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Promoting Exit from Violent Extremism: Themes and Approaches
Abstract
A number of Western countries are currently adding exit programs targeting militant Islamists to their counterterrorism efforts. Drawing on research into voluntary exit from violent extremism, this article identifies themes and issues that seem to cause doubt, leading to exit. It then provides a perspective on how these natural sources of doubt might best be brought to bear in connection with an exit program by drawing on social psychology and research into persuasion and attitude change. It is argued that an external intervention should stay close to the potential exiter's own doubt, make the influence attempt as subtle as possible, use narratives and self-affirmatory strategies to reduce resistance to persuasion, and consider the possibility to promote attitudinal change via behavioral change as an alternative to seek to influence beliefs directly.
... Even though the physical Islamic State (IS) was dismantled in Syria in 2018-2019, IS "continues to stretch its reach beyond borders, breeding homegrown militant jihadi killers wherever possible" [5] (McDowell-Smith, Speckhard and Yayla 2017:51), which means that IS still exists. Moreover, "as foreign fighters begin to stream home, a whole new set of challenges will begin" (Speckhard, Shajkovci and Yayla 2018:18) [6]. 2 While a huge body of research has examined ways into Islamic extremism, why and how people exit such environments is less well explored (see [9,10] Dalgaard-Nielsen 2013; Horgan 2009). However, some scholars have initiated studies of defection from Islamic extremist milieus from a data-driven perspective [10][11][12][13][14][15] . ...
... A group of scholars likewise finds that frustration with societal position and feelings of meaninglessness and loneliness influence jihadi foreign fighters' engagement in extremism [41][42][43] Social, psycho-social, and structural factors have also been shown to be significant for engagement with Salafi-jihadism. Marginalization, difficulties of assimilation, and a failed integration into Western societies among Muslim citizens are found by a range of scholars to be triggers for engagement in Salafi-jihadism [41,50,54,55] what life turned out to be in a given terrorist organization-for example, in the form of brutality, violence, and poor leadership-are found to be a primary reason for defection in a number of studies [5,[9][10][11]13,21,22,42,52,70,73] Speckhard and Ellenberg 2020). Yet, disillusionment does not always lead to actually leaving a Salafi-jihadist milieu and becoming disengaged. ...
... It is well known within the literature that the detachment from an extremist group or cult is "much easier if the individual can find a social support structure which helps to encourage disaffiliation" [6,9,96] (Wright 1987:75; cf. Speckhard and Shajkovci 2018; Dalgaard-Nielsen 2013). ...
Since the Syrian civil war erupted in 2011, an increasing number of European youth have joined Salafi-jihadist milieus in their home countries and/or in the Syrian/Iraqi conflict zone. Some are ardent believers in ending their days as—what they perceive to be—martyrs. Others renege on their commitment, return, and resocialize into conventional society. While engagement, disengagement, and resocialization have each been explored as phases separately within the existing literature, a coherent, criminological study of how those sequences are interconnected has still not been explored in a Danish context from an empirical angle. On the basis of qualitative interviews with three Danish Salafi-jihadist defectors (for example, from the Islamic State), this article unravels the connection and disconnection between engagement, disengagement, and resocialization. The analysis is theoretically informed by David Matza’s theory of drift (1964). However, the theory does have its limitations. As the commitment to Salafi-jihadism entails more than simply an “episodic release from moral constraint”, which defines drift, the informants are only part-time drifters, and here it is argued that the informants are rather entering and exiting a spiraling vortex of Salafi-jihadism. These entries and exits are fueled by the returnees’ nurtured and fractured fantasies.
... One of the key arguments made in the terrorism literature is that it is difficult to pin down any one set of consistent motives and factors that explain why a person radicalized to violent extremism (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2013;Weenink & Vooren-Morsing, 2021). The same applies to answering why someone deradicalized or disengaged (Altier et al., 2020;Horgan, 2009). ...
... Pull factors are factors linked to individuals (i.e., psychological) and the people to whom they are exposed (e.g., radical associates or family members). On the other side of the spectrum push factors triggering disengagement are features linked to involvement with terrorist groups (e.g., burn out, losing faith in leaders, and the ideology) that drive people away from an extremist group (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2013). Pull factors lay outside of the group and act to lure individuals to more conventional social roles (e.g., having children) (Altier et al., 2020;Hwang, 2018). ...
... Burnout can be both physical and psychological, relating to the inability to cope with the physical and psychological demands of participating in, and supporting, extremist actions and causes and consequences of doing so for oneself and others (Hwang, 2018). The age crime curve prevalent in criminal cohorts also appears to exist amongst extremist samples (Carlsson et al., 2020;Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2013). Age-related processes have been highlighted by criminal desistance theory (Rocque, 2017), with the push of getting older and doubts over the benefits of ongoing criminality, needing to be understood as linked to the pull of life course changes and exhaustion (Carlsson et al., 2020;Rocque, 2017). ...
Research shows there is variability in factors that cause a person to radicalize to violent extremism. The use of the push/pull distinction has been one way in which scholars have aimed to provide clarity to the process of radicalization and extremist disengagement. However, it remains a conceptually underdeveloped distinction. In this paper, we draw on aspects of criminological theory to better understand the push and pull distinction. The paper draws on research comprising interviews with three Indonesians and two Australian individuals who have radicalized to violent extremism that is aligned with jihadist ideologies. Based on this primary data, case descriptions and narratives are provided on each individual examining pathways into and away from violent extremism. We draw on aspects of strain theory, social control, differential association, and desistance theory to understand common patterns across each case and to highlight the relative influence of various push and pull factors. Implications for theory and policy are highlighted. We also acknowledge limitations in our approach.
... In terms of the factors that influence desistance and disengagement, Keane et al. (2022a) conclude that the HII, in line with what is recommended in the literature, offers an opportunity for participants to explore identity (e.g., Chernov Hwang, 2015;Fisher-Smith et al., 2020;Horgan, 2009b), and relations (e.g., Barrelle, 2015;Fisher-Smith et al., 2020;Harris et al., 2018). Additionally, the HII aims to provide a safe space to reflect and foster dissatisfaction and disillusionment, which is also recommended in the literature (e.g., Altier et al., 2020;Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2013;Latif et al., 2019;Simi et al., 2019). The programme also acknowledges and encourages prosocial relationships, interests and activities that support desistance, disengagement, and reintegration into society (HMPPS, 2018). ...
... • Relatively low numbers of individuals convicted of terrorism and terrorismconnected offences (who may sometimes be serving long custodial sentences), limited control for extraneous factors like other interventions, limited opportunity to employ an experimental design in an effort to determine whether change can be attributed to the intervention, relatively low proven reoffending rates and due to security, limited access to individuals convicted of terrorism and terrorism-connected offences for primary or secondary research (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2013). ...
The Healthy Identity Intervention (HII) is a His Majesty’s Prison and Probation Service (HMPPS) accredited offending behaviour programme designed to address the psychological and social factors impacting individual engagement and involvement in extremism.
The aims of the three studies conducted as part of the HII evaluation were to better understand: (1) change amongst individuals convicted of terrorism and terrorism-connected offences in the UK who had completed HII; (2) participants’ experiences of undertaking HII; and (3) the effect of HII participation on individuals
... The most interesting part was the change in focus from talking all the time about foreign policy in the Middle East to focusing more on personal matters and on how he could get a job and help his family. As previously pointed out by Dalgaard-Nielsen (2013) and Christensen (2015), it seems that repeated contact with a trusted person outside an extreme environment helped those prisoners to regain a critical distance from an ideology to which they had previously adhered. ...
... If such confidence remains absent, the other qualities of the mentor will not be sufficient to create change. There will be no improvement and no lasting results (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2013). ...
The Norwegian Mentoring Scheme (NMS) has now been running for six years, and was evaluated for the first time by the end of 2018. This paper dwells on the results of this evaluation, published in Norwegian in February 2019 (Orban, 2019). These results were obtained through access to primary sources from the Directorate of Norwegian Correctional Service (DNCS) and from the NMS’ archives, as well as through semi-structured interviews. Eight were conducted with participants in the scheme. Nine were conducted with their mentors. One particular feature of the NMS is the use of mentors from civil society with different backgrounds in order to engage sentenced radical prisoners and to moderate behaviors and discourses. Twenty interviews were conducted with prison staff working with participants in the program, prison wardens and designers of the NMS. All interviews took place from March 2017 to October 2018. Due to high prison security measures, it was not possible to conduct more than one interview per mentee during the evaluation period. Interviews with both mentees and mentors averaged between 1.5 and 2 hours and were exclusively focused on how participation in the NMS was experienced by both groups. This chapter suggests that good targeting of mentors and mentees and trust building are critical factors to create appropriate conditions for change. Despite shortages, unexpected geopolitical developments and economic constraints, the first results of the NMS review were promising. However, the efficiency of the trust model to prevent recidivism into terrorism has yet to be confirmed in the long term. Aside from the work done on influencing behaviors and mindsets, mentors compensated for the lack of management of radicalized inmates in the prison system by providing a humanized form of support. In that sense, this study also suggests that the NMS might have less in common with deradicalization interventions than with existing reintegration measures that seek to empower prisoners to change their lifestyle and to prevent recidivism into crime.
... Comparing Exit programme in the Middle East and South East Asia with those undertaken in Europe, Dalgaard-Nielsen (2013) argues that those programme in the Middle East and South East Asia have tended to focus on ideological or theological re-education via engagement with clerics, scholars and ex-militants or formers. European programme, on the other hand, tend to focus on the practicalities of exit, including economic assistance, psychological counselling and creating new social ties. ...
... European programme, on the other hand, tend to focus on the practicalities of exit, including economic assistance, psychological counselling and creating new social ties. Thus, for European programme, behavioural disengagement, rather than religious or ideological views, tend to be the central focus of these approaches (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2013). Increasingly, however, as several of the chapters in this volume have shown, these approaches have begun to overlap, indicating advancements towards establishing best practices based on global experiences. ...
