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Journal of Social, Evolutionary, and Cultural Psychology
www.jsecjournal.com - 2010, 4 (3): 142-155.
2010 Journal of Social, Evolutionary, and Cultural Psychology
142
Original Article
PERCEPTIONS OF CHOICE: FREE WILL, MORAL
RESPONSIBILITY, AND MIND-BODY DUALISM IN
HUMANS, CHIMPANZEES, AND RATS
Shirley Matile Ogletree.
Department of Psychology
Texas State University- San Marcos
Crystal D. Oberle
Department of Psychology
Texas State University- San Marcos
Janine Harlow
Department of Psychology
Texas State University- San Marcos
Julia Bahruth
Department of Psychology
Texas State University- San Marcos
Abstract: The nature of choice, whether it is to some extent ―free‖ or completely
determined, has implications for moral responsibility and mind-body dualism; this issue
may also affect how we think of ourselves as members of the human species in
comparison to other animal species. In the current study, we explored whether the
―common college student‘s‖ perception of free or determined choice, moral
responsibility, and mind-body dualism in humans extended to chimpanzees and rats.
Humans were perceived as significantly different from chimpanzees and rats on all three
of these dimensions. Moreover, chimpanzees were perceived, primarily by women, as
significantly different from rats on the dimensions of free (versus determined) choice and
moral responsibility. However, on the issue of mind-body dualism, or having a spirit, a
significant difference was not found between chimpanzees and rats. Perhaps possessing a
spirit separate from the physical body may be considered a uniquely human attribute. As
we become more aware of genetic similarities between our own species and other primate
species, our attitudes towards choice, moral responsibility, and mind-body dualism may
change.
Key Words: Determinism; Free Will; Dualism; Moral Responsibility
. AUTHOR NOTE: Please address all correspondence to Shirley Matile Ogletree
Department of Psychology, Texas State University- San Marco, 601 University Drive,
San Marcos, Texas 78666 Email: SO01@txstate.edu
org
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143
Perceptions of Choice: Free Will, Moral Responsibility and Mind-Body Dualism in
Humans, Chimpanzees and Rats
Free Will or Determinism
What is the nature of human choice? Are decisions made freely, or are they
determined? This topic, having its roots in philosophy (Ayers, 1954; Stace, 1952), is also
important to psychologists (Hodgson, 2005; Wegner, 2004;) interested in people‘s beliefs
about free will and determinism. According to Hodgson (2005), the ―plain person‘s‖ use
of free will includes the understanding that choice is based on a nonrandom component
unrestrained by environmental and genetic determinants. Stace (1952), on the other hand,
argued that the term ―free will‖ is commonly used to indicate the absence of immediate
causal agents such as being forced at gunpoint. This ―soft determinism‖ perspective does
not deny the internalization of past experiences, emotions, and cognitions that ultimately
lead to a choice.
In contrast to the free will and soft determinism perspectives, the ―hard
determinism‖ perspective argues that behavior is completely caused by genetics, past
experiences, and current circumstance. Recently, Moore (2008) suggested that genetic
determinism, in particular, is strongly embraced by some students and by some members
of the general public for various reasons. For instance, people may notice for themselves
that certain characteristics, such as the physical similarity between children and their
biological parents, appear to be unrelated to environmental influences. Beyond these
personal observations, the media may also influence these beliefs through their simplified
reports of such studies as those involving identical twins reared apart and those involving
the calculation of heritability statistics. Furthermore, students may be exposed to several
theories that stress the importance of genetics, including theories that are based on
Mendelian genetics, theories that provide evolutionary accounts of behaviors, and
theories that emphasize the role of ―nature‖ on psychological and cognitive
development–not to mention materialistic theories of mind that are grounded in cognitive
neuroscience (e.g., Levy, 2003).
Despite the claimed popularity of genetic determinism, data suggest that most
college students favor the free will perspective over the hard determinism perspective.
