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2007 Imprint Academic Mind & Matter Vol. 5(2), pp. 215–240
Mind – Body – Spirituality
Harald Walach
School of Social Sciences & Samueli Institute, European Office
University of Northampton
Northampton, United Kingdom
Abstract
The argument of this paper is that the modern brain-conscious-
ness debate has left out one important element: the question of
a transpersonal or spirit-like element of consciousness. Thus the
problem really is not a mind-body-problem or brain-consciousness
problem, but a mind-body-spirit or brain-consciousness-soul prob-
lem. Looking at the history of the debate it can be seen that, ex-
plicitly or implicitly, this aspect has always been part of the philo-
sophical debate. Most notably, this can be seen in the Aristotelian
concept of the soul, which held that form and matter were both
together necessary to constitute a unity. But on top of that, a Pla-
tonic strand of teaching existed in Aristotle, which was lost. This
tradition stipulated an aspect of the soul, the active intellect, that
was separate and separable. This idea has inspired other and later
writers into postulating an immortal part of the soul. In the modern
debate this tradition has been lost and was frequently amalgamated
with dualist positions. Phenomenological descriptions of mystical
experiences, as well as other unusual (or exceptional) mind-matter
anomalies suggest that this aspect of the problem needs reconsid-
eration. For this purpose a transcendental kind of monism is sug-
gested which does not violate the consensus that only a monist
description of the world is scientifically viable. Such a position
would, in addition, provide the option to incorporate the transper-
sonal side of the debate.
1. Distinguishing Personal and Transpersonal Views
It is suggested that there are two essentially different aspects of the
mind-body problem:
(a) There is the brain-consciousness or traditional mind-body problem.
It is addressed by asking questions like: Can the phenomenal quali-
ties which characterize our experience of “mind” be reduced to the
physical qualities of patterned neuron-discharges ? Is the brain alone
sufficient to give rise to personal consciousness, or do we need a sep-
arate entity ? Is consciousness a “real”, non-reducible entity which
nevertheless is completely causally dependent or supervenient on
216 Wala c h
neuronal events? In Bunge’s (1991) parlance: Who is the subject of
first-person-singular sentences like “I am hungry”, “I need love”, “I
feel pain” ? Is it the complex neurological system, our brain ? Is it a
separate substantial entity ? Is there no subject at all, and the talk
of personal consciousness and psychological states is only a case of
improper use of language ? In sum, it is the question of how we can
understand personal consciousness.
(b) Apart from this, there is what we would like to term the question of
transpersonal consciousness, often brought forward in the disguise
of a dualist position: Is consciousness confined and relegated to its
physical substrate, the body, in space and time ? Or is conscious-
ness reaching further out ? Is it able to represent mental states of
other, coexistent sentient or conscious beings, thus transcending the
physical boundaries of the body it is usually associated with ? Is it
able to directly pre-sense its own mental states or its body’s physical
states, thus transcending the present into the future ? Is it capable
of directly receiving influences from other people’s past mental or
physical states, other than by the common means of learning, read-
ing, hearing and empathizing, thus transcending the present towards
the past ? Is there, over and above personal consciousness, a mind-
soul-like entity which survives personal death, or is it in any other
respect at least partially independent from a conscious person in a
way that death does not totally obliterate it ? Who would be the
subject of such purported transpersonal states of consciousness ?
The suggestion, thus, is to distinguish a personal mind-body-problem
from a transpersonal or spiritual spirit-mind-body-problem. The personal
mind-body-problem focuses on the question of how personal consciousness
and the brain with its body are related. The transpersonal spirit-mind-
body-problem focuses on the question of whether consciousness has as-
pects reaching beyond the individual brain-consciousness relationship. It
incorporates also the classical question about a “soul-like” entity that
would be able to survive death in a certain form.
In order to distinguish these positions I will be using the following
terminology: I will use the notions “matter”, “body”, “brain” in a rather
synonymous fashion, depending on the context. They denote the ma-
terial side of our existence, which could be potentially described by the
laws of natural sciences such as physics, chemistry, biochemistry, or the
neurosciences.
By “consciousness” I mean the personal awareness of being myself and
knowing this fact. It also comprises the particular feeling accompanying
this act of consciousness, often referred to as “qualia”: the specific internal
nature of all acts of consciousness, the way it feels to be conscious as a
particular person, the “internal” side of our being. This notion could
Mind – Body – Spirituality 217
potentially also comprise all those elements of our mental life that are not
conscious in the first place but contribute to our conscious mental activity,
i.e. the pre-conscious cognitive acts, which very often go unnoticed and
happen automatically, but could potentially be conscious, once focused
upon.
By using “transpersonal consciousness”, “soul” or “spirit” interchange-
ably, I will be voluntarily trespassing on denominational views, since I
would like to point out the generic notion behind the words. I will use
these terms to point to all traditions of thought throughout cultures and
epochs that have held that some part of the human person is indestruc-
tible, survives death, and reaches beyond the personal realm of private
consciousness.
Depending on author, time and cultural background different aspects
of transpersonal consciousness have been emphasized. With the Christian
and Islamic writers from late Hellenistic times onwards personal survival
of death has been of prime importance, while Hindu texts would stress the
super-individual permanence of “Spirit”, or Buddhist teachings, point to
the illusory nature of ego-consciousness altogether and a generic one-ness
of all being, which nevertheless is transcendent. Transpersonal conscious-
ness, thus, refers to the potentially transcendent nature of all or part of
our human consciousness.
Distinguishing these two aspects of the traditional mind-body problem
leads to interesting and illuminating combinations of possible positions
which could be and have been held. Table 1 presents what I think are the
most important among them.
Classical materialism, or strong identity theories, like those first pro-
posed by the Greek atomists, or in modern days by Armstrong (1968,
1977), hold that everything besides matter is non-existent and illusory.
