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Curbing nuisance motels:
an evaluation of police as
place regulators
Gisela Bichler
Department of Criminal Justice, California State University, California, USA
Karin Schmerler
Research and Analysis Unit,
Chula Vista Police Department, California, USA, and
Janet Enriquez
Center for Criminal Justice Research, California State University,
California, USA
Abstract
Purpose – This paper aims to evaluate a problem-oriented policing project that used regulatory
policy to foster responsible place management among operators of nuisance motels located in
Southern California.
Design/methodology/approach – A mixed-methodological approach was used to ensure that a
comprehensive assessment captured substantive outcomes, as well as implementation issues and
displacement effects.
Findings – Each component of the initiative generated some success, with the greatest crime
reduction achieved when all motels were in full compliance with the permit-to-operate ordinance.
Consistency in key project staff was critical to maintaining program integrity.
Research limitations/implications – The displacement analysis suggests that crime prevention
evaluations would benefit from a facilities orientation that identifies locations that might host crime if
the targeted sites are rendered inopportune. And, net effects can be applied to facilities research using
standardized crime rates.
Practical implications – Ends-based regulatory policy offers law enforcement an alternative to
conventional crime control strategies. Responsibility for crime prevention can be shifted to place
managers to reduce the incidents of crime and disorder (reported and unreported to police). Ancillary
benefits include better city-industry communication and more efficient use of city resources.
Originality/value – This research is valuable to police agencies considering the use of ordinances to
address crime and disorder problems plaguing risky facilities.
Keywords Problem-oriented policing, Place management, Risky facilities, Regulatory policy,
Displacement, Motels and hotels, Crime rates, United States of America
Paper type Research paper
Introduction
Evoking responsible place management of motels through a city ordinance is an
alternative to property-by-property nuisance abatement strategies. The primary goal is
to place responsibility for developing and implementing specific actions needed to curb
crime levels with those individuals best positioned to effect change – those who own
and manage places. Typically, ordinances are used by civic authorities (city and police)
The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available at
www.emeraldinsight.com/1363-951X.htm
Received 15 September 2011
Revised 22 March 2012
Accepted 22 March 2012
Policing: An International Journal of
Police Strategies & Management
Vol. 36 No. 2, 2013
pp. 437-462
rEmerald Group Publishing Limited
1363-951X
DOI 10.1108/13639511311329787
The authors would like to thank Melanie Tennant, Amanda Lynn De Vries, Eric McCord,
Stefanie Balchak, and Jill Christie-Merrall for their research assistance. This project was the
overall winner of the 2009 Herman Goldstein Award for Problem-Oriented Policing.
437
Curbing
nuisance motels
to foster better management of private property. This regulatory approach to crime
control aims to increase the public management of sub-standard private facilities and
is a common feature of problem-oriented policing (POP) initiatives. Public management
of sub-standard private facilities is a critical component of problem-solving efforts
because crime at private facilities accounts for a large proportion of police workloads.
As more public areas, such as shopping districts and recreation facilities, are replaced
with large mall structures and other commercial properties, the safeness of private
facilities becomes critical to a community’s well-being.
Selecting from the broad array of regulatory options can be challenging for police
administrators unaccustomed to using civil actions as behavioral control mechanisms.
Until sufficient evidence accumulates, it is unclear which strategy will produce the
greatest effect relative to the effort required to launch new regulatory policy. Using a
mixed methodology, this research paper evaluates an initiative designed to change place
management practices among nuisance motels located in Chula Vista, CA. A central
feature of this initiative, the permit-to-operate ordinance, is an example of ends-based
regulation[1]. Byevaluating the ordinance in relation to the total project, this study offers
clear and convincing evidence of the anti-crime effect police can have as place regulators.
Place management of risky facilities
Risky facilities
Budget motels/hotels offer travelers the most economical room rates for overnight
lodging. Facilities tend to cluster near highway access ramps or along major arterial
roads in areas that attract large volumes of people (LeBeau, 2011). Budget properties
are typically described as motor lodges where guests park their vehicles near to their
rented rooms. Smaller facilities tend to have a horseshoe, L-shape, or terrace structure
that is single or double story with outdoor access to rooms; whereas, some larger
properties are designed to have rooms accessed though interior corridors with several
building egress points that lead to large parking lots. Check-in occurs at the front desk,
which is often not visible from the parking areas. While the location advantage and
anonymity afforded by these inexpensive rooms can attract crime issues, notable
differences are found in crime levels among adjacent properties (LeBeau, 2011;
Schmerler, 2005).
Explanations of crime concentration are enhanced by the recent discussion of risky
facilities (see Clarke and Eck, 2007; Eck et al., 2007). Simply defined, risky facilities are
a class of properties wherein crime appears to concentrate, often at extreme levels
(Eck et al., 2007). Examining crime incidents among a set of homogenous properties
(i.e. apartment complexes, bars, or malls and other youth hangouts) is likely to reveal
that a small proportion of locations account for the majority of crime and disorder
incidents (Clarke and Eck, 2007). This pattern is so common that it has been termed the
iron law of troublesome places (Wilcox and Eck, 2011)[2]. Comparing the characteristics
of high-crime facilities to those of low-crime facilities highlights differences that are
suggestive of possible regulatory action (Eck et al., 2007; Eck and Eck, 2012).
Accumulating evidence points to the role played by management in creating and
sustaining the most extreme criminogenic conditions (e.g. Clarke and Bichler-Robertson,
1998; Hannah et al., 2007; Madensen and Eck, 2008; Mazerolle et al., 1998).
Place managers
Expanding on the role of place managers as explained by routine activity theory
(Cohen and Felson, 1979; Eck, 1995; Felson, 2006)[3], Madensen and Eck argue that
438
PIJPSM
36,2
invoking strategies to change the management approach of individuals positioned to
govern specific places, in this case motel managers/owners, could significantly mitigate
site-level characteristics that are conducive to crime (Madensen, 2007; Madensen and Eck,
2008). According to Madensen and colleagues, place managers fulfill many functions.
Place managers:
(1) organize and oversee the use of space, construction, repair, and selection of
activities that occur on the property;
(2) establish behavioral norms and regulate (promote or prohibit) certain
activities;
(3) control general access to the property and to specific areas within the property;
and
(4) direct the use of resources for the above functions, or to enhance the
profitability of the facility.
Active, engaged place managers can create crime-resilient or crime-susceptible
properties. Those with a penchant to proactively eliminate crime opportunities
are classified as suppressors, in contrast, promoters are managers who recognize the
profitability of crime opportunities and exploit or ignore the situation for personal or
business advantages. Passive management styles also interact with location
characteristics to generate or control crime. Managers who modify behavior or the
environment following a crime event are classed as reactors. Alternatively, enablers
include those place managers who fail to recognize or respond to the crime problem
(Madensen and Sousa, 2008).
Integrating this typology with the broken windows theory (Wilson and Kelling,
1982), Madensen and Sousa (2008) suggest that crime control and prevention strategies
that seek to increase the number of suppressors within a neighborhood should reverse
the spiral of community decay that leads to economic and social disinvestment in
communities. As originally posited by Wilson and Kelling (1982), community decline
begins with rising disorder that engenders fear in the local population. As disorder
continues unaddressed, community sentiment shifts and social cohesion begins to
unravel. People are less willing to intervene, which is interpreted as tolerance, if not
approval, by those involved. Non-offenders modify their behavior, thinking that crime
is on the rise, retreating into their home, or vacating the community. This provides
more opportunity for crime to thrive because the residential management style will
inevitably shift during this process. In turn, this furthers the decline in neighborhood
conditions as evidenced by increasing crime levels (Madensen and Sousa, 2008).
In many communities, budget motel properties clustered along historical
commercial corridors are experiencing this cycle of decline. Originally developed to
support the motoring public prior to the advent of the US Interstate Highway System,
many communities linked by old scenic byways (e.g. Route 66) have central corridors
dotted with a number of small budget motels. As profit margins deteriorate within this
segment of the local hospitality industry – due to the increased popularity of air travel,
changing recreational patterns, and aging of facilities – the number of managers
interested in actively investing resources to suppress delinquency begins to decline.
