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Exercise: Why It Is a Challenge for Both the Nonconscious and Conscious Mind
Abstract
The epidemic of physical inactivity is an important societal and individual problem. Despite the well-documented health effects of physical activity, only 22% of the population exercises regularly enough to get the physiological and psychological benefits (S. N. Blair, 1993, Physical activity, physical fitness, and health. Research Quarterly for Exercise and Sport, Vol. 64, pp. 365–376.) Why does 78% fail to do so? The problem is largely psychological and attributable to the processes of nonconscious and conscious mind. This paper reviews research on how nonconscious and conscious processing affects human behavior in general and exercise behavior in particular. Although there generally is no question about the effect of the nonconscious mind on human behavior, “unconsciously operating motives” in and of themselves are incapable of igniting and sustaining this complex behavior—at least until the behavior has been repeated with regularity and long enough to become consistently prompted by situational cues (as is the case for 22% of the population). There is even some evidence to suggest that the nonconscious mind actually works against exercise by embracing cues and excuses for not exercising. A related problem for both the nonconscious and conscious mind, especially that of the occasional exerciser (54% of the population), is that exercise poses a threat to one's sense of freedom and choice (i.e., “you must do it or else”). The resultant psychological reactance leads to attempts to restore this freedom, but it is often accomplished by giving in to temptations (e.g., TV watching). Although people recognize fitness and health as important human conditions, they often pursue these goals by using exercise as a means toward another end (e.g., to lose weight). In doing so, they struggle cognitively with their need for autonomy while trying to balance it in interpersonal and leisure contexts. Such struggle depletes finite self-control resources and makes people more vulnerable to temptations. The net result is that both the nonconscious mind and the conscious mind fail to turn most people into rational thinkers and “self as doers,” who would do what is best for their health. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2013 APA, all rights reserved)
... The dilemma mostly stems from cognitive demands exercise poses for individuals. Everyone wants to be healthy without having to work for it, and their conscious thinking readily accommodates this propensity through excuses (Iso-Ahola, 2013). Thus, Festinger's (1957) cognitive dissonance problem of two conflicting cognitions is a reality for many would-be exercisers: "Exercise is good for me" vs. "I don't exercise regularly." ...
... Thus, for most people, the initiation and maintenance of exercise has become a conscious decision to do or not to do it, and this is a key reason why 54% of the population remains "occasional" exercisers and 24% non-exercisers (Iso-Ahola, 2013. Over time, the non-conscious mind has relinquished its control of exercise over to a conscious decision to engage or not to engage, and when having that choice, most people intentionally opt for not exercising (Iso-Ahola, 2017, 2018), again, because physical activity has no immediate survival value. ...
... When health practices are undertaken as a means toward an end, they become outcomeoriented and include a choice of not doing them. This is a major reason why conscious deliberations will not be able to turn most people into regular exercisers (Iso-Ahola, 2013. ...
CITATION Iso-Ahola SE (2023) Non-consciously processed physical activity for survival versus consciously deliberated exercise for health. Humans evolved to become dependent on physical activity for their survival, but they have not evolved to exercise today. Because survival in modern society is heavily reliant on conscious thinking, most people (54%) have evolved away from physical activity and become occasional exercisers. This transition from non-conscious to conscious processing prevents people from capitalizing on evolution's wisdom for survival and wellbeing as they consciously deliberate on the utility of health practices to achieve certain outcomes (e.g., weight loss). Unlike in early times, people today have a choice of not engaging in physical activity and yet surviving. As a result, they struggle with the question whether the gains from exercising are greater than losses from not doing it, weighing positive gains and losses against negative gains and losses. Such conscious deliberations, however, can easily be overridden by solving cognitive dissonance (e.g., "exercise is good for my health" vs. "I don't exercise") through conscious rationalizations and non-conscious dismissal. Today's exercise problem can only be solved by individually acquiring the mindset of early times of evolution when the initiation of physical activity was largely a matter of non-conscious thoughts and feelings.
... Is it simply a matter of conscious mental control, saying, "just do it," "get on with it"? It is clear from the reported statistics, however, that while some people succeed most fail in their attempts to achieve mentally demanding everyday goals (Iso-Ahola, 2013;Stroebe et al., 2013). For example, over 70% of the U.S. population is overweight and only about 22% exercises regularly. ...
