BookPDF Available

Das politische System der Schweiz.

January 2011

Publisher: Présence Suisse, Bern.

Authors:

Andrea Iff

Swisspeace

Wolf Linder

Universität Bern

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SwiSS Political SyStem

Switzerland is a small country in Western

Europe with 7.8 million inhabitants. With

its 41,285 square kilometres, Switzerland

accounts for only 0.15 % of the world’s total

surface area. It borders Germany in the

north, Austria and Liechtenstein in the east,

Italy in the south and France in the west.

The population is diverse by language as

well as by religious affiliation. Its historical

roots date back to 1291, whereas the

modern nation state was founded in 1848.

Switzerland’s population is 1.5 % of Europe;

however, the country is economically com-

paratively strong.

INTRODUCTION

Switzerland is a federation; the territory is divided

into 26 cantons. The cantons themselves are

the aggregate of 2,600 municipalities (cities and

villages).

FEDERAL SYSTEM

ELECTIONS AND

DIRECT DEMOCRACY

CONSENSUS

DEMOCRACY

COMPARATIVE

PERSPECTIVES

The political system is strongly influenced by

direct participation of the people. In addition to

the participation in elections, referenda and ini-

tiatives are the key elements of Switzerland’s

well-established tradition of direct democracy.

The consensus type democracy is a third char-

acteristic of Swiss political system. The institu-

tions are designed to represent cultural diver-

sity and to include all major political parties in a

grand-coalition government. This leads to a non-

concentration of power in any one hand but the

diffusion of power among many actors.

After the elaboration of these three important

elements of the Swiss political system, a com-

parative perspective shall exemplify the main

differences of the system vis-à-vis other western

democracies

CONTENTS

PU BLICATION DATA

Switzerland is a federal state with three

political levels: the federal govern-

ment, the 26 cantons and around 2,600

municipalities.



An important element of the Swiss federal

system is the non-centralised division of

powers.



At the same time, the Swiss federal system

is characterised by several forms of vertical

and horizontal co-operation between the

different levels.



The traditionally strong position of the

cantons is also mirrored in the institutional

provisions how they can influence the deci-

sion making at the federal level, among

which the most typical is the second cham-

ber of parliament.



Within the constitutional framework of the

cantons, also the municipalities retain a strong

position in the federal system, based on the

bottom-up development of the federation.



The decentralised division of powers is

also mirrored in the fiscal federal structure

giving the cantonal and municipal level own

tax bases.



An important reason for a federalist nation

building in the 19th century lies in the fact

that the Swiss society is composed of differ-

ent religious and linguistic groups. Federal-

ism promised to combine national unity with

multicultural diversity.



Because of globalisation and internation-

alisation, the Swiss federal system faces

several problems and reform needs, which

are however difficult to achieve. 

FEDERAL SYSTEM

DECENTRALISED DIVISION OF

POWERS: BOTTOM UP

Because of the historical development of the fed-

eration, the cantons retained important powers

of their own and a non-centralised distribution of

responsibilities is in place. All new powers are

vested with the cantons and when the division of

powers is changed, cantons enjoy a kind of veto

power. This distribution and the attempt to solve

issues at the lowest possible level – known as

the subsidiarity principle – are the cornerstones

of Swiss federalism.

Distribution of powers and responsibilities

Municipalities have exclusive powers in local ser-

vice delivery (building and surveillance of local

roads, gas, electricity and water supply, removal

services, election of teachers and building of

schools). Cantons especially retained powers

that are important for their identity (culture,

education, languages, religion) but also issues

related to social policy (health and social ser-

vices). In policy areas that either directly concern

national sovereignty (army, monetary policy, or

external relations) or require special co-ordi-

nation (social security, environment, energy, or

infrastructure), the federal level has exclusive

powers or can promulgate framework legisla-

tion. All three levels, the federal, the cantonal

and the municipal level, have the right to raise

taxes and thus have a certain level of financial

autonomy.

Change in distribution of powers

In Switzerland, as in other federal states,

centralisation or decentralisation of responsi-

bilities is a constant political issue that prompts

ideological, social and economic conflict. By

constitutional rule, the Swiss government can

assume new responsibilities only if the double

majority of the people and the cantons agree

in a popular vote. This has two consequences.

Firstly, it is the cantons who are responsible for

any new tasks in the first place. Secondly, the

constitutional rule protects the autonomy of the

cantons. In the past, many projects for a new

responsibility of the Federal Government failed

in the first run of a popular vote, and one of the

strongest arguments was opposition against

centralisation. In these cases, the bill passed in

a second vote if central government presented a

modified, less centralising project.

Subsidiarity principle

The Swiss federal system exhibits a marked

preference for extensive cantonal and local

autonomy that is based on the idea of subsidiar-

ity. The idea of subsidiarity proposes that a cen-

tral authority should perform only those tasks

which cannot be performed effectively at a more

immediate or local level. In Switzerland, this idea

had a long tradition, already before subsidiarity

has become a constitutional guideline in 2000.

In fact, surveys show that Swiss citizens expect

less responsibilities to be taken by the state than

do citizens from neighbouring countries, and that

they prefer decentralised solutions whenever

possible. The strong autonomy of the cantons

and their communes therefore still corresponds

to the preferences of Swiss citizens today. 

EXAMPLE

Swiss citizenship

DISTRIBUTION OF POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES

FEDERAL POWERS

Based on the Swiss Constitution

CANTONAL POWERS

Based on cantonal constitutions

MUNICIPAL POWERS

Depending on cantonal

legislation

Organisation of federal

authorities

Foreign affairs

Army and civil protection

National streets (highways)

Nuclear energy

Postal services and

telecommunication

Monetary policy

Social security

(pensions, invalids)

Civil law, criminal law

Civil and criminal procedure

Customs

Education (technical universities)

Energy policy

Principles for zoning

Protection of the environment

Citizenship

Federal taxes

Organisation of cantonal

authorities (own constitution,

own anthem, own flag)

Cross-border cooperation

Police

Relations between religion and

state

Culture

Public health

Cantonal streets

Forests, water, natural resources

Education (secondary schools

and universities)

Protection of the environment

Protection of nature and heritage

Citizenship

Cantonal taxes

Education (kindergarten and

primary schools)

Waste management

Municipal streets

Local infrastructure

Local police

Zoning

Citizenship

Municipal taxes

Cantons and capitals with date of entry in the Swiss Confederation

CO-OPERATIVE FEDERALISM

During the first years of the modern federa-

tion, a clear distinction and division of powers

between the federal level, the cantons and the

municipalities was in place. This clear division

of responsibilities, however, has subsequently

been overruled by the mechanisms of inten-

sive co-operation between the three levels of

the federal system. The complexities of mod-

ern infrastructure, economic intervention and

social programmes stimulated the completion

of federal legislation by the cantons, the imple-

mentation of federal programmes by cantonal

and local authorities, and extensive finance and

revenue sharing. Thus, a net of vertical and

horizontal co-operation between and among the

three levels has been established.

Implementation

Most federal policies are implemented by the

cantons and the communes. Thus, the cantons

do not only have their own powers and respon-

sibilities, but they have also the possibility to

influence the implementation of federal policies.

No parallel federal administration with its own

agencies or courts has been established. This

form of co-operation between the federation and

the cantons is controversial. In the past, fed-

eral legislation was of a rather general nature,

leaving considerable discretion for cantonal

implementation. Today, when uniform imple-

mentation is required, federal legislation is more

detailed, and cantonal actors have to report to

federal authorities on its implementation. There-

fore, cantons typically take the view that their

autonomy is endangered if federal legislation

is too detailed, giving them no leeway in imple-

mentation and therefore leading to informal

centralisation. Cantons consider the right to be

different as a central element of federalism.

EXAMPLE

Swiss asylum policy

Vertical co-operation

Besides the vertical co-operation between the

federal and the cantonal level through imple-

mentation of federal laws through the cantons,

there are further forms of vertical co-operation.

As a consequence of internationalisation and

globalisation, foreign relations have become

an important example of vertical co-operation

between the cantons and the federal authori-

ties. Lately, new forms of co-operation have

been introduced, comprising all three levels

of government: the Tripartite Agglomerations

Conference is a political platform of the federa-

tion, the cantons and the cities. It is designed

to prepare political solutions to the problems of

cities, especially big agglomerations like Zurich

and Geneva, which are outreaching cantonal or

even national borders.

Horizontal co-operation

The cantons have the right and are encour-

aged to co-operate amongst each other. Today,

there are more than 700 intercantonal treaties

in different policy fields; however, most of these

are concluded between two cantons only. They

concern mainly finances and taxes, education,

police, infrastructure and health. For these spe-

cific policy areas, different conferences of min-

isters of the cantons (e.g. education, police,

health, finances) have been established already

a long time ago. A younger institution of horizon-

tal co-operation is the Conference of the Govern-

ments of the Cantons, a conference of all execu-

tives of the cantons. Its aim is amongst others

to develop common cantonal positions vis-à-vis

the federal authorities, especially in questions of

foreign policy. As the conference cannot issue

binding guidelines but only recommendations, it

relies on consensus among the cantons. 

CANTONAL PARTICIPATION IN

FEDERAL DECISION MAKING

Besides the non-centralised distribution of pow-

ers, the cantonal participation in the decision-

making process at the federal level is another

important characteristic of Swiss federalism.

The most important formal institutions for this

are the second chamber of parliament, the dou-

ble majority of cantons in a popular vote and the

possibility for cantons to use the instruments of

cantonal initiative and referendum. Moreover,

the informal process of pre-parliamentary con-

sultation has become an important instrument of

influence. Through this process, cantons have

a strong voice in the decision-making process

when a new law is designed.

Second chamber of parliament

Cantons are represented in the second cham-

ber, the Council of States. Following the federal

principle of equal representation of all cantons,

it is composed of one member from the cantons

Basel-Stadt and Basel-Landschaft, Obwalden

and Nidwalden, Appenzell Innerrhoden and

Appenzell Ausserrhoden and two members from

each of the other 20 cantons so that there is a

total of 46 members. The members of the Coun-

cil of States are not bound to any mandate by the

canton. The cantons themselves determine the

modes of election of their representatives. The

composition of the second chamber leads to a

strong overrepresentation of the small cantons:

the fourteen smallest cantons represent less

than 20 % of the people but can, with 23 votes,

block every decision in the Council of States.

Double majority of cantons in popular vote

In addition to the second chamber, the Swiss

cantons have further possibilities to influence

decision making at the central level. For every

constitutional amendment (mandatory refer-

endum or popular initiative) the approval of a

majority of the people but also of a majority of

the cantons is required. For the majority of the

cantons, Basel-Stadt and Basel-Landschaft,

Obwalden and Nidwalden, Appenzell Innerrho-

den and Appenzell Ausserrhoden count half a

vote while the remaining 20 cantons count one

vote. Thus, for the majority of the cantons 12 of

23 cantonal votes are required.

Instruments of direct democracy

Every canton is entitled to hand in proposals for

a federal bill. This is called the right of cantonal

initiative. The proposal has to be approved by

the Federal Assembly, and if it is rejected by one

of the chambers it fails. In addition a collective of

eight cantons has the right to demand a popular

vote on every bill passed by the Federal Assem-

bly. This provision was used for the first time in

2003 when cantonal governments were strongly

opposed to a new federal tax bill.

EXAMPLE

First cantonal referendum 2003

Pre-parliamentary consultation process

Cantons can influence decision making during

the pre-parliamentary consultation process. It is

the most usual way of cantonal influence rather

than in later decisions of parliament or popu-

lar vote. However, the cantons are not the only

actors that are given a voice in the consultation;

the associations and the political parties take

part, too. Often, the cantons retain the most

influence when they are responsible for the

implementation of a law. 

Members of the National Council

by Cantons

Members of the Council of States

by Cantons

THE IMPORTANCE OF LOCAL

GOVERNMENT

Swiss municipalities, about 2,600 in number,

differ strongly in geographical dimension and

population size. Not only the cantonal but also

the municipal level is constitutionally protected.

Communes have the right to choose their local

political organisation within the boundaries of

the cantonal legislation and they have the right

to impose municipal taxes and decide on the tax

rates. Municipalities are closest to the people

and often develop solutions that are tailor-made

for local problems.

Constitutional guarantees

Within the limits of cantonal organisation, the

municipalities have a constitutional right to exist,

including the freedom to merge with other munic-

ipalities or to remain independent, which cannot

be withdrawn by the cantons. This means that

the reform of local government “from above”, as

can be observed in other federations when small

municipalities are for example forced to merge,

would be rather impossible in Switzerland.

Indeed the number of communes (about 3,000

until the early 1990s) had barely decreased

for decades. Since then, about 400 municipali-

ties have merged into larger units, which is not

astonishing because more than half of the Swiss

municipalities count approximately 500 inhabit-

ants. The following figure shows the geographi-

cal borders of the municipalities in Switzerland.

Political organisation

The municipalities have the freedom to choose,

within the boundaries of cantonal legislation, an

adequate political structure and administration.

There are cantons with numerous small munici-

palities and others with fewer but larger ones,

and the degree of autonomy of the municipalities

varies from canton to canton. In small municipal-

ities, local government consists of a few elected

part-time officials who are poorly remunerated.

The larger cities have a parliamentary coun-

cil and a full-time political executive heading

professional services. This leads to somewhat

strange proportions: the 20,000 local govern-

ment officials in Zurich, the country’s largest city

with about 385,000 inhabitants, outnumber the

total population of the smallest canton, Appen-

zell Innerrhoden, which has 15,500 inhabitants.

Local taxes

The municipalities have the right to impose taxes

and to decide the rates by themselves. This is

certainly the most important element in assuring

the autonomy of local government. Fiscal auton-

omy not only allows municipalities to decide on

local infrastructure, services, land-use planning

or other public utilities according to their own

preferences. It also establishes responsibility on

both sides of local government: authorities are

held responsible for using their resources accord-

ing to the people’s needs, and citizens have to

contribute with their taxes to the services they

demand. Thus, decentralised governance brings

the state closer to the people. With more than

30 % in the long-year average, the proportion of

the municipalities of total revenue and expendi-

ture of the three federal levels is considerable. 

EXAMPLE

Drug policy in Swiss cities

Municipalities and Cantons of Switzerland 2009

FISCAL FEDERALISM IN

SWITZERLAND

Each level of government in Switzerland is attrib-

uted with several revenue sources, even though

the cantons collect some taxes for the federal

level. Based on the autonomy of the cantons,

they have also the possibility to determine their

tax rates freely, which leads to tax competition.

However, possible negative effects of this com-

petition are mostly cushioned by several instru-

ments of a financial compensation. Overall, even

though the aim of the fiscal federal system is not

to promote equality of living conditions it is still

based on regional solidarity.

Each level has its own financial resources

All three government levels, the federation,

the cantons and the municipalities, raise direct

taxes (taxes on income as well as profit of enter-

prises). Income is taxed by all three levels, the

federation, the cantons and the municipalities.

The right of the federal level to raise direct taxes,

however, is based on only a temporary arrange-

ment which has to be periodically renewed by the

Federal Parliament. Other tax bases are exclu-

sively attributed to one state level. The value

added tax, certain consumption taxes as well as

the stamp and withholding tax are attributed to

the federal level. The cantons have the exclusive

right to raise taxes on the capital of enterprises

as well as other types of taxes within the limits of

the Swiss Constitution, e.g. inheritance taxes. At

the municipal level, besides direct taxation user

fees on public services (e.g. water, sewage and

purification plants or garbage collection) are the

main sources of revenues.

Collection of revenues

Cantons collect cantonal taxes, and as a service

to the centre, federal direct taxes as well as the

federal withholding and stamp tax. All other –

indirect – federal taxes are collected by the fed-

eral level itself. Municipalities sometimes collect

taxes for the cantons besides their own taxes;

however, in a majority of cantons the canton

collects the municipal taxes for the municipality.

As a rule, each level of state receives the taxes

it raised. Taxing is based on self-declaration of

the citizens and not subtracted directly from the

salary as in other European countries.

Tax competition

The cantons can determine their tax rates freely.

This results in different tax loads in the cantons

for the same revenue (see following graph), but

also in tax competition among cantons. This

competition could lead to a so-called “race to

the bottom”, in which all cantons will find it more

and more difficult to generate sufficient revenue.

However, several mechanisms have a moderat-

ing effect on tax competition, mainly the system

of financial compensation.

EXAMPLE

Impact of fiscal federal system

System of financial compensation

The Swiss cantons vary with regards to their

size and topography, but also with regards to

their number of inhabitants and the sociode-

mographic structure. To mitigate the resulting

effects of lower capacities and of higher service

costs of certain cantons, Switzerland introduced

a system of fiscal equalisation. Both the federal

as well as the cantonal level contribute to this

equalisation. The aim is not the equality of living

conditions but to compensate for differences

of resources between the “rich” and the “poor”

cantons. Besides these equalisation measures

among all cantons, cantonal tasks which have

spillover effects must be performed in contrac-

tual co-operation so that cantons that profit from

services provided by another canton have to

pay compensation to the service provider. Fur-

thermore, some cantons are compensated for

delivering services in the national interest.

