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Political Polarization on Support for Government Spending on Environmental Protection in the USA, 1974-2012
... In general, polarisation within the U.S. electorate regarding environmental issues has increased over the years [16]. It is thus not surprising that partisan identity generally predicts attitudes towards environmental issues, even if its relationship with behaviour tends to depend on the specific action under consideration [25][26][27][28]. ...
... Environmental attitudes and, in general, positions on environmental issues are known to intersect with partisan identity in the U.S. [27,28], as confirmed by the correlations in Fig. 1 and the SEM analysis. To better analyse the differences between left-and right-wing participants, we split the dataset on the median of the partisan identity scale. ...
... The experiment should thus be replicated with a non-U.S. sample, i.e., with participants living in countries where discussions on climate change are less polarised [28] and in particular the link between conservatism and the denial of anthropogenic climate change is weaker [60]. Liberals in the U.S. may feel generally pushed to abide by the perceived pro-environmental norms of their group independently of their personal attitudes [17,39]. ...
The relationship between environmental attitudes and behaviour is known to be weak, especially when these variables are measured as self-report items in surveys. In addition many environmental questions are highly polarised, making it even more problematic to use survey data to inform policy making. To better explore the attitude-behaviour gap in the context of environmental policies, along with its interaction with partisan identity, we ran an online experiment with 805 U.S. residents. Four key variables-environmental attitudes, self-reported environmental behaviour, observed environmental behaviour (in the form of carbon-offset credit purchase), and partisan identity-were measured, and their interactions in promoting pro-environmental behaviour were analysed. We found that (1) self-reported and real behaviour are almost uncorrelated and (2) partisan identity mainly predicted self-reported not actual environmental behaviour. These results suggest that policy-making needs to rely more on behavioural insight to test policies' actual effects and to promote real improvement of the local and global environment.
... In addition to the literal invisibility of carbon dioxide (CO2) (Sheppard, 2012, p.3), the driving force behind climate change, other environmental issues are often perceived as "invisible" because the majority have little to no direct experience with them and their direct effects (Myers, Maibach, Roser-Renouf, Akerlof & Leiserowitz, 2013), instead learning about them through non-interactive media such as documentaries and films (e.g., Greitemeyer, 2013), newspapers (Reis, 1999), religious or politically affiliated outlets (e.g., Greeley, 1993;Jones & Dunlap, 1992;McCright, Xiao & Dunlap, 2014), or miniscule portions of selected school curriculums (Huckle, 1993). While scientists generally use media to combat misinformation (Dudo & Besley, 2016), other outlets may have different priorities . ...
... The second dragon revolves around ingrained ideologies and worldviews steering human behavior. As previously mentioned, human environmental knowledge often comes from religious or politically charged media outlets (Greeley, 1993;Jones & Dunlap, 1992;McCright et al., 2014). Religion and political affiliation also constitute core components of a person's ideology or worldview, which is shown to have a clear impact on how certain individuals treat their surrounding environment (Gifford, 2011). ...
... Reviewing the literature on environmental communication through the years, it is clear that previous attempts to promote pro-environmental action have been affected in various degrees by political and religious influence (Gifford & Chen, 2017;Greeley, 1993;Jones & Dunlap, 1992;Klöckner, 2015, p.121;McCright et al., 2014), the spread of environmental misinformation and conspiracy theories (Boucher, 2016;Hooper et al., 2011;Mohammed, 2019;Smith & Graham, 2019), psychological barriers (Gifford, 2011;Gifford & Chen, 2017;, contextual and physical limitations (Cialdini et al., 1991;Friestad & Wright, 1994;Jager, 2003;Klöckner, 2015, p.83;Ölander & Thøgersen, 1995;Smith et al., 2012;Thøgersen, 2010;Verplanken & Wood, 2006), one-way communication interventions (Johnson & Johnson, 2009, p.157), a lack of direct exposure to environmental issues (e.g., Klöckner, 2015, p.48;Littlejohn & Foss, 2011), repetitive and often vague scientific statistics and data (Houghton, 2015, p.14;Vatne, 2013, p.43) as well as a feeling of psychological distance from what can only be described as an "invisible" entity that slowly sneaks up on us Myers et al., 2013;Sheppard, 2012, p.3). It is very difficult or perhaps even impossible to design and implement a singular communications-based intervention capable of circumventing all these barriers against pro-environmental behavior at once. ...
This thesis serves as a contribution towards the general understanding of how, when, and why environmental and sustainability-oriented games affect their players, and how they can be utilized as tools for increasing environmental literacy. It consists of three qualitative empirical research papers, where the overarching purpose has been to gain an understanding of how games can be used in strengthening the environmental literacy of their players. The results overall show that games can be effective tools for environmental education, especially regarding their innate ability to simplify and visualize complex systems and environmental issues that otherwise appear distant or invisible.
... As such, the current study intends to examine how a green consumer website with various gamification elements could potentially mitigate moral licensing effects, if any, and facilitate consistent pro-environmental behaviors. Furthermore, the political identity of a consumer may also play a role in shaping responses to green messaging such that partisan preferences shapes how they perceive environmental messages and respond to them, with conservatives less likely to support environmentalist efforts (McCright et al., 2014;Nisbet et al., 2015). Hence, how well gamification elements can spark motivations to "be green" may depend on one's political identity to either accept or reject environmentally friendly practices. ...
... As mentioned above, one notable individual difference strongly related to eco-friendly values and behaviors is political ideology. Data suggest that for Americans for instance, beginning in 1992, support for government spending on environmental protection began to diverge by ideology, with conservative elites promoting antienvironmental attitudes and liberals reporting stronger support for environmental protection (McCright et al., 2014). ...
Green consumerism is a growing trend that may contribute to a more sustainable society. However, lack of motivation to pursue a green lifestyle might subject consumers to well-documented moral licensing effects. Moreover, individuals with conservative ideological leanings are also less predisposed to take environmentally friendly actions, suggesting that sustainability communication strategies may need to differ by user ideology. The present study tested gamification techniques as a way to boost green motivations for consumers with varying political ideologies. Through an online experiment (N = 531), we reported null findings with respect to the effects of gamification techniques and political ideology on consumers’ behavioral intentions. Implications and directions for future work on sustainability communication are discussed.
... Interestingly, we found that right-wing political orientation was negatively associated with supporting a proenvironmental image campaign, thereby providing first evidence that rightwing ideology may be associated with opposing not only actual proenvironmental actions (McCright et al., 2014), but also superficial environmental endeavours such as political greenwashing. Campaign support National Narcissism ...
... Moreover, although exploratory, these results elucidate the interplay between ideology, national identity and antienvironmentalism in a more nuanced way. In past work, right-wingers showed an ideological tendency to reject environmentalism (Coffey & Joseph, 2013;Gromet et al., 2013, McCright et al., 2014Milfont et al., 2021; and see Hornsey et al., 2018 for cross-cultural differences). ...
Past research indicates that national narcissism (but not national identification) predicts support for anti-environmental policies, and that this effect is driven by national narcissists’ need to defend the group’s image. We hypothesized that although national narcissists might not support proenvironmental actions, they would support promoting a proenvironmental image of their nation (i.e., greenwashing). In five studies (overall N=2,231), we demonstrated that individuals high in national narcissism were less likely to support actual proenvironmental actions (Studies 2-5), but more likely to support greenwashing campaigns (Studies 1-3, 5), although not when greenwashing would involve financial costs incurred by the ingroup (Study 4). In Study 5, national narcissism predicted support for greenwashing as a political strategy—it was related to the preference for green image enhancement over green actions (controlling for proenvironmental attitudes and individual narcissism). We did not observe similar effects for national identification or right-wing political ideology. Implications for promoting proenvironmentalism across distinct groups are discussed.
... The role of political ideology in climate change attitudes is in line with prior climate change research, highlighting the importance of encouraging conservative leaders who are concerned about climate change to publicly express their views. [43][44][45][46] However, it may be more comfortable for many climate change advocates to affiliate with more politically like-minded individuals who may not be politically conservative. Involving political conservatives in establishing common concerns on climate change and developing feasible solutions is critical in order to develop sustainable change. ...
The COVID-19 pandemic and climate change are two current global threats. This study examined the relationship between climate change attitudes and COVID-19 behaviors and risk perceptions. Drivers of both climate change attitudes and COVID-19 behaviors was also assessed. Study participants were an online sample of 520 respondents from a longitudinal study of COVID-19 and well-being in the US. Logistic regression models were used to examine the outcomes of climate change opinions and COVID-19 perceptions and prevention behaviors (perceived COVID-19 risk, mask wearing, social distancing, and vaccine intentions). Covariates included political ideology, conspiracy beliefs, and trust in scientific information about COVID-19. In the multivariable models of COVID-19 perceptions and prevention behaviors, climate change opinions were also included as a covariate. In these models, climate change attitudes were significantly associated with perceived risk of COVID-19, always wearing masks, decreased time spent with others due to COVID-19, and intending to get COVID-19 vaccine. In adjusted models, the odds of wearing a mask increased 41% (CI: 1.11-1.78) for every 1-point increase on the climate attitude scale and decreased 13% (CI: 0.79-0.96) if the participant distrusted COVID-19 information. Those who reported distrust of COVID-19 information (aOR: 1.61, CI: 1.40-1.85), politically conservative ideology (aOR: 1.24, CI: 1.04-1.47), lower concern about climate change (aOR: 0.71, CI: 0.53-0.97), female sex (aOR: 2.39 CI: 1.38-4.13), and lower disbelief in conspiracy theories (aOR: 0.63, CI: 0.51-0.80) had higher odds of not intending to be vaccinated. These findings suggest that climate change attitudes are linked to COVID-19 behaviors and perceptions, which are not completely driven by political ideology or trust in scientific information.
... This heterogeneity by party affiliation aligns with previous work that found liberals to associate emotion with ''acting green'' 39 and to express greater environmental concern as a result of moral foundations related to caring for and protection of others. 32 Considering the political polarization of environmental issues in the United States, 40 narratives may ''preach to the choir'' and fail to engage, or even repel, citizens who are less environmentally conscious. This result also highlights the importance of examining how behavioral effects vary by context and participant attributes. ...
Scientific evidence that links human activities to environmental damage frequently fails to motivate people to act. Meanwhile, research on emotion, imagery, and identifiable victims has found these factors to influence behavior, and scientists and environmentalists are increasingly advocating for the use of narratives depicting personal stories of loss. We tested the behavioral effects of a narrative compared with scientific facts in a randomized field experiment with over 1,200 adults in a polluted urban watershed. Prior to making real purchase decisions about landscaping products that reduce nutrient runoff, consumers saw either scientific information about runoff's impacts or a narrative with tenuous scientific foundations. When exposed to the narrative rather than scientific information, consumers were willing to pay 11% more (95% confidence interval [4%, 18%]). This average effect, however, masks heterogeneity by political affiliation. While Democrats paid more after reading the narrative, Republicans paid less by roughly the same amount.
... In the United States, left and right identifiers are also sharply polarized on climate change, another issue central to Francis' social teaching. As a great deal of research suggests, American conservatives are more likely to doubt the seriousness of climate change and less likely to support efforts to mitigate it, potentially placing them in greater opposition than moderates and liberals to Francis's position (Kahan et al. 2012;McCright et al. 2014McCright et al. , 2016Schwom et al. 2015). ...
Since his election in 2013, Pope Francis has achieved influence as a religious leader while also impacting political discussions through his teachings on social justice and environmental matters. In the United States, his teachings on these topics have generated some controversy among right‐leaning figures. In this study, I look at whether this controversy is reflected in mass opinion about Pope Francis. Using data from three national surveys of Americans, I find that individuals who identify with the political right evaluate Francis more negatively. Qualifying this, Catholic religious affiliation weakens the tendency for right‐wing identifiers to evaluate Francis more negatively, while strengthening the tendency for those high in religiosity to evaluate the pope positively. Finally, consistent with the idea that politically aware individuals are more likely to make ideologically informed judgments, the relationship between identification with the political right and negative evaluations of Pope Francis was stronger among the politically engaged.
... Socio-demographic differences in funding support were minor, suggesting that prominent polarization dividing American society (Wilson, Parker, & Feinberg, 2020) and influencing support for environmental protection (McCright, Xiao, & Dunlap, 2014) may be less intense when it comes to wildlife conservation. For example, we found comparable levels of funding support across the rural to urban gradient, partially assuaging concerns that an "extinction of experience" linked to urbanization might negatively impact environmental concern and pro-environmental behavior (Gaston & Soga, 2020). ...