They would certainly not allow for a spiritual entity on top of conscious-
ness, and classical individual consciousness would seem to be an illegiti-
mate notion. Modern, weaker versions of materialism would claim basi-
cally the same except that they would not relegate mind to an illusory
realm but admit that consciousness can have a partial subsistence. Just
how autonomous and causally active that consciousness can be is a mat-
ter of debate, and a criterion for discriminating a wide range of subtle
materialist positions. It is, however, not the scope of the present paper
to give a full overview of distinctions of these positions.
In stark contrast is strong idealism, a position which in the West has
probably only been held by Berkeley, but which is very prominent in
Eastern, particularly Indian, philosophies. This position holds that only
“Universal Spirit” or “Consciousness” is real and everything else does not
have substantial existence. A potential modern candidate for this position
is Goswami (1990). Classical idealism, as espoused by Plato and again
by the German idealists, would go along with strong idealism in the sense
218 Wala c h
that also transcendental “‘Spirit” is the only true being. Plato called it the
“Idea of the Good”, the German idealists “Geist” – “Spirit”. In contrast
to the strong idealist position they were willing to grant some real, albeit
derivative, existence to both individual consciousness and matter.
position body, mind, soul, spiritual example
matter consc. spirit matter
materialism, s o o o Armstrong,
strong identity Democritus
emergentisim, s d o o Bunge
funcionalism, AI
weak identity Searle
strong idealism o o s o Berkeley,
Goswami
classical d d s o Plato, Hegel,
idealism Peirce
weak idealism d s s o Leibniz
= =
strong dualism s s s o Descartes,
= = Eccles
transcendental d d d d Bonaventura,
dualism {s} {s} {s} {s}Fons Vitae
Jewish mysticism
gnosticism s d s o esoteric teachings
transcendental d d d o neoplatonism,
monism Buddhism,
{s} {s}Spinoza, Jung
neutral o o o o Russell, Feigl
monism {s} {s}
pan- d d (d) o Whitehead
experientialism {s} {s}
organicism d d (s) o Aristotle
{s} {s}
Thomism d d s o Thomas
{s} {s}Aquinas
Table 1: Possible combinations of tenets in the mind-body-soul discussion and historical
examples thereof. The following letter symbols are used: s = substantial existence
(primary), d = derivative existence (secondary), o = inexistent, illusory. Brackets “()”
indicate that the relation is somewhat unclear or vaguely hinted at, and the equality
sign “=” means that the addressed concepts are conceived as identical. Brackets “{s}”
indicate that only the unity of the indicated derivatives is substantial.
Mind – Body – Spirituality 219
Leibniz’s position seems to be wavering. It is probably fair to call it
weakly idealist, for he starts his philosophy with consciousness as pri-
mary substance. However, he does not distinguish between spiritual-
transpersonal aspects and personal ones. In his monadology (Leibniz
1966), where he develops his system most concisely, he makes a distinction
between different types of monads only in degrees, not in principle. But
in his system matter is certainly not primary. In a modern reading one
could call him a complementarist who held that matter and mind were
complementary aspects of reality (Walach and R¨omer 2000). However,
this is a reinterpretation and would reflect the intention, not necessarily
the text, of Leibniz’s philosophy. Hence, placing him as a weak idealist
comes probably closest to his own understanding.
Strong dualism is best exemplified by Eccles’ position in modern days,
apart from Descartes as the classical source. In these writers it becomes
apparent that no distinction is made between individual consciousness
and transpersonal aspects of it. On the contrary, the mixing of the two is
very likely the hinge around which the claim of dualism moves.
The position I have dubbed “transcendental dualism” was introduced
by Jewish sources, most notably the “Fons Vitae – Source of Life”, which
was written by Ibn Gabirol, known to medieval writers as Avencebrol
(1895), cf. Wittmann (1980). It was taken up by Bonaventure, a Francis-
can scholar contemporary to Thomas Aquinas. He held that a unity of
both individual matter and mind and spiritual matter and transcendental
soul constitutes man (Schneider 1973). While individual mind and matter
die, spiritual matter and transcendental soul survive death.
An important counterposition, at least in religious terms, was held by
all Gnostic teachings (Pagels 1979, 1987). Here a strictly dualist world-
view was elaborated: “Matter” as a bad principle was regarded as op-
posed to some “Universal Spirit” as a good principle, while individual
consciousness was less important and only existent as a derivative of the
“Universal Spirit”. This view has infiltrated a lot of Christian theology,
partially through Augustine, who in his early days was a follower of a
Gnostic sect himself and could never rid himself of this implicit dualism.
In Neoplatonism, as well as in Buddhism, a different kind of tran-
scendental monism is espoused, and it is possible to also position Spinoza
within that frame. Here the only substantial reality is a kind of tran-
scendental “Something” which to name “Spirit” would already be wrong.
Rather it is a reality beyond the distinction of mind and matter, conscious-
ness and material world, out of which these distinctions evolve. Plotinos
called it “To Hen – The One”, out of which all other distinctions – intel-
lect, soul, matter – evolve.
Arguably, Jung had a similar position (Barnes 1945). Some of his
writings seem to suggest that matter and mind are derivative of a unified,
basic reality (Primas 1996). He called this foundational reality “Unus
220 Wala c h
Mundus – One World”, following the 16th century alchemist Gerhard
Dorn (Jung 1955-1957). Less esoteric was Feigl’s neutral monist position,
viewing mind and matter as two sides of one reality without distinct
substantial existence (Feigl 1975).
Whitehead’s pan-experientialism is very close to Aristotle’s in that
both hold that neither matter nor consciousness have a substantial exis-
tence but belong both to an actual being called actual entity or actual
occasion by Whitehead (1978). While Whitehead would not talk about
a spiritual or transpersonal aspect of consciousness, in Aristotle we have
some hints that he was actually holding such a position, although all direct
sources to that effect have been lost. Thomas Aquinas’ work filled that
conceptual gap in Aristotle’s philosophy. Although Aquinas holds that
for the individual mental and bodily aspects are derivative of a primary
unity, there still is a separable and distinct soul exemplified by Aristotle’s
active intellect.