Financial equalisation between the State

and the Cantons (in mio. CHF, 2008)

Non-promotion of equal living conditions

but regional solidarity

Swiss federalism does not promote equality of

living conditions among the cantons. The price

of diversity and autonomy is a certain degree of

socio-economic inequality between cantons and

communes which has to be accepted. Equality of

living conditions would mean centralised policies

and regulations, which would not be accepted

by the majority of the Swiss. Even so, federal

policies are characterised by the objective of

regional solidarity. Thus, the federation guaran-

tees minimum standards in public services, for

example in primary schooling, or provides public

transports not only between big cities but also

up to remote mountain regions.

Tax load in percentage of revenue,

income in thousand francs

Distribution of profit from Swiss National

Bank to the cantons

The Swiss National Bank conducts the coun-

try’s monetary policy as an independent central

bank. Its primary goal is to ensure price stability,

while taking due account of economic develop-

ments. In the distribution of profit, not only the

federal level but also the cantons are included.

One-third of the net profit is accrued to the fed-

eral government, two-thirds go to the cantons.

The cantons receive their shares depending on

the number of their inhabitants. 

FEDERALISM IN A

MULTICULTURAL STATE

Switzerland is composed of cantons of different

languages and religions. Federalism is appropri-

ate for these conditions, because it ensures cul-

tural diversity of the cantons within the national

unity. Federalism helped to mitigate conflicts

between Protestants and Catholics and to pre-

vent divisions between the language groups.

Still, federalism was not always successful in

integrating cultural and linguistic minorities. The

canton of Jura is an example where integration

failed. The Jura region seceded from the canton

of Bern.

EXAMPLE

Dealing with the separatist issue

Multicultural society

64 % of the Swiss population speak German,

20 % French, 6.5 % Italian, 0.5 % Romansh and,

due to immigration, 9 % speak another language

as their mother tongue (data of 2000 census).

Linguistic groups are territorially concentrated.

There are cantons with German-, French-

respectively Italian-speaking populations. Most

cantons are monolingual. Only three of the 26

cantons (Valais, Bern and Fribourg) are bilingual

and the canton of Graubünden is trilingual. The

Romansh-speaking community is the only one

that does not form a majority in any canton. The

two predominant religion groups are the Catho-

lics (44 %) and the Protestants (37 %). Today,

they are distributed more evenly than in the 19th

century, when there were cantons of clear Cath-

olic or Protestant majorities. However, even in

cantons with religious and linguistic diversity

most communes are relatively homogeneous.

Multicultural state

The Swiss nation does not consist of the eth-

nic or cultural unity of its people. Switzerland,

from the very beginning, considered itself as a

multicultural state, recognising different lan-

guages and religious beliefs as equal. Thus, the

constitution of 1848 stated that Switzerland con-

sists of 25 cantons and their peoples. The iden-

tity of Switzerland does not consist in the afl-

iation of its people to the same ethnic group,

religious belief or culture but relies on the iden-

tical citizenship within the same constitutional

democracy. The political institutions helped to

develop a common Swiss society which in 1848

did not exist yet.

Federalism and the overcoming of

cultural cleavages

In the first decades of the Swiss federation, Prot-

estants and Catholics were deeply divided on the

question of the separation of the state and the

church. Linguistic divisions also showed up, for

instance at the beginning of World War I, when

French speakers were on the side of France,

German speakers on the side of the Germans.

Overcoming these cultural cleavages was vital

for Switzerland.

Despite federalism, countries like Belgium or

Canada have serious conflict between their

linguistic groups. Obviously, the integration of

cultural minorities is difficult. The success of

integration in the case of Switzerland had sev-

eral reasons:



Federalism granted high autonomy to the

cantons, which allowed linguistic and religious

minorities to foster their cultural particularities.



Linguistic and religious minorities were given

proportional representation in the Federal Coun-

cil and other federal authorities, which was

beneficial for their political integration.



Most political parties did not evolve as regional

but as national parties. In elections, national

parties need votes from all over the country;

therefore, they were not interested in blowing up

Language distribution in Switzerland

linguistic conflicts. This served national unity.



The constitution of 1848 united cantons of dif-

ferent language and religion. However, linguis-

tic and religious cleavages did not coincide.

Amongst the French-speaking cantons, we find

some with a Catholic majority, while others are

predominantly Protestant. This is an important

feature. It led to changing majorities in parlia-

ment and popular votes: the minority of French

speakers, when voting with the Protestant major-

ity, had a chance to belong to the winners, and

the same was true for Catholics voting with the

German speakers. Consequently, linguistic and

religious conflict could not escalate to one single

and dominant cleavage.

The strong religious cleavage of the 19th century

cooled down when the conservative Catholic

party accepted the separation of church and the

state as requested by the radical majority. The

constitution defines German, French, Italian and

Romansh as the four official languages of the

country. Freedom of language gives the cantons

the right to define their own official languages.

Under these conditions, linguistic conflicts did

not escalate. Even though, we find popular votes

with different behaviour of French- and German-

speaking cantons. A prominent example is the

vote on the European Economic Area in 1992.

EXAMPLE

The popular vote on the membership of

the European Economic Area (EEA)

Federal Resolution on the EEA-joining 1992

In contrast to the German-speaking part of the

country, French cantons are more inclined to

support European integration, individual liber-

ties or welfare politics but are more critical in

questions of the army. Yet these differences are

less important than the rising social cleavages

between capital and workforce or between rural

and urban populations. 

CHALLENGES AND THE LIMITS

OF SWISS FEDERALISM

Besides all the positive attributes of Swiss fed-

eralism, it is also faced with several challenges.

Firstly, in a globalised world, the borders of the

relatively small federal entities in Switzerland

are challenged. Secondly, the overrepresen-

tation of the smaller, more rural cantons leads

to a strong imbalance of the political weight of

a person’s vote. Thirdly, the question arises

whether the many small cantons of Switzer-

land can survive in the long run. Fourthly, strong

immigration of the last decades has led to new

problems of multicultural integration. Federalism

cannot offer solutions to these social problems.

Swiss federalism in a globalised world

Switzerland is one of the most decentralised

and federalised countries in the world. How-

ever, the autonomy of the cantons as well as of

the municipalities is challenged in an economy

which becomes more and more globalised. In

globalised politics, the federal government con-

cludes international treaties which may fall into

the responsibility of the cantons. The question

is how to involve the latter in the decision-mak-

ing process. Taking the example of the Euro-

pean Union, the cantons have taken their own

initiatives. They have their own representative

in the Swiss mission to the European Union

in Brussels. Furthermore, cantonal delegates

in several federal departments are concerned

with EU policies. Finally, the Conference of

the Cantonal Governments is channelling the

opinion-making process among the 26 cantons

so that they are able to speak “with one voice”

when they enter a negotiation with the federal

level. Internationalisation and Europeanisation

of politics, however, lead to undeniable loss of

political autonomy of the federation, the can-

tons and the communes as well.

How the vote of an Uri citizen outweighs

35 votes of a Zurich citizen

Democracy insists on the equal representa-

tion of every individual, that is, one person one

vote. Federalism guarantees equal representa-

tion to the member states of a federation, that is,

one canton one vote. If the two modes of deci-

sion-making are used to decide the same ques-

tion, they can lead to different results. This can

happen not only in the two chambers of parlia-

ment but also in popular votes: a constitutional

amendment can get the majority of the people

but is rejected by the cantons or the reverse.

The federalist veto then plays an important role:

in theory, the smallest 13 cantons, with only

11 % of the voters, can form a stalemate of 11.5

cantonal votes. This means that the “federalist

veto”, representing only 11 of the voters, can

block any constitutional amendment against the

wishes of an 89 % democratic majority. This fed-

eralist overruling, however, is rare. There have

been eight cases only in the past 20 years, and

the federalist veto represented between 20 and

25 % of the voters. Even so, in every constitu-

tional vote, one citizen from Uri may outweigh

35 citizens from Zurich. The Zurich citizen may

say this is unfair while the Uri citizen will sug-

gest that in all countries, correcting democratic

majorities is downright the idea of federalism.

Are the federal boundaries still viable?

Most economic, social or environmental prob-

lems transgress the borders of Swiss cantons

and their communes. Thus, there is a need

for more cooperation in larger regions among

municipalities and cantons, and also for co-

operation with neighbouring countries in cross-

border activities. During the last decades, differ-

ent forms of vertical and horizontal co-operation

have developed. Many of them are performing

well. Their success is flawed, however, by the

fact that they lack transparency, direct partici-

pation of the people or even adequate political

control by parliament.

Territorial reform

Some experts criticise that the 26 Swiss can-

tons are too small and too many in number to

successfully cope with most future problems.

They propose a profound territorial reform: for

instance merging the existing units into six larger

cantons, each of them comprising a population

of about one million inhabitants. Experts think

that such a reform could make federalism more

effective. Such propositions, however, would

hardly be accepted by the people. In a popular

vote in 2002, both the peoples of Geneva and

Vaud rejected the ideal of merging their can-

tons. This is a proof for the findings of many sur-

veys: a great majority of the Swiss citizens are

strongly attached to their canton. Time for ter-

ritorial reform of the cantons has not come yet.

Authorities, therefore, are confined to further

strengthening interstate co-operation. This situ-

ation differs from the one of the communes: the

merging of municipalities has become frequent

over the past decade.

EXAMPLE

Territorial reforms on municipal but not

on cantonal level

New problems of social integration

Due to permanent immigration from many coun-

tries over the past 50 years, more than 20 % of

the resident population of Switzerland is of for-

eign origin. Today, more than 500,000 people

speak a foreign mother tongue, and the religious

communities of Muslims count about 400,000

people. This leads to new and severe problems

of cultural integration. Can the new minorities

profit from federalism, as did Swiss minorities

in the past? For two reasons, the answer is no.

Firstly, only a small part of immigrants acquires

Swiss citizenship, which is a prerequisite for

political participation. Secondly, federalism can

protect minorities only under certain conditions:

a minority must be locally concentrated in a

sub-national unit, where it constitutes a politi-

cal majority, as for instance the 6 % minority of

Italian speakers in Switzerland, who constitute

a more than 90 % majority in the canton Tessin.

This is not the case of immigrants. To the con-

trary, they are geographically dispersed over the

whole country. These are the limits of federalism

regarding minority protection. Social integration

of immigrants must therefore be sought by other

ways and means. 



Elections in Switzerland take place at

all federal levels. The most important are

the ones to the Federal Assembly, the

National Council and the Council of States

as well as the popular votes of the cantonal

governments.



Besides representative democracy, Swit-

zerland has developed a system in which

popular initiatives and referendums give

citizens the opportunity to participate

regularly in the political decisions of their

parliament.



In Switzerland, popular votes are impor-

tant and take place frequently. The voting

campaigns give insights in the willingness

and the competency of the voters to par-

ticipate in politics. Direct democracy and

representative democracy are not contra-

dictory but complement each other.



Direct democracy is one of the most valu-

able parts of Swiss political culture and has

made its proof for more than 150 years. For

the future, there are still some challenges:

can direct democracy survive and cope with

the globalisation of politics?

ELECTIONS AND DIRECT

DEMOCRACY

ELECTIONS

The Federal Assembly is the highest political

authority in Switzerland. It is composed of the

National Council, representing the people, and

the Council of States, representing the cantons.

In contrast to the federal level, the executives of

the cantons and the municipalities are elected

by the people. At the cantonal level, there are

only unicameral parliaments, and 80 % of all

municipalities don’t have a parliament, as a citi-

zen’s assembly is the highest authority.

The Federal Assembly

Legislative power in Switzerland is exercised by

parliament, the so-called Federal Assembly. It

is a bicameral parliamentary body representing

the people (National Council) and the cantons

(Council of States). Both chambers have equal

powers. The Federal Assembly exercises the

supreme authority of the federation, having the

legislative power to make all federal laws, and

appointing the members of the Federal Council

and the Federal Court, the military commander-

in-chief (in times of war) and other major fed-

eral bodies. It supervises all authorities of the

Swiss federal government, and approves the

annual budget prepared by the Federal Council.

The parliament meets four times a year for three

weeks. If required, special sessions are called.

Part-time members of parliament

While in most countries the mandate of a

parliamentarian is a full-time job, in Switzerland,

most parliamentarians still have a profession

aside being a parliamentarian. Therefore, the

Federal Assembly is characterised as a semi-

professional parliament. Members of parlia-

ment devote an average of 60 % of their work-

ing hours to their parliamentary duties (sessions,

preparation, commission or parliamentary group

meetings). Because of the high workload, there

are regular calls for a full-time organisation of

parliament. However, a semi-professional sys-

tem allows parliamentarians to feel closer to

their constituency and to bring their professional

experience into parliamentary work. Also at the

cantonal and the municipal level most politicians

work on a part-time basis.

National Council

The National Council represents the people.

The elections of its 200 members are held in 26

electoral districts, since every canton forms a

separate electoral district. Each canton is enti-

tled seats proportional to its population. The

canton Zurich, which has the biggest population,

is represented with 34 seats, Bern has 26 and

small cantons like Appenzell Innerrhoden or Uri

have just one seat. In the most populous canton

of Zurich, a political party can gain a seat in the

National Council with less than 3 % of the can-

tonal votes, while in small cantons like Schaff-

hausen or Jura with two seats 33 % of the votes

at least are needed to have a seat for sure.

Voting procedure

The electoral system is an open list proportional

system and each canton is an electoral district.

Voters have different possibilities how to choose

candidates. They can freely write the name of

their preferred candidates on a blank list or use

a preprinted list of candidates provided by a

party. If they choose the second option, there

are three different possibilities how to amend

the list: firstly, candidates can be struck off the

list; secondly, candidates can be replaced by a

candidate from another list/party and thirdly, a

candidate can be put on a list twice to enhance

his or her election prospect.

Council of States

The Council of States consists of 46 members.

Every canton is represented by two members,

with the exception of Basel-Stadt and Basel-

Land, Obwalden and Nidwalden, Appenzell

Innerrhoden and Appenzell Ausserrhoden all

represented by one seat. The election to the

Council of States is a cantonal matter. All can-

tons introduced direct elections and all, except

for the canton of Jura, apply the majoritarian sys-

tem. As a rule, in a first round, each of the two

candidates per canton must receive an absolute

majority of votes; in the second round, a rela-

Parliament Building in Bern

National Council

tive majority is sufficient. The canton of Geneva

forms an exception: in the first round, a relative

majority of more than a third of the votes suffices.

Cantonal elections

In contrast to the federal level (where the

government is elected by parliament), in the

cantons, the government is elected directly by

the people (see table). In most cantons, the

election of these governments is based on the

majoritarian system, although the cantons of

Zug and Ticino elect their government members

according to the proportional system. Another

distinction to the federal level is that in the can-

tons, there is only one chamber of parliament.

Similar to the National Council, a majority of can-

tons elect their representatives to the cantonal

parliament based on the proportional system.

Municipal elections

In the municipalities, the executives are also

elected by the people. Only about 20 % of all

municipalities, especially the cities, have an

Municipality in the canton of Glarus

EXECUTIVE, LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL POWER AT FEDERAL LEVELS

Executive power Legislative power Judicial power

Federation Federal Council Federal Assembly Federal Supreme

Court

Seven federal coun-

cillors elected by

the Federal Assem-

bly. The federal

councillors are

the heads of the

seven government

departments

National Council:

200 national coun-

cillors elected by

the people directly

using proportional

rule. The number of

cantonal represen-

tatives depends on

population size

Council of States:

46 state council-

lors, two for each

canton. Popular

election according

cantonal rules

35–48 full-time and

additional substitute

supreme judges

elected by the Fed-

eral Assembly

Cantons Cantonal Council Cantonal Parliament Cantonal Court

Election by the

people every four to

five years. The

cantonal Council

consists of five to

seven members

Election by the people using proportional

rule

Election by the

Cantonal Council or

Cantonal Parliament

Municipalities Municipal Council Municipal Assembly District Court

Election by the

people

In small municipalities usually formed

of all citizens, in larger municipalities

parliaments elected by the people

Election by the

people of a num-

ber of municipalities

forming a district,

or appointed by

cantonal authorities

elected parliament. In the other municipalities,

the citizen’s assembly is the highest political

authority, so aside the Municipal Council, no

elections take place. With regards to the Munici-

pal Council, both majoritarian and proportional

electoral processes are in place. Even though

most municipalities elect their Municipal Coun-

cil in a majoritarian process, 30 % of all Swiss

municipalities opted for an election of the execu-

tive in a proportional system. Especially bigger

municipalities tend to opt for the second option,

to have a better representation of the smaller

political parties. 

DIRECT DEMOCRACY

Direct democracy is one of the most important

features of the Swiss political system. It allows

the people to have the last word on important

decisions of parliament or to formulate propo-

sitions of law. Since the building of the modern

nation state, at the municipal, the cantonal as

well as at the federal level, different instruments

of direct democracy have been introduced. The

most frequent instrument at the national level is

the mandatory referendum, meaning that every

constitutional change requires a popular vote.

