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Introduction: Religiously oriented parties and democratization
Abstract
The role of religion in politics is still understudied as a consequence of the so-called “secularization paradigm”, which has been hegemonic in twentieth-century social sciences. Particularly, the role of religiosity within political parties has often been neglected for two reasons. First, there is a widespread normative prejudice about the role of religions in democratic and democratizing systems, where they are perceived to be illiberal and potentially anti-democratic actors. Second, there is the methodological difficulty of defining them with precision. This introduction to the special issue proposes the concept of the “religiously oriented party”. This is a party whose policies are openly based on a specific interpretation of religious precepts, but it can also be a formally secular one with relevant sections of its manifesto dedicated to religious values, explicitly appealing to religious constituencies, and/or a party including significant religious factions. With this definition in mind, the introduction explores the relationship between religiously oriented parties and democratization. Finally, the introduction presents the articles included in the special issue.
... Externally, the level of institutionalization and hierarchical organization within a religious tradition conditions religious parties' ability to absorb authority and compete with other religious actors. Whether authority is centralized or decentralized shapes religious party 19 Toft, Philpott, and Shah 2011;Brocker and Künkler 2013;Ozzano and Cavatorta 2013;Driessen 2014. 20 In this book, I adopt Brocker and Künkler's definition of what a religious party is: "We use the concept of 'religious parties' as encompassing parties that hold an ideology or a worldview based on religion (having, thus, a cross-class appeal) and mobilize support on the basis of the citizens' religious identity … religious parties, it should be noted, can also become identity and preference shapers when religious identities are rather fluid than fixed " (2013, 175). ...
... Such issues are likely to show great variation across countries and, as such, do not lend themselves to a sound comparative analysis. 36 32 Künkler and Leininger 2009;Ozzano and Cavatorta 2013. See Jeremy Menchik's (2016) insightful analysis of Indonesian Islamic organizations for how these groups negotiate the relationship between democracy and Islam. ...
The Politics of Religious Party Change examines the ideological change and secularization of religious political parties and asks: when and why do religious parties become less anti-system? In a comparative analysis, the book traces the striking similarities in the historical origins of Islamist and Catholic parties in the Middle East and Western Europe, chronicles their conflicts with existing religious authorities, and analyzes the subsequently divergent trajectories of Islamist and Catholic parties. In examining how religious institutional structures affect the actions of religious parties in electoral politics, the book finds that centralized and hierarchical religious authority structures - such as the Vatican - incentivize religious parties to move in more pro-system, secular, and democratic directions. By contrast, less centralized religious authority structures - such as in Sunni Islam - create more permissive environments for religious parties to be anti-system and more prone to freely-formed parties and hybrid party movements.
... Furthermore, Ozzano (2013) argues that the role of religiosity within political parties is often overlooked due to normative biases about religion's place in democratic systems. His research highlights the concept of the "religiously oriented party" and its role in shaping political systems, particularly in countries where religious values dominate public life. ...
This issue of Religious: Jurnal Studi Agama-agama dan Lintas Budaya presents a collection of eight articles that examine the intricate intersections of religion, culture, and politics in Indonesia and beyond. The studies explore a range of topics, including the regulation of religious practices, the politicisation of Islamophobia, the influence of social networks on political behaviour, and the use of digital platforms in preserving cultural values. The issue also delves into local religious responses to agricultural crises and the role of religious identity in fostering social cohesion. Together, these articles contribute to broader discussions on how religious and cultural practices adapt to changing societal contexts, providing valuable insights for researchers, policymakers, and academics.
... Although South Korea and Indonesia are both in Asia, they are very different in demography, social structure, government structure, state-society relations, electoral system, and level of economic development. Comparative analysis shows that none of the following variables (or potential alternative explanations) are significant in shaping the ascendancy of religious fundamentalism in politics: the specific religion (Hamid 2014;Spencer 2005); the level of religiosity (Ali 2015;Fallaci 2002); the relationships between state and religious groups and between religious groups (Gill 2007; the popularity of religious political parties (Ozzano and Cavatorta 2014); the type of electoral system (Moseni and Wilcox 2008); and the level of economic development (Roy 1994;Stern 2003). ...
Many scholars argue that democracy tames religious fundamentalism. This inclusion-moderation theory holds that when radical religious movements are incorporated in the democratic system, they have incentives to adhere to institutional frameworks to influence politics and access power. But despite these claims, we have witnessed a growing influence of religious fundamentalism in Asian democratic politics, with immoderation becoming prominent. Why have religious fundamentalist movements become influential in various democracies in Asia? How have they shaped policies? Using a most-different-systems approach, I investigate religious fundamentalism in two dissimilar democracies: Islamic fundamentalism in Indonesia and Christian fundamentalism in South Korea. In both cases, I argue that religious fundamentalist movements facilitate immoderate politics through strong mobilization capacity, agenda-setting power, and framing. The study contributes to the inclusion-moderation literature through its discussion of religious fundamentalism and its cross-religious comparison.
... Social movement research changed the study of Islamist movements in a progressive way. Rather than treating them as 'anomalies' , recent literature analyses Islamist movements as 'normal' and ordinary social movements (eg Beinin and Vairel 2013;Wickham 2015), and it contextualises Islamist parties within the framework of religiously oriented parties or radical parties (Karakaya and Yildirim 2013;Ozzano and Cavatorta 2014;Tepe 2012). Such an approach makes it possible to compare and contrast the Islamists with others who challenge the established systems, such as the socialist and Catholic parties (eg Bermeo 1997;Finocchiaro 1999;Huntington 1993;Kalyvas 1996Kalyvas , 2000Michels 1966;Pareto 1991). ...
What shapes political parties’ direction of change on the political spectrum? Under what conditions do Islamist movements moderate or shift towards a more radical stance? Drawing on the case of the Ennahda Party in Tunisia, I argue that transformation of the Islamist parties should be analysed on par with that of the secular parties, by focussing on the parties’ popular base and the target electorate rather than through a moderation–radicalisation framework. I find that Ennahda’s shift to Muslim democracy, self-defined as specialisation, is owed to their need to be backed by the new urban middle class in order to rule while maintaining the support of the rural and urban poor to come to power. Through field interviews conducted with the members of Tunisian political parties as well as union leaders and activists, I show that the secular parties are going through a similar process under the pressure of the spatial and class-related dynamics.