Eventually, some of these property managers become passive reactors as higher levels
of disorder begin to manifest. Over time these place managers see their efforts as futile
and slip into a passive enabler role. As more managers begin the disinvestment
process, management approaches shift and some individuals begin to notice crime
439
Curbing
nuisance motels
opportunities; this initiates the influx of promoters. If the trend continues, the balance
sways in favor of crime and community decay ensues.
Based on an action research model, POP initiatives are well suited to reversing the
spiral of decline by attacking the source of crime problems. Support for focussing on
management style is found in POP projects that demonstrate the critical role played by
motel operators. Table I outlines initiatives aimed at dealing with problematic motel/
hotel properties. While the crime issues vary, narcotics activity, prostitution, and
general disorder are common problems that emerge when passive owners/managers
allow crime opportunists to take hold in the motel. Most often, agencies choose to
address one problematic facility at a time. Focussing on the most extreme cases, these
POP projects attempt to force management to adopt a crime suppressor role. Common
among these efforts is the use of strategies to: implement specific check-in practices;
educate staff, particularly housekeeping and front desk clerks, about the signs of
criminal activity; foster proactive management policies to maintain safety and public
health standards; and, hold absentee owners accountable for the conditions and
activities occurring on site. Demonstrable reductions in crime were achieved by
changing management style. However, none of these evaluations adequately tested for
displacement effects. As such, the true impact of forcing motel operators to change
their management style has not been assessed.
Displacement effects
In order to claim that a particular course of action demonstrably reduced the incidence
of crime, one must consider whether the initiative merely displaced crime problems.
While it is generally argued that six forms of displacement are possible – e.g. temporal,
target, method, offense type, offender, and spatial – most studies focus on spatial
effects (noted exception Weisburd et al., 2006). Investigations of spatial displacement
concur that, although possible, displacement effects rarely invalidate the benefits of
situational crime control strategies (e.g. Barr and Pease, 1990). For instance, a recent
meta-analysis of 102 crime prevention initiatives found spatial displacement in about
26 percent of the projects, though a detailed analysis of 13 studies showed these effects
to be less than the overall treatment effect (Guerette and Bowers, 2009). Curiously, most
studies considered only the possibility of immediate spatial displacement, despite what
we know about the antecedents of crime incidents. Adjacent sites are not necessarily
the most likely locations for displaced criminal activity.
For crime events to occur, certain conditions must be present: the situation must be
opportune for potential offenders to decide that the effort and potential risk is worth
the anticipated reward (Cornish and Clarke, 1987). Situational inducements and
criminogenic circumstances are crime specific (Clarke, 1997; Cornish and Clarke, 2008;
Clarke, 2008; Wortley, 2008) as the conditions that facilitate one crime (e.g. lack of
street lighting facilitating robbery at an ATM) may not influence another (e.g. credit
card fraud). Since these facilitating conditions are often specific to place functioning,
we should not expect crime reduction interventions at a budget motel to necessarily
displace crime to a dissimilar adjacent property, such as a fast food outlet.
Previous initiatives also show that problematic budget motels are often located
adjacent to relatively crime-free facilities (e.g. Arlington Police Department, 2008;
Henrico County Division of Police, 2008). Under these circumstances, immediate
spatial displacement is not a likely outcome. Instead, motel crime is apt to move a
reasonable distance to another budget property that offers the same set of crime
facilitating conditions.
440
PIJPSM
36,2
Location Year
a
Target Size
Dominant
crime issues
CFS
rate
b
Management
approach
Place management
strategies Effectiveness
c
Displacement
Edmonton,
Canada
1995 1 site n/a Drug activity,
prostitution,
illicit markets
n/a Passive – absentee
owners enabled
Active – manager
promoted
Management change, public
censure of owners, liquor
serving ordinance, staff training
by PD
30% net increase
in sales
Dealers moved to nearby hotels
and retirement residential
property
Aurora, CO 1996 1 site 27 rooms Dr ug activity,
prostitution,
gang-related
3.6 Active – owner
promoted
Crime house ordinance,
refurbish, change check-in
policy, city-wide training by PD
45% decline Not measured
Yuma, AZ 1998 1 site 50 rooms Dr ug dealing,
disorder
15.4 Passive – owner/
manager enabled
Nuisance abatement, sold,
management change
50% decline Renters moved to other hotels;
effect not measured
Charlotte-
Mecklenburg,
NC
1998 1 site 60 units Drug activity,
disorder,
prostitution,
domestic violence
4.3 Passive – owner
enabled
Code enforcement; staff
training by PD, CPTED,
access control
71% decline
b
Not measured
Fresno, CA 1998 1 site 33 rooms Assaults, drug
activity, prostitution
7.0 Active – manager/
owner promoted
Revocation of the rooming
tax permit, closed 120 days
then sold
99% decline
post-owner
b
Immediate vicinity businesses
crime declined; effect not
measured
Hollywood, FL 1998 Several
sites
n/a Prostitution,
hotel residents
n/a Passive – owner/
managers enabled
No trespassing
and manager outreach, code
enforcement, john ordinance
drafted
n/a Not measured
Fresno, CA 2001 1 site 117 rooms Drug dealing,
prostitution,
property
crime, hotel
residents
1.6 Passive – owners
enabled
Active – manager
promoted
Check-in policy change,
management change,
use change to housing for
homeless veterans
87% decline
b
Not measured
Woodbury, MN 2001 City-
wide
5 hotels;
536 rooms
Drug dealing,
prostitution,
forgery, underage
drinking
0.8
(average
post-test)
Passive –
managers/
staff enabled
Check-in policy
change, staff training
by PD, information
exchange w/PD
238% increase
(intended)
Not measured
(continued)
Tabl e I.
Problem-oriented policing
initiatives targeting
nuisance motels/hotels
441
Curbing
nuisance motels
Location Year
a
Target Size
Dominant
crime issues
CFS
rate
b
Management
approach
Place management
strategies Effectiveness
c
Displacement
National City,
CA
2002 1 site 26 rooms Prostitution 0.9 Active – owner/
manager promoted
Code enforcement, enforced no
1
2night rent ordinance,
registration record maintenance
8% decline Not measured
Oakland, CA 2003 1 site 285 rooms Drug dealing,
prostitution, disorder
n/a Passive – owner
enabled
Active – night
manager promoted
Check-in policy/management
policy enforcement, nuisance
abatement, performance bond,
CPTED
59% initial
decline
Not measured
Anaheim, CA
d
2007 City-
wide
153 hotels Credit card fraud,
drug activity,
property crime
n/a Passive – online
booking company
enabled
Passive – staff
enabled
Check-in policy change, staff
training by PD, online-booking
system changed
n/a Not measured
Reno, NV 2006 1 site 22 rooms Drug activity,
prostitution, assault,
property crime
40.4 Active – managers
promoted
Passive – owners
enabled
Nuisance abatement, code
enforcement, staff training,
CPTED, youth/family services
96% decline
b
Not measured
Henrico County,
VA
e
2008 City-
wide
16 motels Drug dealing,
disorder, larceny,
robbery, assault
n/a Passive – managers
enabled
CPTED, no trespassing, social
services for hotel residents,
code enforcement
22% decline Not measured
Arlington, TX
e
2008 City-
wide
17 motels Drug activity,
prostitution, vehicle
burglary
n/a Passive – managers
enabled
Active – managers
promoted
Hotel registration ordinance,
CPTED, quarterly meetings
with motel owners, no rent list
45% decline Not measured
Notes:
a
This year corresponds to the time when the project was submitted for consideration to the Herman Goldstein Awards program. Projects can be found in the references listed by agency
and this year.
b
Values were calculated by the authors based on information provided in the project reports.
c
The decline in crime measured by calls-for-s ervice or reports unless otherwise noted.
d
A detailed description of the POP project was published in the FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin (Hannah et al., 2007).
e
This case provides detailed, property-by-property statistics; however, the
size of each property is unable and thus, it is not possible to calculate an average CFS room rate
Tabl e I.
442
PIJPSM
36,2
Guidance for setting a reasonable displacement distance is found within offender
mobility research. Studies of offender mobility suggest varying travel distances
(e.g. Rossmo, 2000), with offenders traveling less than three miles to commit disorder
and assault (see e.g. Wiles and Costello, 2000) and even shorter distances to sell drugs
(Eck, 1995; Rengert et al., 2000). Moreover, despite the relatively short distances
traveled to crime sites, there is a tendency toward intercity movement, particularly
among successful deviants (Morselli and Royer, 2008; Wiles and Costello, 2000).