The other two instruments that citizens can initi-

ate themselves are the optional legislative refer-

endum and the popular initiative.

Fundamentally, direct democracy is a perma-

nent control of political elites and gives impor-

tant political decisions higher acceptance and

legitimacy.

As an indirect effect we note that direct democ-

racy helped to transform the political system

from a majoritarian democracy to a democracy

towards compromise and consensus.

Relevance of direct democracy

Direct democracy allows people to have the last

say on important parliamentary decisions or to

propose new projects of law. Direct participation

has not replaced the parliamentary process but

is an important corrective of parliamentary deci-

sions and a permanent control of the political

elites. By means of the referendum and the pop-

ular initiative, the people participate on all federal

levels. The decisions subject to a popular vote

are defined by the constitution, and the people’s

decisions are binding. Direct democracy, by its

nature, is an instrument of the opposition, cuts

back the political elites to modest policy innova-

tion and incremental change. Moreover, direct

democracy has profoundly transformed the

Swiss system from a winner-take-all democracy

into a system where decisions by mutual accom-

modation and compromise have most chances

to be accepted by the people.

Relevance of representative democracy

Even though referendums and popular initia-

tives constitute an important element of Swiss

democracy, they have neither produced revolu-

tions nor resulted in “people’s legislation”. The

crucial players in the political decision-making

process in Switzerland are still parliament and

the government. By far the greatest number of

simple decisions of parliament and the Federal

Council, those with a more limited scope, are not

subject to referendum. In this regard, the Swiss

system functions like any other parliamentary

democracy.

Historical development

Forms of the referendum and the popular initia-

tive were used in the cantons as early as the

1830s. In 1848, when the modern nation state

of Switzerland was founded, the constitution

included only the mandatory referendum for con-

stitutional amendments. It was complemented

by the optional referendum for parliamentary

law in 1874, and by the popular initiative in 1891.

The referendum on international treaties was

introduced in 1921 and extended in 1977 and

2003. Besides these instruments, several other

kinds of referendums and initiatives have been

introduced (see table). At the municipal and

cantonal levels, a variety of further instruments

have been developed, such as the referendum

in financial matters, road planning or important

infrastructure projects.

The mandatory or constitutional referendum

Any constitutional amendment proposed by par-

liament has to be approved by a majority of the

people and the cantons. It means that the pro-

TYPES OF REFERENDUM AND POPULAR INITIATIVE (FEDERAL LEVEL)

Type, year of introduction and of

eventual revisions

Requirements

for application

Description

Constitutional referendum

(1848), membership to

supranational organisations

(1921, 1977)

None

(mandatory)

In cases of revision of the constitution, in cases of

amendments and, since 1977, in decisions con-

cerning membership to supranational organisa-

tions. All mandatory referenda must win a double

majority- more than 50 % of the votes nationwide

and a majority of votes in a majority of cantons.

Legislative referendum (1874),

referendum on international

treaties (1921, 1977, 2003)

Optional: 50,000

signatures or

proposition of 8

cantons

Any law of the Federal Assembly and any impor-

tant international treaty may be challenged. If a

popular majority votes no, the law is nullified.

Abrogative Referendum I (1949) Optional:

50,000

signatures

“Urgent” laws become immediately valid but may

be challenged by way of an optional referendum

during the first year after enactment.

Abrogatives Referendum II

(1949)

None

(mandatory)

“Urgent” laws without constitutional base become

immediately valid but have to be submitted to

a mandatory vote within one year. They are

abrogated if the law is not accepted by the double

majority of the people and the cantons.

Popular initiative for

constitutional amendments

(1891)

100,000

signatures

Citizens’ proposal for a constitutional amendment.

Government and parliament propose to reject or

endorse the popular initiative. It is accepted if it

gets the majority of the people and the cantons.

Popular initiative for the total

revision of the constitution

(1848)

100,000

signatures

The proposal is submitted first to the people. If a

popular majority agree, parliament is dissolved

and a new one is elected to draft a new constitu-

tion. The draft will then be submitted to a refer-

endum, in which it must gain a double majority.

This process has been launched once, in 1935,

by the so-called Frontist Movement, and the first

proposal was rejected.

posal must be accepted by the people (the major-

ity of the valid votes cast in the whole country)

and by the cantons (voters must accept the pro-

posal in a majority of the cantons). The majority

of the cantons is calculated as follows: The pop-

ular majority of each of the cantons counts as

one vote, with the exception of Basel-Stadt and

Basel-Land, Obwalden and Nidwalden, Appen-

zell Innerrhoden and Appenzell Ausserrhoden

counting a half vote. Thus, a constitutional bill

proposed by parliament has to get the majority

of 12 of the 23 votes. 11.5 votes of the cantons,

however, can block a constitutional amendment

even if the people accept in their majority.

As any new competency of the federation has

to be enshrined by a constitutional amendment,

mandatory referendums are frequent. From

1848 to 2009, 187 amendments went to a vote,

and 139 were accepted (see table). The many

defeats of government and parliament show the

“breaking effect” of the referendum. Sometimes,

the government and the parliament are defeated

in votes on important issues. An illustrating

example is the vote on the European Economic

Space in 1992.

EXAMPLE

The popular vote on the membership of

the European Economic Area (EEA)

Effect of the constitutional referendum

In the long run, direct participation in constitu-

tional affairs had a considerable influence on the

development of the Swiss state. It has slowed

down centralisation, has confined the develop-

ment of the welfare state, and led to modest

public expenditure and a small bureaucracy.

The optional legislative referendum

A group of citizens may challenge a law that has

been passed by parliament through an optional

legislative referendum. They have to gather

50,000 signatures against the law within 100

days after it has been passed. If they have been

successful, a national popular vote is sched-

uled in which a simple majority of voters decide

whether to accept or reject the law. Eight can-

tons together can also call such a referendum.

EXAMPLE

Cantonal referendum

Compared with the number of all parliamentary

bills passed, the optional referendum is rare: in

only about 8 % of the 2,260 laws from 1848 to

2006, the referendum was taken by opposition

groups. If the referendum challenge is realised,

however, the chances of the opposition are

high: over 40 % opponents were successful and

defeated the government (see table). In all, how-

ever, 97 % of all laws of parliament pass.

Effect of the optional referendum

Political elites anticipate all possible referendum

challenges in their legislative policy. By negotia-

tion, they try to find compromises that satisfy all

interest groups and parties. Thus referendums

are prevented in most of the cases. Swiss poli-

ticians have the discretionary power neither to

make an issue subject to a referendum nor to

delete a vote from their list. Parliament cannot

SUCCESS OF REFERENDA AND POPULAR INITIATIVES (1848–2009)

Number Accepted Refused

Popular initiative 169 16 153

Mandatory referendum 187 139 48

Optional referendum 164 91 73

Source: w ww.swissvotes.ch

circumvent referenda, even though for some

decisions it may be particularly difficult to obtain

a majority. New taxes, for example, are not very

popular in any state.

EXAMPLE

Introduction of new taxation

The obstacles for success are high, not only for

amendments of the constitution where the dou-

ble majority of the people and the cantons is

required. In ordinary lawmaking, the parliament

can never rule out that its decision will finally

be challenged by a referendum and is therefore

bound to be cautious in lawmaking. For these

reasons, the referendum is an instrument of the

opposition and favours the status quo.

The popular initiative

Contrary to the referendum, where citizens

intervene at the end of a decision-making

process, the initiative forms its point of depar-

ture. It enables citizens to put new proposals

on the political agenda, which might have been

neglected by the political elite. To do so, they

propose a constitutional amendment which

has to be signed by 100,000 citizens within 18

months. After deposition of the necessary sig-

natures, the government and the parliament

discuss the initiative and advise the people

to accept or – as in most cases – to refuse it.

Government and parliament are not allowed to

change the text of an initiative; however, they

may make a counterproposal (direct or indirect)

to the initiative which is then at the same time

submitted to the popular vote. The popular initia-

tive is restricted to constitutional amendments.

In practice, this does not exclude any political

Collected signatures for a popular initiative

issue – from most important ones such as the

abolition of the Swiss army down to speed limits.

But, as constitutional amendments, any popu-

lar initiative needs a double majority of the peo-

ple and the cantons to be accepted. Only about

10 % of all popular initiatives pass the hurdle of

the popular vote.

Effect of the initiative

Despite their low success, popular initiatives

influence the shaping of policy. This is due to

four reasons: Firstly, the popular initiative can

be an instrument for the minority groups in par-

liament. The latter hope that their issue will be

popular enough to find the majority in the vote.

Secondly, federal authorities pick up ideas from

the initiatives by drafting a counterproposal or

simply by fitting them into a current legislative

bill. This way the long shots of popular initiatives

are transformed into proposals that are more

in line with conventional wisdom and therefore

stand a better chance of being accepted. Thirdly,

initiatives widen the political agenda and give

voice to problems that remain non-issues as far

as the elites’ policy is concerned. Fourthly, politi-

cal parties and social movements use the popu-

lar initiative as a platform for electoral success.



EXAMPLE

Abolition of the Swiss army

VOTERS AND CAMPAIGNING IN

DIRECT DEMOCRACY

As in other countries, not all citizens partici-

pate in votes. People with higher education and

income, men, and older people participate gen-

erally more in votes than their counterparts. In

the average, approximately 40 % of the people

participate in votes; however, participation var-

ies strongly depending on the issue. The vot-

ers form their opinion during campaigns. Their

decision is influenced by several factors such

as tradition, self-interest and political values.

An important question is how propaganda can

influence voters. Popular votes in Switzerland

include a very broad range of issues, from the

abolition of the army to the change in the health

care system. The system in Switzerland shows

that both direct and representative democracy

can complement each other.

Who is allowed to vote?

“The people” comprises all adult men and women

who hold a Swiss citizenship, including those

who live abroad. People under the age of 18

and foreign nationals have no political rights at

the federal level. In the cantons of Neuenburg

and Jura, also foreign nationals are allowed to

vote on the cantonal and municipal level. The

cantons of Vaud and Fribourg introduced this

right only at the municipal level. Additionally,

there are some individual municipalities that

introduced the right for foreigners to vote in the

cantons of Appenzell Innerrhoden and Graubün-

den. Women have the right to vote at the federal

level since 1971. The last canton to introduce

women’s right to vote was the canton of Appen-

zell Innerrhoden in 1992, obliged to do so by a

decision of the Federal Court.

Who does vote?

As in other countries, people with higher educa-

tion or income are more likely to vote than their

less educated or working-class counterparts.

Besides education and income, there are other

sociodemographic characteristics that influence

political participation: younger citizens, women,

and non-married or divorced people participate

less than their counterparts. Moreover, some

political characteristics make a difference: peo-

ple with no party affinity, with no confidence in

the authorities participate less, and the most

important single factor that determines partici-

pation is political interest.

What is subject to a vote?

As there are no restrictions on the issues or

topics that the Swiss people can vote about, one

can find a broad range of subjects of past popu-

lar votes (see table).

What is the voting procedure?

There are two possibilities for voting: on the one

hand, by personally putting the ballot paper in a

box on the day of the vote, on the other hand by

postal voting. Almost half of the voters make use

of this second possibility and do not go to the

ballot stations themselves. There are now pilot

projects concerning electronic voting in the can-

tons of Geneva, Neuchâtel and Zurich. These

projects show that the interest in e-voting is

high among the citizens. Future will show if the

costs and the opposition against a centralised

electronic register are not too high to introduce

e-voting at the federal level.

Level of participation in direct democracy.

Only about one-quarter of the voters are regular

voters, while about half of them occasionally go

LIST OF SELECTED VOTES

Issue Type Year

UN membership CR 1986, 2002

Maternity insurance LR 1987, 1999

Protection of moor landscapes I1987

Forty-hour work week I1988

Raise motorway speed limit to 130 kph I1989

Abolition of the army I1989

Moratorium to build new nuclear power plants I1990

International Treaty of the European Economic Area (EEA) CR 1992

Naturalisation for foreigners CR 1994, 2004

New railways (transit through the Alps) LR 1992

Remuneration for members of parliament LR 1992

Restrictions for persons living abroad to acquire real estate LR 1995

New Federal Constitution CR 1999

Dispensing of heroin to drug addicts LR 1999

Bilateral treaties with the European Union LR 2000, 2005

Abortion to go unpunished LR 2002

Regulation on asylum abuse I2002

Law about the research on embryonic stem cells LR 2004

Statutory regulations for homosexual couples LR 2005

Financial aid to East European countries CR 2006

Flexible age for retirement pensions I2008

Against construction of minarets I2009

I = popular initiative; CR = mandator y (constitutional) referendum; LR = optional (legislative) referendum

A database with all votes that took place since 1848 can be found on www.swissvotes.ch

to the ballot, and a good 20 % are non-voters.

At an average about 45 % take part in popular

votes. This seems to be very low, but participa-

tion in direct democracy is very demanding. Vot-

ers in Swiss democracy are supposed to vote on

issues that are sometimes complicated. To read

the official documentation on several proposals

takes time. Together with votes on cantonal and

local affairs, a voter is supposed to give his or

her preference on up to 20 or 30 issues a year.

However, in controversial issues participation is

much higher than average, as in the vote on the

EEA treaty (79 %) or on UN-membership (58 %).

The deciding majority and its democratic

legitimacy

The proportion of qualified voters in Switzer-

land is about 65 % of the total population. Those

under the age of 18 and foreign residents are

not allowed to vote. Then again not all those who

do qualify take part in a vote. If voters are split

roughly 50:50, the deciding majority becomes

rather small, about 15 %. Figure 1 shows the

deciding majority in federal votes as a percent-

age of the total Swiss population since 1880.

It accounts for the facts that women were not

allowed to vote until 1971, that participation var-

ies between 20 and 80 % and that majorities dif-

fer from vote to vote.

Even so, direct democracy decisions are consid-

ered to be of the highest democratic legitimacy.

The reason for this is simple: direct democracy is

not so much about the majority of a democraphic

survey but about direct participation of active

citizens in a binding procedure, giving their deci-

sion credibility as an act of self-determination.

Campaigning: can votes be bought?

Weeks before the vote, interest groups, political

parties, and the authorities try to mobilise and

to convince voters for a “yes” or “no” to the pro-

posal at stake. Out of the mixed chorus of pro-

paganda, party slogans, newspaper editorials,

workplace discussions, TV appearances by poli-

ticians, and government information brochures

the citizens have to make up their own minds.

Today, campaigning has become highly profes-

sionalised, and budgets are uneven: sometimes,

one side can raise twenty or even thirty times

more money than the other. Can votes therefore

be bought? Current studies indicate that indeed,

under certain circumstances, money and one-

sided propaganda can be a deciding factor. This

is the case if a narrow result is expected and big

money is put into propaganda. However, money

is just one factor among many having an impact

on the voting result.

Semi-direct democracy –

an exceptional system

The Swiss system is at odds with mainstream

political thought. It contradicts theories of repre-

sentative democracy that consider the people’s

capacity too limited for reasonable direct choice.

Switzerland illustrates that intensive political

Voting by putting the ballot paper in a box

Deciding majority in proportion to the

total population

participation beyond occasional election of a

political elite is possible and can play an impor-

tant role. Direct participation has neither led

to unreasonable choices, nor has it derogated

the functioning of parliamentary politics. Rather,

parliament and the people are complementary

actors: they share decision making in the impor-

tant political issues. Therefore, we can call this

system a “semi-direct democracy”, a system in

which political elites still shape the policies but

must be sensitive to the people’s preferences

and needs. It has made its proof in the past, but

we mention a few challenges for the future. 

Voting campaign

CHALLENGES OF DIRECT

DEMOCRACY

As can be shown for the Swiss case, one should

not underestimate the general capacity of ordi-

nary citizens to directly decide on questions of

high politics. Thanks to political parties which

in the past renounced from populism, direct

democracy was able to overcome even deep

conflict. The hope is that this will last in the years

to come. Finally, globalisation and the interna-

tionalisation of politics constitute a challenge

and some new risks for direct democracy.

Are ordinary citizens capable to decide

high politics?

It is often argued that ordinary citizens can elect

authorities but are unable to decide high politics.

Studies show, indeed, that many voters do know

little about the issue they vote upon. However,

they are able to form a rational choice. They rely

on party recommendations or slogans of propa-

ganda - which simplify the question. However,

voters do not blindly follow cues but also follow

rational arguments of the political elite and make

intelligent use of heuristics. The ability of vot-

ers to assess political issues in a rational way

should not be underestimated.

Depending on the issue to be decided, people’s

political behaviour is more influenced by tradi-

tional social ties, by self-interest or by social

values suggesting solidarity or altruism. There is

thus no general answer to the question whether

the Swiss vote more with their hearts, their

purses or on the basis of traditional ties.

