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Abstract

Anthropomorphization is the tendency to ascribe humanlike features and mental states, such as free will and consciousness, to nonhuman beings or inanimate agents. Two studies investigated the consequences of the anthropomorphization of nature on people’s willingness to help victims of natural disasters. Study 1 (N = 96) showed that the humanization of nature correlated negatively with willingness to help natural disaster victims. Study 2 (N = 52) tested for causality, showing that the anthropomorphization of nature reduced participants’ intentions to help the victims. Overall, our findings suggest that humanizing nature undermines the tendency to support victims of natural disasters. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2013 APA, all rights reserved)
S.Sacchi et al.: Anthropomorphizationof Nature and SupportforDisaster VictimsSocial Psychology2013; Vol.44(4):271–277© 2012HogrefePublishing
Original Article
When Mother Earth Rises Up
Anthropomorphizing Nature Reduces
Support for Natural Disaster Victims
Simona Sacchi, Paolo Riva, and Marco Brambilla
Department of Psychology, University of Milano-Bicocca, Italy
Abstract. Anthropomorphization is the tendency to ascribe humanlike features and mental states, such as free will and consciousness,
to nonhuman beings or inanimate agents. Two studies investigated the consequences of the anthropomorphization of nature on people’s
willingness to help victims of natural disasters. Study 1 (N= 96) showed that the humanization of nature correlated negatively with
willingness to help natural disaster victims. Study 2 (N= 52) tested for causality, showing that the anthropomorphization of nature reduced
participants’ intentions to help the victims. Overall, our findings suggest that humanizing nature undermines the tendency to support
victims of natural disasters.
Keywords: anthropomorphism, nature perception, help intentions
At length did cross an Albatross,
Thorough the fog it came;
As if it had been a Christian soul,
We hailed it in God’s name.
[S. T. Coleridge, 1798]
Anthropomorphization is the tendency to ascribe human
characteristics such as reasoning, emotions, and intentions
to nonhuman beings or inanimate objects (Epley, Waytz,
Akalis, & Cacioppo, 2008; Epley, Waytz, & Cacioppo,
2007; Gray, Gray, & Wegner, 2007; Waytz, Morewedge et
al., 2010). Research from different disciplines has long not-
ed that people endorse an anthropomorphic view of ani-
mals (Kwan, Gosling, & John, 2008), common objects or
machines (e.g., Eyssel & Kuchenbrandt, in press; Kiesler,
Powers, Fussell, & Torrey, 2008), divinity (Boyer, 2001),
and even of geometric shapes (Heider & Simmel, 1944;
Scholl & Tremoulet, 2000). Among different forms of an-
thropomorphization, the projection of human-like features
to nature is a widespread cognitive tendency (Clayton &
Opotow, 2003). Our everyday language is imbued with
metaphorical expressions such as “mother earth” or “moth-
er nature”; archaic religions and myths personified the awe-
some forces of nature (Guthrie, 1993), and children tend to
hold an animistic view of the physical world (e.g., Piaget,
1972/1926). However, despite its ontogenetic and phyloge-
netic relevance, the anthropomorphization of nature, has
received little attention by empirical research and by ex-
perimental psychology (for exceptions, see Norenzayan,
Hansen, & Cady, 2008; Waytz, Cacioppo, & Epley, 2010,
Study 6). The present work aims at filling this gap by in-
vestigating the effects of the anthropomorphization of the
natural world on the perception of the social world in gen-
eral, and the potential consequences for victims of natural
disasters in particular.
Research has revealed that anthropomorphism seems to
serve some critical cognitive functions (e.g., Kwan & Fis-
ke, 2008). The crucial causes of anthropomorphism stem
from the perceiver’s need for understanding. In fact, the
ascription of mental states and intentions is the best way to
explain events linked to independent agents, given that dis-
positional factors are seen as stable and easy to control
(Heider, 1958). Thus, humanizing nonhuman agents might
help people to gain a sense of complex phenomena, per-
ceiving unpredictable behaviors as understandable and an-
ticipating future events (Epley et al., 2007). Despite the
lack of empirical studies on the anthropomorphization of
nature, the same rationale could be applied to it. As already
noted, previous scholars suggested that among the determi-
nants of anthropomorphism stands the need to understand,
control, and predict another agent’s behavior (Epley et al.,
2007). Such effectance motivation (Epley et al., 2008;
Waytz, Morewedge et al., 2010; White, 1959) is likely to
be particularly relevant when people face natural events,
especially when they are negative and lead to dramatic con-
sequences such as natural disasters. Humanizing nature
could help the perceiver to conceive natural events as im-
bued with intentionality and significance rather than con-
sidering them merely random and meaningless phenomena
(Gray & Wegner, 2010). Consequently, it might help peo-
ple to rationalize and justify past unpredictable natural di-
sasters and to perceive more control over anticipated future
accidents.