... For this reason, scholars have been focusing on the institutional evolution of Islamist movements, 15 analyzing political identities of Islamist actors, 16 and using theoretical frameworks that would look familiar to those working on social movements, political parties, and regime transitions in both Muslim and non-Muslim contexts, 17 rather than on re-examining the already answered questions, "such as whether Islam and democracy are compatible, whether inclusion or exclusion is a better strategy for deflating Islamic challengers, or whether Islamists treat democracy as a strategic or tactical option." 18 Since Asef Bayat's seminal work pointing out the failure of many Islamist actors to translate their vision into tangible policies and meet the needs and demands of their support bases, many have also suggested that we have been witnessing a paradigm shift from Islamism to post-Islamism, 19 and that even the Islamists themselves have been abandoning their "nostalgic traditionalism" in favor of alternative modernities and opening themselves to new social and political realities. ...
Shifting attention away from doctrinal debates on Islam toward the political realities of Muslim majority countries, this study investigates the promises and limitations of populism in the Islamic world. Using examples from Egypt, Turkey, and Indonesia, it aims to develop a more nuanced understanding of political Islam, and to shed light on populist forms of politics beyond Western democracies. Central to this ambition is the exploration of whether this recent tide of Islamic populism acts as a corrective that empowers the people, or as a threat that capitalizes on the ill-informed masses to garner support for charismatic leaders.
The cases under scrutiny demonstrate that by weakening the authoritarian structures, producing doctrinally flexible politicians, and incorporating marginalized groups into politics, this new form of populism facilitates democratic transitions in authoritarian and competitive-authoritarian settings. However, the very characteristics of populism that prove successful against the establishment also create significant impediments for democratic consolidation later on. By rejecting plurality and failing to re-establish the formal and informal institutions necessary for democratic governance, these movements often replace one form of authoritarianism with another. Broken promises of inclusion leave a bitter legacy of populism in the political arena, making citizens much more cynical about political processes in the long run.
... Nonostante la cruciale rilevanza della cosiddetta "borghesia anatolica" quale zoccolo duro del consenso all'AK Parti, negli anni si è sviluppato un fecondo dibattito attorno alla natura del partito e all'ipotesi che esso possa essere catalogato come "religioso". Pur non negando la crescita dell'influenza e della visibilità della religione all'interno della sfera pubblica turca negli ultimi anni, la maggior parte degli studiosi concorda nel non ricomprendere l'AK Parti all'interno della categoria dei "partiti religiosi" (Carkoglu 2006;Ciddi 2011;Hale, Ozbudun 2010;Ozzano 2013;Tepe 2006;Yavuz 2009). L'AK Parti e Erdogan si sono limitati ad assecondare alcuni processi già latenti all'interno della società turca, interpretandoli con successo. ...
In Occidente, all'indomani del fallito colpo di Stato orchestrato da alcuni settori delle forze armate nella notte fra il 15 e il 16 luglio 2016, sono molti gli osservatori che si sono domandati quale assetto politico si sarebbe istituzionalizzato in Turchia nell'immediato futuro. Al centro delle questioni vi era la portata delle misure repressive adottate per volontà del presidente della Repubblica, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, e del Governo a guida AK Parti-la formazione politica di cui Erdogan stesso è uno dei fondatori. L'epurazione avviata a livello istituzionale (forze armate, magistratura, sistema educativo e dell'informazione) sarebbe servita davvero a rafforzare la solidità democratica del sistema o, al contrario, avrebbe costituito la precondizione, impraticabile prima del tentato colpo di Stato, per affondarne anche la dimensione politica? Le incertezze che hanno avvolto la politica interna si sono estese anche alla sfera degli affari internazionali, con particolare riguardo alla crisi siriana, alla lotta contro il terrorismo curdo e, più in generale, alla questione curda; e, ancora, al riavvicinamento a Paesi quali Israele e la Russia, con cui negli anni addietro si era verificata una crisi nei rispettivi rapporti bilaterali, all'inasprimento delle relazioni con lo storico partner americano, alla disputa con l'Unione Europea sulla questione dei migranti.
... This was not an easily pre-determined outcome in the region, especially since the countries of the region had already missed the so-called third wave of democratization (Huntington 1993) that began in the 1970s. The main issue in the democratization debate in the region revolves around Islamism and the capacity of these countries to absorb democratic liberal principles into the Islamic cultural and social background (Ozzano, Cavatorta 2013). This is why one important point of interest in analysing the transitional process in Tunisia is the evolution of Islamism in general and its most important representative, the Ikhwani-inspired Nahda party. ...
... One last refl ection concerns the role of political parties and/or movements claiming a religious identity in the making of laws. The literature on law and religion seldom covers this aspect, but political scientists pay attention to it (Ozzano and Cavatorta 2014 ). The main question is whether the inclusion of radical religious parties in political games contributes to moderation of their discourses and their initiatives, or not. ...
Contemporary democracies are open to cultural and religious diversity, but encounter problems when prevailing values and norms are questioned in the name of religious or cultural beliefs and practices. In many Western liberal democracies, legal pluralism is high on the agenda of law and religion scholars because State centred legality fails to do justice to the complexity of social and normative interactions. Legal pluralism provides the intellectual tools for understanding how cultural and religious identities and norms are shaped in different sectors of society. Nonetheless, legal pluralism provides no direct and clear answer to the question of how social order and equality can be upheld under democratic constitutions. Pluralism alone does not guarantee that coexistence among people who live their lives in different groups can be sustained by prosocial attitudes, rather than undermined by conflict. Social psychology, cultural anthropology, and political science investigate how those attitudes can be nurtured. This chapter argues that to understand and manage the tensions generated by the intersection of state norms and religious norms, the law should also make use of the insights provided by these disciplines on human behaviour in society.
... These intuitions mean putting aside the previous debates about Islam/Islamism and its compatibility with democracy in order to concentrate attention on what factors that might contribute to the moderation of religiously oriented parties (Ozzano, 2013). In this context, there is a growing literature dealing with the conditions of Islamist moderation that can vary substantially from country to country and from movement to movement and range from moderation through inclusion to moderation through exclusion and repression. ...