Identifying other properties with similar place characteristics must go beyond
simple land use matching. If motels with high, stable crime levels are located adjacent
to low crime facilities, then it is likely that the adjacent low crime properties have place
characteristics that make them resilient to the crime occurring nearby. This means that
crime prevention targeted at motel A, situated along a street with three budget motels,
might displace crime to motel C, bypassing the more proximate facility B, if motels A
and C provide similar crime facilitating conditions. Physical proximity alone does not
indicate situational comparability. Evaluations of programs targeting entrenched
crime problems occurring at a subset of facilities should use properties exhibiting
similar characteristics as control properties and to assess displacement effects.
Comparison motels should share various features, such as similar management
practices and policies, building layout and accessibility, presence of high-risk amenities
(e.g. bars), percentage of local guests, proximity to large recreation venues, and room
rate (Bichler et al., 2003; LeBeau, 2011; Schmerler, 2005). When this information is
not available, crime or calls-for-service (CFS) levels might provide a viable substitute to
establish situational comparability. Facilities with established or durable crime or
disorder problems are likely to be the most receptive to displaced deviance. When
assessing city-wide initiatives, nearby comparable high-crime/high-CFS properties can
serve as anticipated displacement sites, while similar facilities a bit farther a field
might make suitable comparison sites.
Facility size/capacity should also be considered when measuring crime levels.
Schmerler (2005) recommends standardizing crime levels by dividing incident counts,
such as CFS, by the number of rooms for rent to account for motel capacity.
Normalizing incident counts adjusts for crime potential or opportunity, permitting
a more equitable assessment of problem magnitude. For example, if both a larger
property (e.g. 250 rooms) and a smaller property (e.g. ten rooms) experienced 12 crime
or disorder incidents during one year, the magnitude of the crime problem at the
smaller motel would be obscured until the count is standardized by size. In this
example, the smaller property has a crime rate of 1.2 CFS per room, whereas the larger
property has an incident rate of 0.05 CFS per room.
To generate an equitable measure of crime and disorder levels, Schmerler (2005)
advocates using a mix of officer- and citizen-initiated CFS, with an emphasis on citizen
calls. Restricting officer-initiated activity to only the CFS resulting in a crime report or
arrest prevents policing directives (i.e. stings) from overly biasing crime and disorder
measures. Integrating CFS from both sources ensures that proactive management
practices (i.e. staff security handles/screens potential crime incidents) will not unduly
suppress official measures. Taking care to develop appropriate incident inclusion
criteria strengthens our ability to detect real change.
A final consideration merits attention. Simply calculating percent change among
the treatment sites, displacement area, and control area is not a sufficiently sensitive
method for estimating the overall effect of a crime prevention initiative (Eck, 2002;
Bowers and Johnson, 2003; Guerette and Bowers, 2009). Estimating the net effect of
443
Curbing
nuisance motels
crime control efforts requires a mechanism that will simultaneously take changes
among all study areas into consideration. This balanced approach permits the
evaluation to consider any possible diffusion of benefits – where the positive effects of
crime prevention naturally spread beyond the treatment area (Clarke and Weisburd,
1994). Two rather sophisticated equations are available: the weighted displacement
quotient (WDQ) measures the extent of displacement or diffusion present in designated
displacement areas in relation to control areas; and, the total net effect (TNE) captures
the overall effect of an initiative in the study area relative to changes experienced in the
control area while adjusting for any displacement or diffusion into adjacent areas (see
Bowers and Johnson, 2003; Guerette and Bowers, 2009). Alternatively, Eck (2002) offers
the alternative net effect (ANE). This measure simply sums the percent change across
all three-study areas and while less sensitive, it may be more accessible to frontline
crime analysts. If all measures generate consistent results, then a simpler calculation
would suffice.
The present study
Chula Vista motel initiative
As of 2009, Chula Vista was home to approximately 233,000 people. Located seven
miles south of San Diego and seven miles north of the Mexican border, the city is well
situated to accommodate tourists visiting both the San Diego Area and Baja, Mexico
(Schmerler et al., 2009). Many of the motels/hotels are clustered along an arterial
commercial street that used to be part of a scenic byway – Highway 101. For many
years, economic development efforts were stymied by the lack of adequate hotel stock
(e.g. athletes using the Olympic Training Center were housed in San Diego) and the
problems afflicting many of the motels resisted conventional policing tactics.
This city’s overnight lodging industry – consisting primarily of budget motels –
provided havens for serious crime, drug use, and prostitution (Schmerler et al., 2009).
Despite increased attention to the motels throughout the 1990s, crime levels continued
unabated. Typically, the 27 motels in Chula Vista generated over 1,200 CFS each year
(Schmerler et al., 2009). In addition to a high level of drug activity and interpersonal
violence, there were noise complaints and other disturbances (e.g. guests or visitors
would not check-out, pay for a room, or leave the property when asked). Analysis
of police data, in conjunction with field interviews with 58 guests (2002), raised the
possibility that management policies and practices contributed significantly to the
crime problems. Subsequently, the City of Chula Vista launched a POP initiative with
three stages of escalating civil and social pressure to encourage motel managers to
make real changes in the way they ran their properties (for more detail see Schmerler
et al., 2009)[4].
Following a hierarchy of shifting problem ownership (Goldstein, 1997; Scott and
Goldstein, 2005), the crime prevention activities began with outreach, moved to code
enforcement and public accountability, and this led to legislated changes and in some
cases, civil sanctions.
Stage 1: outreach. Early responses to the problems found at budget motels included
information sharing efforts to engage motel owners and operators. Project staff
disseminated CFS “report cards,” that tallied the nature and scope of crime and
disorder occurring at each site; report cards were shared with each operator in an effort
to ensure the owners/managers were informed of the nature and scope of the problems
at their properties. Project staff also conducted seminars for managers at the Chula
Vista Chamber of Commerce and the police department facility to share information on
444
PIJPSM
36,2
local research, laws, and best practices. City staff and a Chamber of Commerce staff
person offered on-site technical assistance. Although several individuals took advantage
of property reviews to identify environmental security issues, little change occurred.
Stage 2: code enforcement program and public accountability. Outreach efforts were
unable to correct the crime and disorder problems occurring at the most troubled
properties leading project staff to engage available civil mechanisms. Soliciting
assistance from the City of Chula Vista code enforcement office, each facility was
inspected. Major problems were found with two properties and they were subsequently
closed. In an effort to shame managers/owners into action, project staff also began
distributing reports to all motel operators that ranked each motel property by CFS per
room rate from highest to lowest. Still, serious crime and disorder issues continued
unabated at some locations.
Stage 3: permit ordinance. Ratcheting up the pressure on uncooperative motel
operators, six city agencies formed a working group to develop a permit-to-operate
ordinance (city attorney, finance, fire, police, planning and building, and community
development). Together, this working group developed an annual permit process that
used compliance with public safety standards to issue permits to operate motels. Based
on a fixed city standard – the 2005 median CFS per room rate[5] – properties with crime
and disorder rates below the threshold were granted a license to operate for one year[6].
Properties failing to meet the threshold were required to enter into a memorandum of
understanding with the city (financial guarantees are included in some cases) to take
appropriate corrective action.
General impact
As illustrated in Figure 1, the general impact of this initiative was dramatic among the
most risky motel facilities in Chula Vista. Between 2004-2005 and 2006-2007[7], the top
tier (most troubled properties) experienced a 68 percent reduction in CFS, small decreases
were found among the middle tier properties (36 percent), and the well-performing
properties maintained their low crime and disorder rates (Schmerler et al.,2009).This
dramatic reduction was mirrored in crime reports. From 2003 –to 2009, crime reports
across the city remained relatively constant with a slight decline beginning in 2007;
whereas, there was a 70 percent drop in crime reports at motels (Schmerler et al., 2009)[8].
The grey-hashed area between the closing of a problem motel and the enactment of the
permit ordinance is highlighted because there were extensive communications among
many of the stakeholders regarding the pending city council ordinance vote.
Two of the 24 motels that requested permits in 2008 (the first year they were
required) did not clearly meet the CFS standard during the corresponding performance
review period (federal fiscal year October 1, 2006 to September 30, 2007). Both
properties ultimately entered into memorandums of understanding with the city that
provided financial guarantees that the motel operators would implement substantial
changes in management and security practices in 2008. Subsequently, both of these
facilities fulfilled their obligations and were in compliance the subsequent year. While
this initial assessment suggests that the initiative was successful, several questions
require attention. How effective was the permit-to-operate ordinance relative to
the total project? Was motel crime simply displaced to neighboring jurisdictions?