This book provides an overview of preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) to assist readers in developing a more complete understanding of P/CVE and the issues of radicalisation, disengagement and rehabilitation. It shines a light on some key P/CVE programmes and initiatives in Indonesia and is written to facilitate understanding preventing and countering violent extremism in a larger frame. It is intended to be of interest to civil society activists, security practitioners, communities, policy makers and researchers alike. It represents a collaboration, born out of partnership in the field, that brings together academic researchers and civil society activists from Indonesia and Australia. Around the world, far too little is known about Indonesian society in general and Indonesian Islam and civil society in particular. This is, in large measure, because of the barrier of language. This book represents a small, but hopefully significant, contribution to opening a window to Indonesia. The focus of this book is on the challenging issues entailed with violent and hateful extremism. The initiatives it portrays and the people it describes, and whose voices it channels, are filled with the hope of transforming the world to make it better.
Greg Barton is a research professor in Global Islamic Politics in the Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation (ADI), Deakin University, researching Islam and civil society, democratisation and countering violent extremism. The central axis of his research interests is the way in which religious thought, individual believers and religious communities respond to modernity and to the modern nation-state.
Matteo Vergani is a researcher in ADI and a senior lecturer in sociology at Deakin University, Australia. His primary research interests are political and bias violence, its causes, its impact on society and the study of what could prevent it. he is the founder of the online platform Tackling Hate, which provides free training modules for practitioners working on tackling various forms of hate and extremism.
Yenny Wahid is the second daughter of H.E. Abdurrahman Wahid and established the Wahid Foundation to carry on his work in building tolerance and understanding. She was a former journalist for the Australian newspapers, The Sydney Morning Herald and The Age and a member of the special staff for political communication working in the office of President Yudhoyono.
... Comparing Exit programme in the Middle East and South East Asia with those undertaken in Europe, Dalgaard-Nielsen (2013) argues that those programme in the Middle East and South East Asia have tended to focus on ideological or theological re-education via engagement with clerics, scholars and ex-militants or formers. European programme, on the other hand, tend to focus on the practicalities of exit, including economic assistance, psychological counselling and creating new social ties. ...
... European programme, on the other hand, tend to focus on the practicalities of exit, including economic assistance, psychological counselling and creating new social ties. Thus, for European programme, behavioural disengagement, rather than religious or ideological views, tend to be the central focus of these approaches (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2013). Increasingly, however, as several of the chapters in this volume have shown, these approaches have begun to overlap, indicating advancements towards establishing best practices based on global experiences. ...
This chapter examines the pressing need for widely available rehabilitation and disengagement P/CVE programs in Indonesia. Whilst the overwhelming majority of P/CVE programs in Indonesia have focussed on primary intervention initiatives there have been a number of innovative pilot projects conducting tertiary interventions, some of which are covered in this book. Nevertheless, there remains a pressing need to implement rehabilitation programs in a more comprehensive fashion. As the case studies presented in this volume make clear, Indonesian civil society organisations (CSOs) have the potential to do much more in this space. What is required is leadership, support and facilitation from the Indonesian government. This will need to involve the corrections system and to be supported by the Indonesian national police but, most crucially, it needs to be led by BNPT, Indonesia’s national Counterterrorism Agency. The fact that disengagement and rehabilitation is so poorly understood, as is reflected by the blithe use of the term deradicalisation as a catch-all, speaks to the challenge facing Indonesia in preventing and countering violent extremism and terrorism. Good work by community groups, CSOs and mass organisations, and remarkably effective responses from Densus 88, the special police counterterrorism detachment, has seen Indonesia bring a once surging terrorism threat under control. But this largely tactical and reactive CT work has not been matched by comprehensive strategic initiatives to break the cycle of violence. In the democratic, post-Suharto regime, era of the past two decades, CT efforts have resulted in the disruption of hundreds of terrorist plots and operational cells and have led to the arrest of more than 1,600 individuals, the vast majority of whom have then been successfully prosecuted, convicted and sentenced on terrorism charges, in court cases generally seen to be transparent and fair. This has resulted in a very significant volume of terrorism detainees cycling through Indonesia’s leaky, overcrowded and under-resourced prison system on relatively short sentences. Given the circumstances, it is remarkable that the consequences of recidivism and re-engagement have not, so far at least, been as bad as feared. And yet, as a September 2020 report by IPAC reminds us, the rates of reengaging in extremist networks and activities mean that there are no grounds for complacency, bearing in mind the many hundreds of terrorism detainees involved and the broader networks of families, friends and associates that their lives influence. This underscores both the need to have more extensive and effective rehabilitation programs in and out of prison, and reasons for being confident that such programs can make a significant difference. This chapter incorporates a comprehensive compilation of the current critical literature from researchers and practitioners.
... Comparing Exit programme in the Middle East and South East Asia with those undertaken in Europe, Dalgaard-Nielsen (2013) argues that those programme in the Middle East and South East Asia have tended to focus on ideological or theological re-education via engagement with clerics, scholars and ex-militants or formers. European programme, on the other hand, tend to focus on the practicalities of exit, including economic assistance, psychological counselling and creating new social ties. ...
... European programme, on the other hand, tend to focus on the practicalities of exit, including economic assistance, psychological counselling and creating new social ties. Thus, for European programme, behavioural disengagement, rather than religious or ideological views, tend to be the central focus of these approaches (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2013). Increasingly, however, as several of the chapters in this volume have shown, these approaches have begun to overlap, indicating advancements towards establishing best practices based on global experiences. ...
This chapter examines what we know about radicalisation and recruitment into violent extremism in Indonesia over the past 70 years. It reviews the emergence of proto-Islamist violent extremism in Indonesia (well before the first formulations of jihadi thought by Egypt’s Sayyid Qutb) with the Darul Islam (DI) movement in the early 1950s. It tracks the evolution of Salafi jihadism in Indonesia in successive chapters from the original DI insurgency, through Salafi extremism and the revival of DI in an underground insurgency in the 1970s, led by Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Baasyir, and their retreat, or hijrah to Malaysia in the 1980s. This is followed by the sending of mujahideen to Afghanistan in the 1980s and 1990s which culminated in the declaration of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) in 1993, (with more extreme JI splinter factions carrying out terrorist bombings in the 2000s) leading to the engagement of JI and other extremists in the conflict in Syria and Iraq as foreign terrorist fighters (FTF), first with Jabhat al-Nusra and al-Qaeda and then with ISIS. The second half of the chapter examines the sociology and psychology of radicalisation in Indonesia by unpacking survey research carried out by LSI (Lingkaran Survei Indonesia) for the Wahid Foundation. It draws on national survey data collected in April 2016 and October 2017 with adult Muslims across Indonesia and a third survey, from March 2017, of Muslim youth involved in Rohis (Rohani Islam) religious instruction classes (Rohis). The analysis examines the key issues of imagined enemies and out groups, intergroup contact and support for extremism, the role of toxic masculinity and the contribution of digital literacy. It finds significant correlation between all of these and levels of support for violent and hateful extremism. And in particular, it finds that there is convincing empirical evidence indicating that higher levels of religious observance and religious knowledge, together with belonging to mainstream religious organisations, are associated with lower levels of support for violent extremism. Contact with religious out-groups is found to be an important factor associated with reduction of violent extremism. The quality of the relationship established with out-group members is crucial: the more substantial it is, the more likely it is to shape attitudes and perceptions. This chapter incorporates a comprehensive compilation of the current critical literature from researchers and practitioners.
... Comparing Exit programme in the Middle East and South East Asia with those undertaken in Europe, Dalgaard-Nielsen (2013) argues that those programme in the Middle East and South East Asia have tended to focus on ideological or theological re-education via engagement with clerics, scholars and ex-militants or formers. European programme, on the other hand, tend to focus on the practicalities of exit, including economic assistance, psychological counselling and creating new social ties. ...
... European programme, on the other hand, tend to focus on the practicalities of exit, including economic assistance, psychological counselling and creating new social ties. Thus, for European programme, behavioural disengagement, rather than religious or ideological views, tend to be the central focus of these approaches (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2013). Increasingly, however, as several of the chapters in this volume have shown, these approaches have begun to overlap, indicating advancements towards establishing best practices based on global experiences. ...
... Comparing Exit programme in the Middle East and South East Asia with those undertaken in Europe, Dalgaard-Nielsen (2013) argues that those programme in the Middle East and South East Asia have tended to focus on ideological or theological re-education via engagement with clerics, scholars and ex-militants or formers. European programme, on the other hand, tend to focus on the practicalities of exit, including economic assistance, psychological counselling and creating new social ties. ...
... European programme, on the other hand, tend to focus on the practicalities of exit, including economic assistance, psychological counselling and creating new social ties. Thus, for European programme, behavioural disengagement, rather than religious or ideological views, tend to be the central focus of these approaches (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2013). Increasingly, however, as several of the chapters in this volume have shown, these approaches have begun to overlap, indicating advancements towards establishing best practices based on global experiences. ...
This booklet is intended to complement William’s guidebook (2021) and existing P/CVE toolkits, in particular RAND’s toolkit (Helmus et al., 2017), Hedayah’s evaluation toolkit (Mattei & Zeiger, 2018), USIP’s introduction to evaluation (Holmer et al., 2018) and International Alert and UNDP’s toolkits (Holdaway & Ruth, 2018). It seeks to offer practical advice to civil society organisations about how to design an evidence-based evaluation of P/CVE programs. The final section contains a library of measurement tools as a first step towards standardisation of P/CVE evaluation measurement in Indonesia. Currently, we lack a comprehensive understanding of what works to prevent violent extremism because we don’t have enough reliable evaluations of P/CVE programs to form our evidence base. We argue that it is useful to think that the difficulties encountered in conducting rigorous evaluations are not so very different from the ones that other social programs have to deal with, for example prevention programs that aim at reducing the incidence of risky behaviours among stigmatised communities, including gang violence, alcoholism, drug addiction, obesity and family violence (McDonald et al., 2012; Swinburn et al., 2007). Consequently, we need to closely examine the evaluations conducted in these related fields and learn from the methods used to overcome these barriers. We should seek to make good use of tools and best practices from fields like psychology and criminology to identify best practices and lessons learned to reduce the impact of problems related to social desirability bias in evaluation surveys.
