Democracy and Climate Change: What Can Deliberative Democracy Contribute?

Abstract

This paper argues that deliberative democracy is best placed to meet the challenge that climate change poses to systems of governance, although the task of implementing it is challenging. Deliberative democracy extends on the basic idea of democracy by emphasising the way in which citizens engage with issues, requiring reflection on all relevant dimensions. Where climate change is easily crowded‐out in the prevailing nature of political debate, deliberation helps to make salient less tangible and complex dimensions associated with the issue. Evidence is presented in support of the capacities of citizens to deliberate on climate change, with evidence drawn from a mini‐public in the Australian Capital Region. The possibilities for “scaling up” these benefits of deliberation to the polity as a whole are then discussed. Although it is not straightforward, specific mechanisms for engendering deliberation among the wider public are suggested. If successful, deliberation not only promises to transform the possibilities for action on climate change, but also to build the capacity to respond by improving the underlying conditions for environmental governance.

Full text

Australian Journal of Politics and History: Volume 59, Number 3, 2013, pp.430-449.
© 2013 The Author.
Australian Journal of Politics and History © 2013 School of History, Philosophy, Religion and
Classics, School of Political Science and International Studies, The University of Queensland and
Wiley Publishing Asia Pty Ltd.
Democracy and Climate Change: What Can
Deliberative Democracy Contribute?
SIMON NIEMEYER
Australian National University
This paper argues that deliberative democracy is best placed to meet the challenge that climate
change poses to systems of governance, although the task of implementing it is challenging.
Deliberative democracy extends on the basic idea of democracy by emphasising the way in
which citizens engage with issues, requiring reflection on all relevant dimensions. Where
climate change is easily crowded-out in the prevailing nature of political debate, deliberation
helps to make salient less tangible and complex dimensions associated with the issue. Evidence
is presented in support of the capacities of citizens to deliberate on climate change, with
evidence drawn from a mini-public in the Australian Capital Region. The possibilities for
“scaling up” these benefits of deliberation to the polity as a whole are then discussed. Although
it is not straightforward, specific mechanisms for engendering deliberation among the wider
public are suggested. If successful, deliberation not only promises to transform the possibilities
for action on climate change, but also to build the capacity to respond by improving the
underlying conditions for environmental governance.
Introduction
Australia is generally regarded as a strong democracy, but it is not without flaws,
particularly when it comes to the quality of political debate. And while it has achieved
some measure of action on climate change, the outcomes are patchy. Climate change
policy has been, and still is, subject to wild fluctuations according to changing electoral
fortunes and public opinion. From a deliberative democratic point of view the issue of
climate change has highlighted a relatively poor public sphere in Australia, often
dominated by powerful interests.1 The highly adversarial nature of Parliamentary
debate is regarded as particularly problematic, and these dynamics have spilled over
into public debate on climate change. That this dynamic is ultimately inimical to
developing community solidarity around the need to act on the issue, or even
understand it, is something noted in a number of accounts in this volume.2
Climate change has loomed for some decades as an important challenge confronting
the ability of human social and technological systems to adapt. It is already pushing the
limits of existing systems of governance to effectively respond. This is at least partly
due to the difficulty in conveying the need for action even as scientific consensus
1 Marian Sawer, Norman Abjorensen, and Philip Larkin, Australia: The State of Democracy (Sydney,
2009); Clive Hamilton and Sarah Maddison, Silencing Dissent (Crows Nest, NSW, 2007).
2 John Mikler and Neil Harrison in particular note that even for corporations whose actions contribute
directly to climate change, the adversarial nature of public debate is seen as an obstacle to pushing for
increased technological innovation to address emissions, with companies concerned about intervening
in a highly charged and bifurcated political environment.

Democracy and Climate Change 431
coalesces around findings supporting the need for greater urgency.3 The complexity of
the issue, combined with the nature of public debate in Australia, has made it all too
easy to obfuscate in order to maintain the status quo.4
What can be done to address the apparent disconnect between the democratic
process and the imperatives that are raised by climate change? For some, the impasse
can only be addressed through solutions that bypass the vagaries of debate and a public
incapable of dealing with complex issues.5 For them the cause of public participation
on the climate change issue is lost and the solution is to suspend or modify (in order to
weaken) certain democratic institutions. This contrasts with the assertion of John
Dewey that “the cure for the ailments of democracy is more democracy”.6 It is this
latter position that is adopted in this paper. Indeed, it turns out that the kind of
improvements to democracy advocated by Dewey resembles the deliberative
democratic approach that I seek to advocate.7
Deliberative democracy is a broad field, emerging around 1990, unified by a central
belief that democracy ought to involve more than voting and decision making by
elected representatives. While the specifics of the field can be hard to pin down, John
Dryzek argues that the deliberative capacity of a democratic polity can be determined
by the extent to which it is “deliberative”, “inclusive” and “consequential”.8 It is
deliberative insofar as the political debate involves the exchange of reasons under
conditions of fairness and equality among citizens who are open to competing
arguments and, where necessary, accommodating alternative views. In this sense
deliberative democracy takes seriously the idea that preferences are formed as part of
the political process.9 A polity is inclusive to the extent that all those individuals are
affected by a decision have the opportunity to deliberate and provide input into the
decision making process. And it is consequential to the extent that the deliberations of
citizens are reflected in the decision being made.
While the inclusive and consequential components of deliberative democracy are
critical to the functioning of deliberative democratic systems, here I focus on the
deliberativeness part of the system.10 I seek to identify ways in which improving public
3 Philip Kitcher, “The Climate Change Debates”, Science, Vol. 328, 5983 (June 2010), pp.1230-1234.
4 Bruce Tranter, “Political Divisions over Climate Change and Environmental Issues in Australia”,
Environmental Politics, Vol. 20, 1 (2011), pp.78-96; Clark A. Miller and Paul N. Edward, Changing
the Atmosphere: Expert Knowledge and Environmental Governance, Politics, Science, and the
Environment (Cambridge, MA, 2001).
5 Most famously captured by Schumpeter’s description of the “primitive citizen” when entering the
realm of the political. Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, fifth ed. (London,
[1943] 1976).
6 John Dewey, The Public and its Problems (Athens, OH, 1927); John S. Dryzek and Patrick
Dunleavy, Theories of the Democratic State (Basingstoke, England, and New York, 2009), p.209. See
also Walter F. Baber and Robert V. Bartlett, Deliberative Environmental Politics: Democracy and
Ecological Rationality (Cambridge, 2005).
7 Dryzek and Dunleavy, Theories of the Democratic State.
8 John S. Dryzek, “Democratization as Deliberative Capacity Building”, Comparative Political
Studies, Vol. 42, 11 (November, 2009), pp.1379-1402.
9 E..g. Amy Gutmann and Dennis F. Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement (Cambridge, MA,
1996); John S. Dryzek, Discursive Democracy: Politics, Policy and Political Science (Cambridge,
1990). Bernard Manin, “On Legitimacy and Political Deliberation”, Review of Political Theory, Vol.
15, 3 (August, 1987), pp.338-368.
10 For an introduction to the concept of a deliberative system, see Jane Mansbridge and John
Parkinson, eds., Deliberative Systems: Deliberative Democracy at the Large Scale (Cambridge,
2012).