Did manager behavior actually change in response to law enforcement activities?
And ultimately, was it worth the effort? To address these questions the evaluation of
the Chula Vista Budget Motel project involved two distinct research components: an
impact assessment and a process evaluation.
445
Curbing
nuisance motels
Methodology
Impact assessment research design
Programmatic impact was determined by comparing pre- and post-levels of CFS
among budget motels located in the study area, a comparison zone, and displacement/
diffusion region. Despite efforts to ensure comparability among study groups, the
impact assessment can be classified as a non-equivalent control group design (Cook
and Campbell, 1979). CFS counts for crime and disorder calls to each property were
compared for two pre- and post-periods to separate the effects of the permit-to-operate
ordinance from the larger project. These values were normalized by the number of
rentable rooms prior to being used in the displacement measures that are described below.
Selecting comparison areas. Selecting appropriate comparison and displacement
areas can be challenging when initiatives involve city-wide strategies. Thus, sites
within the region were carefully screened using the following criteria: the properties
must have medium or high rates of crime activity as captured through CFS per room
rates[9]; the facilities must be classed as budget motels/hotels[10]; the properties must
be located on arterial roads or near freeway onramps; the sites could not be located in a
dense, urban core of a major city (i.e. downtown San Diego); and must be located in
San Diego County. These criteria were developed to enhance the equivalence of
properties used. In total, 27 similar facilities were identified. To minimize possible
history effects two properties were disqualified – one from the diffusion group and one
from the comparison group – due to targeted crime control activities by the respective
police agencies that occurred during the study period. The remaining properties
were reclassified into potential displacement sites and comparison locations based
on proximity to Chula Vista.
1.60
Manager
survey
Report
cards
Problem
motel
closed
Permit
ordinance
passed
All motels
in
compliance
Manager
survey
1.40
1.20
1.00
0.80
CFS rate
0.60
0.40
0.20
0.00
00-01
Project
planning
Project
evaluation
Phase 2: code
enforcement
Phase 1:
outreach
Phase 3:
ordinance
01-02 02-03 03-04 04-05 05-06 06-07 07-08 08-09
High tier (1.0+)
Middle tier (0.5-0.99)
Low tier (<0.5)
City standard (0.61)
Figure 1.
Annual change in median
CFS ratios of motels
in high-, middle-, and
low-rate tiers
446
PIJPSM
36,2
Motels/hotels located within three miles of Chula Vista’s hospitality corridor were
used to determine whether CFS increased among nearby properties; nine potential
displacement sites with CFS room ratios above 0.5 were chosen from National City and
Southern San Diego. Spatial displacement was most likely to involve budget motels
located within three miles of Chula Vista for two reasons: first, a highway system links
these alternative locations directly to Chula Vista; and second, studies of offender
mobility find that most serious offenders (engaged in the types of crime and disorder
plaguing Chula Vista motels) rarely travel more than three miles when selecting crime
targets (e.g. Rossmo, 2000)[11].
Contamination is a constant threat when agencies get involved in publicized POP
efforts. To find comparison properties that were less likely to be influenced by
contamination, a wider search area was used; 16 medium and high crime facilities (at or
above a CFS room rate of 0.5) located in two San Diego County cities (La Mesa and El
Cajon) were selected. These cities contain similar motel stock to the study area, but are
located greater than ten miles from the treatment city thereby ensuring some degree of
insulation from local conditions affecting the treatment sites.
Gross and net displacement effects. The CFS per room rate (CFS rate) was generated
by dividing the total annual number of CFS (certain officer- and most citizen-initiated)
received for crime- and disorder-related issues by the number of rooms at each motel.
Traffic stops/pedestrian stops (unless they resulted in an arrest or crime report), and
other non-crime related activity was excluded. Two different sets of time periods were
used in order to detangle the effect of the ordinance from the larger project: the pre- and
post-ordinance evaluation compared 2005-2006 and 2007-2008, while the overall project
impact set an earlier pre-initiative period (2004-2005) against a later post-initiative
period (2008-2009). Recall that all time periods corresponded with the federal fiscal
year (October 1-September 30).
Several measures were calculated from the median of study group CFS rates (for a
detailed discussion of these equations see Bowers and Johnson, 2003; Guerette, 2009;
Guerette and Bowers, 2009). A simpler, alternative equation was also used to assess the
TNE (see Clarke and Eck, 2005; Eck, 2002 for a discussion of this alternative equation).
Using the median of annual rates for each study group diminishes the effect of random
spikes and is more appropriate for non-normal distributions found among risky
facilities. This generates a more conservative estimate of changes in CFS levels. The
calculations were as follows:
Net effect ¼S1
C1
S2
C2
ð1Þ
Weighted displacement quotient ¼
D2
C2
D1
C1
S2
C2
S1
C1
ð2Þ
Total net effect ¼S1
C2
C1
S2
þD1
C2
C1
D2
ð3Þ
Alternative net effect ¼S2S1
S1
þC2C1
C1
þD2D1
D1
ð4Þ
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where Srepresents crime and disorder levels among the study group motels with
subscript 2 designating the post-test and subscript 1 indicating the pre-test; C
represents crime and disorder levels among the comparison motels with subscripts
denoting the pre- and post-test time periods, and; Drepresents crime and disorder
levels among the displacement/diffusion motels with subscripts denoting pre- and
post-test time periods.
Process evaluation research design
Three methods were used to enhance the rigor of the process evaluation. First, the
manager survey, supplemented with site audits, provides evidence of change in
management behavior. Capturing information about the resources used to complete
this project (measured by time spent working with or attending to issues at the study
properties) across two time periods – project development and implementation, and
post-ordinance maintenance – helps to determine the cost-benefit associated with
the project. Finally, to provide guidance for agencies considering the use of POP to
generate an ordinance-based initiative, a program fidelity evaluation was conducted
to suggest aspects of this project that were critical to its success.
Manager survey and site audits. Two methods were used to capture information
about place management. The manager survey documented standard policies and
practices. The pre-test included 77 questions administered in-person to the primary
manager/operator of 23 properties (two managers declined to participated and two
properties had closed)[12]. Two teams of interviewers (two research staff, and
frequently, a volunteer from the City of Chula Vista, were in each group) met with
respondents over a three-day period in November 2002. Reliability assessments of six
pilot interviews used during the training process revealed consistent administration.
Moreover, field observations of the research teams during data collection helped to
ensure protocols were followed. Researchers noted their impressions of whether the
manager was forthcoming immediately after questioning respondents; 81 percent of
motel operators were considered to have been relaxed during the questioning, leading
staff to rank their answers as open and honest. The questions targeted: general hotel
operations and property description, policies and procedures (e.g. check-in, security),
troublesome guest behavior, and factors affecting business success. During the
follow-up survey (a copy is available upon request), 27 of the original questions
were administered online with follow-up telephone calls conducted by one researcher;
the response rate was considerably lower, with only 42 percent of managers agreeing
to participate.
More objective data about management changes were captured with code
enforcement inspections of security features (e.g. doors without deadbolts, peepholes
or nearby windows, and security chains). Code enforcement and fire department staff
also examined health conditions (e.g. building standards related to sewage, structural
integrity, and fire regulations). This information was supplemented with site visits[13]
documented with pre- and post-implementation photographs and written notes about
each property to gauge esthetic improvements.
Cost-benefit analysis. The amount of time city personnel spent on the initiative
was calculated by summing for each project phase the time dedicated by specific
personnel categories (e.g. public safety analysts, city attorney) within each agency (e.g.
city attorney, police department, code enforcement)[14]. Police department time
commitments includes staff dedicated to this research effort (public safety analysts,
police managers), as well as the time police officers spent on certain officer- and most
448
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36,2
citizen-initiated CFS at the motels. Time spent on calls was calculated by subtracting
the time at which a call was cleared from the time the officer was dispatched.
Investigative costs were not included. Each city agency involved in the initiative
(city attorney, code enforcement, finance, etc.) also included the time currently
dedicated to maintaining the ordinance.
Program fidelity. The development of any intervention rarely proceeds as planned.