Thus the history of the debate presents a lot of examples that either ex-
plicitly or implicitly have been addressing the question of a transpersonal
aspect of consciousness. The present scientific debate is largely focusing
on body/matter versus consciousness/mind issues. The question of an in-
dividual or trans-individual soul or transpersonal consciousness has been
largely banned from mainstream scientific inquiry as speculative and not
amenable to scientific debate. It is only recently that, under the heading
of “Transpersonal Psychology”, this topic is surfacing again within aca-
demic debate. However, this discussion is rarely taken into account by
mainstream scientists and philosophers. It is the purpose of this paper to
address some shortcomings of the present debate and suggest some lines
for future research.
Strong dualist positions from Descartes (1954) to modern day du-
alists like Eccles (Beck and Eccles 1992, Eccles 1979) and, for instance,
Squires (1993, 1994) usually do not distinguish individual mind/conscious-
ness from transpersonal soul/spirit and presuppose, without making this
explicit, an identity of mind and soul. If personal and transpersonal con-
sciousness are not distinguished, the debate becomes more complicated
and prone to misunderstandings. Making the different aspects explicit
helps clarifying notions. We suggest that it is indeed helpful to disentan-
gle the two aspects and look at them separately.
After a historical introduction, we will present two strands of research
that might enlighten the discussion: Phenomenological descriptions and
empirical data on transpersonal and mystical experiences, and data from
anomalies research. The latter area has traditionally been an enclave of
research that focused on a potential distinction between matter and mind,
or influence of mind on matter, thereby trying to prove the substantiality
of mind or consciousness vis `avisthe scientific mainstream.
Most recently, it has been argued that a potential non-locality of con-
Mind – Body – Spirituality 221
sciousness questions mainstream concepts of a materialist notion of con-
sciousness (Walach and Schmidt 2005). Hence we will briefly touch on
this debate. Traditionally, intuitive support for a spiritualist or transcen-
dentalist interpretation of the mind-body problem came from mystical,
spiritual or transpersonal experiences. We will examine some claims and
data originating from this tradition. In a final section we will try to
suggest some avenues for future research.
2. A Historical Perspective on the Body-Mind Debate
One general axis of the body-mind debate has been whether individ-
ual mind/consciousness is identical with (Armstrong 1968), reducible to
(Churchland 1995), derivative of (Dennett 1991), emergent from (Bunge
1991), or supervenient on (Searle 1992) matter or not (Chalmers 1996).
The majority of present authors seems to endorse one form or other of
a materialist position, in which matter is thought to be primary and the
problem which needs solving is the question of precisely how consciousness
could arise out of it (Uus 1999). Some authors contend, however, that re-
ductionist positions of any brand fail to address central questions, either
in the phenomenology of the mind (Varela et al. 1991), in private con-
scious experience (Chalmers 1996), in the central structure of our most
elaborate theory of matter, quantum mechanics (Schwartz et al. 2005;
Squires 1993, 1994), in the way we always presuppose our mental activ-
ity in understanding matter, the mind and its workings (Penrose 1990,
1994), or by pointing out other deficiencies (Beck and Eccles 1992, Eccles
1979, Griffin 1998). Those authors who favor any type of non-reductionist
position rarely discuss, whether by consciousness they mean personal, in-
dividual consciousness or its transpersonal generalization, an immortal
individual soul, or a transpersonal, universal consciousness.
Table 1 and a short exposition of the positions represented in Sect. 1
have shown that the reduction of the debate to personal consciousness is a
rather recent restriction. For the most part of history the topic has been
discussed in full breadth. The question of transpersonal consciousness
comes in two general and partially contradictory brands: In the West,
that is Europe and its cultural-philosophical history, there was a strong
emphasis, nourished by philosophical tradition and religious faith, that
apart from personal conscious mind there is some soul-like entity which
survives personal death (Allers 1944, Bergner et al. 1976, Heinzmann
1947, Ivanka 1939, Pegis 1934, Seifert 1973). The East, that is Hindu
and Buddhist traditions of philosophy, on the contrary, used to empha-
size other transpersonal aspects of consciousness, like its non-individual,
transpersonal character, its primacy over matter, or its co-derivative ex-
istence with matter (Odin 1982, Varela et al. 1974). While some Western
222 Wala c h
concepts like the Platonic and Neoplatonic philosophies were very likely
influenced by Eastern concepts (Harris 1982), we nevertheless will focus
mostly on the Western concept of transpersonal consciousness.
One example of how personal and transpersonal consciousness are
mixed is Aristotle’s position and the development resulting from inter-
pretations of his work, like that of Alexander of Aphrodisias or Thomas
Aquinas. It is well known that Aristotle’s concept of the soul entails that
soul is the form of matter. It is only in the unity of matter and form
that a concrete being has its existence. Matter in itself is not subsistent,
neither is form. Only together they give rise to living beings, from plants
to humans. When it comes to humans, however, things change. Aris-
totle distinguishes between the vegetative and animal soul, which enable
life and sensation by giving the body its organic unity, and rational soul,
which gives humans their intellectual unity of consciousness. They all are
forms of the body, having their existence only in a mutual dependence of
matter/stuff and form/idea.