432 Simon Niemeyer
debate on climate change using deliberative innovations can serve to transform the
nature of climate change politics and thus realise in full the environmental potential of
democratic polities.
Using empirical evidence, I will demonstrate that, contrary to the assertions of
sceptics about citizens and their role in democracy when it comes to environmental
issues, the basic ingredients for action on climate change are in fact incipient in the
average citizen. Realising popular support for environmental goods does not require
wholesale transformation of public values, but facilitation to realise latent preferences
that are distorted by the nature of public debate. The solution to the problem is not to
give in to an authoritarian impulse and bypass public debate altogether, but to
democratise public discourse along deliberative democratic lines.
The paper begins by outlining the nature of the challenge of governing in the face of
climate change and the main kinds of responses (authoritarianism, democratic) that are
discussed in the literature. To this discussion I add the possibility of deliberative
democracy, firstly in theory, then in practice, in the form of a three-day deliberative
mini-public conducted on the question of climate change adaptation in the Australian
Capital Region. Drawing on this evidence, I then consider the possibilities for
achieving this kind of deliberation in a broader democratic system, with emphasis on
the Australian context, and the resulting prospects of climate change action.
The Challenge of Governing in the face of Climate Change
Climate change poses serious challenges to any system of governance, where the
environmental functions that underpin so many human activities are set to change at an
increasingly dramatic rate. But the most pressing and immediate issue involves basic
problem recognition.11 In some constituencies, support for taking action on climate
change, among other environmental issues, is softening even as the problem is
increasing in urgency.12
This lack of public demand for action on climate change feeds into the longstanding
distrust of public opinion among many concerned about the issue, who question the
ability of the average citizen to adequately understand its complexities. But the public
is not generally anti-environment per se. The situation is more aptly characterised as
ambivalence than opposition. The phenomenon is well captured by the idea of an
environmental “value-action gap”, where environmental concern does not translate
directly into behaviour change.13 The main problem is that environmental issues are
relatively easily crowded out in view of non-salience and issue complexity. And
climate change in particular exhibits these features, rendering it easy to obfuscate and
confuse the issue.
Thus, in not adequately addressing climate change, democracies such as Australia
may be acting responsively to their constituents. But they are doing so in a very
particular kind of way insofar as the prevailing democratic process cultivates
11 Frank Biermann, “Earth System Governance as a Crosscutting Theme of Global Change
Research”, Global Environmental Change, Vol. 17, 3-4 (2007), p.328.
12 Fergus Hansen, “The Lowy Institute Poll 2010: Australia and the World, Public Opinion and
Foreign Policy” <http://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/2010-lowy-institute-poll>; Phillip
Coorey, “Climate Policy Backlash Takes Shine off Rudd”, Sydney Morning Herald, 8 February 2010.
13 E.g. James Blake, “Overcoming the ‘Value-Action Gap’ in Environmental Policy: Tensions
Between National Policy and Local Experience”, Local Environment, Vol. 4, 3 (1999), pp.257-278;
James D. Gill, Lawrence Crosby and James Taylor, “Ecological Concern, Attitudes, and Social
Norms in Voting Behaviour”, Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 50, 2 (1986), pp.537-554.

Democracy and Climate Change 433
preferences that support short-term outcomes, or at least fails to induce reflection on
longer-term consequences. Anthony Giddens recognises this phenomenon when he
speaks of a “paradox” where straightforward concern for the abstract idea of climate
change translates into inaction in the face of intangible, distant and invisible impacts.14
The result is that, when concrete actions to address climate change are proposed — as
opposed to vague commitments — the intangibility of climate change competes
directly with tangible impacts, such as increased taxation. Successful politicians are
keenly aware of this dynamic, where generic public endorsement can easily translate
into concerted opposition particularly when it is mobilised by powerful interests with a
strong public voice, rendering the task of implementation difficult.
Observations of this dynamic have led to a number of prescriptions that involve
modifying political institutions in ways that bypass the vagaries of the democratic
process. For example, Giddens’ solution is to firewall decision-making specific to
climate change. Others, such as David Shearman and Joseph Smith, would go further,
and place decision-making entirely at the hands of enlightened scientists, or eco-
elites.15 Along similar lines, Mark Beeson posits that the impacts of climate change are
likely to contribute to a movement away from democracy and toward authoritarianism,
which is better placed to achieve environmental outcomes. He cites examples within
Southeast Asia, and China in particular, which are associated with authoritarian forms
of governance that permit more decisive action and in China’s case has been successful
in achieving developmental goals.16
While democracy is uncertain and, in many cases, frustrating for those seeking
decisive action, it is arguable that authoritarianism provides a poor foundation for
motivating and coordinating collective action in order to meet ecological imperatives.
As Dryzek argues, in theoretical terms, authoritarian approaches to governance fail to
adequately coordinate inputs within the socio-environmental system to respond to
environmental challenges.17
This also appears to be the case in practice. The Chinese response to climate change
is not driven by public demand, and the level of support is irrelevant in any case.
Indeed, consideration of climate change per se does not appear to be most relevant.
The push to reduce emissions intensity appears to be driven by economic, rather than
environmental imperatives. Costs can be reduced where there is currently a good deal
of “low hanging fruit” in industries with low energy efficiency and high greenhouse
gas intensity.18 This form of ecological modernisation suits a developmentalist agenda,
but more difficult choices will ultimately need to be made if greenhouse emissions are
to be kept below dangerous levels.
Of course, the lack of responsiveness to the public sphere is the point of the
authoritarians, who wish to side-step an unreliable public will. But my argument here is
that political elites are actually less likely to support environmental causes on their own
terms, not least because the “logic” of the state is skewed toward the functions of
14 Anthony Giddens, The Politics of Climate Change (Cambridge, 2009), p.2.
15 David J.C. Shearman and Joseph Wayne Smith, The Climate Change Challenge and the Failure of
Democracy (Westport, 2007).
16 Mark Beeson, “The Coming of Environmental Authoritarianism”, Environmental Politics, Vol. 19,
2 (March, 2010), pp.276-294.
17 John Dryzek, Rational Ecology: Environment and Political Ecology (New York, 1987).
18 Alex Lo, “China’s Response to Climate Change”, Environmental Science and Technology, Vol. 44,
15 (2010), pp.5689-5690; Bruce Gilley, “Authoritarian Environmentalism and China’s Response to
Climate Change”, Environmental Politics, Vol. 21, 2 (March, 2012), pp.287-307.