DOI: 10.1027/1864-9335/a000112
© 2012 Hogrefe Publishing Social Psychology 2013; Vol. 44(4):271–277
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
Crucial to the purpose of the present study, anthropo-
morphization also has important psychological and behav-
ioral consequences. As Waytz, Morewedge et al. (2010)
stated, “the most fundamental consequence of anthropo-
morphism is its implication for moral agency” (p. 16). Re-
cent research (Gray et al., 2007; Waytz, Gray, Epley, &
Wegner, 2010) demonstrated that ascribing mental states to
an entity implies the attribution of the capacity for both
feeling (i.e., experience) and acting according to specific
purposes (i.e., agency). Consequently, people perceive an
intelligent design behind unexplained or accidental events
and intentionality and moral responsibility behind human-
ized agents’ actions (Gray et al., 2007). In the context of
natural disasters, the anthropomorphism of nature would
imply the perception of natural events as deliberate actions.
We contend that the anthropomorphism of nature might af-
fect not only the perception of the agent per se, but also the
behavior toward the recipient of the action, i.e., the natural
disaster victims.
According to the moral typecasting theory (Gray &
Wegner, 2009), moral events are essentially dyadic and re-
quire, at least, a doer (a perpetrator) and a feeler (a victim).
Therefore, in order to complete the moral dyad, the identi-
fication of a moral agent in the context would lead to com-
plementarily typecast a second entity as a moral patient.
Following this rationale, one would reasonably expect the
perception of nature as agent to accrue the perception of
the victim as a moral patient who experiences distress with-
out being responsible for her/his misfortunes. Supporting
this hypothesis, previous studies showed that people per-
ceive intentional harm as more distressing than uninten-
tional harm (Gray & Wegner, 2008). Such a reasoning
might suggest that the anthropomorphization of nonhuman
agents is likely to lead to greater reactions toward the acts
of an anthropomorphized agent and the sufferers.
However, as past research showed, the detection of a
victim or moral patient in the social context is a necessary,
albeit insufficient, condition to motivate intervention and
helping behavior in the perceiver who plays the role of a
third party in the moral interaction (DeScioli & Kurzban,
2009). For instance, as the just world belief hypothesis pos-
its (Lerner, 1980), people have the pervasive need to be-
lieve that the world is a just and predictable place where
persons usually get what they deserve. In line with this per-
spective, previous studies have noted a robust tendency to
blame victims for their plight, thus preventing the perceiv-
ers from taking action and helping the patients (e.g., Kogut,
2011). Furthermore, according to the classical just world
research (Lerner & Miller, 1978), the need to derogate the
victim is paradoxically stronger when the victim’s respon-
sibility is far from being obvious, as in the case of natural
disaster victims, because the sense of injustice is more chal-
lenging.
This effect may be especially likely in the anthropomor-
phization process when people consider events to be the
result of some deliberate and meaningful master plan. Giv-
en that the perception of a victim is not a guarantee of pro-
social behavior, we hypothesize that the attribution of in-
tentionality to nature might even reduce the willingness to
help victims following a natural event. In fact, conferring
responsibility to a nonhuman agent (i.e. nature), for its ac-
tions could lead to a moral delegation because it makes it
possible to consider the perceived agent as accountable for
events that occur (Waytz, Gray et al., 2010; Waytz, More-
wedge et al., 2010). Consistent with this hypothesis, per-
ceiving personal responsibility proved to be crucial in in-
ducing offers of help (Rogers, Miller, Mayer, & Duval,
1982) both in adults and in children (Staub, 2003). Al-
though not directly related to anthropomorphism, recent
studies on help behavior (Zagefka, Noor, Brown, Randsley
de Moura, & Hopthrow, 2011) have also suggested that the
perceived causes of natural disasters shape people’s reac-
tion toward victims: People are more willing to help and to
donate to disaster victims when the event is perceived as
having been caused by natural rather than human factors.