The lure of populism

With regard to societal conflicts, direct democ-

racy is ambiguous. On the one hand, the people’s

vote has high legitimacy, is a final decision and

ends conflicts. On the other hand, it gives politi-

cal opposition a privileged stage for permanently

articulating social conflicts and divides. Political

parties, in the past, have made use of “issuewise

opposition” occasionally and in a rather restrain-

ing way. Direct democracy, in the 20th century,

was able to deal with salient conflicts, thanks

to political parties that renounced on populism.

The hope is that this will last in the 21st century.

Direct democracy in international affairs

As mentioned earlier, direct participation was

gradually extended in international affairs.

Today, every important international treaty is

subject of a mandatory or an optional referen-

dum. In domestic affairs, defeat in a popular

vote is not a problem because the authorities

can present a better project in a second vote.

If an international treaty is rejected in a popular

vote, however, this is not guaranteed: the inter-

national partner is not bound to co-operate and

may prefer not to negotiate a new treaty. Thus,

direct democracy in growing international affairs

bears an additional risk: the Swiss government,

if it cannot guarantee the acceptance of its

negotiation treaties, may lose credibility in the

international arena. 

Switzerland is a consensus democracy.

Its most important characteristics are

the government coalition composed of

all big political parties, the cooperation

of these parties in parliament and the

political decision-making by negotiation

and compromise.



The seven members of the Federal Coun-

cil (federal executive) form a permanent

grand coalition. The major political par-

ties proportionally share the seats in the

executive body according to their electoral

strength.



Power sharing in the executive is only one

element of consensus democracy. Co-oper-

ation of political parties in a grand coalition

can also be observed in parliament.



The aim of consensus democracy is to let

participate all important political actors in

federal politics. The development of Swiss

consensus democracy was influenced by

the cultural diversity of the country, by fed-

eralism, by the voting system and by direct

democracy.



The policy-making process is character-

ised by negotiation and compromise. This

is an essential difference to majoritarian

democracy.



Consensus democracy bares lights

and shadows. For a good functioning of a

consensus democracy, there are favour-

able and unfavourable conditions. Current

changes in the party system and growing

political polarisation cause challenges for

Swiss consensus democracy.

CONSENSUS DEMOCRACY

THE FEDERAL COUNCIL

The Swiss executive is a body of seven members

elected by parliament. According to constitutional

provision, care must be taken to ensure that the

various geographical and language regions of

the country are appropriately represented. Polit-

ical criteria are even more important: the stron-

gest political parties are represented in the Fed-

eral Council proportionally to their electoral

power, and lately gender representation has

become an issue, too. The executive is organ-

ised as a collegiate body: all seven ministers

take the important decisions collectively. There

is no prime minister with prerogatives. The func-

tion of the president, who rotates every year and

acts also as the head of the state, is purely for-

mal. Finally, each federal councillor is the head

of one of the seven ministries.

Election of the Federal Council

The members of the Federal Council are elected

by the Federal Assembly for a full term of four

years. There is no vote of no-condence; thus,

the Federal Council need not resign when it is

defeated in parliament, or in a referendum. This

means that the Federal Council’s policy is rather

independent from parliament. But also parliament

is independent from the Federal Council, it can

refuse governmental drafts without consequences.

Until recently, the members of the Federal Coun-

cil were re-elected after four years without excep-

tion so that the average term of ofce is more than

two full terms, around nine years. Nonetheless,

the informal rule of re-election of incumbent mem-

bers of the Federal Council as a routine started

to change in the last years, which might lead to

more changes in the body of the Council.

EXAMPLE

The voting out of federal

councillors and the “crisis of

consensus democracy” in 2008

From a one-party government to the

grand coalition

Today, the Federal Council is composed of a

grand coalition. This is not regulated by law but

the result of a long historical process of politi-

cal integration. During the rst fty years, the

Federal Council was dominated by the Radi-

cals. In 1891, the rst member of the Catho-

lic Conservative Party (today Christian Demo-

crat People’s Party) joined the government and

more then twenty years later, it received a sec-

ond seat. In 1929, the rst member of the Farm-

ers Party, today the Swiss People’s Party, was

elected. The Social Democrats, despite being

the biggest political party in the 1930s, were

excluded from participation in the government

until 1943. In 1959, full proportional representa-

tion, the “magic formula” was agreed amongst

the parties. The four governmental parties are

represented according to their electoral strength.

For more than 40 years, the Federal Council was

composed by two Radicals, two Christian Demo-

crats, two Social Democrats and one representa-

tive of the Swiss People’s Party, which represent

together about three-quarters of the voters.

Reasons that led to a grand coalition

Three factors favoured the transformation of the

majoritarian regime into a power-sharing system.

The first one is federalism. The small, mostly

catholic cantons had a veto position in federal

decision-making right from the beginning. This

forced the ruling radicals to make political com-

promises. The second is the introduction of a

proportional electoral system in 1918, which was

the success of a coalition of Catholic conserva-

tives and social democrats fighting the radical

predominance. As a consequence, the radicals

lost their majority in parliament, and the party

system became fragmented in the following

elections. The third and most important factor is

direct democracy. The referendum, in the period

after World War II, has become a strong incen-

tive for the major political parties to co-operate

in an oversized coalition because otherwise the

risk of defeat in the popular vote is too high.

Regional, linguistic and gender

representation

Aside the claim of proportionality of the parties,

there are other formal and informal rules about

the composition of the Federal Council. Arti-

cle 175 of the constitution states that “in elect-

ing the Federal Council, care must be taken

to ensure that the various geographical and

language regions of the country are appropri-

ately represented”. Thus, linguistic and regional

representation remains an important element

in government elections. Since 1848, the three

linguistic regions have been fairly represented

according to the population size of German,

French and Italian speakers. The three larg-

est cantons, Zurich, Bern and Vaud, have had

virtually permanent representation in the past.

Religion no longer plays a role in the election

of a federal councillor. Thirteen years after the

introduction of women’s voting right, the first

woman, Elisabeth Kopp, a Radical Democrat,

was elected in 1984. In 2010, we found four

women in the Federal Council.

Functioning along the principle

of collegiality

According to the constitution, the Federal

Council reaches its decisions as a collegial

body. Thus, it is collectively responsible for its

activities and decisions. Even though unanim-

ity cannot be reached in every case, intensive

discussions and preliminary consultation often

guarantee consensus among all members. All

federal councillors have the same legal rights.

The president of the Confederation rotates every

year. He chairs the Council but does not have

special powers and the office is limited to repre-

sentative functions.

Organisation along seven ministries

The constitution states that “for the purposes of

preparation and implementation, the business

of the Federal Council shall be allocated to its

individual members according to department”.

Because the Federal Council consists of seven

members, seven departments have been set

up (see figure on page 42). As all government

action is organised in seven ministries, a mem-

ber of the Swiss government is responsible for

more policy areas than his counterparts in other

European countries. For example, one minister

is responsible for energy, transport and envi-

ronmental protection, while another is respon-

sible for culture, education and research, as

well as health and social insurance. This leads

to high exposure of the members of the govern-

ment, especially in international co-operation.

Even though several reforms for this problem

have been proposed, none of them has been

successful. 

Departmental Structure of Federal Administration 2011

CONSENSUS SEEKING IN

PARLIAMENT

Risk aversion against successful referenda led

to permanent co-operation of political parties in

government and in parliament. The four govern-

mental parties – the Swiss People’s Party, Radi-

cals, Christian Democrats and Social Democrats,

representing about 80 % of the electorate – try

to find compromises in all their decisions. How-

ever, compromise can fail. It may be even a gov-

ernmental party which, opting for an issuewise

opposition, calls a referendum. Even so, the pol-

itics of compromise is successful. While most

constitutional amendments are accepted by the

people and the cantons, few legislative bills are

challenged by a referendum. Changing coali-

tions among different parties engender mutual

trust and respect with all different partners of the

grand coalition.

Co-operation in parliament

Integrating the main political parties into a govern-

mental coalition was important. Co-optation, how-

ever, was not a free lunch but a deal. The new

members of the government coalition were also

expected to co-operate in parliament, supporting

legislative compromises strong enough to have

success in a referendum. In earlier times, this was

not always the case, and the lack of co-operation

between government and parliament as well as

missing willingness to nd compromises led even

to a crisis of the Swiss political system.

EXAMPLE

Crisis of the Swiss political system

during the worldwide economic crisis

of the 1930s

Issue-specific opposition

In the ideal case, all governmental parties support

a legislative project unanimously in a consensus.

This ideal situation, however, is relatively rare.

More frequently, the political elites are split: one

or more of the political parties defect and play the

game of an issue-specific opposition. This may

happen already during parliamentary proceed-

ings, or later by decision of the political parties,

which not always back the position of their own

parliamentary faction. In all these cases the risk

of defeat for the government increases consid-

erably. In earlier times the center-right coalition,

as a natural majority after all, was able to win

two out of three votes against left-wing opposi-

tion. Today, with the Swiss People’s Party seek-

ing a stronger right-wing profile by way of issue-

specific opposition, the center-right coalition is

often split, which puts the government project at

risk. If two parties leave the consensus, defeat

of the governmental project is predictable with a

high probability.

The importance of changing coalitions

Changing coalitions that differ from issue to issue

are important for the culture of negotiation and

compromise. Political actors, opposed today on

a particular issue, may find themselves as coali-

tion partners tomorrow on a different issue. The

parliamentary factions of Social Democrats and

Christian Democrats, today opposed in financial

policy, may be the core coalition in welfare poli-

cies the other day. Every political party has to

get acquainted to find itself in the role of both

the winner and the loser. This favours mutual

respect. Changing coalitions in parliament are

an important reason why consensus democracy

still works, despite growing polarisation.

The weak spot is, however, that conditions for

changing coalitions are not always given. In

the 1980s, for instance, the three parties of

the centre-right alliance regularly overruled the

green-left coalition in the major issues of pub-

lic finance, energy or environment. The ruling

majority refused accommodation and compro-

mise, and was not exposed to the risk of loos-

ing power through competitive elections as in a

majoritarian system. Thus, as the big change

of opposition and government parties is miss-

ing in the Swiss political system, the small

changes in the issue-specific coalitions between

the different parties is all the more important.

Compromise in parliament and direct

democracy

Less than 10 % of law projects passed by

parliament are challenged by an optional refer-

endum. If the parliament seems to have a good

flair for avoiding the referendum risk, this is due

to several factors. The draft coming from the

pre-parliamentary procedures has a story to tell:

parliament knows which issues were controver-

sial and which were accepted unanimously, and

they are familiar with the positions of the impor-

tant interest groups and of the Federal Council.

Parts of the members of parliament have intense

relations to interest groups whose points they

support. The modifications of all phases of the

procedure are documented for every article of

the new bill. Thus, the members of parliament

and the factions know all about the difficulties

and fragilities of any compromise that has been

reached, and about the robustness of a solution.

Parliament’s factions, too, try to avoid the risk of

a referendum being called, and look for a com-

promise that is supported by as many parties as

possible.

Semi-direct democracy: the interaction of

representative and direct democracy

Most decisions in Swiss politics are taken by the

parliament and the executive as in any other rep-

resentative system. In cases, however, defined

by the constitution, the people have the last

word on the decision. To put it simply, we may

say that for the most important issues (constitu-

tion) it is always the people, for important issues

(laws) it may be the people, and for all decisions

of lesser importance it is the parliament or the

executive who have the last word. This is why

the Swiss system is referred to as a “semi-direct

democracy”, which means that the decision-

making system is composed of elements of rep-

resentative and direct democracy as well. 

THE POLITICAL

DECISION-MAKING PROCESS

AND ITS ACTORS

Federalism, power sharing and direct democ-

racy let a multitude of actors participate in the

political process. In contrast to parliamentary

democracy, which concentrates most power in

the majority of parliament and its executive, we

can find four different arenas where decision-

making takes place, in which one particular

actor plays a leading role: these are the Federal

Council, the interest groups, the parliament, the

people and the federal administration. On the

one hand, decision-making by negotiation and

compromises takes more time and allows less

innovation than decisions by simple majority. On

the other hand, political decisions are accepted

also by the political and societal minorities. This

allows for political stability, unity and integration.

The Federal Council in the decision-making

process

The main function of the Federal Council is the

steering of the entire political process. Giv-

ing the go-ahead for most formal steps of deci-

sion making, setting priorities in substance and

time, the Federal Council has a substantial influ-

ence on the political agenda. It disposes of all

the professional resources of the administration,

which allow it to prepare its own policy projects.

Political leadership of the Federal Council is

restricted, however, for two main reasons: First,

consensus in the all-party government is lim-

ited. Second, parliament is not obliged to sup-

port the government because there is no vote of

confidence. Therefore, it can always turn down

the propositions of the Federal Council. In for-

eign policy, however, the position of the Federal

Council paramount: the Federal Council leads

the proceedings of international diplomacy while

parliament is restricted to accept or to reject

international treaties as a whole.

Interest groups in the decision-making

process

The prime arena of inuence of interest groups

(associations, NGOs, environmental organisa-

tions) is the pre-parliamentary procedure, which

was institutionally formalised after World War II.

They have more inuence than pre-parliamen-

tary lobbying to be found in other countries. The

high bargaining power of interest groups lies in

the fact that they can use the referendum threat

as a pawn. Moreover, interest groups play an

important role in “semi-private” or “para-state”

arrangements. Social partnership between

labour and capital, or public-private partnerships

once played a predominant role with the design

and the implementation of economic and social

policies and are still important. The pre-parlia-

mentary procedure, sometimes preceded by

deliberations of expert committees, serves the

objective of integrating group interests, so as to

reduce the risk of a future referendum.

The parliament in the decision-making

process

The parliament’s main function is law mak-

ing. Besides deciding the budget it has many

instruments at hand to move new projects, to

influence the agenda in domestic politics, and

to supervise the administration. However, its

freedom of action is restricted by direct democ-

racy, by the interest groups who intervene in the

pre- parliamentary process, and by the Federal

Council and its administration who largely con-

trol the agenda of foreign policy.

The people in the decision-making process

The people intervene in two ways. Firstly, using

the referendum, they can defeat projects of

the political elites. In contrast, if the project is

accepted by the people, the bill has the high

legitimation of democratic self-rule. Secondly,

using the popular initiative, the people can

propose constitutional amendments, a way to

bring issues on the political agenda which have

been neglected or rejected by government and

parliament.

The federal administration in the

decision-making process

With the growth of social and economic activ-

ities of the central government after World

War II, the federal administration has acquired

greater political influence for two reasons. First,

it has its own experts, who often direct the pre-

parliamentary process. Second, it has all the

feedback knowledge of implementation, which

often stimulates proposals for legislative reform.

The administration plays an important role in the

definition of problem solving as well as in the

promotion of its own interests. 

THE POLICY CYCLE

The law-making process can be shown as an

ongoing process of problem solving or policy

cycle. It starts with the first ideas and proposi-

tions for a new law or a constitutional amend-

ment. In parliament, each project has to find

a majority of both chambers. However, parlia-

mentarians and the government know that every

decision can be challenged by a referendum. If

a proposition has passed parliament without a

vote or has been supported by the people, the

government starts implementation, a process

carried by administrations of the federation and

the cantons as well. At every stage of the policy

cycle, negotiations result in modifications, rad-

ical changes or even the abandonment of the

project. If the new programme enters the phase

of implementation, this is not the end of the pro-

cess: sooner or later the experience of imple-

mentation will lead to propositions for a new

reform, and a second round of the policy-making

process begins.

Pre-parliamentary arena

The process starts with propositions for a new

law or a constitutional amendment. It can be

handed in by ways of a popular initiative, a

parliamentary motion, or by the administra-

tion which is the informal gateway for pressure

groups seeking reform. If the Federal Council

carries the proposition, it organises the pre-

parliamentary stage of the process. According

to the situation, it charges the administration or

mandates an expert committee to draft a first

project. The subsequent consultative process

involves further organisations, who each try to

formulate a position that represents the view of

their members. When evaluating the results of

the consultative procedure, the administration

seeks to maintain only those reforms that have

found sufficient support. The Federal Council

then proposes this to the parliament.

Parliamentary arena

Each project has to find the majority of both

chambers. If proceedings in the Council of

State and the National Council end up with a

difference in substance, negotiation procedures

between the chambers are organised to align

on the same solution. If this is not possible, the

project has failed. Only about 7 % of law proj-

ects passed by parliament are challenged by an

optional referendum. This means that the cham-

bers seem to have a good flair for avoiding the

referendum risk. This is due to several factors.

The draft coming from the pre-parliamentary

procedures has a story to tell: parliament knows

which issues were controversial and which

were accepted unanimously, and they are famil-

iar with the positions of the important interest

groups and of the Federal Council.

Direct democratic arena

The most important case is the referendum chal-

lenge by a governmental party, when the four

partners of the grand coalition have not reached

consensus. If one party sees too much dam-

age for the interests of its voters, it practises

issuewise opposition. Social Democrats and the

Swiss People’s Party do this more often than the

centrist parties of the Radicals and the Christian

Democrats. Small political parties, too, interest

groups or even grass-roots movements are able

to launch a referendum, and in rare cases they

may even be successful. Finally, if the consen-

sus of the political elites is fragile, a small out-

sider can trigger a chain reaction in which other

actors or even a governmental party defect the

compromise and join the referendum.