Pooling information from many sources – research activity time sheets (e.g. time sheets
documenting the manager survey development and administration), e-mail between
research staff, meeting minutes, memos, and retrospective interviews with individuals
involved with the project – generates a comprehensible description of project
operations and implementation. Examination of these materials uncovered issues
encountered during strategy implementation and possible research limitations
affecting the outcome measures.
Results
Impact assessment
Tables II and III provide the gross effects of the initiative on vulnerable properties.
Comparing the percent change in median CFS per room rates following the
implementation of the permit ordinance suggests that both Chula Vista and the
displacement motels (National City and Southern San Diego) benefited from the
initiative (see Table II). Interestingly, Table III suggests that the overall project impact
showed a more pronounced decline in Chula Vista and the comparison area[15]. Taken
together, the significant declines reported in these tables illustrate the gross effect of
the initiative. A more sensitive exploration is needed to tease out the relative impact of
the project.
Several notable findings emerge from examining the net effects (see Table IV). First,
across all measures used, the permit-to-operate ordinance generated a greater
reduction in crime and disorder among Chula Vista motels than the total project. This
Property
description Total CFS count Median of CFS rates
Facilities Rooms
Pre-
ordinance
Post-
ordinance
Percent
change
b
Pre-
ordinance
Post-
ordinance
Percent
change
c
Study area Chula
Vista motels 15 986 1,016 626 38.39 0.79 0.46 41.77
Displacement/
diffusion motels 9 393 362 272 24.86 1.00 0.43 57.00
National City 6 256 189 150 0.85 0.39
Southern San
Diego 3 137 173 122 1.30 0.62
Comparison motels 16 953 887 919 3.61 0.77 0.73 5.20
La Mesa 6 313 442 361 1.09 0.81
El Cajon 10 640 445 558 0.66 0.62
Notes:
a
The pre-ordinance federal fiscal year ran from October 1, 2005 to September 30, 2006 and the
post-ordinance federal fiscal year ran from October 1, 2007 to September 30, 2008.
b
A one tail w
2
test
reveals that this overall change is significant (w
2
¼57.49; df ¼2; po0.001).
c
A one-tail w
2
test indicates
that this overall change is significant (w
2
¼10.59; df ¼2; po0.01)
Table II.
CFS pre- and
post-initiative for the
permit-to-operate
ordinance for troublesome
motels in the study area,
displacement zone, and
comparison area
a
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suggests that it is possible that the dramatic reduction in crime could have been
achieved by only implementing the ordinance.
The WDQ score of 1.79 for the ordinance indicates that a diffusion effect occurred;
meaning, that the problematic study area and displacement motels experienced a
Property description Total CFS count Median of CFS rates
Facilities Rooms
Pre-
project
Post-
project
Percent
change
b
Pre-
project
Post-
project
Percent
change
c
Study area Chula
Vista motels 15 986 995 415 58.29 0.79 0.39 50.63
Displacement/
diffusion motels 9 393 413 388 6.05 1.10 1.08 1.82
National City 6 256 245 168 1.14 0.47
Southern San Diego 3 137 168 220 0.73 1.62
Comparison motels in
El Cajon 10 640 574 544 5.23 0.81 0.61 24.69
Notes:
a
Crime and disorder counts were only available for El Cajon comparison sites prior to 2005.
The pre-project period was the federal fiscal year from October 1, 2004 to September 30, 2005 and the
post-project period included the federal fiscal year 2008-2009.
b
A one-tail w
2
test reveals that this
overall change is significant (w
2
¼123.54; df ¼2; po0.001).
c
A one-tail w
2
test indicates that this overall
change is significant (w
2
¼8.50; df ¼2; po0.05)
Table III.
Overall project impact
measured by change in
CFS among troublesome
motels
a
Coefficient Use
Permit-to-operate ordinance
impact Total project impact
Score Interpretation Score Interpretation
Net effect Determines study area
impact in relation to
changes in the control
area
0.39 þValue indicates
a decrease in the
study area relative
to the control area
0.34 þValue indicates
a decrease in the
study area relative
to the control area
Weighted
displacement
quotient (WDQ)
Measures the extent of
displacement or
diffusion in the
displacement area in
relation to the study
and control areas
1.79 þValue indicates
there was a
diffusion effect;
study area effects
are amplified
1.23 Value suggests
the study area
effect was eclipsed
by changes in
other areas
Total net effect
(TNE)
Indicates the overall
effect in the study area
in relation to changes
in the control area
while adjusting for
any displacement/
diffusion effects
0.81 þValue suggests
the response was
effective overall
0.05 Small value
suggests no
change overall
relative to other
areas
Alternative net
effect (ANE)
Estimates the total net
effect of the project
1.04 Value indicates
the response was
effective overall
0.77 Moderate value
indicates the
response was
effective overall
Notes: For more information on how to interpret these findings please see: Guerette (2009) or Guerette
and Bowers (2009). The alternative net effect is explained by Eck (2002)
Tabl e IV.
Measured impacts of
the permit-to-operate
ordinance and the
overall project on
median CFS rates
450
PIJPSM
36,2
substantive decline in crime and disorder once all Chula Vista motels were in
compliance, meanwhile there was no change in the median crime level measured
among the comparison properties. In contrast, the WDQ score calculated for the total
project (1.23) shows that overall crime and disorder decreased substantially among
troubled properties in the study area and the comparison area, with no change found
in median scores among motels located in the displacement regions. Interpreting
these figures together might suggest that the reduction in crime experienced in Chula
Vista was eclipsed by overall lack of change in the displacement area. This is not
necessarily a poor outcome. This means that overall, the initiative had no impact on
the displacement properties; crime was not moved to properties with similar pre-test
characteristics.
The TNE values also indicate that the magnitude of change resulting from
the permit-to-operate ordinance far exceeds the total project impact. Notably, while the
ANE also found that the permit-to-operate was effective overall, it offers a conflicting
assessment of the total project impact. Where the TNE shows the overall project
impact to be negligible, the ANE suggests otherwise. Regardless, both show that this
motel initiative reduced CFS in Chula Vista and the project did not simply displace
problems to other vulnerable locations.
Findings from the process evaluation
Manager surveys. Several notable changes were uncovered through the manager
surveys (see Table V). Place management improved as indicated by a reduction in the
number of properties renting to guests staying more than 30 days[16] and an increase
in the number of facilities operating with written check-in policies. Indirectly, the
dramatic decrease in the local customer base reflects a decrease in permissive rental
.
Pre-intervention
(23 respondents;
November 2002)
(%)
Post-intervention
(10 respondents;
May 2008)
(%) % change
Property characteristics
Family operated 67 50 25
Chain or franchise 39 30 23
Policies and practices
Local customer base 70 30 57
Rent rooms for more than 30 days 44 30 32
Drivers’ License or ID recorded at check-in 100 100 0
Written check-in policies 55 90 64
Motel rules posted/handed out 73 70 4
Refused to rent rooms 83 70 16
Troublesome guest behavior (prior month)
Too many people in the room 65 20 69
Guests partying loudly 30 30 0
Vandalism/Graffiti 35 10 71
Suspected prostitution 17 0 100
Suspected drug dealing 35 10 71
Theft of/from car 9 10 11
Threats to motel staff 17 0 100
Stealing from motel 35 30 14
Tabl e V.
Selected indicators from
the manager survey of
policies and practices
451
Curbing
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practices[17]. Prior to the project, 70 percent of motels served primarily local customers
(people living within 30 miles): following the enactment of the permit ordinance, only
30 percent of motels rented primarily to local clientele.
Significant reductions were found in the level of: too many people in the room,
vandalism and graffiti, suspected prostitution and drug dealing, and threats to motel
staff. Two exceptions are noteworthy: guests partying loudly and theft of or from
vehicles did not show substantive change. In general, this self-reported victimization
suggests that while conditions at the properties did change, some crime and disorder
issues remained.
Site audits. Radical improvement in room safety was immediately apparent.
According to code enforcement reports, the number of motel rooms in Chula Vista
that did not meet basic safety standards[18] declined from at least 378 pre-test, to 0
post-intervention. An example illustrates the nature of these safety problems.
Site visits revealed that in 2002, 33 percent of properties did not have peepholes and
28 percent did not have deadbolts on room doors; whereas, no motels were deficient
in 2008. It is also noteworthy that all motels applying for operating permits had
acceptable health inspections in 2008.
