
The "neoliberal" transition which developed across Europe during the Eighties and
Nineties affected France as well, but in a much less pronounced way than most of its
counterparts.
The shift away from the traditional dirigiste state, for example, was gradual and
incomplete (Smith, 1990; MacLean, 1997; Berne & Pogorel, 2005). When the neoliberal
counter-revolution of Thatcher and Reagan was in full swing, the French socialist
government actually embarked on a programme of large-scale nationalisations (1981-
1982) which consolidated the French state-owned sector as one of the largest in
Europe. With the socialist electoral defeat of 1986 the tide changed and in the
following decades a widespread process of total and partial privatisations reversed the
situation.
186
The bulk of it was conducted by centre-right cabinets; centre-left ones
initially positioned themselves on a defence of the status quo (1988-1993) but later
enthusiastically adapted to the trend (1997-2002).
187
This notwithstanding, the French
state-owned sector remained proportionally quite large and bigger than in most other
advanced industrial countries.
188
Similarly, restructuring and retrenchment of the welfare state was much less effective
than in Italy or Germany and sometimes counterbalanced by an actual expansion of
welfare provisions (Cole, 1999; Michel, 2008; Vail, 2010). Aggressive projects of
186
Singling out the most important privatisations, the state progressively sold all or a majority of its
shares in most of its banking and financial (Paribas, Crédit commercial de France, Société générale, BNP,
AGF, CIC, CNP, Crédit Lyonnais), industrial (Saint Gobain, CGE, Suez, ELF, TOTAL, Pechiney, Renault, Bull,
Thomson, EADS) and commercial (Air France, France Télécom, the highway network) companies.
Minority shares of the energy companies GDF and EDF were sold in 2005-2007.
187
The Jospin cabinet, in fact, privatised proportionally more than any other government before or
afterwards.
188
See Christiansen (2011) and Kowalsky et al. (2013). According to the former in 2009 majority-owned
public companies still employed 838,574 workers (against 1,856,000 in 1985); minority-owned
companied had another 924,625 employees. According to the latter the sales of the top five French
public companies in 2011 were equivalent to 7.9% of the French GDP.
238
counter-reform by right-wing cabinets were regularly confronted by massive
workplace and street mobilisations (1994, 1995, 2003, 2006, 2010), which often led to
their partial or total withdrawal and in general slowed down the pace of change. The
socialist cabinets, in turn, generally avoided a direct clash with their traditional
constituency and failed to introduce any notable neoliberal counter-reform; instead,
they sought to accompany and compensate the negative development emerging from
the economic structure (unemployment, de-industrialisation, rise of job precarity and
poverty) with an expansion of the social safety net (e.g. the 1988 introduction of a
guaranteed minimum revenue) and some progressive counter-measures (e.g. 1998-
2000 reduction of the working week to 35 hours)
189
.
Total governmental expenditure rose, hovering for the whole period 1994-2009
around the very high level of 53.4% of GDP. Declines in 1985-1989 (from 51.9% to
48.9%) and 1996-2000 (from 54.5% to 51.7%) were promptly reversed afterwards and
were due not so much to political choice but rather to mere economic fluctuations.
Employment within the civil service, finally, remained one of the highest in Europe and
continuously expanded in absolute term from 4,257,700 (1990) to 5,364,300 (2007),
when the centre-right government proceeded for the first time to a small and gradual
reduction (5,358,800 in 2011). In relative terms, this expressed a rise from 18.3%
(1990) to 20.3% (2007) of total employment, followed by a decrease to 19.9% (2011).
The macro-economic situation of the country was also somewhat better than that of
Italy and Germany (see TABLE 5.8). The French share of the global GDP declined but
real GDP growth, although much slower than during the golden age and the Seventies,
remained at acceptable levels (+1.7%). Large French corporations were altogether
fairly successful within the global competition and maintained or improved their
international position. The current account balance was also (until 2005) positive.
189
On the former (RMI) see Cytermann and Dindar (2008); on the latter see Économie et Statistique,
376-377. The 35-hour reform helped to increase free time, reduce unemployment and raise hourly
wages; however, it also broadened the possibility by companies to introduce irregular working times.
239
TABLE 5.8 MACRO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS
REF
1982-1993
1993-2003
2003-2009
1993-2009
Real GDP annual growth (CAGR)
2.0%
2.2%
1.0%
1.7%
Real wages annual growth (CAGR)
0.7%
0.5%
0.7%
0.6%
Wage share of GDP (average)
59.1%
58.0%
57.9%
58.0%
Unemployment rate (average)
8.6%
9.5%
8.5%
9.1%
Poverty rate (average)
-
7.3%
7.1%
7.2%
Atypical contracts rate (average)
6.6%
10.4%
11.6%
10.8%
Current account balance/GDP
(average)
-0.2%
1.6%
-0.8%
0.7%
1993
2003
2009
France's share of global GDP
5.2%
4.8%
4.5%
Gross public debt/GDP
46.3%
63.2%
79.0%
Sources: my elaborations from WEO (2013 April), INSEE, KLEMS.
Notes: Periodisation according to the economic cycles (trough to through). CAGR: compound annual growth rate.
From the point of view of the working class the situation was less favourable but not
clearly negative. The growth of real net annual wages was very slow (+0.6%) but
positive and expressed a lower number of working hours; the wage share of GDP and
income inequality remained broadly stable; legal minimum revenue (RMI) and
minimum wage (SMIC) regulations kept poverty at bay.
190
The key problem of the period was mass unemployment. Rapidly growing since 1981,
the rate of unemployment peaked at 10.7% in 1997 and remained fairly high
throughout the period (1994-2009: 9.1%). Another negative development was the
growth of atypical work contracts: despite the lack of legislative innovations on this
front, their weight on total employment roughly doubled (1994-2009: 11.5%).
191
In this context, the position of the radical left was difficult. The public image of the
Socialist Party was heavily marked by its "tournant de la rigueur" of 1983 and its
failures to seriously tackle mass unemployment (Vail, 2010). The party also slowly but
consistently drifted to the right on socio-economic themes, moving from a discourse of
"rupture with capitalism" in 1981 to a moderate course of adaptation to the changed
international climate afterwards (Cole, 1999). However there is no doubt that the most
190
Official poverty rate (50% of median income) between 1996 and 2009 was 7.2%, quite low by
international standards and with a tendency to decrease.
191
Attempts of the centre-right governments to introduce new precarious contracts for the youth (the
CIP in 1993, the CNE in 2005, the CPE in 2006) were all withdrawn or shelved after a few years under the
pressure of large social mobilisations. Nevertheless, existing non-standard contracts (fixed-term, agency,
apprenticeship) boomed.
240
consistent attacks to the Keynesian-welfarist post-war settlement came from the
centre-right. Since 1986 the latter gradually reasserted its domination over the
executive power (1986-1988, 1993-1997, 2002-2012) and deployed an aggressive,
although not always successful, programme of neoliberal reforms. Moreover, the
communist party was largely jointly liable for the faults of the socialist-led cabinets of
Mauroy (1981-1984) and Fabius (1984-1986), participating to the former and
supporting externally the latter.
The "vacuum" of political representation of working class and welfarist interests thus
appears at first sight less pronounced in France than in most other Western European
countries, and the radical left seems less well positioned to profit from it. The rest of
the section will discuss these problems in more detail.
241
5.3.2 Contours of the vacuum
In fact, as FIGURE 5.9 clearly shows, the consent and legitimacy of the main
"establishment" parties RPR/UMP, UDF and PS
192
was problematic. These three parties
have been dominating the political system since the late Seventies, occupying on
average 86.2% of the lower chamber of parliament (due to the effects of the two-
round majoritarian electoral system) and all offices of president and prime minister.
Their level of electoral support, however, has fallen dramatically in the period 1986-
2002 – not accidentally, the time frame of the harshest implementation and
contestation of neoliberal reforms.
In presidential elections their results fell from 72.2% of valid votes (57.6% of the total
electorate) in 1981 to 48.0% (33.2%) in 2002. In legislative elections they declined from
76.1% of valid votes (52.8% of the total electorate) in 1981 to 53.4% (34.5%) in 1997.
The main beneficiaries were abstentionism and the right-wing anti-establishment
National Front (FN)
193
. The anti-establishment far left (LO, LCR, PT) also grew but was
significant in presidential elections only. Other parties (e.g. communists, ecologists,
radicals, independent centre-right) had ups and downs, decreasing until 1988 and
growing afterwards.
Establishment parties recovered part of their electoral lost ground after the shock of
the 2002 presidential elections. The political trauma provoked by the accession of
Jean-Marie Le Pen to the second round led to a massive rise of political interest and
participation
194
, a centralisation of voting behaviour from minor parties to the two
main ones (PS and UMP) and a fall of the extremes (far-left and far-right). The previous
tendencies, however, slowly reasserted themselves after 2007.
192
Rassemblement pour la République, gaullist right; in 2002 it enlarged and renamed Union pour un
mouvement populaire. Union pour la démocratie française, centre-right; in 1998-2008 it progressively
recentred, lost pieces to the UMP and in 2007 morphed in the centrist party Mouvement démocrate
(MoDem). Due to its marginalisation from power, the MoDem results of 2007-2012 are accounted for in
the "other parties" category. Parti socialiste, left.
193
Front national.
194
Valid votes in presidential elections increased from 69.2% in 2002 to 82.6% in 2007 (the highest level
since 1974) and remained high at 77.9% in 2012. In absolute terms this was even more impressive (from
28.5 million to 36.7 million valid votes, +28.8%). The movement of re-politicisation interested not only
abstentionists but also citizens who for some reason were not registered in the electoral lists: the total
number of registered citizens grew by 8% (whereas the "natural" increase due to the coming of age of
adolescents and new naturalisations accounted for less than half of it, 2.0%-3.5%).
242
FIGURE 5.9 ELECTORAL RESULTS OF FRENCH PARTIES BY TYPE
Source: Ministère de l'Intérieur.
Notes: Above presidential, below legislative elections. Share of total electorate. Main establishment parties: RPR/UMP, PS, UDF
(without MoDem). Anti-establishment parties: far-right and far-left.
The data at the level of broad political blocs show a similar picture. Since 1981 every
single French government, with one exception, was voted out of office at the
subsequent legislative election after heavy electoral losses. The big exception is
represented by 2007, when the seating centre-right coalition managed to compensate
the losses on its left (toward the centrist MoDem, which had in the meantime moved
to the opposition) by draining the far-right electorate.
243
Finally, the efforts of the centre-right governments to push forward a neoliberal
agenda of reforms, far from demoralising the left-wing opinion, have invariably
revitalised it and given rise to mass movements of resistance (Wolfreys, 2006;
Kouvelakis, 2007; Ancelovici, 2012). Altogether, the level of left-wing extra-
parliamentary mobilisation was of a magnitude and persistence unmatched in any
other European country, with the possible exception of Greece.
The labour movement demonstrated an unexpected militancy. Despite the misleading
indications of official statistics, overall strike activity has remained vibrant since 1986,
with peaks in 1989, 1995, 2003 and 2010 equal or superior to the levels of the
Seventies (FIGURE 5.10).
195
Strikes have declined dramatically in the private sector but
have exploded in the civil service and the rest of the public sector.
Between 1986 and 1989 a series of generally successful sectorial movements were
launched by transport and industrial workers, nurses, teachers and employees of the
Ministry of Finances, with a prominent role played by grassroots coordinations
(Narritsens, 1991; Kergoat et al., 1992; Denis, 1996; Leschi, 1996 and 1997;
Chevandier, 2007). In 1995 an enormous mobilisation of public sector workers led to
the withdrawal of the pension reform of the Juppé government (Trat, 1997; Béroud &
Mouriaux, 1998). Other massive but unsuccessful mobilisations of the public sector
against further pension reforms were launched in 2003 (Khalfa, 2003) and 2010
(Andolfatto, 2011; Ancelovici, 2011; Béroud & Yon, 2012). In 2009, finally, large
movements around the themes of purchasing power and employment developed in
the French Antilles (Monza, 2009; Desse, 2010, Rey, 2010) and on mainland France
(Béroud & Yon, 2012): the first successful, the second unsuccessful.
195
The often-cited series of the DARES excludes political strikes, the whole public sector and, since 1995,
the transport sector [in the figure: "official"]. Following the lead of Kouvelakis (2007), I integrate it with
administrative data from other official sources (DARES, DTT-IGTT, SOeS, DGAFP and DGOS) [in the figure:
"all sectors"]. While administrative data are fairly reliable for the public sector, Carlier (2008) has
convincingly shown that they systematically and increasingly underestimate the level of industrial
conflict in the private sector and has estimated their coverage at 48% in 1992 and at 23% in 2004. After
2005 it is possible to reconstruct a series which largely compensates this gap by combining the usual
administrative data for the public sector and the new survey data of ACEMO for the private sector [in
the figure: "all sectors (b)"]; the two series are of course not comparable. Some sectors still escape
completely (agriculture, local government, companies below 10 employees) or intermittently (some
transport and nationalised companies, the health sector, political conflicts in the private sector between
1996 and 2004) from the computation.
FIGURE 5.10 LABOUR CONFLICT
Source: my elaboration from DARES, DTT-IGTT, SOeS, DGAFP, DGOS.
Notes: Thousands of working days lost on strikes. 2005: new methodology and series break.
245
All movements combined industrial action, mainly by public sector workers, with very
large and protracted cycles of demonstrations (Filleule & Tartakowsky, 2008);
regardless of their eventual success, they also seemed to enjoy a the sympathy and
support of the majority of the population.
The youth was the other main protagonist of the period. The student movement
repeatedly initiated large and successful cycles of demonstrations and occupations: in
particular, the 1986 movement against the Devaquet university reform (Dray, 1987),
the 1994 movement against the CIP job contract (Borredon, 1996) and the 2006
movement against the CPE job contract (Obono, 2008). High school students were the
dominant actors behind the rise of the anti-fascist movement, which flared from a
relative marginality to several hundred thousand demonstrators in April-May 2002
(Monzat, 2003; Gemie, 2003). Second generation immigrant youth, finally, headed
several important moments of contentious politics, from the Marches for Equality in
1983-1984 to the urban riots of 2005 (Hargreaves, 1991; Le Goaziou & Mucchielli,
2006; Béaud & Masclet, 2008).
Beside public sector workers and the youth, other social actors created a backdrop of
continuous effervescence with activities which were quantitatively weaker but
qualitatively interesting and very prominent in the public debate (Waters, 2006;
Ancelovici, 2008; Mathieu, 2012). Three relatively coherent cycles stand out: the
mobilisations of the "sans" – undocumented migrants, homeless, unemployed – of the
period 1991-1998 (Siméant, 1993; Royall, 1997 and 2004; Mouchard, 2002 and 2009;
Lahusen & Baumgarten, 2006; McNevin, 2006; Garcia, 2013); the alter-globalist
movement of the period 1999-2004 (Agrikoliansky et. al., 2005; Agrikoliansky, 2007);
and the 2004-2005 grassroots campaign for a "left no" to the EU constitution
referendum (Crespy, 2006).
This context of disaffection toward the traditional parties of government, widespread
rejection of neoliberal policies and very large extra-parliamentary mobilisations on
traditional "old left" and "new left" themes fuelled expectations of vibrant growth for
the radical left. The following sub-sections will show that these were only marginally
fulfilled.
246
5.3.3 Electoral mobilisation
As already remarked in section 5.2.1, the electoral mobilisation of the French radical
left had mixed results.
At an aggregate level, the radical left failed to recover the losses of the period 1978-
1986 and, notably, the long-term shift of the French electorate toward the Socialist
Party. Since 1986 its results have been oscillating around an average of 10.8% of valid
votes, less than half of the pre-crisis values of 1978 (23.9%). The post-1986 trend was
neither downward nor upward. This overall long-term stability was the product of an
alternation of middling or strong showings (1986-1988, 1995-2002, 2009-2012) with
weak ones (1989-1994, 2002-2007). While some sizeable electoral victories (13.9% in
1995; 12.6% in 2009) seemed at first to contain the promise of a bright future of
growth, retrospectively they represented maximum ceilings which were followed by
periods of stagnation and drops to unprecedentedly weak troughs (the legislative
elections of 2002, 7.6%, and 2012, 7.9%).
At the level of individual parties, the landscape was very dynamic. The overall growth
of the far left was unstable but remarkable: from 1.3% in 1992 to 6.1% in 2009, with an
incredible peak of 10.4% in the 2002 presidential elections. LO dominated this space
up to 2002, the LCR/NPA afterwards. The communist party suffered periodical drops
(1981-1986, 1989, 1997-2002) followed by periods of stagnation or hollow recovery. In
legislative elections, the most stable indicator of its weight, it fell from 11.3% in 1988
to 9.6% in 1997, 4.8% in 2002 and 4.3% in 2007. The Left Front, finally, came to entirely
hegemonise this scene after 2009; its results, however, wildly oscillated between
11.1% (2012 presidential) and 6.9% (2012 legislative), depending on its campaigning
profile and the specific stakes and characteristics of the election.
The underlying reasons of this behaviour can be illuminated by looking at the broader
trends of the left-of-the-centre electorate (FIGURE 5.11).
FIGURE 5.11 ELECTORAL RESULTS OF RADICAL AND MODERATE LEFT
Source: Ministère de l'Intérieur.
Notes: shares of valid votes. Numbers: legislative elections.
.
248
The figure shows very clearly that the total left vote rose during periods of seating
centre-right governments and large extra-parliamentary mobilisations against
neoliberalism (1986-1988; 1993-1997; 2002-2007; 2007-2012) and collapsed while the
left was in power (1988-1993; 1997-2002). The only exception was the period 2004-
2007, when the left vote fell despite the effervescence of the preceding years. The
reason for this deviation is likely to lie partly in the lack of credibility of the Socialist
Party, which had been deeply lacerated by the controversy over the 2005 European
constitution referendum, and partly by a law and order reflex provoked by the riots in
the banlieues.
The radical left had thus to navigate a very narrow path.
During periods of leftward swing of the public opinion, the way to go was to present
itself as a unitary force which would contribute to the defeat of the right-wing while
exerting a radicalising pressure on the Socialist Party. The parties who failed to do this,
adopting a more intransigent attitude, could have brief spikes in support but were
ultimately severely punished and marginalised (LO after 2002; the NPA in 2010-2012).
Indeed, after April 2002 the whole radical left paid dearly the consequences of the
botched presidential election, with its overall results plunging at an all-time low.
During periods of centre-left cabinets, on the other hand, the association of the radical
left with the seating governments was clearly poisonous and had to be avoided at all
costs. Most of the electoral collapse of the PCF stemmed precisely from its periods of
governmental participation (1981-1984; 1997-2002). A more uncertain collocation,
such as the one adopted toward the socialist cabinets of 1984-1986, 1988-1993 and
2012-present
196
, was less damaging but hardly positive.
The attempts to exploit the changing political mood with a flexible and appropriate
strategy, however, were by no means always guaranteed a successful outcome. A
powerful push to the left of public opinion benefitted significantly the PCF in 1993-
196
The lines between support and opposition were here blurred. In the first and third period the
socialist cabinets did not need the communist support to have a parliamentary majority; concretely, the
PCF voted yes (1984) or abstained (2012) at the initial confidence vote and then decided on a case-by-
case basis. In the second case, the socialist cabinets did not have an autonomous parliamentary majority
and relied sometimes on the PCF but mostly on centrist dissidents, often with the help of the peculiar
procedure of the article 49.3 of the Constitution (Ferretti, 2003). Posed in front of no-confidence
motions, the party voted them twice (1990 and 1992) but enabled the survival of the cabinet the
remaining times.
249
1997 and the FdG in 2010-2012 but only marginally or uncertainly the PCF in 1986-
1988 and the whole radical left in 2002-2004. Conversely, a clear oppositional stance
against socialist governments by the far left led to extraordinary results in 1997-2002
but had been of little benefit beforehand (1981-1986, 1988-1993), when the fruits of
the disillusionment toward the left in power were rather reaped by abstentions and
the far-right.
To sum up, the French radical left was often among the beneficiaries – together with
the moderate left – of leftward swings of the public opinion but ultimately failed to
profit from periods of weakening of the Socialist Party and came nowhere near to
challenge its central position within the left-of-the-centre camp.
The CDSP survey data on political proximity offer a further confirmation of the limits of
this success (see FIGURE 5.12). Between 1988 and 2007 people identifying with the PS
dropped from 41.9% to 24.9%. People identifying with PCF, LO and LCR/NPA did
increase from 6.0% to 9.7%. This improvement, however, represented a very small
portion of the socialist losses (which were mainly lost to the right) and did not
necessarily translate in an electoral growth.
FIGURE 5.12 INDICATORS OF LEFT-WING OPINION
Source: my elaboration from CDSP (1978, 1988, 1995, 2007).
Notes: share of valid votes. Vote: real results. Proximity: poll data, people declaring their proximity to a party. Self-positioning: poll
data, position on the left-right continuum.
250
5.3.4 Organisational mobilisation
If the electoral mobilisation of the French radical left was at least able to ensure an
overall stability around comparatively high levels, its organisational mobilisation failed
to stop a ruinous decline. Unlike in Germany and Italy, the issue here was not the
capture of disillusioned social democrats or post-communists: the French Socialist
Party has historically had comparatively social roots and a minority position within the
left spectrum. The problem was the re-capture of the traditional communist sub-
culture which had been dissolving since the late Seventies. Ultimately, neither the PCF
nor other radical left forces managed to make progresses on this task.
The collapse of the radical left membership continued relentlessly all along our time
frame (see FIGURE 5.13).
FIGURE 5.13 RADICAL LEFT MEMBERSHIP
Source: my elaboration from Martelli (2010b), Videt (2011) and various estimates.
251
The PCF had already fallen from its all-time high of 566,492 in 1978 to 368,609 in 1986,
stabilising until 1988 (375,187). The end of the Soviet bloc, the effects or failures of
internal reforms, internal dissidences, the 1997-2002 period of governmental
participation and demographic replacement led to a new precipitous haemorrhage
which reduced due-paying members to 92,772 (2003) and again 64,184 (2012).
197
The large majority of former communist members, especially those with a
middle/lower class background, abandoned any direct political engagement and often
even failed to retain a link of electoral loyalty toward the party, shifting to a socialist or
far-left vote.
The remaining radical left organisations missed the opportunity to profit from the
communist decline. Lutte Ouvrière indeed strengthened its network of activists and
sympathisers in the period 1980-2002
198
but remained numerically insignificant
compared both to the PCF and to its own electoral influence. The same assessment
applies to other far-left traditions in the Noughties: the LCR rose from 1,041 members
in 1997 to 2,640 in 2007, in a period when its electorate soared from practically nil to
one and a half million votes;
199
the NPA had a brief initial spike (9,123 members in
early 2009) but soon plunged back to the levels of its predecessor. Even Mélenchon's
own PG, despite the very successful presidential campaign of its leader, saw its
(declared) members double in 2009-2012 (to 12,000) but came nowhere near the
membership of the PCF.
The dense network of collateral organisations which enveloped the PCF up to the
Eighties suffered the same fate. As already remarked, the leadership of friendly mass
organisations often retained a personal proximity with and even the membership of
the PCF; however, they ceased to act as relays of party ideas and influence and
adapted to a context dominated by de-politicisation and a shift toward the Socialist
Party and the right. The more openly political organisations which emerged from the
197
Formal members (an institute introduced in 2002 to mask the decline) stabilised at 130,063 in 2003
and 133,476 in 2009.
198
Estimates are not very precise. Activists might have risen from 650 to 2,000 and formal members
from less than 1,000 to 7,000-8,000.
199
More precisely, from 71,304 votes in the 1997 legislative election to 1,498,581 in the 2007
presidential election.
252
struggles of the Nineties and Noughties, in turn, chose not to affiliate explicitly with
any of the existing radical left parties.
Finally, the radical left lost much of its traditional presence within workplaces. The
official number of workplace cells of the PCF declined from 9,494 (1978) to 5,499
(1988) and 2,800 (2000); they were de facto scrapped as a central organisational form
at the 2000 congress and now survive almost exclusively within PCF-controlled local
administrations and big state-owned companies (postal office, transports, EDF).
Despite their efforts, other radical left organisations (especially LO and parts of the
LCR/NPA) also saw their workplace presence stagnate or decline.
253
5.3.5 Conclusions
The detailed analysis of this section has sought to address the key question of whether
the French radical left has been able, and to what extent, to fill the vacuum of political
representation produced by the rightward drift of the political system in the neoliberal
age.
The answer is that it generally has not. The mobilisation of the radical left in the period
1988-2012 produced at best slightly increasing, in general declining outcomes (see
FIGURE 5.14).