For example, Ogletree and Oberle (2008) found that, although most students recognized a
role for genes and environment in impacting decision making, a majority of college
students believed in some degree of free will beyond these determinants. Comparable
results have been found in other studies with undergraduates, who were presented with
hypothetical deterministic scenarios. For instance, Nahmias and colleagues (Nahmias,
Morris, Nadelhoffer, & Turner, 2005) described a futuristic scenario involving a
supercomputer with the ability to predict all future events including human behavior.
Even though the supercomputer was described as predicting future human behavior with
100% accuracy, 76% of the respondents believed that a person in the hypothetical
scenario still freely chose to rob a bank. Similarly, over 90% of participants in another
study were more likely to believe that an indeterministic, rather than a deterministic,
universe was more like ours (Nichols & Knobe, 2007).
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144
Choice and Mind-Body Dualism
Perhaps a belief in free will is related to a belief in a spirit that is separate from
the physical body, a mind-body dualism. Nahmias (2006) reported that if human
decisions are described as the result of ―chemical reactions and neurological processes‖
rather than the results of ―thoughts, desires, and plans‖ (p. 231), participants are more
likely to give a deterministic response. Perhaps the former wording, portraying human
decision-making as the result of biological processes, de-emphasizes mind-body dualism.
In related research, Monterosso, Royzman, and Schwartz (2005) found that using
physiological versus experiential antecedent explanations for behavior mitigated
perceived culpability, or moral responsibility, for behaviors in hypothetical vignettes.
Choice and Moral Responsibility
How does a deterministic versus free will perspective affect moral responsibility
assigned to actions? The incompatibilist position (Double, 2004; Nichols & Knobe, 2007)
argues that if people can make no other decisions than the ones they make, how could
they be blamed or praised for such a decision? Clark (2003, 2005) and Stace (1952) have
argued that punishments and rewards should not be justified by what is fair but rather by
the consequences that promote individual change in a way that is beneficial to society.
Thus, if a person commits a crime or other unethical act in one situation, even if the
action was determined by genetic or environmental factors, the experience of being
punished for the action will ideally result in more acceptable behavior if the person is
confronted with a comparable situation in the future (Levy, 2003).
The common person, though, may link actions being freely chosen with holding
people responsible. In research with college students, Ogletree and Oberle (2008)
reported positive correlations between agreeing with a free will perspective and agreeing
with the moral responsibility for people who commit crimes or hurt others. Similarly, in
the research by Nahmias and colleagues (Nahmias et al., 2005; Nahmias, Morris,
Nadelhoffer, &Turner, 2006), the majority of participants both believed in free will and
considered a person blameworthy for either robbing a bank or stealing a necklace.
Affect, or the emotion that is aroused by learning about someone‘s immoral
actions, can also impact the extent to which a person is held morally responsible. Nichols
and Knobe (2007) referred to an ―affective performance error‖ to explain why people
believe in moral responsibility to a different degree if they are given either (a) an abstract
question of whether a person would be morally responsible for their actions in a
deterministic universe or (b) a specific scenario in which ―Bill‖ kills his wife and three
children in order to be with another woman in a deterministic universe. Most (86%) of
the participants indicated that a person could not be fully morally responsible in a
deterministic universe; however, 50% indicated that Bill would be fully morally
responsible in this same deterministic universe.
Extension to Other Species
Is free will perceived to be uniquely human? Humans share an estimated 94% of
their genes with chimpanzees, our closest relative (Minkel, 2006). If the common person
assumes humans make choices that are, at least to some extent, independent of
environmental and genetic influences, would this capacity also be perceived as
characteristic of chimpanzees? Could a chimpanzee, as well as a human, be held morally
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145
responsible for an action? To what extent does the common person believe in mind-body
dualism in people and chimpanzees?