However, there is also the cryptic passage in “On the Soul”, where
Aristotle says that the most intelligible part of the soul, the nous poi-
etikos or agent intellect (intellectus agens of the scholastics) comes “from
outside” (thyrathen: it comes from outside through the door, literally
translated). This intellect seems to be a part of the soul, according to
Aristotle, that can exist separately (choristos, De anima 430a17; Aris-
toteles 1968). This parlance seems to be alien to what Aristotle teaches
otherwise. It has given rise to manifold interpretations, one of the most
influential being that of Alexander of Aphrodisias, one of Aristotle’s com-
mentators. He tried to unite this Aristotelian doctrine with a more Neo-
platonist reading of his writings, claiming that the agent intellect, coming
from outside, was an independent, soul-like entity (Merlan 1963).1
Thomas Aquinas, perhaps the most faithful and understanding com-
mentator of Aristotle’s original teachings, took up this idea and moulded
it into his own which, on the one hand, tried to give credit to a then
“scientific” outlook, represented by Aristotle, and the teachings of theol-
ogy on the other hand. His famous notion of soul-as-the-form-of-the-body
(anima forma corporis) means that mind and matter have to be seen as an
inseparable unity with neither mind nor matter being primordial or sub-
stantial in itself (Pegis 1934, Schneider 1973). On top of that, however,
there is the agent intellect, a separable part of the soul, as it were, which
1This apparent contradiction within Aristotle himself has to do with the fact that
Aristotle’s book “Peri Psyches – De Anima – On the Soul” is only part of his psychology.
The more esoteric teaching, which was Platonic in its leaning, was contained in his
dialogue “Eudemos”, which is lost. It can be assumed that this esoteric doctrine of the
soul, its spiritual nature and kinship with the “Good”, a teaching probably closer to
Plato than his extant psychology, was contained in this dialogue and presupposed by
Aristotle, when discussing the more mundane side of his psychology in “Peri Psyches”
(cf. Gigon in his introduction to Aristotle’s “On the Soul”, Aristoteles 1983).
Mind – Body – Spirituality 223
would survive personal death, thereby granting all the elements germane
to Christian teaching: life after death, personal responsibility for morally
relevant actions, and the possibility of an eternal life in bliss in God’s
grace.
A similar, but slightly different view was adopted by Thomas Aquinas’
contemporary and father of the Franciscan tradition of medieval scholas-
ticism, Bonaventure, who held that also the immortal part of man was
composed of mind and a spiritual type of matter, thereby forming a spir-
itual unity. While the mortal part of form and ordinary matter decayed,
the immortal part would survive death as a spiritual unity. Souls, like
angels, also have “bodies”, made of spiritual matter (Bergner et al. 1976,
Lutz 1909).
This distinction, introduced into the scholarly debate by Thomas Aqui-
nas via Aristotle, seems to have been neglected with the rise of natural
science, and most notably in the age of enlightenment. The “soul” as
an individual, spiritual entity was dismissed as a metaphysical notion.
The scientific enterprise as a herald of enlightenment made the battle
against superstition and wild speculation, against human ignorance and
man-made bondages its main agenda. Knowledge and scientific inquiry
was not only an enterprise in its own right, it also was a movement against
traditional teachings (Walach and Reich 2005).
In order to become self-sufficient, human rational endeavor had to
break itself free from its religious underpinnings. By letting go of old at-
tachments to religion, science advanced and made progress. It did so by
excluding from the scientific enterprise in its strict sense a whole set of gen-
uinely human experiences (James 1985), spiritual, religious, or transper-
sonal. Nowadays we might be in a position to bring these experiences into
the focus of scientific scrutiny.
3. Mystical and Religious Experiences
Mystical and religious experiences have been testified in many hu-
man cultures and times, and thus are a heritage of mankind (Albert
1996, James 1985). So far, nobody has succeeded in giving a sufficiently
elaborated reductionist account of religious experience or human actions
which are religiously motivated. There have been some attempts, however.
Studies of meditative states suggest that neuronal activities accompany-
ing higher states of consciousness are correlates of a transcendental con-
sciousness in “Transcendental Meditation” (Orme-Johnson 1977). Such
consciousness is characterized as contentless, sub jectless awareness full of
bliss.
A recent imaging study points towards differential activation of the
brain during different states of meditation (Davidson et al. 2003). Other
224 Wala c h
correlates, like the often quoted 40Hz activity during meditation (Anand
et al. 1961), have been found to be artefacts by one study (Ott 2001), but
apparently vindicated recently (Lutz et al. 2004). Parietal lobe dysfunc-
tion or mini-seizures seem to convey some of the phenomenal qualities
attributed to spiritual experiences (Fenwick 2001, Fenwick et al. 1985,
Gammel and Moosbrugger 1982, Persinger 1983). All these attempts de-
scribe concomitants of spiritual experiences but fail to give satisfactory
explanations. One prominent attempt at both explaining “spiritual expe-
riences” as temporal lobe mini-seizures and inducing them by stimulation
(Persinger 1983; Persinger and Makarec 1987) has been clearly demon-
strated to be due to a lack in methodological rigor and thus a consequence
of social desirability (Granquvist et al. 2005).
Another prominent attempt at reductively explaining religious expe-
rience as a specific pattern of brain activitation (Newberg and D’Aquili
1998) has been criticized on methodological and philosophical grounds to
be too shortsighted (Runehov 2004). Many of these attempts have suc-
ceeded in pointing out some neural correlates of religious or transpersonal
experience, but they are far from reductively explaining these experiences.
An empirical study of reports of religious experiences, as opposed to
everyday experience or schizophrenic narratives has shown that they have
different content and grammatical structure, and use different words (Ox-
man et al. 1988). Many people through the ages adhering to different
religions and practicing within different spiritual systems have testified
to remarkably similar types of experiences (Albert 1996, James 1985,
O’Hanlon 1978, Storm and Thalbourne 2000, Thomas and Cooper 1980).
Some core elements of such experiences are described in the following.