Therefore, the political elites can never rule out

the possibility of a referendum, and they accept

occasional defeat of their projects. The verdict of

the people is binding and has immediate effect.

In cases of referenda, the project is enacted or

has failed.

Implementation arena

Once a law project has passed the parliament’s

decision or got the majority in a popular vote,

it comes into effect. The implementation is

an important part of the policy cycle. In many

Policy Cycle

cases, policy programme for proper implemen-

tation have to be developed or revised. As most

programme are implemented in co-operation

with the cantons, negotiations with their admin-

istrations take place. It is one of the character-

istics of federalism that the federal authorities

have little means of coercion and thus have to

respect the autonomy and the preferences of the

cantonal authorities in the implementation pro-

cess. Resistance from the cantons may impede

implementation. Conversely, negotiation and

compromises may lead to intense co-operation,

which facilitates implementation of federal poli-

cies. Thus, we may speak of a form of vertical

power sharing. 

FAVOURABLE AND

UNFAVOURABLE CONDITIONS

FOR CONSENSUS DEMOCRACY

Consensus democracy is more than a political

style. Its institutions are different from those of

majoritarian democracy, as shows a comparison

between Switzerland and Great Britain. Consen-

sus democracy is demanding. The possibility to

establish consensus may be difficult. It depends,

among others, on the economic situation and the

issue at stake. Therefore, consensus democ-

racy needs political elites that are able to reach

compromise and consensus also under difficult

conditions.

Main characteristics of powersharing

The entire political process aims at the achieve-

ment of a political compromise. Instead of a

majority that imposes its solution to a minority,

we find mutual accommodation: no single win-

ner takes all, everybody wins something (see

Consensus democracy). Some people attri-

bute this behaviour to a specific peculiarity of

Swiss culture. From a political science perspec-

tive, however, the effect of institutions seems to

be paramount. The referendum challenge, the

strong influence of the cantons and the multi-

party system are veto points that do not allow for

majority decisions and compel political actors

to co-operation and compromise. The upcom-

ing table shows the differences between Great

Britain, a typical majoritarian democracy with

opposition and government, and Switzerland, an

example of consensus democracy.

Consensus depends on economic situation

The idea that “no single winner takes all, ever y -

body wins something” has not always worked

out. Mutual adjustments were most successful

in the period up to the 1970s, when economic

growth also allowed the distribution of more

public goods. Optional referenda were few and

the success rate of obligatory referenda was

high. Consensus became more difficult after the

recession of the 1970s. With lower economic

growth after the first oil crisis, there was less sur-

plus to distribute. Political redistribution became

a zero-sum game, spending more money for

one group meant giving less to another. Eco-

logical sustainability became a political issue

and prompted new conflicts. The party system

fragmented and new social movements arose.

At the end of the 1980s important legislation

failed or remained incomplete. In the last two

decades, globalisation functioned as pressure

from the outside, leading to quicker and larger

steps of political innovation, but also to higher

polarisation, to winners and losers of globalisa-

tion and Europeanisation, and to the deepening

of old cleavages .

Consensus depends on issue

The feasibility of the idea “no single winner takes

all, everybody wins something” also depends on

the issue. In financial affairs, consensus can be

found easily by compromise: if proponents for a

100-Swiss-franc raise of rents face an opposi-

tion that wants no raise, a 50-Swiss-franc raise

may be a compromise that is accepted by both.

Yet, there are indivisible public goods, for which

consensus becomes difficult. In 1977 the Fed-

eral Council proposed to introduce daylight sav-

ing time as many Western European countries

were doing at the time. Farmers were opposed

to put their clocks one hour forward in the spring

and then back again in the autumn, claiming

that cows would give less milk. A compromise

of putting the clocks 30 minutes forward would

have helped nobody. Thus, the farmers’ oppo-

sition led to an outright refusal of daylight sav-

ing time. However, living on a “time isle” in the

centre of Europe did not prove to be very practi-

cal, and daylight saving time was introduced two

years later. Similarly, compromise can be diffi-

cult in issues involving fundamental values such

as abortion. Whether or not a woman should be

given the right to have an abortion is considered

by many people to be a question of principle. In

Switzerland reform of the abortion law led to a

long-lasting debate and to several popular votes.

Political elite in a power-sharing system

Power sharing engenders strong formal and

informal contacts amongst the entire political

elite. This gives rise to criticism that power shar-

ing leads to a cartel of “the political class”, which

neutralises electoral competition and democratic

A SYSTEM COMPARISON BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND SWITZERLAND

GREAT BRITAIN:

representative, majoritarian democracy

SWITZERLAND:

semi-direct, consensus democracy

Strong competition between parties.

Winner takes all.

Weak party competition.

Proportional representation.

Salient elections, lead to periodical alternation of

power.

Low salient elections; power sharing amongst

political parties prevents alternation of power.

Enactment of the political programme of the

government, backed by the parliamentary majority.

Comprehensive innovation possible.

Integration of cultural minorities and of conflicting

group interests; changing coalitions for different

issues. Incremental innovation.

Political legitimation through changes in power or

re-election of government satisfying the voters’

expectations.

Underlying idea: politics for the people.

Institutional legitimation through different forms of

participation: the most important decisions being

taken by the people, important ones by parliament

and the rest by government.

Underlying idea: politics through the people.

Participation as a form of general and program-

matic influence: voters elect a government and its

programme for the entire legislative period.

Direct participation as “single-issue” influence:

people vote on specific questions. No strategic

government policy, no influence of voters on a

specific government programme.

control. In the Swiss case it may be argued that

indeed elections do not lead to a change of roles

between government and opposition and there-

fore play a minor role for democratic control.

Direct democracy, however, leads to a perma-

nent control of the elites. Every political party

and its leaders have to defend their compro-

mises in the people’s vote. Direct democracy

imposes limits to elitism.

Institutions of power sharing can engender

mutual trust amongst the political elites. There is

one thing, however, which depends on the elites

themselves. It is the “spirit of accommodation”.

It means the will of politicians to develop a com-

mon way of problem solving, leading to creative

compromise. Success of consensus democracy

depends on politicians willing to develop per-

spectives reaching beyond the interests of their

clientele. 

PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS OF

CONSENSUS DEMOCRACY

Consensus democracy cannot guarantee

equal chances of political influence to all inter-

est groups. Chances of influence in political

negotiation are unequal because they depend

on resources. The influence of many powerful

interest groups has no democratic legitimation.

Consensus democracy favours the status quo;

therefore, Swiss politics have to content them-

selves with incremental steps of innovation. Dur-

ing recent years, the Swiss system has become

more polarised – this also showed the fragility of

consensus democracy. Still, the model of con-

sensus democracy seems to be able to face all

these challenges.

Inequality of political influence

Consensus democracy cannot guarantee fair

competition in the sense that all interest groups

and political parties have equal chances of influ-

ence. In negotiations and lawmaking by mutual

adjustment, the haves are better off than the

have-nots, whose refusals have no trade-in.

Moreover, organisations defending exclusive

and short-term benefits for their members are

likely to be stronger than those promoting gen-

eral and long-term interests. Environmental

groups for instance face the problem of having

to fight for a long-term public good. They are

popular and outnumber the biggest political par-

ties in membership. Faced with vested industrial

interests, however, they are not able to articulate

comparable threats, and consumers’ willingness

to renounce on the cheap gasoline in favour of

ecology is limited. One may object, however,

that these inequalities are not a peculiarity of

Swiss consensus democracy. In fact they are a

flaw of all pluralist and democratic systems.

Political influence of interest groups

Interest groups are able to organise referenda.

Using this possibility as a threat or as a pawn

in negotiation gives them additional influence

in all matters of legislation. Thus, direct democ-

racy, instead of being the voice of the people,

has partly become the instrument of vested

interests. Indeed, this critique has some strong

arguments, especially for the long period of time

when the Swiss Parliament was weak and often

adopted the pre-parliamentary compromise

between the interest groups without major modi-

fication. Today, however, the image of a state

of vested interests that dominate parliament

may less correspond to political realities for sev-

eral reasons. Not only has parliament become

stronger in shaping legislation, but the adminis-

tration can also be a strong counterpart. Even-

tually, the strength of some interest groups is

fading. With the process of globalisation, some

of the strongest interest groups of the domestic

market, such as those of agriculture and indus-

tries, have significantly lost political influence,

and many traditional coalitions, such as those

of industries or between employers and unions,

are split today, thereby neutralising each other.

In contrast, globalised industries such as the

pharmaceutical lobby or the banks seem to gain

additional influence.

Lack of innovation

Negotiation and compromise have provided

important advantages. In the absence of elec-

toral change, there are no abrupt discontinuities

in federal policy. The sobering effect of nego-

tiation cools down ideological exaggeration and

promotes pragmatic solutions. The elites’ coop-

eration in committees, in government and in

parliament leads to mutual adjustments where

learning processes occur over the substantive

issues of legislation. However, elections do not

provide the possibility of the government and

the opposition changing places the way they

do in parliamentary democracies. Therefore the

Swiss system also lacks the larger innovatory

process brought about by changes of power in

parliamentary democracies. It has to rely on

incremental reform.

EXAMPLE

Revisions of the invalidity insurance

Consensus democracy in a polarised

system

Polarisation, stimulated by the political parties of

the right and of the left, leaves its traces in polit-

ical culture. Pluralism, positive belief in com-

promise and co-operation, tolerance towards

differences, or willingness to accept adverse

decisions are declining among parts of the polit-

ical elite and of the electorate as well. Adher-

ents of the Swiss consensus democracy worry

about the loss of the “spirit of accommodation”.

As a strategy towards majoritarian politics, how-

ever, the politics of confrontation would not be

enough. Reducing the veto points of federalism

and of direct democracy would be necessary.

Even gradual transformation towards majoritar-

ian politics seems feasible only under electoral

change which sees a leading party capable to

formulate a convincing political programme but

also to carry the necessary institutional reforms.

Prospect of the Swiss powersharing system

Since the 1990s, pressure from the outside –

globalisation and Europeanisation – stimulates

innovation. Power sharing, despite growing

polarisation, is working. The grand government

coalition is sometimes defeated in referenda,

but not more often than in earlier times. In par-

liament, one sees growing antagonism between

the conservative right and the welfare factions

of the left. Yet, compromise still happens in

changing issue-specific coalitions in which the

political centre plays an important role. The par-

tial break-up of the bourgeois camp has made

this possible. Under the conditions of a tripar-

tite system of the right, the centre and the left,

consensus democracy has the chance to work

even better than in the 1980s when the bour-

geois majority made the left a permanent loser.

Consensus politics may change, but the popular

rights still urge the important political actors to

practice co-operation and compromise. 

In this chapter, the three main elements

of the Swiss political system are pre-

sented in a comparative perspective.



Federalism in Switzerland guarantees

“unity in diversity” and is a safeguard for

cultural minorities. Other countries have

different meanings of federalism. There is a

variety of “federalisms”.



Direct democracy is not only used in Swit-

zerland, but also in many other countries.

However, Swiss citizens are the only ones

having the right of direct participation at all

levels of government.



The Swiss system of consensus democ-

racy contrasts sharply with the model

of ma-joritarian democracy as known

for instance in Great Britain. Consensus

democracy can be an appropriate way to

resolve problems in multicultural societies.



The Swiss system, facing Europeanisation

and globalisation, has to deal with multiple

challenges, not only with regard to the rela-

tions to the European Union but also with

regard to internal social conflict.

COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES

FEDERALISM COMPARED

The most important function of Swiss federal-

ism was the overcoming of cultural cleavages

between different segments of society and the

linguistic regions of the country. Can federalism

protect minorities also in other countries? Com-

parative studies show that structures, processes

and the culture of federalism vary significantly.

Not all countries practise federalism with the

objective of guaranteeing cultural diversity, and

the experience with regard to minority protec-

tion. A way to protect minorities without territo-

rial segmentation is non-territorial or corporate

federalism. Federalism can interfere with the

democratic principle of “one person, one vote”.

The essentials of federalist institutions

Federalism is a political answer to provide a com-

mon biosphere for segmented parts of a larger

population. The antagonism between unity and

diversity is bridged by giving the different seg-

ments of society utmost autonomy within the

confines of a national whole. Yet it is an answer

to territorial segmentation of a society only. Fed-

eralism is responsive to cultural minorities only

to the degree that the latter dispose of a polit-

ical majority in some of the subnational units.

Federalism institutionally splits political power

into parts, and this can be done in different

ways. An important part is played by the politi-

cal culture. Federations, despite the heteroge-

neity of subnational units, need the political will

of a society to constitute and remain a nation

or state. Lack of political will can lead to the

collapse of political unity as in former Czecho-

slovakia or Yugoslavia.

Federalism – a structure, a process and a

political culture

Federalism is more than a structure. Besides

varying structural settings, the political process,

too, can be organised in different ways. More-

over, different equilibriums of power imply differ-

ent appropriate behaviour, which may crystallise

into political cultures: the USA and Switzer-

land are similar in structure. Both developed

by a bottom-up process, the subnational units

keeping much of their “sovereign” rights as for-

merly independent states. The political culture,

however, is different. The main aim of Ameri-

can federalism is not the protection of cultural

minorities but above all the separation and con-

trol of state power. In Switzerland, the canton’s

high veto power has engendered a non-hierar-

chical co-operation between the national and

the subnational level. The process of accommo-

dation of the federal authorities with the subna-

tional units is an appropriate behaviour to find

solutions. It has become an element of political

culture, mostly informal, and just occasionally

prescribed as a legal procedure.

Federalism as a guarantee for cultural

difference and diversity

Federalism is sometimes used as a synonym of

the guarantee for cultural difference and diver-

sity, regardless of history or socio-economic cir-

cumstances. But is federalism really capable

of protecting cultural difference and diversity, if

this is the project? The experience is mixed. In

South Africa, federalism seems to play an impor-

tant role for the consolidation of a deeply divided

society. Under the common roof of India’s or

Nigeria’s immense cultural diversity are some

shadows: In-depth studies provide evidence that

in situations of serious crisis federal structures

in both countries are not used to ease a conflict.

In Belgium, which grants its two segments of

French and Flemish speakers utmost autonomy,

national unity is said to be fading. In any case, to

achieve effective minority protection, federalism

must be embedded in other institutional devices

such as a non-religious, non-ethnic concept of

the central state, a strong and effective tradition

of human rights, and institutional elements of

political power sharing.

Federalism and democracy

Democracy, basically, is majority rule founded

on the number of votes cast, each vote hav-

ing equal weight, whereas federalism implies

equal representation of uneven units. Inevitably

votes of individuals or representatives of mem-

ber states with a small population are weighted

more heavily than those of large member states.

They can organise a veto to block democratic

majorities. Federalism interferes with democ-

racy. It has, however, two main advantages

that can compensate for this cost. First, once

conflicts arise, federalism is a constraint that

“forces” democratic majorities to bargain with

federal minor-ities, and therefore encourages

constructive compromise. Second, costs of fed-

eralism at the central level can be compensated

for by democratic gains in the subnational units,

where the political rights of the citizens have a

much greater significance.

Non-territorial federalism

Non-territorial or corporate federalism allows

a minority to maintain its own public institu-

tions without territorial segmentation. Reli-

gious communities, for instance, can be given

the right to have their own schools. This raises

two questions. The first is: what are the limits

of cultural minorities’ right to run their own pub-

lic institutions? This eventually depends on the

concept of the state, of the constitution and on

a society’s idea of pluralism as well. The second

question deals with the consequences: can non-

territorial federalism keep the balance of unity

and diversity, or do parallel institutions, exclu-

sively reserved to cultural minorities, lead to

deeper social divide and undermine unity? The

discussion remains controversial: while some

observers fear the latter, others see non-territo-

rial federalism as a promising approach to “iden-

tity politics”. 

EXAMPLE

Non-territorial federalism in Belgium

DIRECT DEMOCRACY

COMPARED

Switzerland is the country holding the most

popular votes but not the only country to prac-

tise direct democracy. On the subnational level,

many countries show examples for the intensive

use of direct democratic devices. Direct democ-

racy in the US states shares many similarities

with the Swiss practice. Direct participation by

the people is possible in many different ways.

Experiences of direct democracy compared

In a majority of countries all over the world

nationwide popular votes were held sometime

or other. The distribution of votes that have ever

taken place, though, is very uneven. In most

of the countries the number is below ten, while

more than half of the nationwide votes have

been held in Switzerland. Concerning the issues

of votes, one can distinguish three general cat-

egories. The first one comprises the establish-

ment or secession of a state, of a new consti-

tutional order or regime. A second category,

relatively new, comprises decisions on member-

ship in transnational organisations or changes

of the status of membership. The third category

deals with important national policy decisions for

which a government wants to be given additional

legitimacy. All in all there is a vast variety of

occasions on which people are able to express

their preferences. The following table shows a

classification of direct democratic devices.