In the present paper, we investigated the relationship be-
tween the anthropomorphism of nature and social behavior.
We drew from previous conceptualizations and research on
anthropomorphism but aimed to extend it in two ways:
First, we focused on the neglected process of the human-
ization of nature; second, we tried to bridge a gap by in-
vestigating the unexplored relationship between such a
cognitive process and prosocial behavior (for similar rea-
soning, see Baumeister, Masicampo, & DeWall, 2009).
Specifically, we hypothesized that, in the context of a nat-
ural disaster, the humanization of nature would decrease
people’s willingness to help victims. Our hypothesis was
explored across two studies: In the first study, we investi-
gated whether an association between the anthropomor-
phism of nature and willingness to help victims of natural
disasters emerged. To do so, we measured participants’ ten-
dency to anthropomorphize nature and their willingness to
help victims of a natural disaster. Upon establishing such a
link, in the second experimental study, we tested the effect
of nature anthropomorphism on willingness to help victims
of natural disasters. Accordingly, we actively manipulated
the anthropomorphism of nature to investigate more direct-
ly its causal impact on helpfulness. For its salience, media
resonance, and recency, in both studies, we used the Japan
earthquake (March 2011) as the stimulus and the Japanese
earthquake victims as the target group.
Study 1
Participants
A total of 96 students at the University of Milano-Bicocca,
Italy, participated in this study. The sample consisted of 31
male and 65 female, aged between 18 and 30 (M= 22.27;
SD = 2.45). All participants were Italian citizens.
272 S. Sacchi et al.: Anthropomorphization of Nature and Support for Disaster Victims
Social Psychology 2013; Vol. 44(4):271–277 © 2012 Hogrefe Publishing
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
Procedure and Materials
Participants were approached in the campus libraries and
asked to participate in a study on the social perception of
natural events, and those who accepted were given a ques-
tionnaire to fill out. First, to assess the anthropomorphism
of nature, participants completed a series of four items
measuring their tendency to ascribe to nature human mental
states such as intention and free will (i.e., “Nature acts ac-
cording to its intentions”; α= .81; see Waytz, Cacioppo et
al., 2010). Then, they were presented with a list of 20 emo-
tions, including positive and negative emotions (e.g., fear,
pleasure, humiliation, love; α= .95). Next, participants
were asked to rate the extent to which nature can feel such
emotions (Waytz, Cacioppo et al., 2010).
In the second part of the questionnaire, participants were
presented with a series of four images showing the effects
of the recent earthquake and tsunami in Japan (March
2011). They were asked to look at the images carefully.
After observing the images, participants completed a meas-
ure assessing willingness to help the victims (i.e., Japanese
people) using an eight-item scale (e.g., “The international
community must provide financial support for Japanese
people”; α= .70). Participants provided their responses to
all the measures on seven-point scales, ranging from 1 (=
not at all)to7(=extremely). Finally, participants’ demo-
graphic data (i.e., age, sex, and nationality) were collected.
See the Appendix for the complete lists of items.
Results and Discussion
Consistent with the literature on the link between anthro-
pomorphism and the attribution of emotions to a nonhuman
agent (Gray et al., 2007; Waytz, Cacioppo et al., 2010), our
scale of anthropomorphism correlated with the ascription
of emotions to nature (r= .59, p< .001).1
More interestingly for our purpose, the results showed
that the anthropomorphization of nature and willingness to
help were negatively related (r= –.21, p= .04) such that
high tendencies to humanize nature were associated with
less willingness to support victims of the natural disaster.
The help intentions were not correlated with emotions (r=
–.12, p= .23). The complete pattern of correlations is
shown in Table 1.
To sum up, Study 1 provided preliminary evidence that
anthropomorphism of nature is associated with prosocial
behavior. More specifically, supporting the hypothesis of a
negative impact of anthropomorphism on helping, we
found that the anthropomorphization of nature is negatively
related with willingness to help natural disaster victims.