434 Simon Niemeyer
accumulation, even before we take into account the effect of lobbying by well-
resourced interests. It is no accident that the environmental movement first gained
momentum not within the machinery of government, but within civil society. It
remains the legitimacy function and responsiveness to the public sphere that holds the
key to action on climate change.19
Moreover, authoritarianism does not appear to work on its own terms. If we scratch
the surface, the observation that Asia is inclined toward authoritarianism is less than
straightforward. China, for example, is manifestly authoritarian at the national level.20
However, when we move to regional and local governance the picture is more nuanced.
Local elections are increasingly occurring at village level, along with experimentation
with deliberative methods such as deliberative polls.21 Baogang He and Mark Warren
argue that even at the national level there is an increasing recognition of the limits of
authoritarianism in governing complex social systems (to which I would add the
ecological dimension). The result is a transition toward “authoritarian deliberation”,
which potentially marks a turning point toward greater democracy.22
However, the main task here is not to rebut the advantages of authoritarianism, but
to build an argument in favour of democracy. In theory, a democracy is supposed to
produce better environmental outcomes to the extent that it is inclusive (of all concerns,
including those related to the environment).23 But on the other hand there is a critique
in the literature cited above that, in practice, citizens as political agents fail to
adequately synthesise complex information about climate change and translate this into
demand for action. In addition democracies are supposed to be more responsive, with
built-in accountability and sensitivity to legitimacy, ensuring that the system responds
to environmental concern. But in practice democratic systems often fail to adequately
realize and translate demand for action on climate change into working policy. I argue
below that a remedy to the situation is a not a turn away from democracy, but toward a
more deliberative approach.
Benefits of Deliberation in Theory and Practice
It is notable that the features of democracies that are supposed to be beneficial to the
environment (inclusiveness and responsiveness) cited above correspond closely to the
features of a deliberative system attributed to Dryzek in the introduction (inclusivity
and consequentiality).24 To these dimensions, deliberative democracy adds
“deliberativeness” to a democratic system.25 And it is this deliberative dimension that
19 Claus Offe, Contradictions of the Welfare State (Cambridge, MA, 1984). Richard Rose, “On The
Priorities Of Government: A Developmental Analysis Of Public Policies”, European Journal of
Political Research, Vol. 4, 3 (September, 1976), pp.247-289.
20 Gilley, “Authoritarian environmentalism”.
21 Ethan Leib and Baogang He, The Search for Deliberative Democracy in China (New York, 2006);
Baogang He and Mark E. Warren, “Authoritarian Deliberation: The Deliberative Turn in Chinese
Political Development”, Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 9, 2 (June, 2011), pp.269-289.
22 He and Warren, “Authoritarian Deliberation”.
23 See Burnell for a more complete account of these benefits, including value of human life and
relatively higher status of women increasing the role of environmental values in politics. Peter
Burnell, “Democracy, Democratization and Climate Change: Complex Relationships”,
Democratization, Vol. 19, 5 (2012), p.823.
24 Dryzek, “Democratization as Deliberative Capacity Building”.
25 Notable exceptions include Graham Smith, Deliberative Democracy and the Environment (London;
New York, 2003) and Baber and Bartlett, Deliberative Environmental Politics.

Democracy and Climate Change 435
holds the key to realising the full potential of democratic systems to respond the
environmental challenges.
There is a good deal of support for the argument that engaging citizens in
deliberation produces improved environmental outcomes. This is because deliberation
can consider the interests of non-human agents to the extent that they can be
represented via arguments used by interlocutors in favour of those interests. To this
extent, deliberation has the capacity to make salient the environmental dimensions of
issues. It also has the potential to attune citizens to the complexities.26
Ideally, deliberation produces reflection by citizens of the kind that Shearman and
Smith prize in advocating rule by eco-elites and avoids Giddens’ paradox, such that
citizens come to reflect on the issue with a view to the long-term. This effect is very
different to the idea of nudge theory, which involves the use of social marketing and
behavioural economics to “nudge” behaviour without inducing reflection.27
Deliberation, on the other hand involves a far more conscious process, which,
arguably, results in far deeper and more enduring solutions.28
Thus, on the face of it, deliberative democracy holds the potential to assuage
democratic sceptics insofar as deliberation involves careful reflection by citizens
regarding the course of action that they want implemented. But is the citizen-
philosopher, who openly reflects on the implications of climate change, a realistic
prospect in light of the evidence? There are two related questions here. The first
concerns whether it is possible for at least some proportion of the citizen population to
engage in deliberation, and the boundary contours of this group. The second concerns
whether it is possible to improve the “deliberative competence” of the population as a
whole, and to what extent “scaling up” deliberation is possible.
In terms of the first question, there is evidence to suggest that thoroughgoing
deliberation including ordinary citizens is relatively rare.29 However, this is not to say
that citizens are simply incapable of behaving deliberatively — engaging with
alternative arguments with an open mind.30 It seems that the settings in which political
discussion is conducted and the norms operating within the group play an important
role in shaping the behaviour of interlocutors, and in turn their ability to deal with
complex issues.31 By contrast, when researchers produce findings against the
26 John Dryzek, “Political and Ecological Communication”, Environmental Politics, Vol. 4, 4 (1995),
pp.13-30; Goodin, “Enfranchising the Earth and its Alternatives”; Simon John Niemeyer,
“Deliberation in the Wilderness: Displacing Symbolic Politics”, Environmental Politics, Vol. 13, 2
(2004), pp.347-372; Baber and Bartlett, Deliberative Environmental Politics; Smith, Deliberative
Democracy and the Environment.
27 Peter John, Graham Smith, and Gerry Stoker, “Nudge Nudge, Think Think: Two Strategies for
Changing Civic Behaviour”, Political Quarterly, Vol. 80, 3 (2009), pp.361-370.
28 Jonathan Rowson, Transforming Behaviour Change: Beyond Nudge and Neuromania (London,
2011).
29 Shawn W. Rosenberg, “Rethinking Democratic Deliberation: The Limits and Potential of Citizen
Participation”, Polity, Vol. 39, 3 (2007), pp.335-360; Tali Mendelberg, “The Deliberative Citizen:
Theory and Evidence” in Michael Delli Carpini, ed., Political Decision Making, Deliberation and
Participation (San Diego, 2002), p.6.
30 For example, see: Claus Offe, “Micro Aspects of Democratic Theory: What Makes for the
Deliberative Competence of Citizens?” in Axel Hadenius, ed., Democracy’s Victory and Crisis
(Cambridge, 1997), pp.81-104; Claus Offe and Ulnch Preuss, “Democratic institutions and moral
resources” in David Held et al., eds, Political Theory Today (Stanford, CA, 1991).
31 Luisa Batalha et al., “Group Dynamics and Deliberative Processes: Affective and Cognitive
Aspects”, paper presented at the Annual Scientific Meeting of the International Society of Political