The electoral results following the Arab Awakening have rewarded Islamist parties in Tunisia, Egypt and Morocco. Their arrival in power sparked once more intense scholarly and policy debates related to the relationship between Islamism, democracy and individual rights. This article examines that relationship in the context of the constitutional debates in Morocco and Tunisia, which have seen the prominent role of Islamist parties in attempting to shape the new constitutional charters. What emerges from this analysis is that, in the parties examined, pragmatism plays a greater role than fixed ideological positions.
The Politics of Religious Party Change examines the ideological change and secularization of religious political parties and asks: when and why do religious parties become less anti-system? In a comparative analysis, the book traces the striking similarities in the historical origins of Islamist and Catholic parties in the Middle East and Western Europe, chronicles their conflicts with existing religious authorities, and analyzes the subsequently divergent trajectories of Islamist and Catholic parties. In examining how religious institutional structures affect the actions of religious parties in electoral politics, the book finds that centralized and hierarchical religious authority structures - such as the Vatican - incentivize religious parties to move in more pro-system, secular, and democratic directions. By contrast, less centralized religious authority structures - such as in Sunni Islam - create more permissive environments for religious parties to be anti-system and more prone to freely-formed parties and hybrid party movements.
The Turkish economy is in freefall with rising inflation, unemployment, poverty and income inequality. Yet, the incumbent Justice and Development Party (JDP) continues to get the support of roughly one-third of the voters according to the latest surveys. Although this is a long way from the peak of the party when it was getting half the overall votes a decade ago, it is nevertheless a significant proportion of the voter base. What explains such a vote? More generally, why do people vote against their own material interests? Looking at the JDP’s twenty-year incumbency, it can be argued that the JDP created party identification amongst a particular set of Turkish voters by utilising religious institutions, the education system, the media and civil society to construct its cultural hegemony.
This book explores the deep roots of modern democracy, focusing on geography and long-term patterns of global diffusion. Its geographic argument centers on access to the sea, afforded by natural harbors which enhance the mobility of people, goods, capital, and ideas. The extraordinary connectivity of harbor regions thereby affected economic development, the structure of the military, statebuilding, and openness to the world – and, through these pathways, the development of representative democracy. The authors' second argument focuses on the global diffusion of representative democracy. Beginning around 1500, Europeans started to populate distant places abroad. Where Europeans were numerous they established some form of representative democracy, often with restrictions limiting suffrage to those of European heritage. Where they were in the minority, Europeans were more reticent about popular rule and often actively resisted democratization. Where Europeans were entirely absent, the concept of representative democracy was unfamiliar and its practice undeveloped.
This chapter introduces the terms of the question: what is the ‘religion’ and the ‘pluralism’ in ‘religious pluralism’? Though their ideas were developed in a workshop at the European University Institute in 2015, contributors here and elsewhere in the volume speak from their own disciplinary traditions, taking different approaches to terminology as a result. Therefore, this chapter works across disciplines, providing an overview of some of the central ways in which different disciplines have approached and understood ‘religious pluralism’. This chapter makes a particular distinction between what Rouméas terms theological, sociological, philosophical pluralisms alongside the idea of religious pluralism as a political ideal. This chapter draws attention to how different methodological and ideological approaches give rise to distinctive understandings of ‘religious pluralism’, as well as to how disciplinary-specific assumptions shape how the concept is interpreted.
The Masks of the Political God is a unique contribution by professor of political science Luca Ozzano to studies of religion in party politics. The added value of this important contribution resides in the combination of three aspects: its case selection covers main world religions; it relies analytically on five types of religiously oriented parties proposed by the author in his earlier publications; it studies comparatively religion-related political cleavages during four decades since 1980.
No previous study has combined these three elements. Comparative studies on religion in party politics have been limited to selected geographic/cultural regions and have mostly used theoretical frameworks (e.g. populism, nationalism) that do not tackle the question of religion in party politics as straightforwardly and comprehensively as does this volume.
Scholars studying religion in party politics benefit from both the theoretical and the empirical chapters of the volume. The typology of religiously oriented parties (first published by Ozzano in 2013 jointly with Franscesco Cavatorta, fully presented and used in this volume) is a useful tool for comparative study of religion in party politics; the chapters on democracy and political cleavages present a state-of-the-art overview of recent scholarship and of the main empirical trends. From the selected case studies we gain the insight that besides using useful typologies, we need to consider carefully also contextual particularities.
In the last two decades, multiple Islamic parties have become incumbent parties and/or joined coalition governments. Such a development brought debate as to whether these parties could moderate into democratic actors à la Christian Democratic Parties in Western Europe, or whether they were aiming at the formation of an Islamist state and society through electoral means. What remains relatively unaddressed in the literature, however, is to what degree Islamic parties truly derive their socio-political agenda from Islam. Hence, this paper will ask, how do Islamic parties utilize Islam? To answer this question, this paper will use a single case-study approach to test and to rethink Islamic political parties and what is “Islamic” about them in the Turkish case. This paper will study the Turkish case because the country’s incumbent party, the Justice and Development Party (JDP), has been governing Turkey since 2002, making the Party the longest ruling Islamic party still in power. Based on the literature on populism, this paper will argue that the way the JDP utilized Islam can be characterized as populism flavored by religion that is based on (i) a thin theological foundation, (ii) a majoritarian rather than a multivocal interpretation of Islam, and (iii) a Muslim unity rhetoric.
Despite secularisation, there is growing recognition that some religious parties continue to influence elections and the formation of policy in several countries. What explains why religious parties persist in some countries but not others? This study tests an argument holding that religious diversification promotes political cooperation and therefore reduces the number of religious parties. Using a data set of religious parties across advanced industrial democracies between 1945 and 2011, this paper analyses this argument and finds that religious diversity puts downward pressure on the number of religious parties over time.
