Civil asset forfeiture is no stranger to criticism, in part because law enforcement agencies can share in the proceeds obtained from forfeitures. Critics claim that this potential for “profit” in law enforcement is the driving force behind civil asset forfeiture; that the noble goals of controlling crime and curbing illicit drug use are not high priorities. The research reported in this article partially substantiates critics' claims that pecuniary concerns guide civil asset forfeiture activities. Results from a survey of 1400 municipal and county law enforcement executives revealed that a substantial proportion of law enforcement agencies are dependent on civil asset forfeiture as a necessary budgetary supplement. In an attempt to explain the “addiction,” evidence is offered that dependence on civil asset forfeiture is positively associated with revenues generated from past forfeiture activities and inversely related to fiscal expenditures. The primary implication tied to these findings is that a conflict of interest between effective crime control and creative fiscal management will persist so long as law enforcement agencies remain dependent on civil asset forfeiture.