... It has been argued that such demanding behaviors as exercise cannot be a choice among other leisure activities (Iso-Ahola, 2013, 2017a. Instead, when freedom of choice is suppressed or eliminated altogether by a long-term decision to undertake this behavior no matter what (e.g., going for a walk/run-rain or shine), nonconscious processing and the attendant automaticity of action is enhanced. ...
... An intriguing aspect of autonomy is that even if daily behaviors are presently viewed as obligatory, they can be turned into intrinsically motivating activities. For example, it is known that regular runners develop personal competence and expertise about their activity (e.g., subscribing to running magazines and buying expensive shoes), which increasingly helps them see running as their freely chosen activity, even if they originally had made a forced choice, or a negative choice, to run every day (Iso-Ahola, 2013, 2017a. A sense of autonomy grows with increased competence (Sheldon et al., 1996). ...
Much of everyday life consists of obligatory long-term behaviors, from work itself to doing dishes. Although some activities (e.g., exercise) are harder than others, even the seemingly easy activities can turn into hard ones when repeated monotonously day after day. It is proposed that this paradox has its roots in two fundamental human tendencies: (a) following the path of least resistance and (b) avoiding monotony, boredom, and even stimulus deprivation. How does the human mind operate in the presence of these tendencies to get everyday tasks and activities completed? The first tendency is manifested in gradual reduction of conscious processing and incremental increase in nonconscious processing. Constant repeats of demanding behaviors reduce cognitive strain and energy consumption, enhancing automaticity through the strengthened cue-behavior link. Automaticity in turn makes task performance easier and more efficient, resulting in a greater likelihood of getting everyday behaviors done. However, the sheer repeating of behavior is not enough; rather, a key is to repeat-with-variety, which posits that conscious interjection of variability into routine patterns facilitates the completion of both demanding and nondemanding behaviors in the long run. It is important, however, that such conscious intervention does not activate a sense of freedom about engagement because if it did, the elevated sense of freedom would undermine attempts to repeat behaviors and complete tasks. Understanding task completion also requires a consideration of the object of consciousness: Being unconscious of the mental processes motivating an action but conscious of the experience of doing the action.
... This inconsistent pattern of findings can, among other things, be explained with the help of the "strength model of selfcontrol" : Voluntary attention regulation is to be understood as a volitional process that depends on the current availability of self-control strength (Schmeichel & Baumeister, 2010). A number of studies have shown that a negative anxiety-performance relationship was only present if a person's self-control strength was experimentally depleted in a previous task (Englert & Bertrams, 2012, 2013. Subjects who did not have to exercise self-control strength before the respective sporting task were able to maintain their performance despite increased anxiety. ...
... their diet plans when they are in a state of ego depletion. According to Martin Ginis and Bray (2010), self-control must also be invested in the implementation of an exercise schedule in order to resist situational action alternatives and achieve the overall goal of physical fitness (see also Iso-Ahola, 2013). At the dispositional level, it has been shown that individuals with higher trait self-control strength are more likely to achieve their exercise goals . ...
Regular physical activity, healthy nutrition, and even learning sufficiently for a final exam are desirable behaviors that many individuals fail to implement in their lifestyle. In addition to motivation, volition plays a decisive role in the persistent implementation of target intentions. In this context, volition serves as a collective term for self-regulatory functions that enable the initiation and maintenance of a target intention, even when barriers to action arise. In this chapter, three of the central theories of volition will be presented and discussed: the “Rubicon model of action phases” (e.g., Heckhausen, 1989), the “theory of action control” (e.g., Kuhl, 1983; Kuhl and Beckmann, 1994), and the “strength model of self-control” (e.g., Baumeister et al., 1998). In addition, recommendations for action are derived from each theory in order to support the permanent implementation of target intentions.
... However, there are logical reasons to expect nonconsciously experienced phenomena to be more replicable because of people's general tendency to delegate conscious thoughts to nonconsciously processed operations (28,37). The more frequently thoughts and behaviors are repeated, the more automatic and nonconscious they become (19,20,21). As nonconscious thoughts are cognitively nondemanding, they are less liable to conscious interference, and thus, other things being equal, more repeatable and replicable. ...
... If we are unable to persuade most people to get vaccinated even when facing serious consequences from not doing it, what hope is there for getting the 78% segment of the population that is sedentary to start exercising regularly? (19,20,21). A lot of original studies and constructive replications remain to be funded and conducted. ...
