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1 23
Minerva
A Review of Science, Learning and
Policy
ISSN 0026-4695
Minerva
DOI 10.1007/s11024-013-9242-x
Techno-Nationalism and the Construction
of University Technology Transfer
Creso Sá, Andrew Kretz & Kristjan
Sigurdson
1 23
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Techno-Nationalism and the Construction of University
Technology Transfer
Creso Sa
´•Andrew Kretz •Kristjan Sigurdson
Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013
Abstract Our historical study of Canada’s main research university illuminates
the overlooked influence of national identities and interests as forces shaping the
institutionalization of technology transfer. Through the use of archival sources we
trace the rise and influence of Canadian technological nationalism—a response to
Canada’s perceived dependency on the United States’ science and technology.
Technological nationalism provided a symbol for producing a shared understanding
of the desirability and appropriateness of technology transfer that legitimated the
commercial activities of university scientists.
Keywords Technology transfer Canada Techno-nationalism
Institutionalization Research commercialization Universities
Introduction
In Canada, one of the foremost policy issues over the last four decades has been the
country’s underperformance in industrial innovation. Canadian industry investment
in research & development (R&D) is a commonly cited weakness of the national
economy. Comparisons of Canadian business participation in R&D with the United
States and other OECD economies such as Japan, South Korea and the UK highlight
the country’s weakness in this area (AUCC 2006; CCA 2009;Sa
´and Litwin 2011).
This situation has led to concern about the weakness of innovation in Canadian
industry and has become a persistent theme in the federal science and technology
policy debates (Fisher and Rubenson 2010). The narrative of Canada’s ‘‘innovation
C. Sa
´(&)A. Kretz K. Sigurdson
Department of Leadership, Higher, and Adult Education, University of Toronto, Toronto,
ON M4Y 1R6, Canada
e-mail: c.sa@utoronto.ca
123
Minerva
DOI 10.1007/s11024-013-9242-x
Author's personal copy
gap’’ and the consequential threat to economic development represents the current
paradigm for justifying investments in university research (Sa
´2010).
One of the explanations for this innovation gap is the country’s proximity to U.S.
markets, and the technological dominance of American firms. The presence of a
large, accessible foreign market has meant a high level of U.S. investment in
research and development, typically into Canadian subsidiaries of American
corporations (McDougall 2006), which has been blamed as stifling corporate
expenditures in research and innovation. Moreover, the large American market for
skilled labor and advanced technology has often generated fears of a flow of talent
and research out of Canada towards the United States.
This paper reports findings from our investigation of the institutionalization of
technology transfer at the University of Toronto. Prevalent views on technology
transfer in Canadian universities have an orientation towards contemporary events
(Atkinson-Grosjean 2006; Fisher and Rubenson 2010), and while this orientation is
not unusual, it leaves blind spots in the analysis of organizational change. The long-
term evolution of academic cultures and practices in Canadian universities remains
scantily studied and poorly understood. The broader literature on research
commercialization and technology transfer has overwhelmingly centered on
American universities, and more specifically in selected institutions and regions
in the U.S. (Matkin 1990; Mowery et al. 2004; Geiger and Sa
´2009; Berman 2012).
We draw from archival materials to map-out and analyze changes in technology
transfer practices, meanings, and organization. Our analysis identifies the important
role of national ambitions and interests—which have historically been shaped in
relation to the U.S.—in influencing university decisions about whether and how to
support scientists’ engagement with the commercial realm. We contend that
changing notions of the public good, a notion largely influenced by Canada’s
relationship with the U.S., contributed to how technology transfer was articulated,
promoted, and organized.
Canada–U.S. Political, Economic and Academic Ties
Proximity to the United States has had a profound impact on Canadian invention and
innovation (Russell 1980). Richard Jarrell (2001) notes that ‘‘[g]iven their proximity,
shared language, similar cultures, and being each other’s primary trading partners, it
was inevitable that American and Canadian science would become closely linked’’
(p. 103). The size and strength of the American market and infrastructure for science,
however, and the weakness of the Canadian economy relative to that of the U.S., has
resulted in Canada becoming increasingly dependent on American imports, capital
and technology (McDougall 2006). In industry, many sectors are dominated by
foreign firms that manufacture, assemble, and even distribute in Canada, but which
concentrate R&D activities abroad—mainly in the U.S.
Along with this economic integration has been increasing levels of scientific
integration and cooperation. At various periods in its history, Canadian higher
education has leaned on its southern neighbor to staff its growing universities and to
replace Britain as its major source of science and research collaboration. In the
C. Sa
´et al.
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nineteenth century, influential Canadian scientists were increasingly prone to
nurture peer relationships with American collaborators at the expense of their
commonwealth colleagues due to reasons of communicational efficiency and
ideological differences among others (Zeller 2009). In addition, Canadians seeking
advanced degrees and post-graduate training around the turn of the twentieth
century often looked south when faced with the sparse offerings available to them in
their own country (Friedland 2002). Ironically, the opening of western Canadian
universities and their rapid growth in the 1960s and 1970s led to a situation where
many American professors had to be recruited due to the small number of doctorates
from Canadian universities at the time (Gingras 1991).
After the Second World War, scientific collaboration with the U.S. proliferated.
The lack of positions for university graduates in Canada prior to the 1960s led to
substantial numbers of Canadians with advanced education seeking work in the
United States, especially in nuclear, space and military science programs (Jarrell
2001). The expansion of Canadian universities during the 1960s and 1970s once
again exposed the lack of homegrown supply of academics and required Ottawa to
offer tax incentives to U.S. academics to fill vacancies (Stuart 2007). During this
time, it became common to hear of academic departments in universities across
Canada staffed with more American graduates than Canadian, which became a key
concern of Canadian nationalists in the 1960s and 1970s (Cormier 2004).
From the 1960s onward, it became increasingly common for Canadian scientists
to become active participants in American scientific organizations, and as American
science journals became the gold-standard in many fields, Canadian academics
sought to publish their findings therein (Jarrell 2001). The transparency of the
border between the countries led to many American scholars moving north to take
up important positions in Canadian universities, and important Canadian scholars
including several Nobel laureates moving south. The introduction of Canadian-U.S.
Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA) and North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) in the late 1980s and 1990s expanded bi-national labor markets and the
preferential treatment for highly-educated workers led to even deeper intermingling
in science, academia, and high-technology areas (Stuart 2007).