436 Simon Niemeyer
possibility of deliberation the results are often obtained in settings that are not actually
designed to be deliberative, in some cases stretching the concept considerably.32 The
same also appears to apply to citizens’ willingness to participate in political
deliberation, where the prevailing democratic experience plays an important role in
motivating citizens33 — a point to which I return to later in relation to the question of
scaling up deliberation.
The challenge, then, is finding settings in which the ideals of deliberative behaviour
can be achieved. One type of forum that is explicitly designed to be deliberative is the
example of “mini-publics”, which are the most practical expression of deliberative
democracy to date.34 They have provided the test bed for much of the empirical
research involving authentic citizen deliberation.35 Mini-publics typically involve the
random selection of citizens to participate in a forum that is (ideally) held over multiple
days, where discussion is facilitated to achieve the ideals of deliberation and
information is provided, usually in the form of expert presentation.
Thus, mini-publics provide a window into the possibilities for achieving citizen
deliberation, which, in theory at least, improves the prospect of increasing the demand
for action on environmental issues such as climate change by making salient those
dimensions that are otherwise crowded out by more tangible and immediate concerns.
In the following section I draw on an example of a mini-public involving members of
the Australian public in the Australian Capital Region to demonstrate these
possibilities, before moving to consider whether it is possible to scale up these affects
to the polity as a whole.
Can Citizens Deliberate about Climate Change and does it make difference?
Evidence from a Mini-public
A series of citizens’ deliberative forums were conducted as part of the Australian
Research Council-funded Climate Change and the Public Sphere project on the
question of climate change and adaptation in the local regions of Canberra (Australian
Capital Territory) and Goulburn (New South Wales). The research involved comparing
the effect of exposing participants to a series of climate change scenarios ranging from
no change in climate to changes anticipated under “business as usual” resulting in a
Psychology, Chicago, IL, 6–9 July 2012; Simon John Niemeyer, Luisa Batalha, and John S. Dryzek,
“Changing Dispositions to Australian Democracy in the Course of the Citizens’ Parliament” in Lyn
Carson and John Gastil, eds, The Australian Citizens’ Parliament and the Future of Deliberative
Democracy (University Park, Penn., forthcoming 2013).
32 Jürg Steiner, “Concept Stretching: the Case of Deliberation”, European Political Science, Vol. 7, 2
(June, 2008), pp.186-190.
33 Nicole Curato and Simon John Niemeyer, “Reaching Out to Overcome Political Apathy: Building
Participatory Capacity Through Deliberative Engagement”, Policy and Politics (forthcoming).
34 Graham Smith, “Taking Deliberation seriously: Institutional Design and Green Politics”,
Environmental Politics, Vol. 10, 3 (Autumn, 2001), pp.72-93; Archon Fung, “Recipes for Public
Spheres: Eight Institutional Design Choices and their Consequences”, Journal of Political
Philosophy, Vol. 11, 3 (2003), pp.338-367; Simone Chambers, “Deliberative Democratic Theory”,
Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 6 (June, 2003), pp.338-367.
35 E.g. Robert E. Goodin and Simon John Niemeyer, “When Does Deliberation Begin? Internal
Reflection Versus Public Discussion in Deliberative Democracy”, Political Studies, Vol. 51, 4
(December, 2003), pp.627-649; Niemeyer, “Deliberation in the wilderness”; Niemeyer, “The
Emancipatory Effect of Deliberation: Empirical Lessons from Mini-Publics”, Politics and Society,
Vol. 39, 1 (2011), pp.103-140; Maija Setälä, Kimmo Grönlund and Kaisa Herne, “Citizen
Deliberation on Nuclear Power: A Comparison of Two Decision-Making Methods”, Political Studies,
Vol. 58, 4 (October 2010), pp.688-714.

Democracy and Climate Change 437
high level of greenhouse emissions. These responses where then compared to the
positions that emerged among a subset of participants involved in a three day
deliberative mini-public.
The approach used in the project is outlined in Figure 2. It shows the key
components of the research design, split into three phases that spanned 2008 to 2010.
The first phase involved the development of three climate change scenarios (baseline,
covering the years 1970 to 2000; medium; and high emissions) and the impact on the
region inclusive of Australian Capital Territory (ACT: Canberra) and the Goulburn-
Mulwaree district (Goulburn).36 The medium and high emissions scenarios included
two different emission trajectories based on a “medium” level of emissions (equivalent
to the International Panel on Climate Change, Special Report on Emissions Scenarios,
SRES scenario A1B, which approximates a moderate level of greenhouse emission
abatement) and a “high” level of emissions (SRES A1FI, which approximately tracks
“business as usual”) in the years 2050 and 2100.
The impacts on various climate parameters for the medium and high emissions
scenarios were then produced for the 2050 and 2100 time slices. The scenarios that
were presented to participants covered a range of climatic variables relating to
temperature, rainfall, growing range for key species and “climatic domain
representation” involving a visualisation of how the climate would “migrate”. The
scenarios were in presentation form using multimedia technology. In most cases the
information was presented in map form, otherwise as graphs or bullet points. The
changes to scenario parameters in map, graphical and schematic form were animated
between the time slices to highlight the changes that were occurring over time.37
Figure 1. Research Design
In phase two, interviews were conducted with 103 individuals. During the interviews
the three scenarios were presented to participants, who were encouraged to imagine
that they were living under the conditions described by the scenarios. At the conclusion
36 For details see Kersty Pamela Hobson and Simon John Niemeyer, “Public Responses to Climate
Change: The Role of Deliberation in Building Capacity for Adaptive Action”, Global Environmental
Change, Vol. 21, 3 (August 2011), pp.957-971.
37 The scenarios can be viewed at <http://delibdem.anu.edu.au/ccps/scenarios/>.

438 Simon Niemeyer
of each scenario presentation, participants were interviewed about how they might feel
under that scenario and respond to the impacts. They also performed a series of
surveys, where the condition of instruction was to respond as if they were living under
the conditions depicted by that scenario. The first survey concerned the broad policy
response that they would prefer to see implemented, in conjunction with a question
regarding their willingness to pay (via taxation) to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
The second survey involved responding to a series of statements drawn from public
debate about climate change from various media and interview sources.
In the third and final stage of the study, a sub-sample of the participants from stage
two were selected to participate in one of two treatments. The first involved
participation in a three-day intensive deliberative forum, involving three days of
evidence gathering and deliberation “proper” to develop policy recommendations
(n=35). A further twenty participants did not participate in the deliberative event, but
were individually interviewed three months after the phase two interviews in respect to
their longer term response to exposure to the information provided in the scenarios.
The conditions for deliberation were created by careful facilitation, which was
designed to first build a “deliberative norm” within the group, where participants
ideally came to identify with the need to collectively consider the merits of different
arguments in relation to climate change and adaptation.38 Once participants were
familiar with and accepted (in most cases, see below) the conditions under which
discussion would proceed, the process moved to the information stage involving expert
presentations and group discussion about the information provided, where small groups
developed and coordinated follow up questions.39
This process was very nearly derailed due to a small number of individuals at
different extremes of the climate change debate refusing to accept the norms of
deliberation, in some cases behaving to disrupt the process — and in one case this was
a deliberate strategy. It turned out that the deepest of climate sceptics in particular were
very unwilling to reflect on their positions,40 although deep alarmists also behaved
problematically from a deliberative perspective. But the process still maintained an
overall deliberative flavour. Non-deliberative behaviour — using information
selectively and behaving aggressively and without respect — was regulated among
participants by the group itself, a strong majority of whom accepted and policed the
norms of deliberation, as well as by the facilitator. In the end, two deep sceptics left the
process: one because of the failure to shape the process, the second for more negative
reasons pertaining to protracted argument with a deep alarmist — who did himself
eventually agree to participate according to deliberative norms.
On the final day, participants used their accumulated knowledge to develop
recommendations that would address their primary concern in relation to climate
change.41
38 For a discussion of group identity in deliberation seeAndrea Felicetti et al., “Collective Identity and
Voice at the Australian Citizens’ Parliament”, Journal of Public Deliberation, Vol. 8, 1 (2012),
available at <http://www.publicdeliberation.net/jpd/vol8/iss1/art5>; Niemeyer, Batalha and Dryzek,
“Changing Dispositions to Australian Democracy”.
39 For a more complete description of the deliberative event, seeHobson and Niemeyer, “Public
Responses to Climate Change”.
40 Kersty Pamela Hobson and Simon John Niemeyer, “What do Climate Sceptics Believe? Discourses
of Scepticism and their Response to Deliberation”, Public Understanding of Science (forthcoming).
41 For a detailed description of the deliberative process and recommendations, see Simon John
Niemeyer et al., “Climate Change and the Public Sphere: Public Responses to Climate Change and