As there are no universal constants in psychological, medical and economic sciences, only constructive-phenomenon replications are meaningful. Yet, psychologists continue to perform direct replications, as evidenced by recent preregistered multilab attempts at exact replications of the ego depletion effect. Statistics are driving the replication movement into a ditch because of an overemphasis on the determination of statistical magnitude of effects while ignoring commonsense magnitude and other criteria for evaluating phenomena’s validity, reliability, and viability. The nature of the human mind and the variability of psychological phenomena pose difficult challenges for the scientific method and insurmountable obstacles for precise replications in psychological sciences. The situation is no better in medical and economic sciences. The interaction effect of person (genetics) and environment (lifestyle) calls for constructive replications to determine, for example, drugs’ efficacy as a function of group and individual differences. The vaccine-vaccination paradox is an interesting case because psychological and medical sciences meet at this intersection. In all fields, science advances by theory building and model expansion, not by replication tests of statistical hypotheses. Rigorous logical and theoretical analysis always precedes and guides good empirical tests. The nonexistence of an effect is not viable if it can withstand rigorous logical and theoretical analyses. Empirical studies are mainly evaluated for their theoretical relevance and importance, not their success or failure to exactly reproduce the original findings.
... Although social desirability and heightened awareness through monitoring may be relevant across populations, they may be particularly influential among women in midlife with elevated CVD risk, who are aware of the benefits of regular PA for their health conditions and express self-consciousness about their failure to adhere to PA guidelines (Im et al., 2010;Hendry et al., 2010). These women may experience greater motivation for PA and reducing time spent sedentary at the outset of a research study -particularly if PA is presented as the research context (as in the present study) -as a way to reduce the discrepancy between their knowledge and behavior (Iso-Ahola, 2013). A regression to the mean effect may occur over the observation period, as more typical habits take over during their busy daily lives. ...
Objectives:
To estimate the extent of reactivity to measurement of physical activity (PA) and sedentary behavior among women in midlife with elevated risk for cardiovascular disease (CVD).
Design:
Secondary analysis of a 10-day observational study of PA and sedentary behavior.
Main outcome measures:
PA (steps, minutes of light PA, total minutes of moderate-to- vigorous PA [MVPA]) and percent time in sedentary behavior per day were assessed using ActiGraph GT3X tri-axial accelerometers in 75 women in midlife with elevated CVD risk (e.g. hypertension; MAge = 51.61, MBMI = 34.02 kg/m2). Two-level multilevel models were used to test for evidence of reactivity, with the addition of random effects to test for evidence of individual differences in observed trends.
Results:
All outcomes showed linear trends across days (ps < 0.001), though this masked what appeared to be meaningful dropoff after Day 1 or Day 2 (with little difference between subsequent days; srs ranging from 0.15 to 0.32). The random effect was significant only for percent time in sedentary behavior (χ2[1] = 10.40, p = 0.02).
Conclusions:
Consistent small to medium effects were found for all PA and sedentary behavior outcomes, underscoring the importance of considering measurement reactivity in populations with elevated CVD risk.
... Moreover, transportation researchers apply theories of self-control to predict risks while driving (Keane et al., 1993), educators examine the impact of self-control on academic performance (Englert & Bertrams, 2013;Oaten & Cheng, 2006;Tangney et al., 2004), and personality researchers have shown robust links between self-control and addiction (Kim et al., 2008;Schilbach, 2019). Among these studies, self-control appears as an independent, dependent, moderating, and mediating variable, and has been broadly applied to all manner of research questions ranging from dieting to exercise to religion to finances (Iso-Ahola, 2013;Liu et al., 2019;Reynolds & Baumeister, 2016;Sullivan et al., 2015). As such, the scientific literature suggests that self-control is a fundamental element of human behavior. ...
The study of self-control occurs in many different types of experimental settings using a wide range of methodologies. In addition, measures of self-control vary in their procedures and operational definitions from simple questionnaires to complex scenarios where individuals must choose to act or not. The present summary draws on trends within the literature using widely accepted measures of self-control. The measures are organized based on established paradigms in the literature and focus on three categories: executive functioning tasks, delay of gratification tasks, and subjective-report surveys. We also include an “additional measures” category to capture measures that do not readily fit in these three categories. Finally, we discuss recent approaches to the scientific exploration of self-control and integrate the categories of measures used here within these approaches. This integration incorporates a wide range of research paradigms and provides direction for future studies.