Parallel to the trend of increased Canada–U.S. interaction has been a push back
against it, often in the form of Canadian nationalism. Historically, Canadian
nationalists have resisted the strength of American influences on Canadian culture
and institutions and at the same time focused their interests on strengthening national
identity and cultural sovereignty (Cormier 2004). The backlash against American
influence goes back to the early twentieth century as exemplified by the 1929 Royal
Commission on Radio Broadcasting. Concerned over the growing influence of
American radio broadcasting in Canada, the commission advocated for a publicly
funded radio broadcast system, leading to the creation of the Canadian Radio
Broadcasting Commission, the forerunner of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation
(Nash 1994). Concerns about American influences in Canadian universities mirrored
those resulting from trends in radio and television broadcasting. The intensity of
academic migration during several periods spawned backlash from Canadians who
saw the influx of U.S. trained academics in negative terms, thinking that these
individuals were unwitting agents of U.S. imperialism (Jarrell 2001).
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As we will argue below, the involvement of Canadian universities with industry
is positioned at the intersection of concerns for science policy, economic
development, and autonomy. Investigating the history and institutionalization of
technology transfer at the largest Canadian university in the context of this evolving,
American-dominated partnership provides the opportunity to better understand
rationales underlying the evolution of the mission of universities in Canada.
Theoretical Approach and Methods
This study takes the approach of a detailed historical analysis of the institution-
alization of technology transfer meanings, practices and the organization of related
activities. The emergence of technology transfer as increasingly routine and
organizationally integrated activities is viewed through the lens of institutional
theory in organizational analysis.
Rather than viewing organizations as self-contained systems, institutional theory
recognizes the ‘‘embeddedness’’ of organizations, such as universities, within
institutional contexts (Meyer and Rowen 1977). These contexts create, maintain,
and render desirable various norms, strategies, and structures. Our historical
analysis is informed by an understanding of how the concept of nation–as a social
entity, composed of shared language, culture, history, and economic commonal-
ities–is relevant for understanding innovative processes and outcomes (Montresor
2001). The selection of different priorities, structures, and strategies is often
influenced by cultural and national contexts (Freeman 1995; Edquist and Johnson
1997; Dill and van Vught 2010). The relationship of nationalism and orientations
towards science and technology is captured through the construct of ‘‘techno-
nationalism.’’
The term, first coined by Robert Reich in 1987, characterizes strategies and
policy orientations that favor the nation and its innovative capabilities and
technological autonomy (Ostry and Nelson 1995; Narula and Dunning 1998). In
contrast with neo-mercantilist or import-substitution industrialization strategies that
encourage the generation of science and technology solely for reasons of national
self-sufficiency and the growth and consolidation of domestic markets, techno-
nationalism describes actions that seek to enhance the innovative capabilities and
competitiveness of national industries within globally integrated networks (Edler
and Boekholt 2001; Yamada 2000). Therefore, policies that limit both technological
dependence on foreign countries and international knowledge spillovers from
domestic research are generally supported to ensure national competitiveness within
international markets (Archibugi and Michie 1997; Edler and Boekholt 2001).
According to Montresor (2001), techno-nationalism can be disaggregated into
four components: ‘‘techno-territoriality’’, which pertains to the influence of physical
distances and spaces in innovative processes; ‘‘techno-sovereignty’’, which relates
to governance structures and policy making that supports science and technology
policies; ‘‘techno-citizenship’’, which concerns the accountability of actors to their
home country; and ‘‘techno-nationality’’, which deals with the influence of socio-
cultural sharing on technological change. Whereas techno-territoriality and techno-
C. Sa
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nationality concern the social and spatial shaping of technology and the innovative
process, and are thus not relevant to our study, we find Montresor’s (2001)
conceptions of techno-sovereignty and techno-citizenship offer useful constructs
through which to view the actions and intentions of governments and universities.
Our study uses multiple sources of data, but primarily relies on archival sources.
The University of Toronto’s Archives and Records Management Services holds
materials that address the development of technology transfer and research
commercialization activities. In our investigation, we accessed records dating back
to 1914, including the minutes of various administrative bodies and committees,
reports, correspondence, and various other materials generated during technology
transfer activities. We also draw from hundreds of archived invention files, each
containing a disclosure form, and in many cases, correspondence and meeting
minutes generated in the course of assessing the disclosure, assigning invention
rights, and licensing the invention to a company.
From the First World War to Mid-Century: The Rise of Canadian Science
The Canadian government’s involvement with research policy began during the
First World War. Pressure had been previously mounting from the Royal Society of
Canada, the Canadian Institute of Toronto, and the Montreal business community
for a concerted national effort to develop Canadian science and technology
(Phillipson 1991). In 1916, with the encouragement of Britain’s Imperial War
Cabinet, and to discourage Canadian universities from associating with Britain’s
Department of Scientific and Industrial Research, the Canadian government began
efforts to coordinate research for the first time (Eggleston 1950). That year the
Canadian government convened an Honorary Advisory Council on Scientific and
Industrial Research with a mandate to guide Canada’s university research activities
during the War. The Council was formed late in the War, and as a consequence
made little contribution to military efforts. Still, the Council provided the
foundation for the subsequent development of policy instruments directed towards
building Canada’s research infrastructure and capacity.
After the War, the mandate of the Honorary Advisory Council for Scientific and
Industrial Research shifted to coordinate, report on, and set priorities for existing
research agencies in ways that would promote Canada’s industrial interests and
reduce the trade imbalance that arose during wartime (Feldberg 1991). One
challenge in building Canada’s research capacity was the emigration of university
graduates to the U.S. Between 1919 and 1926, one out of every ten University of
Toronto graduates moved to the United States (Stuart 2007). The failure of Britain
to provide an easy pathway for Canadian students to access advanced scientific
training, and the ease of entry to U.S. graduate programs and academic positions led
to an increasingly strong Canada–U.S. relationship in science and higher education.
The situation even led to repeated warnings in the first decade of the 1900s by the
principal of McGill and president of the University of Toronto ‘‘that if British
universities did not adapt to the American system, Canadians would emigrate to the
United States and would be a loss to the empire’’ (Gingras 1991: 47).
The Construction of University Technology Transfer
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In 1924, the Honorary Advisory Council on Scientific and Industrial Research
was transformed into the National Research Council (NRC), an advisory body to the
federal government. The NRC took an active role in managing research in the early
1930s, when the federal government established national laboratories in Ottawa
(Jarrell and Gingras 1991). The NRC’s involvement with research expanded during
the Second World War, when scientific research was again expected to contribute to
military operations. Once the war efforts concluded, the NRC resumed its pre-war
civilian R&D with an expanded role as financier of university research, which was
rapidly growing. During the post-war years scientists and the research community
autonomously directed the activities of the NRC with little or no regard for social
needs or national priorities (Phillipson 1974).
Unsurprisingly then, technology transfer at the University of Toronto was an
exceptional activity that remained separate from normal campus functions and was
frequently subject to contestation. The university’s President and Board of
Governors were hesitant to accept a role in supporting or endorsing the patenting
and licensing of university inventions, and only permitted such activities when in
defense of the public interest. The university’s general approach towards technology
transfer and research commercialization is reflected in its first engagement with such
activities: the establishment of Connaught Laboratories in 1917 for the production
of vaccines and antitoxins.