... Comparing Exit programme in the Middle East and South East Asia with those undertaken in Europe, Dalgaard-Nielsen (2013) argues that those programme in the Middle East and South East Asia have tended to focus on ideological or theological re-education via engagement with clerics, scholars and ex-militants or formers. European programme, on the other hand, tend to focus on the practicalities of exit, including economic assistance, psychological counselling and creating new social ties. ...
... European programme, on the other hand, tend to focus on the practicalities of exit, including economic assistance, psychological counselling and creating new social ties. Thus, for European programme, behavioural disengagement, rather than religious or ideological views, tend to be the central focus of these approaches (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2013). Increasingly, however, as several of the chapters in this volume have shown, these approaches have begun to overlap, indicating advancements towards establishing best practices based on global experiences. ...
The case study contributions to this book reveal the importance of recognising the full range of actors involved in P/CVE and the need to foster deep collaboration between these diverse stakeholders. Greater collaboration between these actors is necessary to help create more effective programs and responses and facilitate more efficient alignment between stakeholder activities. One welcome and important development is the shift towards more fully supporting the contributions of women to P/CVE. Traditionally, both violent extremism and P/CVE have been dominated by men and masculine narratives of security, violence, war and state power, while women have been marginalised and issues of gender deemed irrelevant. Working with women in developing economic independence can also play an important role in capacity building and empowering women to be agents of peace within their families and broader communities, as well as preventing women from engaging in violent extremism themselves.
... Insgesamt spiegeln die theoretischen Annahmen im Projektefeld recht gut den Stand der Forschung wider, was Annahmen über und Modellierungen von Radikalisierungsprozessen angeht. So zeigt eine Übersicht über jüngere wissenschaftliche Publikationen im Themenfeld (Borum 2011;Klausen 2010;Wiktorowicz 2005;Sinai 2014;Dalgaard-Nielsen 2013) Wiktorowicz 2005;Dalgaard-Nielsen 2013), theoretisch in den Interviews mit den Projektmitarbeitenden eher unterbelichtet bleibt. Auffällig oft wird hier in den Interviews auf metaphorischen Formulierungen zurückgegriffen (z.B. ...
... Insgesamt spiegeln die theoretischen Annahmen im Projektefeld recht gut den Stand der Forschung wider, was Annahmen über und Modellierungen von Radikalisierungsprozessen angeht. So zeigt eine Übersicht über jüngere wissenschaftliche Publikationen im Themenfeld (Borum 2011;Klausen 2010;Wiktorowicz 2005;Sinai 2014;Dalgaard-Nielsen 2013) Wiktorowicz 2005;Dalgaard-Nielsen 2013), theoretisch in den Interviews mit den Projektmitarbeitenden eher unterbelichtet bleibt. Auffällig oft wird hier in den Interviews auf metaphorischen Formulierungen zurückgegriffen (z.B. ...
... Cognitive dissonance occurs during everyday thinking when one experiences two or more beliefs that are inconsistent in some way (Harmon-Jones and Harmon-Jones, 2007). Often expressed in language, dissonance plays a role in many aspects of life, for example affecting health-related behavior such as smoking (Chapman et al., 1993) and contributing to the development of (and exit from) extremism (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2013). However, while the phenomenon is common enough to occur on a daily basis, dissonance is still relatively rare among the myriad of other relationships between * co-lead authors beliefs that occur across random selections of linguistic expressions and thus makes the automatic detection of it a rare-class problem. ...
... Cognitive dissonance occurs during everyday thinking when one experiences two or more beliefs that are inconsistent in some way (Harmon-Jones and Harmon-Jones, 2007). Often expressed in language, dissonance plays a role in many aspects of life, for example affecting health-related behavior such as smoking (Chapman et al., 1993) and contributing to the development of (and exit from) extremism (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2013). However, while the phenomenon is common enough to occur on a daily basis, dissonance is still relatively rare among the myriad of other relationships between beliefs that occur across random selections of expressions and thus makes the automatic detection of it a rare-class problem. ...
While transformer-based systems have enabled greater accuracies with fewer training examples, data acquisition obstacles still persist for rare-class tasks -- when the class label is very infrequent (e.g. < 5% of samples). Active learning has in general been proposed to alleviate such challenges, but choice of selection strategy, the criteria by which rare-class examples are chosen, has not been systematically evaluated. Further, transformers enable iterative transfer-learning approaches. We propose and investigate transfer- and active learning solutions to the rare class problem of dissonance detection through utilizing models trained on closely related tasks and the evaluation of acquisition strategies, including a proposed probability-of-rare-class (PRC) approach. We perform these experiments for a specific rare class problem: collecting language samples of cognitive dissonance from social media. We find that PRC is a simple and effective strategy to guide annotations and ultimately improve model accuracy while transfer-learning in a specific order can improve the cold-start performance of the learner but does not benefit iterations of active learning.
... 39 One study also revealed that while former extremists did not think that their parents triggered their deradicalization process, they still emphasized that parents played an essential supportive role when this process first started. 40 Family members may function as a valuable link between an official exit program and the potential exiter, 41 and parents play a key role in establishing parental or family-based community support networks that might assist persons wishing to leave an extremist milieu. 42 Supportive family members also play important emotional, social, and material roles when an individual disengages from an extremist milieu. ...
This study examines early intervention against individual radicalization. The data originate from interviews with young Muslims in Norway who had experienced interventions related to their own radicalization, or engaged in or witnessed interventions directed at a radicalized peer or relative. We find that informal interventions by family and friends were most prevalent in the data and played the most decisive role in interrupting radicalization, while police interventions were less common and had mixed results. Interventions by family or peers often came early in the radicalization process, were employed by trusted “insiders”, and took place as part of everyday life, thus having less detrimental consequences for radicalized individuals. We finally discuss the challenges of combining interventions by family members and friends with involvements from the police and security service.
... As discussed above, some research with high-value detainees emphasizes the social relational features of the interview interactions to a greater degree than studies which emphasize cognitive, legalistic, and physical interview features. Research with extremists has revealed that their needs and drives appeared undifferentiated from those of the rest of the population (i.e., missing loved ones, longing for a normal life, feelings of guilt, burnout, Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2013). This finding indicates that attending to basic PJ tenets in an interview with a highrisk detainee, such as showing a genuine interest in their well-being, may be effective. ...
National security priorities, result-oriented pressures, and cost sensitivity are common features of contemporary policing. While the global shift to evidence-based policing (EBP) increased police reliance on behavioral science research on interrogation and interviews, skepticism about the effectiveness of “soft” science is pervasive and “hard” sciences have been privileged. Psychologists have consequently been challenged to fulfill their roles in compliance with the four key principles that underpin psychologists' codes of ethics, namely, respect for rights and dignity, competent caring, integrity, and social responsibility. This chapter reviews the alignment of these principles with the relational skills implicit in the four tenets of the leading theory in international police practice, procedural justice (PJ). An analysis of research constructs applied in contemporary interviewing research demonstrated the integral connection between these relational skills and effective interviewing of high-value detainees. These links are present both in a “ticking bomb” scenario as well as less exigent contexts. By mapping the links between ethical principles, PJ tenets, relational research constructs and outcomes, this chapter offers a potential framework for behavioral scientists in policing contexts to develop their ethical literacy and better articulate and evaluate potential ethical issues in their practice. Adherence to PJ tenets can reduce psychologists' role conflicts and facilitate the ethical practice of psychology and EBP.
... While there has been a long-standing research interest in terrorism, radicalization, and the processes that drive individuals to join extremist groups, understanding how individuals decide to disengage from extremist groups and the related process of deradicalization has been less well understood (Bjorgo, 2011;Bubolz & Simi, 2015;Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010;2013;Horgan, 2009;Sageman, 2004). Indeed, many scholars view the research on exit as Fisher-Smith, Sullivan, Macready & Manzi: Identity Reconfiguration and the Core Needs Framework 2 Spring 2020 Nr. 22 ISSN: 2363-9849 being in an early stage of development, particularly compared to the research on radicalization. ...
This empirical study examines intensive interview data collected from eight (N=8) former members of white supremacist organizations in order to understand the meanings of exit – that is, disengagement and deradicalization – from the extremist’s perspective. Using a thematic analysis approach, our findings build on the distinction in the existing exit literature between push and pull factors and the process of role exit identified by Ebaugh (1988). These push and pull factors as well as social identity, we argue, are subsumed within a complex exit process, which includes disengagement, identity deconstruction, and transgressive and transitional relationships. For some, this process culminated in an accomplished identity reconstruction and deradicalization. Most importantly, our findings suggest that exit is linked to entry by a developmental drive that we call the participant’s core need. The core need was the background motivator of entry, disengagement, exit, and ultimately deradicalization. We think that this identity reconfiguration and core needs framework may help make heterogenous exit trajectories that have remained puzzling for researchers more understandable.
... Hierover later meer.2.2.2 'Deradicalisation' & 'Disengagement' -DDPDaniel Koehler (2017) maakt onderscheid tussen de twee termen deradicalisation en disengagement op het vlak van gedrag (van overtreding naar niet-overtreding) en psychologische of ideologische aspecten van betrokkenheid bij extremistische, criminele of radicale identiteiten. Hierbij plaatst hij de kanttekening dat dit onderscheid onder beleidsmakers een tweedeling veroorzaakt: moet het succes afhangen van ook ideologische verandering, of is de verandering in gedrag voldoende (en ook haalbaarder)(Barrelle, 2015;Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2013;Schmid, 2013; Van der Heide & Schuurman, 2018).Bjørgo en Horgan (2008) voegen hieraan toe dat er push (zoals spijt) en pull factoren (zoals het stichten van een familie) meespelen voor de deradicalisatie of disengagement van terroristische groeperingen, net zoals dat push, pull, en persoonlijke factoren een rol spelen bij 'radicalisatie naar gewelddadig extremisme'(Vergani, Iqbal, Ilbahar, & Barton, 2018). Voor een uitgebreide systematische review van literatuur over disengagement uit terroristische groepen, street-gangs, mainstream religieuze groepen, en cults/New Religious Movements, zieWindisch, Simi, Ligon en McNeel (2017). ...