FIGURE 5.14 INDICATORS OF INFLUENCE
Notes: share of total electorate (above), share of valid votes (below).
254
Expressed in absolute terms, the membership collapsed from 371,809 to 86,184
members (-76.8%), legislative votes decreased from 2,845,826 to 2,046,578 (-28.3%)
and presidential votes grew (+34.5%). Expressed in terms of percentages of the total
electorate, membership density (M/E) has continuously declined from 0.99% to 0.19%
of the electorate. The share of votes in legislative elections has also collapsed from
7.52% to 4.44%, almost entirely as a result of the 2002 drop. The share of votes in
presidential elections went through a small but significant increase from 8.96% to
9.99%: results have oscillated widely but are on average superior to those of the late
Eighties. Expressed in terms of percentages of valid votes, results were similar: an
unstable but rather growing presidential vote, a strongly declining legislative one.
The electoral level (particularly presidential elections) proved to be the most
favourable terrain for the radical left, but even here successes were limited, uncertain
and unstable. Large leftward shifts of the electorate, sparked by unpopular right-wing
governments and mass extra-parliamentary mobilisations (1986-1988; 1993-1997;
2002-2004; 2007-2012), generally benefitted the radical left; however, rather less than
other left parties (e.g. the PS and the Greens). Periods of direct participation or
external support of the PCF to socialist governments (1981-1986; 1997-2002) almost
annihilated its electoral support. Vocal opposition to socialist governments by the far
left (1981-1986; 1988-1993; 1997-2002; 2012-present) gave fruits only in the third
case; in all other instances disaffected left voters dispersed toward abstention and in
other political directions, while the indirect but ultimate beneficiary was the far-right
(Fysh & Wolfreys, 2003).
The level of extra-parliamentary organisation, on the contrary, represented a heavy
failure. Membership levels, networks of collateral organisations, influence within civil
society and social movement organisations: all sub-dimensions were dragged down by
the decay of the PCF to the levels of the Twenties, before the 1935 surge. The other
radical left organisations completely failed to intercept these disaffected ex-
communists and to provide them a new political home. More crucially, even when
some party did manage to expand its electorate (the PCF in 1994-1997, LO in 1993-
2002, the LCR/NPA in 2002-2009, the FdG in 2008-2012), its organisational growth
lagged well behind the electoral surge: that is, it only marginally translated its
improved popular sympathy into tighter forms of organisational linkages. This worrying
255
development means that the French radical left has been willingly or unwillingly
conforming to the general long-term shift of political parties from organisations solidly
anchored within civil society to mere receptors of a fleeting electoral consent (Mair,
1994).
How can we explain this failure to exploit the high level of dissatisfaction and
resistance against neoliberalism as a springboard for a durable organisational and
electoral strengthening?
Various interesting explanatory factors have been advanced in the French literature.
The first factor refers to organisational shortcomings of the PCF. Mischi (2003b), for
instance, has pointed out that "the actual rupture occurs when the party loses its
primacy within the communist universe". The loss of the sense of a historic mission, of
clear identitarian references and of internal discipline leads to a crisis of the
communist institution, the progressive autonomisation of its components and an
avalanche effect on its organisational strength. This process, however, seems rather
more a consequence of unavoidable external pressures – the defeat of the Western
labour movement since the late Seventies, the general shift toward what Jacques Ion
(1997) has defined as "distanced activism", the crisis and fall of the Soviet bloc – than
the fruit of precise subjective responsibilities. The party leadership put up much
resistance against these trends up to the Nineties and progressively embraced them
only when it felt that there was no alternative to them. If the reforms of Robert Hue
are likely to have accelerated the loss of members and cohesion, they initially
succeeded in stalling the loss of electoral and institutional influence.
The second factor has been identified in the fragmentation of the radical left. The
failure of the various parties to agree on a common candidate in the 2007 presidential
election has been particularly criticised (Khalfa, 2007; Artous & Kouvelakis, 2007;
Kouvelakis, 2007). The hypothesis is suggestive and has been lent some confirmation
by the outcome of the 2012 presidential election, when unity produced a dynamic
campaign and good results. The context of 2007 however, marked as it was by a
powerful centripetal realignment of the left electorate toward the moderate candidate
most likely to defeat the right (the socialist Ségolène Royal or even the centrist
François Bayrou), was unlikely to reward a joint radical left candidature more than it
256
did several smaller ones. More generally, across the period 1990-2012 organisational
fragmentation has of course reduced the societal weight of each individual party but
has instead rather tended to increase their total weight, catering for partially different
constituencies and complementing their strengths and weaknesses. The existence of
an anti-systemic far left in the period 1993-2002, for instance, compensated for the
decline of the PCF which would have otherwise dragged down the voting results of the
whole area. On the contrary, a regroupment of the radical left on intransigent bases
would have largely wiped out its local and perhaps national parliamentary
representation, which was instead safeguarded by the politics of alliances of the
PCF.
200
The third factor refers to the incapacity of the parties to rapidly and adequately adapt
to the changes in the political conjuncture. Kouvelakis (2007: 229-252), for instance,
correctly reproaches the far left for its rigidity, arguing that its relative decline in 2002-
2007 (compared with 1998-2000) was partially due to its failure to adapt to the shift
from an "anti-political" to a "political" sequence and its insistence on a rather sectarian
posture which ignored the widespread desire to defeat the right. At another level, the
continuous zigzags of the PCF from conciliatory to intransigent attitudes toward the
Socialist Party proved to be too flexible: the choice of direct governmental
participation (1981-1984, 1997-2002) left it exposed to the full brunt of the
disillusionment of its electorate while the constant shifts played an important role in
the above-mentioned crisis of the communist identity, sowing a deep confusion among
its ranks; the party thus ended up losing support both on its right and on its left.
My analysis has put forward a partially different explanation.
On the one hand, the loss of cohesion, organisational fragmentation and tactical
troubles appear as intrinsic and largely unavoidable consequences of the objectively
contradictory position of the radical left in the neoliberal era. Radical leaders, activists,
voters and potential supporters all grapple with the tensions produced by a dilemma
of difficult resolution: that between anti-neoliberal coherence and desire for left unity.
200
The regional elections are a good example of this. Since 2003 non-aligned lists can pass to the second
round and obtain parliamentary representation only if they overcome a 10%-threshold: this was a
realistic possibility for the radical left in less than half of the metropolitan regions. On the contrary, in
2004 the alliance with the PS guaranteed to the PCF an over-proportional number of seas (10.7%).
257
Aggressive right-wing governments tend to revitalise and mobilise the left-wing
opinion but at the same time reactivate strong pressures toward an alliance;
subsequent periods of left-wing alternation prove politically deceiving and thoroughly
discredit the radical left forces which enabled them. Striking a rewarding balance
between the two sides of the dilemma is extremely difficult, especially in contexts
when the radical left support becomes crucial for the formation of a centre-left
electoral or parliamentary majority. In these cases, a very likely outcome is thus
cyclical electoral oscillations and a fragmentation in rival sensibilities and
organisations.
On the other hand, the disarray caused by the exhaustion of the models of the
Twentieth Century workers' movement has not yet been superseded by viable new
ones. Soviet-style state socialism was thoroughly discredited; the traditional state-
based reformism of Western social democratic and communist parties gradually
morphed into a counter-reformism fully at ease with free-market financialised
capitalism; the kind of workplace radicalism typical of the Sixties and Seventies was
less and less capable to win material improvements and to counteract the
fragmentation, precarisation and disorganisation of the workforce. In this context, the
parties of the radical left were to some extent successful in repositioning themselves
as champions of the welfare state but failed to develop a convincing long-term political
vision and effective modalities of extra-parliamentary intervention.
France did not deviate significantly from the Western European norm. Anti-neoliberal
dissatisfaction and extra-parliamentary mobilisation did at times fuel significant
electoral surges (1992-1995, 2007-2009), but these proved to be short-lived; electoral
sympathy, in turn, failed to translate into tighter forms of activism and commitment.
258
5.4 Explaining fragmentation and regroupment
The progressive organisational fragmentation described in section 5.2.2 can be traced
back to the interplay of three main factors: (i) a strategic differentiation along
intransigent or conciliatory lines; (ii) the institutional impact of the political system; (iii)
a question of political and organisational identities.
The first point relates to the key dilemma of the contemporary French radical left: the
difficult relation with the Socialist Party, electorally weak but absolutely predominant
within the left spectrum (second rounds of elections, parliamentary weight and
governmental weight).
From the Seventies to the early Nineties the whole radical left lost very large sections
of its constituency to the PS which, despite its increasingly moderate course, continued
to exert an incredible pull on the former.
201
Overall fragmentation did not increase
much as a result, as the successive splits of dissident communist tendencies were
short-lived and generally ended up merging with the PS or other moderate left parties
(Greens, MDC).
From 1997 to 2002, on the contrary, the experience of the Jospin government (1997-
2002) led to a collapse of its reputation among radical left circles and progressively
hardened the differentiation between intransigent and conciliatory tendencies. The
ensuing collapse of the PCF did not benefit the far left in terms of membership but
fuelled its unexpected and powerful electoral surge and was the main reason behind
the sinking of Hue's project of an enlarged "new communist party" (1999-2002).
After 2002, finally, the appeal of the Socialist Party on the left remained low; not so
the pressure toward some form of collaboration, either simply to defeat the right or in
the hope of exerting a more long-term pull on its policy course. As a consequence, the
differences between the various radical left forces (PCF, LO, LCR) remained
201
Among the many prominent leaders and cadres who left for the PS the following must be mentioned:
from the PCF Henri Fiszbin (1986) and Charles Fiterman (1998); from the LCR Julien Dray (1981), Henri
Weber (1986) and Gérard Filoche (1994); from the OCI Lionel Jospin (Seventies), Jean-Luc Mélenchon
(1976) and Jean-Christophe Cambadélis (1986).
259
irreconcilable and led to the failure of both the LO-LCR alliance (2003-2004) and the
debates on a common presidential candidature in 2006-2007.
The second point relates to the role of the (electoral, financial, etc.) rules and
regulations of the political system in providing positive and negative incentives to
fragmentation or in artificially neutralising it. The effects have not been uniform.
The permissive 1993 reform of party financing has helped the proliferation of
organisations alternative to the PCF, providing them with a reasonably accessible influx
of resources.
202
The working of electoral legislation has on the contrary made very difficult to the same
organisations the access to parliamentary representation.
203
Finally, the impact of electoral legislation on candidatures and electoral results varied
according to the specific rules of each kind of election. The extraordinary tribune
offered by the presidential election has encouraged a proliferation of competing
radical left candidates, despite the high formal barriers.
204
The medium-level electoral
thresholds of European and regional elections have on the contrary tended to promote
the establishment of alliances.
205
Finally, the two-round majoritarian system of both
presidential and legislative elections has generally not discouraged electoral
fragmentation, as it enabled the electoral shift of socialist voters toward the radical
left and of communist voters toward the far left in the first round (e.g. Tiberj, 2004).
This was an effective means to nudge their parties to change their policies ("vote
d'influence") without running the risk of compromising the overall result of the second
202
Between 1993 and 2008 four groups have managed to regularly access state financing: LO, LCR/NPA,
PT and SEGA (a technical regroupment of the eco-socialist milieu).
203
Access to national parliament has been virtually precluded to any minor radical left organisation, with
the exception of dissident MPs seeking to retain their seat. Successful examples of the latter are
provided by the former communists Jean-Pierre Brard (CAP), Maxime Gremetz (orthodox), François
Asensi (FASE) and Jacqueline Fraysse (FASE), by the former socialist Marc Dolez (PG) and by the former
MDC Jacques Desallangre (ind. then PG). Access to sub-national and supra-national assemblies was rare
but not impossible (e.g. LO and LCR between 1998 and 2004).
204
Candidates need to gather signatures of support (parrainages) by existing elected representatives: 50
(1958), 100 (1965), 500 (1981). The bar seems to be a high one for extra-parliamentary organisations
(the total number of possible signatories is about 42,000) but has been de facto lowered by the
willingness of local politicians to offer their signature to parties they do not belong to out of democratic
or strategic reasons. The number of radical left presidential candidates has thus oscillated from a
minimum of 2-3 (1981, 1995, 2012) to four (1988 and 2002) and five (2007).
205
E.g. between LO and LCR (1999, 2004) or the FdG lists (2009, 2010).
260
round; as soon as it produced the unintended consequence of the April 2002
presidential election, however, this pattern swiftly and permanently reversed.
The third point, finally, relates to the attainment of a common identity or at least a
mutually acceptable compromise between the various political cultures and organised
tendencies of the radical left.
Although the project of a regroupment of the radical left on pluralist and anti-
neoliberal bases was implemented with some success only after 2009, many of its
preconditions were present since the mid-Nineties. In particular, the turn of Robert
Hue's PCF away from monolithism and hegemonic predilections and toward a practice
of external collaborations offered a promised path for a recomposition of the radical
left. A series of obstacles, however, persistently prevented its realisation. Firstly, as I
have shown above, the fundamental disagreements on the relationship with the
moderate left could not be easily wished away in a period when the PCF resolutely
turned toward a strategy of generalised electoral and governmental alliances with the
Socialist Party. Secondly, the long-standing contrasts between different political
cultures (Trotksyism, anti-capitalism, communism, socialism, ecologism) could in
principle coexist under a common roof, as the experiences of other countries and of
the Left Front prove, but were a source of friction. Thirdly, organisational jealousies on
the sharing of power and resources remained difficult to assuage. In particular, the
question of who was to embody the radical left in presidential elections was the single
most important factor behind the failure of the 2005-2007 talks, and the regroupment
operated by the Left Front in 2009-2012 became possible only when an enfeebled PCF
became ready to hand over the position of presidential candidate to a non-communist.
The post-2009 regroupment process had its objective bases in the obvious overlapping
of the anti-neoliberal programmatic of the different parties and in the unprecedented
weakness of PCF and of the French radical left in its entirety during the period 2003-
2007. Its partial success lies in the ability of the FdG to make the best out of the three
above-mentioned factors.
On the first level, the Mélenchon presidential candidature was effective in neutralising
centrifugal pressures on strategic issues by simultaneously insisting on a clear political
differentiation vis-à-vis the socialists and on left unity against the right. On the second
261
level, the rival project of the New Anticapitalist Party was out-manoeuvred in 2009-
2010 at the crucial level of the achievement of parliamentary representation.
206
On the
third level, the form of a pluralist front headed by a non-communist and giving equal
footing to all member organisations quickly downplayed the concerns of ideological
and organisational identity and emphasised the benefits of co-operation.
Both the strategic and the identitarian dilemmas are however merely assuaged and
not resolved: unity thus remains fragile and exposed to dangers of disintegration.
206
The NPA narrowly missed access to the European Parliament in 2009 (4.88%). The 2010 regional
elections further confirmed that far-left currents could hope to gain representation only through
alliances with the PCF. These led to 7 GU and 2 NPA councillors; independent NPA and LO lists, on the
contrary, obtained no representation.
262
5.5 The strategy of leftward pull
The analysis of section 5.3 has shown how the French radical left failed to significantly
expand on the back of widespread dissatisfaction and resistance against neoliberalism.
However, its extra-parliamentary and electoral support (legislative elections excepted)
remained significant and in a high range for Western European standards.
What were the results of its efforts to exert a leftward pull on the political system?
The record was altogether poor.
The policy course of the Socialist Party seems to have been only marginally affected by
the pressure coming from its left. The PS progressively adopted a neoliberal economic
policy centred on privatisations and liberalisations, an open economy and EU (trade,
fiscal, legal) constraints but sought to accompany it with a preservation or expansion
of public employment, state expenditures, basic welfare provisions and safety nets
(e.g. minimum wage, minimum income, 35-hour working week); until recently, it also
refrained from major pension and employment reforms. Lionel Jospin (1999) famously
synthesised this approach as an embrace of the "market economy" but a rejection of
the "market society" – a distinction more rhetorical than practical (Bergounioux &
Grunberg, 2007; Grunberg, 2011) but not entirely devoid of empirical validity. The
radical left can certainly claim no credit for obstructing the conversion of the Socialist
Party toward the free market: its turn to privatisations happened precisely in the years
when the communist party was its allied in power (1997-2002). The "progressive"
measures of socialist governments, on the other hand, seem to have been
autonomously conceived to lubricate and accompany the neoliberal transition (Vail,
2010) rather than as a response of any left-wing mobilisation.
The effects on governmental policies were clearer to see. The contribution of the
radical left to the successive waves of mass extra-parliamentary struggles which rocked
the country since 1986 was generally minoritarian but nevertheless important. These
mobilisations were often successful in forcing right-wing governments to retreat
unpopular policies (the general movements of 1994, 1996 and 2006) or in obtaining
specific material concessions for specific professional or social categories (civil
263
servants, students, the unemployed, the population of the French Antilles). They had
however very precise limitations. Firstly, left-wing contentious politics flared up in
periods of centre-right domination but tended to evaporate when the left was in
power. Secondly, the failures became more and more frequent, despite the very large
size of supporting strikes and demonstrations (2003, 2009 and 2010). Thirdly, they
retained a generally defensive character, largely bypassed private sector workers and
had little impact on organisational consolidation (i.e. the institutionalisation of social
movement networks or membership growth of trade unions and other organisations).
The radical left also played an important role in the outcome of referenda on EU
matters: the no option lost by a hair's breadth on the 1992 referendum on the
Maastricht treaty (49.0%) and actually won on the 2005 referendum on the proposed
European constitution (54.7%). These manifestations of dissent, however, did not
affect the overall process of European integration in any noticeable way.
The effects on non-governmental actors, finally, were also rather modest. The balance
of power within private sector workplaces, in particular, solidly in the hands of owners
and managers and organising and mobilising efforts failed to put a brake to ongoing
negative tendencies (wage stagnation, precarisation, industrial dismissals and union
density).
This failure to exert a leftward pull on French politics and society was common to all
parties (PCF and the far left) and strategies (conciliatory and intransigent). Three
explanations are possible.
Firstly, the outcome may simply derive from an insufficient level of electoral,
parliamentary and extra-parliamentary pressures. As I have shown in section 5.2.1, the
societal weight of the French radical left was fairly high by Western European
standards but always remained of a middling size. Despite short-lived spikes, it
followed a long-term constant or declining trend and it never came close to threaten
the dominant position of the Socialist Party within the left-of-the-centre political
spectrum. Moreover, it was increasingly divided between competing organisations
which not always reached some form of unity in action.
Secondly, the problem may instead lie in the wrong kind of tactics. At the electoral
level, support to socialist candidates in the second round has rarely been explicitly
linked to clear policy conditionalities. Since the disaster of the 1958 legislative
264
elections left parties, including the far left, have generally stuck to the deeply-
ingrained precepts of "republican discipline" (discipline républicaine), providing for
stand-down agreements (désistements) and the convergence of all votes on the best
placed left candidate; in some cases, especially at the sub-national level, this basic
form of co-operation has been upgraded to more solid agreements on common left
candidates from the first round. Only Lutte Ouvrière (after 1981) has normally turned
away from this custom and refused to call for a left vote in the second round. Both
tactics, however, left the socialist candidates free from the need to commit to policy
concessions to their left.
207
At the parliamentary level, the PCF was wary to push its
bargaining with seating socialist governments to the point of threatening to topple
them. The communists were decisive for the survival of the centre-left on two
occasions: 1988-1993 and 1997-2002; the party threatened to support a no-confidence
motion twice, in 1990 and 1992, but failed both to win significant concessions and to
force a cabinet reshuffle or new elections. The key problem in adopting this set of
more aggressive tactics was the fact that they risked to prove double-edged swords,
running against the widespread desire of left unity against the right and leading to a
punishment in the ballot box.
Thirdly, the incapacity of the radical left to assume a leading role within workplaces
and civil society organisations and to devise effective methods of mobilisation may
also be one of the culprits. The radical left enjoyed more credit among sympathisers of
the left-leaning trade unions than that among the general population, at times higher
than that of the PS;
208
this notwithstanding, it was generally isolated within the unions'
top decision-making instances and unable to carry on the fight against their will (2003
and 2010) or initiate significant mobilisations against centre-left governments.
207
Conditional agreements were on the other hand sometimes offered by the far left to the PCF, for
instance, by LO for the 1988 and 1997 legislative elections (LO, 1988 and 1996c) and by the LCR in the
framework of possible processes of radical left regroupment; they were usually ignored.
208
In the period 1995-2012, voting intentions for radical left candidates were 37.0% within Solidaires,
33.4% within the CGT, 19.3% within FO and 18.2% within the FSU.
265
5.6 Conclusions
The French national context was to a large extent not dissimilar to the German and
Italian ones. Common features were: the downturn of the militancy, organisation and
effectiveness of the labour movement begun in the late Seventies and its
consequences in terms of the socio-economic and political-ideological balance of
forces; the moves toward a neoliberal restructuring of state and society such as the
privatisation of the state-owned sector and reforms of welfare provisions and labour
protection; the progressive rightward shift of social democratic parties; the crisis and
final collapse of the Eastern bloc and the need to redefine a credible and appealing
vision of a post-capitalist future.
Some key differences were however evident. Firstly, in France left-wing extra-
parliamentary mobilisation has remained since the late Eighties at fairly high levels,
with a constant background of localised movements by wage workers, the youth and
other social subjects and cyclical eruptions of mass conflicts (1994-1995, 2003, 2005-
2006, 2009-2010). Secondly, a strong popular suspicion and resistance to neoliberalism
has determined a much slower and incomplete pace of the process of
neoliberalisation: if the state-owned sector has been largely (but not completely)
dismantled, pension and labour reforms have been less incisive than elsewhere and
welfare provisions, state expenditure and state employment have remained stable or
even expanded. Thirdly, a comparatively successful record in macro- and micro-
economic terms has favoured a feeble but not negligible growth of real wages
(contrary to the wage stagnation in Italy and Germany), although unemployment rates
have remained high.
Although the shock of the years 1989-1992 did not represent the sudden
organisational break experienced in other countries, it accelerated a process of
progressive change of the radical left away from the Twentieth Century models to new
features and characteristics. The main trend directions, consistent with the general
Western European trends, can be schematised as follows.
266
Ideologically, the parties moved from traditional communist references to a vaguer
"left" identity and from long-term anti-capitalist goals to a more concrete anti-
neoliberal programmatic. Sociologically, the barycentre of their constituency shifted
from the lower-middle strata of the salaried population (e.g. industrial and agricultural
workers) to a more composite mix of ordinary wage workers, highly educated strata
and inactives. Organisationally, the mass party (PCF) and avant-garde party (LO, LCR)
models morphed into light organisation with a predominantly electoral focus.
Strategically, the dilemma of the relationship with the moderate left became the
centre of the inter- and intra-party debate and led to periodic oscillations, lacerations
and an overall growth of fragmentation.
The transition remains to this day incomplete and open-ended: stark discontinuities
are counterbalanced by the legacies of the past; the old ways are increasingly sidelined
but their replacements are unstable and incoherent.
This turbulence was largely the symptom and attempted response to two key
challenges: (i) arresting or compensating for the collapse of the communist sub-
culture; (ii) exploiting the political vacuum created by the accommodation of
mainstream parties to neoliberalism as a springboard for a recovery of societal weight
and political influence.
The balance sheet of more than two decades of activity is mixed. On the one hand, the
radical left managed to remain a vital and medium-sized political area and preserved
an important role at all levels of French politics and society. On the other hand, it failed
to embark on a stable path of electoral and organisational growth and to dent the
supremacy of the Socialist Party within the left-of-the-centre spectrum. Instead, the
bouts of expansion ignited by mass dissatisfaction and resistance against the proposed
neoliberal reforms of the right (1993-1997 and 2009-2012) remained of limited
magnitude and were followed by periods of stagnation (1997-2002) or relative
weakness (2002-2008). As it was, the vacuum to the left of the Socialist Party proved
much more difficult to fill than expected.
The inability to overcome certain maximum ceilings (13.8% of valid votes; the
interruption of membership decline; a consolidation of the presence within civil
society and social movement organisations) may be attributed to subjective mistakes:
267
the overly conciliatory course of the PCF during the term of the Jospin government
(1997-2002); the overly sectarian attitude of the far-left organisations at the peak of
their electoral influence (LO-LCR in 2002-2004; NPA in 2009-2012); the failure to carry
out an early process of regroupment (2005-2007). From my perspective, however,
these problems are largely a reflection of objective constraints.
Firstly, the radical left space occupies a structurally contradictory position, torn as it is
between the necessities of anti-neoliberal coherence and those of anti-right unity. The
former undermined any conciliatory strategy of long-term left alliances while the latter
frustrated the formation of a fully autonomous pole.