Connaught Laboratories began from the work of John FitzGerald, an associate
professor of hygiene at the university who began to produce a diphtheria antitoxin.
Universities played relatively minor roles in the development of biomedical
research in the early twentieth century (Malissard 2000). The Board of Governors of
the University of Toronto were at first hesitant to support FitzGerald’s research
because of the perceived commercial aspects of manufacturing and distributing
pharmaceuticals. The initial reluctance and suspicion of becoming involved in
commercial aspects of science was founded on a concern that the university’s status
as a public institution would be compromised. During the First World War
FitzGerald lobbied the federal government for funds to support his lab, arguing that
it would be ‘‘a highly patriotic action for us to manufacture our own anti-tetanus
toxins for the Canadian Expeditionary Forces’’ (Friedland 2002: 266). Due to the
lack of any major Canadian pharmaceutical companies meeting this demand
(Malissard 2000), the government agreed. With an infusion of funds, FitzGerald’s
laboratory produced and distributed a tetanus antitoxin and vaccines for smallpox
and typhoid to Canadian troops and the general public.
The successful contribution of the laboratories during the First World War
attracted university support for the establishment of a permanent laboratory for the
non-commercial production of vaccines and antitoxins. Located off campus,
Connaught Laboratories was indirectly controlled by the Board of Governors
through a standing committee. Although characterized by its director as ‘‘a non-
commercial science institute created and operated for medical public service,’’
1
it
1
Letter, Defries (director) to Board of Governors, June 6, 1939, p. 32, A1970-0024/027, University of
Toronto Archives, University of Toronto.
C. Sa
´et al.
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also came to be seen as a clever way for the university to generate funds for research
(Malissard 2000).
The university’s first dealings with the patenting of faculty inventions was
likewise pursued with the intent of safeguarding the public good. The earliest
experience of the university in such matters was related to the 1921 production of an
extract composed of an anti-diabetic hormone trademarked by the university as
‘‘Insulin.’’ Process and product patents were requested by the Board of Governors—
with the inventors’ encouragement—on the basis that the ‘‘patent [would] not to be
used for the purpose of restricting the preparation of this or similar extracts
elsewhere, or by other persons’’ (Insulin Committee 1923: 484). Moreover, as for
the logic guiding the appropriation of intellectual property, the Board of Governors
claimed to hold the patents for Insulin ‘‘for the purpose of preventing [the]
commercial exploitation and uncontrolled manufactur[ing]’’ of the extract (Insulin
Committee 1923: 485).
To administer Insulin’s patents, issue licenses ‘‘to suitable organizations’’
worldwide, collect royalties, and operate a testing laboratory, the university’s Board
of Governors established a committee to act on behalf of the university. The
‘‘Insulin Committee,’’ as it became known, was a standing committee of the Board
and was housed within Connaught Laboratories, which manufactured Insulin for
distribution in Canada and the United States. Although it was established to manage
Insulin related activities, the Insulin Committee was quickly designated by the
Board as the university’s arm for sponsoring applications for patents arising from
any inventions made by staff of the university.
2
During this period, the legitimacy of technology transfer activities was weak.
Cases were dealt with idiosyncratically as they occurred, not as sought-after
situations, but as exceptions conditionally accepted as appropriate so far as deemed
relevant to the public good or interest. The university took ownership of inventions
and engaged in technology transfer and research development, although being
careful to maintain these efforts outside the boundaries of routine university
activities. Nevertheless, these early experiences provided the university with the
first formal venues to channel information and activities related to technology
transfer, laying the institutional foundations for later developments.
Mid-Century Techno-Nationalism and the Organization of Technology
Transfer
A turning point in the university’s engagement with technology transfer occurred in
1959 when the university encouraged the standardization of procedures for
technology transfer for the first time as a growing number of faculty requested
information from the Board of Governors concerning the patenting and licensing of
inventions. That year, the university president, Claude Bissell, recommended that a
2
Fisher to Ireton, 9 Jan. 1961, A1975-0004/006. University of Toronto Archives, University of Toronto.
The Construction of University Technology Transfer
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special committee be formed to advise university inventors on patenting and
licensing matters.
3
In its first report, the Advisory Committee on Patents
recommended that the Insulin Committee be renamed the ‘‘Scientific Development
Committee,’’ with enlarged authority to include all matters pertaining to patent
application, patents, and licensing.
In the fall of 1961, the Scientific Development Committee proposed the
university’s first patent policy, the Policy on Discoveries and Inventions, which was
adopted by the Board of Governors.
4
The policy provided a clear indicator of the
status of technology transfer at the university, stating:
In acting for the University the Committee recognizes that the prime interest
of the staff of the University of Toronto is teaching, research and publication
and urges that this scholarly interest be given first consideration. It is the
Committee’s objective to conduct activities in and related to the patenting and
licensing of developments with this prime interest in mind.
5
Furthermore, in the policy, the Committee noted that such activities were conducted
only to make ‘‘the benefits of the discoveries of inventors available to the public.’’
6
As the university took on this stance, debates around the role of science in
Canada surfaced that challenged the traditional borders between academic research,
the government, and industry. Several reports emerged that criticized the federal
government for concentrating its resources on basic research, which was viewed as
too far removed from the industrial sector. The first report was issued in 1963 by the
Royal Commission on Government Organization (the Glassco Commission), which
argued that federal science failed to sufficiently support industry needs (Canada
1963). The same year, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment (OECD) published international comparisons of national science policies, and
declared that the comprehensive planning of science according to state-defined
objectives was necessary for successful economic policy. A few years later, in 1969,
the OECD released the report, Review of National Science Policy: Canada, which
was critical of Canada for failing to coordinate research activities around clearly
articulated priorities (OECD 1969).
In response to the criticisms of the Glassco Commission and the OECD’s reports,
the Canadian government created the Science Secretariat within the Privy
Council Office in 1964 to provide staff support for the Prime Minister and the
3
Meeting Minutes, Board of Governors, June 25, 1959, p. 184, A1978-0006/004. University of Toronto
Archives, University of Toronto. The committee was to define a general policy governing the interest of
the university in discoveries made by its staff members and ‘‘to recommend the means for providing
advice on patent procedures, servicing and financing projects deemed to be patentable and arranging for
licensing and receipt of royalties.’’ First Report, Advisory Committee on Patents, 1959, A1973-0025/008,
University of Toronto Archives, University of Toronto.
4
Meeting Notes, Scientific Development Committee, 1964, A1973-0025/040, file: Board Committees –
SDC –meetings 1964–1965/ University patent policy. University of Toronto Archives, University of
Toronto.