De interactie tussen de overheid en de groepen die zij aanduidt als extremistisch is uiterst grillig en weinig eenduidig en volgt ogenschijnlijk niet een eenduidig actie-reactiepatroon. Dat concluderen onderzoekers van de Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen, Maria Vliek en Martijn de Koning, in het onderzoek Beleidsinstrumenten en extremistische wereldbeelden, waarin zij in opdracht van het WODC verkenden wat het doel is van overheidsbeleid gericht op als zodanig benoemde religieus gemotiveerde extremisten. Ook is gekeken naar hoe deze groepen beleidsinstrumenten percipiëren en hoe zij daarop reageren.
... The consistency of attitudes, influence and attitude change, information elaboration and dissonances in radicalisation processes can be understood as an individual's need to experience a world that is both integrated and meaningful. The concept of cognitive dissonance explains the disorienting process of restructuring ideas and values, which are closely tied up with identity issues and life choices such as radicalisation and disengagement (Dalgaard-Nielsen 2013). Disengagement often starts with increasing dissonances and stress caused by the acknowledgement of incongruent information and feelings. ...
The aim of our article is to analyse the disengagement process of a Swiss returnee from Syria and the emergence of dissonances during his involvement with the Islamic State (IS) and to compare this evolution to the pathway of a right-wing extremist willing to leave the violent extremist group Blood & Honour. Although the contexts of these extremist groups are very different, a number of elements – as the ideology based on hate, the groups’ internal pressure and the affinity for violence – are quite similar. The disengagement process of both extremists is analysed by means of reconstructive methods and the theory of cognitive dissonance (Festinger 1957), as well as by the current state of research on disengagement processes. This serves as a theoretical framework. The findings show that comparing their pathway to defection reveals a number of parallels: the experiences within the extremist groups, especially violent acts against group members, increased their dissonances and provided a trigger to an opening process and ultimately the attempt to opt out of the group.
... This research pointed to a number of push-and-pull factors involved in disengagement, such as ageing and burnout, having children and changes in relationships, and organisational pressures, that have been reported elsewhere in research exploring right-wing or Islamist groups (Barelle, 2015;Bjorgo, 2009;Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2013;Sukabdi, 2015). However, some of the findings challenged commonly held assumptions, for example around radicalisation processes in prison, and instead of viewing prison radicalisation as a wholly negative process, the findings pointed to the potential for positive impact from prison radicalisation Ferguson, 2016b). ...
... This research pointed to a number of push-and-pull factors involved in disengagement, such as ageing and burnout, having children and changes in relationships, and organisational pressures, that have been reported elsewhere in research exploring right-wing or Islamist groups (Barelle, 2015;Bjorgo, 2009;Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2013;Sukabdi, 2015). However, some of the findings challenged commonly held assumptions, for example around radicalisation processes in prison, and instead of viewing prison radicalisation as a wholly negative process, the findings pointed to the potential for positive impact from prison radicalisation Ferguson, 2016b). ...
Making an Impact on Policing and Crime: Psychological Research, Policy and Practice applies a range of case studies and examples of psychological research by international, leading researchers to tackle real-world issues within the field of crime and policing.
Making an Impact on Policing and Crime documents the application of cutting-edge research to real-world policing and explains how psychologists’ insights have been adapted and developed to offer effective solutions across the criminal justice system. The experts featured in this collection cover a range of psychological topics surrounding the field, including the prevention and reduction of sexual offending and reoffending, the use of CCTV and ‘super-recognisers’, forensic questioning of vulnerable witnesses, the accuracy of nonverbal and verbal lie detection interview techniques, psychological ‘drivers’ of political violence, theoretical models of police–community relations, and the social and political significance of urban ‘riots’.
This collection is a vital resource for practitioners in policing fields and the court system and professionals working with offenders, as well as students and researchers in related disciplines.
... Several studies have also recommended various approaches, for example, motivational interviewing, Socratic questioning (RAN, 2017), and family interventions and strength-based approaches (Stanley et al., 2018). Lastly, when maneuvering into dialogue about ideology, remaining close to the client's own doubt while applying subtle strategies to reduce resistance was recommended by Dalgaard-Nielsen (2013). ...
Social workers are a part of the wider counter-terrorism efforts in many European countries, such as the United Kingdom, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, and Belgium. While there are several theoretical and discursive studies on social workers’ involvement in preventing violent extremism, few studies have explored and analyzed how these prevention workers understand radicalization and the strategies and approaches they employ. This paper addresses this research gap with findings from a qualitative study that utilized data from 17 individual in-depth interviews and two focus-group interviews of experienced social workers doing indicated prevention work against violent extremism in Norway. Goffman’s frame analysis and Weber and Carter’s theory on the construction of trust are applied to the findings. A thematic analysis found that, first, the participants frame radicalization cases in the same way they do other cases—as a social problem. Second, a two-way process of trust was revealed, as a critical component in their work is creating openings for dialogue about values and ideology. Contrary to other studies, this paper finds that social workers manage this work as close to “business as usual.” Also, it reveals that well-established strategies in social work, such as client-directed practice, Socratic questioning, and motivational interviewing, potentially play an important role in face-to-face prevention work against radicalization and violent extremism.
... The field of counter-terrorism research entails, among others, studies on Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) and radicalisation as a political and social concept (Richards 2015;Eroukhmanoff 2015;Dalgaard-Nielsen 2013). While Dutch scholar Schmid (2013) focuses on a conceptual analysis of meanings assigned to radicalisation and de-radicalisation, other recent academic studies analyse the efficiency of CVE policies such as U.S based researcher Romaniuk (2015). ...
This research paper argues that Danish online radicalisation policies are driven by logics of urgency (the threat is imminent) within a limited realm of discursive possibilities (the threat is securitised) which blur the lines between state and civil society as well as state and private sector interactions. Potential political implications bring into play questions about the democratic values that are perceived as safeguarded by these policies. The Danish case shows that we (as citizens, policy makers and researchers) must engage in further discussions on dynamics between the current threat perception of online radicalisation and policies addressing such a threat. My argument is constructed from a discourse analysis of official documents as of 2016- 2017 on countering and preventing violent extremism and an analysis of the political logics driving a state-level conceptualisation of online radicalisation through interviews with government officials. The two-part analysis is theoretically based on Securitisation from the Copenhagen School in combination with Critical Terrorism Studies to create a critically inspired approach that remains within existing structures of Danish politics. This is done to engage with the current political landscape characterised by a securitisation of specific forms of online content associated with the Islamic State as an Other. Online radicalisation is herein constructed as a multidimensional threat towards a societal Self referring to the physical safety of citizens and a value based ‘way of life’. The decentralised structure of the internet allows communication flows that enable radicalisation to be understood as an intersectoral threat where multiple elements of the referent object are threatened simultaneously. This threat perception challenges government officials in developing and implementing policies to address the threat of the Other while safeguarding the democratic values of the Danish Self.
... Psychological reactance theory has been applied as a basis for these objections. Instead, tailored individual approaches are much more useful, as they connect with the extremists at an individual level (Braddock, 2014;Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2013). ...
De-radicalisation programmes in Indonesia often feature ideological conversion and general inadequacies in human and material resources to carry out the technical aspects of the de-radicalisation programme. Worldwide, civil society organisations (CSOs) are increasingly considered as a key partner in de-radicalisation of violent extremist offenders (VEOs). In Indonesia, however, de-radicalisation programmes are often criticised for their centralised nature in which spaces for non-state actors are limited. This paper critically examines the role of CSOs in mitigating the shortcomings of government-sponsored de-radicalisation programmes in Indonesia. Although CSOs have strong ties with the people they work with, can reach to unreachable groups and function as a ‘resilience group’ in violence prevention, the paper contends that there continues to be a perpetual lack of coordination between the government and CSOs in countering violent extremism. Drawing on a desk-based review of literature on de-radicalisation combined with interviews, this paper presents a thematic analysis of Indonesia's CVE programmes and CSOs’ engagement in de-radicalisation. The paper concludes by offering a possible roadmap that might help enhancing partnerships between government and CSOs in de-radicalisation of violent extremist offenders.
... Second, all the early-stage efforts in question focus heavily on theological-ideological dialogue and religious reeducation to encourage detainees to moderate their views and renounce violence. 34 This overreliance on religious reeducation as a kind of broad-spectrum antibiotic may be misplaced and problematic given that the complex set of motives and dynamics that drive people toward violent extremism often may have little, if anything, to do with religion. ...
This article reflects on the proliferation of responses to the so-called phenomenon of “foreign terrorist fighters,” and the profound human rights challenges they give rise to. It considers national, regional and international developments, many spurred by an activist Security Council, through which expanded powers have been assumed and rights restricted by reference to the need to respond to ftf threats. A series of uncomfortable relationships emerge from this analysis. They include for example tensions: between the evolving and still relatively superficial understanding of the nature and source of uncertain threats and contributing factors on the one hand, and the onerous and far-reaching nature of responses directed against them on the other; between the expansive use of coercive measures including criminal law, and basic constraining principles of criminal law upon which its legitimacy and power depends, such as individual culpability, harm principle and remoteness; or between the original purposes of most ftf measures and their impact in practice, on the operation of humanitarian law, on humanitarian workers and human rights defenders, and on the rule of law. Exceptional ftf measures continue to spread their reach and creep into other areas of security and organised crime. The article highlights the need to consider the short and long term impact, on the full range of rights of many, of the array of administrative, criminal and other measures being passed into law and implemented in practice across the globe in the name of responding to the ill-defined phenomenon of “ ftf s”.
... Када је појединац уверен у недостатке идеологије, онда је навод-но "дерадикализован" (Silke, 2011). Дерадикализација се стога може схватити као важна имунска реакција (демократских) друштава која штите ове основне вредности од радикалних идеологија 5 без употребе репресивне силе против њих (што би било у супротности са заштитом личних слобода) (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2013). ...