209
This is the material foundation
of most predicaments of the contemporary radical left, from its cyclical electoral
development to its growing organisational fragmentation.
Secondly, the Socialist Party shows a continued ability to neutralise the threat on its
left through a variety of political and technical mechanisms: a periodic renewal
through opposition; the exploitation of its pivotal position within the left camp and of
the two-round electoral system; the cooptation of junior partners of moderate left or
radical left origin and of extra-parliamentary social movements; the attraction of non-
attached voters on grounds of enabling the success and stability of movements of
political alternation.
Like its German and Italian counterparts, the French radical left has so far failed to find
a way out of these conundrums. It has thus become a thermometer of the
dissatisfaction toward the moderate left but no credible alternative to it.
209
Grunberg and Schweisguth (2003) are thus correct in describing the French political system as
fundamentally tripartite: left, centre-right and far right.
268
CHAPTER SIX. CROSS-COUNTRY
COMPARISON AND CONCLUSION:
FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS.
This concluding chapter will draw together the findings and implications of my analysis.
In section 6.1 I will show how this thesis contributes to illuminate the questions on the
meaning of the Western European radical left emerging from the existing scholarly
literature. In section 6.2 I will expand on the political nature of the contemporary
radical left. Sections 6.3, 6.4 and 6.5 will be devoted to charting the evolution of the
various dimensions of societal weight (electoral, institutional and organisational) of this
political area and to a discussion of their reasons and consequences. In section 6.6 I
will explain the contradictory tendencies toward regroupment and fragmentation. In
section 6.7 I will assess the failure of the radical left to exert a significant influence on
Western European politics and society. In section 6.8, finally, I will provide some
concluding remarks on the overall trajectory of the contemporary radical left.
269
6.1 The meaning of the contemporary radical left.
Incoherent adaptation, revival of left reformism or a
socialism for the Twenty-First Century?
In the initial literature review and throughout the three national chapters I have shown
that no consensus has so far emerged within the scholarly community on the
fundamental nature of the contemporary radical left. Three main questions have
proven particularly divisive.
The first question refers to the coherence or lack thereof of the contemporary radical
left and the possibility to understand it as a party family.
On the one hand, many early analyses have tended to emphasise the predominance of
an incoherent process of disintegration of the Western European communist party
family, as each party transformed at a different pace and in a different direction. Bell
(1992) and Bull (1994 and 1995) proclaimed the end of the Twentieth Century
communist movement: after 1989 the parties followed divergent paths of adaptation
(traditionalism, reform or rupture with the communist tradition) and what was left was
too inhomogeneous to be encompassed by a single analytical category. Botella and
Ramiro (2003b) and Marantzidis (2003) substantially concurred with this analysis and
insisted on the fragmentation of the radical left landscape and on the partial or total
reconversion of former communist parties to other political traditions. The former
pointed to four outcomes: a more or less orthodox preservation of a communist
identity; the transformation into social democratic, green or non-communist leftist
parties. The latter identified four slightly different groupings: "Marxists-Leninists",
"disillusioned social democrats", "socialdemocratised" and "post-materialists".
On the other hand, most recent surveys have insisted that the contemporary radical
left, once the dust of abandonments (e.g. the Italian PCI and the Dutch CPN) or
extinctions (e.g. the British CPGB) settled down, has retained a minimal level of
coherence: the rejection of capitalism and neoliberalism; an effort to offer a political
representation to the working class and the workers' movement; an anti-neoliberal
270
programmatic merging the defence of the welfare state with left-libertarian themes.
Nevertheless, the tendency toward convergence was seen as uneven and not
preventing the existence of a great diversity and fragmentation. March and Mudde
(2005) identified four sub-groupings: communist, green and new politics, democratic
socialist and social populist parties. March (2011) further refined the distinction in ten
sub-categories: conservative communists, reform communists, democratic socialists,
populist socialists and social populist parties, each of them split into "radical left" and
"extreme left" parties. De Waele and Vieira (2012) and Ducange et al. (2013) focused
on the differences between communist, red-green and left social democratic parties.
Hildebrandt (2010), finally, singled out two main currents: democratic socialists and
communists.
My analysis has demonstrated that, contrary to the first group of authors, the
contemporary radical left can indeed be understood as a unitary party family. All
parties, whatever their historical tradition and present sensibilities, share largely
similar fundamental features: some form of critique of capitalism; an anti-neoliberal
mid-term programme; the fusion of "old left" and "new left" themes and social
constituencies; an ideal and concrete link with the workers' movement and other left-
libertarian social movements; an unresolved relationship with the moderate left; an
electoral behaviour intimately connected with disaffection toward social democracy
and the political system. Contrary to the second group of authors, however, I have
shown that the attempts to devise stable ideological sub-groupings are misguided.
Common tendencies affect all parties while the main lines of differentiation operate
not between but across parties. Under favourable conditions all radical left sensibilities
can coexist under a common organisational framework, be it a unitary party (e.g. the
Italian PRC or the German PDS/DIE LINKE) or a looser alliance (e.g. the French FdG).
Under unfavourable conditions, instead, the radical left tends to explode into rival
fragments. Neither broad left parties nor competing organisations, however, can ever
fully escape the overall tendencies and tensions of the radical left space, thus
continuously oscillating between anti-capitalism and anti-neoliberalism and between
conciliatory and intransigent postures.
271
The second question refers to the deeper meaning of the radical left project. At least
three basic positions can be identified here.
The first possibility is to understand the post-1989 evolution of the radical left as a
transition from anti-capitalism to social democracy ("social democratisation") based on
a fundamental discontinuity with the past. Most scholars recognise an element of
truth in this argument, although they rarely push it to its extreme consequences. The
concept has been applied with reference to both the overall Western European
context (Marantzidis, 2004; March, 2008)
210
and to specific national parties (Arter,
2002; Fülberth, 2008)
211
.
The second option is to identify the radical left as "left reformist" while insisting that it
was already so in the past (Callinicos, 1999, 2008 and 2012; Rees, 2001; Blackledge,
2013). "Reformist consciousness" always had more and less radical variants and
incarnated in a variety of parties: the crisis of Stalinism and the disaffection toward
social democracy led in part to the growth of revolutionary forces but predominantly
to a revival of new kinds of reformism, sometimes within traditional working class
parties but increasingly outside of them.
The third choice is to claim that the radical left has retained a fundamental continuity
in its "anti-capitalist" goals, although the contours of the socialist project and the
conditions of its action were rethought and adapted to a changed external
environment. For some authors we deal here with a case of a wolf in sheep's clothing
(Backes & Moreau, 2008). Others insist on the fact that the long-term vision, albeit
generally vague, remains one of an alternative to capitalism (Hudson, 2000 and 2012;
March & Mudde, 2005; Seiler, 2012; Marlière, 2013). Finally, Kouvelakis (2007: 289-
294) has argued that while tensions between anti-neoliberalism and anti-capitalism do
exist, the general adoption of the former by radical left parties does not necessarily
involve a reformist outcome: in the present conjuncture, any coherent anti-neoliberal
210
Marantzidis (2004:172) states that "despite the appearance of a grand variety of choices at the end
of the Eighties, the communist and post-communist parties seem to orient themselves toward social
democracy". March (2008: 1) claims that "the far left is becoming the principal challenge to mainstream
social democratic parties, in large part because its main parties are no longer extreme, but present
themselves as defending the values and policies that social democrats have allegedly abandoned".
211
Arter (2002:233) suggests that "the first decade [after 1989] has witnessed an attempted social-
democratisation of the post-communist parties in Finland and Sweden [...] the potential in this appeal lay
in the fact [...] of a neo-liberalisation of the ruling Social Democrats [...]". Fülberth (2008: 162) argues
that "[DIE LINKE] is the second (neo-)socialdemocratic party of a capitalist German society".
272
approach inevitably leads to large-scale class confrontations and to the actuality of a
break with capitalism.
My analysis shows that the use of the term "social democratisation" is doubly
misleading. On the one hand, the assimilation of the programmatic vision of the radical
left to a mere take-over of social democratic themes ignores the fact that its socio-
economic demands are often the legacy of a specifically communist form of reformism
and that its non-economic demands rather derive from the "new left" and
movementist thinking of the post-1968 period. On the other hand, the ideological
rapprochement of the radical left with traditional social democratic policies was not
matched by a recreation of the key organisational features of the "narrow" definition
of social democracy (Moschonas, 2002: 15-22): in particular, an interpenetration of
parties with the workers' movement and with a mass working class sub-culture. The
gains of the contemporary radical left, when they occurred, were exclusively electoral
in nature and never managed to revert the tendency to a steep decline of the
(communist or social democratic) mass party model.
The controversy between reformist and anti-capitalist characterisations, on the
contrary, remains somewhat open and conditioned by the specific interplay of
historical traditions, environmental constraints and subjective developments in each
country and period. Firstly, while a growing number of radical left forces indeed lack
any reference to Marxism and to a post-capitalist future, in many cases this was
actually the outcome of a radicalisation of traditional social democratic tendencies
(e.g. the German WASG, the French PG) or of newly-politicised layers (e.g. the youth of
the alter-globalist and anti-crisis movements); the demands and attitudes of these
currents were generally to the left of those of traditional communist parties and an
actual implementation of their vision might have led to a kind of dynamic similar to the
one suggested above by Kouvelakis. Secondly, forces which explicitly call for an
overcoming of capitalism remain strong both outside and within the pragmatic radical
left parties (e.g. DIE LINKE, PRC and PCF) and moves to completely abandon any anti-
capitalist perspective are rare and tend to lead to a quick exit from the party family
(e.g. the experience of the Dutch GL or the Italian PDS and more recently SEL). Thirdly,
however, the fact that none of the contemporary radical left parties has so far
developed a credible vision of a post-capitalist society and of the path toward it does
not bode well for their future development. Renewed (non-Stalinist) Leninist
273
blueprints (Bensaïd, 2007; Post, 2013) remain marginal and controversial even among
the most radical currents. "Movementist" strategies based on the linear growth of
extra-parliamentary mobilisations and counter-powers (Hardt & Negri, 2000;
Holloway, 2003) have failed to devise effective new methods to consolidate the
movements and win significant reforms, let alone to point to a transcendence of
capitalism: all major mobilisation cycles of the period (the workers' struggles of 1992-
1995, the alter-globalist movement of 1999-2004 and the anti-crisis protests of 2009-
2012) were of an eminently defensive character, failed to institutionalise themselves in
permanent counter-hegemonic organisations and ultimately reverted to electoral
politics and centre-left alliances as a "lesser evil" trench helping to weather the storm.
The partisan radical left, finally, has attempted to play the role of a left-wing counter-
weight and correction to the mainstream moderate left – depending on the
circumstances, institutional or movementist and conciliatory or intransigent – but has
not succeeded in designing a successful way to either political power or policy
attainment.
Altogether, the case for the contemporary radical left as a vehicle of the "socialism for
the Twenty-First Century" (Hudson, 2012) seems at present not supported by the
German, Italian and French experiences. On the contrary, this political area certainly
appears to be an electoral thermometer of the dissatisfaction toward neoliberalism
and of the crisis of the Twentieth Century workers' movement in its social democratic,
communist and far-left variants; it has however not (yet?) found a solution either to
the renewal of working class politics or to the emergence of new forms of democratic
radicalism.
The third question refers to the entity of the electoral success of the contemporary
radical left. Initial accounts (Bell, 1993; Bull & Heywood, 1994) certified a swift decline
of Western European communism and tended to forecast its inevitable extinction.
Subsequent analyses (Moreau et al., 1998; Botella & Ramiro, 2003b; March & Mudde,
2005; Backes & Moreau, 2008) underlined contradictory tendencies toward both
decline and recovery and remained cautious on the overall direction of change. The
most recent contributions (March, 2008 and 2011; De Waele & Vieira, 2012; Marlière,
2013), on the contrary, stressed an uneven but significant recovery since the low point
of the early Nineties.
274
The analysis I carried out in chapter two demonstrates that from 1993 to 1999 a strong
recovery of the radical has indeed taken place across Western Europe; after that date,
however, not much progress has been made on the whole. Average results have
steered a stagnating course between sudden surges and falls; national trajectories
have become asynchronous; a stable or slightly growing electoral weight has often
translated into a lower political influence (due to the growth of organisational
fragmentation).
The following figure (FIGURE 6.1) summarises the evolution of radical left parties in
national legislative and European Parliament elections in fifteen Western European
countries.
FIGURE 6.1 ELECTORAL EVOLUTION OF THE WESTERN EUROPEAN RADICAL LEFT
Source: my elaborations from official electoral data.
Notes: 15 countries (EU15), rolling averages. Total shares of valid votes, unweighted national averages. National: legislative
elections. EP: European Parliament elections.
Three further important elements emerge from the analysis of the curves.
Firstly, the extent of the recovery of the contemporary radical left tends to be
overestimated by the tendency to look at simple averages (red lines and columns)
instead of at total results (blue lines and columns). The growing gap between the two
sets of results is due to the fact that the radical left has rather improved in medium-
small countries (e.g. Greece, Netherlands, Ireland, Denmark, Portugal) and, with the
275
exception of Germany, rather declined or stagnated in the big ones (Italy, France,
Spain, UK).
Secondly, the strong link between the contemporary radical left and the alter-
globalisation movement asserted by many scholars (e.g. Callinicos, 2008 and 2012)
appears largely imaginary from a global electoral perspective; on the contrary, the
international mobilisations of the period 1999-2003 come across as ininfluent or
negative diversions from the task of building solid national parties.
Thirdly, the swings seem instead to be strongly correlated with social and political
events at the national level. In particular, large-scale labour and anti-governmental
mobilisations almost always result in gains while governmental participation unfailingly
produces heavy losses.
276
6.2 Political nature: anti-neoliberal parties and
troubled relationship with the moderate left
The German, French and Italian case studies point to three key features that all the
radical left parties share at least in part: a mid-term anti-neoliberal programme mixing
working class, welfarist and left-libertarian themes; a composite social constituency; a
strategy of leftward pull on the political system and more specifically on the moderate
left parties.
The first feature provided a common ideological framework to overcome the shock of
the failures of the Twentieth Century communist movement, to by-pass old debates,
to regroup different organisations and sensibilities and to appeal to the discontents of
the neoliberal transition and of the rightward shift of moderate left parties.
The mid-term programmatic of the radical left tended to cover three types of issues:
socio-economic demands (working and living conditions of the majority of wage
workers, employment, welfare provisions and public services, inequality and
redistribution between classes and geographical regions); a questioning of the existing
model of economic development (formal ownership and effective control of the means
of production, quantity and quality of economic growth, and its overall purpose and
direction) and so-called left-libertarian issues (solidarity, peace, civil and democratic
rights, minority rights, secularism and environmental protection).
The area where the radical left was more effective was the defence of the social
advances of the Sixties and Seventies which were being progressively abandoned by
their original authors (social democratic, Christian democratic and left-liberal parties).
Activity on the other two fronts was less rewarding, as the terrain of left-libertarian
issues was already selectively covered by green and other mainstream parties while
the appeal of a deeper critique of capitalism was dampened by a lack of clarity on the
proposed alternatives.
212
212
Both at a strictly political and at a broader intellectual level, the radical left was vocal in criticising the
consequences of unbridled capitalism but remained more cautious and vague on the specific features of
its proposed alternative: the role of nationalisations, the mechanisms of democratic and workers'
control, participation to the Eurozone and to the European Union, growth vs. de-growth, the promotion
277
Important differences in the outlook of each radical left group lingered but their
saliency steadily decreased over time. The fractures caused by diverging international
allegiances lost much of their relevance with the collapse or adaptation of the regimes
of really-existing state socialism. The obstacles provoked by authoritarian modes of
organisations were removed by the adoption by of a democratic, pluralist and "broad
party" approach by all communist parties. The tension between the pursuit of reforms
within the boundaries of capitalism and the advocacy of an anti-capitalist rupture
appeared largely academic at a time where class struggles had an entirely defensive
character and the daily activity of all tendencies was focused on the mere defence of
the existing regimes of social protection. Finally, the debates on the precise features of
a post-capitalist transformation suffered the same fate, as the feasibility of such a
transition seemed to be put off to a very distant and uncertain future. All these
reasons concurred to favour the collaboration and mixing of forces of different origin
(orthodox and dissident communists, left-wing socialists, social movement activists,
newly-politicised strata, Marxists and non-Marxists) in a new kind of anti-neoliberal
radical left.
A symptom of this shift was the progressive downplaying of traditional identitarian
references and the adoption of broader and inclusive ones
213
.
The evolution of the class composition of the German, French and Italian radical left is
summarised in the following table (TABLE 6.2).
Their electorate retained a significant working class class bias. Employed and
unemployed wage workers – in particular blue-collar workers and the unemployed –
were somewhat over-represented (with an index of 133 in France, 126 in Italy and 113
in Germany); employers and self-employers strongly under-represented. The total
share of the working class (Germany, 62.4%; France, 58.3%; Italy, 48.8%) remained
virtually unchanged compared to the pre-1989 figures; what changed was the relative
of large vs. small enterprises, the identification of strategic sectors and products, the repudiation of
public debt, and so on. This ambiguity ensured that in the early Nineties, despite their veto power as
vital partners of centre-left governmental majorities, both the Italian PRC/PdCI and the French PCF
actually enabled the adoption of the common European currency and the dismantlement of the state-
owned sector in exchange for small redistributive concessions.
213
For instance, through the rebranding with a non-communist and generic "left" label: Left Party (2005)
and The Left (2007) in Germany; Left Front (2008) in France; Rainbow Left (2008), Left Ecology Freedom
(2008) and Federation of the Left (2009) in Italy.
278
weight of each component, with a decline of blue-collar workers and a growth of
white-collar and unemployed ones.
Their membership, on the contrary, testifies to a significant loosening of the historic
links of the parties with the history of the socialist workers' movement. The German
SED, the French PCF and the Italian PCI, despite profound differences, had
unquestionable working class roots: wage workers and specifically (industrial and
agricultural) blue-collar workers made up a majority of their membership; part of their
organisation was structured along the workplace principle (workplace cells); cadres
with a working class background were schooled and promoted to significant leadership
positions. Within their contemporary heirs, instead, active workers have become a
sometimes small minority while the weight of groups with an ambiguous class position
(pensioners, professionals, students and other inactives) has soared.
TABLE 6.2 CLASS COMPOSITION
GERMANY
FRANCE
ITALY
VOTERS
-
R.L.
1998-2009
R.L.
1978
R.L.
1995-2007
R.L.
1987
R.L.
1996-2008
Average on...
4 elections
3 elections
4 elections
WORKING CLASS
-
62.4% (113)
57.3% (140)
58.3% (133)
48.4% (122)
48.8% (126)
EMPLOYED
-
50.4% (101)
49.9% (138)
50.7% (132)
44.7% (122)
39.7% (126)
White-collar
-
29.6% (93)
25.1% (112)
32.8% (121)
10.7% (71)
20.1% (108)
Blue-collar
-
20.8% (116)
24.9% (180)
17.9% (158)
34.0% (158)
19.6% (153)
UNEMPLOYED
-
11.9% (256)
7.3% (159)
7.6% (144)
3.7% (126)
9.1% (127)
MEMBERS
SED
1988
R.L.
1998-2009
PCF
1979
PCF
1997
PCI
1987
PRC
1999-2006
Average on...
2 surveys
1 survey
3 surveys
WORKING CLASS
-
31.6%
-
-
-
48.2%
EMPLOYED
78.5%
25.1%
59.9%
43.7%
52.4%
40.3%
White-collar
-
19.9%
27.8%
27.4%
11.1%
20.0%
Blue-collar
-
5.2%
32.1%
16.3%
41.3%
20.3%
UNEMPLOYED
-
6.5%
-
-
-
7.8%
Source: my elaboration from FGW, CDSP and ITANES survey data.
Notes: share of each category over radical left totals; in brackets: index of over-representation compared to valid votes.
Altogether, the social constituency of the radical left appears composite and not very
homogeneous. The lingering over-representation of the working class thus seems to
have changed its deeper meaning: not the heart of the parties' identity but one of the
many components of a broader left-wing coalition based on a variety of political
appeals (class, welfarism, secularism, left-libertarianism, regional political cultures).
Finally, with the exception of the most extreme currents which expounded a strategy
of anti-capitalist alternative, all major parties broadly agreed on a strategy of leftward
279
pull aimed at gradually influencing the course of the moderate left through a
combination of parliamentary and extra-parliamentary, friendly and hostile pressures.
The traditional differentiations of radical left parties over ideology, long-term goals,
means, class composition and political culture were overshadowed by a different kind
of problem, which became the veritable bone of contention of the period: the degree
of intransigence to be adopted vis-à-vis the moderate left. Conciliatory voices declared
the unavoidability of strategies of organic centre-left alliances, hoping to prevent even
worse outcomes (a right-wing government) and to influence policies from the inside.
Intransigent voices, on the contrary, tended to reject electoral and above all
governmental coalitions on grounds of anti-neoliberal coherence. Most of the parties
constantly oscillated between the two poles.
280
6.3. Electoral mobilisation: discordant trends,
underlying reasons and the "vacuum thesis"
6.3.1 Overall support
The evolution of electoral weight of the German, French and Italian radical left is
summarised below (TABLE 6.3 and FIGURE 6.4).
Average levels were medium-small in Germany (6.32% of valid votes) and Italy (6.55%),
medium in France (9.62% in legislative and 12.47% in presidential elections).
TABLE 6.3 ELECTORAL WEIGHT
GERMANY
legislative
ITALY
legislative
FRANCE
legislative
FRANCE
presidential
GERMANY
East
GERMANY
West
PERIOD
1990-2013
1992-2013
1993-2012
1995-2012
1990-2013
1990-2013
VOTES (n.)
Average
2,916,005
2,451,164
2,465,564
3,916,947
1,851,846
1,064,159
First
1,138,174
2,201,428
2,788,058
4,248,012
1,026,739
111,435
Last
3,784,482
1,949,768
2,046,578
4,598,832
1,877,897
1,906,585
Change
2,646,308
-251,660
-741,480
350,820
851,158
1,795,150
Change %
232.50%
-11.43%
-26.59%
8.26%
82.90%
1610.94%
% on valid votes
Average
6.32
6.55
9.62
12.47
19.04
2.95
First
2.45
5.61
10.96
13.94
9.95
0.31
Last
8.65
5.73
7.89
12.82
21.37
5.46
Change
6.20
0.12
-3.07
-1.12
11.42
5.15
Change %
253.06%
2.14%
-28.01%
-8.03%
114.77%
1661.29%
% on electorate
Average
4.74
5.09
6.06
9.40
13.65
2.20
First
1.88
4.64
7.15
10.62
7.40
0.24
Last
6.11
4.16
4.44
9.99
14.34
3.90
Change
4.23
-0.48
-2.71
-0.63
6.94
3.66
Change %
225.00%
-10.34%
-37.90%
-5.93%
93.78%
1525.00%
Source: my elaborations from official national data.
Notes: rolling averages; Italian data are slightly inflated by the 2008 and 2013 results. Germany East includes Berlin.
281
FIGURE 6.4 ELECTORAL WEIGHT
Source: my elaborations from official national data.
Notes: legislative elections, shares of valid votes.
The trends broadly conform to the general development of the West European radical
left: collapse in the early Nineties, recovery in the mid-Nineties, nation-specific
trajectories afterwards. Interestingly, values show a certain convergence toward
central levels up to 2005-2007 but diverge again hereafter. The development is
unquestionably positive only in Germany; in France and Italy is rather declining.
In all three countries the radical left suffered a heavy initial blow from the dissolution
of the international communist movement in 1989-1991. In Italy the Partito Comunista
Italiano, which in 1987 still gathered 26.58% of valid votes, in 1991 decided to
transform itself into a moderate social democratic organisation and defected from the
party family, leaving behind a medium neo-communist party (PRC) formed by
disparate communist dissidents and other leftists. In France the Parti communiste
français experienced an early decline, plunging from 20.62% in 1978 to 9.50% in 1986.
By that time further communist losses were generally compensated by the gains of
other (far-left and alternative) organisations. In Germany the landscape was marked by
the 1990 reunification: in the West the radical left had been and remained virtually
non-existent, while in the East the collapse of the authoritarian socialist regime
shattered the influence of the Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands but
nevertheless enabled its reformed successor party (PDS) to preserve a not negligible
electoral appeal.
282
The period 1992-1998, on the contrary, led to a strong recovery in all three countries.