5
Policy on Discoveries and Inventions, Scientific Development Committee, 1961, A1973-0025/040, file:
Board Committees – SDC –Policy on Discoveries and inventions. University of Toronto Archives,
University of Toronto.
6
Ibid.
C. Sa
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Cabinet (Carter 1966). The staff of the Secretariat also served the Science Council
of Canada, created in 1966 to produce independent advice for the government on
science and technology matters of national significance (Dufour and Gingras 1988).
In 1968, the Science Council produced the document, Towards a National Science
Policy, calling for the pursuit of multidisciplinary, mission-oriented R&D involving
not only government agencies and universities, but industry as well (Grove 1989).
A third significant document to influence the course of Canadian research policy
was produced by the Senate Special Committee on Science Policy (also known as
the Lamontagne Commission). In its multi-volume report entitled A Science Policy
for Canada, the commission made similar criticisms and recommendations as the
Royal Commission on Government Organization and the OECD. In response to
these familiar recommendations, the government established a Minister of State for
Science and Technology in 1971 (Brassard 1996). One of the first actions of the
Minister was to begin a push to contract government research needs to universities
or industry rather than commissioning research to be undertaken in the national
laboratories (Phillipson 1974).
The growth of contracted research forced the university to consider issues of
ownership, licensing, and revenue sharing. Furthermore, the increased government
expectations that universities contribute to national priorities and industrial
innovation encouraged the university to elaborate and expand on efforts already
in place for the transfer of academic inventions to the public, via industry. At the
University of Toronto, the Patent Committee of the Research Board of the Office of
Research Administration was created in 1965, and was made responsible for the
processing and management of inventions and patents under the general supervision
of the Research Committee of the Board of Governors.
The Patent Committee’s primary function was to determine what, if any, interest
the university had in inventions created on campus. Thus, the Committee
unanimously agreed that all faculty had to disclose discoveries with their
department head and the Board of Governors. At this point in time, considerations
of serving the public good became interpreted as ensuring that the university
captured any revenue generated from the exploitation of licensed inventions.
7
The
committee believed university scientists ‘‘must recognize their moral responsibility
to the University in cases where there is a large sum of money arising out of a
patent.’’
8
Several Committee members expressed concern that ‘‘the University
would be open to public criticism if it did not determine that the University got a
proper return from the investment put into the invention.’’
9
This regard for ensuring a public return on investment by encouraging the
disclosure of faculty inventions was also encouraged by Canadian Patents and
Development Limited (CPDL), the technology transfer arm of the federal
government. The NRC established CPDL in 1947 as a subsidiary company to
7
Papers, Research Board, 1976, A1980-0023/007. University of Toronto Archives, University of
Toronto.
8
Meeting Minutes, Patent Committee, 1965, A1975-0004/023, file: Corr. Of G. de B. Robinson, Oct.–
Nov. 1965. University of Toronto Archives, University of Toronto.
9
Meeting Minutes, Patent Committee, September 27, 1972, A2004-0007/012, file: Milles Townsend.
University of Toronto Archives, University of Toronto.
The Construction of University Technology Transfer
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‘‘assist in making available to the public, through industry, benefits inherent in those
inventions resulting from publicly-financed and public or institutionally-conducted
research.’’
10
In 1967, the University of Toronto entered into an agreement with CPDL
‘‘to secure patents on inventions and to bring these inventions into use, to derive a
reasonable income therefrom and to protect these inventions from misuse.’’
11
Although the Patent Committee required the disclosure of inventions and
discoveries, Committee members felt that university faculty should not be forced to
have their inventions patented after disclosure, as most faculty preferred their
research findings to remain in the public domain. Nevertheless, some patents on
faculty inventions were filed and licensed to companies. The general approach was
to grant non-exclusive licenses. During a meeting of the Patent Committee, one
member argued, ‘‘the university had to make sure that it was not in a position of
creating a monopoly to the detriment of the public.’’
12
The reputational implications
of such a scenario were cause of concern. The Committee noted, ‘‘it would be
unfortunate if word were to get around that research in the University of Toronto
can be anybody’s domain.’’
13
However, firms were reluctant to license an invention
that required development under this condition. In response, the Committee began
to offer three-year periods of ‘‘unofficial’’ exclusivity to a company, after which the
university could make licensing offers to other companies.
14
Concerns that the university capture the rights and benefits of inventions made on
campus reflected a general reaction in Canada against increasing foreign influence
over Canadian identity and autonomy. As early as 1951, the Royal Commission on
National Development in the Arts, Letters, and Sciences, otherwise known as the
Massey Commission, had examined Canada’s cultural institutions and concluded
that Canadian cultural autonomy and identity were threatened by the growing
strength of American mass culture (Canada 1951). The Massey report recognized
Canada’s universities as powerful forces in serving local needs and guiding the
direction of national culture. The effectiveness of Canadian universities in serving
the nation, however, was deemed under threat by the influence of the U.S. and the
specter of brain drain.
Soon after the Massey Commission’s recommendations in 1951, two reports by
the Royal Commission on Canada’s Economic Prospects expressed concern about
10
Letter, Annis to Robinson, April 24, 1967, A1975-0004/006. University of Toronto Archives,
University of Toronto.
11
CPDL Agreement, January 26, 1967, p. 233, A1979-0012. University of Toronto Archives, University
of Toronto.
12
Meeting Minutes, Patent Committee, October 20, 1970, A2004-0007/003, file: Etkin/Goering.
University of Toronto Archives, University of Toronto.
13
Meeting Minutes, Patent Committee, 1969, A1975-0004/006, file: patents 1969–1971. University of
Toronto Archives, University of Toronto.
14
Meeting Minutes, Patent Committee, 1969, A2004-0007/001, file: Balmain, University of Toronto
Archives, University of Toronto; This practice is elaborated in the minutes from a meeting of the Patent
Committee: ‘‘In granting a non-exclusive license the University has sometimes made a practice of giving
a letter saying that it is the intention of the University to grant no more licenses. This will give the
licensee assurance that if a good job is done there will be no other license granted but retain to the
university the right to grant other licenses if it wishes.’’ Meeting Minutes, Patent Committee, 1969,
A1975-0004/006, file: patents 1969–1971.
C. Sa
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growing foreign ownership. Nearly a decade later, the private founding of the
Committee for an Independent Canada by Walter Gordon helped to create the
atmosphere favoring economic and cultural independence. Responding to such
pressures, the federal government under Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau established
the Canada Development Corporation (CDC) in 1971 to develop and maintain
companies under domestic ownership (Hampson 1972).