Insufficient funding is a major impediment to conservation efforts around the world. In the United States, a decline in hunting participation threatens sustainability of the “user‐pay, public benefit” model that has supported wildlife conservation for nearly 100 years, forcing wildlife management agencies to contemplate alternative funding strategies. We investigated support for potential funding options among diverse college students, a rapidly expanding and politically active voting bloc with a potentially powerful influence on the future of conservation. From 2018 to 2020, we surveyed 17,203 undergraduate students at public universities across 22 states. Students preferred innovative approaches to conservation funding, with 72% supporting funding derived from industry sources (e.g., natural resource extraction companies), 63% supporting state sources (e.g., general sales tax), and 43% supporting conventional user‐based sources such as license fees and excise taxes associated with outdoor recreation activities (e.g., hunting). Findings emphasize the need to broaden the base of support for conservation funding and highlight the importance of considering the preferences and perspectives of young adults and other diverse beneficiaries of wildlife conservation.
... While early studies reject the effects of ideological constraint on policy attitudes (e.g., Converse, 1964), current research on environmental attitudes demonstrate significant left-right cleavages as people self-identifying with the ideological left tend to be more favorable toward environmental protection than those on the ideological right (Dunlap et al., 2001;Krosnick et al., 2000;Tranter, 2011). Further research has demonstrated that this ideological cleavage has grown larger over time (Dunlap & McCright, 2008;McCright et al., 2014). 3 In part, left-right differences in policy attitudes are suggested to be a result of the ideological right's desire to limit governmental interference (Milbrath, 1986), protect free-market capitalism (Campbell & Kay, 2014), and preserve the current economic and political system (Feygina et al., 2010;Häkkinen & Akrami, 2014). ...
en Carbon taxes are frequently advocated as a means of reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, yet their political feasibility remains a challenge. To enhance their political appeal, carbon tax proponents have proposed revenue recycling as a means of alleviating public concern with this instrument's visible costs. Analyzing data from identical survey-experiments administered in the United States, Canada, and Germany, we examine the extent to which returning revenues to the public has the potential to broaden the political acceptability of carbon taxes across ideological and national contexts. While public opinion is sensitive to the cost attributes of carbon taxes, we find that in some cases, opposition to carbon taxes can be offset by a reduction in income taxes. However, these effects tend to be modest in size, limited to some ideological groups, and varied across countries. Moreover, we demonstrate that fairness perceptions are a crucial mechanism linking revenue recycling to carbon tax support in all countries examined.
摘要
zh 碳税作为减少温室气体（GHG）排放的一种手段经常被提倡，但其政治可行性仍然是一个挑战。为了增强其政治吸引力，碳税的支持者提出了收入回收的建议，以减轻公众对这一工具的可见成本的担忧。通过分析在美国、加拿大和德国进行的相同调查实验的数据，我们研究了将收入返还给公众在多大程度上有可能扩大碳税在不同意识形态和国家背景下的政治接受度。虽然公众舆论对碳税的成本属性很敏感，但我们发现，在某些情况下，对碳税的反对可以通过减少所得税来抵消。然而，这些影响往往规模不大，仅限于某些意识形态群体，并且在不同国家之间存在差异。此外，我们证明，在所有被调查的国家中，公平观念是将收入回收与碳税支持联系起来的关键机制。
Resumen
es Los impuestos sobre el carbono se defienden con frecuencia como medio para reducir las emisiones de gases de efecto invernadero (GEI), pero su viabilidad política sigue siendo un reto. Para aumentar su atractivo político, los defensores del impuesto sobre el carbono han propuesto el reciclaje de los ingresos como medio para aliviar la preocupación pública por los costes visibles de este instrumento. Analizando los datos de encuestas-experimentos idénticos realizados en Estados Unidos, Canadá y Alemania, examinamos hasta qué punto la devolución de los ingresos al público tiene el potencial de ampliar la aceptabilidad política de los impuestos sobre el carbono en distintos contextos ideológicos y nacionales. Aunque la opinión pública es sensible a los atributos de coste de los impuestos sobre el carbono, encontramos que en algunos casos, la oposición a los impuestos sobre el carbono puede ser compensada por una reducción de los impuestos sobre la renta. Sin embargo, estos efectos tienden a ser modestos en tamaño, limitados a algunos grupos ideológicos y variados entre países. Además, demostramos que la percepción de equidad es un mecanismo crucial que vincula el reciclaje de los ingresos con el apoyo a los impuestos sobre el carbono en todos los países examinados.
... This indicates that Republicans-despite their well-documented preference for small government-are not fundamentally opposed to public investment in preparedness but rather that the willingness to back such investments is sensitive to their price. Second, previous research documents that individual attitudes toward environmental issues are increasingly structured along partisan lines (McCright et al., 2014). Our findings advance this research by revealing an important similarity: Republicans and Democrats tend to be equally sensitive to the price of improving disaster preparedness. ...
Societies can address collective threats such as natural disasters or pandemics by investing in preparedness (ex ante) or by offering compensation after an adverse event has occurred (ex post). What explains which of these options voters prefer? We study how personal exposure and policy knowledge affect mass support for long-term disaster preparedness, a type of long-term investment meant to cope with an increasingly destructive and frequent class of events. We first assess whether support for preparedness reflects personal affectedness and find that neither subjective nor geo-coded measures of disaster exposure predict policy preferences. Second, we explore whether this finding can be explained by misperceptions about the features of the available policy options. We find that revealing the damage reductions associated with preparedness systematically reduces opposition to long-term investment. These results suggest that opposition to preparing for collective threats may depend more on informational deficiencies than on personal experience with realized risks.
Supplementary information:
The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s11109-021-09738-2.
... A pesar de la cada vez más vasta literatura sobre la temática, el término continúa aún hoy sin un encaje claro y cerrado sobre el que de forma sistémica construir una exégesis. En virtud de este pretexto aspiramos a dar forma a unas aportaciones que puedan ser extrapolables a regiones y complejidades sociales múltiples, más allá de los constantes estudios que desde los 70 se vienen alumbrando sobre el contexto de los EE.UU (Abramowitz y Saunders, 2008;McCright et al., 2014). Por tanto, pretendemos incorporar y desarrollar en el debate, cuestiones acerca de cómo poder graduar cuándo una sociedad ha sido o está inmersa en un proceso de polarización. ...
... Measures reported to correlate with proenvironmental behavior include pro-environmental attitudes (Pavalache-Ilie & Cazan, 2018), belief in anthropogenic climate change (cf. Hall et al., 2018;van der Linden, 2015), political orientation (McCright et al., 2014;Samdahl & Robertson, 1989;Xiao & McCright, 2007), gender (Hunter et al., 2004;Zelezny et al., 2000), and formal education (De Silva & Pownall, 2014;Meyer, 2015). The literature on household income and religiosity as predictors of pro-environmental behavior provides very mixed results, therefore we do not predict a particular direction of a correlation. ...
The present research introduces the Carbon Emission Task (CET) as a new behavioral paradigm grounded in experimental economics. It assesses consequential pro-environmental behavior in laboratory, online, or classroom studies. Participants face repeated tradeoffs between financial bonus opportunities paired with real carbon emissions and foregoing such opportunities while staying carbon neutral. In two studies, we find that people react systematically to the incentives set out in the task and that average pro-environmental behavior correlates with related constructs. Higher bonus prospects decrease pro-environmental behavior, whereas higher environmental consequences increase pro-environmental behavior. Average pro-environmental behavior in the CET correlates with environmental attitudes, belief in climate change, and demographic factors such as gender, education, or political orientation. Finally, average pro-environmental behavior in the CET predicts participants’ reported carbon footprints and their extraction behavior from a common-resource pool. Taken together, our findings suggest that the CET relates to constructs often used in psychological research, but due to its relationship with experimental economics may help to integrate the two disciplines and synthesize the research efforts. In addition, it opens the door for novel research questions testing behavioral reactions under varying sets of incentives. In sum, the CET offers the research community a fast and efficient tool to assess actual and consequential pro-environmental behavior in a way that appeals to various social scientific disciplines.
... 55). Conversely, members of the Republican Party are not usually as concerned with environmental protection as the Democratic party and think too much money has been spent by the government on environmental issues [21,42]. ...
Freshwater resources are being rapidly depleted by unsustainable human activities in the United States (U.S.), causing concern for water security. If individuals were targeted with appropriate information, public engagement in water conservation may increase. Political affiliation and ideology may play a role in grouping individuals based on their engagement in water conservation, as environmental issues are politically contentious in the U.S. The purpose of the study was to determine if political affiliation, political ideology, and theory of planned behavior variables related to water conservation predicted intent to engage in water conservation. Data were collected from 1049 U.S. residents using non-probability opt-in sampling methods. Descriptive statistics and multiple linear regression models were used to analyze the data via the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) 26. The results from a multiple linear regression model revealed that political affiliation, political ideology, attitude, subjective norms, and perceived behavioral control predicted 27.5% of variance in respondents’ intent to engage in water conservation; however, the variance accounted for was mostly attributed to theory of planned behavior variables. The findings have implications for environmental communication, namely focusing on increasing subjective norms towards water conservation.
... In fact, among the 12 countries, there are 10 countries at the HI level, except China and Brazil at the UMI level. This suggests that environmental protection mechanisms and energy-saving techniques are more advanced in highly economically countries (Chel and Kaushik, 2018;Mccright et al., 2014;Chen et al., 2019b). For example, over the last 40 years, Germany has started to implement waste Fig. 4. The overall eco-efficiency performance of the 102 sample countries. ...
In today's world, determining how to improve the quality of the economy, technology innovation and human well-being within resource and environmental limits is a global sustainable development goal. Thus, research on eco-efficiency (EE), eco-technology innovation (ETI) and eco-well-being performance (EWP) has great significance for improving the efficiency of converting ecological consumption into economic benefits, technological innovation and human well-being. This paper presents a two-stage Super-slack-based measure (SBM) model to examine the EE, ETI and EWP (3E) of 102 countries. The indicator system for the 3E network process is constructed by using inputs, intermediate products and outputs. The empirical results show that the highest 3E performers are Singapore, the United States and Iceland. The results also indicate that countries with high levels of economic development have much better EE, ETI and EWP levels than low-income countries. After comparing the values of the 3E in different countries with the global average, the results further show that overall global 3E performance is relatively low. These findings provide significant references to help governments generate different strategies for improving national 3E performance.
... The Democratic Party has made substantial efforts to preserve and protect natural resources for future generations in the U.S. (Owens and Lamm 2017). Conversely, Republican Party members are generally not as concerned with environmental protection as the Democratic Party and think government spending for environmental issues is too high (McCright et al. 2014;Owens and Lamm 2017). Republican Party members believe the protection of natural resources harms the U.S. economy and threatens numerous jobs (Owens and Lamm 2017). ...
Unsustainable human activities are rapidly depleting freshwater resources in many parts of the United States. Public policy surrounding water conservation is arguably one of the most essential strategies for targeting the preservation of water. Increased public engagement in environmental policy may bolster sustainable consumption of water resources if nuances in human behavior are targeted through communication messages. A quantitative research design using an online survey of the general United States public was used to explore if political affiliation and political ideology predicted how respondents prepared to vote on a policy that impacts water. The study revealed that respondents neither agreed nor disagreed on the level to which they would take specific actions to become prepared to vote on a policy that impacts water, indicating there is room for improvement. Results from a multiple linear regression revealed political affiliation and political ideology significantly predicted how respondents prepared to vote on a policy that impacts water; however, they accounted for a small amount of variance in the models. Future studies should identify additional predictors to determine how respondents prepare to vote on a policy that impacts water since political affiliation and political ideology were not a major influence on how respondents prepare to vote. Environmental communicators should focus their outreach efforts on increasing public preparedness to vote on polices that impact water.
... Van Liere and Dunlap reviewed many studies showing that environmental concern is higher among younger, better educated, and more liberal individuals. The political party at that time exhibited relatively weak effects, although more recent studies have seen ideology and party both as dominant predictors while converging as virtually interchangeable indicators for sociopolitical identityreflecting decades of "party sorting" through which parties, and especially Republicans, became ideologically more homogeneous (Brulle 2013;Fiorina and Abrams 2008;Guber and Miller 2013;McCright et al. 2014). Articles applying a "social bases" framework to climate change, and finding broadly consistent results, are far too numerous to list (Shwom et al. 2015;multi-survey U.S. examples include Hamilton et al. 2015;McCright and Dunlap 2011). ...
Background
Research on the social bases of environmental concern has established robust findings across various sociodemographic characteristics. This includes interaction effects between education and political identity, as well as particularly low concern among supporters of President Trump.
Objectives
Using 2016 survey data, we extend such research to examine U.S. public support for four climate-change mitigation strategies: investment in renewable energy, lifestyle changes, a revenue-neutral carbon tax, and cap-and-trade.