Democracy and Climate Change 439
Not surprisingly, the climate change scenarios had a significant effect on
participants, although it tended not to last beyond the interview process. Each scenario
resulted in increased preference for decisive action on climate change: with the high
emissions scenario yielding a stronger result compared to the medium scenario.42 This
was also reflected in the willingness to pay (WTP) monthly to reduce greenhouse
emissions. The data is shown in Table 1.
Deliberation also had an effect on preferences. Table 1 shows an appreciable
increase in WTP between baseline and post-deliberation, although it is not statistically
significant given the relatively small numbers. Nevertheless, the level of change in
WTP is comparable to that which individuals nominated under the Medium Emissions
Scenario (where they were asked to imagine that they were actually living under those
conditions). Moreover, follow-up discussions with participants suggested that these
preferences were more enduring than those individuals who were only exposed to the
scenarios.43
Table 1. Willingness to Pay to Avoid Climate Change (monthly)
Mean Minimum Maximum Std. Deviation N
Baseline 128 5 850 142 87
Medium Scenario 230 0 2000 344 85
High Scenario 384 5 6000 731 84
Post Deliberation 222 20 1000 266 20
While the preference changes are interesting, from a deliberative point of view (which
privileges reasons) it is more important to understand what is driving those changes,
and whether they reflect a greater appreciation of the issue or some other driver
explained by non-deliberative forms of group behaviour.44
To understand the underlying drivers of the changing response to climate change,
analysis was performed to determine the subjective positions, which can also be
understood as discourses — where the term is used in the same sense as Dryzek, such
that a discourse models a set of beliefs about the world that is embedded in language,
representing different perspectives in relation to the issue.45 Similar to Dryzek, the
approach uses Q methodology, which involves obtaining “Q sorts” — or ordering of a
series of statements drawn from real arguments made in the public domain from “least
Governing Adaptation, with specific reference to the ACT and Goulburn-Mulwaree regions”, Centre
for Deliberative Democracy and Global Governance, The Australian National University, 2010.
42 See Hobson and Niemeyer, “Public responses to climate change: The role of deliberation in
building capacity for adaptive action”.
43 Ibid.
44 Many deliberation outcomes have been attributed to “groupthink” or “group polarisation”, although
this interpretation is strongly contested. Robert S. Baron, “So Right it's Wrong: Groupthink and the
Ubiquitous Nature of Polarized Group Decision Making” in Mark P. Zanna, ed., Advances in
Experimental Social Psychology (San Diego, 2005), pp.219-253.
45 See John S. Dryzek and Jeffrey Berejikian, “Reconstructive Democratic Theory”, American
Political Science Review, Vol. 87, 1 (March, 1993), pp.48-60.

440 Simon Niemeyer
agree” to “most agree” — from participants at each study stage outlined in Figure 1.
The results were then analysed using inverted factor analysis (as is the standard
approach in Q methodology) to produce different “discourses” that accounted for the
underlying perspectives (or “subjectivity”) of participants. The resulting discourses
include:46
A. Self-assured Scepticism
B. Governance Imperative
C. Assured Pragmatism
D. Alarmed Defeatism
The main characteristics of each of the discourses are schematically represented in
Figure 2 as four overlapping spheres, comprising statements relevant to each discourse
(numbers in brackets after each statement corresponds to the statement number).
Features that are shared by two or more discourses are shown in the areas of overlap.
The diagram is schematic, rather than precise or analytic.
Discourse A (Self-Assured Scepticism) describes those individuals who do not
believe in human-induced climate change or who believe that it is occurring but not
anthropogenic.47 Many are doubtful about the veracity of climate science, and overall
there is a belief that there is not enough information to sustain the anthropogenic
argument. However, these sceptics do express concern about the planet and future
generations and a willingness to “do their bit”. But action, and, to some extent, a belief
in climate change, is forestalled by profound lack of trust in existing institutions and
key actors in the climate change debate i.e. the media, government and scientists.
Problematically, they want these actors to get on and “sort the issue out” while not
trusting them to do so. There is a sense that such tensions are reconciled by the belief
that climate change is really not a major issue and that we do not need to panic,
resulting in a general willingness to act that is blocked by a justifiable reason for
inaction.
Discourse B most closely echoes the majority sentiment in the wider Australian
community.48 It represents the view that climate change is a genuine anthropogenic
phenomenon and that direct government action is required, as market forces alone will
not be able to address the problem. In this discourse, a perceived failure of leadership
to date was a significant feature, along with the belief that government efforts to
engage people with climate change had been somewhat tokenistic. Indeed, there was a
strong feeling that it was the responsibility of the government to act: a feeling shared
by many other Australians. This resonates with the strong belief that Australia must
take action, as it has both a pragmatic and moral imperative to act and lead on climate
change policy. However, this discourse was underpinned by the need for political
leadership: without which, individuals are less likely themselves to respond to wider
attempts to adapt to climate change.
46 The specific analysis is described in detail in Hobson and Niemeyer. For reasons of space, only a
short description is provided here. Hobson and Niemeyer, “Public Responses to Climate Change”.
47 For a comprehensive discussion focusing specifically on the different types of climate change
sceptics participating in the research and the impact of the scenarios and deliberation on their
positions see Hobson and Niemeyer, “What do Climate Sceptics Believe?”.
48 A. Ong, M. Zafiris, and C. Govan, “Community Attitudes to Climate Change”, National Climate
Change Adaptation Research Facility – Australian Climate Change Adaptation Research Network for
Settlements and Infrastructure Report (2010).

Democracy and Climate Change 441
Like Discourse B, Discourse C accepts that climate change is real, anthropogenic,
and happening. But it is slightly more indifferent to the need to take action, not only
because of technological optimism, but also because (like A) there is a strong belief in
our capacity to adapt.
Discourse D embodies an emphatic belief that climate change is real and here, and a
serious threat. It echoes a catastrophic and apocalyptic view, entailing the “end of
civilisation”. And it is a defeatist position, “giving up” on measures such as education
and evoking pessimism about the possibility of mitigating climate change given the
enormity of the challenge.
Figure 2: Discourses from ACR Scenario Interviews
These discourses were used as reference points to track to overall positions of
participants at different stages of the research. Individual movements among the
discourses between the baseline scenario (i.e. the positions prior to the research) and
the high emissions scenario are represented by arrows in Figure 3. Analysis reveals that
climate change scepticism decreased through the scenario interviews, dramatically so
in some cases. Most of the movement between the baseline and high scenario is in a
southeast direction from discourse A towards D. Those individuals who begin strongly
associated with B tend to stay there.
In discourses B and D for the high emissions scenario — and, to a lesser extent
medium — there is a strong increase in belief that we need to act and act now. As
discussed below, there is a good deal of potential for a strongly maladaptive public
response in both discourses: particularly in discourse D, which represents a withdrawal
from collective attempts to deal with climate change. Discourse B is less problematic,
but does embody a difficult situation from a governance point of view where there is a
strong demand for definitive action from government, yet the level of trust in
government is very low.

442 Simon Niemeyer
As for preferences, it turned out that three months following their participation in
the climate change interviews, most participants tended to return to their baseline
position prior to exposure to scenarios. In other words, the process of visualizing and
learning about the potential impacts on climate change has little or no impact on
ongoing positions.49
Figure 3. Schematic Representation of Changes between the Baseline and High
Emissions Scenarios
Deliberation, on the other hand, had a very different impact than mere exposure to the
scenarios. Not only did it change the position of participants; it changed the nature of
the climate change debate. It altered discourses A and B, and produced two new
discourses. These are labelled:
A’ Accommodating Scepticism
B’ Governance and Engagement Imperative
E Collective Action Imperative
F Adaptive Reassurance
As for the scenario interviews, there was a strong overall move in the direction of
discourse B, and the discourse itself changed: from “governance imperative” with a
strong emphasis on centralized action, in favour of a more decentralized approach
involving the community. In short, deliberative engagement increased the desire for
more deliberative engagement. This is not a unique finding for deliberative processes,
49 Hobson and Niemeyer, “Public responses to climate change”.