... Although deradicalization is more likely to lead to longer-term desistance than disengagement, disengagement is seen by some experts as a sufficient and more attainable outcome, given the difficulty experienced in attempting to change entrenched beliefs (e.g., Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2013). This is particularly true in societies where the freedom of speech is protected, and people are free to hold extreme attitudes as long as they do not act upon those attitudes in a manner that may cause harm to others. ...
Political violence is often portrayed as a means of last resort. Thus, there is a perception among those who use political violence that this tactic has a chance to succeed where others have failed. Extant evidence, however, suggests the contrary. For instance, a comparison of 323 violent and non-violent campaigns from 1900 to 2006 found that violent campaigns only achieved their political goals 26% of the time, whereas nonviolent campaigns succeeded 50% of the time (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011). Though these findings suggest that political violence is inimical to political success, its practice across the globe shows no signs of relenting. In this chapter we turn to social psychology for answers. Specifically, we review theories and empirical evidence addressing this phenomenon. We begin by defining basic constructs pertinent to the study of political violence and political extremism. We then describe the theoretical model that explains political extremism by identifying its basic motivational determinants. We conclude by functionally interrelating this model to models that focused on the progression toward extremism. We finish with recapitulating the state of the knowledge that research on political activism and political violence has managed to contribute and we identify practical implications of this knowledge for solving the problem of violent extremism.
... [50] Nevertheless, some reviews of empirical studies on deradicalization do exist. Dalgaard-Nielsen [51], for example, was able to identify sixteen academic articles and books published between 1990 and 2012, based on a total of 216 interviews with former members of various extremist or terrorist groups. Daalgard-Nielsen [52] identified three key themes in these studies: "ideological doubt, doubt related to group and leadership issues, and doubt related to personal and practical issues. ...
In recent years, the number of counter-radicalization and deradicalization programs has steadily increased, and they belong now to the standard counterterrorism and conflict resolution repertoire of many countries. How is the personnel of these programs trained to perform its duties and what does this tell about the relationship between academic and practitioner understandings of countering radicalization and deradicalization? This article aims at answering these questions by comparing the state of the art in evidence-based radicalization and deradicalization research with a detailed analysis of primary data concerning twelve training courses for personnel in this field. It finds that training courses are significantly disconnected from research. On the other hand, training in this field indicates that the academic literature is not well-grounded in the practical realities of delivering interventions. Both findings reveal the need for a more mutually beneficial relationship that can help improve practitioner training and making (de)radicalization research more practitioner-oriented.
... By challenging the leading extremist detainees, this tool aims to remove the aspect of religious legitimization of violence as the condition for jihad. However, it was argued that direct ideological confrontation might lead to reactance and even deepen the radicalization (Braddock, 2014;Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2013). In Al-Hadlaq's account of the Saudi-Arabian deradicalization program, even highest ranking religious scholars were seen largely as ineffective in using theological confrontation to deradicalize terrorist inmates (2015). ...
This article explores the rise of and the response to violent extremism, as well as the state of affairs regarding ‘soft’ approaches to counter-terrorism in Sudan. Using unique primary data, I argued that the growth of violent extremism in Sudan is far from being solely an extension of the global jihad movements; rather, it is a manifestation of domestic political and historical dynamics.
... This information management paradigm has proven to work well in our past lab-based research , and in our field research (Oleszkiewicz, Granhag, & Kleinman, 2017). Importantly, the practical relevance of this paradigm is supported by research examining individuals on their way leaving violent extremist groups (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2013) and studies on insider spies (Herbig, 2008), showing that the incentive to be semi-cooperative with respect to sharing information is commonly linked to divided loyalties. Furthermore, evaluating human intelligence gathering techniques require novel measures of efficacy (Oleszkiewicz, 2016). ...
Studies have demonstrated the efficacy of the Scharff technique for gathering human intelligence, but little is known about how this efficacy might vary among different samples of practitioners. In this training study we examined a sample of military officers (n = 37). Half was trained in the Scharff technique and compared against officers receiving no Scharff training. All officers received the same case file describing two sources holding information about a terrorist attack. University students (n=74) took the role of the semi-cooperative sources. Scharff-trained officers adhered to the training as they (1) aimed to establish the ‘knowing-it-all’ illusion, (2) posed claims as a means of eliciting information, and (3) asked fewer explicit questions. The ‘untrained’ officers asked many explicit questions, questioned the reliability of the provided information, pressured the source, and displayed disappointment with the source’s contribution. Scharff-trained officers were perceived as less eager to gather information and left their sources with the impression of having provided comparatively less new information, but collected a similar amount of new information as their untrained colleagues. The present paper both replicates and advances previous work in the field, and marks the Scharff technique as a promising technique for gathering human intelligence.
Despite being recognised as the foundational process of an extremist group exit [Morrison, J. F., Silke, A., Maiberg, H., Slay, C., & Stewart, R. (2021). A systematic review of post-2017 research on disengagement and deradicalisation. Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats. https://crestresearch.ac.uk/download/3797/21-033-02.pdf], identity transformation is surprisingly under-investigated. This paper therefore explores how identity is represented in the exit process by examining ten autobiographies written by right-wing formers. The data were analysed using thematic analysis, and three themes were developed and named: ‘is this who I am?’, fatherhood, and reinventing the self. Drawing on social identity theory [Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1979). An integrative theory of intergroup conflict. In W. G. Austin, & S. Worchel (Eds.), The social psychology of intergroup relations (pp. 33–37). Brooks/Cole], the article proposes that emotionally laden cognitive openers can alter intergroup evaluation and social identity satisfaction. Certain cognitive openers, such as fatherhood, were seen to strongly influence the former’s self-categorisation and personal identity. The analysis also found that rebuilding an alternative identity after leaving the group took significant time and effort. The paper highlights the complexities of identity transformation during and after an extremist group exit and suggests that the process can involve changes to both personal and social identity structures.
La radicalización constituye una de las mayores problemáticas a nivel securitario y social. No obstante, el número de detenciones en los últimos años han llevado a replantearse reforzar los modelos de intervención en su relación con la desvinculación y la desradicalización. Como consecuencia, la atención está cambiando hacia los procesos de desvinculación/desradicalización. Tratando de aunar los conocimientos sobre la temática, en el presente manuscrito se realiza una revisión de la literatura que trata de identificar y valorar algunos de los factores y modelos de desvinculación, desradicalización y/o reinserción desarrollados en estas últimas décadas. En primera instancia se conceptualizan la desradicalización, entendida como un proceso social y psicológico por el que el compromiso de un individuo con la radicalización violenta y su participación en ella se reducen hasta el punto de que ya no corre el riesgo de implicarse y participar en actividades violentas, y la desvinculación, proceso mediante el cual un individuo experimenta un cambio de rol o función que suele ir asociado a una reducción de la participación en la violencia. Posteriormente, se analizan los principales factores de empuje y atracción que se han encontrado en la literatura, destacando, por un lado, la desilusión con la estrategia o las acciones del grupo radical y, por otro lado, las relaciones con personas fuera del grupo y las demandas familiares. A continuación, se hacen explícitos siete modelos teóricos propuestos desde distintas disciplinas que tratan de explicar los procesos de desvinculación, desradicalización y/o reinserción social. Entre estos modelos, encontramos la trayectoria de desvinculación, el modelo de inversión, el modelo 3N, el modelo pro-integración, los bucles de refuerzo, el modelo de las dinámicas de la desvinculación y el modelo fénix de desvinculación. Finalmente, se discuten algunas de las similitudes y diferencias de estos modelos y sus principales limitaciones.
Se analiza el concepto de resocialización manejado por la jurisprudencia en el marco del mandato constitucional del artículo 25.2, descubriendo un doble discurso, que se conforma con la previsión de mecanismos destinados a evitar la desocialización cuando se trata de examinar la legitimidad de una ley o de una decisión administrativa, pero exige una asunción de la ilicitud y la dañosidad del hecho, e incluso a veces el arrepentimiento u otros cambios de actitud para afirmar la resocialización cuando se trata de examinar el progreso de un recluso para decidir su evolución penitenciaria o la conveniencia de algún beneficio. Se confronta esta jurisprudencia con la teoría de la pena de la que se parte para hacer algunas críticas, observaciones y recomendaciones.
QAnon, the view that Donald Trump is the last line of defense against a secret group of Satanic child traffickers, has garnered a great deal of traction and attention. A growing number of people describe themselves as having lost friends and relatives to QAnon, and many of us are unsure of how to interact with QAnon adherents. Intuitively, QAnon is a conspiracy theory. This might suggest that the right strategy is to debunk QAnon, because conspiracy theories are generally considered epistemically flawed views. However, this perspective may leave us ill-prepared to appreciate just how committed QAnon adherents are. To interact with them, we must find a way to take QAnon seriously, rather than dismissively. In this spirit, I argue for an alternative framework: we should treat QAnon as a religion. I first show that QAnon can reasonably be thought of as a religion. This opens the door to using tools from philosophy of religion to understand the epistemology of QAnon adherents. I use a quasi-fideist account of religious epistemology to explain why QAnon is a particularly recalcitrant worldview, and to develop an account of how one might ‘convert’ a QAnon adherent to a different worldview.
Abstract The activities of extremist groups are perceived as a key threat to modern democracies. However, much remains unknown about the role families can play in prevention or disengagement from such groups. A scoping review identified seven studies that were eligible for inclusion. The findings suggest that there is limited, yet some, support for family‐directed services to directly prevent engagement in extremist groups. Rather, family directed services may indirectly influence this by strengthening family members' resilience and thus their ability to engage with the family member. Additionally, professionals working with families where a member is on a path to developing extremist ideology should continuously reflect upon their professional conduct and develop a narrative approach to reduce resistance. An important limitation to these findings is the different contexts and countries they have been conducted in, spanning from East Africa to Northern Europe.