Methods
We perform ordered logit regression of belief in anthropogenic climate change and support for these strategies on several key independent variables.
Results
Support follows some of the patterns expected for environmental concern generally but with new details. Trump support is a dominant predictor, and education × party interactions show significant variations in levels of support.
Conclusion
This provides important insights for public policy decision making related to climate change by considering which characteristics are most predictive of support for specific strategies.
... Political parties with a stronger pro-environment focus can take (legislative) action to stimulate better CSP (Hess 2014) and in so doing enhance sustainable development. For example, in the United States, the Republican Party has been found to be substantially less pro-environment than the Democratic Party (Dunlap, Xiao, and McCright 2001;McCright, Xiao, and Dunlap 2014). As elections in the United States are relatively free and fair, citizens have the option of voting for the Democratic Party in future elections if environmental protection becomes a more salient societal concern, ceteris paribus. ...
Policymakers are increasingly concerned with enabling sustainable corporate behavior as part of the transition toward a more sustainable society. Yet, it remains unclear to what extent a country’s governance quality impacts on the sustainable behavior of firms. Drawing on the good governance literature, we hypothesize that the quality of different governance dimensions at the nation-level affects corporate social performance (CSP). This reasoning is tested using a longitudinal data set that combines nation-level and firm-level observations. Different model specifications confirm that countries with a better governance quality have higher CSP. In particular, higher levels of voice and accountability, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption are positively associated with CSP across model specifications. We conclude with a discussion of the implications for research and practice.
... These findings suggest that Democrats are willing to accept deeper involvement of the government in the market economy for the sake of the environment, unlike Republicans. Other research conducted in the United States has also indicated that Republican orientations are less conducive to environmental care (McCright et al., 2014;Stoutenborough et al., 2014). Nevertheless, it remains unclear whether this can be attributed to issues around the free market and attitudes towards economic growth or to a conservative hierarchy of values, resulting in reduced environmental awareness and less inclination toward pro-ecological behavior. ...
Many studies have found a positive association between liberal political views and support for environmental protection activities even though they require greater involvement of the state in market economies. However, such a conclusion is contradicted by empirical studies on pro-environmental activities with regard to the theory of planned behaviour. On the one hand, subjective norms (including the expectations of public authorities) are usually found to be insignificant or very weak drivers of ecological behaviour. On the other hand, self-efficacy (individual attitudes and beliefs in one’s capabilities) is perceived as a leading factor. This inspired us to explore the long-term effects of localism on environmental quality in Poland. Because liberalism and conservatism exist in their ‘pure’ forms, Poland is very well suited to such a study. The aim of the article is to assess the long-term impact of local and liberal orientations (with conservatism as the reference), as reflected by electoral decisions on the quality of the environment. First, the current state of the environment is measured over four dimensions (air, water, soil, and biodiversity), and the effects of environmental policies (including spatial dependence) are estimated. Subsequently, the treatment effects on the environment when a particular political orientation is adopted are estimated using multi-valued treatment effect analyses. The study confirms that local orientation is conducive to long-term environmental care. Moreover, greater coordination of environmental policies at different levels is recommended, focusing on the negative spatial dependence of local environmental expenditure.
... Climate change has been strongly contested and increasingly politicized since its emergence on the national agenda, especially when specific policies such as the Kyoto Protocol were being considered (Dunlap and McCright 2010). Based on the party sorting theory, such political differences among elites will likely extend to the general public (McCright, Xiao, and Dunlap 2014) and can inhibit further development and implementation of environmental policy. ...
Recent events around the world have revealed varying degrees of public
support for climate change and environmental regulation. Applying a
latent class logit model, this study investigates Norwegian and Scottish
public’s economic support for proposed deep sea management policies
for novel attributes, identifying the presence of preference
heterogeneity. Marine litter and health of fish stocks were the attributes
with the highest values in absolute terms. This was followed by the size
of the protected area coverage, whilst the creation of jobs was the least
valued. The results highlight public support for the further collective
action required by the EU in moving beyond the 2020 objective of
achieving good environmental status of Europe’s seas, despite the low
WTP values of the minority classes in each country
... A clear example is partisan sorting where elite cues impact mass opinion on climate/environmental issues and the public opinion becomes more divergent so that Democrats move left (i.e., to the pro-environment) and Republicans do right (i.e., to the anti-environment) [19]. Such polarization of both politicians and the public has been substantial, particularly since the 1990s [3]. While there were pivotal global events such as the Rio Earth Summit and the Kyoto Protocol at that time, the Republican took over Congress from the Democratic in the U.S. so that policy hegemony was shifted to the conservatives [1]. ...
This study aims to overview the U.S. sustainable development by measuring the environmental performance of 50 states over the period of 2009–2018. To attain the objective, we employ data envelopment analysis for environmental assessment where we prioritize the minimization of CO2 emissions first and the maximization of gross state product later under the concept of managerial disposability (i.e., an environment-based performance measure). Then, we examine how the state-level environmental performance measures are associated with their political and spatial contexts. For the purpose, we conduct the Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test across groups of states characterized by their political transitions in the presidential and gubernatorial elections and defined by the regions of the U.S. Economic Development Administration and Environmental Protection Agency. Based on our empirical results, we find that (a) overall environmental performance has gradually enhanced over time, (b) there are statistically significant differences in the environmental performance measures along with the political transitions, and (c) states on both coasts have outperformed those of the middle in the measurement.
... Despite this importance, political scientists have paid only slight attention on public opinion to-ward air pollution. On environmental issues, scholars have focused on examining individual energy preferences (Aklin and Urpelainen, 2013;Ansolabehere and Konisky, 2014), beliefs about climate change (Brechin, 2003;McCright and Dunlap, 2011), and broad views on the relative importance of environmental issues to other issues (McCright et al., 2014;Fowler, 2016;Kim and Urpelainen, 2018). These studies are informative in understanding public opinion toward environment in general, but they may not necessarily serve as a useful and direct guideline for understanding public opinion toward air pollution. ...
... The Reagan Era saw the partisan gap grow larger, as the Reagan Administration's embrace of free-market, anti-regulatory ideology led to unprecedented efforts to weaken federal environmental agencies and regulations (Layzer 2012;Turner & Isenberg 2018). This trend escalated in the Nineties as the Republican Party moved farther to the right, leading to a chasm between the parties in terms of Congressional voting and increased partisan polarization in support for environmental protection among the US public (McCright et al., 2014). This growing polarization is primarily due to the increasing radicalism of the Republican Party (Mann & Ornstein, 2016) stemming from right-wing funders and pressure groups and the Tea Party (Nesbit, 2016;Skocpol & Williamson, 2012). ...
The key actors involved in producing climate change denial misinformation are identified and discussed, along with their connections to one another. The first set includes those acting primarily out of economic self-interest: the corporate world, front groups and coalitions, public relations firms, and astroturf groups and campaigns. The second includes those with strong ideological (as well as varying levels of economic) motivations: conservative philanthropists and foundations, conservative think tanks, contrarian scientists, conservative media, denial bloggers and advocates on social media, and the Republican Party. This large ecosystem of actors, some more central than others and their importance varying over time, tend to work in coordination. They have played a major role in hampering effective action to ameliorate climate change in the U.S. and internationally. Various strategies for combatting their misinformation are discussed.
... Therefore, it is important to consider how individual political beliefs may influence support for risk-reduction activities, ranging from regulations passed by local authorities (e.g., zoning mandates and elevation requirements) to investment of public funds (e.g., construction of levees). In the US, support for government spending is closely tied to political ideology and party identification, with Democrats and liberals generally being more supportive of spending than Republicans and conservatives (McCright et al. 2014). Additionally, recent studies have found that conservatives prefer more proximate levels of government (i.e., state over federal) in managing risk (Choi and Wehde 2019) and tend to view individuals, rather than government, as responsible for disaster preparedness (Wehde and Nowlin 2021). ...
Although it is largely accepted that disasters offer windows of opportunity for adoption of risk-reduction measures, the dimensions of support for hazard mitigation following a disaster are not well understood. Drawing on a survey of Upper Texas Coast residents 9 months after Hurricane Harvey (2017), this study explores public support for various types of hazardmitigation within the context of a natural hazard focusing event. Regression models estimate the association of risk perceptions, objective risk, political beliefs, and disaster experience with individual support for hazard mitigation of seven types including structural and nonstructural, household, and community levels. The findings suggest that individuals with higher risk perceptions, thosewho reside in areas with high flood risk, thosewho experienced disaster damages to their property, and those who value investment of tax dollars in disaster management are more likely to support hazard mitigation than their counterparts. This support varies across hazard mitigation type, indicating there are some factors related to the benefit gained from the specific mitigation technique that are more relevant than other.
... There is an ongoing debate about which factors can help explain this finding, specifically whether the resistance to environmental and climate policy among evangelicals can most accurately be explained by reference to political orientation (including values and attitudes towards collective action), religious beliefs, or a combination of both (Veldman et al. 2021). A significant number of studies have confirmed that political conservatives tend to be less concerned about the environment than their liberal counterparts (Dunlap et al. 2001;Dunlap 2010, 2011;Antonio and Brulle 2011;McCright et al. 2014). Since many evangelicals, at least in the U.S., are politically conservative, it therefore comes as no surprise that resistance to environmental and climate policy is particularly prevalent within this group (Newman et al. 2016). ...
Studies from the United States (U.S.) show that opposition to climate policy is strong among some Christian groups, especially White evangelical Protestants. Much of this opposition is channelled through organisations such as the Cornwall Alliance, which argue against climate measures on religious, economic and what they claim to be science-based grounds. In the present study, we investigated to what extent these convictions were present among Swedish evangelical denominations. Representatives from the Evangelical Free Church, the Pentecostal Alliance, the Swedish Alliance Mission, and the Seventh-day Adventist Church were interviewed to identify the denominations’ views on the scientific underpinnings of climate change and the moral implications of climate policy. Our data show that the denominations’ views differ markedly from those expressed by climate-oppositional evangelical groups in the U.S. The denominations held homogenous views on the legitimacy of climate science, expressed a clear biblical mandate for climate policy based on the notion of human stewardship, and believed that climate change was inextricably linked to poverty and, thus, had to be addressed. Our results point to the need for further studies on the factors behind acceptance and denial of climate science within and between faith-based and other communities in different countries.
... More generally, past research has found that right-wing partisans hold antagonistic views toward environmental protection (McCright et al. 2014). Yet our results indicated that, among our sample of Twitter users in the US, members of the public across the political spectrum express shared environmental interests. ...
Effective digital environmental communication is integral to galvanizing public support for conservation in the age of social media. Environmental advocates require messaging strategies suited to social media platforms, including ways to identify, target, and mobilize distinct audiences. Here, we provide – to the best of our knowledge – the first systematic characterization of environmental personas on social media. Beginning with 1 million environmental nongovernmental organization (NGO) followers on Twitter, of which 500,000 users met data quality criteria, we identified six personas that differ in their expression of 21 environmental issues. General consistency in the proportional composition of personas was detected across 14 countries with sufficiently large samples. Within the US, although the six personas varied in their mean political ideology, we did not observe that the personas split along political party lines. Our results pave the way for environmental advocates – including NGOs, public agencies, and researchers – to use audience segmentation methods like the methods discussed here to target and tailor messages to distinct constituencies at high speed and at large scale.
... Socio-demographic differences in funding support were minor, suggesting that prominent polarization dividing American society (Wilson, Parker, & Feinberg, 2020) and influencing support for environmental protection (McCright, Xiao, & Dunlap, 2014) may be less intense when it comes to wildlife conservation. For example, we found comparable levels of funding support across the rural to urban gradient, partially assuaging concerns that an "extinction of experience" linked to urbanization might negatively impact environmental concern and pro-environmental behavior (Gaston & Soga, 2020). ...
Insufficient funding is a major impediment to conservation efforts around the world. In the United States, a decline in hunting participation threatens sustainability of the “user-pay, public benefit” model that has supported wildlife conservation for nearly 100 years, forcing wildlife management agencies to contemplate alternative funding strategies. We investigated support for potential funding options among diverse college students, a rapidly expanding and politically active voting bloc with a potentially powerful influence on the future of conservation. From 2018 to 2020, we surveyed 17,203 undergraduate students at public universities across 22 states. Students preferred innovative approaches to conservation funding, with 72% supporting funding derived from industry sources (e.g., natural resource extraction companies), 63% supporting state sources (e.g., general sales tax), and 43% supporting conventional user-based sources such as license fees and excise taxes associated with outdoor recreation activities (e.g., hunting). Findings emphasize the need to broaden the base of support for conservation funding and highlight the importance of considering the preferences and perspectives of young adults and other diverse beneficiaries of wildlife conservation.