Pressure for ‘‘nationalization’’ was also exerted by the Movement for an
Independent Socialist Canada (also known as the Waffle), a wing of Canada’s New
Democratic Party that vigorously supported the nationalization of domestic
industries. The Waffle’s influence, particularly during Pierre Trudeau’s government
that followed the 1972 election, contributed to the government’s assertion of
domestic economic control as a policy objective, establishing Petro-Canada to
control of the energy sector, and the Foreign Investment Review Agency to review
and limit foreign ownership and takeovers of Canadian companies (Morton 1986).
The overall political climate of the 1960s and 1970s, together with the emerging
role of the government in steering science policy, legitimated the notion that
university relations with firms should contribute to national industry. One inventor
told the Patent Committee that his intention for disclosing his invention was to
‘‘promote the commercial exploitation for the benefit of Canada’’ and noted his
consent of the ‘‘right to manufacture in Canada to any Canadian firm but not to any
foreign firm without our expressed approval.’’
15
He said his desire was to make his
invention ‘‘in Canada for the benefit of Canadians.’’
16
Relatedly, the university’s
solicitors, after a review of a renewing contract between the university and CPDL,
suggested, ‘‘somewhere in the agreement, a recital to the effect that part of the
intention of the CDPL is to stimulate the development of Canadian industry and
that, wherever feasible, Canadian industry will be licensed before any other
industry.’’
17
These sentiments were common among other inventors. Another
inventor stated that he was ‘‘anxious to help Canadian Industry.’’
18
Yet another
scientist articulated the ideal licensee for his invention: ‘‘a large size, Canadian-
owned [company], with [a] head office in Toronto.’’
19
Patenting and licensing took on added significance as Canadian industry was
dwarfed by the presence of American multinationals. In one case, the Patent
Committee discussed whether to assign a higher licensing rate in the U.S., but
decided that because the manufacturer was a Canadian company and profits would
15
Letter, Locke to Patent Committee, April 13, 1973, A2004-0007/008, file: Litherland, University of
Toronto Archives, University of Toronto.
16
Meeting Minutes, Patent Committee, April 16, 1973, A2004-0007/008, file: Litherland. University of
Toronto Archives, University of Toronto.
17
Letter, University of Toronto to General Manager of Canadian Patents and Development Limited,
February 1, 1972, A1975-0004/006. University of Toronto Archives, University of Toronto.
18
Meeting Minutes, Patent Committee, July 3, 1968, A2004-0007/001, file: Brewer. University of
Toronto Archives, University of Toronto.
19
Letter, Adamson to Woodhams, n.d., A2004-007/13, file: Woodhams R.T., Xanthos. University of
Toronto Archives, University of Toronto.
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123
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fall back to the company that it did not matter whether the goods were made in the
U.S.
20
Often, inventors noted that they would prefer to negotiate with a Canadian
company, but that American firms tended to have the necessary patent ‘‘know-
how.’’
21
One inventor noted he ‘‘would like to see the development stay within
Canada’’ but the ‘‘Committee expressed the feeling that a Canadian company would
probably not have the funds necessary to produce the prototype.’’
22
One inventor,
also a member of the Patent Committee, noted that information of his invention was
sent to Canadian companies that might have an interest, but that none were willing
to license the invention. He felt that licensing to a United States subsidiary, the only
other option, would mean that all development would take place abroad. Rather than
commit to this option, he established a company with university approval, to which
the university could license the invention.
23
Concerns about the longstanding ‘‘branch plant’’ character of the national
economy influenced nationalistic sentiment regarding the commercial exploitation
of academic inventions. As stated by one administrator: ‘‘publication without other
action will destroy any commercial potential for this country.’’
24
In addition, the
CPDL was at this time suggesting to university administrators that they exhort
researchers to disclose by pointing out that unless researchers patent in Canada, the
benefits of their research will be lost, and that it was ‘‘therefore a patriotic duty to
disclose.’’
25
During this period, university participation in technology transfer continued to be
founded on the logics of public service responsibility, which became increasingly
articulated as a defense of Canadian interests and protection against foreign
multinational intrusion. Nevertheless, technology transfer activities at the university
remained ostensibly secondary to the core functions of teaching, research, and
publication. Despite the growing acceptance of university technology transfer for
the benefits returned to Canada, commercial activities remained vulnerable to
contestation.
The selling of Connaught Laboratories by the university in 1972 underscores this
point. Beginning in the late 1960s, a newly emergent Canadian pharmaceutical
industry began exerting pressure on the university to relinquish ownership of the
laboratories (Gingras et al. 2000). Up until then, the absence of a strong national
pharmaceutical industry gave Connaught a near monopoly on pharmaceutical
manufacturing in the country. The dominant market position of Connaught
20
Meeting Minutes, Patent Committee, July 3, 1968, A2004-0007/001, file: Balmain. University of
Toronto Archives, University of Toronto.
21
Meeting Minutes, Patent Committee, January 30, 1967, A1975-0004/00, file: Esso Invention.
University of Toronto Archives, University of Toronto.
22
Meeting Minutes, Patent Committee, December 11, 1975, A2004-007/006, file: Hewitt & Slobodian.
University of Toronto Archives, University of Toronto.
23
Report, Patent Committee Review Task Force, 1977, A1980-0023/007. University of Toronto
Archives, University of Toronto.
24
Letter, Clark to Litherland, December 22, 1977, A2004-0007/008, file: Litherland. University of
Toronto Archives, University of Toronto.
25
Letter, Rosser to Robinson, June 23, 1967, A1975-0004/006/file: Dr. Guillet, University of Toronto
Archives, University of Toronto.
C. Sa
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Laboratories, together with its exemption from taxes (as a university owned
subsidiary), made it a target of pharmaceutical companies. Newly established
Canadian pharmaceutical manufacturers—generally local subsidiaries of foreign
firms—took issue with Connaught’s unfair advantage and lobbied the university’s
Board of Governors to relinquish its ownership.
From this industry opposition came a discourse of conflict of interest between the
university and Connaught Laboratories that did not exist previously (Gingras et al.
2000). Moreover, opponents of university ownership of Connaught argued that
ownership of a manufacturing company weakened the university’s argument for
continued tax-exempt status, and that Connaught exposed the university to financial
risk and other liabilities.
26
Although some on the Board of Governors disapproved
of the university’s involvement in operating a business (Gingras et al. 2000), the
public service mission that historically legitimated the university’s ownership of
Connaught persisted. There was concern among university administrators that the
sale of Connaught would be seen as an abandonment of the university’s duty as
custodian of a public good by converting a health service into a profit seeking
enterprise. In addition to fears that selling it would result in the loss of a source of
income and prestige, the director of Connaught cautioned that a separation from the
university would incite ‘‘vigorous and articulated protest…from within the
university community, from politicians and from the public.’’