However, emotions and help intentions proved to be uncor-
related. Given that anthropomorphism and mind perception
are related to two different dimensions, namely, agency and
experience (Gray et al., 2007), our results seem to suggest
nature agency (intentionality and responsibility) rather than
experience (emotions) to play a crucial role in affecting
social behavior. This study, however, did not allow us to
test for causality. Thus, Study 2 sought to replicate the find-
ings of Study 1 by manipulating the anthropomorphization
of nature.
Study 2
Participants
A total of 52 students from the University of Milano-Bi-
cocca, Italy, participated in this study. The sample consist-
ed of 16 male and 36 female, aged between 20 and 30 (M
= 22.19; SD = 2.33). All participants were Italian citizens.
Procedure and Materials
Participants were approached in the campus libraries. As
in Study 1, they were asked to participate in a study on the
social perception of natural events, and those who accepted
were given a questionnaire to fill out. In the first part of the
booklet, participants were presented with the experimental
manipulation: Half of the sample was presented with an
anthropomorphic image of Mother Earth followed by a
brief paragraph that described its positive and negative fea-
tures in humanized terms (“Mother Earth takes care of Her
sons and She satisfies their needs. However, sometimes
She suffers, gets angry and rises up”); the other half was
presented with an image of the planet Earth followed by a
brief paragraph that described some positive and negative
characteristics without any reference to humanization (“On
the planet Earth, living beings can satisfy their fundamental
needs. However, sometimes the planet is place of disasters
Table 1. Means, standard deviations, and correlations for an-
thropomorphization of nature, attribution of emo-
tions to nature and willingness to help (Study 1)
Mean SD 123
1 Nature anthropomorphization 3.59 1.59
2 Emotions 2.90 1.41 .59** –
3 Willingness to help 4.37 0.83 –.21* –.12
Notes. Significance levels of correlations are denoted by **p< .01,
*p< .05 (two-tailed). N=96.
S. Sacchi et al.: Anthropomorphization of Nature and Support for Disaster Victims 273
© 2012 Hogrefe Publishing Social Psychology 2013; Vol. 44(4):271–277
1It is worth noting that the list of emotions included both primary and secondary emotions, namely, emotions that are considered uniquely
human (Demoulin et al., 2004). Due to of the very high correlation between the two subsets (r= .91, p< .001), the emotion scores were
averaged into a global index. Furthermore, in this research, the differentiation of emotions into two distinct categories may be not crucial:
Since people generally do not perceive nature as being able to feel, anthropomorphism could be related to the attribution of both primary
and secondary emotions.
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which strike its inhabitants”). Participants were randomly
assigned to one of the two experimental conditions. Then,
they were asked to complete a series of five items measur-
ing the tendency to anthropomorphize nature, used here as
a manipulation check (α= .88). The scale was composed
of the four items we used in Study 1 and an additional item
to briefly assess the ascription of emotions to nature (i.e.,
“Nature experiences emotions.”).
In the second part, participants were presented with a
series of four images showing the effects of the earthquake
in Japan. After observing the images carefully, participants
completed a measure assessing their willingness to help the
victims (α= .71). The items of the scales were identical to
those used in Study 1. Participants provided their responses
to all the measures on seven-point scales, ranging from 1
(= not at all)to7(=extremely). See appendix for the list
of items.
Finally, the participants’ demographic data (i.e., age,
gender, and nationality) were collected; they were thanked
and released.
Results and Discussion
To verify our manipulation efficacy, a t-test was computed
on anthropomorphism comparing the two experimental
groups (anthropomorphization vs. control condition). The
analysis revealed that participants anthropomorphized na-
ture more in anthropomorphism condition (M= 4.61, SD =
1.35) than in control condition (M= 2.97, SD = 1.45), t(50)
= 4.21, p< .001, d= 1.17. Thus, can conclude that the
experimental manipulation of anthropomorphism was suc-
cessful.
Then, we computed Δt-test comparing the two experi-
mental conditions on the critical dependent variable, i.e.,
help intentions. In line with Study 1, the results revealed
that participants in the anthropomorphism condition were
tendentially less willing to help the victims of the natural
disaster (M= 4.39, SD = 1.02) than participants in the con-
trol condition (M= 4.89, SD = 0.87), t(50) = –1.91, p= .06,
d= 0.53.