Violent extremist groups have increasingly turned to online platforms such as social media and online messaging providers to distribute content, to engage with their audiences and to recruit new followers. Recognising the challenges presented by new and evolving communications technologies, governments, civil society organisations and the tech industry have begun to develop innovative counter terrorism (CT) and preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) initiatives to tackle violent extremism in the online space. This chapter explores some of these initiatives by first distinguishing online CT efforts from online P/CVE efforts, before exploring both in more detail, with a particular focus on P/CVE. These online P/CVE efforts are broadly categorised as counter narratives, remedial interventions, positive and alternative narratives and critical thinking/resilience. A series of examples of these efforts are provided, including cases from within Indonesia and best practice examples and pilot studies conducted around the world. This chapter concludes by providing a series of recommendations informed by existing approaches and research gaps. This chapter incorporates comprehensive references from practitioner and scholarly literature.
What makes a neo-Nazi become a convinced anti-fascist or a radical left-winger become a devout Salafist? How do they manage to fit into their new environment and gain acceptance as a former enemy? The people featured in this book made highly puzzling journeys, first venturing into extremist milieus and then deciding to switch to the opposite side. By using their extraordinary life-stories and their own narratives, this book provides the first in-depth analysis of how and why people move between seemingly opposing extremist environments that can sometimes overlap and influence each other. It aims to understand how these extremists manage to convince their new group that they can be trusted, which also allows us to dive deep into the psychology of extremism and terrorism. This fascinating work will be of immense value to those studying radicalization and counter-radicalization in terrorism studies, social psychology and political science.
Zusammenfassung
Der Begriff der Radikalisierung prägt weiterhin die Diskussion um Extremismus. Die unterschiedlichen Konzeptualisierungen sind in ihren Folgen für eine Kriminalprävention offenzulegen. Die zentralen Begriffe für die Zielsetzung einer Radikalisierungsprävention, Disengagement und Deradikalisierung, werden präsentiert. Sowohl die für die Frage der Prävention notwendigen Konzeptualisierungen als gerade auch erste Verweise auf die empirische Umsetzung in Deutschland erfolgen. Auf die Notwendigkeit der stärkeren Beachtung der Wiedereingliederungsperspektive wird verwiesen.
This article compares how individuals from two different Salafi‐jihadi groups disengage from high‐risk activism and political violence. Drawing on original interviews, we explore the “push” and “pull” factors that influence our respondents' decisions to leave. We identify numerous push‐and‐pull factors that are consistent with previous research, including disagreements with group leaders over strategy and practices and educational and employment opportunities. We also contribute to existing research by including “persistent activists” in our sample who did not disengage. Surprisingly, these respondents remained in their groups despite experiencing some of the same push‐and‐pull factors as those who left. Including this variation allows us to separate necessary but insufficient conditions of disengagement from factors that exert a more profound impact. We highlight the influence of one key factor—and its absence—in our discussion: alternative social networks with supportive outsiders for those who left and the lack of such meaningful relationships for those who remained. We conclude by discussing the implications of our research for countering violent extremism.
Policies to prevent radicalization and violent extremism (PRVE) frequently target a number of social movements seen as threats to national security. Often, this includes militant Islamist, right-wing and left-wing extremist milieus. In this article, we ask what distinguishes the ways in which local practitioners perceive and respond to these three milieus. Based on in-depth interviews with public servants in Sweden, we show how the milieus are seen to represent different types of threats, hold core values that resonate differently with dominant values in mainstream society and require responses that challenge public servants in diverging ways. Building on our analysis, we introduce a multidimensional model that clarifies why practitioners relate differently to each milieu. By including the rarely examined left-wing milieu, we are able to showcase the complexity of local PRVE work. Our study sheds new light on the challenges experienced by practitioners who are tasked to implement PRVE policy and demonstrates the problems of approaching “violent extremism” as a uniform phenomenon.
Research in the field of countering violent extremism (CVE) has grown significantly in the last few decades. This research project contributes to the CVE literature by studying narratives as tools of reflections on self-identity designed intentionally within gaming exercises to help contextualize and account for as much environmental complexity as possible. This paper provides theoretical understandings of narratives (and their role in our lives), discusses narratives as they relate to violent extremist ideologies, and proposes how narrative reflections may serve as a deradicalization tool within cooperative games. Additionally, this article highlights elements of narrative reflection within current CVE resources and provides a list of exercises (games) that can be used in the field to promote narrative reflections.
In an era of international terrorism, interviews with high-value detainees may have the dual purpose of extracting useful information and of disengagement. We conducted a small-scale, qualitative study using in-depth, individual interviews with 11 experienced interviewers in the Southeast Asia region and Australia, in order to provide insights into the types of interviewing strategies employed in terrorist rehabilitation. Our findings highlight the potential efficacy of creating a physically comfortable and relaxed interview setting, and of using interview strategies that focus on rapport-building, principles of social persuasion and elements of procedural justice, along with a patient and flexible stance to questioning. We suggest that interviewers performing rehabilitation interviews with high-value detainees ought to be trained to use the social approach to interviewing.
The fall of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria has raised a number of questions over the future of the organization and the potential threat it might continue to pose. While some commenters argue that the demise of the Caliphate will reduce ISIS’s global appeal, others have stressed the role that jihadi supporters may play in perpetuating ISIS’s ideological legacy. Yet, little is known on how supporters have responded to recent changes in circumstances. Employing a cognitive dissonance approach, this contribution examines the implications of ISIS’s defeat on twelve jihadi supporters’ commitment. It shows that while a minority of supporters have disengaged, the majority have remained committed to the group. While these differences stress the influence of personal situational factors on supporters’ responses, the data at the same time indicates that dissonance has preceded in some cases ISIS’s defeat. The contribution overall shows that integrating cognitive dissonance theory to the study of radicalization and terrorism can provide a more nuanced understanding of how individuals renegotiate the nature of their involvement in extremism when confronted by changes in circumstances.
In today’s interconnected world, technological advances, digitization, and online human behavior indubitably play a dominant role in foreign and national security policies of states. This was clear during the last few years of sporadic social media instigated ethno-religious riots across Sri Lanka, that culminated with the post-Easter Sunday ethnic tensions in April 2019. Christchurch attack and the way it was live-streamed on social media is another side of the same story. There is an increased attention on to what extent internet consumption feeds radicalization/spread of violence, and how to mitigate that. While tech companies should self-govern content on their own platforms, states undeniably also need to play an active role. The key question is how small countries like Sri Lanka should moderate its citizen’s behavior online, leverage the giant tech companies, and manage the digital state craft right? This LKI Policy Brief suggest that Sri Lanka considers a three tier ‘TechPlomacy’ policy that includes (1) Silicon Valley diplomacy, (2) national digital/cyber security policies and (3) regionalism, in order to standardize the state’s involvement in national security issues emerging from the world of Internet of Things (IoT).
Progress in understanding and responding to terrorism and violent extremism has continued to stall in part because we often fail to adequately conceptualize the problem. Perhaps most notably, much of our terminology (for instance, “radicalization”) and many variants of our existing models and analogies (including conveyor belts, staircases and pyramids) conflate sympathy for this violence with involvement in its creation. As its name suggests, the Attitudes-Behaviors Corrective (ABC) model seeks to overcome this issue by placing this key disconnect between attitudes and behaviors at its core. In this paper, we first present the key elements of our model, which include a graphic representation of this disconnect and a classification system of the drivers of violent extremism. The former enables us to track the trajectories of individuals in relation to both their attitudes and behaviors, while the latter helps ensure that we consider all potential explanations for these movements. We then adapt these elements to focus on exit from violence, applying the dual concepts of disengagement and deradicalization. Finally, we conclude with a section that aims to provide the research community and those tasked with preventing and countering violent extremism with practical benefits from the ABC model.
The aim of this study is to provide an answer to questions such as: What is it that makes radical movements break down? Why is it that a violent course of action is renounced at a certain point in time? Why do some people leave their radical group? Because of the fact that Islamic forms of radicalism are receiving a great deal of attention, and this phenomenon has, until recently, been relatively unknown in the Netherlands, we endeavour, in particular, to make assessments with regard to a possible decline in this phenomenon. We address the topic of possible deradicalisation of Islamic forms of radicalism in the future and discuss how this process of deradicalisation could be supported if required.
However, as there is no evidence yet of a decline in Islamic radicalism, we must look towards other cases of deradicalisation where we are able to analyse the decline. To this end, we undertake a detailed study of the radical Moluccans of the 1970s, the squat-ters’ movement in the 1980s and the extreme right-wing Centre parties of the 1980s-1990s and analyse the specific nature of religious radical movements in relation to non-religious radical movements.
Cognitive‐behavioural therapy can prevent criminal offenders from continuing their criminal careers. However, some treatment programmes work better than others.
This Campbell review shows that a small number of factors make the difference. It is particularly important for the programmes to be stringently implemented, by well‐trained providers. No significant differences were found in the effectiveness of the different types of programmes or “brand names”. Whether the treatment is implemented in prison or in the community has no influence on the outcome.
This research examined individual differences in attitude importance (J. A. Krosnick, 1988a) as a moderator of resistance to persuasion. In 2 studies, individuals who favored allowing gay people to serve openly in the military were aurally presented with a counterattitudinal message. Participants who considered their attitude high (vs low) in personal importance were more resistant to the message. Process analyses revealed that both thought listings and self-reported affect mediated this attitude importance effect. A 2nd study, which also examined message quality, showed that both high- and low-importance individuals were more resistant to a weak (vs strong) message. This effect was explained by the fact that the weak (vs strong) message engendered more irritation and negative affective elaborations. Results highlight the role of attitude importance in motivating resistance to persuasive communications and reveal that the resistance process is both cognitive and affective. Implications for contemporary models of persuasion are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Renewed interest on how and why terrorism ends has emerged in parallel with increased visibility of some new and innovative approaches to counterterrorism. These are collectively known, whether for good or bad, as ''de-radicalization programs.'' However, and despite their popularity, data surrounding even the most basic of facts about these programs remains limited. This article presents an over-view of the results of a one-year pilot study of select de-radicalization programs and investigates critical issues surrounding assessment of their effectiveness and outcomes. We argue that Multi Attribute Utility Technology (MAUT) may offer promise for future empirical assessment of what we prefer to designate ''terrorism risk reduction initiatives.'' Perhaps less obviously, and until more data surrounding the efficacy of such initiatives becomes available, MAUT may also provide a concep-tual basis for planning, evaluating, and guiding the development of future such initiatives and may have the unanticipated consequence of facilitating progress by encouraging greater exploration of efforts to change behavior from other contexts.
Cognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT) is among the more promising rehabilitative treatments for criminal offenders. Reviews of
the comparative effectiveness of different treatment approaches have generally ranked it in the top tier with regard to effects
on recidivism (e.g., Andrews et al., 1990; Lipsey and Wilson, 1998). It has a well-developed theoretical basis and explicitly
targets “criminal thinking” as a contributing factor to deviant behavior (Beck, 1999; Walters, 1990; Yochelson and Samenow,
1976). And, it can be adapted to a range of juvenile and adult offenders, delivered in institutional or community settings
by mental health specialists or paraprofessionals, and administered as part of a multifaceted program or as a stand-alone
intervention.
In this first comprehensive comparison of left-wing violence in the United States and West Germany, Jeremy Varon focuses on America's Weather Underground and Germany's Red Army Faction to consider how and why young, middle-class radicals in prosperous democratic societies turned to armed struggle in efforts to overthrow their states. Based on a wealth of primary material, ranging from interviews to FBI reports, this book reconstructs the motivation and ideology of violent organizations active during the 1960s and 1970s. Varon conveys the intense passions of the era--the heat of moral purpose, the depth of Utopian longing, the sense of danger and despair, and the exhilaration over temporary triumphs. Varon's compelling interpretation of the logic and limits of dissent in democratic societies provides striking insights into the role of militancy in contemporary protest movements and has wide implications for the United States' current "war on terrorism." Varon explores Weatherman and RAF's strong similarities and the reasons why radicals in different settings developed a shared set of values, languages, and strategies. Addressing the relationship of historical memory to political action, Varon demonstrates how Germany's fascist past influenced the brutal and escalating nature of the West German conflict in the 60s and 70s, as well as the reasons why left-wing violence dropped sharply in the United States during the 1970s. Bringing the War Home is a fascinating account of why violence develops within social movements, how states can respond to radical dissent and forms of terror, how the rational and irrational can combine in political movements, and finally how moral outrage and militancy can play both constructive and destructive roles in efforts at social change. © 2004 by The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved.
This accessible new book looks at how and why individuals leave terrorist movements, and considers the lessons and implications that emerge from this process. Focusing on the tipping points for disengagement from groups such as Al Qaeda, the IRA and the UVF, this volume is informed by the dramatic and sometimes extraordinary accounts that the terrorists themselves offered to the author about why they left terrorism behind. The book examines three major issues: what we currently know about de-radicalisation and disengagement, how discussions with terrorists about their experiences of disengagement can show how exit routes come about, and how they then fare as 'ex-terrorists' away from the structures that protected them, what the implications of these findings are for law-enforcement officers, policy-makers and civil society on a global scale. Concluding with a series of thought-provoking yet controversial suggestions for future efforts at controlling terrorist behaviour, Walking Away From Terrorism provides an comprehensive introduction to disengagement and de-radicalisation and offers policymakers a series of considerations for the development of counter-radicalization and de-radicalisation processes. This book will be essential reading for students of terrorism and political violence, war and conflict studies, security studies and political psychology.
After the murder of Theo van Gogh, the issue of expressions of racism and extremism among young people assumed large proportions and attracted a great deal of interest. In response, the decision was made to take a closer look at the problem within the context of the Racism & Extremism Monitor. In the ensuing report, The Lonsdale Problem − published in 2005 − attention was paid to recurring questions concerning the degree of racism and right-wing extremism among the Lonsdale youth. Do extreme right-wing gabbers constitute a youth culture, or are we instead dealing with a form of juvenile delinquency? In addition, an attempt was made to estimate the numbers of extreme right-wing gabber groups and the incidents in which extreme right-wing gabbers were involved. The various responses to the Lonsdale problem were also examined. So far the problem has occurred only on a small scale in the Netherlands, which means little experience has been gained in formulating specific policy that addresses extreme right-wing young people. Because we can learn from experiences acquired elsewhere, a sketch has been made (in connection with the description of the reaction patterns in the Netherlands) of the so-called 'exit' initiatives in Norway, Sweden and Germany. The present chapter in this report can be regarded as an attempt to delve more deeply into what was said about deradicalisation in The Lonsdale Problem. 8.1 — The extreme right and deradicalisation projects: a few basic principles One of the first times that the problem of non-organised, extreme right-wing, racist youth groups manifested itself was in Great Britain around 1980. This occurred under various labels and names, the most well-known being the British Movement. The growing problem − mainly anti-social behaviour in public, acts of violence and criminal manifestations of racism − more or less coincided with the decline of the racist, extreme right political party the National Front in the last seventies. Because both developments took place during the same period, the suspicion arose that there might be some kind of connection between them. The British political scientist Layton-Henry suggested that a reverse connection might exist between extreme right-wing electoral success and street politics. 1 In a nutshell: strong in the street, weak in the elections, and vice versa. Although the correctness of this connection has been much discussed, it does seem to provide an accurate description of the current situation in the Netherlands. The picture of right-wing extremism in the Netherlands today differs considerably from that of roughly ten years ago, when extreme right groups were represented in the national parliament and in dozens of city councils. The situation at that time left its mark on the approach to the extreme right as a problem: the primary focus was on organised connections, i.e. extreme right-wing parties, their leaders, their presence in democratically elected organs and their attitudes expressed in the form of street demonstrations. 2 1 Z.Layton-Henry, The politics of race in Britain, London: George Allen & Unwin 1984, p.118. 2 J. van Donselaar, De staat paraat? De bestrijding van extreemrechts in West-Europa (Is the state prepared? Combating the extreme right in Western Europe), Amsterdam: Babylon De Geus 1995. J. van Donselaar, Monitor racisme en extreem-rechts. Eerste rapportage (Monitoring racism and the extreme right. First report), Leiden: LISWO 1997.
Terrorists disengage from the groups or organizations to which they belong as a result of structural, organizational, or personal factors. These types of factors seem to operate with relative mutual independence. All this can be analytically induced from research conducted at an individual level of analysis, based on 35 long interviews with former members of ETA who voluntarily decided to conclude their militancy at some point between 1970 and 2000. Until the mid-1980s, the individual decision to leave ETA tended to be linked to a subjective perception of ongoing political and social changes. From then on, disagreement with the internal functioning of the ethno-nationalist terrorist organization or the tactics adopted by its leaders became more salient motivations for those militants who decided to walk away. All along, however, there were ETA members who left terrorism behind for reasons of a rather personal nature. As expected, in this qualitative empirical study, disengagement was found to be a process seldom concomitant to that of deradicalization.
This article explores the causes of terrorism from the standpoint of social learning theory. One key contention is that terrorism is a learned behavior that is specifically taught through the various mechanisms that are common to any and all learned behaviors. Further, it is a tenet of social learning theory that just as behaviors are learned behaviors can also be unlearned. However, it is the specific contention of this article that the social learning mechanisms used by terrorist groups are so effective as to essentially inoculate the member from contrary learning input. Ironically, this means that the very same social learning mechanisms used to shape the terrorist mind are also the very reasons that this learning is not amenable to effective treatment or change. This stands in direct contrast to the notion that all learned behaviors can also be unlearned and therefore demonstrates that terrorist behavior is a paradox within the framework of a social learning analysis.
This article analyzes the global transformations of jihadist movements towards abandoning and de-legitimizing political violence in general and terrorism in particular. It focuses on the de-radicalization process of Libya's largest armed Islamist movement: the Islamic Fighting Group. It analyzes the causes behind those transformations and outlines the necessary conditions for, and policy implications of, successful de-radicalization. The article is mainly based on primary sources, field work, and interviews with former jihadist leaders, mid-ranking commanders, grassroots activists, security and intelligence officers, and state officials.
This article analyzes the factors that have motivated members of Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) to abandon terrorism and the factors that have motivated other members of the terrorist organization to maintain their activism. The article examines the process of disengagement of an important faction of ETA and that of other terrorists throughout the group's protracted campaign in order to explain the reasons behind the decision to give up violence. The article concludes with an analysis of the variables that should be considered in order to encourage the collective disengagement of the group that has become the most enduring terrorist organization in Europe.
When, why, and how do people living in a democracy become radicalized to the point of being willing to use or directly support the use of terrorist violence against fellow citizens? This question has been at the center of academic and public debate over the past years as terrorist attacks and foiled plots inspired by militant Islamism have grabbed European and American headlines. This article identifies and discusses empirical studies of radicalization and points to the strengths as well as the weaknesses characterizing these studies. The aim is to take stock of the current state of research within this field and to answer the question: From an empirical point of view, what is known and what is not known about radicalization connected to militant Islamism in Europe?
The decline of oppositional terrorism is a critical question for both scholars and policy‐makers. The former have neglected the issue, while the latter have tended to assume that government policies of prevention and deterrence are the key determinants of outcomes. This analysis suggests that government actions must be seen in the context of the internal organizational dynamics and strategy of the opposition groups using terrorism. In some cases, terrorism is self‐defeating.
The article provides a brief background to the activities of the Italian Red Brigades, then examines the group's development in terms of three phases ‐ social, existential and survivalist. A perceived social and political identity in the early 1970s gave the organization an illusory security and the self‐confidence to step up the attack on the state. As the level of violence increased the BR became separated from their social base and created an auto‐identity based on self‐delusion and political alienation. Armed struggle was simplified to existential abstractions of myth and symbol. By the early 1980s the effects of legal and police repression, popular rejection and internal conflict reduced the remaining militants to a strategy of simple survival. The irreversible degeneration of the group's morality accompanied the process of social estrangement.
Recently many scholars have focused their attention on the dynamics of radicalization, de-radicalization, and disengagement, yet most studies are based on indirect and/or data which is difficult to verify. An exception comes from Italy, where authorities have recently benefited from the insights of two former members of an al Qaeda-affiliated Tunisian network. The two have voluntarily described to authorities the process and factors that led them to their radicalization and encouraged them to abondon the network. Based on thousands of pages of their unpublished confessions, the article provides a case study of radicalization that is rich in detail and uniquely reliable.