The practice of direct democracy

in the US states and Switzerland –

similarities and differences

US direct democracy is fundamentally differ-

ent from Switzerland’s in one point: it is limited

to state or local level. Yet, the US states’ and

Switzerland’s experience of direct democracy

are the richest; the instruments of the referen-

dum and the popular initiative are practically

the same, and one can find many similarities in

their use. Examples for similarities are the facts

that direct democracy can influence the political

agenda in favour of issues important to less well

organised interests, that campaigns and propa-

ganda influence the outcome of a vote and that

direct democracy is an additional control of polit-

ical elites. As an important difference to Switzer-

land, direct democracy in the US states is not

an element of political power sharing and has

not led to co-operation between political parties.

Direct democracy on subnational level

While in Switzerland direct democracy is known

on all federal levels, some other countries prac-

tise direct participation only on the sub-national

levels. This is the case, for instance, in Germany

where votes are held in some Bundesländer and

their municipalities or, as already mentioned,

in the US states where direct democracy is as

widely institutionalised and used as it is in Swit-

zerland. In all US states, with the exception of

Delaware, any amendment of the constitution

requires a popular vote. In about half of the

states we find one or another type of referendum

for parliamentary laws, often complemented by

a financial referendum. Moreover, citizens in

many states can propose legislation by means of

the popular initiative, or initiate a “recall”, which

allows voters to remove or discharge a public

official from office. In no other part of the world

but California have citizens had so much oppor-

tunity to express their political preferences: from

1884 to 2003, Californians voted on nearly 1800

issues.

More direct democracy – a worldwide trend

The idea of direct democracy is spreading out

all over the world. Numerous referenda have

been held during regime changes and the build-

up of democracy in Central European coun-

tries. Moreover, plebiscites on EU affairs have

become more and more frequent both in old and

new member states.

EXAMPLE

The Irish votes on the Lisbon treaty

New social movements, grass-roots politics,

non-governmental organisations, and new infor-

mation technologies have made civil society

more active in daily politics. They claim more

and better influence on politics. New instruments

of direct participation, especially at the local and

the subnational level, developed in many forms.



A CLASSIFICATION OF DIRECT DEMOCRATIC DEVICES

Main characteristic Description

Binding and non-binding referenda It is obvious that binding referenda have a higher

impact than non-binding votes which are merely

consultative or advisory.

The authority empowered to call a popular vote With regard to who has the authority to demand

that a popular vote be held, we can distinguish four

basic types of participation:

• government-controlled referenda

• constitutionally required referenda

• referenda called by the people

• popular initiatives

National and subnational referenda While in Switzerland direct democracy is known

on all federal levels, some other countries practise

direct participation only on the subnational levels

(e.g. USA, Germany).

CONSENSUS DEMOCRACY

COMPARED

The Swiss system widely corresponds to an ideal

type of consensus or power-sharing democracy,

in contrast to majoritarian democracy. In multi-

cultural societies, consensus democracy can be

a better device to resolve political conflict than

majoritarian democracy.

Majoritarian and consensus democracy –

a comparison

If there is a continuous thread in Swiss politi-

cal history it is probably the desire to prevent

winners from taking all, leaving losers with

nothing – or in other words, power sharing. Yet,

power sharing is practised not only in Swit-

zerland but also in Belgium, the Netherlands,

Northern Ireland, South Africa or India. Power-

sharing or consensus democracy distinguishes

them fundamentally from the type of majoritar-

ian democracy, which can be found in Great

Britain or New Zealand. Arend Lijphart, a promi-

nent scholar comparing political institutions, has

called this “consociational”, “power sharing” or

“consensus” democracy, in contrast to the type of

“majoritarian” or “Westminster” model of democ-

racy. The two models of democracy represent

coherent and therefore ideal polities maximising

the basic ideas of either enabling decision by

majority or decision by consensus. Next table

shows a direct comparison of majoritarian and

consensus democracy. It is easy to identify Swit-

zerland and Great Britain as two polities that

correspond to most criteria of one of the models.

Democratic power sharing – a key to

resolving conflicts in multicultural societies

The predominant model of democracy is

majoritarian. In multicultural societies, how-

ever, majoritarian democracy may encounter

serious difficulties. Cultural values, beliefs and

languages are not only heterogeneous, but may

lead to different political preferences that do

not change. In case of conflict, minorities have

no voice or are even permanently excluded

from political influence and power. Consensus

democracy, in contrast, gives societal minorities

a chance to participate in political power und

have a voice in the policies of the government,

which cannot be overheard. By mutual agree-

ment and compromise, societal divides may be

eased or even overcome. An example for this

is Northern Ireland. For decades, the majoritar-

ian Protestant regime, excluding the Catholic

minority from power, could not prevent violent

conflict and the divide of society. Recently, the

two parties agreed on a power-sharing govern-

ment, hoping to overcome societal division and

political conflict.

The culture of power sharing

How can trust between political opponents in

multicultural societies develop? It is obvious

that there is a vital need for co-operation, which

can be driven or even forced. Proportional

representation is a universal key to power shar-

ing. Its effects are the chance of mutual recog-

nition of even antagonistic actors as equal part-

ners. Under these conditions accommodation

becomes feasible. If none of the partners of a

grand coalition has a majority position, rotation

of majorities for different issues become likely.

This stimulates mutual respect and prevents

minorities abusing their veto. Permanent co-

operation in political decision making enables

elites of different cultures, language or religion

to overcome mutual prejudices and to deal bet-

ter with their differences. Once the political elites

have developed better mutual understandings,

such a culture can trickle down to larger parts

of society.

Also under favourable conditions, development

of mutual trust and of a culture of accom-moda-

tion take time. The process is vulnerable and

can fail. The institutions of power sharing are

not a guarantee for overcoming societal division

and deep conflict. However, they offer better

chances for political integration than majoritar-

ian democracy. 

LIJPHART’S TYPES OF MAJORITARIAN AND CONSENSUS DEMOCRACY

MAJORITARIAN DEMOCRACY

e.g. Great Britain

CONSENSUS DEMOCRACY

e.g. Switzerland

1. Executive Concentration of power in one-

party and bare-majority cabinet

Power sharing in broad coali-tion

cabinet

2. Relations executive /

parliament

Cabinet dominance Balance of power

3. Political parties Two-party system Multiparty system

4. System of elections Majoritarian and disproportional Proportional representation

5. Influence of interest

groups

Pluralism Corporatism

6. Government structure Unitary and centralised Federal and decentralised

7. Parliament Concentration of legislative

power in unicam-eral legislature

Strong bicameralism

8. Type of constitution Flexibility, simple procedure

of amendment, or unwritten

constitution

Rigidity, complex procedure of

amendment

9. Judicial review Absent or weak Strong

10. Central bank Controlled by executive High degree of autonomy

EPILOGUE – THE SWISS SYSTEM

IN THE FUTURE

Switzerland is exposed to the dynamics of Euro-

peanisation and globalisation, which provoke

conflicts in the interior. The country is divided

on the question of European integration. Rising

polarisation between the right and the left makes

power sharing more difficult. Swiss democracy

is not an export model. Its experience, however,

can serve as an example to other countries

looking for their own way of federalism, power

sharing or direct democracy.

Switzerland in the process of globalisation

Since 1992, when the Swiss people, in a popular

vote, turned down membership of the European

Economic Area (EEA), the Swiss government

and the EU have managed to find another way

to develop their relations: the “bilateral way”.

EXAMPLE

The bilateral treaties between

Switzerland and the European Union

It has led to a number of treaties between the

EU and Switzerland, which were all accepted in

popular votes. They give Switzerland partially

access to the European market, under condition

that EU regulations apply on the Swiss market.

Swiss authorities pretend that the bilateral way

best serves the autonomy of the country. How-

ever, Switzerland is fully exposed to the dynam-

ics of Europeanisation and globalisation as

well. This not only creates new winners and

losers but widens the divide between liberal

pro-Europeans and conservative nationalists.

Swiss politics have become much more polar-

ised. The old cleavages between capital and

labour, and between urban and rural regions,

are becoming more salient. Polarisation, the

strategy of both the right and the left, makes

consensus more difficult and is detrimental to

the spirit of accommodation.

EXAMPLE

Internationalisation of law

The future of the bilateral way

Future success of the bilateral way is uncertain.

If bilateralism does no longer guarantee national

autonomy, the question of EU membership will

have to be put on the political agenda again. Yet,

the majority of Swiss voters consider the Euro-

pean Union as an elitist project, bureaucratic

and centralistic. EU-membership would not

stand a chance in a popular vote. Direct democ-

racy, while being the main obstacle for member-

ship, is at the same time the most robust politi-

cal institution that holds the Swiss together. It

forces the political elite to share power, main-

tain co-operation, negotiation and compromise

despite all other transformations of the Swiss

polity, despite growing divides, and despite the

ongoing difficulties induced by Europeanisation.

Swiss democracy – not an export model

but subject of dialogue

Every country has to find its own way of devel-

oping its political institutions on the basis of its

cultural heritage, history, economic and social

situation. This is the reason why the “Swiss model

of democracy” cannot be exported one-to-one –

neither to industrialised nor to developing coun-

tries. So, if the Swiss want to aid democracy,

they should choose a way of dialogue. Partners

interested in the Helvetic model of democracy

will find out that the Swiss system is unique as

is their own system. However, the concepts of

federalism, power sharing or direct democracy

are not: they can be realised in different coun-

tries in specific ways. So far, partners may find

the Swiss experience useful for their own way. 

Introduction ................................................................................................................... 2

FEDERAL SYSTEM ....................................................................................................... 3

Decentralised division of powers: bottom up .................................................................. 4

Co-operative federalism ................................................................................................. 7

Cantonal participation in federal decision making .......................................................... 9

The importance of local government ............................................................................. 11

Fiscal federalism in Switzerland ....................................................................................13

Federalism in a multicultural state ................................................................................16

Challenges and the limits of Swiss federalism...............................................................20

ELECTIONS AND DIRECT DEMOCRACY .....................................................................23

Elections ......................................................................................................................24

Direct democracy ..........................................................................................................28

Voters and campaigning in direct democracy ................................................................33

Challenges of direct democracy ....................................................................................37

CONSENSUS DEMOCRACY ........................................................................................39

The Federal Council .....................................................................................................40

Consensus seeking in parliament ..................................................................................43

The political decision-making process and its actors ......................................................45

The policy cycle ............................................................................................................47

Favourable and unfavourable conditions for consensus democracy ..............................50

Problems and prospects of consensus democracy ........................................................53

COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ..................................................................................55

Federalism compared ...................................................................................................56

Direct democracy compared .........................................................................................58

Consensus democracy compared .................................................................................60

Epilogue – the Swiss system in the future .....................................................................62

Contents .......................................................................................................................64

Impressum ...................................................................................................................65

CONTENTS

Publication data

Publisher Federal Department of Foreign Affairs FDFA, Presence Switzerland

Authors Prof. Dr. Wolf Linder and Dr. Andrea Iff; University of Bern,

Institute of Political Science

Reference to the Text Wolf Linder, Swiss Democracy – Possible Solutions to Conflict in

Multicultural Societies. 3rd Edition, 2010.

French Translation

and Revision

Prof. Dr. Bernhard Waldmann and Dr. Nicolas Schmitt;

University of Fribourg, Institute of Federalism

German Translation Prof. Dr. Wolf Linder

Spanish Translation

and Revision

Lingua-Communications, Köniz

English and German

Revision

Rotstift AG, Bern

Concept and Design Presence Switzerland and Screenlight Interactive AG

Technical Realisation Screenlight Interactive AG, Zollikerberg

Photos Copyright Presence Switzerland, Swiss Parliament, Imagepoint, IRI, 123rf

Films

Publisher Federal Department of Foreign Affairs FDFA, Presence Switzerland

Production and Scripts Tina Hirschbühl

Video Editing and Sound Mix Swissinfo.ch

TV Footage Schweizer Radio und Fernsehen SRF, Zurich;

Radio Télévision Suisse RTS, Geneva; Telepool GmbH, Zurich;

RTS Mise au Point, Geneva

Script Translation SRG SSR Media Services

Speakers English Tina Hirschbühl and Michael Morris

Speakers French Isabelle Eichenberger and Bernard Lechot

Speakers German Regula Siegfried and Urs-Peter Wolters

Speakers Spanish Patricia Islas and Jaime Ortega

A Swiss citizen has a triple citizenship, the one of

a municipality, of a canton and of the federation.

If non-natives want to acquire Swiss citizenship,

they have to start with the local citizenship. The

latter must be acquired before one can apply for

the cantonal, and then for the federal citizenship.

The procedure is burdensome, and the highest

hurdle is at the local level. Applicants must have

lived a number of years in the same commune.

A local commission demands proof that the

applicant speaks one of the Swiss languages

and has a basic knowledge on the Swiss politi-

cal system, history and society. Furthermore, in

smaller communes of some cantons, the citi-

zens’ assembly finally decides on the applica-

tions in a direct democratic vote.

In the late 1990s, when discrimination happened

against applicants from certain countries, the

Supreme Court intervened, defining standards

of fair procedure for the people’s assembly.

While this decision was acclaimed by the liberal

side, it was criticised by conservatives: in their

eyes, the courts’ instructions were an offence

against the liberty and the sovereignty of the

local people. 

ExamplE

Swiss citizenship

Asylum policy is one of the examples of co-oper-

ative federalism where the federal level sets

the law and the cantons implement the policy.

The federation and the cantons co-finance the

asylum relief. In 1998, it was decided to shorten

the allowance for asylum seekers to reduce the

financial burden. The cantons had two possibili-

ties how to reduce their costs, either to repatriate

asylum seekers more quickly and thus shorten

their stay in Switzerland or to raise the number

of asylum seekers that are allowed to work. Both

possibilities were used extensively and thus, the

cantons implemented different practices. Urban

and Latin speaking cantons preferred the second

option, rural cantons the first. Still, the problem

remains that there is no equal treatment for all

asylum seekers in all Switzerland. 

ExamplE

Swiss asylum policy

At the beginning of the 1980s, there were

so-called “open drug scenes” in several Swiss

cities, such as Zurich, Bern, Olten and Solo-

thurn. As a consequence, the miserable state of

drug addicts was becoming increasingly visible.

That’s why every city developed its own public

and social services to help the addicts and protect

them against HIV and Aids. The Swiss Federal

Office of Public Health supported many of these

services. Because of the different experiences

that the cities made with their own programme,

in the 1990s, Switzerland introduced new mea-

sures to reduce the problems associated with

drug use and adopted a new national drug strat-

egy. Only because of the local experiences,

successes and failures, it was possible to elabo-

rate an innovative and coherent federal strategy.

It consists not only of repressive measures, but

also of prevention, harm reduction and therapy.

Important international agencies, then focused

on repression, were sceptical about the Swiss

strategy. By now, however, the Swiss drug policy

has won international recognition. 

ExamplE

Drug policy in Swiss cities

What is the relevance of this system for the

Swiss citizens in their daily life? The differences

in taxes can be shown with an example of a

family with two children and a taxable income

of 1–50,000 Swiss francs. In 2003, in Delémont,

the capital of the canton of Jura, such a family

had to pay approximately 24,000 Swiss francs

in cantonal and local taxes. That same family

would have paid less than half of this amount,

only 10,000 Swiss francs, in the canton of Zug.

At the same time, because of the equalisation

system, the families have more or less equal

living standards in their cantons and the same

possibilities with regards to schooling and infra-

structure. 

ExamplE

Impact of fiscal federal system

The canton of Jura represents an exception to

Swiss integration of cultural minorities. The Jura

region, which is mainly Catholic and French-

speaking, was incorporated into Protestant,

German-speaking Bern in 1815. As a minority

located at the northern periphery of the canton,

the people of Jura felt they were being discrimi-

nated against both politically and economically.

An escalation of political clashes after Second

World War gave rise to a separatist movement,

which triumphed in 1978 when the new Jura

canton was created.

Things were complicated by the fact that the

population of Jura was itself divided: three south-

ern districts had been Protestant since the 16th

century, were economically better off and had

traditionally better relations with the old can-

ton. Thus the deepening conflict was not only

between Jura and Bern, but also between “sepa-

ratists” and (Bernese) “loyalists” within the Jura.

The government of the canton of Bern there-

fore proposed a procedure which allowed the

districts to decide by popular majority whether

they wanted to stay with Bern or join the new

canton. In 1974 and 1975 the people of Jura

then voted according to this procedure which

was first accepted as a constitutional amend-

ment to the Bernese constitution.

In the first vote the inhabitants of all the Jura dis-

tricts voted 37,000 for and 34,000 against inde-

pendence. The cleavage between separatists

and loyalists was clear: the northern districts

voted for separation by three to one, whereas

the three southern districts voted by almost two

to one to stay with the old canton. Two of the

three districts confirmed their preference to stay

in the canton of Bern in the second vote in 1975,

but in one of the southern districts the vote was

split. Here a third vote was held: Moutier, the

main city of the district, decided to stay with

Bern whilst some northern municipalities in the

district chose to join the new canton. After these

votes the boundaries of the new canton, Jura,

were known, and in 1976 its people elected a

constituent assembly which then drew up a draft

constitution for the new canton. The constitution

was accepted by the people of Jura in 1977, and

one year later the Swiss people and the cantons

accepted Jura as the twenty-sixth canton of the

federation.