The findings from a multitude of behavioral and physiological research studies
suggest that chimpanzees are remarkably similar to humans in terms of personality,
emotionality, and morality. Regarding personality, all five of the following personality
characteristics from the five-factor model have been found in chimpanzees: neuroticism,
extraversion, openness, agreeableness, and conscientiousness (for a review, see Gosling
& John, 1999). Regarding emotionality, like humans, chimpanzees have functional
amygdalae and hypothalami, as well as the relevant hormones and neurotransmitters that
provide the neural bases for experiencing and expressing emotions and empathy (for
reviews, see Gosling, 2001; Preston & de Waal, 2002). Regarding morality, many
researchers have concluded that chimpanzees possess the same moral precursors as
humans (e.g., Bekoff, 2001, 2004; Brosnan, 2006; Brosnan & de Waal, 2003; Flack & de
Waal, 2000; Lyn, Franks, & Savage-Rumbaugh, 2008; Watson & Platt, 2006). According
to Bekoff (2001) and Brosnan (2006), these moral precursors, which include perceptions
of fairness and moral judgments, develop from such daily social interactions as playing,
sharing food, dividing labor, compromising, and resolving conflict, all of which foster
cooperation among individuals to avoid inequity. Then, when inequity or injustice occurs,
like humans, chimpanzees will experience relevant social emotions and will respond
negatively, with temper tantrums by subordinates or punishment by dominants (Bekoff,
2004; Brosnan & de Waal, 2003; Clutton-Brock & Parker, 1995; Okamoto & Matsumara,
2001). Whereas the aforementioned research shows that chimpanzees do possess
personality, emotional, and moral characteristics just as humans, research on people‘s
perceptions of these characteristics in chimpanzees is limited to perceptions of similarity
between humans and unspecified non-human animals. This research typically uses a
survey with questions asking whether people believe that non-human animals have a
spirit or soul like humans, as well as whether people believe that non-human animals can
think and can feel emotions such as fear (e.g., Templer, Connelly, Bassman, & Hart,
2006). Not surprisingly, people who respond the most affirmatively to such questions are
more likely to be animal rights activists who are predominantly female (Hills, 1995;
Plous, 1991). More recent research, however, reveals that people who perceive greater
similarity between humans and non-human animals are less likely to dehumanize
immigrants (Costello & Hodson, 2010) and are less likely to support violence against
African-American crime suspects (Goff, Eberhardt, Williams, & Jackson, 2008),
revealing important implications of this perceived similarity. According to Costello and
Hodson (2010), dehumanization of ―outgroups‖ is founded in categorizations that
differentiate humans from non-human animals.
Current Study
The current study adds to the literature on this perceived similarity by
investigating people‘s perceptions about three specific species of animals: humans,
chimpanzees, and rats. The latter two animals were chosen for their differing degrees of
similarity to humans and to avoid potentially confounding anthropomorphism that occurs
with such common pets as cats and dogs. In terms of genetic makeup, humans are most
similar to the Pan genus that includes chimpanzees and bonobos; chimpanzees were
selected over bonobos based on expected student familiarity. Beyond this genetic
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Perceptions of Choice
Journal of Social, Evolutionary, and Cultural Psychology – ISSN 1933-5377 – volume 4(3). 2010.
146
similarity, as mentioned previously, chimpanzees are also remarkably similar to humans
with respect to personality, emotionality, and morality. In contrast to chimpanzees, rats
possess only about 64% of the DNA sequences comprising the human genome (Gibbs et
al., 2004). Further, although they are capable of emotion (Gosling, 2001) and reason
(Blaisdell, 2010) comparable to humans, other characteristic similarities are significantly
less than in chimpanzees. For example, whereas all five major personality factors have
been identified in chimpanzees, only neuroticism and agreeableness have been identified
in rats (Gosling & John, 1999). Including all three of these species in the current study
will allow for determination of perceived similarities or differences between humans and
animals, but also between animals that vary in degree of verified similarity to humans.