The radical left was among the beneficiaries of the growing dissatisfaction and
resistance toward neoliberalism encapsulated by large strikes by public and private
sector workers and massive anti-governmental demonstrations (1992-1993 and 1996-
1997 in Germany; 1995 in France; 1994 in Italy).
Since 1998, finally, the evolution of the radical left was characterised by oscillating and
highly nation-specific paths. In Germany it followed an altogether upward trajectory
punctuated by temporary setbacks (2002 and 2013); its results grew from 5.12%
(1998) to 8.65% (2013) and, crucially, included the unprecedented achievement of
establishing a mid-sized electoral foothold in the Western regions of the country (from
1.13% to 5.41%). In France, it declined strongly in legislative elections (average: 7.85%)
and slightly in presidential ones (average: 11.87%). In Italy, a cyclical fluctuation until
2006 was followed by a serious collapse afterwards. In all three cases the crucial
obstacle which broke the previous upward movement was that of the relationship with
the moderate left, with radical left parties paying dearly for both their governmental
participation (France in 1997-2002; Italy in 1996-2001 and 2006-2008) and the
pressure of tactical anti-right voting (Italy in 1999-2001 and 2008; France since 2002;
Germany in 2002 and 2013).
6.3.2 Radical left voters
Who were the voters of the radical left? The following table (TABLE 6.5) summarises
the socio-demographic characteristics influencing positively or negatively a vote for
the radical left.
283
TABLE 6.5 SELECTED SOCIOLOGICAL FEATURES OF VOTERS
GERMANY
1998, 2002, 2005, 2009
(legislative)
ITALY
1996, 2001, 2006
(legislative)
FRANCE
1995, 2002, 2007
(presidential)
GEOGRAPHY
Positive
Eastern regions
Valid 20.8% - RL 65.6% - index 314
Red area
Valid 18.4% - RL 22.7% - index 123
-
Negative
Western regions
Valid 79.2% - RL 34.4% - index 43
North-East
Valid 12.1% - RL 8.3% - index 69
-
GENDER
Positive
-
-
-
Negative
-
-
-
AGE
Positive
-
<25 years old
Valid 12.2% - RL 16.9% - index 138
-
Negative
-
>64 years old
Valid 16.1% - RL 10.2% - index 63
>59 years old
Valid 27.2% - RL 15.6% - index 57
RELIGIOUS
PRACTICE
Positive
Non-religious
Valid 27.0% - RL 61.2% - index 228
Non-believers
Valid 5.5% - RL 16.3% - index 295
Non-practicing Catholics
Valid 11.9% - RL 18.1% - index 152
Non-believers
Valid 24.9% - RL 42.4% - index 170
Negative
Catholics
Valid 34.7% – RL 13.0% - index 37
Protestants
Valid 38.3% - RL 25.8% - index 68
Practicing Catholics
Valid 52.1% - RL 31.4% - index 60
Practicing Catholics
Valid 10.9% - RL 4.2% - index 38
Other religion
Valid 5.4% - RL 4.2% - index 78
Semi/non-practicing Catholics
Valid 58.8% - RL 49.2% - index 83
EDUCATION
Positive
-
University degree
Valid 7.7% - RL 9.8% - index 128
-
Negative
-
-
University degree
Valid 24.4% - RL 20.0% - index 82
PROFESSION
Positive
Unemployed
Valid 4.7% - RL 11.9% - index 258
Students
Valid 7.9% - RL 12.0% - index 151
Blue-collar workers
Valid 13.6% - RL 19.8% - index 146
Blue-collar workers
Valid 11.4% - RL 18.1% - index 158
Unemployed
Valid 5.9% - RL 8.2% - index 140
White-collar workers
Valid 14.9% - RL 19.2% - index 129
Negative
Civil servant
Valid 4.5% - RL 2.8% - index 61
Self-employed
Valid 7.2% - RL 4.8% - index 68
Self-employed
Valid 13.5% - RL 8.0% - index 59
Self-employed
Valid 4.6% - RL 1.6% - index 35
Retired
Valid 26.9% - RL 17.3% - index 64
SELF-
POSITIONING
Positive
n.a.
Left (1+2)
Valid 20.3% - RL 73.7% - index 364
Far-left
Valid 4.3% - RL 18.5% - index 426
Left
Valid 33.9% - RL 52.4% - index 155
Negative
n.a.
Centre (5+6)
Valid 17.8% - RL 4.6% - index 26
Centre-right (7+8)
Valid 23.2% - RL 1.6% - index 7
Right (9+10)
Valid 12.4% - RL 0.6% - index 5
Centre
Valid 22.0% - RL 13.8% - index 63
Right
Valid 29.9% - RL 4.9% - index 16
Far-right
Valid 3.2% - RL 0.2% - index 7
Source: my elaborations from ITANES (1996, 2001, 2006), CDSP (1995, 2002, 2007) and FGW (1998, 2002, 2005, 2009).
Notes: Valid: average weight of the category among valid votes. RL: average weight of the category among radical left voters.
Index: average ratio of over-representation of the radical left in the said category. Only categories showing at least +/- 9%
variation from the average in all elections are included.
Only two factors had a strong and unambiguous effect in all three countries: ideology
and religious affiliation/practice. Not surprisingly, the spatial self-positioning of voters
on the left-right axis was the most important factor favouring a vote for the radical
left: parties drew the overwhelming majority of their support among voters on the
284
"far-left" or "left" end of the spectrum and rapidly lost support among those on the
centre, right and far-right.
214
The religious factor also showed a very strong effect, with
non-believers being much more likely and practicing Christians (especially Catholics)
much less likely to support the radical left than the average voter.
Other key sociological factors, on the other hand, had a more selective and uneven
effect.
Deep-seated geographical sub-cultures were very relevant but their persistence seems
to be slowly eroding. The support for the PDS was largely concentrated in the small
territory of the former German Democratic Republic (more than 75% of its votes) but
this share dropped to around 50% with the creation of the Left Party and DIE LINKE;
over-representation of Eastern voters thus steadily declined from 406.5% (1990) to
235.1% (2013). The support for the Italian radical left was geographically better
distributed. The PRC and its various splinter groups generally enjoyed strong results in
the "red" central regions (former PCI strongholds) and weak ones in the "white" North-
East (former DC and current right-wing strongholds), but the over-representation of
the red area almost completely disappeared over time (from 149.8% in 1992 to 106.2%
in 2013). In France, finally, traditional communist strongholds were spatially very
fragmented: roughly speaking, one area in the North, one in the Centre and one on the
Mediterranean coast. Here as well the differences seem to have gradually decreased
over time (Martelli, 2009; Brechon, 2009).
The radical left electorate was on average slightly masculine, but counter-examples
abounded. A substantial gender balance was achieved in Italy in 1996 and in Eastern
Germany throughout the period. In France the 2002 elections even saw a small over-
representation of female voters.
215
As far as age is concerned, over-60 tended to be strongly reluctant toward the radical
left in Italy, France and Western Germany but not in Eastern Germany. Supportive
groups also varied from country to country and from election to election. The youth
214
The data on Italy and France thus support the German findings of Doerschler and Banaszak (2007),
who found that "the most consistent and powerful explanation of PDS support across time is ideology [;]
unlike other explanations [...] whose relative import is either negligible or waxes and wanes over time,
ideological beliefs appear consistently significant through the first 14 years after unification".
215
Sperber (2010) has emphasised the strong showing of the far left among the female electorate in this
election, due to its success among the highly feminised "service proletariat". The outcome was however
partially counter-balanced by the (masculine) communist electorate and was not replicated in 2007 and
2012.
285
(under-24) was consistently favourable in Italy, generally favourable in France (except
in 1995) but generally hostile in Germany. The working-age population (25-59), finally,
gave inconclusive results, although there seems to be a tendency toward a weakening
of the younger age brackets and a strengthening of the older ones.
As far as educational levels were concerned, holders of a university degree were more
likely than the average voter to support the radical left in Italy and less likely in France;
in Germany, the strongly favourable attitude of graduates toward the PDS was
reversed with DIE LINKE.
Finally, the influence of class on the radical left vote was moderately strong and
somewhat consistent, but not completely uniform. In all three countries employers
and self-employed were very unlikely to vote for the radical left. The success among
the different sectors of employed wage workers, however, varied: largely limited to
blue-collar workers in Italy; broader (blue-collar and white-collar) in France; evolving in
Germany, where the hostility of blue-collar workers toward the PDS turned to a strong
attraction toward DIE LINKE. The unemployed were strongly favourable in Germany
and France but not in Italy. Students were very supportive in Italy but inconsistent in
the other two countries. Finally, the remaining sections of the economically inactive
population (e.g. pensioners, housewives, discouraged unemployed) tended to be quite
hostile in France and Italy but not necessarily so in Germany.
To sum up, the political profile of the radical left in the three countries found a
uniformly strong support among the ideologically left-wing and non-religious sectors of
the population but had a fluctuating success among other socio-demographic groups
and categories. The French radical left was the most characterised from the point of
view of class, obtaining good results among the lower and middle strata of the
(employed and unemployed) salaried population and bad ones among the self-
employed, the economically non-active population and the professionals. The Italian
and German radical left, on the other hand, were only partially successful among their
"natural" target constituency. In the first case the sociological profile was incoherent,
with consistently good results only among manual workers and students. In the second
case the PDS started out as the mouthpiece for very peculiar social stratum (the
downwardly-mobile former bureaucracy of the GDR) and progressively expanded its
286
constituency to other social strata: success was immediate and extraordinary among
the unemployed but had to wait until 2005 among blue-collar workers.
6.3.3 The vacuum on the left and its limitations
The social and political environment of post-Cold War Western Europe provided for a
contradictory mix of opportunities and obstacles to the electoral recovery of the
radical left.
The nation-specific chapters of this thesis (chapter three, four and five) have analysed
at length the contours of an emerging vacuum on the left of the political spectrum.
Three main elements are crucial to the understanding of this issue.
Firstly, the declining and overall poor macro-economic performance of the "neoliberal
era" compared to the "golden age" of welfare capitalism (Gordon et al., 1987; Harvey,
2005; Harman, 2009; Duménil & Lévy, 2011) provided the material basis for a
widespread dissatisfaction toward the social and political system. There is no obvious
reason why these trends should benefit the left. On the contrary, the obvious
consequence of declining growth rates, high unemployment and stagnating living
standards was to sap the organisational capabilities and the confidence of the working
class and to create an adverse political climate which translated in political
disengagement and passivity (Crouch, 2004; Mair, 2006), diminishing expectations and
the drift toward narrow forms of protest and social protection (e.g. xenophobia,
ethno-regionalism, law and order conservatism). It is perhaps not accidental that the
two main periods of growth of the Western European radical left (1993-1999 and
2004-2007) coincided with upswings of the international economic climate, when the
contradiction between increased social wealth and a limited distribution of its benefits
appeared more visible and cogent. What this economic predicament did do, however,
was to undermine the popular support of mainstream (conservative, Christian
democratic and social democratic) parties, which went on to govern with less and less
consent (electorate, membership, party identification, policy support). For left-wing
287
anti-establishment parties this represented a conjuncture hard to exploit but with a
very large potential, as the recent success of Syriza in Greece seems to suggest.
Secondly, the progressive adaptation of mainstream political parties to an agenda of
privatisations, wage and welfare containment and labour market flexibility further
eroded their historical legitimacy, which had been largely built on past policies of
regulation, redistribution, de-commodification, public employment and social
protection. The rightward shift of moderate left parties such as the German SPD, the
French PS and the Italian PDS/DS/PD from "traditional" welfarist social democracy
toward the model of a "new", "third way" or "market" social democracy (Gamble and
Wright, 1999; Pierson, 2001; Moschonas, 2002; Bailey, 2009; Callaghan et al., 2009;
Nachtwey, 2013), in particular, seemed to create important opportunities for the
radical left. Scholars have variously defined the problem as a "representation gap"
(Abromeit, 1993), as a "vacuum on the left" (Neugebauer & Stöss, 1998), as a "crisis of
[working-]class representation" (Nachtwey, 2009) or as a "space" which opened up on
the left and only waited to be filled (March & Mudde, 2005; Callinicos, 2008; Marlière,
2013). Certainly, the attempt to win over the traditional core social constituencies
(employed wage workers) and themes (welfare state, mixed economy, redistribution,
Keynesianism) of "people's" parties has been at the centre of the mobilising efforts of
the contemporary radical left.
Thirdly, the direct attempts by right-wing and left-wing governments to implement
programmes of neoliberal counter-reforms (state-owned sector, public services, labour
law, pensions, welfare provisions, wage-indexation mechanisms, state budgets) were
less liable to be accepted as mere reflections of impersonal market forces and more
likely to revitalise left-wing dissent and resistance.
216
Strike activity in the private sector
collapsed to a historically low plateau (Franzosi, 1995; Salucci, 2008) but anti-
governmental general strikes actually rose (Kelly & Hamann, 2010). Welfare and labour
reforms often became the focal point of wide-ranging extra-parliamentary
mobilisations combining strikes, huge demonstrations and other forms of contentious
politics (France in 1993-1995, 2003, 2005-2006 and 2009-2010; Germany in 1992-1993
216
Conversely, as Harmann (2007) has correctly stressed, one fundamental goal of privatisations was to
shift the blame for restructuring away from the state. Experience proves that this strategy was effective:
while resistance during privatisations did emerge (e.g. in Germany in 1992-1993), post-privatised
companies have been fairly pacified and calls for re-nationalisations feeble.
288
and 2003-2004; Italy in 1994 and 2002). Finally, this resistance had mixed material
results but generally succeeded in shifting the political climate and leading to the
defeat of the seating government in the subsequent electoral cycle.
The cases of Germany, France and Italy tend to support the empirical existence of a
political vacuum predicated on the above-mentioned historical developments.
They also tend to confirm that, under certain conditions, the radical left could succeed
in growing electorally on the back of the popular rejection of neoliberalism and the
defection of social democratic voters. The case of the German radical left is exemplary:
between 2002 and 2009 DIE LINKE made a net gain of 3.2 million votes, 64.3% of which
were former SPD supporters. On a smaller scale the same was true for the Italian
radical left: between 1994 and 1996 the PRC gained 0.9 million votes, 69.4% of which
were former PDS supporters. French data on electoral fluxes are imprecise, but here as
well it seems that a good section of the growth of the periods 1993-1992 and 2007-
2012 derived from the influx of former PS voters.
Such successes, however, were always of a limited magnitude and short-lived. Only in
Germany we can talk of a consistent upward movement (with two interruptions); in
Italy and France the radical left rather tended to stagnate or decline. In a nutshell, the
vacuum proved to be much more difficult to fill than expected. Why was it so?
The study of the preconditions of radical left electoral success points to three major
possible avenues of growth.
The first avenue is represented by an overall shift of the political mood to the left, with
both moderate and radical left parties benefitting from the swing. More precisely, this
could mean either an actual growth of the share of voters identifying themselves on
the left of the political spectrum or their over-mobilisation vis-à-vis right-wing voters (a
differential abstentionism). Such a conjuncture was generally the result of the attempt
of seating right-wing governments to implement neoliberal reforms and of the
consequent development of large extra-parliamentary movements of resistance: good
examples are the years 1995-1997 and 2009-2012 in France, the years 1993-1998 in
Germany and the years 1994-1996 and 2002-2005 in Italy.
The second avenue is represented by a shift of moderate left voters toward the radical
left, with the aim either of punishing more mainstream parties for their governmental
289
policies or of nudging them to move further to the left. The French politological
literature has distinguished these two effects in a "vote sanction" and a "vote
d'influence" (Tiberj, 2004). A favourable environment for this kind of strategy was
provided by grand coalition governments suspending the left-right divide, where the
moderate left got discredited while the pressure toward anti-right unity lost its
saliency, fuelling the rise of anti-establishment parties of all hues. A good example is
Germany (2005-2009), to a less extent Italy (1994-1996) and, outside the three
countries, Greece (2009-2012). The Italian radical left wasted an extraordinary
opportunity to exploit a similar situation which occurred after 2011. Its opposition to
the Monti and Letta cabinets was not very credible, in view of its past and present links
with the centre-left coalition and its unprecedented organisational and parliamentary
weakness; the chance was instead seized by Grillo's populist Five Star Movement.
Another favourable environment was the one described under the previous point: a
critical or potential alliance with the centre-left in a context of unpopular right-wing
governments could attract voters wishing to use the radical left as a "corrective" to its
moderate partners (Italy in 1994-1996 and 2004-2006; France in 1994-1997 and 2012;
Germany in 1994-1999). This tactics, however, was self-defeating in the long term, as it
implicated the radical left in the disillusionment elicited by the governmental coalitions
they ended up supporting (France in 1997-2002; Italy in 1996-2001 and 2006-2008). A
path of head-on confrontation against a seating centre-left government, finally, could
also bear fruit (Germany 2002-2005; the French far left in 1997-2002); in absence of a
minimum level of confidence among the radical left constituency, however, it could
lead instead to demobilisation or adaptation to a "lesser evil" perspective (Italy in
1999-2001 and 2008; Germany in 2002).
The third avenue is represented by a growth of the radical left beyond the confines of
the secular and progressive left-wing voters. As already remarked, the strategies
employed and the success met varied for each party. The French far-left candidates
(Laguiller, Besancenot) were the most successful in appealing to class and attracting a
core constituency of economically active wage workers.
217
The German PDS, on the
other hand, saw the predominance of a regional (East German interests) over a class
217
It was this appeal which enabled LO and LCR to obtain much better results than the PCF among non-
left voters (identifying as "neither left nor right", "centrist" and even "right-wing") and "semi-practicing
Catholics".
290
appeal, with strong but socially undifferentiated results among the Eastern voters and
a nation-wide over-representation only among the unemployed. The Italian radical
left, finally, showed a decreasing capability to attract specific social constituencies
(except for the youth, among whom it was very successful) and remained
predominately characterised by its left-wing ideological positioning.
As it is clear from the above-mentioned discussion, most of the strategies of the radical
left were thus self-moderating: they could give good results in the short term but
inevitably led to a counter-swing in the mid-term.
The key problem was that the very electoral success of the radical left parties tended
to make them determinant, in the ballot box and in parliament, for the formation of a
centre-left governing coalition – the more so, the more successful they were on
contending the typical electorate of mainstream left parties. The choice to exploit this
situation as a powerful lever to influence the policies of a victorious centre-left
coalition invariably turned out to be a poisoned chalice. Both external support (Italy in
1996-1998) and direct governmental participation (France in 1997-2002, Italy in 1998-
2001 and 2006-2008) yielded few visible material results, destroyed the credibility of
the parties in the eyes of their electorate and led them to electoral disasters at the
subsequent election. The opposite choice of intransigence, on the other hand, risked
to expose the parties to accusations of playing into the hands of the enemy and to the
consequent squeeze due to anti-right tactical voting. The French radical left
experienced this brutal pressure after the 2002 presidential election: the shock of the
elimination of Lionel Jospin from the second round led to an immediate loss of almost
half of its electorate, mainly in the direction of the Socialist Party, and its effects
appear to be long-lasting.
218
The Italian radical left also suffered heavily from this
mechanism in 2008, when it lost at least 0.7 million votes to the Democratic Party;
219
more frequently, the choice of intransigence meant painful splits (the CU in 1995; the
PdCI in 1998; SEL in 2008-2009) of the tendencies which were determined to maintain
218
From 2002 to 2008 its scores in all kinds of elections oscillated between 7.6% and 9.2% of valid votes
(against an excellent 13.8% of the 2002 presidential first round). Even the subsequent upswing in 2009-
2012 did not completely defuse this danger, as the sharp drop in the 2012 legislative election (7.9%)
proved.
219
The figure refers to the net losses of PRC and PdCI only; the other partners of the Rainbow Left cartel
were completely cannibalised by the PD.
291
a close alliance with the centre-left. The threat was somewhat minimised only in the
German case, as it was the SPD which consistently refused a governmental alliance
with the radical left.
220
Crucially, the oppositional stance which might work well at times of centre-left
governments became less practical and rewarding at times of strong rejection and
mobilisation against right-wing ones; conversely, the unitary posture which yielded
fruits against the right became catastrophic as soon as it involved any form of
governmental participation.
An additional problem was provided by the fact that the sudden surges of enthusiasm
obtained through a convincing electoral or extra-parliamentary campaign, a popular
leader or a new partisan project were difficult to sustain for a longer period. As neither
conciliatory nor intransigent organisations managed to win immediate, concrete and
visible policy concessions for their constituency, the hopes raised by an initial bout of
electoral growth tended to wear off quickly, while the newly-won supporters went
back to abstentionism or more mainstream political options.
A further obstacle was the response of mainstream centre-left forces to the
competition on their left. Veritable shifts to the left were minimal, even at a rhetorical
level. However, the mere return to opposition after an electoral defeat generally
enabled them to win back a section of their former disaffected supporters (Italy in
2001-2006; France in 1993-1997 and 2002-2012; Germany in 2009-2013), although it
was rarely sufficient to entirely recover the past losses. Moreover, the fact that the
parties retained declining but strong linkages with the workers' movement (trade
unions, cooperatives, associations) and other civil society and social movement
organisations enabled them to preserve the loyalty of critical strata which might have
otherwise gone over to their more radical competitors. The general point made by
Callinicos (2012) and Davidson (2013) on the actual ideological but incomplete
organisational break of the "new" social democracy with its traditional constituency is
fully supported by the Italian and German cases.
Finally, it seems that the rightward shift of mainstream political parties was
accompanied by a parallel rightward shift of their constituencies. The proactive role of
220
Pro-SPD swings were modest (0.3 million votes in 2002, 0.4 million in 2013) and roughly equivalent to
those toward abstention.
292
moderate left leaderships in driving the neoliberal adaptation of their parties (e.g. the
role of Achille Occhetto and Walter Veltroni in Italy and Gerhard Schröder in Germany)
tended to run against an often intense initial resistance by their activists, members and
voters. However, although these shifts in identity and policies proved to be
controversial, over time most of the critics came around to the new course and
accepted or resigned to the changes. In other words, political neoliberalisation did
create a short-term window of opportunity but that opening tended to significantly
narrow in the mid-term.
6.3.4 Conclusion
The balance sheet of the electoral mobilisation of the radical left in Germany, Italy and
France is mixed. Only in the first country was the story one of unquestionable success;
in the other two countries the radical left followed an altogether stagnating or
declining path.
The environment of the post-Cold War period offered important opportunities for its
renewal and growth: the lukewarm macro-economic climate, the rightward shift of
mainstream parties on socio-economic issues, the roll-out of neoliberal reforms and
the intense dissatisfaction and resistance against them designed the contours of a
vacuum in the political representation of working class and welfarist constituencies
which the radical left could legitimately aspire to fill.
This potential, however, proved difficult to concretise. The choice of an appropriate
strategy was hampered by the structurally contradictory nature of this political area,
torn between anti-neoliberal intransigence and the pressures of anti-right unity.
Electoral upsurges, similarly, were usually dampened and wiped out by structural
obstacles, producing cyclical fluctuations without a clear overall direction.
293
6.4 Institutional weight: a double-edged sword
The previous section has shown that in the three countries the radical left enjoyed a
mid-sized electoral support: on average 6.32% of valid votes in Germany, 6.55% in Italy
and 9.62% (legislative) and 12.47% (presidential) in France. The translation of these
electoral results into forms of institutional weight – such as the presence in
representative assemblies and executive bodies, both at the national and regional level
–, however, gave rise to strong disproportionalities (see TABLE 6.6).
TABLE 6.6 PARLIAMENTARY WEIGHT AND GOVERNMENTAL INVOLVEMENT
PERIOD
AVERAGE
BEGINNING
END
Change
(% points)
1a) NATIONAL PARLIAMENT
GERMANY
1990-2013
6.04%
2.57%
10.14%
+7.57
ITALY
1991-2013
4.09%
5.56%
5.87%
+3.81
FRANCE
1990-2013
4.06%
4.33%
1.73%
-2.60
1b) REGIONAL
PARLIAMENTS
GERMANY
1990-2013
5.18%
2.80%
5.84%
+3.04
ITALY
1991-2013
5.27%
1.33%
3.69%
+2.35
FRANCE
1990-2013
8.92%
8.74%
7.21%
-1.54
1c) PARLIAMENTS
(COMBINED)
GERMANY
1990-2013
5.61%
2.68%
7.99%
+5.31
ITALY
1991-2013
4.68%
1.70%
4.78%
+3.08
FRANCE
1990-2013
6.49%
6.54%
4.47%
-2.07
2a) NATIONAL
GOVERNMENT
GERMANY
1990-2013
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
-
ITALY
1991-2013
34.78%
0.00%
0.00%
-
FRANCE
1990-2013
20.83%
0.00%
0.00%
-
2b) REGIONAL
GOVERNMENTS
GERMANY
1990-2013
4.28%
0.00%
3.42%
+3.42
ITALY
1991-2013
29.84%
0.00%
37.77%
+37.77
FRANCE
1990-2013
49.65%
8.21%
85.28%
+77.07
2c) GOVERNMENTS
(COMBINED)
GERMANY
1990-2013
2.16%
0.00%
1.71%
+1.71
ITALY
1991-2013
32.31%
0.00%
18.88%
+18.88
FRANCE
1990-2013
35.24%
4.11%
42.64%
+38.53
Source: my elaborations from official national data (Bundestag, Camera dei Deputati, Assemblée Nationale).