Sooner or later, the Jura question will come up

again. Indeed, a popular initiative in the Jura of

2004 charges the cantonal parliament with work-

ing out a constitutional framework for a “United

Jura” which includes the southern districts. Bern

authorities, so far, follow a different path: they

propose a status of partial autonomy for the

southern districts.

The case of the Jura secession is relevant for

several reasons. Firstly, the procedure of sepa-

ration had to be invented at a time when the con-

flict was escalating. Its success is rather aston-

ishing. The people of Bern canton conceded a

right for secession to the Jura people, and the

Swiss people, in the last vote, accepted the Jura

as a new canton. Federalism made a successful

proof. Secondly, the separation was not based

on the grounds of ethnic affiliation but on prin-

ciples of direct democracy: the popular major-

ity of each district decided on secession. Thirdly,

the Jura case had its particular historical back-

grounds. But it shows also the risks of conflict

if several cleavages coincide: the northern part

of the Jura felt discriminated as a linguistic and

ExamplE

Dealing with the separatist issue

religious minority, and as a poor region as well.

This situation was exceptional and can hardly

be found in other regions. This may have saved

problems of secession to other cantons. 

An initiative to merge the cantons of Geneva

with the canton of Vaud had no chance in a

popular vote in 2002. The voting campaign was

intense but it soon became visible that the idea

of a merger was merely academic and had no

backing in the population. The initiative was

turned down in both cantons with a high major-

ity of over 70 %. In contrast, on the municipal

level, territorial reforms are common. During the

1990s, the number of municipalities decreased

from over 3,000 to approximately 2,600 and is

still decreasing. The most prominent example is

the canton of Glarus: in 2006 its people decided

to reduce the number of its communes from 25

to three. 

ExamplE

Territorial reforms on municipal but not on cantonal level

In a democracy where people can challenge

any law through a referendum, the government

has to find encompassing majorities. One policy

area that exemplifies this problem are taxes. If

the government needs more revenue it must

theoretically encounter tax resistance from all

citizens. However, it may propose a solution that

gets a majority of voters, for instance reducing

the tax burden for a majority of modest-income

households by a small amount and raising taxes

for the smaller group with higher incomes. By

doing so the government may expect a political

majority for its project of a net fiscal gain. How-

ever, these hopes may be dashed: Firstly not

only higher income groups affected by higher

taxes might vote against the bill but also two

other groups, namely lower-income groups vot-

ing as if they are of higher income status (an

often observed situation). Secondly, voters of

all income groups may agree that higher taxes

are unavoidable but prefer cantonal taxes for

regional public goods. In practice, the federal

authorities in Switzerland were able to raise

revenue in the past but seemed to be aware of

these difficulties: consumer taxes, disliked by

most households, are lower than in other coun-

tries, and federal revenue relies much more on

income than on consumer taxes. Progression of

income tax is high – a minority of people with

high income contribute much more to federal

revenue than all other households. Finally, a

good part of federal revenue is paid back to the

cantons in the form of transfers. 

ExamplE

Introduction of new taxation

On 6th December 1992 the Swiss people, in a

popular vote, turned down membership of the

European Economic Area (EEA) which would

have brought economic integration in a Euro-

pean market without responsibilities and rights

of membership in the EU. Whereas the other

members of the European Free Trade Associa-

tion (EFTA) – Austria, Finland, Iceland, Norway,

Sweden and Liechtenstein – decided to become

integrated into the European market, Switzer-

land chose to remain outside. The result of the

vote was already obvious in the early afternoon,

when only the small cantons have been counted.

Already 30 % of the overall votes were enough

to turn down the vote because of the missing

majority of the cantons. Finally, 19 cantons

rejected the treaty. Also the people rejected the

adhesion, but only with a very small majority of

50.3 %.

No other political decision since World War II has

been of such crucial importance to Switzerland

than this decision. This policy change was highly

controversial, and the popular vote of December

1992 left behind a divided nation. Whereas the

treaty was of immediate economic importance,

its significance went far beyond economics.

Many people feared for the country’s political

neutrality, direct democracy and sovereignty.

The referendum, therefore, was a vote on Swit-

zerland’s political future and national identity. 

ExamplE

The popular vote on the membership of the

European Economic Area (EEA)

This possibility has never been used by the

cantons until 2003, when the cantons joined

together to fight budget cuts implied by a new

federal law. For the first time, the cantons

have been successful in calling a nationwide

vote challenging a decision of parliament. The

cantons of Vaud, Basel-Stadt, Bern, St.Gallen,

Graubünden, Solothurn, Valais and Obwalden

supported the referendum. The aim was to pre-

vent a federal tax reform, as it would have been

a great financial burden for the cantons. The

people supported the cantons in the referendum

and voted against the federal law in May 2004.



ExamplE

Cantonal referendum

On 27 November, 1989 the New York Times

reported the following news from Switzerland:

“Switzerland today voted to keep its army as

the best way of maintaining its neutrality. An

initiative to abolish the army was turned down

by a margin of almost two to one. ‘A majority of

the states rejected it’, a government spokesman

said. Only in Geneva and Jura did the major-

ity vote in favour of the proposal. The initiative,

forced by a petition signed by 111,300 citizens,

set off a fierce national debate on the useful-

ness of an army in a small neutral country.” The

initiative on the abolition of the Swiss army is a

prominent example for mobilising effect of initia-

tives. From the very beginning, the proponents

of this initiative were aware that they would

not win a majority of the vote but used the four

years’ discussion to change political attitudes on

the formerly taboo subject of Swiss military and

peace politics, with considerable success. 

ExamplE

Abolition of the Swiss army

The old rule of re-election of incumbent federal

councillors has been broken in recent times. In

the parliamentary election of 2003 the Swiss

People’s Party had become the strongest party,

while Christian Democrats were amongst the los-

ers. Christoph Blocher was elected as the Swiss

People’s Party’s second representative, while

incumbent Federal Councillor Ruth Metzler from

the Christian Democrats was not re-elected.

However, in 2007, a coalition of Social Demo-

crats, Christian Democrats and Greens, opposed

to his politics, successfully boycotted Blocher’s

re-election and brought another member of

the Swiss People’s Party, Eveline Widmer-

Schlumpf, into office. The Swiss People’s Party

did not accept this manoeuvre and expelled

Widmer-Schlumpf as well as Samuel Schmid,

the second representative out of the party. As

a consequence, the Swiss People’s Party was

divided and the two federal councillors joined a

new party. The Swiss People’s Party, no longer

represented in the Federal Council, declared

the end of the grand coalition and announced its

determination to practise fundamental opposi-

tion because they didn’t feel represented in gov-

ernment. One year later, however, Ueli Maurer

– the official candidate of the Swiss People’s

Party – was elected as the successor of out-

going Samuel Schmid.

This episode shows two things: First, the “crisis

of consensus democracy” was very short. The

Swiss People’s Party soon realised that political

chances of permanent opposition of one single

party against a coalition of three are not favour-

able. The governmental parties, on their side,

were also interested in restoring the grand coali-

tion. The election of Maurer was the first step.

Second, non re-election of incumbent federal

councillors might recur in the future. This can

be seen as a loss of stability of the government,

but also as a chance for more personal change

in the Federal Council. 

ExamplE

The voting out of federal councillors and the

“crisis of consensus democracy” in 2008

In the period of worldwide economic depression

in the 1930s the bourgeois coalition not only

came under pressure from the political left but

also from their “own” interest groups who chal-

lenged bills put forward in the federal chambers.

Moreover extremist forces, impressed by Nazi

and fascist propaganda in Germany and Italy,

tried to undermine trust in democracy and par-

liamentary institutions. Their so-called “Frontist

Initiative”, which proposed a new political order,

was overwhelmingly rejected in a popular vote,

but the legislative process became blocked by

referenda challenges from all sides. The Swiss

political authorities had to learn that the referen-

dum could also be successfully used by small

groups, and that it was difficult to obtain a suf-

ficient majority even with the support of inter-

est groups and parties. In the years before the

Second World War the Federal Council and the

parliament extensively used an “urgency clause”

of the constitution, allowing to enact laws with-

out a referendum. Direct democracy was practi-

cally suspended. After World War II, measures

were taken to avoid the collapse of the legis-

lative process in the future: urgency legislation

was restricted and a consultation process was

introduced to give cantons and interest groups

the possibility to articulate their interests before

the parliamentary process. 

ExamplE

Crisis of the Swiss political system during the worldwide

economic crisis of the 1930s

Since many years, the Swiss invalidity insur-

ance has had considerable financial problems.

Thus, the insurance has been reformed several

times. Every time, discussions in parliament

were highly controversial. Right-wing politicians,

above all the Swiss People’s Party, and eco-

nomic associations wanted savings by cutting

back the benefits, while left-wing politicians,

above all the Social Democrats, and unions

were fiercly opposed to all cutbacks. Consen-

sus was found but the measures were modest,

far from resolving the financial problems of the

insurance.

Not only in parliament, but also in the popula-

tion, discussions about invalidity insurance were

controversial. Twice in the last ten years, there

was a popular vote on a revision of the invalidity

insurance. In 1999, the Swiss people rejected

saving measures adopted by parliament. Organ-

isations of disabled people, with the support

of left parties, had challenged the revision by

optional referendum. In 2007, there was another

referendum vote on a revision of the invalidity

insurance. Again, the organisations of disabled

people could not support the cutback of benefits.

This time, the parties on the right succeeded and

the bill was adopted by the people.

This means that the departure from the status

quo must remain very small and only incremen-

tal reforms have a possibility to succeed. 

ExamplE

Revisions of the invalidity insurance

Belgium is the most prominent example where

federalisation since 1970 has taken territorial

and corporate forms as well. The country is

divided into the regions of Flanders, Wallonia

and Brussels. But Belgium is also divided into a

Flemish-speaking community (comprising both

the geographically defined area of Flanders and

the corporately defined group of Flemish speak-

ers in Brussels), a French-speaking commu-

nity (comprising both the region of Wallonia and

Francophone Bruxellois), and a German-speak-

ing community (Eupen/Malmédy). 

ExamplE

Non-territorial federalism in Belgium

Ireland held two referenda on the European

Union’s Lisbon treaty in 2008 and 2009. The

Irish people had to decide whether to accept

or to reject the provisions of the treaty. On 13th

June 2008, 53.4 % of Irish voted “no”, and the

rejection of the treaty plunged the EU into a

crisis. Its political elites became aware that their

decisions, even the most important ones, do not

always correspond with the people’s preference

and that the popular vote of a single country

can block the institutional mechanisms of the

EU. The Irish government decided to hold a sec-

ond vote which took place on 2nd October 2009.

This time an overwhelming majority of 67.1 %

approved the treaty. The Irish vote was the last

big hurdle for the treaty and soon afterwards it

could come into effect. 

ExamplE

The Irish votes on the Lisbon treaty

As a consequence of the people’s “no” to the

EEA in 1992, the Swiss government decided

to suspend the negotiations for membership of

the European Union. But, in order to develop

their relations, Switzerland and the EU in 1994

started negotiations about issues for bilateral

treaties. The Swiss aim was to ensure a partial

economic integration in the European market

without membership in the EU and maintaining

the political autonomy. In 1999 and 2004, two

series of bilateral treaties were concluded. Reg-

ulations bear on subjects of traffic, public pro-

curement, scientific and technical co-opera-

tion, free movement of persons, public security

(Schengen) as well as agriculture and environ-

ment. The “Bilaterals” include about 20 main and

100 subsidiary agreements between Switzerland

and the European Union.

The treaties were passed by parliament and

by the people in referendum votes. There are

serious doubts about future success of the bilat-

eral way. For practical reasons, Switzerland is

bound to accept large parts of EU law and it has

to accept unilateral adaptation of the treaties if

the EU’s “acquis communautaire” is subject to

change. 

ExamplE

The bilateral treaties between Switzerland and

the European Union

Switzerland’s exposition to Europeanisation

and globalisation is mirrored in the internation-

alisation of law. Growing international interde-

pendence leads to an increase of international

law adopted by Swiss authorities and directly

applicable in Switzerland, compared to origi-

nal national law. Until the 1990s, the proportion

of national law was clearly higher than the part

of international law. In the meantime this has

reversed: in 2007, 53 % of all Swiss law were in

line with international law. 

Internationalisation of law

ExamplE

Internationalisation of law

At least eight cantons have to join together to

call a cantonal referendum – a democratic

instrument that has existed since 1874 and

has never been used until 2003. In that year,

however, the cantons decided to make use of this

instrument: apart from canton Vaud the cantons

of Basel-Stadt, Bern, St.Gallen, Graubünden,

Solothurn, Valais and Obwalden have supported

the referendum. They were opposed to plans of

a fiscal reform of the federation which would

have charged the cantons with an additional tax

burden of 500 million Swiss francs. The refer-

endum was successful. The late “discovery” of

the cantonal referendum shows that federalism

is not a frozen framework but flexible and open

to new modes of action by political actors. 

ExamplE

First cantonal referendum 2003

According to the census of 2000, 64 % of the Swiss

population speak German, 20 % French, 6.5 %

Italian, 0.5 % Romansh and, due to immigration,

9 % speak another language as their first lan-

guage. These linguistic groups are territorially

concentrated and most cantons are monolin-

gual. Of the 26 cantons only three are bilingual

(Bern, Fribourg, Valais) and one (Graubünden)

is trilingual. The Romansh-speaking community

is the only one that does not form a majority in

any canton. With regards to the main religions,

Catholics represent 44 and Protestants 37 %

of the population. Religious groups are slightly

more dispersed than linguistic groups. However,

even in cantons that are faced with religious and

linguistic diversity, at least municipalities are

relatively homogeneous. 

DEfinition

Diversity of the society

In 1291, Switzerland was created as a confeder-

ation of three independent states, mainly for the

purposes of defence against outside enemies.

The confederation evolved slowly, new states

were included with new treaties. The French

Revolution ended the “old order” of the con-

federation. French troops invaded the Swiss

cantons in 1789. Napoleon installed a central-

ised regime. When it proved to be not effective,

Napoleon reformed it, re-installing the cantons.

In 1815, after the defeat of the French, Switzer-

land returned to a confederal organisation. With

the industrialisation and nation-building in the

surrounding states, confederal arrangements

became too inflexible. The following decades

were characterised by democratisation in certain

cantons, disputes over the future organisation,

and religious conflicts, which culminated in a

short civil war between Catholic and Protestant

cantons in 1847. The victory of the liberal Prot-

estant side opened the way for installing a

democratic federal state in 1848. The procedure

for adopting the constitution made sure that only

a compromise between opponents and support-

ers of a federal union could succeed. The major

principles of state organisation remained the

same since then, even though many smaller and

two total revisions (1874 and 1999) of the consti-

tution took place. 

DEfinition

Historical origins

Swiss economy is highly globalised. It is based

on a highly qualified labour force produc-

ing quality products. The main areas include

microtechnology, high-tech equipment, biotech-

nology and pharmaceuticals, as well as bank-

ing and insurance. Most of Swiss manpower is

employed by small and medium-sized enter-

prises, which play an extremely important role

in the Swiss economy. In the 1990s, it was hit by

a recession which led to the highest unemploy-

ment ever seen in Swiss industry. Even though,

Swiss economy today is internationally highly

competitive, performing better than most OECD

countries. 

DEfinition

Switzerland’s economy

Until today, the official name of the Swiss federal

state is in Latin “Confoederatio Helvetica” or

Swiss Confederation. This traditional name

derives from the historical origins. Today, still,

the abbreviation CH for ‘Confoederatio Helvet-

ica’ is the Swiss country code found on motor

vehicles and Internet domains.

In English, however, the term “Swiss Confedera-

tion” is somehow misleading. Switzerland, today,

is a “federation” since 1848, and no longer a

“confederation”, a term to characterise a loose

association of otherwise independent states. 

DEfinition

Confederation

Romansh is one of the four official languages

of Switzerland. It is Latin variety with regional

particularities. Romansh is predominant in the

south-eastern trilingual canton of Graubünden,

besides German and Italian. According to the

census of 2000, only about 0.5 % of the Swiss

population still speak Romansh. The language

is spoken in a number of closely related dia-

lects. The language has been recognised as

one of the four national languages in 1938 and

was declared an official language in 1996. As a

consequence, Romansh speakers may use it for

correspondence with the federal government. 

DEfinition

Romansh

DEfinition

Federalism

The word federalism comes from the Latin word

“foedus”. This expression was used for personal

bandages and treaties between peoples in the

middle age. Federalism defines a state in which

(1) at least two levels of government rule the

same land and people, (2) each level has some

area of action in which it is autonomous, (3) sub-

national units participate in important decisions

of the central government. The last point marks

the essential difference of federalist in contrast

to decentralised systems. 

