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India and Indonesia: Reliable Partners in an Uncertain Asia
Abstract
The India-Indonesia strategic engagement is both a reflection of as well as a response to the changing politico-strategic landscape of Asia during the post-Cold War era and the first decade of the twenty-first century. The partnership has emerged out of growing concerns about prevailing strategic uncertainty in Asia and the mutual desire of benefitting from the Asian stories of growth, integration, and development. Moreover, two decades of the multi-pronged strategies of engagement under India's Look East Policy have not only broadened the canvas of the engagement but also placed the relationship in the broader strategic context of Asia, a discourse once advocated aggressively by the two leaders of the two countries—Nehru and Sukarno.
... The fundamentals of India-Indonesia relations have been formed by their shared colonial experiences, anticolonial struggles, and shared worldviews. 25 The same could be said of Malaysia. India views its ties with Malaysia as a core element of its Act East Policy. ...
The Andaman and Nicobar Islands (ANI) are some of the most neglected maritime terrain in the world despite their proximity to one of the busiest maritime chokepoints on Earth. Strategic competition in the Bay of Bengal and around the Strait of Malacca necessitates that U.S. strategy carefully considers the implications of having a U.S. presence on the ANI. The United States has the capacity to assist in international law enforcement of illegal, unreported, unregulated (IUU) fishing and piracy as well as ensure the security of international shipping through the Strait of Malacca. The possibility of bilateral exercises that introduce concepts such as expeditionary advanced base operations (EABO) and the use of the U.S. Coast Guard in multiple capacities are real possibilities as well. Perhaps most importantly, the United States can partner with India to leverage China’s Malacca Dilemma and constantly threaten a blockade of Chinese shipping through the Strait of Malacca in a potential conflict. China also aspires to alleviate its Malacca Dilemma.
... The fundamentals of India-Indonesia relations have been formed by their shared colonial experiences, anticolonial struggles, and shared worldviews. 25 The same could be said of Malaysia. India views its ties with Malaysia as a core element of its Act East Policy. ...
The War of the Pacific (1879–84) showcases the development of amphibious warfare during a period of industrialization and technological flux. Historians have traditionally framed Chilean victory in the war as a function of seapower: naval superiority from which victory on land followed as a result. This view underestimates the complex and reciprocal interplay of amphibious and naval operations throughout the conflict. The war can be better understood as a campaign of port hopping, enabled by maritime capacity and naval power, but reliant on amphibious elements to achieve political results and sustain Chilean sea control. In exploring the relationship(s) between amphibious and naval operations in the War of the Pacific, this article historicizes the emergence of modern amphibious warfare as a component of seapower in the industrial era.
India and Indonesia are two key emerging economies in the Indo-Pacific region—both with a strong reliance on the maritime domain for sustained economic growth. After a relatively tumultuous phase in their bilateral relations during the Cold War, the countries have embarked on a path of reconciliation and developing stronger ties.
During this phase, there has understandably been a strong focus on enhancing maritime security cooperation between them, so as to obtain positive bilateral and regional outcomes. This has gained impetus in recent years with congruence of thought at the political level in both New Delhi and Jakarta. However, the many institutional mechanisms developed over the years have not been as effective in engendering tangible security outcomes in the region. Both countries—and indeed the Indo-Pacific region—would decidedly benefit from focusing on key areas of cooperation in maritime security that promise mutually beneficial operational outcomes and the prospect of establishing long-term cooperative mechanisms in the Indo-Pacific region.