Democracy and Climate Change 443
which tend to produce increases levels of political efficacy.50 Discourse A weakened in
support during deliberation but remained influential, albeit in a modified form where
most sceptics became more accommodating and willing to accept the possibility of
climate change (discourse A).51
The two new discourses (E and F) are important signifiers of a change in perspective
in relation to the issue. Both are consistent with the kind of increase in internal/political
efficacy observed in deliberative forums. Discourse E suggests there addressing
climate change requires a stronger commitment to the common good and a
fundamental change of attitude, including more respect and compassion. Discourse F
was more optimistic about the prospect of dealing with climate change, while at the
same time recognising that there are no “easy solutions”. It resonates with a belief in
the intrinsic toughness of the Australian rural population and their ability to cope in the
face of adversity.
This post-deliberative discourse map reflects a much higher level of consensus than
was the case before deliberation, as well as a higher adaptive capacity.52 However, the
post-deliberative outcome still preserves some diversity, for arguably good reason in
the face of a complex issue such as climate change, reflecting an important “meta-
consensus” — or collective understanding of the nature of the issue — in the form of a
new agreement about the important issue dimensions.53
This revised meta-consensus includes the rejection of arguments such as those
claiming that Australia will pay a disproportionately high price for unilateral action:
the kind of argument that plays into the blocking dynamic where climate change
concerns are crowded out by tangible (if, arguably, unfounded) concerns. Indeed there
is consensus across the whole group in favour of action. This occurred partly because
deliberation served to dispel intuitively appealing, highly partisan “symbolic”
arguments that did not reflect the substance of the issue.54
What Did Deliberation Do? Changing Minds and Building Capacity
What was the main impact of deliberation? Most importantly, relating to the concerns
raised in relation to democracy and climate change at the beginning of this paper,
deliberation served to clear the way for focus on more substantive issues and improved
the ability of citizens to better deal with the kind of complexity associated with climate
change. This occurred because, for most participants, the deliberative setting not only
provided the environment in which information can be acquired, it also provided the
incentive structure to engage with that information.55 The result is a shift from the
“primitive” citizen, or — more charitably — a “cognitive miser”, who is prone to
50 A very similar outcome was observed for the Australian Citizens’ Parliament on parliamentary
reform. Michael E. Morrell, “Deliberation, Democratic Decision-making and Internal Political
Efficacy”, Political Behavior, Vol. 27, 1 (2005). See also Niemeyer, “The Emancipatory Effect of
Deliberation”.
51 For a detailed analysis of the sceptics, see Hobson and Niemeyer, “What do Climate Sceptics
Believe?”.
52 Hobson and Niemeyer, “Public Responses to Climate Change”.
53 For an explanation of meta-consensus, which involves agreement on issue dimensions, See John S.
Dryzek and Simon John Niemeyer, “Reconciling Pluralism and Consensus as Political Ideals”,
American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 50, 3 (July, 2006), pp.634-649.
54 This is consistent with the idea of symbolic politics. See Murray J. Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of
Politics (Urbana, Ill., 1985).For an account of how deliberation displaces symbolic politics, see
Niemeyer, “Deliberation in the Wilderness”.
55 Goodin and Niemeyer, “When Does Deliberation Begin?”.

444 Simon Niemeyer
drawing conclusions based on intuitive modes of thinking (referred to as system I or
“peripheral processing) toward deeper forms of cognition (system II or “cognitive
processing”).56
The level of cognition displayed by everyday citizens in deliberative contexts might
not achieve the same standard sought by Shearman and Smith, but it is clearly possible
to raise the bar in their assessment of complex issues such as climate change.57
Deliberation does not fundamentally change the citizen; they still have roughly the
same set of capabilities after as before.58 The value set of citizens is also roughly the
same, although certain values, such a concern for the environment have become
activated as part of the process.59 What the deliberative context did was to engender a
set of capabilities that are possible, but not otherwise brought to bear on every day
politics.
But deliberation did much more than improve appreciation for the climate change
issue. It helped to change the conditions under which the issue could be governed and
the expectations of citizens in a democratic system. Among many participants, the
climate change issue transformed from being a problem for a distrusted government to
address, to an issue for the community to address, with government partnership with
citizens. In other words, deliberation enhanced the tendency to view the issue of
climate change through the lens of collective identity in solving a common-good
problem.60 It shifted emphasis away from elected representatives and a failure of
politics toward individual responsibility for the issue — not only seeking to understand
it, but also to contribute to collective outcomes, both directly in form of action on
climate change, and indirectly, via improved levels of political efficacy.61
Moreover, for participants in deliberation, these effects on political efficacy and
civic-mindedness appear to be enduring.62 Thus, it is just possible that a polity that is
more deliberative not only responds to climate change more constructively, in ways
that reflect the inner desires of its citizens; it may also be able to recreate the conditions
required for proper democratic functioning. And in doing so, it may help to avert the
56 For a discussion of type I versus type II systems of cognition see Stanovich and West. For a
discussion of the overlapping concept of cognitive and peripheral processing, see Petty and Cacioppo.
Richard E. Petty and J. Cacioppo, Communication and Persuasion: Central and Peripheral Routes to
Attitude Change (New York, 1986); Keith E. Stanovich and Richard F.West, “Individual Differences
in Reasoning: Implications for the Rationality Debate?”, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, Vol, 23, 5
(2000), pp.645-726.
57 Shearman and Smith, “The Climate Change Challenge and the Failure of Democracy”.
58 Jason Barabas, “How Deliberation Affects Policy Opinions”, American Political Science Review,
Vol. 98, 4 (November 2004), pp.688-701.
59 A similar mechanism can be found in Shalom H. Schwartz, “Normative Influences on Altruism” in
Leonard Berkowitz, ed., Advances in Experimental Psychology (New York, 1977), pp.222-280.
60 See also Laura W. Black, “Deliberation, Storytelling, and Dialogic Moments”, Communication
Theory, Vol. 18, 1 (February 2008), pp.93-116.
61 Hobson and Niemeyer, “Public responses to climate change”.
62 Troy E. Hall, Patrick Wilsony, and Jennie Newman, “Evaluating the Short- and Long-term Effects
of a Modified Deliberative Poll on Idahoans’ Attitudes and Civic Engagement Related to Energy
Options”, Journal of Public Deliberation, Vol. 7, 1 (2011; Shane Doheny and Claire O’Neill,
“Becoming Deliberative Citizens: The Moral Learning Process of the Citizen Juror”, Political
Studies, Vol. 58, 4 (2010), pp.631-648; John Gastil et al., “From Group Member to Democratic
Citizen: How Deliberating with Fellow Jurors Reshapes Civic Attitudes”, Human Communication
Research, Vol. 34, 1 (January 2008), pp.137-169.