3.1 Core Elements of Mystical Experiences
In all cultures and times, the sudden appearance of bright light has
been a metaphor or a phenomenological descriptor of a mystical expe-
rience. Accompanying and following such an experience seems to be a
sudden and non-algorithmic way of knowing. Saint Ignatius, in his life
recollections, wrote about his enlightenment experience that he “saw”
so many “truths” and understood the meaning of all the teachings in a
sudden moment that everything he had learned to this point and would
learn later was less than he had seen here in one instant. The same topic
of sudden understanding, on a deep level, runs through all strands of
Christian mystical writings, and can be observed in a completely different
context in the modern description of enlightenment experiences contained
in Kapleau (1969). Many anecdotes of historical figures, such as Zen pa-
triarchs or Christian saints testify to the fact that they had apparently
gained deep wisdom and understanding not from learning, but from spir-
itual practice.
Mind – Body – Spirituality 225
The experience of an all-encompassing love is usually accompanied by
a deep appreciation for other human beings, even life forms. Hence the
Buddhist practice to avoid eating meat and to prevent hurting others, even
if these others are bugs. In the Christian doctrine the original Jesuanic
experience of love has permeated the whole of theology and has been
reiterated by virtually all teachers of the Christian church. It is condensed
in the well-known statement from the Letter of John: God is love.
Although also depending on personal and cultural characteristics, an-
other common element seems to be a nearly ecstatic experience of bliss
and happiness that carries on beyond the experience itself and transforms
the experiencer into someone who has a much stabler and serener affective
life. This is not to say that pain or depression cannot afflict them. The
writings of Saint John of the Cross indicate the oppposite. But at some
point during this experience there is the feeling of bliss and happiness
which seems to be boundless and radiates out to others.
Part and parcel of mystical experiences seems to be the experience of
transcendence of the personal self, merging with a larger reality, at least
temporarily. This experience gives rise to many puzzling and often con-
tradictory statements, such as the famous “I am all”, or “I am God”.
Such statements express the realization of one’s own “greater” nature in
such an experience. Usually this larger entity is then described in terms
of a known cultural matrix, such as Buddha, Christ, Atman. The com-
monality of these experiences seems to be that something larger than the
self is experienced, of which this self is an integral part. The distinction
between subject and object is obliterated. At the same time, this experi-
ence is the source of a wider knowledge and gives rise to the potential of
wider action.
Most interesting and challenging from an epistemological point of
view are reports about direct subtle experience and knowledge. Kapleau’s
(1969) descriptions of contemporary enlightenment experiences contain
some modern examples, and Thurston (1956) describes famous historical
examples from Catholic hagiography which have been well documented.
Often they contain elements of seemingly anomalous ways of gleaning
knowledge.
Nearly in all traditions at least some individuals with deep spiritual
experiences have also exhibited subtle ways of acting as healers without
any medical interventions. The historical Jesus started his career foremost
as a healer, and modern exegesis is beginning to discover that (Walach
2005). A famous historical example is the Kabbalist Abulafia. He went
to Rome to discuss with the pope the tribulations his people had to go
through by the hands of the reconquistadors in Spain. On his long winding
way to Italy the papacy changed hands and the new pope threatened him
with death, should he walk through Rome’s gates. Abulafia carried on,
eagerly practicing his Kabbalah. When he walked through the gates of
226 Wala c h
Rome one day in 1280, the bells rang for the death of the pope. He
had died shortly after Abulafia had arrived (Idel 1988). Although no
sensible scholar would say that Abulafia had killed the pope, and certainly
Abulafia would have attributed his own delivery from immanent death to
God’s intervention, it is a good example for the phenomenology of spiritual
experiences. The physical world appears to rearrange itself in accordance
with certain states of consciousness, without any direct intervention.
3.2 Mystical Experiences versus Scientific Approaches
It is obvious that experiences do never happen independent of culture
and language, and thus are always interpreted within the cultural and
historical matrix in which they occur. Katz (1983), among others, has
advanced the argument that experiences are actually fully construed by
the cultural matrix they occur in. Although the argument is certainly
valid for the linguistic framework which is used to convey the experience
to others, it is extremely doubtful that a cultural conditioning hypothesis
can explain the quite universal features of some experiences listed in the
preceding section, some of which are even contradictory to the culture
someone was raised in (Hufford 2005).
Quite a few historical examples, for instance, are examples of complete
conversion experiences, where the experience itself gave rise to a change
of the cognitive and cultural matrix, and not the other way around. Two
prominent examples within the Christian context are Saint Paul and Saint
Augustine, and Buddha himself would be a good example for an experi-
ence that is actually negating, if not annihilating, a cultural context within
which it occurred. Experience, then, would be at the basis of mystical or
spiritual teachings, albeit usually couched within a framework of cultur-
ally available theologemes or philosophemes.
Experience in a general sense is also at the bottom of all scientific
endeavor. Science can be characterized as a disciplined mode of possi-
bly public experience of the outer world and the entities inhabiting it.2
But in contrast to our experience of the outside world, mystical or reli-
gious experience is inner experience. Its subject matter is invisible in the
same sense as quarks are invisible to the naive observer. But in the same
way as competent scientists, trained in their discipline, can observe and
retrace the paths of subatomic particles and can deduce out of certain
characteristics of their traces their energy, lifetime, charge and mass, per-
sons trained in contemplative disciplines can experience the reality they
describe as Atman, Buddha nature, Christ or whatever notions are pro-
vided by their traditions (Albert 1996). There is no technology to be
2Scientific results on scales that are very different from the scales of everyday expe-
rience, however, are only accessible by “competent observers”. The whole subatomic
particle zoo and the exotic objects of extragalactic astrophysics, for instance, cannot
be directly observed and make sense only to experts.
Mind – Body – Spirituality 227
derived out of such experiences, but there can be a direct impact on po-
litical or human actions, teachings or social works. There are remarkable
case reports of profound mystical experiences and their effects on individ-
ual lives (Kapleau 1969, Thurston 1956) and whole groups (Grundmann
1977, Lerner 1972).