The decline of Catholic parties across Latin America appears as an interesting exception to the global political resurgence of religion. Catholic parties, once important players in the region’s politics, have become less distinctive or failed altogether. While many explanations focus on social secularization or the instability of regional politics, this article emphasizes the role of shifting relationship between the Catholic Church and Latin American states. Specifically, it argues that the emergence of flexible accoresearchers continue to catalog the myriad ways in whichmmodation, an arrangement whereby religious politics is managed by individual bishops, politicians and officials, has undermined the functionality and appeal of programmatic religious parties for elites and voters alike. As a result, Catholic religious politics remains vibrant, but is increasingly channeled outside the electoral arena.
Clerical ‘non-negotiable values’ were actively promoted by right-wing governments in the 2000s, the Monti government that replaced them was strongly supported by the Vatican and the Italian bishops, and the current left-wing government is led by a former member of the Catholic popolari who attends Mass every Sunday. But this article argues that, rather than a new golden age of political Catholicism, the return of Catholicism to Italian politics has taken a ‘low intensity’ form which lacks the robust combination of ideas, leaders, organizations, and interests that informed earlier, genuinely political forms of Catholic engagement. The article demonstrates this by focusing on the ‘Todi movement’, which played a crucial role in the Monti government, and on Matteo Renzi’s current leadership of the Partito democratico and the national government. It also proposes a theoretical framework to explain the apparent contradiction between the high visibility and the low political relevance of Catholicism in Italian politics.
Political science struggles, sometimes more than it knows, to study religion’s relationship with politics, democratic and otherwise. The difficulty is in part theoretical. This paper synthesizes diverse strains in recent scholarship on religion to propose a theoretically attuned definition well suited for empirical political science. Religions are defined as systems of shared activity organized around transcendental signifiers. Transcendental signifiers are readily identifiable in public discourse and are “god terms” that organize (or rest at the center of organized) systems of shared activity. This parsimonious definition admits both belief-oriented and practice-oriented phenomena and allows political scientists to study religion as it shapes political acts, interventions, and possibilities. For illustrative purposes, the paper examines a key speech delivered by Sukarno at Indonesia’s founding moment, in which naturalistically observable transcendental signifiers mark the mobilization of religion. Revising older histories that discover a contest between “secular” and “religious” actors, or that are keen to determine the sincerity of Sukarno’s own belief, we contend that Indonesia’s founding is best understood in terms of competing religious discourses that merge in the development of a new civil religion.
Two Islamic actors in Turkey have transformed the state’s strict control of the religious field (laicism). While the National Outlook Movement, the “mother-movement” of the governing Justice and Development Party, did so through its “participation” in party politics, the Gülen Movement, Turkey’s most powerful Islamic movement that operates hundreds of schools and a major media network, contributed to this transformation through its “non-participation” in party politics as a social movement, providing an alternative to laicist establishments outside of institutional channels. These two movements, by following different political paths, have embodied different opportunities for and challenges to Turkish democratization. To understand their influence in Turkish politics today, this article will adapt a “method of difference” and ask what explains these two Islamic movements’ variation in regards to party politics and what the consequences of this variation are for Turkish politics. Based on qualitative fieldwork in Turkey, this article will argue that both movements have made their decisions about party politics by strategically and differently evaluating the political opportunities/threats of party politics in light of their varying ideological priorities and organizational needs, and that these strategic decisions have transformed the movements themselves and the Turkish regime altering the laicist status quo between them.
This chapter discusses Jürgen Habermas’s institutional translation proviso, which is central to his concept of post-secular societies1 and consists of the claim that religious arguments should be translated into a secular language before entering the public sphere. Habermas’s argument is not only normative but also relates the translation proviso to socio-political developments such as the religious pluralization of European societies, which goes hand in hand with a decreasing level of individual religiosity. Habermas’s response to cultural plurality is that religious reasons can be publicly expressed but must be accessible to others once they enter the arena of political decision-making. This chapter focuses on the extent to which Habermas’s concept is applicable to empirical cases; the difficulty in identifying religious arguments; and the problems arising from the observation that “translation” is often used as a strategy by conservative religious citizens to voice their claims.
This article is part of a special issue on the five Muslim democracies. It aims at understanding the role played by religion, and particularly by religiously oriented actors, in Turkey's democratization processes. The first section analyzes the different theoretical approaches to the role of religion in democratization. The second section analyzes the different phases of Turkey's political history since the 1980 coup, taking into account both democratization processes and the role played by religious actors in the political system, and trying to understand the possible relations between the two phenomena.
Featuring contributions from renowned experts, Religion, Politics, Society, and the State provides a uniquely broad perspective on religion's influence on politics, covering multiple countries in major regions. It shows how religion interacts with politics on many different levels, and that these influences can be divided into the influence of the state and the influence of society on politics.
Representing multiple disciplines, methodologies, and levels of analysis--including individual, social group, institutional, and state--the selections cover several countries in major world regions, including the United States, Israel, Turkey, North Africa, and Western Europe. In addition, two chapters include information from the entire world.
This book has several main themes and arguments. International Relations has been westerncentric, which has contributed to its ignoring religion; while religion is not the main driving force behind IR, international politics cannot be understood without taking religion into account; the role of religion is related to the fact that IR has evolved to become more than just interstate relations and now included elements of domestic politics. The book proceeds in three stages. First, it looks at why religion was ignored by IR theory and theorists. Second, it examines the multiple ways religion influences IR, including through religious legitimacy and the many ways domestic religious issues can cross borders. In this discussion a number of topics including but not limited to international intervention, international organizations, religious fundamentalism, political Islam, Samuel Huntington's 'clash of civilizations' theory, and terrorism are addressed. Third, these factors are examined empirically using both quantitative and case study methodology.
More than a century of scholarly attention to political parties has resulted in a substantial number of party models. Yet, so far all these party typologies have not accumulated into a more general theory on the genesis, development and transformation of political parties. This is caused primarily by the fact that most of the party models are seriously biased. First, most party models were developed in the context of western Europe and the United States of America, resulting in a limited ‘travelling capacity’ of these conceptualizations (Sartori, 1984) even across the Atlantic (see Ware, this volume). Secondly, most party models are very unidimensional in their approach, oftentimes focusing heavily or even exclusively on organizational aspects. Duverger (1954: xv) even argued that ‘present-day parties are distinguished far less by their programme or the class of their members than by the nature of their organization.