Democracy and Climate Change 445
reflex of some to favour more authoritarian modes of governance, or forms of liberal
paternalism (such as nudge theory) in the face of climate change.
Of course, this all works very well in carefully designed deliberative mini-publics.
The key challenge is the extent to which these types of deliberative contexts might be
recreated elsewhere or at a larger (even national) scale.
Scaling Up Deliberation and The Prospects for Climate Action
So much for theory and the observation of deliberation in small-scale and highly
structured settings: real world politics, of course, poses a much more complex and
problematic test for deliberative ideals.63 If deliberative democracy is to provide real
and practical solutions to problems of governance related to climate change it is
necessary to ascertain if, and how it might be possible to coax polities such as Australia
in a more deliberative direction. This section briefly considers how this might be
achieved, and then the prospects for achieving it, given the current state of Australian
politics.
It simply is not possible to simulate the workings of a deliberative mini-public in
ways that involve everyone affected by a decision deliberating together. For Goodin
the solution is to encourage greater internal reflection within a deliberative system by
individuals. 64 But this is not straightforward. Exposure to the climate change scenarios
in the ACR case study above certainly failed to induce deep reflection. It may be that
deliberation properly takes place in groups for a reason — we are simply hard-wired to
deliberate via discussion.65
Deliberation by individuals is indeed possible (via internal discussion) even
desirable. But it is harder to achieve. And it may not be reasonable to expect citizens to
devote the cognitive resources to deliberate deeply on every political issue that they
encounter. Even the most diligent citizen cannot exhaustively consider every facet of
every issue.66 As Claus Offe points out, there is an opportunity cost for the effort
applied.67 Moreover, there is a strong question mark concerning how easy is to achieve
deliberative modes of behaviour in anything but very specific settings.68
However, improving environmental outcomes may not require achieving ideal
deliberation in all sites in the public sphere, as much as developing the capacity to
avoid the distortion of public opinion by entrenched interests.69 Achieving this likely
involves the steady building of deliberative capacity and development of deliberative
cultures that are inured to the blandishments of elites making claims counter to the
public interest.70
63 Ian Shapiro, “Enough of Deliberation: Politics is about Interests and Power” in Stephen Macedo,
ed., Deliberative Politics (Oxford, 1999).
64 Robert E. Goodin, “Democratic Deliberation Within”, Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 29, 1
(January 2000), pp.81-109.
65 Hugo Mercier and Helene E. Landemore, “Reasoning is for Arguing: Understanding the Successes
and Failures of Deliberation”, Political Psychology, Vol. 33, 2 (April 2012), pp.243-258.
66 Shelley Taylor, “The Interface of Cognitive and Social Psychology” in J. Harvey, ed., Cognition,
Social Behavior, and the Environment (Hillsdale, N.J, 1981), pp.241-276.
67 Offe, “Micro Aspects of Democratic Theory”.
68 Rosenberg, “Rethinking Democratic Deliberation”.
69 Niemeyer, “The Emancipatory Effect of Deliberation”.
70 Rosenberg, “Rethinking Democratic Deliberation”; Martyn Griffin, “Developing Deliberative
Minds: Piaget, Vygotsky and the Deliberative Democratic Citizen”, Journal of Public Deliberation,
Vol. 7, 1 (2011).

446 Simon Niemeyer
It is also necessary to develop deliberative capacity to a sufficient level to be able to
deal with those who refuse to deliberate and act as “spoilers” to any attempt to engage
in meaningful discourse. In the mini-public example cited above it was possible for the
group to regulate this kind of behaviour in carefully designed deliberative settings. This
is more difficult in broader political settings.
In contrast to the short time scales associated with mini-publics, as Doheny et al
suggest, the process of developing deliberative capacity on a wider scale requires a
long-term view, involving a “moral learning process”.71 Rosenberg argues that any
such long-term strategy would necessarily involve the use of exemplary forms of
deliberation to provide a vehicle for learning how to deliberate.
In Australia, and many other constituencies, the longest-standing and most salient
deliberative institution is the legislative parliament. In representative democratic
systems, particularly based on the Westminster model, it is supposed to be the
parliament that provides a model of deliberation.72 But there is a serious question about
the deliberative credentials of the parliamentary process — at least those that occur in
the public gaze, such as question time. As Jürg Steiner and his colleagues demonstrate,
deliberation is important when it comes to legislative outcomes, but not all
parliamentary settings are equal in terms of quality of deliberation.73 Their particular
mode of analysis — which involves careful coding of speech acts according to a
discourse quality index (DQI) — has not been applied to any Australian parliamentary
proceedings, but observation suggests that the level would be comparatively low.74 The
implication of Australia’s parliamentary setting is that it potentially reflects, or even
contributes to poor deliberative capacity within the wider Australian public sphere.75
Where parliament fails, another possible exemplar for public deliberation could be
the kind of mini-public deliberative forum such as the one analysed above. From a
transformative perspective it should be possible to scale up specific transformative
features of mini-publics to the polity as a whole. This can involve mini-publics acting
in a number of capacities. They can act as information regulators. This is something
that the mass media is supposed to do, by checking different sides of the argument,
synthesising and providing the results of the analysis for public consideration, as well
as exposing arguments that are deceptive, against the public interest or downright
untrue — at task in which it increasingly fails.76 Mini-public participants could act to
71 Doheny and O’Neill, “Becoming Deliberative Citizens”. For a similar argument from the
perspective of neuroscience, see Rowson, “Transforming Behaviour Change”.
72 For example, John Stuart Mill: “Parliament [is] an arena in which not only the general opinion of
the nation, but that of every section of it, and, as far as possible, of every eminent individual whom it
contains, can produce itself in full light and challenge discussion”. John Stuart Mill, Considerations
on Representative Government (Wellington, 2009).
73 Jürg Steiner et al., Deliberative Politics in Action: Analysing Parliamentary Discourse
(Cambridge, 2005).
74 Uhr contradicts this observation, but I side with Steiner et al., who find greater deliberative quality
in cooperative, deliberative legislative settings than is observed in the Australian Parliament. John
Uhr, Deliberative Democracy in Australia (Melbourne, 1998). Steiner et al., Deliberative Politics in
Action.
75 John Boswell, Simon John Niemeyer, and Carolyn M. Hendricks, “Citizens’ Deliberations Meet
‘Realpolitik’: Responses to Gillard’s Citizens’ Assembly Proposal”, Australian Journal of Political
Science (forthcoming).
76 Benjamin Page, Who Deliberates?: Mass Media in Modern Democracy (Chicago, 1996).