How people engage in leisure is an important but frequently underappreciated aspect of meaning in life. Leisure activities range from highly engaging and meaningful to subjectively trivial. Leisure itself is largely defined by meaning: The essence of leisure lies less in the specific activity than in the subjective perception of freedom, choice, and intrinsic motivation. People desire their lives to be meaningful, and leisure activities offer varying degrees of satisfying the basic needs for meaning (here covered as purpose, value, efficacy, and self-worth). Leisure activities vary along multiple conceptual dimensions, such as active vs. passive, seeking vs. escaping, solitary vs. interpersonal, and we consider the implications of these for meaningfulness. The most common leisure activity in modern society, watching television, encapsulates some of the paradoxes of leisure and meaningfulness. The study of how leisure enhances meaning in life is rich and ripe for future research.
O estresse e a prática de exercícios físicos, implicam em diversos desfechos à saúde dos indivíduos, dentre eles as alterações celulares. O ensaio de citoma de micronúcleo bucal (BMCyt) é um biomarcador amplamente utilizado para avaliar os impactos das características de estilo de vida como níveis de estresse sobre alterações nucleares. O objetivo deste estudo foi avaliar e relacionar o nível de estresse percebido com a ocorrência de dano no DNA e outras anormalidades nucleares/celulares em praticantes de academia. Estudo transversal descritivo, realizado com 116 praticantes de academia de Madrid, Espanha. Um questionário foi utilizado para avaliar o nível de estresse percebido e o BMCyt foi utilizado para avaliar a de dano no DNA e outras anormalidades nucleares/celulares. Dos 116 indivíduos avaliados, 54,3% relataram estar às vezes estressados. Não houve diferença significativa em relação ao nível de estresse relatado e os biomarcadores de dano no DNA (células com micronúcleos ou brotos nucleares), potencial proliferativo (frequência de células basais) e de morte celular (células com cromatina condensada, cariorréxicas, cariolíticas e picnóticas) (p>0,05). Contudo, os praticantes de academia que relataram estar quase sempre/excessivamente estressados apresentaram significativamente menor frequência de células binucleadas (biomarcador de defeitos citogenéticos) em relação aos indivíduos que relataram estar raramente estressados (p=0,008). Nossos resultados mostraram que a maioria dos praticantes de academia relataram estar às vezes estressados. Entretanto, verificou-se que os praticantes de academia que relataram estar quase sempre/excessivamente estressados apresentaram menor frequência de células binucleadas.
The research aims to examine the static and dynamic balance capacities of 5-9-year-old children who receive gymnastics training. The research group consists of 101 children, 21 boys and 80 girls, between the ages of 5-9 who are trained in gymnastics. Static balance (Flamingo balance test) and dynamic balance (Y balance test) tests, which are among the basic motor movement performance tests, were applied to examine the balance ability, one of the basic motor capacities of children aged 5-9. Arithmetic average and standard deviation, frequency and percentage distribution from general distribution statistics were obtained as data and Independent T test and One Way Anova tests were used to determine the significance levels between variables. With this research, it was concluded that the static and dynamic balance capacities of children who received gymnastics training at the age of 5-9 differ according to the age variable.
To illustrate the differing thoughts and emotion's involved in guiding habitual and nonhabitual behavior, 2,. diary studies were conducted in which participants provided hourly reports of their ongoing experiences. When participants were engaged in habitual behavior, defined as behavior that had been performed almost daily in stable contexts, they were likely to think about issues unrelated to their behavior, presumably because they did not have to consciously guide their actions. When engaged in nonhabitual behavior,or actions performed less often or :in shifting contexts; participants' thoughts tended to correspond to their behavior, suggesting that thought was necessary to guide action. Furthermore, the self-regulatory, benefits of habits were apparent in the lesser feelings of stress associated with habitual,. than nonhabitual behavior.
Empirical study of free will is directly related to the study of the control of human behavior. This chapter discusses four cognitive research paradigms, as well as their implications for the study of free will. Libet's investigations of the neural precursors of conscious choice provide evidence challenging the primacy of conscious thought. Studies using Logan's stop-signal paradigm demonstrate the capacity to inhibit simple, even habitual, actions. Research using Jacoby's process dissociation procedure (PDP) suggests that human behavior may be influenced by both automatic and controlled processes. The use of Koriat and Goldsmith's free and forced reporting procedure demonstrates how control may be exercised over both the accuracy and specificity of responses in cognitive tasks. All four paradigms show that humans can exert at least partial control over their actions, especially through inhibition. However, whether such control is evidence for the existence of free will may never be answered.