27
Ultimately, the university sold off Connaught Laboratories in 1972, due in no
small part to the growing recognition for the need to increase industry donations
from the same business community calling on the university’s exit from
pharmaceutical manufacturing (Gingras et al. 2000). Possession of Connaught
was transferred to the newly created Canadian Development Corporation under the
condition that Insulin and its other products would continue to be made available at
reasonable prices. Furthermore, the terms of sale established that the university
would continue to receive research funding from Connaught, and that the company
would remain Canadian-owned (Friedland 2002). For its part, the university agreed
to continue to provide Connaught with the right of first refusal over pharmaceutical
products and processes developed as a result of university research.
The opposition to university ownership of Connaught Laboratories reveals that,
despite the organizational evolution of structures and policies supporting university
technology transfer and commercial activity, these roles remained contested and
open to debate. The fledgling acceptance of technology transfer is further evident in
the weak commitment of faculty and administrators to such functions. Both the
Scientific Development Committee and the Patent Committee that succeeded it each
typically received one or two-dozen disclosures a year. The Scientific Development
Committee noted that although the staff and administrators generally considered the
Patent Policy as reasonable and effective, many were not familiar with it or the
existence of the Committee, a concern repeated throughout the 1970s. In addition,
the Scientific Development Committee reasoned that because its activities ‘‘would
26
Letter, Ferguson to Brent, October 31, 1968, B1994-0010/003, file: .003. University of Toronto
Archives, University of Toronto.
27
Ibid.
The Construction of University Technology Transfer
123
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not be of interest to members of many departments in the university’’ that ‘‘it does
not appear to be within the responsibilities of the Committee to notify staff members
of this policy.’’
28
The Mid-Seventies: Making of the Contemporary Era
Meeting a new sense of urgency in Canada about the country’s failure to better
translate science into successful technological industries, the university further
embraced techno-nationalism during the second half of the 1970s. In this period the
university took important steps in establishing policy and structures governing
technology transfer, as the federal and provincial governments started to move more
aggressively to support university-industry cooperation. The obligation to protect
Canadian interests in inventions made at the university required an increasingly
complex technology transfer structure, and the idea that the university should have
its own invention development unit—an idea discussed by members of the patent
committee and the research board since 1970—became realized in 1976.
At the time, the federal government became involved in establishing industrially-
oriented research centers. In 1976, the university had entered into a contract with the
Ministry of Industry, Trade, and Commerce to establish a Bio-medical Instrumen-
tation Unit. The unit, known as BIDU, was noted as unique for developing
university bio-medical research for commercial manufacture.
29
It was viewed as
linking Canadian industry with university researchers ‘‘to make a dent in the
American monopoly of medical instruments’’ (Swartz 1979). The university was
also active in developing a proposal for the Ministry of State for Science and
Technology’s 1978 Research-Industrial Research & Innovation Centres initiative,
which was to assist in research commercialization.
30
The government encourage-
ment for universities to become involved in supporting self-sufficient, non-profit,
industrially-oriented centers, such as BIDU, signaled the changing trend towards
greater acceptance and even promotion of the technology transfer mission of
universities in Canada, and invited more deliberate university efforts at commer-
cializing research.
31
28
Meeting Minutes, Scientific Development Committee, August 4, 1964, A73-0025/040, file: Board
Committees – SDC –meetings 1964–1965. University of Toronto Archives, University of Toronto.
29
Letter, Clark to Connell, March 24, 1977, A1980-0023/007, University of Toronto Archives,
University of Toronto.
30
Proposal, Industrial Research and Innovation Centres, 1977, A1982-0007/009, file: Research-
Industrial Research and Innovation Centres, 77–78, University of Toronto Archives, University of
Toronto.
31
Minutes from a Special Research Board Meeting note that, ‘‘The President [of the university] indicated
he is sympathetic to the issue of being responsive to the development of innovative industry, particularly
if the Government offers tax incentives and funding to universities to help them become involved. To the
extent that the Federal Government makes real its proposals, the University of Toronto as an institution
should be responsive, particularly in terms of industrial interface, to the best of its ability.’’ Minutes,
Special Research Board Meeting, 19 Sept. 1978, A1982-0007-009, File: Research Board. University of
Toronto Archives, University of Toronto.
C. Sa
´et al.
123
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From the second half of the 1960s onward, inventors and members of the patent
committee had articulated the desire to license inventions to Canadian businesses.
The Patent Committee frequently encountered complications and disappointments
when attempting to license to Canadian firms, finding that most of Canadian
industry was not capable of developing and marketing university inventions. As a
result, university inventors often reluctantly licensed university intellectual property
to U.S. corporations. Recognizing this issue, the Research Board appointed a Patent
Committee Review Task Force in 1976 to advise the Board on how to improve the
university’s Patent Policy and technology transfer activities. This was at least in part
a response to growing public expectations that university research emphasize
practical applications.
32
In 1977, the Patent Committee Review Task Force report recommended that ‘‘the
university encourage researchers to find practical applications for their inventions and
that the university provide assistance, where practicable, in the development of
inventions.’’ Towards this end, the Task Force composed a framework for a foundation
to develop university inventions and improve technology transfer. At the time, the
university had no structured mechanism for contacting the business community in
order to find support from entrepreneurs or venture capital.
33
In its final report, the
Task Force introduced a proposal for an Invention Development Corporation,
claiming that ‘‘it is essential to improve the interaction between universities and the
sources of entrepreneurial expertise and business capital to bridge the gap between
scientific discovery and practical applications of such discoveries.’’
34
The Research Board backed the creation of the Invention Development
Corporation, claiming that ‘‘[s]ince Canada has special problems related to its
educational and industrial institutions, we believe a new departure for the
development of technology is warranted.’’
35
The Invention Development Corpo-
ration proposal echoed the argument of the federal government that Canada lagged
behind similar countries in its innovative capability, and that such a corporation
would support domestic industry. Furthermore, it addressed fears of American
dominance in Canadian technology industries. In a 1976 report of the Research
Board, it was noted: ‘‘At best, with the very active cooperation of the inventor, the
University may succeed in entering into a license agreement with a major company,
preferable a Canadian company, but often, because of necessity, a major United
States company.’’
36
The envisioned corporation would prevent ‘‘take-over by larger and technically
stronger foreign multi-national corporations.’’ Directly addressing the concerns
raised in the policy reports of the late 1960s and early 1970s, the proposal warns, ‘‘If
32
Report, Patent Committee Review Task Force, 1977, A1980-0023/007. University of Toronto
Archives, University of Toronto.
33
Ibid.
34
Meeting Minutes, Research Board, March 30, 1976, A1979-0025/019, file: Research Board ’75–6.
University of Toronto Archives, University of Toronto.