The article comparatively investigates the role of religious actors in the
democratization processes of five ‘young’ democracies from the Catholic,
Protestant, Christian-Orthodox and Muslim world: West Germany after
World War II (1945–1969), Georgia and Ukraine post-1987/9, Mali (post-
1987), and Indonesia from 1998. The analysis provides an overview of the
roles religious actors played in the erosion of authoritarian rule, the transition
to democracy and subsequent democratic consolidation processes, as well
as de-democratization processes. Our three paired comparisons, including
one in-country comparison, show that the condition which most affected the
role of religious actors in all three phases of democratic transitions was the
de facto autonomy they enjoyed vis-a`-vis the political regime as well as
the organizational form these actors took. Their aims, means, and the political
significance of their theology were highly dependent on the extent to which
they benefitted from de facto autonomy within the state.
Few parts of Europe see as much religious observance as Northern Ireland, and fewer places in Europe have religion as one of the major cleavages on which politics seems to rest. In this article we argue that although religion is an important identifier, it acts as a reinforcer of ethno-national differences rather than as an intrinsically important difference itself. Religious differences while often symbolically important rarely emerge as points of real conflict in Northern Irish politics. It has had little impact on the ongoing process of democratization in Northern Ireland. We review an array of evidence which supports this conclusion. However, we find that religion still has a power to divide and so makes a political settlement less likely than an accommodation.
Religion can influence party politics in several ways: directly, through the activity of explicitly religious parties; indirectly, both through the lobbying activity of institutional actors such as churches and religious non-governmental organizations, and through the influence of religious values on the manifestos of non-explicitly religious parties. However, although several studies about specific contexts exist in the literature, an exhaustive comparative typological analysis of the role of religion in party politics is still missing. One of the main obstacles to a thorough classification is the notion of “religious party” itself, which many reject since it proves too restrictive and is often perceived as carrying a normative meaning. This article therefore proposes a typology of “religiously oriented parties”, which includes not only explicitly religious parties, but also formally secular parties that have significant sections of their manifestos dedicated to religious values, explicitly appeal to religious constituencies, and/or include significant religious factions. The article offers five types of religiously oriented parties: the conservative, the progressive, the fundamentalist, the religious nationalist, and the camp types. Each type is examined through several variables related to political parties more broadly: their organization, their relation with interest groups, their ideology, their social base, and their impact on the quality of democracy and on democratization processes.
ABSTRACT While the literature already includes a large number of party typologies, they are increasingly incapable of capturing the great diversity of party types that have emerged worldwide in recent decades, largely because most,typologies were based upon,West European,parties as they existed in the late nineteenth through,mid-twentieth centuries. Some new,party types have been advanced, but in an ad hoc manner and on the basis of widely varying and often inconsistent criteria. This article is an effort to set many,of the commonly,used conceptions,of parties into a coherent framework, and to delineate new party types whenever the existing models,are incapable,of capturing,important,aspects of contemporary parties. Weclassify,each of 15 ‘species’ of party into its proper,‘genus’ on the basis of three criteria: (1) the nature of the party’s organization (thick/thin, elite-based or mass-based, etc.); (2) the programmatic orien- tation of the party (ideological, particularistic-clientele-oriented, etc.); and (3) tolerant and pluralistic (or democratic) versus proto-hegemonic (or anti-system). While this typology lacks parsimony, we believe that it captures more,accurately the diversity of the parties as they exist in the contemporary democratic world, and is more conducive to hypothesis- testing and,theory-building than others. KEY WORDS � party organization,� party programmes,� party systems � party types For nearly a century, political scientists have developed typologies and
The saliency of religious parties in recent democratic consolidation processes forces the discipline to reconsider key questions on party change: Under what conditions do (radical) religious parties moderate? Is their mere inclusion in the democratic process enough to result in their moderation? If so, exactly what mechanisms are at work here? What roles are played by intervening variables such as coalition politics and electoral systems? And if this is not the case, what other variables may explain the movements of religious parties along the axis between moderation and radicalization? Does religion itself play a role? In the endeavor to answer these and related questions, this introduction to the Special Issue on Religious Parties initially provides some conceptual clarifications and offers an overview of the relevant literature. It is followed by a list of conditions under which the development and shift of religious parties towards ideological and behavioral moderation may be expected. The argument posits that the democratization of the political system and inclusion in electoral competition are not the sole determining factors. Inclusion, indeed, seems to be neither a necessary nor sufficient condition. The four case studies presented after the introduction (by Carolyn Warner, Michael Buehler, Steven T. Wuhs, and Sarah Wilson Sokhey/Kadir Yildirim) analyze this in more depth by working diachronically and across parties of different religions. The first article revisits the development of Catholic parties in Italy, while the following set examines religious parties in the third- and fourth-wave democracies of Mexico, Turkey and Indonesia, and in Egypt, which has still not reached the status of a constitutional democracy.
The article comparatively investigates the role of religious actors in the democratization processes of five young democracies from the Catholic, Protestant, Christian-Orthodox and Muslim world, specifically in West Germany after World War II (1945-1969), in Georgia and Ukraine post-1987/9, as well as in Mali post-1987 and Indonesia after 1998. The analysis provides an overview of the roles religious actors played in the erosion of authoritarian rule, the transition to democracy and subsequent democratic consolidation processes, as well as de-democratization processes. Our three paired comparisons, including one in-country comparison, show that the condition which most affected the role of religious actors in all three phases of democratic transitions was the legal position they enjoyed vis-à-vis the political regime as well as the organizational form these actors took. Their aims, means, and the political significance of their theology were highly dependent on their de facto legal status within the state.