Scientific experience is usually held to be objective, although this can
be argued to a considerable extent (Collins and Pinch 1993, Latour 1999),
and “intersubjectivity” is probably a more reasonable term than “objec-
tivity”. It is usually accepted that the subject matter of science is an
objective, outside world. The subject matter of mystical or religious ex-
perience is thought to be inside-outside at the same time: By going inside,
it is claimed, some form of reality is experienced. This inner reality, what-
ever that is, is claimed to be identical with the essence of outer reality.
The validity claims of mystical and inner experiences are less readily
testable than scientific predictions. There is no commonly accepted canon
of methodology. It is more difficult to establish intersubjectivity in this
area, as the ongoing quarrels between representatives of different religions
prove. It is more difficult within spirituality to employ methods with re-
producible results although, to repeat this point, the sciences also have
similar problems sometimes (Collins and Pinch 1993). However, spiri-
tual traditions such as Zen (Hakuin 1994) or traditions of contemplative
prayer (Martin 1977, Walach 1996) claim that certain methods of spiri-
tual practice lead to roughly reproducible results. This is possible through
pragmatic criteria, for instance in Koan training in Zen Buddhism or in
the “distinction of spirits” of the Ignatian tradition in Christianity.
Scientific and mystical experience have in common that they are only
accessible after extensive training, which in turn is only accessible to a
handful of highly intelligent or specially gifted individuals. It is beyond the
majority of normal persons who simply have to believe in what scientists
say and can enjoy the technological impacts of their knowledge. Mystical
and religious experience usually is also not every man’s bread but open to
those who devote themselves to it, although this requirement is certainly
not tied up with any intellectual training.3The rest of the population
could, in principle, make the same experiences if they would devote enough
effort to it. So they have to rely on what the experts in the field usually
call faith. They indirectly partake in the effects of mystical experience
insofar as those who are deeply moved by what they experience sometimes
set up philanthropic societies, social groups or inaugurate movements.
3According to many written sources of the Christian mystical tradition, this fact is
underlined by seminal writers such as Hugh de Balma, by the anonymous author of the
Cloud of Unknowing, by the whole movement of the Devotio Moderna, it is mentioned
several times by Meister Eckhart and also by Saint Ignatius of Loyola. Neither Catarina
of Siena nor Theresa of Avila, the only two women who are teachers of the church and
who were eminent mystics, had any appreciable intellectual training.
228 Wala c h
This can help to bring a little bit more justice, social peace or welfare
to society at large, but deficient forms of religion and religiosity can also
have detrimental effects.
The whole field of the spiritual-religious traditions within society and
the teachings and experiences associated with them used to be well con-
tained within religious or similar social institutions. As science has in-
herited some of the plight of religion following the secularization of the
enlightenment, it does not come as a surprise that it now has to deal
with some of the questions that were originally the domain of religion.
With the mind-body-soul problem these topics come back to science in
the clothes of the simple but tantalizing question of what is the basic
nature of human consciousness.
While mystical writers within the framework of different religions seem
to answer this question differently, even contradictorily, the common de-
nominator of all of them is the affirmation of some sort of transpersonal
consciousness. It would be a difficult task in its own right to trace differ-
ences and commonalities in the different spiritual traditions. Suffice it here
to say that the common denominator of mystical experiences seems to be
the transpersonal concept of the transcendence of consciousness, either as
a god-like essence of the soul, or as universal mind, or both (Walach 2005).
In any case, the materialist stance, be it reductive, identity-theoretic,
eliminative, emergentist, supervenient, or epiphenomenalist, is not com-
patible with a transpersonal concept of mind. The strongest challenge
for any brand of materialist concept of consciousness comes from such
transpersonal experiences.
4. Near-Death Experiences
Apart from mystical experiences proper, which can be framed as di-
rect experiences of a transcendent reality, another quite challenging kind
of transpersonal experiences are near-death experiences. Some near-death
experiences have similarities with out-of-body experiences, where the ex-
periencer sees himself lying on a bed or on the floor from above, as if his
consciousness floats bodiless on the ceiling. Such experiences are not really
a challenge for a physicalist interpretation, as Metzinger’s (2003) attempt
at explaining them has shown. They would only be a challenge if the ex-
periencer claims to have seen locations and events that were inaccessible
to him under “normal” sensory operation. However, as such cases are less
well documented than near-death experiences and very likely happen in
a fully functioning organism, they seem to be less of a mystery.
Some types of near-death experiences may be readily explainable as
products of a dying brain, or a protective mechanism (Metzinger 2003,
Whinnery 1997). Other experiences, however, which have been well doc-
umented, seem to take place after a time when the brain has been clinically
Mind – Body – Spirituality 229
dead for too long as to be plausibly taken as results of the dying process
(Fauth and R¨umelin 2003, Parnia and Fenwick 2002, Parnia et al. 2001,
Sabom 1998, van Lommel et al. 2001).
In some cases of a series of near-death experiences, van Lommel has
found that the reported experiences, involving precise descriptions of med-
ical help given to the patient, have taken place 30 minutes or later after
a heart attack. By contrast, all our medical knowledge today teaches us
that after 5 to 10 minutes at the latest after the heart stops beating the
brain is clinically dead and no brain activity can be registered any longer
(van Lommel 2004, van Lommel et al. 2001).
We have two options to understand these data: Either we redefine our
concept of death, with dramatic consequences for all our present practices
of donor organ surgery, or we redefine our concept of consciousness. For,
apparently, at least in some cases conscious activity has been reported
without any likelihood of concomitant brain activity.
Another well described case refers to a patient whose brain had been
cooled to 15 degrees Celsius such that all physiological activity remained
suspended for a surgery of an aneurism of the basal aorta of the brain.