35
Invention Development Corporation Draft Proposal IV, Research Board, December 18, 1975, A1979-
0025/019, Research Board –executive -75–76. University of Toronto Archives, University of Toronto.
36
Research Board Report: The Concept of An Inventions Foundation, March 30, 1976, A1979-0025/019.
Research Board ’75–6. University of Toronto Archives, University of Toronto.
The Construction of University Technology Transfer
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this trend is not reversed in the near future, Canada may well find that it has moved
from being a political colony of Great Britain to a technical colony of the United
States.’’
37
The Task Force recommended that ‘‘[i]nventors should be encouraged by
the university to find practical applications for their inventions and to ensure that, if
possible, the invention is practiced in Canada.’’ The assumption was that if the
university helps inventors develop their invention to be more market-ready, then
licensing and working with Canadian companies would be more successful. Here,
technology transfer is rationalized in a clearly nationalistic frame.
Inasmuch as the initiative for the Invention Development Corporation emerged
from the desire to better transfer university inventions to Canadian industry, the
unfavorable perception of faculty inventors towards CPDL may have propelled it
forward. For years university researchers had criticized the CPDL’s handling of
inventions and for lacking ‘‘effective connections with the pertinent industry, with
the local business community and with the local financial community.’’
38
Inventors
and administrators at the university were alarmed when the NRC President D. J. Le
Roy informed universities that:
To ensure that the results of these grants are fully and appropriately exploited
to benefit the Canadian economy, in March 1971 the Council decided that in
[the] future, recipients of negotiated grant support shall be required to refer all
inventors, developments, designs, and new ideas resulting from such research
support to CPDL for first consideration as to patentability and possible
exploitation in Canada.
39
If CPDL did decide to patent, a university would have 120 days from the date of
disclosure to decide to license back any ensuing intellectual property.
40
Whereas
CPDL previously entered into agreement with universities to ‘‘protect inventions
from misuse,’’ the rationale now was to ensure that inventions were ‘‘exploited to
benefit the Canadian economy.’’ Although the university shared this concern, it
disapproved of CPDL’s decision to mandate for itself the right of first refusal of
invention disclosures. The minutes of a Patent Committee meeting note one member
saying, ‘‘considering its [the CPDL] past record this could be a disaster.’’
41
In 1976, the Patent Committee had drafted a plan for a university-based invention
development unit called ‘‘Univentures.’’ During one committee meeting it was
suggested that ‘‘the Univentures idea might be a pressure to help improve the
situation at CPDL,’’ and that ‘‘a copy of the Univentures draft could be sent to
CPDL along with a letter indicating that the organization is concerned with
technology transfer and that the present mechanisms are not working particularly
37
Ibid.
38
Invention Development Corporation Draft Proposal IV, Research Board, December 18, 1975, A1979-
0025/019.
39
Letter, LeRoy. 22 March 1971. A1975-0004/31, file: .002. University of Toronto Archives, University
of Toronto.
40
Ibid.
41
Meeting Minutes, Patent Committee, April 7, 1975, A2004-0007/13, file: Professor H.L. Williams.
University of Toronto Archives, University of Toronto.
C. Sa
´et al.
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well and asking for comment.’’
42
The university’s initiative to establish the
Invention Development Corporation, while legitimated and driven by the desire to
contribute to Canadian technological development, had the added benefit of being a
solution to an unfavorable circumstance.
In 1980, the Patent Committee Review Task Force’s proposed Invention
Development Corporation was established as the University of Toronto Innovations
Foundation. The Innovations Foundation was created as an industrially-oriented,
non-profit agency responsible for promoting the commercial development of the
results of the university’s research. Despite the arguments of the Task Force that
‘‘invention and innovation are important corollaries to the creation of knowledge,’’
the Foundation was separately incorporated and placed off-campus. This reflected a
sentiment expressed in University of Toronto’s 1984 submission to the Commission
on the Future Development of the Universities of Ontario that ‘‘the commercial-
ization of University research should be an enterprise as separate as possible from
the normal operations of the University’’ (University of Toronto 1984: 41).
Nevertheless, this was no longer a unanimous view. Executive members of the
Research Board had intended the Foundation to be placed off-campus not because
of the undesirability of its actions in an academic setting, but because these
members assumed that this would enable it to better ‘‘respond to market objectives’’
and to be under ‘‘competent business management.’’
43
In the Task Force’s report, the lines between public and private are blurred.
Recall that in 1923, the Board of Governors patented Insulin ‘‘to ensure that the
invention could be controlled for the public good rather than strictly private gain.’’
44
Fifty-three years later the Patent Committee Review Task Force confronted the
suspicion of exclusive ownership as ‘‘contradiction to the spirit of free inquiry
which is a basic tenet of academic thought’’ by making the case that patents and
licenses ‘‘do not restrict information, but only the commercial use of such
information.’’
45
The Task Force goes on to argue that without guarantees of
exclusive rights or ownership, the public benefit of inventions would otherwise be
unfulfilled because there would be no incentive to encourage any investments in the
development and distribution of the invention - the rationale for the exploitation of
intellectual property that prevails today.
For the first time, people at the university were suggesting that the institution
should stimulate the creation of inventions and their transfer to the marketplace.
Whereas practices in the past sought to harness beneficial inventions created in the
course of routine university activities so as to promote and protect Canadian
interests, the Task Force asserted,
42
Meeting Minutes, Patent Committee, December 11, 1975, A2004-0007/010, file: Jorgensen. University
of Toronto Archives, University of Toronto.
43
Letter, Eastman to Slemon, 1975, A1979-0025/010, file: Research Board –executive –75–76.
University of Toronto Archives, University of Toronto.
44
Meeting Minutes, Board of Governors, 1923, p. 165, A1970-0024/018. University of Toronto
Archives, University of Toronto.
45
Report, Patent Committee Review Task Force, 1977, A1980-0023/007. University of Toronto
Archives, University of Toronto.
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Invention and innovation are important corollaries to the creation of
knowledge and should be encouraged. This is true not only because the
results of research can be financially rewarding to both society and to the
university and inventor, but because the University has an obligation to ensure
that the knowledge it produces is both useful and relevant.
46
The Patent Committee made several attempts at familiarizing the university
community with its activities, even publishing an Inventions Handbook in 1977 to
showcase discoveries arising out of faculty work. In the Handbook, published by the
Office of Research Administration, the Office’s director noted, ‘‘there is still
considerable debate within the University community as to the extent to which it
should become preoccupied with the practical application of the knowledge and
understanding which are the fruits of research.’’ To apparently mollify such concerns,
he explained, ‘‘the patenting and licensing of inventions can be regarded as another
aspect of publication, for it allows the findings of University researchers to reach in an
appropriate way the industrial sector of Canadian society.’’