Notes: rolling average. 1a) share of MPs (first chamber); 1b) share of regional deputies, weighted by regional population; 1c)
average of 1a and 1b; 2a) time in national government; 2b) time in regional government, weighted by regional population; 2c)
average of 2a and 2b. The radical left is counted as in government when at least one of its parliamentary parties externally
supports or directly participates to it.
294
The radical left was significantly under-represented in the respective national
parliaments, commanding on average 4.06% of seats in France, 4.09% in Italy and
6.04% in Germany. This was mainly due to the working of electoral legislation
221
and, in
Italy, to organisational fragmentation. The risk of a loss of the parliamentary status was
always present: it happened in Italy in the 2008-2012 legislature and was not far from
materialising in Germany in the 2002-2005 legislature (2 MPs) and in France in the
2012-2017 legislature (10 MPs). The internal balance was heavily distorted to the
detriment of the smaller and more intransigent organisations.
The presence in regional parliaments
222
was altogether more favourable: 5.18% of the
seats in Germany, 5.27% in Italy; 8.92% in France. Radical left parties were consistently
represented in the vast majority of the French and Italian regions, more sporadically in
Germany
223
. While the German radical left paid its general inability to overcome the
electoral thresholds in the populous Western regions of the country, the
representation of the Italian and French radical left was broadly proportional to their
actual electoral strengths. However, this was often due more to the choice of the main
parties to integrate the framework of centre-left alliances than to the presence of
more democratic and accessible electoral systems.
221
In France the two-round majority system; in Germany the 5% electoral threshold; in Italy various
majoritarian elements (a 4% electoral threshold and first-past-the-post seats until 2005; variable
thresholds and majority premiums afterwards).
222
A complete analysis of the institutional weight of political parties should proceed further and include
representation in the elective bodies of the local (e.g. provincial/departmental/county and municipal)
levels of state administration. This endeavour would be particularly interesting in the case of France,
where communes and départements are often endowed with more powers and resources than the
regions. The poor quality and ambiguous nature of the data on local assemblies, however, prevents it.
223
The six Eastern regions were safe strongholds. The ten Western regions, on the other hand, saw no
radical left presence until 2006. In the period up to 2010 DIE LINKE managed to gain access to most of
them but subsequently lost ground and is currently represented only in four (the smallest).
295
Radical left parties, despite their reduced parliamentary weight, were often
determinant for the formation of centre-left governmental majorities (see TABLE 6.7
and FIGURE 6.8).
TABLE 6.7 GOVERNMENTAL INVOLVEMENT AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL
GERMANY
ITALY
FRANCE
DETERMINANT FOR A CENTRE-LEFT MAJORITY
2005-2009
1995-1996
1988-1993
2013-2017
1996-2001
1997-2002
2006-2008
EXTERNAL SUPPORT TO A CENTRE-LEFT GOVERNMENT
None
1995-1996 (CU) – Dini
None *
1996-1998 (PRC) – Prodi
DIRECT GOVERNMENTAL PARTICIPATION
None
1998-2001 (PdCI) – D'Alema, Amato
1997-2002 (PCF) – Jospin
2006-2008 (PRC, PdCI) – Prodi
Notes: * both in 1988-1993 and 2012-present the PCF remained halfway between external support and opposition.
FIGURE 6.8 GOVERNMENTAL INVOLVEMENT: REGIONAL AND COMBINED
Notes: Involvement of at least one radical left party in regional and national governments. "Regional": weighted by the regional
population. "Combined": average between regional and national (either 0.0% or 100.0%).
296
In the case of Italy and France this translated into a significant level of governmental
involvement (external support or direct participation). In Italy, one or the other radical
party has supported five national cabinets (34.08% of the total time) and a similar
amount of regional cabinets (administering on average 31.20% of the national
population, with a peak of 65.49% in 2005). The issue has however proved very
controversial, producing frequent shifts of collocation, splits and defections. In France,
the PCF has participated to only one national government (21.02% of total time) but to
a very large amount of regional ones (on average 47.97% of the population, with a
peak of 86.90% in 2004-2009). In Germany, on the contrary, the SPD has been
adamant in refusing any collaboration with the PDS/DIE LINKE at the national level,
preferring to it the option of a "grand coalition" with the CDU (2005-2009 and,
possibly, after 2013). Even at the regional level the experiences of collaboration have
been altogether rare (on average 4.32% of the population with a peak of 9.71% in
2001)
224
.
These developments had important consequences for the overall evolution of the
radical left.
Firstly, the fact that a large number of radical left elected representatives in Italy and
France owed their seats not so much to their own organisations but rather to the
benefits of a choice of alliance with the centre-left encouraged them to adopt
conciliatory attitudes and, in case of conflicts, to engage in right-wing dissidences and
splits.
Secondly, the increasing integration of the Italian parties (PRC, PdCI and SEL) and of
the French PCF into regional governments – which boomed in the period 1998-2009 to
incredibly high levels – had the same effects described above and helped to
fundamentally transform the self-understanding and external perception of the radical
left from an "anti-system" to an institutional and pragmatic force.
Thirdly, the experiences of national governmental participation (1995-2001 and 2006-
2008 in Italy; 1997-2002 in France) proved disastrous for their initiators, shattering
224
Three cases of direct governmental participation (Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 1998-2006, Berlin
2001-2011, Brandenburg 2009-present) and two cases of external support (Sachsen-Anhalt 1994-2002,
Berlin 2001), all in the East. Recently DIE LINKE has come close to provide an external support in two
Western regions, Hessen (2008-09) and Nordrhein-Westfalen (2010-2012) but its contribution has not
been accepted by the SPD.
297
their credibility and leaving a fertile ground to far-left (especially in France) or populist
(especially in Italy) competitors.
298
6.5 Organisational mobilisation: the crisis of the
communist mass party model continues
While electoral scores of the radical left were oscillating and its governmental
involvement soaring (at least in France and Italy), the results of its organisational
mobilisation were altogether poor. Neither the internal reforms of the neo-/post-
communist parties (the German PDS, the Italian PRC and the French PCF), nor the
electoral surge of actors from a far-left or social democratic background (the German
WASG, the Italian SD, the French LO, LCR and PG), nor the creation of new broad left
containers (the German DIE LINKE, the Italian FdS and SEL, the French NPA and FdG)
managed to counterbalance the collapse of the old communist mass organisations,
networks and sub-cultures. In the present section I will summarise in more detail the
evolution of each key sub-dimension (party membership, collateral networks and
material resources) and derive their implications.
6.5.1 Party membership
The veritable collapse of radical left party membership is portrayed below (TABLE 6.9
and FIGURE 6.10). All indicators show a dramatic and unmitigated decline, with
reference to both their pre-1989 predecessors and the situation of the early Nineties.
299
TABLE 6.9 MEMBERSHIP EVOLUTION
AVER.
1990-
2013
PRE-1989
1991
2012
Change
1991-2012
%
Change
1988-2012
%
RAW NUMBERS (M)
ITALY
116,262
1,559,963
112,835
77,448
-35,387
-31.5%
-1,482,515
-95.0%
FRANCE
182,205
365,533
332,580
86,184
-246,396
-74.1%
-279,349
-76.4%
GERMANY
108,835
2,297,000
186,079
70,461
-115,618
-62.1%
-2,226,539
-97.0%
SOCIETAL PENETRATION (M/E)
ITALY
0.24
3.41
0.24
0.17
-0.07
-30.6%
-3.25
-95.2%
FRANCE
0.45
0.96
0.81
0.20
-0.62
-75.9%
-0.77
-79.7%
GERMANY
0.20
3.98
0.51
0.11
-0.30
-78.5%
-3.86
-97.1%
SUB-CULTURAL ENCAPSULATION (M/V)
ITALY
4.85
14.32
5.13
3.97
-1.15
-22.5%
-10.35
-72.3%
FRANCE (leg.)
7.27
12.80
11.36
4.41
-6.95
-61.2%
-8.40
-65.6%
GERMANY
6.79
-
26.83
1.86
-24.97
-93.1%
-
-
SHARE OF PARTY MEMBERSHIP (M/M')
ITALY
6.31
37.32
3.24
3.81
+0.57
+17.7%
-33.5
-89.8%
FRANCE
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
GERMANY
6.18
-
8.43
5.36
-3.07
-36.4%
-
-
Source: my elaborations from various sources.
Notes: M/E = ratio of radical left members over the total electorate; M/V = ration of radical left membership over the radical left
voters; M/M' = ratio of radical left members over total party members. All ratios refer to the membership of the previous year.
Pre-1989 data refer to the closest available data (1986 to 1988). German data for 1988 refer to the hypothetical sum of East and
West Germany. Italian and French data on total party membership are not very reliable. PCF data after 2002 refer to the "due-
paying" category.
FIGURE 6.10 MEMBERSHIP EVOLUTION
Source: my elaborations from various sources.
Notes: absolute values, due-paying members.
A focus on the period 1991-2012 reveals that the German radical left lost 115,618
members (-62.1%), the French radical left 246,396 members (-74.1%) and the Italian
radical left, which started from much lower levels, 35,387 members (-31.5%). In terms
of their societal penetration (M/E), the parties continued a transition from mass
organisations well rooted within their respective national societies to electoralist
forces with a marginal and patchy presence on the ground. In 1991 0.81% of the
French, 0.51% of the German and 0.24% of the Italian electorate carried a card of a
300
radical left party; in 2012 this ratio had fallen to 0.20%, 0.11% and 0.17% respectively.
Their data for sub-cultural encapsulation (M/E) show results of a similar magnitude: in
the early Nineties 26.83% of German, 11.36% of French and 5.13% of Italian radical left
voters were also party members; in 2012-2013 this ratio had collapsed to 1.86%, 4.41%
and 3.97% respectively. The radical left thus shifted from the very tight kind of
encapsulation typical of Twentieth Century mass parties (6-15%) to the medium levels
typical of modern cadre parties (3-5%) or to the loose levels typical of purely electoral
or new parties (below 2%).
The driving force behind this decline was the progressive evaporation of the legacies of
the communist mass party model. This erosion followed a different tempo in each
country. In France, the formal organisational continuity of the PCF before and after
1989 led to a steep and continuous decline, which only after 2003 started to be
partially compensated by the growth of other organisations (LO, LCR/NPA, PG). In
Germany, the mix of continuity and discontinuity of the PDS with its SED past led to a
vertical collapse in 1989-1992 followed by a slower decline, briefly reversed in 2005-
2009 by the creation of the WASG and the merger in DIE LINKE. In Italy, finally, the PRC
was established in 1991 as an effectively new organisation, largely unencumbered by
the legacy of the Italian Communist Party. It thus started from quite low initial levels
but at the same time bypassed many of the negative tendencies which affected its
main post-communist rival (PDS/DS/PDS) – a shrinking, aging and increasingly inactive
membership – and remained up to 2006 fairly stable and vital. In all cases, however,
the early or late arrival to a stage of relative stabilisation could not reverse the
underlying declining trend; by 2012 the radical left of all three countries was at its level
of greatest membership weakness since the defeat of fascism.
The experience of Germany, France and Italy suggests two implications for the future
of the contemporary radical left.
The first implication is that the kind of strong and dense membership-based
organisations which were characteristic of the Twentieth Century workers' movement
– of a communist, social democratic and even Christian democratic type – are a thing
of the past and are unlikely to be reproduced in the near future. The crisis of
traditional communist parties is still exerting its effects thirty-five years after its
301
beginning in the late Seventies and almost twenty-five years after the fall of the Berlin
Wall; no party has so far managed to completely stop, let alone invert the course. Even
the French renewal of left-wing activism (since 1986), labour militancy (since 1995)
and political participation (since 2002) has had virtually no bearing on this trend.
The second implication is that successful alternative organisational models have yet to
emerge. On the one hand, the most dynamic radical left parties from the point of view
of electoral and membership growth (the PDS, WASG and DIE LINKE in Western
Germany, the far left in France) have remained elite organisations with tiny
memberships and absolutely shallow levels of sub-cultural encapsulation. On the other
hand non-partisan social movement networks (e.g. the French "movement social" of
the early Nineties, the alter-globalist and anti-war movement of 1999-2005 or the anti-
crisis movements of 2011-2012), despite their capacity to mobilise large numbers of
participants for well-delimited contentious events, failed to consolidate in new mass
associations, unions, political parties or other organisations. The only counter-
examples in the world are provided by left-wing parties of the Global South having led
significant revolutionary processes: the Venezuelan PSUV and perhaps (reliable figures
are not available) the Nepali CPN-M and the Bolivian MAS.
Thus, for the foreseeable future the Western European radical left will tend be
dominated by increasingly small political organisations, often capable of significant
electoral exploits but unable to translate this superficial sympathy into more solid and
stable relations of adhesion and activism.
Does all this matter?
The decline of party membership in Western political systems has been widely
attested empirically (Katz & Mair, 1992b; Mair & van Biezen, 2001; Van Biezen et al.,
2012) and discussed theoretically (Mair, 1994; Ignazi, 1996 and 2004). Its
consequences are not necessarily negative for the health of political parties. Firstly, the
importance of the membership as a resource for propaganda and financial support has
steadily declined vis-à-vis the role played by traditional and web-based mass media,
external PR consultants and public financing. Secondly, the decreasing encapsulation
of the electorate by parties (of which phenomena such as the mass party and
pillarisation were an expression) has certainly increased the volatility of their support,
but this situation presents both dangers and opportunities. Thirdly, the ideal of a
302
membership-based democracy has always rested uneasily beside that of an election-
based democracy, as the political preferences of committed party members and
activists are likely to diverge significantly from those of the electorate at large. It has
thus been argued that the shift might be a welcome development for the ordinary
citizen, who will be allowed to express her political preferences through old (elections)
and new (opinion polls, focus groups, open primaries, internet-based voting)
mechanisms without the distortions introduced by the primacy of the party member.
Moreover, the deliquescence of traditional forms of large, dense and intense linkages
goes far beyond that of the mass party model, including most allegiances (class,
religion) and organisations (parties, trade unions, churches, cooperatives, civic
associations), and does not seem to be reversible in the medium-term.
225
As far as the radical left parties are concerned, membership decline has been clearly
irrelevant to their short-term electoral fortunes. However, it poses two essential long-
term problems. From a practical point of view, the dwindling numbers, cohesion and
quality of party members have undermined the attempts of the radical left to exert a
serious extra-parliamentary influence on the political scene. For instance, the radical
left has generally been incapable to improve its positions within the apparatuses of
labour unions and significantly influence their politics; as a consequence, it has been
deprived of a powerful tool of resistance and social transformation. From a theoretical
point of view, the whole doctrinal elaboration of the post-Berlin Wall radical left has
stressed the essential and necessary role of democratic participation and mobilisation
in the attainment of short-term goals (resisting neoliberalism, winning elementary
reforms), in a possible mid-term shift of the political climate and in the long-term
process of building a democratic socialist or communist society. Its inability to foster
viable outlets and institutions where grassroots democracy can live and thrive, thus,
represents a veritable challenge to its raison d'être and entire political vision.
225
See Robert Putnam (2000) on the USA (the "erosion of civic engagement") and Jacques Ion (1997) on
France (an emerging model of "engagement distancié" or "à la carte").
303
6.5.2 Sub-cultural linkages
The membership crisis of the parties of the radical left parties was paralleled by a
similar erosion of their networks of friendly sub-cultural mass organisations.
A precise operationalisation of this variable is at present impossible. This would involve
calculating the total number of members of ancillary, affiliated, collateral and friendly
organisations of a party (excluding double membership) and weighing each linkage by
its intensity. Unfortunately, political research is still far from reaching a satisfactory
solution to these problems.
226
Nevertheless, it is absolutely evident that not much
remains of the world of strong, dense and tightly-knit sub-cultures and organisational
networks which marked much of the history of Nineteenth and Twentieth Century
Western Europe, of which mass political parties were both an expression and a central
point of reference and organising agency.
Radical left parties have been fully affected by this shift. Its consequences, however,
have perhaps been more serious than for other party families, which were either not
very interested in the organisation of the masses in the first place (e.g. the parties of
the social elites) or could replace it with other forms of party-society linkages (e.g.
direct contacts through the parliamentary institutions, the state machine, the mass
media and "top-level" bargaining with civil society organisations).
As I have shown in the previous chapters, this process was characterised by three
overlapping dimensions: (i) a quantitative decline of the constituency of friendly mass
organisations; (ii) the autonomisation of civil society organisations from their
traditional partisan referents and the de-politicisation of their reciprocal links; (iii) the
de-ideologisation of civil society organisations themselves, which tended to drop
strong systemic goals, values and pedagogical pretensions and emphasised instead
their role as more prosaic providers of individual/group services. The outcome was a
new model of looser, more punctual and constantly renegotiated relations between
226
Poguntke (2008), for instance, offers a measure of the average strength of the party organisational
linkages but does not quantify their number and social relevance. The latter task, in turn, presents
various theoretical and empirical problems: the poor quality of data on membership of civil society
organisations; the issue of overlapping memberships; the different qualitative nature of different kinds
of membership; the problem of attributing the "collateral" status to organisations without formal ties
with a party.
304
increasingly autonomous organisations and social spheres, couched in terms of a
celebration of the a-partitical or a-political character of civil society activity and in the
rhetoric of the autonomy of social movements.
In the case of Italy, the PRC was deprived from the start of any influence within the
imposing network of collateral or friendly mass organisations of the Italian Communist
Party (CGIL, Legacoop, ARCI, UDI, SUNIA, ANPI and so on) which was entirely inherited
by the rival post-communist party (PDS). Over the subsequent decades PRC, PdCI, SEL
and other smaller groups had a hard time rebuilding solid relations with old or new
civil society and social movement organisations. Relations of affinity and collaboration
were indeed established with a variety of societal milieus: the left-wing minorities of
the CGIL trade union; sections of the old left associationism; the galaxy of alternative
trade unions and centri sociali; alter-globalist, pacifist and other left-libertarian social
movement networks. The quantitative importance of these groups was however
smallish and the qualitative nature of the linkages never went beyond a weak and
informal connection. Key obstacles to a progress on this front were the continued
(albeit sometimes critical) allegiance of the leaders and cadres of veritable mass
organisations to the PDS/DS/PD and the absence of a coherent strategy of
intervention.
In the case of Germany, the organisational linkages of the SED were completely
shattered in 1989-1990 by the joint effects of the East German revolution and of the
unification of the two German states. The PDS managed to retain tight links with a
small network of organisations representing the interests of the former bureaucracy
(OKV) and with the largest Eastern charity (Volkssolidarität) but lost all influence
among the organised labour movement and other societal milieus. As in Italy, in the
following decades PDS, WASG and DIE LINKE made some progress in establishing good
working relations with large sections of the Eastern civil society and smaller sections of
the Western one (alternative, alter-globalist and pacifist groups; few thin layers of
trade unionists; some small professional and minority organisations). Here as well,
however, the bulk of mass organisations continued to retain looser versions of their
traditional political allegiances (SPD, CDU/CSU and Greens).
France, finally, was the only country where the old network of collateral mass
organisations of the PCF (CGT, FSGT, SPF, UFF, FNMT, CNL, ARAC and so forth) was not
305
suddenly destroyed by the implosion of the Soviet system. Instead, it suffered a slow
long-term erosion due to the electoral decline of the Communist Party, the rising
appeal of the Socialist Party and generic disengagement. Thus, while these
organisations remained until the early Eighties part of a large and compact sub-culture
closely connected to the PCF, during the Eighties and Nineties the network lost
coherence and loosened or entirely severed its links with the party. The outcome was
often paradoxical: many leaders and cadres remained communist members or
sympathisers but their wider membership switched to different political proclivities
and the organisations effectively ceased to act as relays of communist influence. More
than in the other two countries, the various radical left parties managed to preserve
and strengthen important relations of collaboration with significant intellectual, trade
union, associative and movementist milieus. The intensity of these links remained
however somewhat loose and the mutual benefits limited.
The general argument is well exemplified by the case of the trade union movement.
Although the radical left parties had better voting intentions among union members
than among the general population (on average, around 10% in Italy and Germany and
around 20% in France), their actual presence within the top echelons of the union
apparatuses was quite weak and their influence on union policies almost absent.
306
6.5.3 Material resources
Finally, it is not clear if the crisis of the communist mass party model (membership and
networks of collateral organisations) had a similar impact on the material resources
available to contemporary radical left parties for carrying out their political activities.
The data available are sketchy and incoherent but seem to indicate large national
variations, with a general tendency to decline in the Nineties and to stabilisation
afterwards.
The evolution of party finances (real yearly incomes) is depicted in the following figure
(FIGURE 6.11).
FIGURE 6.11 FINANCES
YEAR
GERMANY
FRANCE
ITALY
PARTIES:
PDS, L.PDS, WASG,
DIE LINKE
PCF, LO, LCR/NPA, PG
PRC, PdCI, SEL
(central level only)
1990
€ 683,452,336
1991
€ 44,213,489
1992
€ 15,607,860
1993
€ 18,154,349
1994
€ 22,172,487
1995
€ 25,923,268
1996
€ 22,717,181
1997
€ 22,639,143
€ 11,249,662
1998
€ 23,507,303
€ 8,481,060
1999
€ 24,655,574
€ 11,984,138
2000
€ 23,475,788
€ 13,088,379
2001
€ 23,461,848
€ 11,023,873
2002
€ 24,725,204
€ 11,232,111
2003
€ 24,743,284
€ 42,987,689
€ 11,829,939
2004
€ 23,122,915
€ 46,527,470
€ 15,629,235
2005
€ 25,513,726
€ 41,257,639
€ 19,966,689
2006
€ 25,903,149
€ 40,687,450
€ 25,941,671
2007
€ 23,362,157
€ 44,761,594
€ 28,896,959
2008
€ 25,562,946
€ 38,538,933
€ 20,890,468
2009
€ 27,566,111
€ 38,782,152
€ 12,179,536
2010
€ 27,851,633
€ 38,294,617
€ 12,008,729
2011
€ 3,640,874
AVERAGE
2003-2010
€ 25,453,240
€ 41,479,693
€ 18,417,903
share
5.50%
19.40%
-
Source: my elaborations from party accounts (Deutscher Bundestag, 1992-2011; CNCCFP, 2005-2011; G.U., 2000-2012).
Notes: yearly incomes, real 2010 euro. Share: average share of the total yearly incomes of all registered (France) or parliamentary
(Germany) political parties. Italian accounts refer to the central level only (excluding intermediate and primary articulations).
Germany is the only country where coherent data for the whole period are available.
Revenues collapsed in the period 1989-1992, when the PDS was stripped of almost all
307
the resources inherited from the SED. In the following decades the party strongly
recovered, growing from 15.6 million euro (1992) to 27.8 million euro (2010); their
overall amount remained however smallish when compared with the total incomes of
German political parties (around 5.4%).
In France, the incomes of the radical left are likely to have declined during the Eighties
and Nineties, as a consequence of the membership and institutional decline of the PCF,
but precise data are available only since 2003. Despite a slight erosion, their overall
amount remains astoundingly high: on average, 41.9 million euro and 19.6% of total
party incomes.
In Italy, finally, resources follow a parabolic path: from extremely weak initial levels, to
a veritable boom in 2004-2008, to a rapid collapse after the 2008 electoral defeat.
Unlike in the other two countries, where self-financing and state financing were fairly
balanced, in Italy the dynamic was almost entirely determined by levels of the latter.
A quantification of the human resources of radical left parties is even harder to come
by.
In the Noughties the official staff of the parties amounted to about 100 people in Italy,
200 in Germany
227
and more than 300 in France. This figure, however, represents only
a fraction of the total number of people directly or indirectly reporting to the parties.
Professional staff includes politicians (paid members of representative assemblies and
state executive bodies), their assistants, employees of party-owned companies (e.g.
newspapers and publishing houses) and party foundations, hired external consultants
and some officials of collateral organisations. Semi-professional and non-professional
staff includes much of the active party membership and, in particular, local elected
representatives (e.g. councillors) and members holding internal party offices (e.g.
branch secretary).