The patient later described vivid experiences of parts of the operation
which she could not have gathered from incidental information or which
could be attributed to kryptomnesia. The experiences took place dur-
ing periods when the brain was clearly unactive, as documented through
continuous monitoring of lacking brain-stem activity (Sabom 1998). Al-
though the tone of the case description with its fundamentalist religious
connotations is somewhat repulsive, it contains a precise documentation
by a neurosurgeon that is likely to be trustworthy.
5. Mind-Matter Anomalies
Some other types of data that are difficult to incorporate within a
reductionist-materialist tradition are due to apparently anomalous rela-
tionships between mental and material states, briefly mind-matter anom-
alies. When the Society of Psychical Research was founded in 1882, it was
its declared aim to scientifically study claims of the supernatural, which
included mediumistic contact with deceased persons or demonstrating di-
rect mind-matter interactions. The community emerging from these early
precursors has always been a countermovement to standard reductionist
stances, although scientific methods have been used to demonstrate its
claims. These claims remain far from being accepted or established, but a
host of data have been accumulated which largely remain unknown to and
unconsidered by the scientific community. A thorough review with the re-
spective arguments has been presented elsewhere (Walach and Schmidt
2005).
230 Wala c h
If the existing evidence for mind-matter anomalies were accepted,
there would be instances of relations between mental and physical sys-
tems (psychokinesis, clairvoyance), between mental and mental systems
(extrasensory perception, clairvoyance), or between a mental system and
its own or other systems’ future states (precognition). Insofar as such re-
lationships are supposed to exist without any exchange of signals and en-
ergy, they are anomalies within our currently accepted world view. They
point to the potential notion of a broader and wider view of conscious-
ness, and possibly also of physical reality. While it is not within the scope
of this paper to reiterate published reviews (Schmidt et al. 2005), let us
demonstrate the potential challenge by one recent experimental example.
Two spatially separated subjects have their EEG recorded, while one
of them is being stimulated by visual or auditory signals. Grinberg-
Zylberbaum, who built on earlier and similar work (Duane and Behrendt
1965), reported that the non-stimulated person showed an EEG signature
similar to an evoked potential, which he therefore called “transferred po-
tential” (Grinberg-Zylberbaum 1982, Grinberg-Zylberbaum et al. 1994).
Several critical points of Grinberg-Zylberbaum’s original experimental
set-up were amended in later replication attempts (acoustically and elec-
tromagnetically shielded cabins, checkerboard patterns for visual stimula-
tion, six EEG electrodes with control for ocular and muscular artefacts).
Moreover, a non-parametric testing method based on permutation sta-
tistics was used instead of simple visual or correlational analyses. Un-
der well-defined control conditions, we found significant deviations from
randomness in the EEGs of non-stimulated subjects while their isolated
counterparts were being stimulated (Wackermann et al. 2003).
This result is in agreement with data from other groups (Radin 2004,
Standish et al. 2003, Standish et al. 2004), and has meanwhile been
replicated with a larger data set and stricter, intra-individual controls
(Wackermann et al. 2004). If replicable and robust, these results would
indicate inherent non-local correlations accompanying brain events and,
hence, raise the question of a potential non-local activity of consciousness.
This would imply that there seem to be instances in which our individ-
ual consciousness can have access to or can influence reality beyond the
confines of our individual brain-body-consciousness unity that we call our
selves.
From a theory of science point of view, anomalies of this type are sig-
nificant for consciousness research and have to be considered as a fruitful
challenge (Feyerabend 1975, Lakatos 1978, Laudan 1977, 1981). This has
rarely been attempted with serious effort (Braude 1978, 1986, 1987). Fre-
quently, researchers feel tempted to either take the corresponding data
base seriously and are prompted towards a more or less dualist stance
(Beloff 1987), although this is certainly not the only way of conceptualiz-
ing mind-matter interactions (Jahn and Dunne 2001). Our suggestion is
Mind – Body – Spirituality 231
to disentangle the mind-body-problem into the classical problem of per-
sonal consciousness vis `avisits body and transpersonal consciousness vis
`avismatter in general. We then might be in a better position to look at
the data with fewer preconceptions.
I believe that it is highly unlikely that all of the anomalies reported
during a long history of systematic research should turn out to be bogus in-
formation. Granted, then, that some sort of anomalous mind-matter and
mind-mind interaction sometimes occurs, with yet unspecified boundary
conditions, frequency, scope, or modifying events, this type of data adds
to what is known from the study of mystical traditions.
6. Consequences for Consciousness Research
Acknowledging that the mind-body problem does indeed have the
two sides of the traditional mind-brain problem and the transpersonal
consciousness-matter problem allows for a broader outlook. If mind-
matter anomalies are taken seriously then at least some of them speak
against a reductionist version of materialism, or else the notion of mat-
ter would have to be profoundly revised. In addition, more elaborate
non-reductionist versions like theories of supervenience or emergence are
challenged by data that point to the potential non-locality of conscious-
ness. This is to say that there seems to be some interaction between
consciousness and material events which is not tied to particular narrow
domains of space and time.
All physical theory relies on at least a methodological dualism (At-
manspacher et al. 1999) in which an observing (and conscious) system is
differentiated from the material system studied, producing what is dubbed
the Cartesian cut (Atmanspacher 1994). Since every physical theory pre-
supposes this cut, present-day physics as a theory of matter can never be
sufficient for explaining it (Schwartz et al. 2005), unless physical theory is
reformed and provides a concept of matter which is inclusive of conscious-
ness as a dimension capable of direct interaction with material systems
(Lockwood 1989). Perhaps this would be a theory in which both matter
as we now have it and consciousness as we now understand it turn out
to be two sides of one more fundamental essence, much like Spinoza en-
visaged it (Elitzur 1991, Kirsch and Hyland 1987, Spinoza 1977, Velmans
2002, Walach and R¨omer 2000).