This research inisiated from the ehancement of Indonesia-India’s maritime cooperation in 2015. Indonesia and India has great role in their region. Every aspect of their policy reflecting their own national interest and strategy. These enhancement become interesting because its need to explain by geopolitic and geostrategy point of view. The author try to explain the reasons of enhancement base on maritime geopolitic and geostrategy. This research believe that theory of hedging strategy and theory of maritime sea power could be the best answer to this issue. To give the reasons of enhancement, this reaserch has time range between 2001-2005. This research argues that the enhancement is caused by Indonesia’s hedging strategy in the middle of strategic rivalry between two great powers in region.By cooperation with both India and China, Indonesia use hedging strategy to face the uncertainty condition by India and China competition in Indian Ocean. Through hedging strategy, Indonesia could also implementating his ambition of sea power and maintain his chokepoint security.Keywords: Hedging, Maritim, Indonesia, India, China, Strategic Rivalry
India and Indonesia relationship has a long history. While
This article reviews and critiques recent scholarly work on Southeast Asian relations with the great powers, examining the strategies that ASEAN governments have used and the effects of those strategies. The author argues that Southeast Asian governments have generally steered away from traditional balance of power politics to promote a more complex 'balance of influence' comprising military, economic, institutional, and ideational dimensions. A key feature of this balance of influence strategy has been its inclusiveness. Southeast Asian governments have invited competing great powers to participate in the region's economic and diplomatic affairs so that they develop stakes in the region's peace and prosperity. The author contends that Southeast Asian efforts have been relatively successful to date, contributing to a multi-dimensional balance that is relatively resilient and places significant constraints on any external power's ability to exercise unwanted dominance in the region. © The author [2008]. Published by Oxford University Press in association with the Japan Association of International Relations; all rights reserved.
This article begins by outlining the similarities and differences between the European Union (EU), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the East Asia Community (EAC) to understand the historical and political context of regional integration in three different regions. It then examines the interests, roles and concerns of three major external powers (the United States, the European Union and Russia) that have vital stakes in the future evolution of Asian multilateralism. This study argues that it is not in the interests of any of these three external powers to see one or more countries in Asia dominating the EAC or covertly working to transform regional organizations into alliances or collective security pacts, as that would not only undermine regional stability but also give a bad name to multilateralism. Of the three external powers, the United States—by virtue of its power and presence—is the most important external power and the state of its relations with regional heavyweights would inevitably influence the EAC-building process. All three external powers share a vested interest in ensuring that Asian multilateralism is not shanghaied. The future of the EAC-building, in the ultimate analysis, will be determined by several key issues, including the role of external powers, membership criteria, ASEAN's will and capacity to remain in “the driver's seat,” the EAC's distinctive character, utility and relationship with other existing multilateral forums (such as APEC, ARF—and last but not least, the state of China's relations with the United States, Japan and India, which would make or mar progress toward EAC-building.
As trade-driven growth and prosperity redefine both the Chinese economy and the global competitive landscape, U.S. policy makers increasingly must ponder whether the Chinese leadership will seek new options and capabilities to protect its far-reaching oceanic lifelines. As imported oil and raw minerals power the Chinese juggernaut, much of these flows traverse the Strait of Malacca and other littorals where there is little current Chinese capability to project power. In recent years, there is an ongoing debate among Chinese military circles regarding the feasibility of constructing a blue-water fleet that could change the balance of power in the Western Pacific and Indian Oceans. U.S. policy makers watch with increasing unease as a new generation of technically-savvy navy officers forcefully argue for a forward-looking maritime strategic posture that extends beyond the East and South China Seas. In addition, recent Chinese space-based and cyber warfare technology initatives bear watching as Beijing seeks to nullify key U.S. advantages in C4SRI using a high-tech variant of “asymmetric warfare.” Although it is unclear what direction future Chinese maritime strategy and doctrine will take, U.S. policy makers need to remain vigilant about rising Chinese maritime ambitions and capabilities in the future.
We compare the rise of Chinese seapower today to the rise of Imperial German seapower a century ago. The comparison is worthwhile for two reasons. First, the comparison holds merits in its own right. We use German Admiral Wolfgang Wegener's three indices of seapower–strategic position, the fleet, and strategic will to the sea–to assess the two countries’ maritime potential. This analysis leads inexorably to the conclusion that China holds far more potential for seapower that did the Kaiser's Germany. And second, the Chinese themselves are consulting German history as they inquire into the triumphs and failures of past great powers. Trying to divine how they interpret the German experience could let Western practitioners and scholars of grand strategy glimpse China's maritime future. In turn they can improve their own handling of strategy in East Asia.
As globalization accelerates, U.S. foreign policy makers have become less convinced of the influence geopolitics and power politics have on international affairs. They now risk losing touch with rising competitors like China that continue to view the international system in geopolitical terms. Chinese geopolitical strategists have great influence with the country's defense policy makers, who are focusing increasingly on the need for China to establish command of the seas—a goal that threatens conflict between it and the United States throughout Asia. In order to prevent a return to a world dominated by aggressive, geopolitically driven actors, the United States cannot afford to assume that China shares its worldview and that geopolitics has disappeared from international relations.