Most components seem to have accompanied the decline of party membership, sub-
cultural networks and financial resources; however, semi-professional elected
representatives have probably suffered a weaker retrenchment and cadres indirectly
made available by the state have perhaps even increased.
227
Before 1989 the SED directly employed more than 44,000 people.
308
6.5.4 Conclusions
The study of the electoral evolution of the parties of the contemporary radical left
offers the image of limited and contradictory, yet real, recovery since the shock of the
fall of the Eastern bloc. This picture, however, contrasts strongly with that provided by
their organisational evolution, where the long-term crisis which has enveloped the
labour movement – in both its partisan and non-partisan forms – in Western Europe
since the late Seventies seems to be still ongoing.
Even in a context characterised by large waves of left-leaning contentious politics
and/or electoral growth (France in 1993-2002, 2005-2006 and 2009-2012; Italy in
1994-1996 and 2001-2004; Germany in 1992-1997 and 2003-2009), radical left parties
have failed to play the roles of effective outlets for a renewal of political engagement
and activism and of catalysts for an organisational structuration of the anti-neoliberal
discontent and resistance. On the one hand, the legacies of the communist past (a
mass membership, a tightly-knit network of collateral mass organisations) have
followed a trajectory of sudden collapse (1989-1991 in Germany and Italy) or slower
but relentless erosion (France). On the other hand, the (re)politicisation and
(re)activation of left-wing social layers has rarely moved past the point of a generic
sympathy toward the parties of the radical left and toward more stable and intense
forms of collaboration. The apparatuses of traditional mass civil society organisations
have tended to confirm a loose allegiance to the mainstream social democratic or
Christian democratic parties of government. Figureheads and activists of the so-called
"new" social movements (e.g. alter-globalism) have either hidden behind a
theorisation of their autonomy and distinctiveness or, when they have sought to
bridge the gap with party politics, they have turned out to be generals without an
army, having little or no effect on radical left membership and electoral results.
Ordinary citizens, finally, have not overcome a difficult and intermittent relation with
politics, where participation remained punctual (the act of voting, marching in a
demonstration) and engagement short-lived.
Contemporary radical left parties, thus, tend to be characterised by a small
membership, shallow linkages with a non-homogenous constituency and little or no
retinue of collateral or sympathising civil society and social movement organisations.
309
This state of affairs does not necessarily constitute a problem from the point of view of
their electoral performance, as the loss of ideological voters can be compensated or
over-compensated by the conquest of mobile ones. However, it represents a
fundamental obstacle to their potential for extra-parliamentary mobilisation, the
conquest of concrete reforms and the implementation of their ambitious projects of
social transformation.
310
6.6 The case for regroupment and the reasons
behind fragmentation
While the internal conflicts and debates of the radical left of all three countries have
been broadly similar, their outcomes have produced strikingly different national
trajectories.
The following table summarises the evolution of radical left fragmentation at the level
of votes, members and MPs in electoral years (TABLE 6.12).
France belongs to the group of Western European countries (together with Greece,
Portugal and Denmark) where the radical left has been firmly and stably divided in a
plurality of significant organisations. The competition between the PCF and other far-
left (LO, LCR/NPA, PT) or radical left actors became entrenched during the Eighties and
grew larger in the following decades. A serious effort of regroupment in 2005-2007
failed and the landscape remained unstable until 2012, when the successful electoral
campaign of the Front de gauche led to a partial but significant move toward
unification.
Italy started out with the establishment of an uncontested broad left party (PRC) but
went down a course of progressive fragmentation in competing parties and micro-
parties. Subsequent attempts of regroupment have all failed to yield results.
In Germany, finally, the PDS was able to avoid the recurring danger of fragmentation
(1989-1990 and 2002-2005) and has on the contrary become the cornerstone of a
larger broad left party, DIE LINKE.
How can these divergent trajectories be explained?
311
TABLE 6.12 FRAGMENTATION
GERMANY
Votes
1990
1994
1998
2002
2005
2009
2013
AVER.
PDS
99.2%
99.4%
99.5%
99.9%
-
-
-
56.9%
L.PDS/DIE LINKE
-
-
-
-
98.5%
99.3%
99.2%
42.5%
Others
0.8%
0.6%
0.4%
0.1%
1.5%
0.7%
0.8%
0.7%
Members
1990
1994
1998
2002
2005
2009
(2012)
AVER.
PDS/L.PDS
96.1%
92.5%
90.4%
90.2%
74.9%
-
-
63.5%
WASG
-
-
-
-
15.6%
-
-
2.3%
DIE LINKE
-
-
-
-
-
91.8%
89.5%
26.0%
Others
3.9%
7.5%
9.6%
9.8%
9.5%
8.2%
9.5%
8.3%
MPs
1990
1994
1998
2002
2005
2009
2013
AVER.
PDS/L.PDS
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
77.8%
-
68.3%
WASG
-
-
-
-
22.2%
-
3.2%
DIE LINKE
-
-
-
-
-
100.0%
100.0%
28.6%
Fragmentation index
1990
1994
1998
2002
2005
2009
2013
AVER.
Votes
1.02
1.01
1.01
1.00
1.03
1.01
1.02
1.01
Members
1.08
1.16
1.21
1.21
1.68
1.18
1.21
1.25
MPs
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.53
1.00
1.00
1.08
ITALY
Votes
1992
1994
1996
2001
2006
2008
2013
AVER.
PRC
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
74.9%
71.6%
-
-
63.8%
PdCI
-
-
-
24.9%
28.4%
-
-
7.6%
SA/RC
-
-
-
-
-
69.3%
39.2%
15.5%
SEL
-
-
-
-
-
-
55.9%
8.0%
Others
-
-
-
0.2%
-
30.7%
4.9%
5.1%
Members
1992
1994
1996
2001
2006
2008
(2011)
AVER.
PRC
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
77.8%
68.4%
69.5%
38.8%
79.2%
PdCI
-
-
-
22.2%
31.6%
28.6%
21.0%
14.8%
SEL
-
-
-
-
-
-
38.1%
5.4%
Others
-
-
-
-
-
2.0%
2.1%
0.6%
MPs
1992
1994
1996
2001
2006
2008
2013
AVER.
PRC
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
55.0%
71.9%
-
-
65.4%
PdCI
-
-
-
45.0%
28.1%
-
-
14.6%
SEL
-
-
-
-
-
-
100.0%
20.0%
Fragmentation index
1992
1994
1996
2001
2006
2008
2013
AVER.
Votes
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.61
1.69
1.95
2.14
1.48
Members
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.53
1.76
1.77
2.94
1.57
MPs
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.98
1.68
-
1.00
1.28
FRANCE
Votes (legislative)
1993
1997
2002
2007
2012
AVER.
PCF
80.8%
77.2%
62.7%
53.4%
-
54.8%
FdG
-
-
-
-
87.6%
17.5%
LO
8.1%
13.4%
15.4%
10.4%
6.2%
10.7%
LCR/NPA
1.2%
2.3%
16.2%
25.6%
-
9.1%
Others
9.9%
7.2%
5.7%
10.6%
6.2%
7.9%
Votes (presidential)
(1995)
2002
2007
2012
AVER.
PCF
61.0%
24.4%
21.4%
-
27.0%
FdG
-
-
-
86.7%
21.7%
LO
38.0%
41.4%
14.8%
4.4%
24.7%
LCR/NPA
0.0%
30.8%
45.4%
8.9%
21.3%
Others
0.0%
3.4%
18.4%
0.0%
5.44%
Members
1993
1997
2002
2007
2012
AVER.
PCF
99.0%
96.7%
92.3%
88.1%
74.5%
90.1%
LO
0.7%
3.0%
5.7%
7.7%
8.1%
5.1%
LCR/NPA
0.2%
0.3%
2.0%
4.1%
3.5%
2.0%
PG
-
-
-
-
13.9%
2.8%
MPs
1993
1997
2002
2007
2012
AVER.
PCF
95.7%
94.3%
90.9%
83.3%
70.0%
86.8%
Others
4.4%
5.7%
9.1%
16.7%
30.0%
13.2%
Fragmentation index
1993
1997
2002
2007
2012
AVER.
Votes (legislative)
1.50
1.62
2.25
2.69
1.29
1.73
Votes (presidential)
1.89
3.06
3.37
1.31
2.41
Members
1.02
1.02
1.07
1.27
1.72
1.21
MPs
1.09
1.12
1.20
1.38
1.72
1.30
Source: my elaborations various sources (see statistical appendix).
312
The case for a regroupment of forces of different origin and sensibility under a
common organisational framework – either a broad party (e.g. the German DIE LINKE)
or a semi-permanent front (e.g. the French FdG) should be clear from the discussion of
section 6.2. A broad anti-neoliberal programme based on the grievances that the
mainstream left and its sympathetic trade unions confederations were proving unable
or unwilling to address provided the rational basis for the unity of radical left forces of
different origin and sensibility. Although a host of political and material questions
produced tensions and fostered vocal debates, there was no good reason why
compromise solutions could not be found. And, indeed, contemporary radical left
parties were often successful in initiating and carrying out modest movements of
regroupment.
The establishment and preservation of radical left unity was overwhelmingly
dependent from three factors: (i) the ability of the main radical left party to find a
reasonable political and material balance between the existing potential partners; (ii)
the incentives provided by the political system, in particular the access to party
financing and parliamentary representation; (iii) the climate of political competition.
The behaviour of the biggest radical left party in each country (PDS, PRC and PCF) was
of crucial importance. A willingness to modernise its ideology, open up to pluralism
and ensure political viability and equal dignity to potential partners helped to bring
about unity among forces of different origin and sensibility; excessive pride,
inflexibility and poor choices fostered the crystallisation of the disagreements into
separate organisations.
In Italy, the open and flexible attitude of the PRC did manage for a short period (1991-
1997) to bring together orthodox and neo-communists, far-left groups and sections of
the PDS left, before fragmenting under the pressure of bipolarism. In France the PCF
had many opportunities to become the centre of processes of larger regroupment
(1993-1997; 2004-2007) but regularly wasted them; a belated unification occurred
(2009-2012) when the party came around the idea of giving up its symbolic and
material primacy within the alliance by selecting non-communists as prominent
candidates. In Germany, finally, the PDS managed to survive two potentially lethal
threats of fragmentation (1989-1992 and 2002-2005) and to aggregate around its core
313
Eastern constituency successive layers of external partners: at first only smallish far
and radical left forces; later much larger sections of the Western population. To a great
extent, this was due to the willingness of its leadership to grant generous political
compromises and to share with largesse its considerable resources (e.g. finances,
internal offices, public offices) with potential partners.
The presence of institutional incentives was also very important in ensuring the
cohesion (or lack thereof) of radical left forces.
In Germany, the 5% electoral threshold discouraged potential competitors to the PDS
and was one of the key drivers of the alliances of 1990 (with Western leftists) and
2005-2007 (with the WASG). In Italy, the 4% electoral threshold had a similar effect of
deterrence on far-left organisations but was undermined by the selective incentives
offered to right-wing splits of the PRC (CU in 1995, PdCI in 1998, SEL in 2009), which
were guaranteed a significant parliamentary representation even with a very limited
electoral support by an alliance with the centre-left. Later on, the post-2007 drive
toward very heterogeneous electoral coalitions (SA, SeL, FdS and RC) was also
motivated by the determination of a weakened radical left to overcome the threshold
and to gain parliamentary representation. In France, finally, the extremely high
barriers to representation provided no disincentive to the proliferation of competing
candidatures, as fielding common candidates did not increase the chances of election
but reduced the media exposure and financial prospects of each individual
organisation.
228
Finally, the saliency of the central political fault line of the radical left, the question of
the (conciliatory or intransigent) attitude toward the moderate left, varied sharply
according to the external political climate. The dilemma could be temporarily defused
or fudged in periods of opposition to right-wing or grand coalition governments and, to
a less extent, when the moderate left had the numbers to govern alone (or refused a
dialogue). Whenever the contribution of the radical left became determinant for the
formation or survival of a centre-left government, however, powerful centrifugal
228
Indeed, the only electoral alliances between LO and LCR (1999 and 2004 European, 2004 regional
elections) occurred precisely in cases when unity was likely to ensure such benefits, i.e. parliamentary
representation.
314
pressures were regularly set in motion. The hard choice between granting the survival
or determining the fall of a centre-left parliamentary majority drastically reduced the
scope for ambiguity and compromises and undermined the internal cohesion and
external appeal of radical left parties, and leading to a proliferation of right-wing and
left-wing splinter groups and electoral losses in all directions. In Germany the PDS had
the luck of being considered as nicht koalitionsfähig (not a viable coalition partner) by
the SPD, which involved it only in a few experiments at the regional level; this greatly
alleviated the pressures on the cohesion of the party. In the other two countries, on
the contrary, the choice of the PS and PDS/DS/PD to pursue a course of broad centre-
left coalitions including the radical left was the key factor in encouraging a progressive
fragmentation in the form of right-wing splits (Italy) or the emergence of more radical
competitors (France).
On the basis of the aforementioned considerations, the trajectory of the three
countries becomes easy to understand. The unity of the Italian radical left was
progressively destroyed by the salience of the issue of governmental participation and
by the selective incentives offered by the electoral system to right-wing splits. That of
the German radical left was preserved by the absence of the first pressure, by the
positive effects of the electoral system and by the willingness of the PDS to reward
potential allies with material resources and a political role well above their effective
contribution. In the case of France, finally, the many chances of regroupment of the
gauche de la gauche between 1993 and 2007 were scuppered partly by the issue of
governmental participation and partly by the incapacity of the various potential
partners to reach a balanced compromise; the latter element, in turn, largely derived
from disproportions in their respective societal influence.
229
It was only when the bad
memories of the Jospin period waned and when a weakened PCF was ready to agree
to important material concessions that the partial regroupment of the Left Front could
take place (2009-2012).
229
The PCF, a giant from the point of view of membership, resources and institutional presence, could
not envisage an equal partnership with groups which could score well electorally (in presidential and
European elections) but were dwarves in all other respects. The far left, on the other hand, hoped to use
the lever of its electoral popularity to split the communist constituency and pave the way for a deeper
reconfiguration.
315
6.7 Systemic influence: much ado about nothing?
Was the radical left effective in pushing forward its political programme and shaping
Western European politics and society?
At the level of extra-parliamentary mobilisation, the radical left parties were very
active in their support of and participation to a broad range of struggles and social
movements.
This involvement was generally regarded as constructive by the participants, tended to
win them new allies and often significantly increased their electoral audience. The link
between electoral gains and broad left-wing social mobilisations emerges very clearly
in all three countries. In France the two electoral peaks of the radical left (1995-2002
and 2009-2012) are tightly correlated to massive anti-right mobilisations led by the
labour movement (1995 and 2009-2010). In Italy the two peaks (1995-96 and 2004-
2006) neatly followed large anti-Berlusconi mobilisations by the trade unions (1994
and 2002) and pacifist networks (2002-2004). In Germany, finally, the two largest
increases of the vote for the PDS/DIE LINKE (1994 and 2005) were direct consequences
of the 1992-1993 anti-Treuhand, of the 2003 pacifist and of the 2003-2004 anti-Hartz
mobilisations.
230
The organisational and strategic benefits of such an involvement, however, remained
limited. First of all, the parties largely failed to translate the gains of sympathy into
more stable linkages such as new members and activists, the establishment of
collateral and friendly organisations or the conquest of leadership positions within the
key social movement organisations. The trade union movement, in particular, tended
to remain closely aligned with the moderate left and the influence of radical left
activists was stagnating (Germany, France) or even declining (Italy). Secondly, all but
one major mobilisation were directed against seating right-wing governments; as a
consequence, they tended to primarily benefit the main opposition party (SPD, PS, PD)
230
A significant exception to this trend is provided by the important French mobilisations of the period
2003-2006 (2003 labour and 2006 anti-CPE mobilisations), which failed to produce a positive impact on
the radical left vote. The reason for this was probably the 2002 presidential election, which led to a mid-
term shift of many former radical left voters toward the Socialist Party.
316
and to increase the pressures on the radical left to agree on a united front policy
including the electoral and parliamentary level. Thirdly, despite their mass character,
many of the union-based movements were ultimately either unsuccessful (France in
2003 and 2009-2010, Germany in 1993 and 2004) or were circumvented by
subsequent trade union negotiations (Italy). In short, the radical left was altogether
unable to make use of extra-parliamentary mobilisations to improve its long-term
ability to achieve its aims; the benefits, therefore, remained generally limited to short-
term electoral gains which disappeared as the general mood turned from optimism to
pessimism and resignation.
At the level of electoral and parliamentary mobilisation, the radical left parties were
similarly unable to alter the "direction of competition" (Sartori, 1976; Evans, 2002) and
to put a halt to the main trends of the neoliberal era. In all three countries the ruling
elite was altogether able to push forward a major reconfiguration of class power,
reversing the post-war balance between state-led and privately-led enterprises,
making labour cheaper, more flexible and less influential and shifting the burden of
taxation away from capital and managerial incomes (Duménil & Lévi, 2011). The
legacies of the post-WWII embedded liberalism are far from having been obliterated
(Harman, 2007) but the overall direction of change remains highly unfavourable to the
radical left project.
How can this insufficient record be explained?
On the one hand, the failures of the radical left have of course depended on the
altogether limited levels of its social weight. As a medium-small political family
representing between 4% and 13% of the electorate, often fragmented in competing
organisations and lacking important resources of independent social mobilisation (e.g.
a mass membership, collateral trade union confederations, a large-scale system of
communication), the pressures it could exert on the social and political system were
modest. In particular, its ability of exerting a leftward pull on the moderate left was
hampered by a long series of factors: the lack of vitality of social democratic internal
left-wing tendencies; the hostility of the leadership of key civil society organisations, in
particular the trade union movement; the general weakness (with the exception of
France) and ineffectiveness of labour conflict; the weakened but still effective capacity
317
of the moderate left to compensate the loss of traditionalist supporters with the gain
of more moderate ones (e.g. Mitterrand, Schröder, Prodi) or with a successful appeal
to tactical voting against the right (e.g. the German SPD in 2002, the French PS after
2002, Veltroni's PD in 2008); finally, the continuous strategic oscillations of radical left
parties between conciliatory and intransigent strategies.
On the other hand, the insensibility of the political system (and, in particular, of the
moderate left) to the pressures toward increased protection and redistribution could
have deeper roots. One possible explanation might derive from the entrenchment of
neoliberalism into complex institutional architectures (the European Union and the
Eurozone; the WTO; the role played by global financial markets in the financing of
public debt, corporate and private debt and pension funds) which "locks in" the
changes and, falling short of a head-on confrontation with multiple national and
international power centres, bars the implementation of even modestly heterodox
economic policies. A second explanation might be found in the slow growth rates of
advanced European economies and the increased pressure of international
competition, both of which curtail the space for direct and indirect redistributive
policies.
Further research is needed on the topic. What seems clear is that in absence of drastic
theoretical and organisational improvements the radical left seems condemned to
stagnation and overall ineffectiveness.
318
6.8 Concluding remarks
This thesis has endeavoured to offer an original contribution to the existing scholarship
on the partisan radical left and on political parties.
From an empirical point of view, the detailed comparative analysis of the German,
French and Italian radical lefts based on a wealth of quantitative and qualitative data
has painted a nuanced picture of more than two decades of evolution, has revealed
important and often surprising findings and has laid the foundations for a solid
attempt to provide a convincing theorisation and interpretation of the overall
trajectory of the Western European radical left.
From a methodological point of view, the adoption of a comparative (three countries),
aggregate (the radical left as a complex political space), multi-dimensional (political
nature; societal weight and influence; electoral, institutional and organisational
mobilisation; strategies and tactics) and multi-level (party-organisation, party-
constituency, external actors and structural environment) approach has proven its
power in avoiding the pitfalls of one-sided generalisations from circumscribed
experiences and in advancing our general understanding of the multi-faceted relations
between political parties and contemporary societies.
Finally, the unusual vantage point of non-mainstream political actors has provided an
interesting perspective into the socio-political transformations of the neoliberal age
and broadened conventional conceptions of politics, democracy and historical agency.
The Western European radical left has emerged from the analysis as a genuine political
actor, endowed with important resources of societal weight and capable of playing a
not decisive but nevertheless significant role in all sectors of political and social life:
elections; intellectual production and public debate; extra-parliamentary mobilisation;
governmental formation; law- and decision-making.
At the same time, the parties of the German, French and Italian radical left have not
succeeded in making decisive progresses toward their main proclaimed goals: to fill the
vacuum left by the neoliberal transformation of mainstream political parties; to
embark on a long-lasting path of recovery of their societal weight and influence; to
319
devise a credible vision of an alternative project of society, of a transition beyond
neoliberalism and capitalism and of a renewal of working class politics and democratic
radicalism. In other words, they have failed to chart a way out of the long-term crisis of
the Twentieth Century workers' movement and its various revolutionary, Stalinist and
social democratic variants.
Their experience, both in their successes and in their shortcomings, represents a vital
piece of contemporary political history and shines a revealing light on the key
challenges and possibilities of Europe's present – and Europe's future.
320
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2. REFERENCE WEBSITES
Assemblée Nationale – http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/
BdI (Bundesministerium des Innern) - http://www.bmi.bund.de
BfA (Bundesagentur für Arbeit) – http://ww.arbeitsagentur.de/
BGBL. (Bundesgesetzblatt) -
http://www.bgbl.de/Xaver/start.xav?startbk=Bundesanzeiger_BGBl
bpb (Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung) - http://www.bpb.de
Bundesregierung (Die) - http://www.bundesregierung.de/
BWL (Bundeswahlleiter) - http://www.bundeswahlleiter.de
Camera dei Deputati – Archivio Storico - http://archivio.camera.it
CDSP - Centre de données socio-politiques, Sciences Po - http://cdsp.sciences-po.fr/
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Deutscher Bundestag - http://www.bundestag.de
DIE LINKE - http://die-linke.de
DIE LINKE.PDS - http://archiv2007.sozialisten.de
DKP – Deutsche Kommunistische Partei – http://www.dkp.de
ESSF – Europe solidaire sans frontières - http://www.europe-solidaire.org
EU KLEMS database - http://www.euklems.net/
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FdG (Front de gauche) - http://www.placeaupeuple.fr/
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GESIS (Leibnitz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften) - http://www.gesis.org
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370
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371
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%2363%3B-1424.html
3. INTERVIEWS
Christine Buchholz (WASG/DIE LINKE.), 16.05.2010, Rostock
Annick Coupè (Solidaires), 30.4.2012, Paris
Daniele D'Ambra (PRC/SC), 6.09.2010, Roma
Judith Dellheim (PDS/DIE LINKE.), 17.05.2011, Berlin
Jean-Philippe Divès (NPA), 27.4.2012, Paris
Thomas Falkner, 19.05.2011, Berlin
Bernd Gehrke, 24.05.2011, Bautzen
Alessandro Giardiello (PRC), 6.09.2010, Milano
Thies Gleiss (WASG/DIE LINKE.), 16.05.2010, Rostock
Werner Halbauer (WASG/DIE LINKE.), 06.06.2011, Berlin
Benjamin Hoff (DIE LINKE.), 07.06.2011, Berlin
Ralf Krämer (WASG/DIE LINKE.), 03.06.2011, Berlin
Franziska Lindner (DIE LINKE.SDS), 25.06.2011, Leipzig
Roger Martelli (PCF/FASE), 30.4.2012, Paris
Kordula Michels (DIE LINKE.), 14.05.2010, Lübeck
Horst Parton (ISOR), 18.05.2011, Berlin
Bernd Preußer (PDS/DIE LINKE.), 17.05.2010, Berlin
Pia P. Probst (DIE LINKE.SDS), 03.07.2011, Leipzig
Tilo Probst (DIE LINKE.SDS), 04.07.2011, Leipzig
Danilo Streller (DIE LINKE.SDS), 05.07.2011, Leipzig
Jochen Traut (PDS/DIE LINKE.), 19.06.2011, Suhl
Michel Rodinson (LO), 7.4.2012, Paris
372
Simon Zeise (DIE LINKE.SDS), 22.06.2011, Leipzig
373
B. STATISTICAL APPENDIX
GENERAL
GEN1 Real Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
YEAR
GERMANY
%
FRANCE
%
ITALY
%
1989
€ 1,692.5
€ 1,272.4
€ 1,144.2
1990
€ 1,789.3
5.7%
€ 1,305.8
2.6%
€ 1,167.7
2.1%
1991
€ 1,879.0
5.0%
€ 1,319.3
1.0%
€ 1,184.5
1.4%
1992
€ 1,907.2
1.5%
€ 1,338.8
1.5%
€ 1,194.3
0.8%
1993
€ 1,887.8
-1.0%
€ 1,329.9
-0.7%
€ 1,184.1
-0.9%
1994
€ 1,935.7
2.5%
€ 1,359.8
2.2%
€ 1,209.6
2.2%
1995
€ 1,970.0
1.8%
€ 1,387.6
2.0%
€ 1,244.5
2.9%
1996
€ 1,986.1
0.8%
€ 1,402.4
1.1%
€ 1,258.7
1.1%
1997
€ 2,021.5
1.8%
€ 1,433.1
2.2%
€ 1,282.1
1.9%
1998
€ 2,055.1
1.7%
€ 1,481.5
3.4%
€ 1,300.7
1.4%
1999
€ 2,090.9
1.7%
€ 1,530.2
3.3%
€ 1,319.6
1.5%
2000
€ 2,159.9
3.3%
€ 1,586.6
3.7%
€ 1,367.8
3.7%
2001
€ 2,195.3
1.6%
€ 1,615.7
1.8%
€ 1,393.3
1.9%
2002
€ 2,195.9
0.0%
€ 1,630.7
0.9%
€ 1,399.6
0.5%
2003
€ 2,187.4
-0.4%
€ 1,645.4
0.9%
€ 1,398.9
0.0%
2004
€ 2,202.6
0.7%
€ 1,687.2
2.5%
€ 1,423.1
1.7%
2005
€ 2,221.2
0.8%
€ 1,718.0
1.8%
€ 1,436.4
0.9%
2006
€ 2,307.6
3.9%
€ 1,760.4
2.5%
€ 1,468.0
2.2%
2007
€ 2,385.8
3.4%
€ 1,800.7
2.3%
€ 1,492.7
1.7%
2008
€ 2,404.9
0.8%
€ 1,799.2
-0.1%
€ 1,475.4
-1.2%
2009
€ 2,282.9
-5.1%
€ 1,742.6
-3.1%
€ 1,394.3
-5.5%
2010
€ 2,374.8
4.0%
€ 1,771.6
1.7%
€ 1,418.4
1.7%
2011
€ 2,448.3
3.1%
€ 1,801.6
1.7%
€ 1,423.7
0.4%
2012
€ 2,469.5
0.9%
€ 1,802.1
0.0%
€ 1,389.9
-2.4%
Source: my elaborations from www.imf.org (WEO, April 2013).