A case study provides a more subjective illustration of the nature of some changes.
Prior to the start of this initiative, the El Primero Hotel had a CFS ratio of 1.6 and
charged $200 per week to rent a room. After meeting with project staff, reviewing the
report cards, and participating in the voluntary site audits, the original owners decided
to sell the property. The new owners enacted improvements and completely remodeled
the property. The property’s CFS ratio dropped to 015 in 2005 and room rates increased
considerably, to $100 per night in 2008.
Cost-benefit analysis. Table VI displays the estimated annual time spent dealing
with problematic motels for two periods – project development compared to ordinance
implementation. Aside from code enforcement and the city attorney’s office, most of
the non-police city and other related costs pertain to the development and assessment
of the regulatory response. In contrast, the vast majority of the law enforcement costs
pertain to attending CFS. For this reason, the city and other related commitments
are listed separately from law enforcement costs. Average annual personnel hours are
also reported.
The savings in dedicated patrol officer time attending CFS was significant; on
average 1,253.4 hours per year are being saved following the implementation of the
ordinance (51.2 percent reduction). Of note, this does not factor in detective and
other personnel costs borne by the department. If these values were included, the
saving of police personnel time would be considerably higher. This is a significant gain
in light of the relatively minor cost required to maintain the ordinance.
Program fidelity. Study duration and history effects. While lengthy study periods
may introduce history threats, they were also instrumental in the success of this
initiative. The evaluation spanned nine fiscal years. Various events and macro-level
situations may have affected crime levels at the Chula Vista motels, or motels in the
displacement or comparison areas, that were unrelated to the initiatives described here.
For instance, at least one notoriously troubled motel in the displacement area was
disqualified because it was the subject of a targeted law enforcement initiative
(National City Police Department, 2002). Despite assurances from all relevant agencies
that all motel-oriented policing activities were reported to Chula Vista program staff,
it is plausible that other, undocumented policing activities occurred. However, a
potentially greater concern is posed by macro-economic trends.
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PIJPSM
36,2
Since the permit-to-operate ordinance was couched within the overall project impact,
it is important to acknowledge that the extended follow-up period intersects with
both the economic bubble growth and collapse associated with the housing market
that dramatically affected cities in Southern California, particularly Chula Vista. If
these conditions harmed the overnight lodging industry, it was not evident in the
monthly transient occupancy tax figures. City revenue from motels, calculated
at a 10 percent tax rate, show that the average annual revenue generated for Chula
Vista was $2.1 million pre-ordinance (2001-2006) and $2.5 million post-ordinance
(2007-2009)[19]. While the relative stability of tax figures might be an artefact of
increasing room rates that typically followed radical management changes[20], these
data clearly show that the aggregate profitability of the motels operating in Chula
Vista maintained constant throughout the duration of the project. Macro economic
factors did not have an immediate impact. Moreover, upgrading facilities and invoking
stronger place management does not necessarily lead to widespread insolvency among
motel operators.
Extended project timelines contributed significantly to the success of this initiative
for several reasons. Interviews of police staff revealed that lengthy implementation
periods provided sufficient time for motel operators to respond to the site audits, report
cards noting crime problems, and the stipulations of the permit ordinance. Operators
needed time to voluntarily take responsibility for developing and implementing
changes on their own before escalation to more coercive strategies was warranted.
Considerable effort was extended to ensure that various community stakeholders
were routinely provided with information throughout the duration of the project.
Time spent on dealing with
problematic motels Average annual personnel hours
Project
development
(2001-2006)
Ordinance
implementation
a
(2007-2009)
Project
development
Ordinance
implementation
City/other costs
b
City attorney 40 95 6.7 31.7
Code enforcement 165 72 27.5 24.0
Finance 35 15 5.8 5.0
Fire 30 0 5.0 0
Planning 35 0 5.8 0
Redevelopment 20 0 3.3 0
Research partner
c
784 95 130.7 31.7
Subtotal city/other costs 1,109 277 184.8 92.4
Law enforcement costs
Police project staff 1,775 760 295.8 253.3
Attending calls-for-service 14,686 3,583 2,447.7 1,194.3
Subtotal law enforcement costs 16,461 4,343 2,744 1,448
Notes:
a
Ordinance implementation time commitment costs include enforcement and maintenance of
the ordinance program for federal fiscal years (October 1-September 30).
b
City personnel estimated
time spent on this project.
c
Total research time costs were concentrated in a shorter time period:
pre-ordinance activity occurred in 2002-2003 and post-ordinance activity occurred only in 2008.
To calculate the average annual hours, the number of years included in the pre- and post-ordinance
periods was used
Table VI.
Staff time committed to
addressing problems
measured in hours
453
Curbing
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This degree of communication gave interested parties sufficient opportunities to raise
concerns and respond to requests. Ancillary benefits included public endorsement of
the project and the development of interagency rapport. From a budgetary and staffing
perspective, spreading each phase of the initiative over a couple of fiscal years enabled
project staff to manage competing priorities and regular duties: the motel project was
not a full-time assignment.
Staff turnover, a consistent plague in all crime prevention programming, did not
threaten the Chula Vista motel project. Despite a change in command staff
and retirements/transfers among project personnel, this initiative remained on course
in part because both a key member of the program staff and the research partner
remained the same throughout the duration of the study. Consistency in some
personnel was essential to maintaining the focus of the project, integrity of program
implementation, and stability in data collection (pre- and post-test measures). Involving
a research partnership with faculty from an academic institution contributed to
program stability. Academics are less apt to be transferred out of a department/unit
during multi-year projects as the promotion and retirement processes are different than
those of law enforcement agencies.
Data reliability. Due to budgetary constraints, the survey of motel operators
conducted during the pre-test was not fully replicated during the follow-up period.
The laundry list of items used in the original survey (77 questions), was reduced to 27
questions that directly tapped policies and practices shown to be associated with crime
problems (Bichler et al., 2003; Schmerler, 2005). While instrumentation was not at issue
since the original wording was retained, the shorter survey may have reduced the
rapport built with respondents. During the pre-test, 81 percent of respondents were
ranked as being forthcoming with information. In contrast, the research staff reported
that fewer respondents were thought to be forthcoming during the shorter follow-up
survey. In addition, the face-to-face administration process used to gather baseline
information generated a response rate of 88 percent (23 of 26 attempted) and this
dropped considerably on the follow-up (40 percent), where internet/telephone survey
methods were used (ten of 25 completed the survey). Using fewer questions and
changing to a less personal administration style may have decreased the researcher/
subject rapport and this may have adversely affected the response rate and the
reliability of self-reported victimization. It is the latter issue that is of concern here.
During the follow-up motel manager survey, several respondents noted that calling
the police to assist when problems arise was now being counted against them.
Reluctance to call police may have suppressed post-test CFS counts, particularly
among smaller properties. For example, to maintain an acceptable threshold, a 200-unit
motel could conceivably have 99 CFS during the year without violating the permit-to-
operate standard; whereas, a smaller facility of only 15 units would only have seven
CFS before risking their permit for the following year. For this reason it is possible that
smaller properties may be more inclined to suppress calling activity.
Several performance measures are needed to ensure that real change is captured
when assessing problem-solving activity that is likely to decrease citizen-generated
CFS. To this end, a mixed methodology was used in this evaluation (i.e. victimization
survey and code enforcement reports) and key outcome measures including both
citizen- and select officer-initiated call activity as described above. Since all research
components found consistent or complimentary evidence that crime and disorder
declined in the study area, the self-reported reluctance to call the police is unlikely
to have materially altered these findings. The results are more convincing because the
454
PIJPSM
36,2
findings from each component concur. Future evaluations of POP efforts are strongly
encouraged to adopt a mixed-method approach.
In sum, to successfully develop and implement an ordinance that will foster
improved place management of private facilities several factors must be considered:
(1) private parties must have sufficient time to voluntarily develop and implement
changes at their facilities;
(2) clear, consistent communication is needed among all relevant stakeholders
throughout the duration of the project to garner political support;
(3) stability in project staff is critical to maintaining the integrity of the project;
(4) developing research partnerships with academic institutions can improve the
breadth of information available to understand a problem, provide scientific rigor
to program evaluations, and increase the stability of project staff personnel; and
(5) using a mixed methodology and various measures to capture the impact of the
program are essential to providing: clear and convincing evidence that real
change resulted from the POP activity, and sufficient mitigation to thwart
potential research limitations.