In November of 2002, the Justice and Development Party swept to victory in the Turkish parliamentary elections. Because of the party’s Islamic roots, its electoral triumph has sparked a host of questions both in Turkey and in the West: Does the party harbor a secret Islamist agenda? Will the new government seek to overturn nearly a century of secularization stemming from Kemal Atatürk’s early-twentieth-century reforms? Most fundamentally, is Islam compatible with democracy? In this penetrating work, M. Hakan Yavuz seeks to answer these questions, and to provide a comprehensive analysis of Islamic political identity in Turkey. He begins in the early twentieth century, when Kemal Atatürk led Turkey through a process of rapid secularization and crushed Islamic opposition to his authoritarian rule. Yavuz argues that, since Atatürk’s death in 1938, however, Turkey has been gradually moving away from his militant secularism and experiencing “a quiet Muslim reformation.” Islamic political identity is not homogeneous, says Yavuz, but can be modern and progressive as well as conservative and potentially authoritarian. While the West has traditionally seen Kemalism as an engine for reform against “reactionary” political Islam, in fact the Kemalist establishment has traditionally used the “Islamic threat” as an excuse to avoid democratization and thus hold on to power. Yavuz offers an account of the “soft coup” of 1997, in which the Kemalist military-bureaucratic establishment overthrew the democratically elected coalition government, which was led by the pro-Islamic Refah party. He argues that the soft coup plunged Turkey into a renewed legitimacy crisis which can only be resolved by the liberalization of the political system. The book ends with a discussion of the most recent election and its implications for Turkey and the Muslim world. Yavuz argues that Islamic social movements can be important agents for promoting a democratic and pluralistic society, and that the Turkish example holds long term promise for the rest of the Muslim world. Based on extensive fieldwork and interviews, this work offers a sophisticated new understanding of the role of political Islam in one of the world’s most strategically important countries.
In 2002 the Islamist Justice and Development Party (AKP) swept to power in Turkey. Since then it has shied away from a hard-line ideological stance in favour of a more conservative and democratic approach. In this book, M. Hakan Yavuz negotiates this ambivalence asking whether it is possible for a political party with a deeply religious ideology to liberalise and entertain democracy or whether, as he contends, radical religious groups moderate their practices and ideologies when forced to negotiate a competitive and rule-based political system. The author explores the thesis through an analysis of the rise and evolution of the AKP and its more recent 2007 election victory. The book, which tackles a number of important issues including political participation, economics and internal security, provides a masterful survey of modern Turkish and Islamic politics, which will be of interest to a broad range of readers from students to professionals and policymakers.
This innovative book analyses the relationship between religion and politics in the Middle East through a comparative study of five countries: Egypt, Israel, Turkey, Iran, and Saudi Arabia. Robert D. Lee examines each country in terms of four domains in which state and religion necessarily interact: national identity, ideology, institutions, and political culture. In each domain he considers contradictory hypotheses, some of them asserting that religion is a positive force for political development and others identifying it as an obstacle. Among the questions the book confronts: Is secularization a necessary prerequisite for democratic development? How is it and why is it that religion and politics are so deeply entangled in these five countries? And, why is it that all five countries differ so markedly in the way they identify themselves and use religion for political purposes? The book argues that the nature of religious organization and practice in the Middle East must be understood in the context of individual nation states. The second edition is updated throughout and includes an entirely new chapter discussing the political and religious climate in Saudi Arabia. Earlier introductory analysis has been condensed to make room for new material, and chronologies at the end of each chapter have been added to help students understand the broader context. The second edition of Religion and Politics in the Middle East is a robust addition to courses on the Middle East.
A leading authority in the discipline, Jeffrey Haynes has contributed to many of the most significant debates in the fields of religion & politics and religion & international relations in the last twenty years. This book brings together many of his most influential essays, offering a comprehensive analysis of religious actors and their political goals.
This essay provides an introduction to the secularization debate as it presents itself at the end of the 1990s. After a conceptual survey from the mid-1960s to the present, we focus on the empirical and historical elements that undergird both the daims of secularization theory and those of its principal critics. Secularization theory is placed in relationship both to the Religion of Reason of the Enlightenment and developments in European religious historiography during the nineteenth century. The underlying conflict to be resolved with respect to "secularization" is whether the term can be used in a relatively value-neutral analytic way or whether it inherently carries unsubstantiated value presuppositions.
This essay provides an introduction to the secularization debate as it presents itself at the end of the 1990s. After a conceptual
survey from the mid-1960s to the present, we focus on the empirical and historical elements that undergird both the claims
of secularization theory and those of its principal critics. Secularization theory is placed in relationship both to the Religion
of Reason of the Enlightenment and developments in European religious historiography during the nineteenth century. The underlying
conflict to be resolved with respect to “secularization” is whether the term can be used in a relatively value-neutral analytic
way or whether it inherently carries unsubstantiated value presuppositions.
The inclusion of Hindu nationalist parties in India's democratic process has not resulted in their moderation in a linear manner. Since 1947, the parties have oscillated between a sectarian strategy of religious mobilization and a more moderate one of abiding by democratic processes and liberal norms. While the former has led to radicalization, the latter has facilitated democratic coalition building. Whether the Hindu nationalist parties opted for the path of radicalization or that of moderation has chiefly depended on their relation with their mother organization, the perception of Muslims that prevails at a given time in India, and the electoral strategies of the other parties.
Democratization processes involving religious parties are risky, particularly when these parties are on the verge of winning mandates in critical elections. Religious parties face a commitment problem. Even when willing to comply with the emerging democratic order, they find it difficult to signal credibly that, once in power, they will subject themselves to democratic control. Yet for democratization to succeed incumbents must be convinced that religious parties will behave democratically. A comparison of nineteenth century Belgium and contemporary Algeria shows that established, centralized, autocratic, and hierarchical religious institutions can have a positive effect on democratization processes because they make it possible for religious parties to overcome commitment problems.
Elements of the relation between religion and politics are standard themes in political theory: toleration and free exercise rights; the parameters of separation of church and state; arguments for and against constraints imposed on religious discourse by philosophic norms of “public reason”. But religious parties and partisanship are no part of political theory, despite contemporary interest in “value pluralism” and in liberal democratic theory's capacity to address multicultural, religious, and ethnic group claims. This essay argues that religious parties are missing elements in discussions of “identity politics”. They play an important role not just in expressing but also in constructing and mobilizing religious political identity. Political activity linked to parties is a principal way of bringing diffuse, politically unorganized groups, whose leaders are self-appointed and not regularly accountable for the way they represent co-religionists in political life, into the democratic mainstream. With political organization and especially partisanship, the “fact of pluralism” is made concrete for democratic purposes.