Notes: billions of 2005 chained euro at the end of the year, % change on previous year. Germany: before 1992 West
Germany (much of the 1989-1991 growth is the result of the progressive incorporation of the Eastern regions).
374
GEN2 Unemployment rate
YEAR
GERMANY
FRANCE
ITALY
1990
-
7.9
11.0
1991
-
8.1
10.9
1992
7.7
9.0
11.5
1993
8.9
10.0
9.7
1994
9.6
10.6
10.7
1995
9.4
10.0
11.2
1996
10.4
10.6
11.2
1997
11.4
10.7
11.2
1998
11.1
10.3
11.3
1999
10.5
10.0
10.9
2000
9.6
8.5
10.0
2001
9.4
7.7
9.0
2002
9.8
7.9
8.5
2003
10.5
8.5
8.4
2004
10.5
8.9
8.0
2005
11.7
8.9
7.7
2006
10.8
8.8
6.8
2007
9.0
8.0
6.1
2008
7.8
7.4
6.7
2009
8.1
9.1
7.8
2010
7.7
9.3
8.4
2011
7.1
9.2
8.4
2012
6.8
9.8
-
Source: statistik.arbeitsagentur.de, www.insee.fr, seriestoriche.istat.it.
Notes: ratio of unemployed people on the total active population, yearly averages.
375
GEN3 State budget
YEAR
GERMANY
FRANCE
ITALY
Rev.
Exp.
Debt
Rev.
Exp.
Debt
Rev.
Exp.
Debt
1990
47.1
49.6
35.2
41.2
52.6
94.3
1991
43.2
46.1
39.5
47.7
50.7
36.0
42.4
53.7
97.6
1992
44.5
47.0
42.0
47.4
52.0
39.7
44.7
55.0
104.7
1993
45.0
48.0
45.8
48.6
54.8
46.0
46.0
56.0
115.0
1994
45.3
47.7
48.0
48.6
54.1
49.2
44.2
53.2
121.2
1995
45.4
54.9
55.6
48.9
54.4
55.4
44.8
52.2
120.9
1996
45.7
49.1
58.5
50.5
54.5
58.0
45.2
52.2
120.3
1997
45.5
48.2
59.8
50.9
54.2
59.4
47.2
50.0
117.4
1998
45.7
48.0
60.5
50.1
52.8
59.5
46.0
48.9
114.3
1999
46.6
48.2
61.3
50.8
52.6
58.9
45.9
47.9
113.1
2000
46.2
45.1
60.2
50.2
51.7
57.4
45.0
45.9
108.6
2001
44.5
47.6
59.1
50.0
51.7
56.9
44.5
47.7
108.3
2002
44.1
47.9
60.7
49.6
52.9
59.0
44.0
47.1
105.4
2003
44.3
48.5
64.4
49.3
53.4
63.2
44.4
48.1
104.1
2004
43.3
47.1
66.2
49.6
53.3
65.0
44.0
47.5
103.7
2005
43.6
46.9
68.5
50.6
53.6
66.7
43.4
47.9
105.7
2006
43.7
45.3
67.9
50.6
53.0
64.1
45.0
48.5
106.3
2007
43.7
43.5
65.4
49.9
52.6
64.2
46.0
47.6
103.3
2008
44.0
44.1
66.8
49.9
53.3
68.2
45.9
48.6
106.1
2009
45.1
48.2
74.5
49.2
56.8
79.2
46.5
51.9
116.4
2010
43.6
47.7
82.5
49.5
56.6
82.3
46.1
50.4
119.3
2011
44.5
45.3
80.5
50.8
56.0
86.0
46.1
49.8
120.8
2012
45.2
45.0
82.0
47.7
50.7
127.0
AVER.
44.7
47.2
62.3
49.5
53.4
59.5
45.1
50.1
111.0
Source: my elaborations from www.imf.org (WEO, April 2013).
Notes: state revenues over GDP, state expenditures over GDP, gross debt over GDP.
376
GEN4 State employees
YEAR
GERMANY
%
FRANCE
%
ITALY
%
1990
7,044.6
4,257.7
18.3%
1991
6,737.8
17.4%
1992
6,657.2
17.4%
1993
6,502.7
17.3%
1994
6,094.3
16.2%
1995
5,371.0
14.2%
1996
5,276.5
14.0%
4,598.9
19.9%
1997
5,163.8
13.7%
1998
5,068.6
13.3%
4,699.6
19.7%
3,602.4
17.1%
1999
4,969.4
12.9%
3,593.9
16.9%
2000
4,908.9
12.5%
4,831.0
19.2%
3,504.2
16.2%
2001
4,821.1
12.3%
4,839.2
19.1%
3,520.4
16.0%
2002
4,809.1
12.3%
5,046.1
19.8%
3,478.4
15.6%
2003
4,779.4
12.3%
5,157.6
20.2%
3,454.2
15.5%
2004
4,669.9
12.0%
5,219.3
20.4%
3,456.5
15.4%
2005
4,599.4
11.8%
5,274.0
20.4%
3,470.6
15.4%
2006
4,576.0
11.7%
5,316.6
20.3%
3,429.3
14.9%
2007
4,540.6
11.4%
5,364.3
20.3%
3,436.8
14.8%
2008
4,505.1
11.2%
5,363.9
20.4%
3,376.2
14.4%
2009
4,547.6
11.3%
5,386.0
20.6%
3,315.2
14.4%
2010
4,586.1
11.3%
5,379.6
20.5%
3,283.0
14.4%
2011
4,602.9
11.2%
5,358.8
19.9%
2012
4,617.4
11.1%
2013
Source: my elaborations from www.destatis.de, www.insee.fr, www.fonction-publique.gouv.fr,
www.contoannuale.tesoro.it, www.istat.it.
Notes: thousands of state employees, shares of total employment.
377
GERMANY
GER1 Name, shorthand and symbol
Date
Name
Shorthand
Logo
22.4.1946
Sozialistische
Einheitspartei
Deutschlands
SED
16.12.1989
Sozialistische
Einheitspartei
Deutschlands –
Partei des
Demokratischen
Sozialismus
SED-PDS
4.2.1990
Partei des
Demokratischen
Sozialismus
PDS
Date
Name
Shorthand
Logo
3-4.07.2004
Wahlalternative Arbeit &
soziale Gerechtigkeit e.V.
WASG
22.01.2005
Arbeit & soziale
Gerechtigkeit- Die
Wahlalternative
WASG
Date
Name
Shorthand
Logo
17.7.2005
Die Linkspartei. or
Die Linkspartei.PDS
Die Linke. or
Die Linke.PDS
16.6.2007
DIE LINKE.
DIE LINKE.
378
GER2 Legislative results of "workers' parties", 1919-2013
WEIMARER REPUBLIK
KPD
USPD
SPD
OTHERS
TOTAL
1919
-
7.6%
37.9%
0.0%
45.5%
1920
2.1%
17.9%
21.7%
0.0%
41.7%
5.1924
12.6%
-
20.5%
0.0%
33.1%
12.1924
8.9%
-
26.0%
0.0%
34.9%
1928
10.6%
-
29.8%
0.0%
40.4%
1930
13.1%
-
24.5%
0.0%
37.6%
7.1932
14.3%
-
21.6%
0.0%
35.9%
11.1932
16.9%
-
20.4%
0.0%
37.3%
1933
12.3%
-
18.3%
0.0%
30.6%
AVERAGE 1920-1933
11.4%
2.2%
22.9%
0.0%
36.4%
FRG (WEST)
KPD/DKP
SPD
OTHERS
TOTAL
1949
5.7%
29.2%
0.0%
35.0%
1953
2.2%
28.8%
0.0%
31.0%
1957
0.0%
31.7%
0.2%
31.9%
1961
1.9%
36.2%
0.0%
38.2%
1965
1.3%
39.3%
0.0%
40.6%
1969
0.6%
42.7%
0.0%
43.3%
1972
0.3%
45.8%
0.0%
46.2%
1976
0.3%
42.6%
0.1%
43.0%
1980
0.2%
42.9%
0.0%
43.1%
1983
0.2%
38.2%
0.0%
38.4%
1987
0.0%
37.0%
0.0%
37.1%
AVERAGE
1.2%
37.7%
0.0%
38.9%
FRG (UNIFIED)
PDS/DIE
LINKE
SPD
OTHERS
TOTAL
1990
2.4%
33.5%
0.0%
35.9%
1994
4.4%
36.4%
0.0%
40.8%
1998
5.1%
40.9%
0.0%
46.1%
2002
4.0%
38.5%
0.0%
42.5%
2005
8.7%
34.2%
0.1%
43.1%
2009
11.9%
23.0%
0.1%
35.0%
2013
8.6%
25.7%
0.1%
34.4%
AVERAGE
6.4%
33.2%
0.0%
39.7%
Sources: my elaboration from www.bundeswahlleiter.de; www.gonschior.de/weimar/index.htm;
www.reichstagsprotokolle.de.
Notes: shares of valid votes. KPD/DKP after 1956 includes the results of their electoral fronts
379
GER3 Radical left vote, 1946-1947 regional elections
REGION
DATE
ELECTORATE
VALID
VOTES
RADICAL
LEFT
%
Party
Württemberg-
Baden
6.1946
1,685,371
1,161,185
116,665
10.0%
KPD
Hamburg
10.1946
958,454
701,951
72,925
10.4%
KPD
Bremen
10.1946
243,410
193,547
22,262
11.5%
KPD
Hessen
12.1946
2,380,109
1,609,388
171,592
10.7%
KPD
Bayern
12.1946
4,210,636
3,048,337
185,023
6.1%
KPD
Schleswig-
Holstein
4.1947
1,594,794
1,072,715
50,398
4.7%
KPD
Niedersachsen
4.1947
3,956,675
2,459,479
138,977
5.7%
KPD
Nordrhein-
Westfalen
4.1947
7,860,608
5,028,892
702,410
14.0%
KPD
Rheinland-Pfalz
5.1947
1,666,547
1,161,052
100,739
8.7%
KPD
Baden
5.1947
694,953
427,824
31,703
7.4%
KPD
Hohenzollern
5.1947
615,812
378,333
27,571
7.3%
KPD
WEST
1946-1947
25,867,369
17,242,703
1,620,265
9.4%
KPD
SAARLAND
10.1947
520,855
449,565
37,936
8.4%
KPS
BERLIN
10.1946
2,307,122
2,085,338
412,582
19.8%
SED (w/o SPD)
Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern
10.1946
1,308,727
1,113,748
551,594
49.5%
SED (incl. SPD)
Brandenburg
10.1946
1,655,980
1,446,819
634,787
43.9%
SED (incl. SPD)
Sachsen-Anhalt
10.1946
2,700,633
2,330,511
1,068,703
45.9%
SED (incl. SPD)
Sachsen
10.1946
3,803,416
3,290,995
1,616,068
49.1%
SED (incl. SPD)
Thüringen
10.1946
1,986,081
1,661,859
818,967
49.3%
SED (incl. SPD)
EAST
10.1946
11,454,837
9,843,932
4,690,119
47.6%
SED (incl. SPD)
GERMANY
1946-1947
40,150,183
29,621,538
6,760,902
22.8%
KPD+KPS+SED
Sources: my elaboration from www.wahlen-in-deutschland.de
Notes: in the West the communists ran alone (KPD; KPS in the Saarland). In the East they led the unity lists resulting
from the "forced" merger between KPD and SPD (SED). In Berlin the social democrats were split between those
supporting the SED and those remaining in the SPD.
GER4 SED-PDS vote, 18.03.1990 Volkskammer election
District
Votes
%
MPs
GDR (tot)
1,892,329
16.4%
66
Berlin
267,834
30.2%
9
Cottbus
106,733
17.9%
4
Dresden
176,629
14.8%
6
Erfurt
85,764
9.9%
3
Frankfurt
106,412
22.1%
4
Gera
65,072
12.5%
2
Halle
170,756
13.8%
6
Karl-Marx-Stadt
149,176
11.3%
5
Leipzig
135,718
14.5%
5
Magdeburg
124,391
14.2%
4
Neubrandenburg
108,586
25.8%
4
Potsdam
129,627
16.6%
4
Rostock
142,929
23.2%
5
Schwerin
72,464
17.8%
3
Suhl
50,235
12.6%
2
Sources: www.wahlrecht.de
380
GER5 GDR opinion polls: opinion toward the reunification
Strongly
agrees
Agrees
Disagrees
Strongly
disagrees
Poll 1 (20-27 Nov 1989)
16%
32%
29%
23%
Poll 2 (29 Jan-9 Feb 1990)
40%
39%
15%
6%
Poll 3 (26 Feb-6 Mar 1990)
43%
41%
13%
3%
Poll 4 (end Apr 1990)
49%
36%
12%
3%
Sources: my elaboration from Förster-Roski (1990).
GER6 GDR opinion polls: voting intentions
FDP
CDU/
DSU
SPD
SED/
PDS
BB
Poll 1 (20-27 Nov 1989)
0%
10%
6%
31%
17%
Poll 2 (29 Jan-9 Feb 1990)
0%
13%
53%
12%
6%
Poll 3 (26 Feb-6 Mar 1990)
1%
22%
34%
17%
2%
Electoral results (18 Mar 1990)
5.3%
40.9%
21.9%
16.4%
4.9%
Source: my elaboration from Förster-Roski (1990).
Notes: BB = Bürgerbewegungen (civic movements): Neues Forum, B90, Grüne Partei, DA, UFV, DFD, VL, AJL, etc.
381
GER7 Parliamentary elections, 1990-2013 (Bundestag)
PARTY
YEAR
GERMANY
EAST
WEST
GDR
FRG
N. VOTES
DIE LINKE
2013
3,755,699
1,866,669
1,889,030
1,752,785
2,002,914
OTHER R.L.
2013
28,783
11,228
17,555
DIE LINKE
2009
5,155,933
2,291 555
2,864,378
2,181,132
2,974,801
OTHER R.L.
2009
34,112
18,229
15,883
DIE LINKE
2005
4,118,194
2,322,277
1,795,917
2,243,797
1,874,397
OTHER R.L.
2005
60,843
30,711
30,132
PDS
2002
1,916,702
1,504,940
411,762
1,474,566
442,136
OTHER R.L.
2002
1,624
1,624
0
PDS
1998
2,515,454
2,087,248
428,206
2,054,773
460,681
OTHER R.L.
1998
10,957
3,152
7,805
PDS
1994
2,066,176
1,728,581
337,595
1,697,224
368,952
OTHER R.L.
1994
11,323
3,189
8,134
PDS/LL
1990
1,129,578
1,019,965
109,613
1,003,631
125,947
OTHER R.L.
1990
8,596
6,774
1,822
% electorate
DIE LINKE
2013
6.06%
14.26%
3.87%
15.07%
3.98%
DIE LINKE
2009
8.29%
17.02%
5.88%
18.13%
5.93%
DIE LINKE
2005
6.66%
17.08%
3.72%
18.44%
3.77%
PDS
2002
3.12%
11.06%
0.86%
12.13%
0.90%
PDS
1998
4.14%
15.34%
0.91%
16.94%
0.95%
PDS
1994
3.42%
12.78%
0.72%
14.16%
0.76%
PDS/LL
1990
1.87%
7.35%
0.24%
8.15%
0.26%
% valid votes
DIE LINKE
2013
8.59%
21.24%
5.41%
22.66%
5.56%
OTHER R.L.
2013
0.07%
0.13%
0.05%
DIE LINKE
2009
11.89%
26.45%
8.25%
28.52%
8.33%
OTHER R.L.
2009
0.08%
0.21%
0.05%
DIE LINKE
2005
8.71%
23.30%
4.81%
25.29%
4.88%
OTHER R.L.
2005
0.13%
0.31%
0.08%
PDS
2002
3.99%
15.30%
1.08%
16.93%
1.13%
OTHER R.L.
2002
0.00%
0.02%
0.00%
PDS
1998
5.10%
19.49%
1.11%
21.58%
1.16%
OTHER R.L.
1998
0.02%
0.03%
0.02%
PDS
1994
4.39%
17.65%
0.90%
19.76%
0.96%
OTHER R.L.
1994
0.02%
0.03%
0.02%
PDS/LL
1990
2.43%
9.88%
0.30%
11.11%
0.34%
OTHER R.L.
1990
0.02%
0.07%
0.01%
Sources: my elaboration from www.bundeswahlleiter.de
Notes: second votes (Zweitstimmen). East = six Eastern regions. West = ten Western regions. GDR = former GDR
territory plus East Berlin. FRG = former FRG territory plus West Berlin.
382
GER8 European Parliament elections
PARTY
Date
Votes
%
Seats
%
DIE LINKE.
7.06.2009
1,969,239
7.48%
8
8.1%
OTHER R.L.
7.06.2009
35,261
0.13%
0
0.0%
PDS
13.06.2004
1,579.109
6.12%
7
7.1%
OTHER R.L.
13.06.2004
62,955
0.24%
0
0.0%
PDS
13.06.1999
1,567,745
5.79%
6
6.1%
OTHER R.L.
13.06.1999
0
0
0
0.0%
PDS
12.06.1994
1,670,316
4.72%
0
0.0%
OTHER R.L.
12.06.1994
23,670
0.07%
0
0.0%
RADICAL LEFT
18.06.1989
86,003
0.30%
*
0.0%
Sources: my elaboration from www.bundeswahlleiter.de
Notes: in the period 1990-1994 the PDS had three observers (without voting rights) nominated by the GDR
parliament.
GER9 Radical left members of Parliament, 1990-2013 (Bundestag)
1990
(11th)
1990
(12th)
1994
(13th)
1998
(14th)
2002
(15th)
2005
(16th)
2009
(17th)
2013
(18th)
Total seats
663
662
672
669
603
614
622
630
Radical left
24
17
30
36
2
54
76
64
Direct
mandates
-
1
4
4
2
3
16
4
Seating
-
9
8
17
1
13
40
51
New
-
8
22
19
1
41
36
13
Male
13
9
17
15
0
29
36
28
Female
11
8
13
21
2
25
40
36
East
24
16
25
30
2
30
36
31
West
-
1
5
6
0
24
40
33
Source: my elaboration from www.bundestag.de
Notes: MPs elected at the beginning of the legislature. 11th legislature: after reunification the old FRG Bundestag
was enlarged to Volkskammer representatives. The categories East and West refer to the region of election; it must
be noted that some Western-born members were put on Eastern electoral lists in order to facilitate their election.
The 1990 numbers refer to the Volkskammer representatives sent to the Bundestag after the reunification.
383
GER10 Radical left members of regional assemblies, 1990-2013
YEAR
TOTAL SEATS
RADICAL
LEFT SEATS
%
simple
%
weighted
R.L. SEATS
(West)
1990
2045
86
4.21%
2.80%
0
1991
2045
86
4.21%
2.79%
0
1992
2045
86
4.21%
2.77%
0
1993
2045
86
4.21%
2.77%
0
1994
1975
118
5.97%
4.35%
0
1995
1967
129
6.56%
4.35%
0
1996
1967
129
6.56%
4.34%
0
1997
1967
129
6.56%
4.34%
0
1998
1984
135
6.80%
4.41%
0
1999
1917
151
7.88%
5.31%
0
2000
1917
151
7.88%
5.31%
0
2001
1917
151
7.88%
5.45%
0
2002
1916
144
7.52%
5.22%
0
2003
1916
144
7.52%
5.18%
0
2004
1840
159
8.64%
5.72%
0
2005
1840
159
8.64%
5.70%
0
2006
1841
150
8.15%
5.53%
0
2007
1848
157
8.50%
5.59%
7
2008
1833
182
9.93%
6.79%
32
2009
1825
193
10.58%
6.92%
49
2010
1875
204
10.88%
8.22%
60
2011
1835
203
11.06%
8.12%
58
2012
1885
184
9.76%
6.54%
39
2013
1870
173
9.25%
5.84%
28
AVERAGE
1921
145
7.64%
5.18%
11
Source: my elaboration from www.bundeswahlleiter.de
Notes: regional assemblies (Landtage). Mid-term defections are ignored. % weighted = the numbers are weighted
for the people entitled to vote (Wahlberechtigte) in each region (to eliminate the distortions deriving from the fact
that population size and assembly size vary).
384
GER11 Governments, 1949-2013
BT
YEARS
CHANCELLOR
COALITION
SEATS
1
1949 – 1953
Konrad Adenauer, CDU
UNION + FDP + DP
208/402
2
1953 – 1957
Konrad Adenauer, CDU
UNION + FDP + DP + GB/BHE
285/487
3
1957 – 1961
Konrad Adenauer, CDU
UNION + DP
287/497
4
1961 – 1963
1963 - 1965
Konrad Adenauer, CDU
Ludwig Erhard, CDU
UNION + FDP
UNION +FDP
309/499
309/499
5
1965 – 1966
1966 - 1969
Ludwig Erhard, CDU
Kurt Georg Kiesinger, CDU
UNION + FDP
UNION + SPD
294/496
447/496
6
1969 – 1972
Willy Brandt, SPD
SPD + FDP
254/496
7
1972 – 1974
1974 - 1976
Willy Brandt, SPD
Helmut Schmidt, SPD
SPD + FDP
SPD + FDP
271/496
271/496
8
1976 – 1980
Helmut Schmidt, SPD
SPD + FDP
253/496
9
1980 – 1982
1982 - 1983
Helmut Schmidt, SPD
Helmut Kohl, CDU
SPD + FDP
UNION + FDP
271/497
279/497
10
1983 – 1987
Helmut Kohl, CDU
CDU + FDP
278/498
11
1987 – 1990
Helmut Kohl, CDU
CDU + FDP
269/497
12
1990 – 1994
Helmut Kohl, CDU
CDU + FDP
398/662
13
1994 – 1998
Helmut Kohl, CDU
CDU + FDP
341/672
14
1998 – 2002
Gerhard Schröder, SPD
SPD + Grünen
342/669
15
2002 – 2005
Gerhard Schröder, SPD
SPD + Grünen
306/603
16
2005 – 2009
Angela Merkel, CDU
UNION + SPD
448/614
17
2009 – 2013
Angela Merkel, CDU
UNION + FDP
332/622
Source: my elaboration from www.bundesregierung.de and www.bundestag.de
Notes: BT = legislature number. UNION = CDU and CSU.