This article examines the factors that have contributed to the end of the Red Army Faction (RAF), and places particular emphasis on the causes and characteristics of individual disengagement of RAF members from the armed struggle. It discusses the evolution, ideology, and decline of each of the three generations of the RAF. The article's contribution is twofold. First, by assessing both contextual- and individual-level factors that led to the group's demise, the article bridges two approaches to analyzing the demise of terrorist organizations—the literature on how terrorism ends and why individuals disengage from terrorism. Second, the article helps build a growing empirical body of work on the demise of terrorist groups that can be used to confirm, challenge, or refine existing hypotheses on how terrorism ends, while formulating new ones. The article concludes that different factors contributed to the decline of each subsequent generation of the RAF. Successful German police efforts played a critical role in thwarting the RAF's first generation. Lack of public support and recruits, due in large part to an escalation of terrorist violence, hastened the decline of the second generation of the group. The third generation suffered from serious interorganizational strife, exacerbated by a government initiative that offered to release those RAF members from prison who renounced terrorism.
This article seeks to analyze the life histories of two former members, Patroklos Tselentis and Sotiris Kondylis, of the defunct terrorist group, the Greek Revolutionary Organization 17 November (1975–2002) in order to look for causes of disengagement, dissociation, and repentance. Analyzing the life histories of Patroklos Tselentis and Sotiris Kondylis offers valuable insights into the development of complex processes of involvement in and disengagement from 17 November terrorism. The detail stemming from their testimonies provides a more complete picture of the group's internal dynamics and challenges a range of simplistic stereotypes, not only about the individuals involved in terrorism but also about the ways in which they make decisions and reflect on their experiences of being part of a terrorist organization.
This article provides a preliminary insight to the ideological revision of the two principle Islamist militant groups in Egypt, the Al-Gamaa Al-Islamiyya and Al-Jihad Al-Islami. Several leaders of these groups have taken steps to renounce violence and promote peace co-existence with the government and society. They have also repented and apologized for the past terror attacks in Egypt that led to the killing of many innocent civilians, government officials and tourists. In addition, they have gone to great lengths to counter and argue against Al Qaeda's violent ideology and to restrict its influence on the Muslim population. The ideological revision of these two groups reflects a significant shift in the efforts of the Egyptian authorities and community to address the problem of ideological extremism and terrorism in the country.
We wanted to bring together under one cover an integrated treatment of a wide range of research, theory, and application in the realm of social influence.
The result is a book that covers all the major social influence topics, including persuasion, compliance, conformity, obedience, dissonance and self-attribution, conditioning and social learning, attitude-behavior relations, attitude involvement, prejudice, nonverbal communication, and even subliminal influence. The coverage is wide, but also integrated through the use of the recurring theme of "attitude systems" in which attitudes, cognitions, behaviors, and intentions can all be affected by external agents of influence, and all can be influenced internally by each other. We also devote two full chapters to applications of social influence principles that we see as decided "growth areas" now and in the near future. One applications chapter focuses on influence in the legal system and the other on improving the quality of life (the environment, personal health, and mental well-being).
This book is intended primarily for undergraduates. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
This article argues that (a) ego, or sel L is an organization oJ knowledge, (b) ego is characterized by cognitive biases strikingly analogous to totalitarian inJormation-control strategies, and (c) these totalitarian-ego biases Junction to preserve organization in cognitive structures. Ego's cognitive biases are ego- centricity (selJ as the Jocus oJ knowledge), "beneffectance " (perception oJ responsibility Jot desired, but not undesired, outcomes), and cognitive conservatism (resistance to cognitive change). In addition to being pervasively evident in recent studies oJ normal human cognition, these three biases are Jound in actively Junc- tioning, higher level organizations oJ knowledge, per- haps best exemplified by theoretical paradigms in science. The thesis that egocentricity, benelectance, and conservatism act to preserve knowledge organizations leads to the proposal oJ an intrapsychic analog o! genetic evolution, which in turn provides an alternative to prevalent motivational and inJormational interpreta- tions oJ cognitive biases.
Individual Disengagement from Al Qa'ida-Influenced Terrorist Groups. A Rapid Evidence Assess-ment to Inform Policy and Practice in Preventing Terrorism
- Emma Disley
- Kristin Weed
- Ana¨ Reding
- Lindsay Clutterbuck
Emma Disley, Kristin Weed, Ana¨ Reding, Lindsay Clutterbuck, and Richard Warnes, " Individual Disengagement from Al Qa'ida-Influenced Terrorist Groups. A Rapid Evidence Assess-ment to Inform Policy and Practice in Preventing Terrorism. " RAND Europe (2011). Available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical reports/TR785.html (accessed 10 December 2012).
The Weather Underground; Reinares Exit From Terrorism
- Docurama
Docurama, The Weather Underground; Reinares, " Exit From Terrorism, " p.
Narrative Persuasion and Overcom-ing Resistance
- Sonya Cin
- P Mark
- Geoffrey T Zanna
- Fong
Sonya Dal Cin, Mark P. Zanna, and Geoffrey T. Fong, " Narrative Persuasion and Overcom-ing Resistance, " in Knowles and Linn, eds., Resistance and Persuasion, pp. 175–191.
Processes of Disengagement, " p. 37; Bjørgo and Carlsson Early Intervention, " p. 27; Centrum fö kunskap om brott och atgå mot brott, Exit fö avhoppar, p. 41; Rommelspacher
- Arnstberg
- Hållé
- Smaka
Arnstberg og Hållé, Smaka kanga, p. 36; Bjørgo, " Processes of Disengagement, " p. 37; Bjørgo and Carlsson, " Early Intervention, " p. 27; Centrum fö kunskap om brott och atgå mot brott, Exit fö avhoppar, p. 41; Rommelspacher, " Der Hass, " pp. 151 and 155.
Roads to Mil-itant Radicalization. Interviews With Five Former Perpetrators of Politically Motivated Organized Violence
- Jon A Olsen
Jon A. Olsen, " Roads to Mil-itant Radicalization. Interviews With Five Former Perpetrators of Politically Motivated Organized Violence. " DIIS Report 12. Danish Institute for International Studies (2009);
Deradicalization and Rehabilitation Programmes Tar-geting Religious Terrorists and Extremists in the Muslim World: An Overview
- Richard Barrett
- Laila Bokhari
Richard Barrett and Laila Bokhari, " Deradicalization and Rehabilitation Programmes Tar-geting Religious Terrorists and Extremists in the Muslim World: An Overview, " in Tore Bjørgo and John Horgan, eds., Leaving Terrorism Behind. Individual and Collective Disengagement (London: Routledge, 2009), pp. 170–180, p.
Roads to Militant Radicalization
- Olsen
Olsen, " Roads to Militant Radicalization, " p.
Identity and Morality in the Italian Red Brigades The review also excludes autobiographies by former extremists as they represent subjective perspectives with an inherent risk of bias
- Jamieson
Jamieson, " Identity and Morality in the Italian Red Brigades, " Terrorism and Political Violence 4 (1990), pp. 508–520. The review also excludes autobiographies by former extremists as they represent subjective perspectives with an inherent risk of bias. Otherwise interesting autobiographies include Peter Collier and David Horowitz, Destructive Generation. Second Thoughts About the Sixties (San Francisco: Encounter Books, 1989), pp. 275–365;
are apparently under way with a quasi experimental study of the effect of de-radicalization efforts targeting detainees in Sri Lanka and the Philippines
- Kruglanski
- Gelfand
Kruglanski, Gelfand, and Gunaratna are apparently under way with a quasi experimental study of the effect of de-radicalization efforts targeting detainees in Sri Lanka and the Philippines.
The Buccinasco Pentiti
- Vidino
Vidino, " The Buccinasco Pentiti, " p. 410.
The Islamist. Why I Joined Radical Islam in Britain, What I Saw Inside and Why I Left
- Ed Husein
Ed Husein, The Islamist. Why I Joined Radical Islam in Britain, What I Saw Inside and Why I Left (London: Penguin Books, 2007);
The De-Radicalization of Jihadists; Ashour How Terrorism Declines
- Ashour Martha
- Crenshaw
Ashour, The De-Radicalization of Jihadists; Ashour, " Post-Jihadism " ; Martha Crenshaw, " How Terrorism Declines, " Terrorism and Political Violence 3(1) (1991), pp. 69–87;
Walking Away from Terrorism
- Horgan
Horgan, Walking Away from Terrorism, p. 69.
Decline and Disengagement
- Demant
Demant et al., Decline and Disengagement, pp. 131–132.
Influence, p. 57; Zimbardo and Leippe, The Psychology of Attitude Change, p. 216. 42. Hogg and Vaughan, Social Psychology
- Cialdini
Cialdini, Influence, p. 57; Zimbardo and Leippe, The Psychology of Attitude Change, p. 216. 42. Hogg and Vaughan, Social Psychology, p. 230.
This Thing of Darkness, p. 135; Demant et al., Decline and Disengagement
- Aho
Aho, This Thing of Darkness, p. 135; Demant et al., Decline and Disengagement, p. 139;
Extremist Re-Education and Rehabili-tation in Saudi Arabia
- Christopher Boucek
Christopher Boucek, " Extremist Re-Education and Rehabili-tation in Saudi Arabia, " in Tore Bjørgo and John Horgan, eds., Leaving Terrorism Behind. Individual and Collective Disengagement (London: Routledge, 2009), pp. 212–223, at p. 218.
Why Greek Terrorists Give Up, " p. 561; Reinares Exit From Terrorism
- Kassimeris
Kassimeris, " Why Greek Terrorists Give Up, " p. 561; Reinares, " Exit From Terrorism, " pp. 783 and 794.
Nynazistiske miljøer. En studie om tilslutnings-og exitprosessene
- Tom Olsen
Tom Olsen, " Nynazistiske miljøer. En studie om tilslutnings-og exitprosessene. " MA diss. University of Stavanger (2010/2011);