Relevant to the preceding review, this study compared college students‘
perceptions of free versus deterministic decision making, moral responsibility, and mind-
body dualism in these three species. Additionally, we compared students‘ responses to
three types of actions: negative (attacking another), neutral (turning right), or positive
(sharing food). We hypothesized three primary findings. First, we expected to replicate
Ogletree and Oberle‘s (2008) finding that agreeing with free will would be positively
related to perceived moral responsibility. Second, we predicted that a person would be
perceived as more morally responsible for a negative or positive act than for a neutral act,
based on the affective performance error (Nichols & Knobe, 2007). Finally, we predicted
that humans, compared to chimpanzees and rats, would be perceived as more likely to
have the capacity for free will, as being morally responsible for an action, and as having a
mind separate from the body. Although differences may fail to emerge from a sample of
animal rights activists (Plous, 1991), college students, who are otherwise representative
of the general public, may conceivably view these characteristics as uniquely human.
Method
Participants
The participants were 63 men and 162 women recruited from a junior-level,
lifespan development class. The majority of the participants were 25 years of age or
younger (93%) and were from middle class or upper-middle class backgrounds (84%).
Regarding ethnicity, 65% were Caucasian, 23% Hispanic, 6% African American, 3%
Asian, and 3% ―other.‖
Materials and Procedure
For this study, participants completed a 23-item survey. After providing
demographic information in response to five of the questions, participants read one of
nine scenarios similar to that used by Nahmias (2006). Each scenario included one of
three actors (person, chimpanzee, or rat) and one of three actions (sharing food--a
positive action, turning left--a neutral action, or attacking another--a negative action). A
sample scenario is as follows:
Imagine that a hungry person shares some food with another person at a
particular place and time. Now imagine that the universe is re-created
over and over again, starting from the exact same initial conditions (and
with all the same laws of nature).1
1 This sentence is identical to that used by Nahmias (2006, p. 219).
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147
Participants then used a five-point Likert scale to indicate their degree of
agreement with 18 statements. These statements related to the likelihood that the actor
would repeat the action (―The person will definitely share the food the next time the
universe is re-created.‖), whether the actor has free will for choices, (e.g., ―People have
free will when making choices.‖), whether the actor has moral responsibility (e.g.,
―Consequences for people only serve the purpose of changing their behavior, not
teaching them right from wrong.‖), and whether the actor has a spirit separate from the
physical body (e.g., ―People have a spirit that is separate and distinct from neurological
activity in the brain.‖). Participants who read scenarios related to chimpanzees or rats
read items appropriately changed to reflect corresponding opinions for chimpanzees and
rats. Results
To reduce the number of items for analyses, a principal components factor
analysis with varimax rotation was performed on the 17 items designed to assess opinions
regarding free will, moral responsibility, and mind-body dualism; the item relevant to the
repetition of the action was a separate criterion variable that was not included in this
factor analysis. Three factors emerged with Eigenvalues greater than 1, though two items
loaded strongly on two or more of the factors. To ensure that the scale appropriately
discriminated the different constructs, these two items were removed, consistent with the
scale work of other researchers (e.g., Hills, Francis, & Rutledge, 2004; Hutchinson et al.,
2006; Richardsen & Martinussen, 2004; Van Dierendonck, Schaufeli, & Buunk, 2001).
After these two items were removed, another factor analysis was performed on the
remaining 15 items. Three factors again emerged, accounting for 58% of the variance.
The relevant items and the factor loadings are given in Table 1. The first factor,
accounting for 21% of the variance, included six items related to moral responsibility. In
creating the resulting composite variable, two of the items were reverse-coded because
their factor loadings were negative. The second factor, accounting for 19% of the
variance, included four items related to mind-body dualism or spirit. The third factor,
accounting for 18% of the variance, included five items related to conscious decision
making and free will.
Composite subscale scores were computed for each of these three factors, and
Pearson correlation analyses were conducted to analyze the relationships among them.