Implications
This evaluation demonstrates that a problem-oriented framework can be used to
change management practices among troublesome, private facilities without
displacing crime issues to other vulnerable sites. Policing through regulatory policy
has the potential to shift the focus of crime control from a place-by-place or case-based
strategy to an omnipresent solution. Evident from the POP projects reviewed (recall
Table I) is a tendency to police entrenched crime problems one at a time; nine of the 14
motel POP projects reviewed describe policing efforts targeting a single motel. Most
specified required changes to each property and used the threat of existing code
enforcement or nuisance abatement procedures to coerce compliance. Eck and Eck
(2012) would classify these efforts as means-based regulatory actions involving
command and control policies – motel operators were required to adopt specific
practices or technologies.
Two problems surface with this approach. First, providing motel operators with
an itemized list of corrections can backfire. As aptly demonstrated by the Oakland
airport motel POP project (Oakland Police Department, 2003), management can enact
superficial changes, in full compliance with required corrections, that do not meet the
spirit of the requested change. For instance, ordering a property to dismiss a problem
employee will not change management practices because motel owners can replace one
poor employee with another – replacing a promoter with an enabler will ensure that
crime problems continue unabated. In the end, the Oakland project achieved success
when they changed to an ends-based approach.
Second, a piecemeal approach that targets facilities individually is less likely to
produce sustained crime reductions. Addressing a single, high-crime site governed by
an active crime promoter or passive enabler will simply deflect crime to nearby
facilities that are receptive to deviant behavior. Further, motel operations are unlikely
to remain static: properties with motel operators that are passive enablers (e.g. failing
to adequately screen prospective guests) may change, possibly in response to macro-
level economic conditions, into active promoters of crime (e.g. knowingly renting rooms
455
Curbing
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by the hour to prostitutes). This means that an assortment of managers, with
varying interests in preventing crime, will exist in a city. Drawing from the
modified broken windows theory presented by Madensen and colleagues (Madensen,
2007; Madensen and Eck, 2008; Madensen and Sousa, 2008), reversing the spiral of
community decline will require routine and community-wide efforts to bolster the
rigor of place management.
Ends-based regulations that apply to all facilities equally while providing flexibility
for individual circumstances and room for adjustment to address community dynamics
holds greater promise for success. Giving place managers the freedom to, experiment
with and individualize prevention methods so as to find the solution that best fits
their unique property and budget, can: reduce the strength of objections; decrease
obligations on civic leaders and police to produce means evidence (Eck and Eck, 2012);
shift the responsibility for crime reduction on those most capable of invoking change
(Scott and Goldstein, 2005); and, reduce the possibility of displacement.
Police can act as place regulators of private facilities without incurring excessive
costs. Control and management of private facilities is a critical issue affecting the
development of community crime problems. Apathy frustrates crime prevention
efforts: often the people best situated to rectify the conditions that generate crime
issues are the ones least motivated to invest the time and resources to make the
changes needed. This study found clear evidence of behavioral change (i.e. the
implementation of better management practices, such as hiring high-level private
security, controlling access to the property, and rigorously screening guests and
visitors) on the part of motel operators that materially decreased the crime and
disorder incidents occurring on their properties. Police efforts were able to affect
change at the most criminogenic properties without increasing crime and associated
costs at the well-managed properties in the city. The resource savings (time spent
on the project vs dealing with crime and disorder incidents at budget motels) and
consistent tax revenue generated suggests that regulatory policies are a viable
and effective method of exerting public influence to police private facilities. Given the
current civic crisis in budgetary shortfalls, such initiatives may provide a mechanism
to reduce the drain on city resources that festering crime problems cause. Establishing
a small licensing fee or fine system could produce the financial support needed to
maintain ends-based monitoring, thereby ensuring the sustainability of the ordinance
(Eck and Eck, 2012).
By using a POP framework, law enforcement agencies can acts as both a catalyst
and facilitator to bring about real change in the underlying causes of crime. Police
agencies regularly collect invaluable data about community problems; their data
systems also offer a potential means of measuring success and monitoring situations
so as to identify when crime and public safety issues begin to resurface. In addition to
being able to draw attention to issues, law enforcement agencies are uniquely
positioned to engage stakeholders in developing solutions. The routine actions of
police put them into direct contact with the community, social service agencies, private
business and professional associations, and various branches of city governance.
Though often lacking the resources to resolve crime problems independently, police
departments are well versed in the art of forming a task force to accomplish specific
aims. The Chula Vista motel project aptly demonstrates the leadership role law
enforcement can play in developing partnerships to resolve crime problems.
Displacement analysis is critical to determining whether a crime prevention
program was effective; however, the method used must be tailored to the type of facility
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PIJPSM
36,2
being examined. This study used an innovative approach to measuring displacement
that involved three facets. Instead of measuring displacement from a target area, a
facilities orientation was adopted. The conditions required to support crime are
situation-specific and thus, like facilities are more apt to experience displacement
than areas of different land use that are adjacent to the targeted site. Second, using a
city-wide crime prevention strategy necessitated the use of similarly situated budget
motels with stable crime levels in four other nearby jurisdictions, with the closest
locations set as the displacement facilities and the locations farther away acting as the
comparison sites. Evaluations of POP are strengthened by incorporating offender
movement tendencies when stipulating likely displacement sites. Third, in measuring
crime and disorder incidents, the number of officer- and citizen-initiated calls
associated with each facility was standardized (dividing by the room count).
Standardizing the outcome measure controlled for differential opportunity and reduced
the manipulative impact of intentional changes in CFS patterns. By integrating these
facets, this study is the first to use a facilities approach to measuring net displacement
that controls for differential opportunity.
Calculating displacement effects does not have to be complicated. Comparing the
more sophisticated WDQ and TNE coefficients suggested by Guerette and Bowers
(2009) (also see Bowers and Johnson, 2003; Guerette, 2009) to the simpler equation
suggested by Eck (2002) revealed that making the effort to conduct a more
rigorous investigation of the effects of a crime prevention strategy can be informative.
However, the WDQ and TNE rely on ratios rather than percent change. While this
makes the coefficients more sensitive, if the displacement sites and the control sites
have stable crime levels during the pre- and post-test, one might be forced to divide or
multiply values by zero. In fact, zero values should appear when using standardized,
facilities-based values. If the crime prevention was a resounding success, the values
for at least the comparison sites should be the same, thereby generating ratios with
values of zero. In this situation Eck’s (2002) ANE equation could be more appropriate
as it relies on the addition of percent change ratios within each area. For many
crime analysts accustomed to calculating percent change, this equation may be more
accessible. Ease of calculation and interpretation might encourage greater use,
in turn, leading to an increased number of project assessments that capture
displacement effects.
Conclusion
Regulatory policies offer law enforcement an alternative to conventional crime control
strategies. An array of regulatory options focussed on means-based anti-crime policy
(i.e. codifying the locking mechanisms required for each motel room) and ends-based
policy (i.e. setting acceptable crime thresholds) are viable. As was shown here, while
the Chula Vista budget motel initiative included several strategies, the findings show
that the permit-to-operate ordinance exhibited the strongest impact on crime,
producing a notable decline in crime and disorder, and demonstrable changes in
property management. These results were not compromised by displacement effects.
The ends-based regulatory instrument used here may be more powerful overall
because it was precise and carried the most significant penalty – failure to control
crime on the property incapacitates the business – whereas, the overall project offered a
diffused influence that was harder to measure. This research is valuable to other police
agencies that are considering adopting ordinances to address problems at risky
facilities.
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Notes
1. Eck and Eck (2012) differentiate between ends-based and means-based policies: ends-based
regulation specifies targets and standards of operation with accompanying sanctions
or penalties for failure to achieve target thresholds; and, means-based policies require the
adoption of prescripted mechanisms considered effective in thwarting crime problems.
2. Although, Wilcox and Eck (2011) contend that the high levels of crime experienced by some
sites might be a simple correlate of popularity.
3. Felson (2002) argues that the geographical and temporal patterns of crime are best
understood by uncovering everyday patterns of work, social, and residential routines
because these habits shape the convergence of the six essential ingredients of crime events.