... Political affiliation has been identified as a strong predictor of attitudes toward environmentalism overall (McCright, Xiao, & Dunlap, 2014) as well as specific issues such as climate change (Hornsey, Harris, Bain, & Fielding, 2016). Contemporary partisanship of environmentalism is not unique to the United States; indeed, environmentalism is similarly divided between liberal and conservative political groups in other Western nations (Dalton, 2009). ...
Abstract Controversial wildlife conservation and management, such as that involving gray wolves (Canis lupus), can be symbolic of broader social conflicts. We conducted an online survey (N = 420) to determine factors shaping public attitudes toward wolf management among residents of Washington state, United States. We used 12 Likert‐type statements to form a single latent construct that represented attitudes toward wolf management in a multi‐use landscape and fit a simple structural equation model to identify demographic predictor variables. The strongest predictors were that voters self‐identifying as Democrats were more likely to hold positive attitudes toward wolves and management to conserve them than those identifying with other political parties (standardized latent variable coefficient = 0.585) and women were more likely than men to hold negative attitudes (−0.459). Older respondents were also more likely to hold negative attitudes (−0.015) and respondents who tried to stay informed about wolf issues were more likely to hold positive attitudes (0.172). Perceived links between wildlife management issues and political ideology may exacerbate community disagreements, hindering coexistence between rural livelihoods and wolves. We recommend appropriate framing and messengers to account for this linkage and improve communication of policy and promote science‐based decision‐making.
en This paper focuses on the effects of political ideology and party affiliation on support for more government spending on environmental protection. Pooled‐sample results show that Liberals (Democrats) are more likely to support higher government spending on environmental protection than Moderates (Independents), who, in turn, are more likely to support higher spending levels than Conservatives (Republicans). The results persist even when we control for respondents' opinions concerning whether the federal government, in general, does too little or too much. When stratifying by party, ideological divisions generally narrow, while stratifying by ideology leads to slightly wider divisions between Democrats and Republicans. Together, these results suggest that when Liberals and Conservatives form opinions about government spending on the environment, party affiliation, to some degree, dampens the effects of ideology. Between 2014 and 2018 the probability of supporting more environmental spending increased, albeit slightly, for all ideologies and parties, but more so for Liberals and Democrats.
Abstract
es Este documento se centra en los efectos de la ideología política y la afiliación partidista en el apoyo a un mayor gasto público en protección ambiental. Los resultados de muestras agrupadas muestran que los liberales (demócratas) tienen más probabilidades de apoyar un mayor gasto público en protección ambiental que los moderados (independientes), quienes, a su vez, tienen más probabilidades de apoyar niveles de gasto más altos que los conservadores (republicanos). Los resultados persisten incluso cuando controlamos las opiniones de los encuestados sobre si el gobierno federal, en general, hace demasiado poco o demasiado. Al estratificar por partido, las divisiones ideológicas generalmente se reducen, mientras que la estratificación por ideología conduce a divisiones ligeramente más amplias entre demócratas y republicanos. Juntos, estos resultados sugieren que cuando liberales y conservadores se forman opiniones sobre el gasto público en el medio ambiente, la afiliación a un partido, hasta cierto punto, amortigua los efectos de la ideología. Entre 2014 y 2018, la probabilidad de apoyar más gasto ambiental aumentó, aunque levemente, para todas las ideologías y partidos, pero más para los liberales y demócratas.
Abstract
zh 本文聚焦政治意识形态和政治派系对支持政府加大环境保护开支一事产生的效果。混合样本（Pooled‐sample）结果显示，自由派（民主党人士）比温和派（独立人士）更有可能支持政府加大对环境保护的开支，而后者反过来比保守派（共和党人士）更有可能支持更高的环境保护开支。当我们对调查对象关于联邦政府是否从整体上作的太少或太多所持的意见加以控制时，结果仍然不变。当用党派进行分类时，意识形态差别一般较窄，而当用意识形态进行分类时，民主党和共和党人士之间的差异稍大。综合来看，这些研究结果暗示，当自由派和保守派对政府在环境上的开支形成意见时，政治派别在一定程度上会抑制意识形态的效果。2014‐2018年间，支持更大的环境开支的可能性有所增加，尽管从所有意识形态和政党来看增幅很小，但就自由派和民主党人士而言增幅稍大。
American cities have played an increasingly critical role in advancing US climate change mitigation and adaptation. Subnational government support for these efforts, however, varies across social, political, economic, and biogeophysical contexts. While the influence of politics on US climate mitigation is well established, further research is required to identify barriers to—and discern complex influences on—US subnational climate action. This study examines the influences of power dynamics between public and private interests, political party affiliation within government and the public, and risk of climate impacts, on observed climate mitigation and adaptation efforts within 136 urban US cities and 33 states. The findings of this study shed light on the motivations of subnational governments to take climate action, and identify significant dynamics influencing the likelihood of key state or local government decision-makers to take climate action.
Previous research suggests that climate skeptics may hold a series of environmental concerns and support for environmental policy that, if engaged with, could serve to (in part) mitigate climate change. Using a unique data set from an online survey of 1,000 adults in the U.S. Pacific Northwest who are uncertain or skeptical of anthropogenic climate change, we explore the diversity of environmental concerns, environmental behaviors, and support for pro-environmental policy within and among those who do not accept climate science. Our results reveal statistically significant and consistent positive effects of (negative) environmental experiences on climate change skeptics’ environmental concerns, behaviors, and policy support. We also find that, among climate skeptics, religious ideation, conspiracy ideation, science distrust, political ideology (conservative), and gender (men) are negatively associated with certain pro-environmental attitudes, behaviors, and support for pro-environmental policy initiatives. We discuss the implications of these findings for climate change and science communication, environmental campaigns, and policy development.
Economic development in rural areas is commonly tied to the use of natural resources. These uses can be categorized as extractive (e.g. mining, natural gas, and logging) or non-extractive (e.g. real estate, tourism, outdoor recreation, and wind energy). Research has shown local support is crucial for sustainable economic development. Therefore, understanding what drives support can help researchers better understand why some projects succeed where others do not. This becomes increasingly important in the face of global climatic change. Extractive uses of natural resources in rural areas are associated with high volumes of CO2 emissions and will have to be greatly reduced if the United States is to successfully respond to climate change. In their place, non-extractive forms of natural resource development have emerged as possible alternatives in transition. Therefore, understanding the impact of climate change beliefs on support for different forms of natural resource development is beneficial for ensuring equitable plans that reflect the needs and desires of rural residents. Using a cognitive hierarchy framework, we test a model hypothesizing support for extractive or non-extractive development is influenced by climate change beliefs which are influenced by both environmental beliefs and political conservatism. We test our model on a sample of rural Pennsylvanians using structural equation modeling and find mixed support for the model. Notably, anthropocentrism and biocentrism both had positive relationships with both forms of development, refuting hypotheses. Further, belief in anthropogenic climate change had a positive relationship with extractive support, but no relationship with non-extractive support.
The evolution of U.S. environmental policy has occurred through a series of three overlapping epochs, with each distinguished by differences in problem definition and policy objectives, implementation philosophies, points of intervention, policy tools, data and informational needs, political and institutional contexts, and key events and public actions. In the third environmental epoch, policy efforts have primarily been framed within the context of sustainability and focus on applying comprehensive, bottom-up policy and planning initiatives. Despite its practical approach for addressing cross-cutting environmental issues, the “sustainable communities” paradigm has fallen short of facilitating a transformation in which U.S. society subsists within the Earth system’s ecological limits. As a result of the sustainability epoch’s policy failures, environmental policy practitioners have increasingly applied the concept of resilience to frame policy discussions. This study draws from resilience theory and applies the environmental epoch framework to conceptualize the emergence of a fourth epoch in U.S. environmental politics and policy, governing for resilience. An examination of the features that distinguish an environmental epoch that centers on resilience contributes to theory and provides practical insight for policymakers by identifying opportunities to prepare for ongoing and unprecedented environmental challenges.
The production of shale gas depends not only on shale resources and capital investment but also on having a flexible and stable policy environment. This paper examines whether and how partisan ideology affects the extraction of shale gas. We use panel fixed effects as well as the system–generalized method of moments approach with quarterly panel data from 15 US states over the period 2007−2016. We consider not only the political ideology of the state governor but also the state legislature’s influence on the governor, control over the governorship and the legislature by the same party, the reelection of an incumbent government, and turnover in the political party in power. The results indicate that because the right-leaning party is more likely to support shale gas development, when a member of that party heads the state government, shale gas production performance is higher than when the left-leaning party is in power. Therefore, the production of shale gas rises with a turnover in political control from left to right, reelection of a right-leaning incumbent, and more right-leaning power in the state legislature. We believe our results shed light on the role of partisan ideology in shale gas production, which has implications for environmental regulations.
As the effects of climate change begin to materialise across Pacific Island nations, many exposed communities are considering migrating away from their homelands. Migrants’ resettlement experiences can depend upon their reception in the host nation. However, it is unclear whether justice-based obligations will influence host attitudes toward climate migrants. Using an online survey of 238 Aotearoa New Zealanders, we explore how beliefs about anthropogenic climate change, climate justice and global responsibility contribute to public attitudes towards climate migrants. Overall, people thought more positively of immigrants in general than of climate migrants. Through moderated mediation analyses, we observed that people with stronger belief in anthropogenic climate change were more positive towards climate migrants. This pattern was related to people’s beliefs about climate justice and justice-based migration approaches. Findings suggest that host perceptions of climate migrants are connected to being aware of the ties between greenhouse gas emissions and migration. We outline anticipated challenges and potential opportunities for both migrant communities and the nations in which they seek refuge.
Indicators of global warming encourage us to pursue
sustainable consumption, as there is a necessity to resolve the ongoing
environmental threat. The best option is to promote green consumption;
however, despite varying awareness and contributions on the many benefits
of renewable energy, developing countries such as Ghana have yet to fully
benefit from it due to skepticism about its exorbitant price. Our study
attempted to explore the Theory of Reason action model to understand this
phenomenon using five variables (Knowledge, Environmental Concerns,
Environmental beliefs, Attitude, and the willingness to pay). We did an indepth
analysis to understand the role each plays in influencing behavior
towards green consumption. A partial least squares structural equation
modeling (PLS-SEM) methodology was used for statistical analysis. Our
results revealed interrelated effects as well as aggregated effects on
variables. The domineering element expressed to encourage the willingness
to pay for and use solar energy was knowledge and environmental
concerns. Ultimately, it provided a framework for the Ghanaian
Government and stakeholders on the best strategy to upscale solar energy
introduction and to assist decision-makers in developing long-term energy
policies to achieve long-term consumption sustainability.
Our research note focuses on whether policy changes in the transportation sector contribute to green innovations, measured as patents. We explore federal policies, specifically energy policies such as Energy Policy Act of 1992 or 2005, that provide incentives for the development of environmentally friendly technologies in transportation. Drawing on a combination of qualitative and quantitative data, we construct and test several novel policy measures while controlling for other factors that may influence green transportation innovations. We develop a unique legislative timeline with the use of key-informant interviews, literature searches, and legislative updates reviews. Only one policy variable (executive orders) appears to have a positive effect on the number of patents in green transportation innovation sphere. High capital expenditures for pollution abatement decrease innovation activity, while high operating expenditures increase innovation activity. The federal policies over the time period analyzed seem to create uncertainty rather than provide a clear incentive for innovation. The executive orders may affect innovation levels; further tests are needed with the changes in political leadership. The results of our research note signal that stronger and more consistent incentives at federal level may be necessary to realize desired policy outcomes.
This study attempts to investigate the effect of the Internet penetration on government's environmental protection expenditure (GEPE). On the basis of Chinese provincial panel data from 2007 to 2016, this paper estimates a dynamic panel model by employing the system generalized method of moments (GMM). We find a significant positive relationship between Internet penetration and the GEPE in China, and this conclusion remains consistent after conducting several robustness checks. In addition, we further identify three potential mechanisms to explain how Internet penetration affects the GEPE, namely, the popularity of the Internet contributes to restraining government's behaviors, improving government's responsiveness to public's needs, and enhancing public's environmental protection awareness. The findings shed light on several issues in environmental policy, for instance, the relationship between information and communication technology (ICT) and sustainable development.