First, the ratings from the six items related to moral responsibility were added to form a
composite moral responsibility score (MR), whereby higher values represent stronger
beliefs that actors are morally responsibility for their actions. Second, the ratings from the
four items related to mind-body dualism or spirit were added to form a composite spirit
score (S), whereby higher values represent stronger beliefs that actors possess a spirit that
is separate from their body. Third, the ratings from the five items related to free will were
added to form a composite free will score (FW), whereby higher values represent
stronger beliefs that actors possess free will and consciously make their decisions. The
correlation analyses revealed significant positive correlations between FW and MR
(r[214] = .54, p < .001), between FW and S (r[216] = .46, p < .001), and between MR
and S (r[211] = .54, p < .001).
Four three-way independent-measures analyses of variance were performed on
the item regarding whether the actor would repeat the action, as well as on each of the
three aforementioned composite scores from the factor analysis. The three between-
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148
subjects factors for each analysis were actor category (humans, chimpanzees, rats), action
category (negative—attacking, neutral—turning left, positive—sharing food), and
participant sex (male, female). The overall model for the item assessing whether the
action would be repeated was not significant.
Table 1
Factor Loadings for Moral Responsibility (MR), Spirit (S), and Free Will (FW) Items
Item
Factor
Loading
Consequences for people only serve the purpose of changing their behavior,
not teaching them right from wrong.
MR
.75
People cannot be held morally responsible for their behavior.
MR
-.75
People can learn the difference between right and wrong.
MR
.68
People can be taught using rewards and punishments but cannot be held
accountable for their behaviors to other people.
MR
-.65
People have a conscience that helps them do the right thing.
MR
.63
People feel guilty if they do behavior they have previously been punished for.
MR
.63
People have a spirit that is separate from neurological activity in the brain.
S
.79
People have a nonphysical spirit in addition to a physical body.
S
.75
People have a soul that continues to exist after their physical death.
S
.74
People have an ―essence‖ that is more than their physical characteristics.
S
.73
Ultimately people use their mind when making a decision.
FW
.74
The person made a conscious decision to share (turn left, attack).
FW
.72
People have the potential to be flexible and spontaneous.
FW
.62
People have free will when making choices.
FW
.58
Choices that people make may be influenced by their genes and environment,
but they make choices that are to some extent independent of these influences.
FW
.55
Note. These factors accounted for 58% of the variance. ―Chimpanzees‖ and ―rats‖ were substituted
for ―people‖ for the appropriate versions.
For the MR factor, the main effects of participant sex (F[1, 197] = 8.55, p < .01)
and actor category (F[2, 197] = 57.78, p < .001) were significant. Regarding participant
sex, women (M = 18.69, SD = 4.64) scored higher than men (M = 17.79, SD = 4.37),
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149
suggesting that women are more likely than men to assign MR to the actor. Regarding
actor category, as indicated by Bonferroni post hoc tests, the means for the human actors
(M = 22.27, SD = 3.39) were significantly greater than the means for the chimpanzee
actors (M = 17.97, SD = 3.50), which were in turn significantly greater than the means for
the rat actors (M = 15.47, SD = 3.94). Participants were most likely to assign MR to
people and least likely to assign MR to rats. A significant interaction found between actor
category and participant sex (F[2, 197] = 3.30, p < .05) revealed that MR was assigned
to chimpanzees more by women (M = 18.56, SD = 3.32) than by men (M = 15.88, SD =
3.42); no sex differences were found for humans or rats (see Figure 1).
For the S factor, the main effect of actor category was significant (F[2, 199] =
16.62, p < .001). As indicated by Bonferroni post hoc analyses, the means for the human
actors (M = 13.86, SD = 4.20) were significantly greater than the means for both the
chimpanzee actors (M = 11.13, SD = 3.64) and rat actors (M = 10.34, SD = 3.50), but the
means for the chimpanzee and rat actors did not significantly differ. This result suggests
that participants were more likely to perceive mind-body dualism as more characteristic
of humans than any other animals. None of the other main effects and none of the
interactions were significant.