This article analyses the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) and the Independent Democratic Union (UDI) of Chile, both of which could be considered religiously oriented parties. On the basis of the typology introduced in this special issue, we conclude that the PDC has oscillated between the “progressive” and “conservative” types. Meanwhile, the UDI represents an uncontested example of the conservative type. However, both parties share a number of traits. First, they both emerged as youth movements in the Pontifical Catholic University of Chile, where a sizable portion of the country's elite are educated. Second, they both represented movements that sought to break with established political forces, by occupying a specific (and untapped) ideological niche, and by engaging in innovative mobilization strategies. Third, a short time after their creation, both parties witnessed rapid electoral growth, which they consolidated over time. Both parties remain electorally successful today, even in the wake of increasing levels of secularization in Chilean society. Our comparative analysis of both parties describes their historical trajectory in the party system, as well as their contemporary organizational and ideological characteristics. We also analyse each party's doctrinaire influences and their relation to the Chilean and global Catholic Church.
For more than the half of its republican history, the Italian political landscape was dominated by the Christian Democrats – a religiously inspired conservative political party. After its collapse, the possibility of creating a new (or renewed) Catholic party has been widely debated. This contribution focuses on how different areas of Italian Catholicism present the issue of a possible unified Catholic political commitment: what is in their opinion the unifying criterion and what shape the Catholics’ political commitment should take. Data are based on the analysis of articles from Catholic magazines and daily newspapers in the period between September 2008 and spring 2012, thus including the Monti cabinet (November 2011–February 2013).
The success of processes of democratic change is often predicated on the moderation of anti-systemic and extremist parties. The literature on such parties argues that such moderation, namely the acceptance of democratic procedures, human rights, and a market economy, comes about through inclusion. This seems to be borne out when one analyses a number of Islamist parties having contributed to the progressive democratization of their respective countries. The Tunisian case, however, offers a different perspective on moderation. This article argues that it has been exclusion through repression and social marginalization that has led the Islamist party Ennahda to move from its extreme anti-systemic position of the 1970s to become the mainstream conservative party it is today.
With their “deeply divided societies”, distinctive electoral rules and pivotal religious parties, Israeli and Turkish politics offer crucial cases to probe into “polarization” processes and the ways in which religious parties play a role in them. Using a large sample of public opinion and experimental survey data, the analysis shows how polarization can be marked by some contravening trends. Despite declining social trust, religious party supporters do not denounce any institutions categorically; yet disregard some opposing parties as viable political alternatives. The political positions of religious partisans differ from their party leadership. Supporters assign different levels of significance to polarizing issues and carry the potential of forming issue-based coalitions across different ideological groups. Although they acquire news and political information from different venues, most partisans tend to process factual information through partisan lenses, reinforcing partisan ideological commitments. While religious party supporters increasingly reject the existing markers of politics and show signs of political apathy, they do not withdraw from politics. With their multifaceted commitments, religious party supporters do not fall into mutually exclusive political groups. Given the tendency of the political elite to exacerbate divisions for political expediency, it is ultimately the ability of individuals to engage in politics beyond the confines of party politics that presents an escape from these polarization traps.
From the beginning, social scientists have celebrated the secularization thesis despite the fact that it never was consistent with empirical reality. More than 150 years ago Toajuen'lle pointed out that "the facts by no means accord with [the secularization] theory," and this lack of accord has grown far worse since then. Indeed, the only shred of credibility for the notion that secularization has been taking place has depended on contrasts between now and a bygone Age of Faith. In this essay 1 assemble the work of many recent historians who are unanimous that the Age of Faith is pure nostalgia -that lack of religious participation was, if anything, even more widespread in medieval times than now. Next, 1 demonstrate that there have been no recent religious changes in Christendom that are consistent with the secularization thesis -not even among scientists. I also expand assessment of the secularization doctrine to non-Christian societies showing that not even the highly magical "folk religions" in Asia have shown the slightest declines in response to quite rapid modernization. Final words are offered as secularization is laid to rest.
In November 2002 Recep Tayyip Erdogan's Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi (AKP, or Justice and Development Party), a party with roots in Islamic politics, swept to power in Turkey, a state renowned as secular by virtue of its founder, Kemal Ataturk, and his institutionalized Kemalist ideology. This great AKP victory was then solidified over determined military and Kemalist opposition in an even greater electoral victory in July 2007. How did all this happen and what are its implications for secularism, modernity, democracy, and Islam in Turkey and the larger Islamic world?
Having studied this subject both broadly and deeply, Professor Yavuz offers us an original analysis along theoretical and empirical lines that demands close scholarly as well as policy attention. He notes, for example, that "a slow institutional and behavioral Islamization process has been going on in Turkey since the mid-1980s" (p. 262), but that "it would be a mistake to read this Islamization as purely negative. It has played an important role in the ongoing economic development of the country and, as a result, many Muslims have become more moderate" (p. 263). "The AKP is an outcome of the transformation of liberal Islam, directed by four socio-political factors: the new Anatolian bourgeoisie, the expansion of the public sphere and the new Muslim intellectuals, the [EU's] Copenhagen criteria, and the February 28 soft coup" (p. 78). Throughout his study, the author incisively illustrates how these four factors have led to the point where what originated as a Turkish Islamic political movement has evolved into an a- or non-Islamic, conservative democratic party based on neo-liberal economic beliefs.
Yavuz's analysis consists of three sections, the first of which raises various theoretical questions about the definition and evolution of Islamic parties. He argues that "the AKP evolved in reaction to the authoritarian, and somewhat messianic, leadership of Necmettin Erbakan: against his anti-systemic and confrontational National Outlook philosophy" (p. 3). The old Kemalist Turkey "is in fact senile" (p. 43), while the new Turkey does "not seek an Islamic polity but rather the freeing of religion from state control and the removal of obstacles to living a religious life" (p. 4).