The Great Lakes contain most of the United States’ surface freshwater and provide deep personal and economic connections for the residents of the region. These connections create an opportunity for bipartisanship in environmental policies with the potential to permeate energy policies. To explore that possibility, this paper examines how party affiliation affects support for water policy and energy policy in the Great Lakes region of the United States. Data from the Great Lakes Region Public Opinion Survey asked 696 Republicans, Independents, and Democrats from the Great Lakes region to respond to a range of environmental policy prompts. Responses to the policy prompts are grouped into four components: Water Quality, Water Diversions, Traditional Fuels, and Renewables. The results find that there is bipartisan support for the Water Quality and Water Diversions components. Energy policies do not receive the same bipartisan support, with Democrats and Independents having more support for the Renewables component while Republicans have more support for the Traditional Fuels component. However, when the fuel source is tied to its pollutants of the Great Lakes, then reactions to that fuel source receive a bipartisan response. The results of this research suggest that embedding water policy in energy policy may allow those policies to receive more bipartisan support. Combining water policy and energy policy can depolarize some of the politics surrounding environmental policy broadly.
To potentially mitigate further climate change, the US needs to move away from fossil fuels and towards carbon-free sources of energy. The issue of climate change is highly polarized, which has led to beliefs about climate change becoming entangled with political beliefs. Yet, public support for decreasing the use of fossil fuels and increasing renewable sources is high. In this paper, we use an original survey of about 1300 respondents to examine the potential for the entanglement of political beliefs, climate change beliefs, and energy preferences. We find that the majority of respondents support a decreased use of fossil fuels, a slight increase of nuclear energy, and a large increase of renewable sources; however, conservative Republicans prefer smaller decreases of fossil fuels and smaller increases in renewables. Additionally, we find that as respondents increasingly accept the scientific consensus on climate change, they support larger decreases in fossil fuels and larger increases in renewable energy. Finally, using mediation analysis we find that climate beliefs mediate the relationship between political beliefs and energy preferences for conservative Republicans and liberal Democrats, but not those with more moderate political beliefs. These findings point to the potential for energy preferences to become entangled in climate change as a result of elite discourse.
Despite 97 per cent of scientists agreeing on anthropogenic global warming, the remaining 3 per cent play a critical role in keeping the debate about climate consensus alive. Analysis of climate change contrarians from multi-signatory documents reveals 3 per cent of signees to be climate experts, while the remaining 97 per cent do not meet expert criteria and are also involved with organizations and industries who make up the climate change countermovement. The data also reveal most contrarians to be aged sixty-five or older. As a result, we explore other factors (for example, collective memories and ideological views) that may have also contributed to expert and non-expert views.
Maintaining fiscal responsiveness to deteriorating environmental conditions is a critical concern for civil society and public managers. Drawing from multiple theoretical perspectives and panel data of state environmental agency appropriations, we add to the budgeting literature on this salient topic with an examination of the legal, political, institutional, and fiscal factors that drive, and condition, environmental budgets. Given the influence of environmental pollution on funding—as stressed by previous literature—we offer evidence that such impacts are moderated by business interests, political party control in government, and fiscal capacity. Findings from this investigation provide insights into fiscal responsiveness and environmental governance at the state level, which can help elucidate and guide other federal and state co-funded programs.
Research on public opinion regarding government’s role in health care has paid little attention to how public opinion has changed among different age groups over time and to how the intersection of age, birth year, political affiliation, and historical time shape public opinion. In this article, the authors ask, Who supports governmental spending on health care, and how has this changed over time? The authors propose a life-course perspective to study political polarization in the health care domain using General Social Survey 1984 to 2016 data. The results indicate that the growing political polarization in support for government intervention in health care across the 32 years studied occurred among middle-aged adults. The findings of this study contribute new understandings of how age and party membership interact in contributing to political polarization regarding government’s role in health care over time.
Under a polycentric approach to climate change, action is taken at different scales and across all levels of government and sectors of society. Some scholars have argued that such an approach is the best lens to view the governance of climate change and that a polycentric approach has advantages in addressing collective-action problems. However, taking a polycentric approach would require public support for action at multiple scales. The issue of climate change is polarized across political beliefs and cultural worldviews and little research has examined how the public views climate action at one level of government relative to others as well as relative to actions by the private sector and by individuals. Using an original survey of the US public from October 2017, I explore who it is that the public thinks should "do more" about climate change and the role that the cultural worldviews posited by cultural theory—hierarchical, egalitarian, individualist, and fatalist—plays in shaping those opinions. Overall, I find support for multiple actors doing more to address climate change, but with differences in support between egalitarians and individualists for actors overall and for the federal government in particular. © 2022 The Authors. Review of Policy Research published by Wiley Periodicals LLC on behalf of Policy Studies Organization.
Ostatnie stulecie to okres niebywałego postępu cywilizacyjnego ludzkości, a jednocześnie ewidentny gwałt na Naturze. Przez ludzką chciwość, egoizm, pogoń za zyskiem „łamane” są podstawowe i kluczowe dla egzystencji równowagi – ekonomiczna, społeczna i nade wszystko środowiskowa. Natura nie nadąża za dynamiką postępu względem czynnika pracy i kapitału. Etapowo więc i kumulacyjnie spowalnia ten „rozwój” i daje o sobie znać, przynosząc klęski żywiołowe, zmiany klimatyczne, masowe choroby zwierząt hodowlanych, często także przenoszone na ludzi i inne niepożądane z punktu gospodarczego czy społecznego zjawiska. Można uznać, że Natura stawia w ten sposób veto, domagając się harmonijnego rozwoju wespół z ładem ekonomiczno-społecznym. Jednak w rzeczywistości nie jest to łatwe, a jak pokazuje praktyka – samo z siebie – nieosiągalne. Problematyczne jest bowiem pogodzenie efektywności mikroekonomicznej, nastawionej przede wszystkim na zaspokojenie rządz jednostki z racjonalnością makroekonomiczną, gdzie ważniejsze są interesy ogólnospołeczne, narodowe. Podobnie, nie idzie w parze sprawiedliwość społeczna, kiedy w centrum uwagi jest człowiek, ze sprawnością ekonomiczną, gdzie kluczowe są wyniki gospodarcze. Równie trudno pogodzić zapewnienie bezpieczeństwa żywnościowego i dochodów producentów żywności z zachowaniem środowiska naturalnego. Zauważyć też należy, że ograniczenia płynące ze strony środowiska wymuszają przywracanie naruszonych równowag, by możliwe było dalsze gospodarowanie, czy egzystowanie. Najczęściej odbywa się to poprzez system szeroko pojętych instytucji – interwencjonizm państwowy, polityki sektorowe, zmiany mentalności społeczeństw czy inne. Rzecz jasna, pociąga to za sobą określone, coraz wyższe koszty publiczne. A skoro tak, to oczywiste jest, że kwestia dobrostanu środowiska, jest niezbywalną częścią rozwoju cywilizacyjnego ludzkości. Tym samym problem zachowania i ochrony Natury jest w interesie nas wszystkich i winien być ujęty w rachunku wszelkich przedsięwzięć gospodarczych i społecznych. W przeciwnym wypadku Matka Ziemia sama upomni się o siebie, wymuszając dążenie do zrównoważenia, ale będzie to bardziej kosztowne, aniżeli przywracanie i naprawianie wcześniej naruszonych równowag.
Celem głównym pracy jest identyfikacja sił napędzających ewolucję kwestii agrarnej, ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem wpływu na ten proces środowiskowych dóbr publicznych. Zauważyć należy, że większość gruntów w Europie jest zarządzana przede wszystkim przez rolników i leśników. Tym samym dostarczają oni prócz oczywistych pożytków płynących z ich działalności gospodarczej (m.in. żywność i drewno), także szeroki wachlarz dóbr publicznych, szczególnie – środowiskowych dóbr publicznych. Niemniej, przez fakt, iż w zakresie tego rodzaju dóbr póki co nie działa mechanizm rynkowy, nie są one dostarczane w takim zakresie, w jakim oczekiwałoby tego społeczeństwo, co przy okazji można uznać za klasyczny przypadek zawodności rynku. Jednocześnie świadomość społeczna, zwłaszcza w krajach wyżej rozwiniętych, jest coraz większa w zakresie utraty bioróżnorodności, degradacji krajobrazu, zanieczyszczenia wody i atmosfery. Zatem podatnik europejski jest gotowy zaakceptować sytuację, kiedy część jego obciążeń fiskalnych jest transferowana „zarządcom” Natury (np. rolnikom), by byli oni skłonni zapewniać niewystarczające dobra środowiskowe, czy też powstrzymać się od działalności, która szkodzi środowisku naturalnemu. Z drugiej jednak strony, przed rolnikiem stawia się coraz więcej, często sprzecznych wymagań – to od niego przede wszystkim zależy bezpieczeństwo żywnościowe (pod względem dostępności fizycznej, ekonomicznej żywności, jak i jej jakości), ma on prowadzić swoją produkcję z poszanowaniem, gleb, wód, atmosfery i bioróżnorodności, a jednocześnie działalność ta winna być dochodowa (by godnie mogła żyć jego rodzina, a gospodarstwo było w stanie prowadzić produkcję rozszerzoną). W tych warunkach wydaje się racjonalne zwiększanie efektywności środowiskowej gospodarstw rolnych, gdzie z jednej strony dba się o opłatę za zaangażowanie własnych czynników wytwórczych do działalności operacyjnej gospodarstwa rolnego oraz opłatę za ryzyko podejmowane przez prowadzącego gospodarstwo rolne, czyli de facto dochód, a z drugiej monitoruje nakłady stanowiące czynniki tworzące presję środowiskową w działalności rolniczej, tak, by relacja ta mogła być maksymalizowana (pozostała najwyższa). Tym samym można uznać, że takie podejście tworzy przesłankę teoretyczną służącą rozwiązywaniu kwestii agrarnej, rozumianej ogólnie przez pryzmat problemów, jakie rodzi sektor rolny w swoim otoczeniu, a które to są odczuwane na różnych poziomach przez całą gospodarkę, społeczeństwo i środowisko naturalne. Dodać należy, że łagodzeniu, czy rozwiązywaniu kwestii agrarnej sprzyja identyfikacja zarówno jej przejawów (tych nieprzemijających oraz coraz to nowych), jak i sił, poprzez które następuje jej ewolucja. Kluczowe wydają się w tym procesie struktury instytucjonalne, zwłaszcza właściwe ukierunkowana i zaadresowana polityka rolna i środowiskowa, która to powinna stworzyć odpowiednie warunki i motywować „zarządców” Natury, by byli skłonni zaopatrywać społeczeństwo w środowiskowe dobra publiczne. Tym samym dostarczanie gros środowiskowych dóbr publicznych, pożądanych społecznie, a „niewycenialnych” przez rynek, zyska silną legitymację do subsydiowania dochodów rolniczych. Działania te naturalnie winien wspierać mechanizm rynkowy, który zwaloryzuje niektóre z nich (np. żywność ekologiczną, agroturystykę) i pozwoli uzyskać przez wyższe ceny tych dóbr wyższe dochody rolnicze. W ten sposób uczynić można kolejny krok w kierunku łagodzenia czy rozwiązywania kwestii agrarnej – z jednej strony zwiększyć podaż środowiskowych dóbr publicznych, a tym samym dbałość o Naturę, a z drugiej zapewnić trwałość dochodowej produkcji rolnej. Niebagatelną również rolę odgrywają tu zarówno procesy integracji europejskiej (wraz z implementacją polityk wspólnotowych), a także generowanie i transfer wiedzy do rolnictwa i na obszary wiejskie z ich otoczenia.