Actor Category
RatsChimpanzeesHumans
Mean Moral Responsibility Score
24
20
16
12
8
4
0
Participant Sex
Men
Women
Figure 1: Participant Sex by Actor Category for Moral Responsibility
For the FW factor, the only significant main effect was actor category (F[2, 204]
= 6.67, p < .002). As indicated by Bonferroni post hoc tests, the means for human actors
(M = 19.07, SD = 3.70) were significantly greater than the means for the chimpanzee
actors (M = 17.57, SD = 3.84), which were in turn significantly greater than the means for
the rat actors (M = 15.92, SD = 3.94). Participants were most likely to attribute FW to
people and least likely to attribute FW to rats. However, the interaction between actor
category and participant sex was significant (F[2, 204] = 5.19, p < .01), revealing that
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the effect of actor category was significant for women (humans: M = 19.33, SD = 4.04;
chimpanzees: M = 17.51, SD = 4.17; rats: M = 15.00, SD = 4.12) but not men (humans: M
= 18.54, SD = 2.89; chimpanzees: M = 17.35, SD = 2.91; rats: M = 18.09, SD = 2.41) (see
Figure 2).
Actor Category
RatsChimpanzeesHumans
Mean Free Will Score
24
20
16
12
8
4
0
Participant Sex
Men
Women
Figure 2: Participant Sex by Actor Category for Having Free Will
Discussion
Extending past research on attitudes toward free will and moral responsibility,
the present study explored correlations among these and related concepts as well as the
attribution of such characteristics to two mammalian species. Regarding the relation
between perceived moral responsibility and attitudes toward free will/determinism, those
who believe in a deterministic perspective, whereby people can make no other decisions
than the ones they make, logically should be less likely to hold people morally
responsible for their actions (Double, 2004; Nichols & Knobe, 2007), though
punishments and rewards are still justified to promote individual change and to benefit
society (Clark, 2003, 2005; Stace, 1952;). On the other end of the spectrum, those who
believe that people possess free will should be more likely to assign moral responsibility
to people. Consistent with this reasoning and with past research (Ogletree & Oberle,
2008), the present study found a significant positive correlation between beliefs in free
will and assignment of moral responsibility.
Underlying the free will beliefs could be a corresponding belief in mind-body
dualism, whereby people possess a spirit that is separate from the body. The significant
positive correlations relating spirit to both free will and moral responsibility in the
present research support this hypothesis. In other words, the assignment of blame,
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151
justified by holding someone morally responsible, may be related to both attitudes
towards free will/determinism and mind-body dualism.
Regarding the effect of different contextual scenarios meant to arouse positive
(sharing food), negative (attacking another), or neutral (turning left) affects, we found no
evidence to support the affective performance error (Nichols & Knobe, 2007). Although
the mean score relevant to the assignment of moral responsibility was greater for those
who were presented with the negative action than for those who were presented with the
neutral action, this difference was not statistically significant. Our brief scenarios or the
behaviors described may not have been sufficiently emotionally arousing to trigger this
response. For instance, the action of attacking another likely did not evoke the stronger
emotional response achieved by Nichols and Knobe‘s scenario of a man killing his family
to be with another woman. Perhaps using more emotionally charged scenarios would
have led to a significant affective performance error.
In terms of human-chimpanzee-rat comparisons, college students in this study
were significantly more likely to attribute free will and spirit to humans than to
chimpanzees or rats, and they were also significantly more likely to assign moral
responsibility to humans than to chimpanzees or rats. These findings suggest that, despite
genetic similarities, people are reluctant to make similar attributions to humans and other
species. However, the female participants were also significantly more likely to attribute
free will and to assign moral responsibility to chimpanzees than to rats; no differences
between chimpanzees and rats were found for the male participants. Perhaps women tend
to be more animal oriented or more likely to see chimpanzees on a continuum with
people. Such a conclusion is consistent with research showing that most animal rights
activists are women (Jamison & Lunch, 1992; Pious, 1991) and that women have more
humanistic attitudes regarding the treatment of animals (Kellert & Berry, 1987; Knight,
Vrij, Cherryman, & Nunkoosing, 2004). Several researchers explain that these findings
are due to greater levels of empathy – for both humans and non-human animals – in
women than in men (Ascione, 1992; Galvin & Herzog, 1992; Henry, 2006; Herzog,
Betchart, & Pittman, 1991; Taylor & Signal, 2005).