Crimes occur when a motivated offender, a suitable target, intersect at a specific location, and
there is a conspicuous absence of capable guardians, intimate handlers, and effective place
managers (Cohen and Felson, 1979; Eck, 1995, 2002; Felson, 1995, 2002, 2006). An additional
element is the convergence setting or place; these are locations where people gather as they
are getting ready to commit a delinquent act or they could be behavioral settings (Barker,
1968) from which the idea of the crime event develops. Convergence settings play a critical
role in crime commission, particularly when co-offenders are required (Felson, 2006).
4. As is often the case with POP initiatives, a recursive process is required. Initial efforts to
resolve entrenched crime problems are quite frequently insufficient, leading many to repeat
the analysis, response, and assessment phases several times before an effective and stable
resolution is reached. Entrenched, long-standing crime problems are complex and not easily
dislodged.
5. The median CFS rate is calculated on the prior federal fiscal year (October 1-September 30).
Using a variable threshold integrates flexibility into the ordinance; permitting the city to
respond fairly to shifting situations. When first enacted, the CFS threshold was 0.61 CFS per
room. At the time, this figure was the 2005 median CFS rate for the city. The threshold
dropped to 0.5 following the exclusion of several officer-initiated call types, at the request of
city motel operators.
6. A copy of the ordinance (CVMC 5.39) can be found at: www.codepublishing.com/CA/
chulavista_html.html
7. The federal fiscal year, running from October 1 to September 30, was used for all of the
results reported.
8. This dramatic reduction is also reflected in felony arrests; while officer-initiated CFS at
motels declined 19 percent from 2000-2001 to 2008-2009, officer-initiated felony arrests
decreased 86 percent (from a total of 44 to 6).
9. The Chula Vista city standard of 0.5 CFS per room rate was used.
10. Temporary overnight lodging facilities are classed as motels if guests and visitors can
directly access rooms without having to enter the motel lobby or main building; whereas,
hotels include facilities designed so that the guests and visitors must pass through a front
lobby or enter through an external door to an interior corridor to access rooms. Budget
accommodations are generally considered properties with the lowest nightly rates.
Generally, those properties with room rates under $60 per night are classed as budget
motels/hotels (Schmerler, 2005).
11. Crime activity could displace to apartment complexes within Chula Vista. It is arguable that
apartment buildings are similar to motels in that they have comparable density, general level
of anonymity, and high levels of transient populations. Thus, CFS standardized by number
of units was examined for complexes of eight or more units between October 1, 2004 and
September 8, 2008. No displacement was found: these results are available upon request.
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12. This instrument is available in the appendix of the Herman Goldstein Submission for the
Problem-Oriented Policing Award by Schmerler et al. (2009), titled, “Reducing Crime and
Disorder at Motels and Hotels in Chula Vista, CA” located at: www.popcenter.org/library/
awards/goldstein/2009/09-47(w).pdf. A shortened list of notable items can be found on the
Chula Vista Police Department web site at: www.chulavistapd.org/motels
13. During the pre-test, 26 environmental surveys were conducted. This systematic
environmental survey captured information about pedestrian and vehicle accessibility,
social climate (e.g. physical evidence of drug use or prostitution), surrounding land use,
lighting, and target hardening features. Due to its excessive length, the environmental
survey is available upon request from the corresponding author. Alternatively, a copy of
this instrument can be found in the appendix of Schmerler et al. (2009) located at: www.
popcenter.org/library/awards/goldstein/2009/09-47(w).pdf. This instrument was not
administered during the follow-up due to budget constraints. Instead, code enforcement
inspections were used to determine whether specific security features were in place.
14. For two reasons the amount of time devoted to this project was used to estimate project cost.
First, soft costs in salaries and benefits of personnel, whose time is split between different tasks,
is often underestimated and personnel costs often comprise the largest resource required to
conduct problem-oriented policing initiatives. Knowing how many hours each phase of this
initiative required would enable other communities to better estimate if they have the resources
available to conduct a similar project. And second, time spent can be easily converted to dollar
figure by multiplying the number of hours by the average wage for each agency or position
involved in the project. This permits easier adjustment for regional variation in baseline salaries.
15. Earlier data were not available for all sites so the total project assessment does not include
the impact of early outreach efforts and the pre-test manager survey.
16. Housing long-term residents in facilities designed for temporary overnight lodging is generally
associated with higher levels of crime and disorder (for an explanation see Schmerler, 2005).
17. A disproportionate number of local c lientele is associated with high crime and diso rder levels
(Schmerler, 2005). At any time, most budget motels are likely to have a small portion of local
guests. People may stay at a motel located within their cityof residence for several legitimate
reasons (e.g. their home is being fumigated or remodeled, or a domestic argument or the
initiation of divorce or separation may generate a temporary need for housing). However,
when the balance of tenants is drawn from the surrounding community a significant
correlation with crime develops (Bichler et al., 2003). Explanations for this pattern vary.
18. All rooms must have deadbolts, peepholes (or a nearby window) and door chains/security bars.
19. Transient occupancy tax revenues (TOT) were drawn from the 2009 report titled, “San Diego
County TOT Collections,” produced by the San Diego Convention and Visitors Bureau.
20. For example, in 2005 the Royal Vista Inn changed $45 per night when its CFS ratio was 0.76;
whereas, in 2009 with a change in ownership to the Comfort Inn and Suites and a CFS of 0.33,
the hotel charged about $109 per night.
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Further reading
Aurora Police Department (1996), “Red coach motor inn”, Submission for the Herman Goldstein
Award for Excellence in Problem-Oriented Policing, available at: www.popcenter.org/
library/awards/goldstein/1996/96-04.pdf (accessed March 29, 2011).
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department (1998), “Independence lodge project”, Submission
for the Herman Goldstein Award for Excellence in Problem-Oriented Policing, available
at: www.popcenter.org/library/awards/goldstein/1998/98-11.pdf (accessed March
29, 2011).
Edmonton Police Service (1995), “The Klondiker hotel project: hotels, crime, and problem-solving
on the beat”, Finalist, Herman Goldstein Award for Excellence in Problem-Oriented
Policing, available at: www.popcenter.org/library/awards/goldstein/1995/95-21%28F%29.
pdf (accessed March 29, 2011).
Fresno Police Department (1998), “Big star motel project”, Submission for the Herman Goldstein
Award for Excellence in Problem-Oriented Policing, available at: www.popcenter.org/
library/awards/goldstein/1998/98-21.pdf (accessed March 29, 2011).
Fresno Police Department (2001), “The Fresno inn”, Submission for the Herman Goldstein Award
for Excellence in Problem-Oriented Policing, available at: www.popcenter.org/library/
awards/goldstein/2001/01-23.pdf (accessed March 29, 2011).
Hollywood Police Department (1998), “Federal highway project”, Submission for the Herman
Goldstein Award for Excellence in Problem-Oriented Policing, available at: www.
popcenter.org/library/awards/goldstein/1998/98-25.pdf (accessed March 29, 2011).
Reno Police Department (2006), “Motel interdiction program: a nuisance abatement project”,
Finalist, Herman Goldstein Award for Excellence in Problem-Oriented Policing,
available at: www.popcenter.org/library/awards/goldstein/2006/06-43.pdf (accessed
March 29, 2011).
Woodbury Police Department (2001), “Creating relationships and safe hotels”, Submission for the
Herman Goldstein Award for Excellence in Problem-Oriented Policing, available at:
www.popcenter.org/library/awards/goldstein/2001/01-72.pdf (accessed March 29, 2011).
Yuma Police Department (1998), “Tropicana motel”, Submission for the Herman Goldstein
Award for Excellence in Problem-Oriented Policing, available at: www.popcenter.org/
library/awards/goldstein/1998/98-86.pdf (accessed March 29, 2011).
About the authors
Gisela Bichler is a Professor in the Department of Criminal Justice at California State University,
San Bernardino. Generally, Dr Bichler’s research explores the interplay between the environment
and offending behavior. She is Founder and Co-Director of the Center for Criminal Justice
Research – CSUSB. Gisela Bichler is the corresponding author and can be contacted
at: gbichler@csusb.edu
Karin Schmerler is a Senior Public Safety Analyst for the Research and Analysis Unit of the
Chula Vista Police Department. She is responsible for strategic and administrative analysis
products for the agency.
Janet Enriquez is a Research Associate with the Center for Criminal Justice Research – CSUSB.
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