Osiągnięcie celu głównego zostanie wsparte w pracy realizacją celów szczegółowych, dotyczących m.in.:
• identyfikacji kwestii agrarnej i wiejskiej oraz ich wzajemnych relacji, co nastąpi przez przegląd teoretyczny wskazanych zagadnień oraz odpowiedź na pytanie, na ile – wobec kwestii agrarnej – substytucyjna, a na ile komplementarna staje się kwestia wiejska;
• określenia mechanizmu zmian industrialnego paradygmatu rozwoju rolnictwa i wsi na zrównoważony, poprzez wskazanie przesłanek ekonomicznych, społecznych oraz środowiskowych, które wymuszają zmianę ścieżki rozwoju wsi i rolnictwa;
• wskazania na instytucjonalne determinanty interwencji państwa w rolnictwie, których podstawą są zawodności rynku, wyraźnie obecne w sektorze rolnym i przejawiające się głównie niemożliwością optymalizacji alokacji czynników produkcji;
• określenia obszarów interwencji w sektorze rolnym, a tym samym odpowiedzi na pytanie, na ile interwencja ta konieczna jest, by łagodzić kwestię agrarną w zakresie wsparcia dochodów rolniczych, zapewnienia bezpieczeństwa żywnościowego, dbałości o środowisko naturalne, czy utrzymania żywotności obszarów wiejskich;
• wskazania na rolę dochodów rolnych (będących determinantą kwestii agrarnej), które to samoistnie pogarszają się na skutek specyficznych uwarunkowań gospodarowania w sektorze rolnym i innych czynników, co nie sprzyja równowadze ekonomiczno-społecznej, wyrażając się przez relatywnie gorsze (niesprawiedliwe społecznie) warunki egzystencji rodzin chłopskich oraz nadmierne dysproporcje dochodów rolniczych wobec ich pozarolniczego otoczenia;
• identyfikacji podstaw ewaluacji środowiskowych dóbr publicznych, odnoszących się do wyceny warunkowej i rynkowej, a także propozycji alternatywnego podejścia związanego z rentą konsumenta i producenta;
• kwantyfikacji jakości środowiskowych dóbr publicznych, poprzez określenie wskaźników jakości powietrza, gleb i wód gruntowych oraz różnorodności biologicznej oraz syntetycznego wskaźnika jakości środowiska na poziomie lokalnym (tu powiatowym);
• wyznaczenia efektywności finansowania środowiskowych dóbr publicznych: ekoefektywności, ekowydajności i efektywności ekologicznej, poprzez ocenę wpływu szerokiego zakresu krajowych i ponadnarodowych wydatków na osiąganie celów środowiskowych, zarówno w stosunku do gospodarstw rolnych, jak i obszarów wiejskich na poziomie lokalnym;
• odpowiedzi na pytanie o związki kwestii agrarnej, rozumianej przez pryzmat problemu dochodów rolniczych ze środowiskowymi dobrami publicznymi dla przeciętnego gospodarstwa rolnego w powiatach oraz oceny wpływu otoczenia instytucjonalnego na ekoefektywność gospodarstw rolnych, będącą odzwierciedleniem tej relacji.
Główna hipoteza pracy brzmi: Kwestia agrarna rozumiana współcześnie rozszerza pole recepcji odnośnie obszarów wiejskich i środowiskowych dóbr publicznych. Kluczowy dylemat, jaki przyświecał powstaniu tejże pracy można sprowadzić do pytania, czy kwestia wiejska związana z rachunkiem środowiskowych dóbr publicznych jest substytucyjna czy komplementarna wobec kwestii agrarnej? Intuicyjnie można powiedzieć, że komplementarna, bo rozszerza kwestię agrarną a nie ją zastępuje. Postęp cywilizacyjny wymusza to rozszerzenie, ale pamiętać należy, że wyjściowo problem ma swoje źródło w czynniku ziemi. Środowiskowe dobra publiczne wiążą się z niezapłaconym kosztem używania środowiska, które de facto ponosi całe społeczeństwo, dlatego konieczny jest rachunek uwzględniający obciążenie środowiska, bądź zaniechanie tego, a to zmienia poziom i strukturę dochodów rolniczych. Jednakże ta „intuicja” wymaga dowodu naukowego. Wsparciem tego dowodzenia ma być weryfikacja hipotez pomocniczych, tj.:
• występują współcześnie przesłanki zmiany paradygmatu rozwoju rolnictwa i obszarów wiejskich z industrialnego na zrównoważony;
• wyższej ekoefektywności gospodarstw rolnych sprzyja niższy dysparytet dochodów rolniczych, co oznacza, że zwiększanie poziomu ekoefektywności jest przesłanką rozwiązywania kwestii agrarnej.
Dodać należy, że monografia stanowi spójną całość rozważań odnoszących się do postawionego przez Autorkę problemu, gdyż realizowane w poszczególnych częściach pracy cele szczegółowe służą realizacji celu głównego, a to wszystko weryfikacji postawionych hipotez, niemniej niektóre elementy badań były fragmentarycznie publikowane (wskazano właściwe powołania), co nie zmienia faktu, że „suma części nie jest całością”.
Badania nad kwestią agrarną i środowiskowymi dobrami publicznymi oraz ich związkami to przede wszystkim ukazanie: dynamik i struktur dochodów rolniczych, jakości środowiska poprzez wskaźniki syntetyczne stanu wód, gleb, powietrza czy bioróżnorodności oraz związków pomiędzy zamożnością powiatów a ochroną środowiska, czy dochodami rolniczymi a elementami presji na środowisko i determinantami tych zależności. Zakres przestrzenny analiz kwestii agrarnej, a w szczególności dochodów, obejmuje kraje UE (w tym z podziałem na klasy wielkości ekonomicznej gospodarstw rolnych SO – standard output), ale sięga także do przykładów globalnych. Natomiast analizy dotyczące środowiskowych dóbr publicznych są bardziej szczegółowe i koncentrują się na obszarze powiatów Polski (314), z wyłączeniem miast na prawach powiatu, by obserwacje można było odnieść do obszarów wiejskich. Szeregi czasowe są zróżnicowane – dla analiz odnoszących się do gospodarstw rolnych UE zamykają się w okresie od największego rozszerzenia i wprowadzenia w życie ważnej reformy dla sektora rolnego – reformy luksemburskiej, czyli 2004 r., do 2017 r., do którego to roku dostępne były dane pochodzące z systemu FADN (Food Accountancy Data Network). Natomiast dla analiz środowiskowych na poziomie powiatów Polski zamykają się w niemal 20-letnim okresie, tj. 1999-2017. Metody stosowane w pracy to przede wszystkim:
• analiza dynamiki i struktury;
• analiza CRITIC-TOPSIS pozwalająca na wyznaczenie wag dla zmiennych zastosowanych w mierniku syntetycznym i wyznaczenie tego miernika;
• nieparametryczna metoda DEA (Data Envelopment Analysis), dzięki której wskazano benchmark – najlepsze gospodarstwa rolne bądź powiaty;
• metoda SV (Sustainable Value) poprzez którą możliwe było wyznaczenie wpływu czynników obciążających środowisko na tworzenie wartości w wymiarze pieniężnym;
• analiza regresji efektywności środowiskowej wyznaczanej metodą DEA (model VRS) oraz czynników ją determinujących.
Niektóre opisy metodologiczne zostały umieszczone w Aneksie, by ułatwić Czytelnikowi percepcję głównych rozważań.
Układ treści został podzielony na dwie komplementarne wobec siebie części. Pierwsza dotyczy ewolucji kwestii agrarnej w zmieniającym się paradygmacie rozwoju wsi i rolnictwa. Wskazano tu z jednej strony na nieprzemijalność problemów, jakie rodzi sektor rolny w gospodarce, a które są odczuwane na różnych poziomach przez całą gospodarkę, społeczeństwo i środowisko naturalne, z drugiej zaś na ewolucję postrzegania i przejawiania się kwestii agrarnej, której zakres oddziaływania się zmienia i rozszerza na obszary wiejskie. Następnie podjęto próbę wskazania przesłanek, które determinują konieczność zmiany paradygmatu rozwoju wsi i rolnictwa, przez pryzmat uwarunkowań ekonomicznych, społecznych i środowiskowych, co jednoznacznie wpisuje się we współczesne rozważania nad kwestią agrarną. Kolejno została pokazana waga struktur instytucjonalnych, których wpływ na przywracanie naruszonych ładów bądź też utrzymanie już osiągniętych jest przemożny. Dokonano tu także egzemplifikacji obszarów interwencji w sektorze rolnym, w aspekcie ładu ekonomicznego, sprowadzonego do wspierania dochodów rolniczych, społecznego, odnoszącego się do zapewniania bezpieczeństwa żywnościowego i utrzymywania żywotności obszarów wiejskich oraz środowiskowego, polegającego na dbałości o środowisko naturalne. Końcowym elementem rozważań tej części pracy stały się dochody rolnicze, będące wyznacznikiem zrównoważenia społeczno-ekonomicznego i jednym z kluczowych zagadnień kwestii agrarnej. Zostały one zaprezentowane w układzie krajów UE, od momentu największego jej rozszerzenia do ostatnich osiągalnych danych w momencie badania, tj. w okresie 2004-2017, z uwzględnieniem zarówno zróżnicowania dochodów rolniczych między krajami UE, wagi dopłat w dochodzie, parytetu dochodów rolniczych do pozarolniczych oraz zróżnicowania wielkości dochodów ze względu na skalę gospodarowania.
Druga część pracy koncentruje się na środowiskowych dobrach publicznych, będących ważnym elementem równoważenia środowiskowego, a w zamyśle badawczym Autorki pracy – których generowanie i dostarczanie, obok tradycyjnych produktów działalności rolniczej, może przyczynić się do zwiększenia ładu ekonomicznego przez wyższe dochody wzmacniane instytucjonalnie. Idzie o to, że przez mechanizm ich subsydiowania, legitymizowany przez obywateli, ale także częściowo przez mechanizm rynkowy, który niektóre z tych dóbr potrafi pośrednio wycenić, łagodzona jest kwestia agrarna. Działania takie wzmacniają także ład środowiskowy. Tytułem wstępu zaprezentowane zostały rozważania teoretyczne związane z identyfikacją i sposobami wyceny środowiskowych dóbr publicznych oraz propozycja alternatywnego, prócz wycen warunkowych i rynkowych, podejścia do problemu, bazującego na możliwej do osiągnięcia przez producenta rolnego lub konsumenta rencie (nadwyżce). Następnie zidentyfikowano zróżnicowanie jakości środowiskowych dóbr publicznych na obszarach wiejskich w ujęciu lokalnym (na poziomie powiatowym) posługując się miernikami jakości powietrza, gleb, wody oraz bioróżnorodności. Jednocześnie określono determinanty zasobności regionów w środowiskowe dobra publiczne. To ważne z punktu widzenia badań rozpoznanie daje podstawy pozwalające wskazać regiony naturalnie bogate w środowiskowe dobra publiczne, gdzie „zarządcy” Natury mogą czerpać korzyści ekonomiczne z ich występowania, zachęcani jednocześnie przez właściwie adresowaną politykę i jej narzędzia (np. wspólną politykę rolną) do zaniechania tych sposobów gospodarowania, które mogłyby nie służyć zachowaniu i trwałości walorów naturalnego środowiska. Z drugiej strony, w regionach, gdzie antropogeniczna działalność degraduje środowisko, konieczne są radykalne kroki w ramach szerszego spektrum instytucjonalnego, mające na celu przywrócenie zburzonego ładu środowiskowego, który w konsekwencji „odbija się” negatywnie na równowadze ekonomicznej i społecznej. Zagadnieniom tym poświęcony jest kolejny rozdział pracy odnoszący się do finansowania środowiskowych dóbr publicznych w Polsce, w którym przedstawiono system finansowania ochrony środowiska i gospodarki wodnej, wydatki ze środków krajowych na ten cel, płatności w ramach polityki szczegółowej, tj. wspólnej polityki rolnej (WPR), a także efekty rzeczowe inwestycji środowiskowych. Taka prezentacja pozwoliła na ocenę efektywności finansowania ochrony środowiska w Polsce przez pryzmat zarówno ekoefektywności i ekowydajności gospodarstw rolnych a także efektywności środowiskowej obszarów wiejskich. Podsumowaniem całości rozważań jest odpowiedź na kluczowe pytanie rozprawy – czy i jak środowiskowe dobra publiczne zmieniają rozumienie kwestii agrarnej? Podejmując próbę odpowiedzi opracowano wskaźnik ekoefektywności przeciętnego gospodarstwa rolnego w powiecie, będący relacją uzyskanego dochodu z rodzinnego gospodarstw rolnego do nakładów stanowiących czynniki presji środowiskowej w tym gospodarstwie. Przypuszcza się, że w powiatach, gdzie zlokalizowane są środowiskowe dobra publiczne wskaźnik ekoefektywności gospodarstw rolnych będzie wysoki, co będzie oznaczało, że występowanie tych dóbr publicznych zmienia kwestię agrarną. Następnie, oszacowano wpływ otoczenia instytucjonalnego, związanego m.in. z rozwojem gospodarczym powiatów, mentalnością jego mieszkańców, odzwierciedloną w preferencjach politycznych, jakością i przydatnością gleb, stosunkami wodnymi gleb, rzeźbą terenu oraz agroklimatem, szeregiem dopłat wypłacanych gospodarstwom z tytułu interwencji poprzez WPR, czy infrastrukturą wodociągową i kanalizacyjną na ekoefektywność gospodarstw rolnych, spodziewając się, że mają one pozytywny wpływ na ekoefektywność gospodarstw rolnych, a tym samym oddziałują pozytywnie na kwestię agrarną, łagodząc jej przejawy. Na koniec sprawdzono, czy w powiatach, gdzie gospodarstwa rolne cechuje wyższa ekoefektywność, dysparytet dochodów rolniczych do pozarolniczych jest niższy, co może być kolejną przesłanką do tezy, iż występowanie/generowanie i dostarczanie środowiskowych dóbr publicznych łagodzi kwestię agrarną.