DEfinition

Tripartite Agglomeration Conference

According to official statistics more than 70 %

of the Swiss population live in agglomerations.

However, there is no political organisation for

the common needs of their inhabitants. Central

cities in Switzerland, after years of unsuccess-

ful negotiations, have achieved success in the

formation of a Tripartite Agglomeration Confer-

ence, a political platform of the federal level,

the cantons, the cities and the municipalities.

It was founded in 2001 by the Federal Council,

the Conference of the Cantonal Governments,

the Swiss Association of Municipalities, and

the Swiss Association of Cities. The aim of the

conference is that all federal levels work more

closely together to find viable solutions for the

border-crossing problems of agglomerations. 

After the negative popular vote on Switzerland

joining the European Economic Area (EEA)

in 1992 the cantonal governments were look-

ing for ways how to improve the co-operation

between the cantons and the federal level. This

led to the foundation of the Conference of the

Governments of the Cantons in 1993. The aim

of the conference is the co-operation among

the cantons and with the federal level. More

specifically, the aim is to ensure the timely and

encompassing information on international or

European policies that would impact the powers

and responsibilities of the cantons. 

DEfinition

Conference of the Governments of the Cantons

DEfinition

Consensus democracy

A consensual system is characterised by political

decision making in an oversized majority includ-

ing all relevant actors. This requires a permanent

process of negotiation and accommodation in

order to achieve a political compromise. The

idea of seeking a far-reaching consensus –

instead mere majority decisions – has historical

roots and is deeply embedded in the Swiss polit-

ical culture. It is characterised by institutions

different from majoritarian democracy as we find

in most countries of the Anglo-Saxon world. 

DEfinition

Article 175 of the Federal Constitution

Composition and election of the Federal

Council

1 The Federal Council shall have seven members.

2 The members of the Federal Council shall be

elected by the Federal Assembly following

each general election to the National Council.

3 They shall be elected for a term of office of four

years from all the Swiss citizens who are eligi-

ble for election to the National Council.

4 In electing the Federal Council, care must be

taken to ensure that the various geographical

and language regions of the country are appro-

priately represented. 

DEfinition

Article 177 of the Federal Constitution

Principle of collegiality and allocation to

departments

1 The Federal Council shall reach its decisions

as a collegial body.

2 For the purposes of preparation and imple-

mentation, the business of the Federal Council

shall be allocated to its individual members

according to department.

3 Business may be delegated to and directly

dealt with by departments or their subordinate

administrative units; in such cases, the right to

legal recourse shall be guaranteed. 

DEfinition

Judicial organisation and the Federal Court

With judicial authorities on the municipal, can-

tonal and federal level, the judicial organisa-

tion follows the idea of federalism. At the top, as

highest authority and court of last resort, there is

the Federal Court. It is composed of 35–45 full-

time judges and a similar number of part-time

judges. On the base of the revised constitution

of 2000, a Federal Criminal Court and a Federal

Administrative Court have been established as

an additional instance before the Federal Court.

Additionally there are certain specialised courts,

e.g. the Federal Insurance Court or the Military

Criminal Court.

The Federal Court acts in all areas of Swiss law

but in very different functions, depending on

the specificity of the case. The Federal Court

decides on conflicts between the federation and

the member states and on conflicts among the

cantons. It is empowered to review legislative

and executive acts of the cantons and guar-

antees the constitutional rights of the citizens.

However, the Federal Court does not have the

power to rule on the constitutionality of federal

laws. 

The social cleavages and antagonistic political

interests in the second half of the 19th century

led to three main tendencies in Swiss political life:

liberalism, conservatism and socialism. These

tendencies crystallised in the four governmental

political parties of Radicals, Christian Demo-

crats, Social Democrats and the Swiss Peo-

ple’s Party. Federalism and proportional repre-

sentation, however, led to a highly fragmented

multiparty system. The profiles of the Swiss

political parties and their share of votes (in the

2007 national elections) are as follows:



Radicals (15.8 %): regards itself as the heir to

nineteenth century liberal ideas; it enjoys close

relations with business and industry and is highly

influential in economic matters. It is the politi-

cal representative of independent professionals,

entrepreneurs and the middle class.



Christian Democrats (14.5 %): successor to the

Catholic conservative movement. Still the pre-

ferred party of the Catholics. With a bourgeois

and a trade-union wing, it thus tries to integrate

the opposing interests of entrepreneurs and

employees.



Social Democrats (19.5 %): in former times

it was periodically a radical-left movement.

Today it is a moderate party standing for social,

ecological and economic reforms. Enjoys close

relations with trade unions. Most of its support-

ers are in urban, industrialised regions, but it

draws on all social groups.



Swiss People’s Party (28.9 %): once a conser-

vative party appealing mainly to farmers, crafts-

men and independent professionals, it has more

than doubled its electoral force in the last 15

years and become the biggest political party.

Defending Swiss sovereignty and neutrality, it is

today situated at the national-conservative right.



Greens (9.8 %): party of the ecology move-

ment; has drawn from left parties as well as from

new social movements.



Green Liberals (1.4 %): Split from the Green

Party in 2007 to address centre-oriented

ecologists.



Liberals (1.9 %): dates back to the 19th

century; represents a right-wing secession from

the radicals. Strongest affinity of all Swiss par-

ties to neoliberal ideas. Represents the upper

middle class and independent professionals. In

2009 merger with the Radicals.



Protestants (2.4 %): counterpart of the Chris-

tian democrats, but without its electoral success.



Alternative Left (1.1 %): successor of former

radical left parties (mainly the Communist Labour

Party and progressive organisations) that have

almost disappeared. Non-dogmatic, social and

ecological orientation.



Bourgeois-Democrats: split from the Swiss

People’s Party in 2008, with five members of

parliament and one member of the Federal

Council, which was elected in 2007 against the

official candidate of the Swiss People’s Party.

Participates in national elections in 2011 for the

first time. 

DEfinition

Political parties

Financovanie politických strán na príklade Nemecka, Rakúska a Švajčiarska. Výzva pre Slovensko?

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Sep 2010

The municipalities and cities are more than ever dependent on successful cooperation with third parties. Regardless of whether this relates to the cooperation with regional economic entities, other public institutions or citizens and their representatives. It is important to maintain all possible benefits and cost synergies in favour of regional value creation. For example, the civic-participative understanding of democracy, the Integration of people and companies, and the concern for the sustainable provision of services of regional quality of life, rely on cooperation. The declining financial revenue titles – at the same time increasing costs-also oblige the municipalities, towns and regions to cooperate. Based on an analysis of the conditions in Germany, the present book exposes the opportunities and risks of new, contemporary forms of communal cooperation in very different sectors and areas (health, housing, energy, education, etc.) to a detailed description and inter-communal evaluation. Die Gemeinden und Städte sind zwingender denn je auf gelungene Kooperationen mit Dritten angewiesen. Unabhängig davon ob sich dies auf die Zusammenarbeit mit regional ansässigen Wirtschaftsunternehmen, anderen öffentlichen Einrichtungen oder die Bürger und deren Interessenvertretungen bezieht. Es gilt, alle möglichen Nutzen- und Kosten- synergien zugunsten regionaler Wertschöpfungen zu pflegen. So ist es nicht nur ein verändertes, bürgerpartizipatives Demokratieverständnis, das auf eine Integration der Menschen und Unternehmen setzt, oder die Sorge um die nachhaltige Bereitstellung von Leistungen der regionalen Lebensqualität. Auch die rückläufigen finanziellen Einnahmetitel – bei gleichzeitig steigenden Kosten – verpflichten die Gemeinden, Städte und Regionen zur Kooperation. Im vorliegenden Buch werden, von einer Analyse der Bedingungen in Deutschland ausgehend, die Chancen und Risiken neuer, zeitgemäßer Formen kommunaler Zusammenarbeit in ganz unterschiedlichen Branchen und Bereichen (Gesundheit, Wohnen, Energie, Ver- und Entsorgungswirtschaft, Bildung, interkommunale Zusammenarbeit) einer näheren Beschreibung und Bewertung ausgesetzt. 43 Autoren aus Wissenschaft und Praxis kommen zu Wort und formulieren ihre Empfehlungen zur zukünftigen Entwicklung. Einmal mehr spielt dabei das genossenschaftliche Modell der kooperativen Ökonomie eine hervorragende Rolle. Es zeigt sich erneut, wie wirkungsvoll dieses – nicht nur in Zeiten klammer Kassen – eingesetzt werden kann. Inhalt: 1. Grundsätzliche Überlegungen und Aspekte Ausgangslagenbeschreibung Gerd Landsberg: Anforderungen kommunaler Kooperationen aus Sicht der Städte und Gemeinden Karl-Christian Schelzke: Wie wollen Kommunen in Zukunft (über)leben? Wolfgang George: Ziele kommunaler Kooperation Dietwald Gruehn: Klimawandel – Notwendigkeit zu verstärkter kommunaler und regionaler Kooperation im Rahmen formeller und informeller Planungsprozesse? Andreas Memmert: Kommunale Kooperation aus der Sicht eines Bürgermeisters Zukunfts- und Visionsbeschreibungen Dirk Oßwald: Interkommunale Zusammenarbeit in aller Munde: Modeerscheinung oder Überlebenszwang? Finanzierungsaspekte Jürgen Wegmann: Die wirtschaftliche Struktur der gemeinnützigen AG als ein Format der kooperativen Ökonomie Heinrich Degenhart, Lars Holstenkamp: Genossenschaftliche Beteiligungsfinanzierung von Investitionen für die Erzeugung und Verteilung erneuerbarer Energien Gunnar Schwarting: Interkommunale Kooperation – sachlich geboten und finanzpolitisch notwendig Rechtliche Aspekte Henning Jensen: Interkommunale Zusammenarbeit als Thema des Vergaberechts Hans-H. Münkner: Kommunale Kooperation – Genossenschaft als Modell für öffentliche Aufgaben Andreas Eisen: Kooperation und Genossenschaften als Modell der kommunalen (Selbst-)Steuerung Edgar Steinle: Die Genossenschaft als Organisationsform zur Erfüllung öffentlicher Aufgaben Binnenorganisation Joerg Bogumil, Maren Kohrsmeyer, Sascha Gerber: Politikfeldübergreifende Koordination – eine intrakommunale Herausforderung Entwicklung im Ausland Klaus Wirth: Gemeindekooperationen in Österreich – Einschätzungen zum Stand und aktuelle Entwicklungen Roland Scherer: Die Renaissance der Region? Aktuelle Entwicklungen der Regionalisierung in der Schweiz Andrea Iff, Fritz Sager, Rolf Wirz, Eva Herrmann: Demokratie und interkommunale Zusammenarbeit in der Schweiz – Fallstudien von zwei Gemeinden im Kanton Bern Andrea Iff, Fritz Sager: Demokratiequalität interkantonaler Zusammenarbeit in der Schweiz Christian Eigner, Michaela Ritter: LEADER, Kunst und Evaluierung Oder: Wie man sich als Geburtshelfer einer genuin europäischen Politik wiederfindet 2. Beispiele und Modelle Versorgung und Entsorgung Peter Momper, Ulrich Gehrlein, Lorenz Kock: Bioenergie-Region Mittelhessen – Masterplan zur regionalen regenerativen Energieversorgung Ulf Theilen: Organisationsmodelle in der Abwasserentsorgung – Grundsätzliche Möglichkeiten der Kommunalen Kooperation und ausgeführte Beispiele Thomas Berg: Vertrieb Energiegenossenschaften: Entwicklungspotenzial, regionale Wertschöpfung und Multiplikation der Energiegenossenschaften Fabio Longo: Städte und Gemeinden vor ihrer gemeinschaftlichen Zukunftsaufgabe der neuen örtlichen Energieversorgung Marketing und Stadtentwicklung Karl J. Eggers: Chancen kommunaler Zusammenarbeit: Beispiel Standortmarketing Markus Hanisch: Kommunale Kooperation in Form von Multi-Stakeholder Genossenschaften: Das Beispiel Stadtmarketing Wissen Georg A. Pflüger, Heinz Kipp: Regionale Grundschulversorgung zukunftsfähig gestalten Ulrich Vossebein: Stärkung der Region durch Bildungsnetzwerke Soziales Albrecht Goeschel, Rudolf Martens: Regionales Sozialbudget: Konzept für die Kooperation von Kommunen und Sozialen Verbänden Nicole Göler von Ravensburg: Aktuelle Entwicklung von Kultur- und Sozialgenossenschaften Hans-H. Münkner: Kommunale Kooperation – Genossenschaft als Modell für öffentliche Aufgaben Wohnbau Heinz-Otto Weber: Kommunale Wohnungsgenossenschaften Volker Behnecke, Elke Bergsma: Zur Rekommunalisierung öffentlicher Daseinsvorsorge am Beispiel der kommunalen Immobilien- und Wohnungswirtschaft Umsetzung und Projektmanagement Elke Grossenbacher: Interkommunale Zusammenarbeit erfolgreich durchführen – Solides Projektmanagement als unverzichtbare Grundlage

Political Institutions and Politics

Chapter

Jan 2014

Switzerland and Denmark are both old democracies. Switzerland obtains the maximum score (10) on the Polity IV democracy-index from 1848 onwards – notwithstanding that Swiss women were not fully enfranchised at the federal level prior to 1971 and that the last canton to enfranchise them at the cantonal level (Appenzell-Innerrhoden) did so only in 1990. Denmark, which got its first democratic constitution in 1849, obtains its first “10” on the Polity IV democracy-index for the year of 1915, the year Danish women became enfranchised.

Contextual Approach of Voting

Chapter

Nov 2017

Andreas C. Goldberg

This chapter delves deeper into the contextual aspect of cleavage voting. The first part of the chapter focusses on the cantonal distribution of cleavage influence in order to examine the magnitude of differences and to detect possible geographical patterns. In a second step, a cluster analysis groups the cantons into three types according to contextual cleavage variables for religion, social class and rural-urban. This new typology then provides the basis for a first statistical test of different voting patterns in the three cantonal groups. The main empirical analysis using both individual and contextual variables is then presented. This part begins with a theoretical discussion about the possible effects for each cleavage, including an interplay between both the individual and contextual level. The subsequent analysis relies on multilevel modelling that allows for the inclusion of cross-level interactions. After discussion of the findings, the chapter concludes with a summary of the most important results.

Theory of Cleavage Voting

Chapter

Nov 2017

Andreas C. Goldberg

This chapter introduces cleavage voting, the central concept of the book. In order to give a brief overview of voting theories the chapter starts with a presentation of the traditional three schools of electoral research and some more modern approaches. Afterwards the concept of cleavage is defined in more detail and discussed in relation to actual voting behaviour. Subsequently the main types of cleavages are discussed in a historical and modern perspective. Given the changing importance of cleavages in the last few decades, the chapter also presents underlying reasons for these changes. As this book focuses on Switzerland, the specificities of the Swiss cleavage system and developments over time will also be discussed. The final part of the chapter presents the contextual aspect of voting, which will play a major role in the empirical analysis. This final part includes a definition of contextual effects, a discussion of the underlying mechanism of how the context affects voting behaviour and its connection to individual factors in the sense of a moderating influence.

Longitudinal Impact of Cleavages

Chapter

Nov 2017

Andreas C. Goldberg

The focus of this chapter is the development of cleavage voting over time. The chapter opens by discussing the theoretical effects as to why and how the four cleavages matter for voting behaviour. This is followed by a presentation of empirical findings from both the international and Swiss-specific literature. Afterwards the empirical study – the testing of the evolution of cleavage voting in Switzerland – is described. This begins with a data and method section in which the used datasets, the exact operationalisation of variables and the statistical models are presented in detail. The subsequent empirical analysis of voting patterns covers ten elections and 40 years. For each cleavage a descriptive discussion of voting behaviour is followed by more sophisticated statistical analyses on the actual impact of cleavages over time and in comparison to each other. In addition to examining the development of cleavage strength, the analysis also tackles the underlying reasons for this development, namely changes due to behavioural or structural effects. The conclusion summarizes the most important findings and offers explanations for the longitudinal trends found.

Cantonal participation in federal decision making

.............. . Co-Operative Federalism

Co-operative federalism................................................................................................. 7 Cantonal participation in federal decision making.......................................................... 9 The importance of local government.............................................................................11

43 The political decision-making process and its actors

.............. . The Federal Council

The Federal Council.....................................................................................................40 Consensus seeking in parliament..................................................................................43 The political decision-making process and its actors......................................................45

47 Favourable and unfavourable conditions for consensus democracy

. . . . The Policy Cycle

The policy cycle............................................................................................................47 Favourable and unfavourable conditions for consensus democracy..............................50

28 Voters and campaigning in direct democracy

................. . Direct Democracy

Direct democracy..........................................................................................................28 Voters and campaigning in direct democracy................................................................33 Challenges of direct democracy....................................................................................37

Das politische System der Schweiz.

Figures

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