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Softer Smartcards - Usable Cryptographic Tokens with Secure Execution
... The TPM operations can be used to assert to a remote party that certain data was generated by a trusted PAL. In [12] and [3] this framework is respectively extended to allow USB-UHCI and secure user interaction (i.e. input via the keyboard and output via the monitor). ...
... The user can only trust the displayed information if he is assured that it has been generated by a trusted PAL. Brasser et al. [3] proposed an enrollment procedure during which a user-specific picture is sealed to the state of the trusted PAL. This is done in a trusted enrollment environment (e.g. on a freshly installed workstation, not yet connected to the Internet) so that an attacker cannot obtain the picture of the user. ...
... The provider responds with an authentication request containing its certificate, the attribute request and an attestation challenge (2). Subsequently, the PAL is started and the attribute request is passed as a parameter, together with (enc img ) and the certificate of the service provider (3). The PAL now unseals enc img (4). ...
Smart cards are popular devices for storing authentication credentials, because they are easily (trans)portable and offer a secure way for storing these credentials. They have, however, a few disadvantages. First, most smart cards do not have a user interface. Hence, if the smart card requires a PIN, users typically have to enter it via an untrusted workstation. Second, smart cards are resource constrained devices which impedes the adoption of advanced privacy-enhancing technologies (PETs) such as anonymous credentials.
This paper presents a new solution that addresses these issues. It allows users to enter their PIN via the workstation and securely transfer it to the smart card. The solution further extends existing smart card assisted authentication technology based on X.509 credentials with privacy-preserving features such as multi-show unlinkability and selective disclosure. The system can, hence, be used to improve the privacy properties of these rolled-out infrastructures. The solution relies on a secure execution environment running on the workstation. We have put our solution into practice and implemented a prototype.
... The framework supports both Intel TXT and AMD's SVM technology on Windows and Linux based systems. In [5] this framework is extended to allow secure user interaction (i.e. input via the keyboard and output via the monitor). ...
... To allow attestation that this public key is indeed managed by the trusted application, the state is extended with this key (4). The PAL returns its public key to the workstation which resumes its execution (5). A quote operation on the state resulting from the PAL execution is performed using the attestation challenge (6). ...
Traditionally, a user requires substantial trust in a workstation for correctly handling her credentials (e.g. password/login). Unfortunately, malware and compromised software makes them unsuitable for secure credential management. Credentials are easily stolen and the user cannot trust what is being displayed on her workstation, obstructing informed consent.
This paper presents a new solution that addresses these issues. Credentials are bound to the owner using biometrics, effectively impeding abuse through credential sharing and theft. The biometric verification is performed on the client side, preserving the privacy of the user. The solution ensures that the user is correctly informed about the pending authentication, preventing abuse by malware. To demonstrate the feasibility of our approach, a prototype was implemented.
... DRTM technology has been used to securely execute critical software payloads such as SSH logins, X.509 e-mail signatures, or to protect banking secrets [16], [32], [64]. Intel TXT has also been used in combination with Intel VT to initiate a trusted hypervisor, which in turn provides multiple TEEs to the individual running VMs [63]. ...
Trusted computing technologies for mobile devices have been researched, developed, and deployed over the past decade. Although their use has been limited so far, ongoing standardization may change this by opening up these technologies for easy access by developers and users. In this survey, we describe the current state of trusted computing solutions for mobile devices from research, standardization, and deployment perspectives.
... In particular, secure peripherals were shown to be essential for many applications scenarios, such as providing secure user input/output for explicit confirmation of online transactions [6,13,54]. Additionally, we believe that the following functional requirements are essential for providing a practical and versatile security solution: ...
Embedded systems are increasingly pervasive, interdependent and in many cases critical to our every day life and safety. Tiny devices that cannot afford sophisticated hardware security mechanisms are embedded in complex control infrastructures, medical support systems and entertainment products [51]. As such devices are increasingly subject to attacks, new hardware protection mechanisms are needed to provide the required resilience and dependency at low cost.
In this work, we present the TrustLite security architecture for flexible, hardware-enforced isolation of software modules. We describe mechanisms for secure exception handling and communication between protected modules, enabling seamless interoperability with untrusted operating systems and tasks. TrustLite scales from providing a simple protected firmware runtime to advanced functionality such as attestation and trusted execution of userspace tasks. Our FPGA prototype shows that these capabilities are achievable even on low-cost embedded systems.
Classic two-factor authentication has been around for a long time and has enjoyed success in certain markets (such as the corporate and the banking environ- ment). A reason for this success are the strong security properties, particularly where user interaction is concerned. These properties hinge on a security token being a physi- cally separate device. This paper investigates whether Trusted Execution Environments (TEE) can be used to achieve a comparable level of security without the need to have a separate device. To do this, we introduce a model that shows the security properties of user interaction in two-factor authentication. The model is used to examine two TEE technologies, Intel’s IPT and ARM TrustZone, revealing that, although it is possible to get close to classic two-factor authentication in terms of user interaction security, both technologies have distinct drawbacks. The model also clearly shows an open problem shared by many TEEs: how to prove to the user that they are dealing with a trusted application when trusted and untrusted applications share the same display.
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