This study aims to: assess how local community stakeholders perceive disaster risk governance; determine the level of appreciation toward nature and environmental protection; train the local community stakeholders in climate change adaptation, disaster resilience, and mitigation toward a cleaner, more productive, and better future through innovation and; identify the multi-stakeholders cooperation and their level of support to achieve sustainable lifestyles in coastal communities. Participatory action research was conducted in Malolos, Bulacan, Philippines with 155 respondents, while secondary data was reflected in this study. Survey instruments were patterned from Kaizer and Hartig (2011). The study views that nature and environmental protection as divergent manners turned out to be statistically associated. Gardening of various vegetables was introduced to women-residents to encourage them in engaging in nature and environmental protection. The training on climate risk reduction, adaptation, and mitigation for barangay officials was conducted to protect coastal areas, preserving, and bringing back the beauty of nature was the contributory factor for multi-stakeholders cooperation for a better normal. The success of partnership among university, government, and barangay was manifested in community-based action research which can be seen as a paradigm of achieving sustainable lifestyles in responsive community engagement.
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Recent studies have challenged the assumption that environmental quality is a non-partisan issue. Evidence from three state legislatures indicates the existence of significant partisan differences, with Democrats being more "pro-environment" than Republicans. We report similar results at the congressional level. First, available literature suggests that there were significant differences between the parties prior to the rise of "Ecology" as a national issue (Democrats more "pro-environmental"). Second, roll-call analysis of environmental measures in the House (92nd Congress) indicates that Democrats rank significantly higher in "pro-environment" voting than Republicans. The relationship between party and pro-environment voting persists after the possibly confounding effects of constituency influence and personal characteristics of representatives are controlled for via partial correlation. Further, pro-environment voting is highly correlated with indicators of liberal-conservative voting (liberals significantly more pro-environment).
This paper conducts an empirical analysis of the factors affecting U.S. public concern about the threat of climate change between January 2002 and December 2010. Utilizing Stimson’s method of constructing aggregate opinion measures, data from 74 separate surveys over a 9-year period are used to construct quarterly measures of public concern over global climate change. We examine five factors that should account for changes in levels of concern: 1) extreme weather events, 2) public access to accurate scientific information, 3) media coverage, 4) elite cues, and 5) movement/countermovement advocacy. A time-series analysis indicates that elite cues and structural economic factors have the largest effect on the level of public concern about climate change. While media coverage exerts an important influence, this coverage is itself largely a function of elite cues and economic factors. Weather extremes have no effect on aggregate public opinion. Promulgation of scientific information to the public on climate change has a minimal effect. The implication would seem to be that information-based science advocacy has had only a minor effect on public concern, while political mobilization by elites and advocacy groups is critical in influencing climate change concern.
Analysis of three cross-sectional polls administered by the Gallup Organization at 10-year intervalsin 1990, 2000, and 2010demonstrates that partisan identification has become an increasingly important determinant of environmental concern within the American mass public. Polarization on global warming is especially clear, even when compared to a variety of other social, economic, and political problems, but party sorting seems to occur only as citizens acquire information and become familiar with elite cues. The implications of this for the U.S. environmental movement and the strategies it employs are discussed.
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The American conservative movement is a force of anti-reflexivity insofar as it attacks two key elements of reflexive modernization: the environmental movement and environmental impact science. Learning from its mistakes in overtly attacking environmental regulations in the early 1980s, this counter-movement has subsequently exercised a more subtle form of power characterized by non-decision-making. We examine the conservative movement’s efforts to undermine climate science and policy in the USA over the last two decades by using this second dimension of power. The conservative movement has employed four non-decision-making techniques to challenge the legitimacy of climate science and prevent progress in policy-making. We argue that reflexive modernization scholars should focus more attention on similar forces of anti-reflexivity that continue to shape the overall direction of our social, political and economic order, and the life chances of many citizens. Indeed, better understanding of the forces and effectiveness of anti-reflexivity may very well be crucial for societal resilience and adaptation, especially in the face of global environmental problems like climate change.
Open access here http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09644010802055576
Environmental scepticism denies the seriousness of environmental problems, and self-professed ‘sceptics’ claim to be unbiased analysts combating ‘junk science’. This study quantitatively analyses 141 English-language environmentally sceptical books published between 1972 and 2005. We find that over 92 per cent of these books, most published in the US since 1992, are linked to conservative think tanks (CTTs). Further, we analyse CTTs involved with environmental issues and find that 90 per cent of them espouse environmental scepticism. We conclude that scepticism is a tactic of an elite-driven counter-movement designed to combat environmentalism, and that the successful use of this tactic has contributed to the weakening of US commitment to environmental protection.
Recent research has outlined important changes in partisanship among political elites in the United States. Specifically, the effect of partisanship on politicians' vote choice and other political behavior has risen, and the number of issue areas where partisan conflict is present has increased. This article examines whether similar changes have taken place among the general electorate. Using data from the NES Cumulative Datafile, the find- ings presented here do point to changes in partisanship among the mass public. Once thought to be in decline, mass partisanship has rebounded significantly in recent years. In a related development that is perhaps more important, partisanship has become more pervasive within the electorate, with partisan conflict now pene- trating into a greater number of issue areas. Partisanship has become relevant in the areas of racial and cultural issues while retaining its importance for issues involving economic equality y the mid-1990s there was little doubt that, at the elite level, partisanship was resurgent in American politics. However, questions remain about the state of the parties in the general public. The parties arguably differ more on issues now than at any time since the early days of the New Deal. Politicians (party elites) are more likely to support their party and oppose the other party today than at any time since the 1950s. If issues are important to the contemporary electorate, and most evidence indicates that they are, then it makes sense that voters will pick up on the issue differences that exist between the parties and react to these differences. Shouldn't partisan changes at the elite
The sociological literature on global environmental change emphasizes the processes by which the problem of global warming is socially constructed. However, the opposing efforts to construct the "non-problematicity" of global warming advanced by the conservative movement are largely ignored. Utilizing recent work on framing processes in the serial movements literature and claims-making from the social problems literature, this paper analyzes the counter-claims promoted by the conservative movement between 1990 and 1997 as it mobilized to challenge the legitimacy of global warming as a social problem. A thematic content analysis of publications circulated on the web sites of prominent conservative think tanks reveals three major counter-claims. First, the movement criticized the evidentiary basis of global warming as weak, if not entirely wrong. second the movement argued that global warming will have substantial benefits if it occurs. Third, the movement warned that proposed action to ameliorate global warming would do more harm than good. In short, the conservative movement asserted that, while the science of global warning appears to be growing more and more uncertain. the harmful effects of global warming policy are becoming increasingly certain. In order to better understand the controversy over global warming. future research should pay attention to the influence of the conservative movement by identifying the crucial roles of conservative foundations. conservative think tanks, and sympathetic "skeptic" scientists in undermining the growing scientific consensus over the reality of global warming.
This research demonstrates how promoting the environment can negatively affect adoption of energy efficiency in the United States because of the political polarization surrounding environmental issues. Study 1 demonstrated that more politically conservative individuals were less in favor of investment in energy-efficient technology than were those who were more politically liberal. This finding was driven primarily by the lessened psychological value that more conservative individuals placed on reducing carbon emissions. Study 2 showed that this difference has consequences: In a real-choice context, more conservative individuals were less likely to purchase a more expensive energy-efficient light bulb when it was labeled with an environmental message than when it was unlabeled. These results highlight the importance of taking into account psychological value-based considerations in the individual adoption of energy-efficient technology in the United States and beyond.
This article uses data from the American National Election Studies and national exit polls to test Fiorina's assertion that ideological polarization in the American public is a myth. Fiorina argues that twenty-first-century Americans, like the midtwentieth-century Americans described by Converse, “are not very well-informed about politics, do not hold many of their views very strongly, and are not ideological” (2006, 19). However, our evidence indicates that since the 1970s, ideological polarization has increased dramatically among the mass public in the United States as well as among political elites. There are now large differences in outlook between Democrats and Republicans, between red state voters and blue state voters, and between religious voters and secular voters. These divisions are not confined to a small minority of activists—they involve a large segment of the public and the deepest divisions are found among the most interested, informed, and active citizens. Moreover, contrary to Fiorina's suggestion that polarization turns off voters and depresses turnout, our evidence indicates that polarization energizes the electorate and stimulates political participation.
Abstract Using data obtained from National Opinion Research Center's General Social Surveys (1973–1990), this paper tests two hypotheses concerning possible changes in the sociopolitical correlates of environmental concern. The “broadening base” hypothesis predicts that environmental concern will diffuse throughout the populace, resulting in a broader base of support for environmental protection, while the “economic contingency” hypothesis predicts that the economically deprived will disproportionately withdraw support for environmental protection during poor economic conditions. Analysis of the data over the 18 years, however, failed to lend any clear support for either of the hypotheses. In marked contrast, results indicate that the social bases of environmental concern—at least as measured by the NORC environmental spending item—have remained remarkably stable over nearly two decades despite fluctuating economic, political, and environmental conditions. Younger adults, the well-educated, political liberals, Democrats, those raised and currently living in urban areas, and those employed outside of primary industries were found to be consistently more supportive of environmental protection than were their respective counterparts.
Starting from the debates over the 'reality' of global warming and the politics of science studies, I seek to clarify what is at stake politically in constructivist understandings of science and nature. These two separate but related debates point to the centrality of modern science in political discussions of the environment and to the difficulties, simultaneously technical and political, in warranting political action in the face of inevitably partial and uncertain scientific knowledge. The case of climate change then provides an experimental test case with which to explore the various responses to these challenges offered by Ulrich Beck's reflexive moderniza-tion, the normative theory of expertise advanced by Harry Collins and Robert Evans, and Bruno Latour's utopian vision for decision-making by the 'collective' in which traditional epistemic and institutional distinctions between science and politics are entirely superseded.
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For more than two decades political scientists have discussed rising elite polarization in the United States, but the study of mass polarization did not receive comparable attention until fairly recently. This article surveys the literature on mass polarization. It begins with a discussion of the concept of polarization, then moves to a critical consideration of different kinds of evidence that have been used to study polarization, concluding that much of the evidence presents problems of inference that render conclusions problematic. The most direct evidence - citizens' positions on public policy issues - shows little or no indication of increased mass polarization over the past two to three decades. Party sorting - an increased correlation between policy views and partisan identification - clearly has occurred, although the extent has sometimes been exaggerated. Geographic polarization - the hypothesized tendency of like-minded people to cluster together - remains an open question. To date, there is no conclusive evidence that elite polarization has stimulated voters to polarize, on the one hand, or withdraw from politics, on the other.
We examine political polarization over climate change within the American public by analyzing data from 10 nationally representative Gallup Polls between 2001 and 2010. We find that liberals and Democrats are more likely to report beliefs consistent with the scientific consensus and express personal concern about global warming than are conservatives and Republicans. Further, the effects of educational attainment and self-reported understanding on global warming beliefs and concern are positive for liberals and Democrats, but are weaker or negative for conservatives and Republicans. Last, significant ideological and partisan polarization has occurred on the issue of climate change over the past decade.
U.S. public opinion regarding climate change has become increasingly polarized in recent years, as partisan think tanks and
others worked to recast an originally scientific topic into a political wedge issue. Nominally “scientific” arguments against
taking anthropogenic climate change seriously have been publicized to reach informed but ideologically receptive audiences.
Reflecting the success of such arguments, polls have noted that concern about climate change increased with education among
Democrats, but decreased with education among Republicans. These observations lead to the hypothesis that there exist interaction
(non-additive) effects between education or knowledge and political orientation, net of other background factors, in predicting
public concern about climate change. Two regional telephone surveys, conducted in New Hampshire (n = 541) and Michigan (n = 1, 008) in 2008, included identical climate-change questions that provide opportunities to test this hypothesis. Multivariate
analysis of both surveys finds significant interactions. These empirical results fit with theoretical interpretations and
several other recent studies. They suggest that the classically identified social bases of concern about the environment in
general, and climate in particular, have shifted in recent years. Narrowcast media, including the many Web sites devoted to
discrediting climate-change concerns, provide ideal conduits for channeling contrarian arguments to an audience predisposed
to believe and electronically spread them further. Active-response Web sites by climate scientists could prove critical to
counterbalancing contrarian arguments.
Recent research has outlined important changes in partisanship among political elites in the United States. Specifically, the effect of partisanship on politicians' vote choice and other political behavior has risen, and the number of issue areas where partisan conflict is present has increased. This article examines whether similar changes have taken place among the general electorate. Using data from the NES Cumulative Datafile, the findings presented here do point to changes in partisanship among the mass public. Once thought to be in decline, mass partisanship has rebounded significantly in recent years. In a related development that is perhaps more important, partisanship has become more pervasive within the electorate, with partisan conflict now penetrating into a greater number of issue areas. Partisanship has become relevant in the areas of racial and cultural issues while retaining its importance for issues involving economic equality.
