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Euroh ealth O BSERV ER
Eurohealth incorporating Euro Obser ver — Vol.20 | No.2 | 2014
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Summary: Incentives are controversial, but increasingly widespread.
Their basic rationales are not always clear, nor is the complexity
of design options fully appreciated. Four common goals are outlined,
and ten key dimensions of incentive programmes are described.
Possible goal conflicts should be addressed through transparent
communication and through monitoring the extent to which goals
are in fact accomplished. Particular emphasis should be given to
identifying the distribution of benefit among users. Regulators should
specify broad categories in which data should be reported to help
identify and promote appropriate programmes, and prevent or phase
out inappropriate ones.
Haral d Schmid t is an Assistant
Profes sor, Departmen t of
Medical Ethics and Health
Policy and Research Associate,
Center for Health Incentives and
Behavioural Economics, Perelman
School of Medicine, Universit y
of Pennsylvania, USA. Email:
schmidth@mail.med.upenn.edu
Introduction
Four rationales
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Goals and goal conflicts
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The complex anatomy of incentive
programmes
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Conclusion
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References
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Summary: Since the late 2000s, policy makers have made increasing
use of health incentives (‘nudges’). At the same time, criticism of
nudging has been mounting as well. In this article we argue that a
perspective drawing upon solidarity can help to create incentives that
are sensitive to social inequalities and that avoid increasing stigma.
This requires that policy makers give careful thought to the definition
of target groups for ‘nudging’. Moreover, health incentives should
also always focus on what people have in common, and not what
sets them apart.
Barba ra Prainsac k is Professor
of Sociology, Depar tment of Social
Science, Heal th & Medicine, King’s
College London, UK.
Alena B uyx is Professor of
Biomedical Ethics, Institute of
Experiment al Medicine, Chr istian-
Albrechts-University Kiel, Germany.
Email: Barbara.prainsack@kcl.ac.uk
Introduction
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Table 1
Table 1