Democracy and Climate Change 447
filter and synthesise the issues into a series of arguments that are communicative (as
opposed to strategic), and reflective of community norms.77
In other words, mini-publics can act as “trusted arbiter” of public reason, in ways
that parliaments have failed — where mini-public deliberators are trusted because they
are “people like us”, rather than products of political party machinery or journalists
responding to the logic of mass media or the directives of activist editors.78 This kind
of trust potentially overcomes the legitimacy problem ascribed to deliberative mini-
publics highlighted by John Parkinson, by conferring them a status as part of a wider
deliberative system, which includes many sites of deliberation, including the more
conventionally recognisable democratic institutions, such as parliament.79
However, achieving transmission of the results of mini-public deliberation into the
wider public sphere is challenging. It would require such events to achieve a significant
status, albeit not on the same level as parliament. As will be discussed below, it would
also require a good deal of championing by dominant political actors as part of
achieving that status. Unfortunately, as I will argue below, contemporary Australian
politics does not appear to provide the circumstances that are needed in order to
transmit the deliberation of citizens into public debate. However, there are avenues
where, so long as the groundwork has been laid, fortuitous circumstances that make
salient the need for such inputs could provide a foothold.
Climate Change and Developing a Deliberative Culture in Australia
But what are the prospects for moving Australia or similar polities in a deliberative
direction in the face of climate change? Climate change is a policy area that engenders
immense conflict, where the stakes are high, affecting entrenched interests as well as
world-views. Few issues arouse such passion or such polarized opinions. Indeed,
discussion on this issue often takes the form of a quasi-religious battle rather than a
simple policy debate.80 Nowhere is this more evident than in Australia, a polity
renowned for its antagonistic political mode. The “unruly bear pit” of Federal
Parliament is matched by the confrontational nature of interest politics and an
increasingly sensationalized media environment.81
Moreover, Australian politics, at least at the Federal level, has a strongly
representative impulse, which does not lend itself to the kind of deep engagement
advocated by deliberative democrats. The principal, if not exclusive, task of the citizen
is to cast a vote and provide a mandate for government. Although policy debate does
take place, political discussion is increasingly oriented toward securing votes,
sometimes at whatever cost. There is simply not an ethos for developing public debate
in ways that are recognisable by deliberative democrats.
77 Simon John Niemeyer, “From the Minipublic to a Deliberative System: Is Scaling up Deliberation
Possible?”, in Kimmo Grönlund, André Bächtiger and Maija Setälä, eds, Deliberative Mini-Publics:
Practices, Promises, Pitfalls (Essex, forthcoming).
78 Michael K. MacKenzie and Mark E. Warren, “Two Trust-based Uses of Minipublics in Democratic
Systems” in John Parkinson and Jane J. Mansbridge, eds, Deliberative Systems: Deliberative
Democracy at the Large Scale (Cambridge, 2012), pp.95-124.
79 John Parkinson, Deliberating in the Real World: Problems of Legitimacy in Democracy (Oxford,
2006).
80 Mike Hulme, “The Conquering of Climate: Discourses of Fear and their Dissolution”,
Geographical Journal, Vol. 174, 1 (March, 2008), pp.95-124.
81 John Uhr, “Testing Deliberative Democracy: The 1999 Australian Republic Referendum”,
Government and Opposition, Vol. 35, 2 (April, 2000), pp.189-210; Boswell, Niemeyer and
Hendricks, “Citizens’ Deliberations Meet ‘Realpolitik’”.

448 Simon Niemeyer
The fate of a succession of major deliberative events and more recently the failed
Citizens’ Assembly (CA) on climate change proposed by the caretaker Prime Minster
Julia Gillard in the lead-up to the 2010 Federal provide highly instructive lessons on
the prospects for innovating Australian democracy along deliberative lines.82 The
proposal provoked near universal outrage on the part of many public elites and
commentators — at least those who were willing and able to express their opinions via
media — and even members of the public.
In some respects the criticisms of the CA were valid. The very manner and timing of
the announcement of the CA — in the context of an election campaign at a very late
stage of the issue — suggested a desire to take the heat out of a problematic debate
rather than substantively include the public in deliberation. But the response among
commentators goes further than this dimension, taking aim at the very idea of the CA.
This suggests clearly that there is a major challenge when it comes to endorsing, let
alone implementing, more deliberative modes of public debate that involve citizens in
meaningful and consequential ways.
Thus, to the extent that it is possible to deliberatively transform the Australian
polity, such an enterprise involves both time and effort. Combining this observation
with the urgency of climate change action, it is easy to be less than optimistic about the
prospect for a flourishing deliberative politics in Australia that can meet the challenge
of governing in the face of climate change.
Certainly the challenge is considerable, but not insurmountable. When considering
the possibilities for deliberative democracy and the role of mini-publics in a
deliberative system, it is important to consider the role of transformative moments in
politics. One important, and often neglected, dimension is that of leadership.83 For
example, Julia Jennstål analyses the deliberative relationship that was permitted by the
fortuitous combination of personalities at the head of negotiations that led to the fall of
Apartheid in South Africa.84 Jonathan Kuyper recognises the leadership role of Julia
Gillard in proposal the Climate Change Citizens’ Assembly, in the lead-up to the 2010
election. However, it was also a perceived failure of leadership on climate change
policy in the lead-up to the proposal that contributed to its demise.85 A more consistent
role for leadership in providing legitimacy for, and coherence in the application of,
deliberative mini-publics might permit them to properly play a role in shaping the
public discussion.86
While it is possible to be critical of the potential role for the Citizen’s Assembly, as
it was proposed, it is also worthwhile to consider the outcome were it proposed ten
years earlier before public debate intensified, or even earlier still, as an “anticipatory
82 Other examples of deliberative mini-publics organized at the national level that have failed to make
any appreciable impact on the politics of the issue they sought to address include the Australian
Citizens’ Parliament and the Deliberative Poll on constitutional reform.
83 Jonathan W. Kuyper, “Deliberative Democracy and the Neglected Dimension of Leadership”,
Journal of Public Deliberation, Vol. 8, 1 (2012.
84 Julia Jennstål, “Traits and Talks: Lessons about Personality and Deliberation”, Uppsala University,
2012.
85 Boswell, Niemeyer, and Hendricks, “Citizens’ Deliberations Meet ‘Realpolitik’”.
86 A good example here is the championing of the use of larger scale deliberative mini-publics in
Western Australia by a prominent minister (Alanah McTiernan) on a number of public policy issues.
See e.g. Mark E. Warren, “Two Trust-Based Uses of Mini-Publics in Democracy” in Conference on
Democracy and the Deliberative Society (University of York, 2009).

Democracy and Climate Change 449
public”.87 It is also worthwhile considering the potential effect on other kinds of
deliberative behaviour in public institutions when compared to what is observed in
mini-publics. The exemplary deliberation by citizens, who are publicly trusted by their
peers, compared to parliamentary discourse, would surely produce a contrast strong
enough to induce improved performances by political leaders, and in turn, their
response to the challenge posed by climate change. If such dynamics could predate the
entrenchment of interests then it could be possible to achieve a scaling up of
deliberation.
However, such an option is no longer possible for climate change. The contours of
that debate are now ossified. But even here there are possibilities for deliberative
moments from unexpected quarters with the potential to transform public debate. The
unexpected intervention of Hurricane Sandy in the 2012 US presidential election put
climate change back on the electoral agenda.88 As for the possibilities of finding
leadership, the event itself is accidental. However, capturing the possibilities of the
event required public discussion to lay the foundations for action.
The point here is that democracy is uncertain, but filled with possibilities. And,
based on the evidence that I have presented above in relation to deliberation and the
public, a more deliberative approach to democracy improves the chances of achieving
environmental outcomes, including an adequate response to the challenge of climate
change.
Concluding Comments
Deliberative democracy, which began as a normative theory, has the potential to
transform the public response to climate change, as demonstrated by the deliberative
forums conducted in the Australian Capital Region. Deliberation increases the salience
of common-good issues and engenders deeper forms of cognition on complex issues in
ways that produce outcomes reflective of a strongly held, if latent, desire to achieve
action consistent with long-term management of and the need for urgent action on
climate change.
Achieving these outcomes in real world politics, including in Australia, is
exceedingly challenging. But, arguably, it is not impossible. There are clear strategies
available for coaxing politics in a more deliberative direction, given the will and
leadership. Experience so far suggests that such a will for democratic innovation in
Australia, at least at the federal level, is seriously constrained. However, while the
prospects for deliberative transformation appear bleak, it is arguably one of the best
long-term strategies for governance available. Deliberative democracy is difficult to
achieve, but brings considerable benefits in transforming the public response to climate
change and, potentially, the nature of politics itself.
87 Boswell, Niemeyer, and Hendricks, “Citizens’ Deliberations Meet ‘Realpolitik’”.
88 Suzanne Goldenberg, “Sandy Puts Climate Change Back on the US Election Agenda”, Guardian,
31 October 2012.