Using a unique data set that merges an electric utility’s residential customer monthly electricity consumption in 2008 with household level data on demographics, structure and neighborhood characteristics and the political party of registration for the head of household, this paper documents that liberal households consume less electricity than observationally identical households. In the absence of first best carbon pricing, such “voluntary restraint” helps to mitigate the challenge of climate change.
Many observers have asserted with little evidence that. Americans' social opinions have become polarized. Using General Social Survey and National Election Survey social attitude items that have been repeated regularly over 20 years, the authors ask (1) Have Americans' opinions become more dispersed (higher variance)? (2) Have distributions become flatter or more bimodal (declining kurtosis)? (3) Have opinions become more ideologically constrained within and across opinion domains? (4) Have paired social groups become more different in their opinions? The authors find little evidence of polarization over the past two decades, with attitudes toward abortion and opinion differences between Republican and Democratic party identifiers the exceptional cases.
Three years of survey data show that over time concern with pollution and support for the environmental movement were drawn from increasingly broader bases of social structure. Certain social aggregates, however, remained indifferent, suggesting that class and status interests are important determinants of support for environmental reform. (Author/KM)
GARY C. JACOBSON analyzes the results of the 2004 United States House, Senate, and presidential elections, arguing that the Republicans' gains did not reflect any shift in public sentiments in that party's favor, but rather were the result of the Republicans' structural advantages, reinforced by the intense partisan polarization provoked by the Bush administration.
In the aftermath of a potentially demoralizing 2008 electoral defeat, when the Republican Party seemed widely discredited, the emergence of the Tea Party provided conservative activists with a new identity funded by Republican business elites and reinforced by a network of conservative media sources. Untethered from recent GOP baggage and policy specifics, the Tea Party energized disgruntled white middle-class conservatives and garnered widespread attention, despite stagnant or declining favorability ratings among the general public. As participant observation and interviews with Massachusetts activists reveal, Tea Partiers are not monolithically hostile toward government; they distinguish between programs perceived as going to hard-working contributors to US society like themselves and “handouts” perceived as going to unworthy or freeloading people. During 2010, Tea Party activism reshaped many GOP primaries and enhanced voter turnout, but achieved a mixed record in the November general election. Activism may well continue to influence dynamics in Congress and GOP presidential primaries. Even if the Tea Party eventually subsides, it has undercut Obama's presidency, revitalized conservatism, and pulled the national Republican Party toward the far right.
Broad, bipartisan support for environmental protection in the 1960s eroded in subsequent decades as environmental issues became more polarized, particularly along party lines with Democrats lending greater support to environmental causes than Republicans. Yet, party differences and the general influence of partisanship on member behavior may vary over time as changes occur in Congress. Specifically, this article posits that the Republican takeover of the House and Senate in the 1994 elections and the accompanying increase of power vested in leaders enhanced the significance of partisanship. Using League of Conservation Voters’ scores for members of both the House of Representatives and the Senate for the years 1993–2002, this article examines the role of partisanship and other factors on environmental support. While this article confirms the enduring importance of partisanship, we found that both partisanship and other determinants, like constituency characteristics, of members’ support for the environment exhibit considerable variation. This article concludes by suggesting that future research should examine the sources of this variation.
A 2007 survey covering rural areas in nine US states provides data on perceived local impacts of climate change. Perceptions vary from region to region, with a pattern suggesting links to real climate—specifically to winter warming in snow country. A multivariate analysis using mixed-effects ordered logit regression confirms a significant perception-temperature relationship, net of individual background and ideological characteristics, and of regional variations. These findings invite more detailed research. Copyright © 2009 Royal Meteorological Society
Political polarization is commonly measured using the variation of responses on an individual issue in the population: more variation corresponds to more people on the extremes and fewer in the middle. By this measure, research has shown that - despite many commentators' concerns about increased polarization in recent decades - Americans' attitudes have become no more variable over the past two or three decades. What seems to have changed is the level of partisanship of the electorate. We define a new measure of political polarization as increased correlations in issue attitudes and we distinguish between issue partisanship - the correlation of issue attitudes with party ID and liberal-conservative ideology - and issue alignment - the correlation between pairs of issues. Using the National Election Studies, we find issue alignment to have increased within and between issue domains, but by only a small amount (approximately 2 percentage points in correlation per decade). Issue partisanship has increased more than twice as fast, thus suggesting that increased partisanship is not due to higher ideological coherence. Rather, it is parties that are more polarized and therefore better at sorting individuals along ideological lines; the change in people's attitudes corresponds more to a re-sorting of party labels among voters than to greater constraint on issue attitudes. We conclude suggesting that increased issue partisanship, in a context of persistently low issue constraint, might give greater voice to political extremists and single-issue advocates, and amplify dynamics of unequal representation.
Recent commentary points to clear increases in ideological polarization between the major American political parties. We review the theoretical and empirical literature on party polarization and partisan change. We begin by comparing the current period both to earlier political eras and to theories of partisan change. We argue that in the current period the parties have grown increasingly divided on all the major policy dimensions in American politics - a process that we term conflict extension. We discuss various perspectives on increases in polarization between the parties in government, the parties in the electorate, and the parties' activists, and we consider the causal links between polarization at each of these levels. We consider whether American society itself, and not just the parties and their identifiers, has become increasingly polarized. Finally, we discuss the consequences of growing party polarization for American political life.
How people respond to questions involving the environment depends partly on individual characteristics. Characteristics such as age, gender, education, and ideology constitute the well-studied “social bases of environmental concern,” which have been explained in terms of cohort effects or of cognitive and cultural factors related to social position. It seems likely that people's environmental views depend not only on personal characteristics but also on their social and physical environments. This hypothesis has been more difficult to test, however. Using data from surveys in 19 rural U.S. counties, we apply mixed-effects modeling to investigate simple place effects with respect to locally focused environmental views. We find evidence for two kinds of place effects. Net of individual characteristics, specific place characteristics have the expected effect on related environmental views. Local changes are related to attitudes about regulation and growth. For example, respondents more often perceive rapid development as a problem, and favor environmental rules that restrict development, in rural counties with growing populations. Moreover, they favor conserving resources for the future rather than using them now to create jobs in counties that have low unemployment. After we controlled for county growth, unemployment and jobs in resource-based industries, and individual social-position and ideological factors, there remains significant place-to-place variation in mean levels of environmental concern. Even with both kinds of place effects in the models, the individual-level predictors of environmental concern follow patterns expected from previous research. Concern increases with education among Democrats, whereas among Republicans, the relationship is attenuated or reversed. The interaction marks reframing of environmental questions as political wedge issues, through nominally scientific counterarguments aimed at educated, ideologically receptive audiences.
Studies have shown that attitudes toward abortion are polarizing. Yet, these studies have not focused upon what is often assumed to be the cause of polarization—religion. In this paper I find that polarization has increased between mainline and evangelical Protestants, as well as between black Protestants and both Catholics and white evangelicals. Moreover, I find that mainline Protestants and Catholics are internally polarizing. Finally, while I cannot determine the cause of the internal polarization of Catholics, the polarization within mainline Protestantism is caused by demographic changes. For white evangelicals, demographic changes have restrained polarization that would otherwise have occurred.
I offer some theoretical insights to help us better understand the moderator effect of political orientation that Larry Hamilton
and others have found in recent years. Reflexive modernization theory highlights an emerging tension between those who direct
attention to the negative consequences of industrial capitalism such as climate change (e.g., the scientific community and
environmental organizations) and those who defend the economic system against such critiques (e.g., the conservative movement).
Political divisions in the American public increasingly map onto these societal divisions between critics and defenders of
the industrial capitalist order—especially for the issue of climate change. This alignment is facilitated by increased polarization
among political elites and balkanization of the news media. Strong evidence of the moderator effect is consistent with the
expectations of information processing theory and elite cues hypothesis from political science. Recent empirical findings
in political psychology and neuroscience also seem pertinent for explaining this moderator effect. I end by outlining a few
implications for climate change research and communication.
“Nudges” are being widely promoted to encourage energy conservation. We show that while the electricity conservation “nudge” of providing feedback to households on own and peers’ home electricity usage works with liberals, it can backfire with conservatives. Our regression estimates predict that a Democratic household that pays for electricity from renewable sources, that donates to environmental groups, and that lives in a liberal neighborhood reduces its consumption by 3 percent in response to this nudge. A Republican household that does not pay for electricity from renewable sources and that does not donate to environmental groups increases its consumption by 1 percent.
Objectives. This article examines environmental policy attitudes, focusing on the differences in preferences across issue type (i.e., pollution, resource preservation) and geographical scale (i.e., local, national, global). In addition, we study whether an individual's trust in government influences environmental policy attitudes.
Methods. Analyzing data from the 2007 Cooperative Congressional Election Study, we estimate a series of OLS regression models to examine the public's environmental policy attitudes.
Results. We find stronger public support for government action to address pollution issues than resources issues, and stronger support for local and national pollution abatement than dealing with global problems. We also find that Republicans and ideological conservatives are less likely to support further government effort to address the environment, and that more trusting individuals are more favorable to government action to address pollution and global issues.
Conclusion. Environmental policy attitudes vary by the nature of the issue; however, political ideology and partisan affiliation are consistent predictors of preferences across issues, even when controlling for an individual's level of trust in government.
Objective I examine polarization in public opinion using the method of DiMaggio, Evans, and Bryson (DEB) (1996), but go further than DEB by using newly available years of survey data.
Method Like DEB, I derive aggregate distributional parameters for social groups in each year of the surveys, and then regress the year of the surveys on each parameter.
Results As in DEB's original paper, there is little evidence of general polarization in attitudes between the early 1970s and today. However, while DEB found some evidence that polarization in the public may be the result of polarization in our political system, with the additional years of data this conclusion is inescapable.
Conclusions Although political scientists have recently found polarization among our elected officials on economic issues, it seems clear that members of the public who identify with the partisan labels of our political system are becoming polarized on moral issues.
Party polarization in American politics
- Geoffrey C Layman
- M Thomas
- Thomas M Carsey
- Juliana Horowitz
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General Social Surveys, 1972–2012: Cumulative Codebook. National Opinion Research Center General Social Surveys, 1972–2012 [machine-readable data file
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American Environmentalism: The U.S. Environmental Movement Politics and environment in America: partisan and ideological cleavages in public support for environmentalism
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Public opinion and environmental policy
- Riley E Dunlap
Dunlap, Riley E., 1995. Public opinion and environmental policy. In: Lester, James P. (Ed.), Environmental Politics and Policy. Duke University Press, Durham,
NC, pp. 63-114.
Open for Business: Conservatives' Opposition to Environmental Regulation Regression Models for catEGorical Outcomes using Stata, second ed. Stata Press, College Station, TX. McCright, Aaron M., 2011. Political orientation moderates Americans' beliefs and concern about climate change
- Judith A Layzer
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- J Long
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- Jeremy
Layzer, Judith A., 2012. Open for Business: Conservatives' Opposition to Environmental Regulation. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. Long, J. Scott, Freese, Jeremy, 2005. Regression Models for catEGorical Outcomes using Stata, second ed. Stata Press, College Station, TX. McCright, Aaron M., 2011. Political orientation moderates Americans' beliefs and concern about climate change. Clim. Change 104 (2), 243–253.
251–260 Pew Research Center for the People and the Press. 2012. Trends in American values: 1987–2012: partisan polarization surges in Bush, Obama years The Tea Party and the Remaking of Republican Conservatism
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A.M. McCright et al. / Social Science Research 48 (2014) 251–260 Pew Research Center for the People and the Press. 2012. Trends in American values: 1987–2012: partisan polarization surges in Bush, Obama years. Pew Research Center, Washington, DC. Skocpol, Theda, Williamson, Vanessa, 2013. The Tea Party and the Remaking of Republican Conservatism. Oxford University Press, New York.
- Tom W Smith
- Marsden
- V Peter
- Hout
- Michael
- Jibum Kim
Smith, Tom W., Marsden, Peter V., Hout, Michael, Kim, Jibum, 2012. General Social Surveys, 1972-2012: Cumulative Codebook. National Opinion Research
Center, Chicago.
Pew Research Center for the People and the Press Trends in American values: 1987-2012: partisan polarization surges in Bush, Obama years
Pew Research Center for the People and the Press. 2012. Trends in American values: 1987-2012: partisan polarization surges in Bush, Obama years. Pew
Research Center, Washington, DC.