Other cultures may have differing perspectives on the nature of human and
animal consciousness. Supporting this claim is research showing that such European
nations as France and Germany are much more opposed to animal research than the
United States (Pifer, Shimizu, & Pifer, 1994). More recently, the Spanish Parliament,
lessening the human-other species distinction, approved legal rights for great apes,
including bonobos, gorillas, orangutans, and chimpanzees (Mandavilli, 2009). This
resolution gives great apes protection from human exploitation for profit, gives them
protection from harm during research, and recognizes their right to life. Would cross-
cultural research reveal differences in attitudes toward free will, mind-body dualism, and
moral responsibility in humans versus primates in Spain and other European countries,
compared to the United States?
Psychologists and other scientists are discovering striking similarities between
humans and other species. As mentioned previously, humans share an estimated 94% of
their genes with chimpanzees (Minkel, 2006), who are remarkably similar to humans in
terms of personality (Gosling & John, 1999), emotionality (Gosling, 2001; Preston & de
Waal, 2002), and morality (Bekoff, 2001, 2004; Brosnan, 2006; Brosnan & de Waal,
2003; Flack & de Waal, 2000; Lyn et al., 2008; Watson & Platt, 2006). We also share
similarities to other species. Wright (2004) reported that rhesus monkeys taught to play a
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152
video game involving a memory task responded similarly to humans; monkeys and
humans were both more likely to recognize the first and last of a series of images than the
more difficult images in the middle of the series. The implication is that the monkeys
may have demonstrated a form of metacognition in their decision making. Also, for
monkeys and rats as well as people, the generalized matching function characterizes
responses based on reinforcement contingencies (Neuringer, Jensen, & Piff, 2007).
As we increasingly recognize our similarities to other animal species, particularly
primate species, how will our judgments about choice and moral responsibility change? If
people believe that humans possess free will and spirit and subsequently assign moral
responsibility to humans, would these individuals also believe that chimpanzees and other
primate species possess free will and spirit? Would moral responsibility be subsequently
assigned to these species, and would we treat these species differently as a result of these
conceptual revolutions?
Another possibility, as we become more cognizant of our similarity to other
species, is that those individuals who believe that the choices of other primates are
determined may also be more likely to believe that human choices are determined. The
concept of moral responsibility may evolve; instead of being based on ―fairness‖ and
―deserved outcomes,‖ moral responsibility may more heavily focus on what is good for
the individual and others in the community. As Skinner (1948, 1972) argued,
consequences should be applied, not because they are fair, but because they promote
better outcomes for the individual and society. Furthermore, although punishment would
continue to exist for these reasons, our recognition of deterministic choices may lead us
to treat others more humanely. Ultimately, as our thinking about the nature of the human
species changes, social psychological concepts related to interpersonal judgments may be
challenged. If a deterministic perspective becomes more accepted, how will we decide
who is ―blameworthy‖ or ―praiseworthy‖? Will individuals be less likely to make the
fundamental attribution error (Heider, 1958; Ross, 1977), overly ascribing causes to
intrapersonal factors rather than situational factors in explaining the behavior of others?
In short, how we think about ourselves as part of the natural world impacts our
social cognitions. Basic assumptions, related to free will, dualism, and moral
responsibility, may affect our interpersonal judgments and how we ascribe credit and
assign blame. Regarding our perception of other species, greater perceived similarities
between humans and other animals predicts lesser dehumanization of certain minority
groups (Costello & Hodson, 2010; Goff et al., 2008). Thus, discovering these similarities
may likely impact our treatment of both human and non-human animals.
Received May 15, 2009; Revisions received April 23, 2010; Accepted June 15, 2010
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