A theory of ironic processes of mental control is proposed to account for the intentional and counterintentional effects that result from efforts at self-control of mental states. The theory holds that an attempt to control the mind introduces 2 processes: (a) an operating process that promotes the intended change by searching for mental contents consistent with the intended state and (b) a monitoring process that tests whether the operating process is needed by searching for mental contents inconsistent with the intended state. The operating process requires greater cognitive capacity and normally has more pronounced cognitive effects than the monitoring process, and the 2 working together thus promote whatever degree of mental control is enjoyed. Under conditions that reduce capacity, however, the monitoring process may supersede the operating process and thus enhance the person's sensitivity to mental contents that are the ironic opposite of those that are intended.
Publisher Summary Individuals come to “know” their own attitudes, emotions, and other internal states partially by inferring them from observations of their own overt behavior and/ or the circumstances in which this behavior occurs. Thus, to the extent that internal cues are weak, ambiguous, or uninterpretable, the individual is functionally in the same position as an outside observer, an observer who must necessarily rely upon those same external cues to infer the individual's inner states. This chapter traces the conceptual antecedents and empirical consequences of these propositions, attempts to place the theory in a slightly enlarged frame of reference, and clarifies just what phenomena the theory can and cannot account for in the rapidly growing experimental literature of self-attribution phenomena. Several experiments and paradigms from the cognitive dissonance literature are amenable to self-perception interpretations. But precisely because such experiments are subject to alternative interpretations, they cannot be used as unequivocal evidence for self-perception theory. The reinterpretation of cognitive dissonance phenomena and other self-perception phenomena have been discussed. The chapter highlights some differences between self-perception and interpersonal perception and shift of paradigm in social psychology. It discusses some unsolved problems, such as the conceptual status of noncognitive response classes and the strategy of functional analysis.
Aristotle proposed that to achieve happiness and success, people should cultivate virtues at mean or intermediate levels between deficiencies and excesses. In stark contrast to this assertion that virtues have costs at high levels, a wealth of psychological research has focused on demonstrating the well-being and performance benefits of positive traits, states, and experiences. This focus has obscured the prevalence and importance of nonmonotonic inverted-U-shaped effects, whereby positive phenomena reach inflection points at which their effects turn negative. We trace the evidence for nonmonotonic effects in psychology and provide recommendations for conceptual and empirical progress. We conclude that for psychology in general and positive psychology in particular, Aristotle's idea of the mean may serve as a useful guide for developing both a descriptive and a prescriptive account of happiness and success.
© The Author(s) 2011.
Aristotle proposed that to achieve happiness and success, people should cultivate virtues at mean or intermediate levels between deficiencies and excesses. In stark contrast to this assertion that virtues have costs at high levels, a wealth of psychological research has focused on demonstrating the well-being and performance benefits of positive traits, states, and experiences. This focus has obscured the prevalence and importance of nonmonotonic inverted-U-shaped effects, whereby positive phenomena reach inflection points at which their effects turn negative. We trace the evidence for nonmonotonic effects in psychology and provide recommendations for conceptual and empirical progress. We conclude that for psychology in general and positive psychology in particular, Aristotle’s idea of the mean may serve as a useful guide for developing both a descriptive and a prescriptive account of happiness and success.
Evidence is reviewed which suggests that there may be little or no direct introspective access to higher order cognitive processes. Subjects are sometimes (a) unaware of the existence of a stimulus that importantly influenced a response, (b) unaware of the existence of the response, and (c) unaware that the stimulus has affected the response. It is proposed that when people attempt to report on their cognitive processes, that is, on the processes mediating the effects of a stimulus on a response, they do not do so on the basis of any true introspection. Instead, their reports are based on a priori, implicit causal theories, or judgments about the extent to which a particular stimulus is a plausible cause of a given response. This suggests that though people may not be able to observe directly their cognitive processes, they will sometimes be able to report accurately about them. Accurate reports will occur when influential stimuli are salient and are plausible causes of the responses they produce, and will not occur when stimuli are not salient or are not plausible causes.
This chapter describes an empirically based model of how the brain causes behavior and how different brain areas interact to initiate and control movement. In particular, it looks at the role of the frontal cortex/basal ganglia loops in initiating interaction between intention and motivation. After providing a brief overview of the structure and function of the motor system in the human brain, the chapter considers the concepts of “willed intentions” and “sensorimotor intentions” and discusses Benjamin Libet’s experiments on the timing of consciousness in relation to voluntary movement.