A concept like that certainly would be more in line with mystical
traditions which often state that the essence of the universe is “super-
consciousness”, experientially accessible, though beyond the limitations of
everyday experience. It should be clear that this “super-consciousness” is
profoundly different from what we normally mean by individual, personal
consciousness. Thus the materialist intuition could be correct that our
232 Wala c h
everyday conscious life is derived from our brain processes, while at the
same time the dualist intuition could hold that there is some other essence
fundamental to both matter and normal individual consciousness.
Traditional spiritual disciplines like Buddhism teach that the personal
ego is an illusion arising out of many mental activities, and the loss of this
personal self is the goal of spiritual practice (Roberts 1984). This comes
close to some forms of neurobiological reasoning which try to understand
how the brain succeeds in creating the “illusion” of a personal “self”.
The most recent and perhaps most promising attempt at such a theory is
probably Metzinger’s (2003) theory of a phenomenal self-model.
Metzinger proposes that a system that is able to represent an image
of an outside world and thus is presentational to itself will by necessity
generate consciousness. A subjective self-consciousness will by necessity
arise if the following conditions are met: (a) The representational system
contains a model of its own states, and (b) represents this model vis `avis
its own relations to the outside world. This is to say that representational
systems form a so-called phenomenal model of intentionality relations out
of their own interactions between themselves, the outside world, and the
modeling of the relations of the system with the outside world. This self-
model of subjectivity is fully transparent against its own representational
nature and will be ignorant of the fact that it is itself only a model or a
mode of presentation. Hence, it will mistake its own mode or represen-
tationality for a real entity and give rise to the naive realist position of
subjective dualism that is prevalent in folk psychology.
This theory successfully reconstructs how a phenomenal self could arise
– as an illusion, as it were – out of the systemic modeling of a neural system
that tries to present an individual perspective onto the surrounding world
to the system itself. The theory also makes clear that the illusion of
selfhood arises out of a necessary condition for the system to function
properly: In order to break the self-relational loop into potential infinity,
the model itself has to be transparent, meaning forgetful of itself, as being
only a model. In other words: it is precisely the ignorance of the system
for its own properties as being only a modeling relation and presentation
that creates the illusion of selfhood. If that were not the case the system
would need too much computational effort for modeling its relations with
itself and hence forgo its evolutionary goal of economically and successfully
representing the environment to the individual.
This model is close to some intuitions of classic Buddhist thought:
Once the (separate) self-nature is discovered as illusionary, the individual
can experience itself free of greed and egocentricity, and thus proceed to
liberation. In Metzinger’s terminology this would be the philosophical-
neurocognitive striving of a self-conscious system for elucidating its own
state, thus reducing the transparency of its representation. In this way, a
fully enlightened subject in Metzinger’s model would be similar to an en-
Mind – Body – Spirituality 233
lightened subject in the classic Buddhist psychology: she or he would have
understood the empty nature of selfhood. Thus, a materialist program
might be successful at this personal level, and even in line with spiritual
teachings. The corresponding loss of ego or personal self, or rather its
transcendence, is also at the core of Christian teaching (Walach 2005).
However, one important element would still not be included in such
a program of reducing personal subjective consciousness to an emergent
property of a neuronal system. The non-local and transpersonal element
of an enlightenment experience does not only discover the subjective self
to be an empty notion, but also to be eminently enhanced by the experi-
ential discovery of the true nature. This true nature, or Buddha nature,
transcends personal selfhood, as testified in many phenomenological de-
scriptions (Kapleau 1969).
Traditional spiritual teachings are, in their essence, always monist.
They emphasize the unity of everything. This is also true for the Judaeo-
Christian tradition in its original version, which received much of its actual
dualist flavor from gnostic traditions (Pagels 1979, Walach and Schuster
1992). But this monism is usually a transcendental kind of monism, in
which neither matter, as we know and understand it, nor consciousness
as limited ego-consciousness as we normally have it, are the basis for the
universal essence. Rather it is some transcendental kind of consciousness-
or mind-like substance, which is neither matter nor mind, but something
beyond (Atmanspacher 2003).
The lesson to be learnt, we suggest, is that both a materialist posi-
tion and a dualist position have something to recommend themselves, yet
none of them, taken alone, comprises the full picture. They are possibly
related to each other in a complementary fashion (Walach and R¨omer
2000). A materialist stance might be a helpful heuristic to understand
how our everyday experience of “me-ness” comes about, as exemplified
by Metzinger’s (2003) model. A dualist stance might be necessary to un-
derstand how the transpersonal aspects of consciousness come into play.
A phenomenal polarity or complementarity between material and mental
events might be the irreducible tension of a basically monist world, which
is monist in a transcendental sense of the word, neither reducing matter
as we know it nor consciousness as we have it to one another.
Thus, a basic, immediate and non-local interaction between conscious
and material events, as testified by mind-matter anomalies, should be ex-
pected as a logical consequence of a non-dualist, transcendental monist
ontology with a dualist phenomenology. It would be the basic task of a
science of direct mind-matter interactions to elucidate the boundary con-
ditions of such interactions. A successful neurobiology research program
should enable us to understand when and how personal consciousness
arises. From the study and practice of spiritual disciplines we might be
able to understand better when and how to transcend this personal “me-
234 Wala c h
ness” into transpersonal consciousness. A result of a basic theory could be
to see how consciousness is formally and conceptually united with matter,
as already envisioned by Pauli (R¨omer 2002). A fruitful, transdisciplinary
study of consciousness is located in the intersection of all of these efforts.
Acknowledgments
This work was supported by the Samueli Institute for Information
Biology, Newport Beach, CA. I am grateful to two referees for important
hints that have, hopefully, improved the paper.
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Received: 21 April 2005
Revised: 31 October 2006
Accepted: 13 November 2006
Reviewed by David M. Wulff and another, anonymous, referee.