The second section analyzes the socio-political origins of the AKP, giving great emphasis to the policies of Turgut Ozal, which led to "the emergence of new economic opportunity spaces and the evolution of a new set of actors" (p. 45). The rise of an Anatolian bourgeoisie "has been at the center of the 'silent revolution', and the democratization and liberalization of Islamic actors have been very much achieved by this bourgeoisie" (p. 11). As opposed to the older Istanbul-based business class largely represented by TUSIAD (The Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association), the new Anatolian bourgeoisie, as largely represented by MUSIAD (The Independent Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association), "are first-generation college graduates and often part of the Anatolian-based petty bourgeoisie who benefited from Ozal's neo-liberal economic policies, which increased social mobility and allowed them to establish their own middle-and small-size businesses" (p. 52). In addition, "this new bourgeoisie . . . challenges old Orientalist assumptions about Islam and its incompatibility with capitalism" (p. 54). "Not unlike the Christian Protestant Calvinists of the sixteenth century, happiness is defined in terms of profit and the struggle to get ahead" (p. 77).
Yavuz also imputes major importance to the unintended results of the military's silent coup of February 28, 1997 against Erbakan's Islamic-led coalition. The February 28 process fragmented Erbakan's Islamic movement into two competing groups, one of which emerged as today's moderate AKP. The coup "taught Erdogan to realize the parameters of democracy and the power of the secularist establishment, and forced him to become a moderate and a democrat" (p. 68). Another chapter focuses on the lives and roles of Erdogan and Abdullah Gul, the AKP's two main leaders.
The author's third and final section begins by examining "the key debate over the realignment of the boundary between religion and politics" (p. 144). Subsequent chapters deal with the Kurdish issue —"the most difficult challenge the country is facing today" (p. 280) —as well as foreign...
Examining all cases of global democratization between 1972 and 2009 (excluding countries with populations of less than 1 million, while including countries that made democratic progress but fell short of consolidated democratic perfection), the paper explores where and why religious actors made a pro-democratic difference. The analysis finds that religious actors played a significant supporting or leading role in more than half of all cases of global democratization in this period. Although the majority of the pro-democratic religious actors in these cases was Roman Catholic, the best explanation for their pro-democratic activity lies not in religious tradition or identity per se (Catholic v. Protestant or Christian v. Muslim, for example). Instead, the paper argues that the best explanation lies in a combination of two key variables: (1) the given religious actor's institutional or structural relationship to the state and (2) the religious actor's theology of politics and government -- its political theology. Where religious actors enjoy some instititutional independence from the state as well as a political theology that is at least compatible with liberal democracy, they are likely to play a democratizing role. The combination of these two factors -- a religious actor's proximity to power and its theology of power -- provides a robust explanation even of differences in political behavior between religious actors of the same religious tradition (for example, why Brazilian and Chilean Catholic actors were pro-democratic while Argentine Catholic actors were not for the most part) as well as offers a satisfying explanation of the so-called "democracy deficit" in the Muslim world.
Religious Parties " ; Kalyvas, The Rise
- Rosenblum
Rosenblum, " Religious Parties " ; Kalyvas, The Rise.
Party Models In Handbook of Party Politics
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Krouwel, André. " Party Models. " In Handbook of Party Politics, edited by Richard S. Katz and William Crotty, 249–269.
Species of Political Parties " ; Rosenblum Religion and Political Parties
- Diamond Gunther
- Mohseni
- Wilcox
Gunther and Diamond, " Species of Political Parties " ; Rosenblum, " Religious Parties " ; Mohseni and Wilcox, " Religion and Political Parties. "
Democracy and Democratization Religious Parties: Revisiting the Inclusion-mod-eration Hypothesis
- John Anderson
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Anderson, John. Religion, Democracy and Democratization. Abingdon: Routledge, 2005. Brocker, Manfred, and Mirjam Kunkler. " Religious Parties: Revisiting the Inclusion-mod-eration Hypothesis. " Party Politics 13, no. 2 (2013): 171–186.
Bringing Religion Into International Relations Galli, Giorgio. I partiti politici italiani Milano: Rizzoli, 2001. Democratization Giorgi, Alberta Ahab and the White Whale: The Contemporary Debate around the Forms of Catholic Political Commitment in Italy
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Fox, Jonathan, and Shmuel Sandler. Bringing Religion Into International Relations. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006. Galli, Giorgio. I partiti politici italiani (1943–2004). Milano: Rizzoli, 2001. Democratization Giorgi, Alberta. " Ahab and the White Whale: The Contemporary Debate around the Forms of Catholic Political Commitment in Italy. " Democratization 20, no. 5 (2013): 895–916.
The Rise of Christian Democracy in Europe Kalyvas, Stathis N Commitment Problems in Emerging Democracies: The Role of Religious Parties
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Kalyvas, Stathis N. The Rise of Christian Democracy in Europe. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996. Kalyvas, Stathis N. " Commitment Problems in Emerging Democracies: The Role of Religious Parties. " Comparative Politics 32, no. 4 (2000): 379–398.
Religious Parties " ; Kalyvas, The Rise; Kalyvas Commitment Problems " ; Yavuz, Secularism and Muslim Democracy Religion and Political Parties
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An issue discussed, among others, by Rosenblum, " Religious Parties " ; Kalyvas, The Rise; Kalyvas, " Commitment Problems " ; Yavuz, Secularism and Muslim Democracy; Mohseni and Wilcox, " Religion and Political Parties. "
The Perils of Polarization and Religious Parties
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Tepe, "The Perils of Polarization and Religious Parties."
19. Brocker and Kunkler, "Religious Parties."
20. Cavatorta and Merone, "Moderation through Exclusion?"
21. Jaffrelot, "Refining the Moderation Thesis."
Introduction – Secularization Theory " ; Aldridge, Religion in the Contemporary World; Stark
- Christiano Swatos
Swatos and Christiano, " Introduction – Secularization Theory " ; Aldridge, Religion in
the Contemporary World; Stark, " Secularization, R.I.P. "
Ahab and the White Whale
- Giorgi
Giorgi, " Ahab and the White Whale. "
Religion and Democracy; Fox and Sandler, Bringing Religion Into International Relations
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Anckar, Religion and Democracy; Fox and Sandler, Bringing Religion Into International Relations;
From Faith to Freedom " ; Kü and Leininger The Multi-Faceted Role
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Philpott, Shah, and Toft, " From Faith to Freedom " ; Kü and Leininger, " The Multi-Faceted Role. "
Religious Parties in Chile
- Monestier Luna
Luna, Monestier, and Rosenblatt, " Religious Parties in Chile. "