47
This effort to make
technology transfer activities like other acceptable university activities departs from
earlier patent policies that separated publishing from patenting and licensing and is an
attempt to redefine the acceptable boundaries of university activity.
The establishment of the Innovations Foundation signaled the arrival of the
contemporary era in the institutionalization of technology transfer at the University of
Toronto. Before the Innovations Foundation it was common for the university to receive
around a dozen disclosures per year. The university departments with the largest
concentration of invention disclosures were Electrical Engineering, Chemical Engi-
neering and Applied Chemistry, and Chemistry. By the 1990s, around 100 invention
disclosures were annually submitted by faculty members from an increasingly wide
range of departments (although engineering and chemistry-related departments retained
leadership in the number submitted). This number doubled by the middle of the 2000s
(University of Toronto 2005,2009). Today, university policy documents, reports, and
promotional material openly connect patenting, licensing, and the creation of spin-off
companies with the university’s public service mission. However, contemporary
references serve as natural benchmarks of research productivity and focus on economic
and social growth instead of increasing technological capabilities and reducing research
dependency. In addition to the rise of disclosures and university enthusiasm for
technology transfer, faculty generally view research commercialization positively. A
survey of faculty members from science and engineering academic departments at the
University of Toronto reveals the assimilation of technology transfer in departmental
cultures and practices, with nearly two-thirds of respondents reporting that departmental
colleagues held positive views on patenting and spinoff involvement.
48
46
Ibid.
47
University of Toronto Office of Research Administration. 1977. Inventions Handbook.
48
Responses are from a total 84 faculty members from within the Departments of Ecology &
Evolutionary Biology, Cell and Systems Biology, Chemistry, Computer Science, Chemical Engineering
and Applied Chemistry, Civil Engineering, Electrical and Computer Engineering, Materials Science and
Engineering, Mechanical and Industrial Engineering, Biochemistry, Molecular Genetics, Pharmacology
and Toxicology, and Physics. Unpublished report.
C. Sa
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By 1980, the enhanced social desirability and perceived appropriateness for
university technology transfer activities culminated with the creation of the first
organizational unit strictly responsible for commercializing research results. The
conviction within the university that successful technology transfer to Canadian
industry would require the university to aid in invention development increased the
desirability of technology transfer and research commercialization activities.
Inventors and members of the patent committee had long articulated the desire to
license inventions to Canadian businesses, but university inventors, left to their own
in developing their inventions, often out of necessity entered into licensing with
major U.S. companies. Whether to improve on previous practice or to display a
commitment to a public service mission, the Innovations Foundation embodied the
ideas and interests propelling the commercialization of university inventions.
Conclusion
Investigating the institutionalization of technology transfer at a leading Canadian
university through the perspective of techno-nationalism helps deepen understand-
ings of the socio-economic context of university actions. This analysis illuminates
the overlooked influence of national identities and interests as forces legitimating
and shaping university entrepreneurialism. Canadian techno-nationalism provided a
symbolic foundation from which a shared understanding of the desirability and
appropriateness of a university technology transfer mission was produced. By
connecting the patenting and licensing of university inventions to the public good,
which became interpreted through techno-nationalism, university scientists and
administrators were able to legitimate these actions as services of public science.
Techno-nationalism allowed university staff to discursively stay within the norms of
academic science while at the same time driving the diffusion and legitimation of
university technology transfer.
Early university involvement in patenting and licensing the results of research
were undertaken as exceptional activities legitimated by the notion that the
university was safeguarding the public interest. Beginning in the 1960s, the policy
debate shifted, concentrating on the lack of research and development undertaken
by Canadian industry. Around this time the often-evoked notion of the ‘‘public
interest’’ was interpreted at the university from a viewpoint of building and
enhancing the technological capacity of national industry. By the middle of the
1970s, managers of university technology transfer recognized that Canadian
industry lacked the capabilities to develop and commercialize university inventions,
and that most university patents were licensed to firms in the U.S. as a result. The
flow of university inventions towards the U.S. ignited historical concern about
Canada’s scientific and technical dependency on the southern neighbor.
The University of Toronto institutional setting, particularly the heightened public-
national responsibility of the university and emerging government interests in
techno-sovereignty of the 1960s and 1970s, underscored efforts to support domestic
firms. By the mid-to-late 1970s, faculty and university entrepreneurialism was
encouraged and deemed part of the university mission for the first time. Deliberately
The Construction of University Technology Transfer
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promoting the patenting and licensing of inventions coming out of university
laboratories became acceptable and encouraged. This approach was increasingly
supported by an emerging policy landscape that encouraged innovation and
university-industry collaborations. Protecting Canadian research achievements from
being ‘‘lost’’ to multinational corporations or the U.S. was thus a key organizational
logic helping to institutionalize research commercialization in the university.
The desire of the university to improve its ability to transfer its inventions to
Canadian firms, together with growing federal support for such activities,
culminated in the establishment of the Innovations Foundation, signaling the
beginning of increased university acceptance of and engagement with research
commercialization. The shift away from protecting the public interest, articulated in
the Patent Committee and Patent Policy, gave way to an emphasis on the application
of scientific knowledge and results, patentable or otherwise. This shift is represented
in the Inventions Policy that replaced the older Patent Policy and the reconstitution
of the Patent Committee as the Inventions Committee. It is also evident in the push
for a dedicated intermediary organization focusing on invention development, to be
owned by the university but operating in close contact with the business community.
This study reveals the way in which commitments to changing notions of the
public good, a notion influenced by Canada’s relationship with the U.S., contributed
to faculty and administrations’ pursuit of commercial activities. Concern that
Canada was losing its investment in public research and becoming technologically
dependent on the U.S. encouraged university leaders to reason that to successfully
transfer inventions to Canadian firms, greater university involvement in the
development and commercialization of research discoveries was necessary.
Previous explanations for technology transfer as appropriate for protecting the
public interest were elaborated to support entrepreneurial behavior. Rather than a
private and exclusionary activity, technology transfer conventions such as the
ownership, sale, and private disbursement of royalties were framed as necessary
incentives for encouraging the uptake of university inventions by Canadian industry.
This increasingly important realm of university activity has been and will likely
continue to be powerfully shaped by the contextual factors of the unique U.S.–
Canada relationship. For Canada, this relationship has meant privileged access to
U.S. markets, financial capital, and a virtually integrated academic labor market. We
find that factors related to the asymmetrical integration of the U.S. and Canada have
in many ways impacted the ideas and approaches to technology transfer at the
university, as has been the case in many areas of the university’s affairs since its
inception (Friedland 2002). This study also expands on work done in the history of
Canadian science (Gingras 1991), and on broader studies of Canada–U.S. history
and political economy by filling a gap in the understanding of a specific sphere of
university activity that is becoming increasingly central.
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