Overall, the results of this second study provide more
direct support for our hypothesis on the social consequenc-
es of the anthropomorphization of nature. In particular,
when people are induced to humanize nature, they become
less disposed to support victims of natural disasters in fac-
ing the misfortune.
General Discussion
Anthropomorphism is an omnipresent process in our cog-
nitive and social life (see Kwan & Fiske, 2008). The hu-
manization of nonhuman agents is widely acknowledged
in mundane circumstances: Witnessing somebody talking
with a pet, with God, or with a personal computer, do not
surprise us. Nature is not immune from such a phenome-
non. Thus, for instance, we attribute emotions as ire, fury,
or serenity to natural and inanimate elements; we describe
natural events using “typically human” verbs (e.g., to nour-
ish, to devour); and, not accidentally, we baptize tropical
hurricanes with human names (e.g., Andrew, Katrina,
Irene). Recent research has provided a psychological ac-
count of when and why people are likely to anthropomor-
phize (Epley et al., 2007, 2008). The present contribution
focused on the anthropomorphism of nature and moved at-
tention from causes to the possible social consequences of
such a process. More specifically, we hypothesized that the
perception of nature as being like a human being can affect
one’s willingness to help victims of natural disasters. Our
theoretical rationale posits that anthropomorphism of na-
ture is likely to inhibit the willingness to help the victims
following a natural event. In fact, the conception of nature
as a moral agent could lead to the understanding of natural
disasters in terms of meaningful punishments, results of
nature’s will and plan, thus fostering moral delegation.
In line with this hypothesis, the results of two studies
consistently showed a significant negative relationship be-
tween the anthropomorphism of nature and prosocial inten-
tions. More specifically, the results revealed that the more
people ascribe humanlike characteristics to nature, the less
likely they are to help victims. In particular, Study 2, in
which the anthropomorphism of nature was actively ma-
nipulated, suggests a causal impact of anthropomorphiza-
tion on behavioral intentions.
These findings contribute to a first theoretical insight on
the possible social consequences of anthropomorphism
and, more specifically, of the anthropomorphism of nature.
Thus, this line of research could contribute to building a
bridge between cognitive aspects of the humanization of
nature and its socially relevant effects, such as helping be-
havior. To our knowledge there is only one previous study
on the social consequences of anthropomorphism of nature
which shows that the nature humanization leads to envi-
ronmental concern: People who perceive nature as a human
being are more likely to respect it and to use the same social
norms of fairness with nature they use in social interactions
(Waytz, Cacioppo et al., 2010). With the present contribu-
tion, we have tried to show that the anthropomorphism of
nature is not only likely to affect the relation with the hu-
manized agent (i.e., nature; for a distinction between con-
sequences for the perceiver and for the perceived, see
Waytz, Gray et al., 2010), but also with a third party (i.e.,
the victims of natural disasters).
Two aspects of the present results are particularly note-
worthy. The first one relates to the distinction between
“metaphorical,” or weak, and “teleological,” or strong, an-
thropomorphism (Taber & Watts, 1996). As the present re-
search showed, the anthropomorphism of nature is not
merely a metaphor that uses beliefs and emotions to com-
municate ideas on nature in analogy with human beings.
Instead, given the social relevance of its consequences for
behavioral intentions, it is likely to be closer to a teleolog-
274 S. Sacchi et al.: Anthropomorphization of Nature and Support for Disaster Victims
Social Psychology 2013; Vol. 44(4):271–277 © 2012 Hogrefe Publishing
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
ical anthropomorphism that allows phenomena to be ex-
plained in terms of agency and mental state (Gray et al.,
2007).
The second intriguing point is related to the complemen-
tarity highlighted by Kwan and Fiske (2008) between an-
thropomorphism – which means attributing human-like
characteristics to nonhumans – and dehumanization, which
means denying human characteristics of humans (Waytz,
Epley, & Cacioppo, 2010). According to this perspective,
the study of social perception cannot be independent from
the analysis of nonhuman perception.. As our results re-
vealed, helpfulness toward victims of natural disasters de-
creases when the social perceiver has an anthropomorphic
view of nature. Consistent with this, Cuddy, Rock, and Nor-
ton (2007) found evidence that, when the victims of the
Hurricane Katrina were dehumanized, participants were
less likely to volunteer relief. Thus, the humanization of
nature – the agent – has the same effects as the dehuman-
ization of the victims.