GER12 Governmental involvement of DIE LINKE – federal level
Period
Government
Position
11th Bundestag (1990)
CDU-CSU-FDP (Kohl)
Opposition
12th Bundestag (1990-1994)
CDU-CSU-FDP (Kohl)
Opposition
13th Bundestag (1994-1998)
CDU-CSU-FDP (Kohl)
Opposition
14th Bundestag (1998-2002)
SPD-Grünen (Schröder)
Opposition
15th Bundestag (2002-2005)
SPD-Grünen (Schröder)
Opposition
16th Bundestag (2005-2009)
CDU-CSU-SPD (Merkel)
Opposition (*)
17th Bundestag (2009-2013)
CDU-CSU-FDP (Merkel)
Opposition
18th Bundestag (2013-2018)
-
- (*)
Notes: (*) an alternative SPD-PDS-Grünen majority would have been mathematically possible.
385
GER13 Governmental involvement of DIE LINKE – regional level
YEAR
REGIONS
n.
POPULATION
weighted
DETAILS
1990
0
0.00%
1991
0
0.00%
1992
0
0.00%
1993
0
0.00%
1994
1
3.58%
SA (ext.)
1995
1
3.58%
SA (ext.)
1996
1
3.58%
SA (ext.)
1997
1
3.58%
SA (ext.)
1998
2
5.88%
SA (ext.), MV
1999
2
5.87%
SA (ext.), MV
2000
2
5.87%
SA (ext.), MV
2001
3
9.84%
SA (ext.), MV, BE (ext.) then BE
2002
2
6.31%
MV, BE
2003
2
6.27%
MV, BE
2004
2
6.26%
MV, BE
2005
2
6.24%
MV, BE
2006
1
3.94%
BE
2007
1
3.94%
BE
2008
1
3.92%
BE
2009
2
7.36%
BE, BB
2010
2
7.36%
BE, BB, *
2011
1
3.43%
BB, *
2012
1
3.43%
BB
2013
1
3.43%
BB
Notes: Population weighted = the numbers are weighted for the people entitled to vote (Wahlberechtigte). Ext. =
external support. SA = Sachsen-Anhalt. MV = Mecklenburg-Vorpommern. BB = Brandenburg. BE = Berlin. * = the
party also partially supported a minority SPD-Grünen government in the populous Western region of Nordrhein-
Westfalen (21.4% of the population).
386
GER14 Radical left party membership, 1989-2012
YEAR
SED/PDS/
L.PDS
WASG
DIE LINKE
OTHER
(estimates)
TOTAL
RADICAL
LEFT
% on total
party
members
Western
members of
DIE LINKE
1988
2,300,000
1989
1,700,000
1990
280,882
24,500
305,382
12.7%
0.2%
1991
172,579
13,500
186,079
8.4%
0.3%
1992
146,742
10,700
157,442
7.6%
0.4%
1993
131,406
10,000
141,406
7.1%
0.7%
1994
123,751
9,000
132,751
6.8%
1.5%
1995
114,940
9,000
123,940
6.5%
1.7%
1996
105,029
9,300
114,329
6.2%
1.8%
1997
98,624
9,700
108,324
6.0%
2.1%
1998
94,627
10,000
104,627
5.8%
3.1%
1999
88,594
8,800
97,394
5.5%
4.3%
2000
83,478
8,000
91,478
5.3%
4.7%
2001
77,845
7,500
85,345
5.1%
5.4%
2002
70,805
7,500
78,305
4.8%
6.6%
2003
65,753
7,700
73,453
4.6%
6.7%
2004
61,385
7,500
68,885
4.5%
7.0%
2005
61,270
12,760
7,800
81,830
5.4%
9.7%
2006
60,388
8,944
7,500
76,832
5.3%
12.0%
2007
(8,563)
71,711
7,500
70,648
5.6%
28.8%
2008
75,968
7,500
83,468
6.0%
35.1%
2009
78,046
7,000
85,046
6.1%
37.9%
2010
73,658
7,000
80,658
5.9%
37.3%
2011
69,458
7,000
76,458
5.7%
37.5%
2012
63,761
6,700
70,461
5.4%
36.7%
Source: my elaboration from Niedermayer (2013), Deutscher Bundestag (2007, 2008, 2009), Bundesministerium
des Innern (1991-2011).
Notes: Members at the end of the year (WASG 2007: 15.06.2007). Figures for "OTHERS" are police estimates for
DKP and MLPD plus a flat 1,000 figure for minor groups.
387
GER15 Finances of political parties (nominal, €)
YEAR
MAJOR PARTIES
Incomes
DIE LINKE
Incomes
%
DIE LINKE
net assets
DIE LINKE
share of state
financing on
income
1990
€ 454,792,682
1991
€ 383,240,067
€ 31,014,823
8.1%
€ 493,012,146
5.7%
1992
€ 325,003,987
€ 11,511,157
3.5%
€ 224,310,925
5.4%
1993
€ 345,738,223
€ 13,976,499
4.0%
€ 223,826,431
21.0%
1994
€ 432,712,992
€ 17,541,265
4.1%
€ 10,239,180
32.3%
1995
€ 353,594,488
€ 20,867,991
5.9%
€ 15,786,929
36.2%
1996
€ 355,343,296
€ 18,539,067
5.2%
€ 19,691,176
32.7%
1997
€ 350,182,312
€ 18,831,080
5.4%
€ 22,478,477
33.4%
1998
€ 386,574,092
€ 19,748,742
5.1%
€ 17,036,499
32.4%
1999
€ 392,168,403
€ 20,827,352
5.3%
€ 15,175,793
35.7%
2000
€ 374,721,082
€ 20,112,806
5.4%
€ 18,337,489
35.1%
2001
€ 395,636,210
€ 20,491,171
5.2%
€ 19,280,566
35.4%
2002
€ 426,604,483
€ 21,914,483
5.1%
€ 16,623,167
32.7%
2003
€ 443,095,189
€ 22,159,189
5.0%
€ 20,704,390
39.4%
2004
€ 437,304,973
€ 21,049,973
4.8%
€ 18,580,425
37.5%
2005
€ 452,445,153
€ 23,580,153
5.2%
€ 17,749,555
36.7%
2006
€ 431,744,105
€ 24,323,105
5.6%
€ 20,585,395
37.4%
2007
€ 423,129,716
€ 22,433,716
5.3%
€ 23,003,682
39.3%
2008
€ 450,491,936
€ 25,184,936
5.6%
€ 25,200,464
37.6%
2009
€ 479,082,930
€ 27,260,387
5.7%
€ 18,700,412
39.3%
2010
€ 413,678,861
€ 27,851,633
6.7%
€ 23,590,664
38.9%
Source: my elaboration from Deutscher Bundestag (1992-2011)
Notes: Major parties: SPD, CDU, CSU, FDP, GRÜNEN, PDS, WASG, DIE LINKE. DIE LINKE: includes PDS and WASG.
Before 2002: figures converted into Euros at the official exchange rates (DM: 1.95583; DDR-M: 3.91166).
GER16 Party leaders
YEAR
NAME
PDS
President (Vorsitzender)
1989-1993
Gregor Gysi
1993-2000
Lothar Bisky
2000-2003
Gabriele (Gabi) Zimmer
2003-2007
Lothar Bisky
WASG
Executive committee (Geschäftsführender
Vorstand)
2004-2007
Collective leadership (4 people)
DIE LINKE.
President (Vorsitzender)
2007-2010
Lothar Bisky
Oskar Lafontaine
2010-2012
Gesine Lötzsch
Klaus Ernst
2012-present
Katja Kipping
Bernd Riexinger
388
GER17 Party members, DIE LINKE
Year
Men
Women
>30
30-59
>59
1990
-
-
1991
56.1%
43.9%
1992
-
-
1993
-
-
1994
54.6%
45.4%
1995
-
-
1996
-
-
1997
53.9%
46.1%
1998
54.0%
46.0%
1999
54.7%
45.3%
2.3%
29.4%
68.3%
2000
54.4%
45.6%
1.8%
31.2%
67.0%
2001
54.3%
45.7%
2.3%
29.4%
68.3%
2002
54.2%
45.8%
3.6%
27.7%
68.7%
2003
54.8%
45.2%
3.3%
29.1%
67.6%
2004
54.2%
45.8%
2.7%
27.4%
70.0%
2005
55.1%
44.9%
3.3%
26.3%
70.4%
2006
55.6%
44.4%
3.9%
28.0%
68.1%
2007
60.9%
39.1%
6.1%
38.7%
55.2%
2008
62.4%
37.6%
2009
62.8%
37.2%
2010
62.7%
37.3%
2011
62.7%
37.3%
2012
62.3%
37.7%
Source: my elaboration from Niedermayer (2013).
Notes: exact internal data (not survey).
389
ITALY
ITA1 Name, shorthand and symbol
Date
Name
Shorthand
Logo
21.01.1921
(PCd'I)
Partito Comunista
Italiano
PCI
13.04.1978
Democrazia Proletaria
DP
Date
Name
Shorthand
Logo
03.02.1991
Movimento per la
Rifondazione
Comunista
MRC
15.12.1991
Partito della
Rifondazione
Comunista
PRC
27.7.2008
Partito della
Rifondazione
Comunista – Sinistra
Europea
PRC-SE
Date
Name
Shorthand
Logo
14.06.1995
Movimento dei
Comunisti Unitari
MCU
Date
Name
Shorthand
Logo
11.10.1998
Partito dei Comunisti
Italiani
PdCI
Date
Name
Shorthand
Logo
18.06.2006
Partito Comunista dei
Lavoratori
PCL
Date
Name
Shorthand
Logo
5.05.2007
Sinistra Democratica
SD
Date
Name
Shorthand
Logo
8.12.2007
Sinistra Critica
SC
390
Date
Name
Shorthand
Logo
16.03.2009
Sinistra e Libertà
SeL
20.12.2009
Sinistra Ecologia
Libertà
SEL
Date
Name
Shorthand
Logo
5.12.2009
Federazione della
Sinistra
FdS
ITA2 Legislative results of "workers' parties", 1919-2013
KINGDOM OF ITALY
PCd'I
PSI (+PSU)
OTHERS
TOTAL
1919
-
32.3%
2.0%
34.3%
1921
4.6%
24.7%
0.6%
29.9%
1924
3.7%
10.9%
0.0%
14.7%
AVERAGE 1921-24
4.2%
17.8%
0.3%
22.3%
"FIRST" REPUBLIC
PCI
PSI
OTHERS
TOTAL
1946
18.9%
20.7%
0.1%
39.7%
1948
15.5%*
15.5%*
0.1%
31.1%
1953
22.6%
12.7%
1.5%
36.8%
1958
22.7%
14.2%
0.6%
37.5%
1963
25.3%
13.8%
0.0%
39.1%
1968
26.9%
14.5%
4.5%
45.8%
1972
27.1%
9.6%
3.3%
40.0%
1976
34.4%
9.6%
1.5%
45.5%
1979
30.4%
9.8%
2.2%
42.4%
1983
29.9%
11.4%
1.5%
42.8%
1987
26.6%
14.3%
1.7%
42.5%
AVERAGE
25.5%
13.3%
1.5%
40.3%
"SECOND" REPUBLIC
RADICAL LEFT
PDS-DS-FED-PD
1992
5.6%
16.1%
21.7%
1994
6.1%
20.4%
26.4%
1996
8.6%
21.1%
29.6%
2001
6.7%
16.6%
23.3%
2006
8.2%
31.3%
39.4%
2008
4.5%**
33.2%
37.6%
2013
5.7%**
25.4%
31.2%
AVERAGE
6.5%
23.4%
29.9%
Sources: my elaboration from Corbetta & Piretti (2009).
Notes: shares of valid votes. The 1924 election were marred fascist violences and * the two parties ran common
lists and their relative weight cannot be determined. ** the radical left lists included forces of extraneous origin
(2008: Verdi; 2013: Verdi, IdV).
391
ITA3 Parliamentary elections, 1987-2013 (Camera dei Deputati)
Year
Party
Votes
%
Seats
%
25.02.2013
TOT
1,949,768
5.73%
37
5.9%
SEL
1,089,442
3.20%
37
RC *
765,172
2.25%
0
PCL
89,995
0.26%
0
PdAC
5,159
0.02%
0
13.04.2008
TOT
1,623,072
4.45%
0
0.0%
SA
1,124,298
3.08%
0
PCL
208,296
0.57%
0
SC
168,916
0.46%
0
PBC
119,569
0.33%
0
PdAC
1,993
0.01%
0
09.04.2006
TOT
3,113,591
8.16%
57
9.1%
PRC
2,229,464
5.84%
41
PdCI
884,127
2.32%
16
13.05.2001
TOT
2,494,762
6.72%
21
3.3%
PRC
1,868,659
5.03%
11
PdCI
620,859
1.67%
10
Comunismo
5,224
0.01%
0
21.04.1996
TOT
3,213,748
8.57%
35
5.6%
PRC
3,213,748
8.57%
35
27.03.1994
TOT
2,343,946
6.05%
39
6.2%
PRC
2,343,946
6.05%
39
05.04.1992
TOT
2,201,428
5.61%
35
5.6%
PRC
2,201,428
5.61%
35
14.06.1987
TOT
10,892,545
28.2%
185
28.1%
PCI
10,250,644
26.58%
177
DP
641,901
1.66%
8
Source: http://elezionistorico.interno.it/
Notes: National territory (since 2006 foreign constituencies, Valle d'Aosta and Trentino Alto Adige are counted
separately and cannot be added), list vote. * the radical left lists included forces of extraneous origin (2008: Verdi;
2013: Verdi, IdV).
392
ITA4 Parliamentary elections, 1987-2013 (Senato della Repubblica)
Year
Party
Votes
%
Seats
%
25.02.2013
TOT
1,591,076
5.20%
7
2.2%
SEL
912,308
2.98%
7
RC *
550,007
1.80%
0
PCL
113,923
0.37%
0
PCI M-L
9,604
0.03%
0
PdAC
5,185
0.02%
0
13.04.2008
TOT
1,484,270
4.53%
0
0.0%
SA *
1,053,228
3.21%
0
PCL
180,442
0.55%
0
SC
136,679
0.42%
0
PBC
105,827
0.32%
0
PCI M-L
8,094
0.02%
0
09.04.2006
TOT
3,967,305
11.61%
32
10.2%
PRC
2,518,361
7.37%
27
Insieme con l'Unione
(PdCI + Verdi) *
1,423,003
4.17%
5
PCI M-L
25,941
0.08%
13.05.2001
TOT
1,708,707
5.05%
6
1.9%
PRC
1,708,707
5.04%
4
PdCI
-
-
2
Comunismo
2,159
0.01%
0
21.04.1996
Progressisti (PRC)
940,655
2.9%
11
3.5%
27.03.1994
Progressisti (PRC)
-
-
18
5.7%
05.04.1992
PRC
2,171,950
6.5%
20
6.4%
14.06.1987
TOT
9,675,246
29.85%
102
32.3%
PCI
9,181,579
28.33%
101
DP
493,667
1.52%
1
Source: http://elezionistorico.interno.it/
Notes: National territory (since 2006 foreign constituencies and Valle d'Aosta are counted separately and cannot be
added), list vote. * the radical left lists included forces of extraneous origin (2006, 2008, 2013: Verdi; 2013: IdV).
ITA5 European Parliament elections
Year
Party
Votes
%
Seats
%
07.06.2009
TOT
2,162,215
7.06%
0
0.0%
LCA (PRC + PdCI)
1,037,862
3.39%
0
SeL
857,822
3.13%
0
PCL
166,531
0.54%
0
12.06.2004
TOT
2,757,389
8.48%
7
8.97%
PRC
1,969,776
6.06%
5
PdCI
787,613
2.42%
2
13.06.1999
TOT
1,955,144
6.29%
6
6.68%
PRC
1,328,515
4.28%
4
PdCI
622,259
2.00%
2
COBAS
4,370
0.01%
0
12.06.1994
PRC
2,004,716
6.09%
5
5.74%
18.06.1989
TOT
10,048,008
28.86%
23
28.39%
PCI
9,598,369
27.58%
22
DP
449,639
1.29%
1
Source: http://elezionistorico.interno.it/
Notes: National territory (since 2006 foreign constituencies and Valle d'Aosta are counted separately and cannot be
added), list vote. LCA = Lista Comunista e Anticapitalista.
393
ITA6 Members of Parliament, 1990-2013 (Camera dei Deputati)
1990*
(10th)
1992
(11th)
1994
(12th)
1996
(13th)
2001
(14th)
2006
(15th)
2008
(16th)
2013
(17th)
Total seats
630
630
630
630
630
630
630
630
Radical left
13
35
39
35
21
57
0
37
Dependent
-
0
28
15
9
25
0
37
Seating
13
5
9
18
12
12
0
37
New
-
30
30
17
9
45
0
0
Male
11
30
30
27
14
42
0
27
Female
2
5
9
8
7
15
0
10
Source: my elaboration from http://elezionistorico.interno.it/
Notes: Beginning of the legislature. * PCI and DP members who defected to the PRC. Dependent: seats won because
of an alliance with the centre-left (which would not have been lost, ceteris paribus, by running alone).
ITA7 Members of regional assemblies, 1990-2013
YEAR
TOTAL
RADICAL
LEFT
%
simple
%
Weighted
1991
1,067
12
1.12%
1.33%
1992
1,067
12
1.12%
1.33%
1993
1,065
18
1.69%
1.51%
1994
1,065
22
2.07%
1.64%
1995
1,090
63
5.78%
6.09%
1996
1,090
68
6.24%
6.57%
1997
1,090
68
6.24%
6.57%
1998
1,090
66
6.06%
6.55%
1999
1,090
65
5.96%
6.51%
2000
1,071
62
5.79%
6.23%
2001
1,071
60
5.60%
6.03%
2002
1,071
60
5.60%
6.03%
2003
1,071
61
5.70%
6.03%
2004
1,076
65
6.04%
6.16%
2005
1,120
83
7.41%
7.69%
2006
1,120
79
7.05%
7.29%
2007
1,120
79
7.05%
7.29%
2008
1,117
76
6.80%
7.17%
2009
1,112
73
6.56%
7.07%
2010
1,106
47
4.25%
4.13%
2011
1,106
47
4.25%
4.13%
2012
1,106
47
4.25%
4.17%
2013
1,066
43
4.03%
3.69%
AVERAGE
1,089
55
5.07%
5.27%
Source: my elaboration from http://elezionistorico.interno.it/
Notes: all regional assemblies (ordinary and autonomous regions). Mid-term defections are ignored. % weighted =
the numbers are weighted for the people entitled to vote (aventi diritto) in each region (to eliminate the distortions
deriving from the fact that population size and assembly size vary).
394
ITA8 Governments and coalitions
Leg.
YEARS
PRIME MINISTER
POLITICAL
TREND
COALITION
SEATS
10
1989-1991
Giulio Andreotti(VI), DC
Old centre-left
DC, PSI, PRI, minor
381/630
1991-1992
Giulio Andreotti(VII), DC
Old centre-left
DC, PSI, minor
360/630
11
1992-1993
Giuliano Amato (I), PSI
Old centre-left
DC, PSI, minor
335/630
1993-1994
Carlo Azeglio Ciampi, ind.
Technocratic
(centre+left)
DC, PDS*, PSI, PRI,
minor
485/630
12
1994-1995
Silvio Berlusconi (I), FI
Right-wing
FI, AN, LN, CCD,
minor
366/630
1995-1996
Lamberto Dini, ind. **
Technocratic
(centre+right)
PDS*, LN*, PPI*,
Segni*, minor*
302/630
(min.)
13
1996-1998
Romano Prodi (I), ind.
Centre-left
PDS, PPI, PRC*, RI,
minor
337/630
1998-2001
Massimo D'Alema (I&II), DS
Giuliano Amato (II), ind.
Centre-left
DS, PPI, DEM,
UDEUR, minor
337/630
14
2001-2006
Silvio Berlusconi (II&III), FI
Right-wing
FI, AN, LN, CCD-
CDU, minor
368/616
15
2006-2008
Romano Prodi (II), FED
Centre-left
FED, PRC, IDV,
minor
349/630
16
2008-2011
Silvio Berlusconi (IV), PDL
Right-wing
PDL, LN, minor
344/630
2011-2013
Mario Monti, ind.
Technocratic
(grand coalition)
PDL*, PD*, UDC*,
FLI*, minor*
541/630
17
2013-pres.
Enrico Letta, PD
Grand coalition
PD, PDL, SC, minor
457/630
Sources: my elaboration from http://www.governo.it/ and http://legislature.camera.it/
Notes: Leg = legislature number. SEATS = notional seats of the governing coalition in the first chamber (real seats
change over time as result of shifts of parties and individual deputies). Minor = parties with less than twenty seats. *
= external support. ** Dini relied initially on the abstentions of the right-wing and later on that of the PRC and other
minor parties.
ITA9 Governmental involvement, national level
Leg.
YEARS
GOVERNMENT
RADICAL
LEFT
PARTY
Position
DEFECTIONS
(first chamber)
10
1991-1992
Old centre-left
PRC
Opposition
11
1992-1994
Old centre-left
PRC
Opposition
12
1994-1995
Right-wing
PRC
Opposition
1995-1996
Technocratic
PRC
Opposition *
16 MPs external support (CU)
13
1996-1998
Centre-left
PRC
External support
1 MP opposition (COBAS)
1998-2001
Centre-left
PRC
Opposition
14
2001-2006
Right-wing
PRC,
PdCI
Opposition
15
2006-2008
Centre-left
PRC,
PdCI, SD
Government
1 MP external support then
opposition (SC)
16
2008-2011
Right-wing
n.p.
n.p.
2011-2013
Grand coalition
n.p.
n.p.
17
2013-pres.
Grand coalition
SEL
Opposition
Notes: * for three months the PRC abstained to enable the survival of the cabinet.
395
ITA10 Governmental involvement, regional level
YEAR
REGIONS
n.
POPULATION
weighted
DETAILS
1991
0
0.00%
1992
0
0.00%
1993
0
0.00%
1994
0
0.00%
1995
5
16.19%
UMB, MAR, LAZ, ABR, MOL
1996
5
16.12%
UMB, MAR, LAZ, ABR, MOL
1997
5
16.12%
UMB, MAR, LAZ, ABR, MOL
1998
7
27.99%
UMB, MAR, LAZ, ABR, MOL, SIC, SAR
1999
6
25.16%
UMB, MAR, LAZ, ABR, MOL, SIC,
2000
8
37.54%
ER, TOS, UMB, MAR, CAM, BAS, MOL, SIC
2001
6
27.92%
ER, TOS, UMB, MAR, CAM, BAS
2002
6
27.92%
ER, TOS, UMB, MAR, CAM, BAS
2003
7
30.05%
ER, TOS, UMB, MAR, CAM, BAS, FRI,
2004
8
32.95%
ER, TOS, UMB, MAR, CAM, BAS, FRI, SAR
2005
14
65.49%
PIE, LIG, ER, TOS, UMB, MAR, LAZ, CAM, PUG, BAS, CAL,
ABR, FRI, SAR
2006
14
65.39%
PIE, LIG, ER, TOS, UMB, MAR, LAZ, CAM, PUG, BAS, CAL,
ABR, FRI, SAR
2007
14
65.39%
PIE, LIG, ER, TOS, UMB, MAR, LAZ, CAM, PUG, BAS, CAL,
ABR, FRI, SAR
2008
12
60.71%
PIE, LIG, ER, TOS, UMB, MAR, LAZ, CAM, PUG, BAS, CAL, SAR
2009
12
57.79%
PIE, LIG, ER, TOS, UMB, MAR, LAZ, CAM, PUG, BAS, CAL, SAR
2010
6
25.19%
LIG, ER, TOS, UMB, PUG, BAS
2011
6
25.19%
LIG, ER, TOS, UMB, PUG, BAS
2012
6
25.43%
LIG, ER, TOS, UMB, PUG, BAS
2013
9
37.77%
LIG, ER, TOS, UMB, LAZ, PUG, BAS, MOL, FRI
Notes: Regions where at least one radical left party (PRC, PdCI, SEL) participates or provides external support to the
regional government. Population weighted = the numbers are weighted for the people entitled to vote (aventi
diritto).
396
ITA11 Radical left membership
YEAR
PRC
PdCI
SEL
TOT
1991
112,835
112,835
1992
117,511
117,511
1993
120,911
120,911
1994
113,495
113,495
1995
115,984