These preliminary results also raise a number of stimu-
lating questions that might be addressed in further studies.
One interesting direction for further research is to clarify
the factors that could account for the observed relationship
between anthropomorphization and social help. For in-
stance, since moral interactions entail complementary roles
(DeScioli & Kurzban, 2009; Gray & Wegner, 2009), view-
ing a natural disaster in terms of meaningful actions or of
punishment driven by intentionality may imply the percep-
tion of the victims of natural disasters as wrongdoers.
Hence, the question of whether the attribution of responsi-
bility or victims’ blame mediate the effects on helping in-
tentions could be explored. Moreover, we believe that the
relationship between the anthropomorphism of nature and
help intentions could be also significantly moderated by the
individual’s just world belief (Lerner, 1980). Future studies
could introduce direct measures of these theoretical con-
structs into the procedure.
Another interesting extension of the present work could
refer to the valence of the event. Given that negative natural
events have important social costs, and that harms are gen-
erally related to agency perception because more essential
to control (Gray & Wegner, 2010), in the current investiga-
tion we considered a natural disaster, namely, the recent
earthquake in Japan. Clearly, future studies should explore
the effects of the anthropomorphization of nature when nat-
ural events are positive rather than negative (e.g., annual
Nile flood).
Finally, the current results may also have some relevant
practical implications. For instance, when media speak
about the “ire” of a hurricane (e.g., “The ire of Irene,” 2011,
http://arabnews.com/opinion/editorial/article494423.ece)
or about the “anger” of a volcano (e.g., Shukman, 2010,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/8622745.stm), they
not only lend their description of natural events vividness,
but they may also elicit some relevant social perception
processes. These social consequences are likely to be even
more relevant when the anthropomorphization of nature is
associated with animism and teleology (Gallant, 1981), as
in some religious discourses. In this case, nature effectively
becomes not only personified, but also the personification
of the divinity or the concrete instrument of God’s will
(e.g., Morewedge & Clear, 2008).
Acknowledgment
We would like to thank Marco Abbati for his help in data
collection.
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Received January 04, 2012
Final revision received April 23, 2012
Accepted April 24, 2012
Published online July 27, 2012
Simona Sacchi
Department of Psychology
University of Milano-Bicocca
P.zza dell’Ateneo Nuovo 1
20126 Milan
Italy
Tel. +39 02 6448-3821
E-mail simona.sacchi@unimib.it
276 S. Sacchi et al.: Anthropomorphization of Nature and Support for Disaster Victims
Social Psychology 2013; Vol. 44(4):271–277 © 2012 Hogrefe Publishing
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
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Appendix
Complete list of items used in Study 1 and Study 2 (in Italian in the questionnaire).
Anthropomorphization (Study 1 and Study 2)
Nature acts according to its own intentions
Nature is conscious
Nature has free will
Nature perceives stimuli
Nature experiences emotions (only in Study 2)
Emotions (Study 1)
Confusion
Love
Pleasure
Regret
Fear
Veneration
Happiness
Vindictiveness
Anger
Admiration
Attraction
Humiliation
Sadness
Tenderness
Euphoria
Delusion
Annoyance
Optimism
Excitement
Resentment
Help Intentions (Study 1 and Study 2)
The international community must help the Japanese people.
The Japanese themselves should provide the rebuilding.
The Japanese people have resources enough to face the crisis autonomously.
The international community must provide financial support for the Japanese people.
There are other communities who are in greater need than the Japanese people.
If I have time and the possibility, I myself would go to help the Japanese people.
If I have time and the possibility, I myself would promote fundraising in favor of the Japanese people.
If I have time and the possibility, I myself would make efforts to sensitize public awareness of the Japanese situation.
S. Sacchi et al.: Anthropomorphization of Nature and Support for Disaster Victims 277
© 2012 Hogrefe Publishing Social Psychology 2013; Vol. 44(4):271–277
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This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
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