Article

Conceptualizing Epistemic Oppression

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Abstract

Epistemic oppression refers to persistent epistemic exclusion that hinders one’s contribution to knowledge production. The tendency to shy away from using the term “epistemic oppression” may follow from an assumption that epistemic forms of oppression are generally reducible to social and political forms of oppression. While I agree that many exclusions that compromise one’s ability to contribute to the production of knowledge can be reducible to social and political forms of oppression, there still exists distinctly irreducible forms of epistemic oppression. In this paper, I claim that a major point of distinction between reducible and irreducible epistemic oppression is the major source of difficulty one faces in addressing each kind of oppression, i.e. epistemic power or features of epistemological systems. Distinguishing between reducible and irreducible forms of epistemic oppression can offer a better understanding of what is at stake in deploying the term and when such deployment is apt.

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... Many epistemic activities are undertaken along with others and require membership in an epistemic community. Even if they don't involve direct interaction with others, the epistemic resources which they make use ofinformation, languages, conceptual tools -are shared resources to which we have access as members of an epistemic community (Dotson, 2014). In order to participate in shared epistemic activities -that is to receive and transmit knowledge and collaborate with others, we need to be able to communicate with others in our epistemic community. ...
... Often, epistemic injustice (Fricker, 2007) and epistemic oppression (Dotson, 2014) are said to restrict or undermine epistemic agency in virtue of the failure to attain appropriate recognition and uptake. Such statements are often made without reference to degree or context. ...
Article
This thesis offers an account of safety in the classroom and focuses on the relationship between safety and protection. Using a critical character epistemological lens, I argue that a student’s ability to protect themselves from harm may vary in relation to their social positionality or carry significant costs. I demonstrate how a range of epistemic character traits can aid students in protecting themselves from harm in hostile classroom environments. When theorising about epistemic character is done through a critical lens, the relationships between epistemic character and power structures in the social world are emphasised. I argue that the range of protective epistemic character traits available to a student will be affected by a range of factors, including how relationships of power and oppression affect the trajectory of their epistemic character development. Furthermore, the development and exercise of protective epistemic character traits, especially those which are conventionally classified as epistemic vices, can carry significant costs for students. Two such costs are (i) damage to epistemic character – the development of epistemic character in ways that are at odds with epistemic flourishing – and (ii) the constraint of epistemic character. I then illustrate the relationship between protection and safety by presenting the following account of safety: a classroom is safe for some student S if being in and participating in the classroom does not put S at higher than tolerable level of risk of harm without S being required to protect themself in ways that cannot be reasonably expected of them. Means of self-protection which students cannot be expected to adopt include those which cause, or make students vulnerable to further harm, and those which significantly disadvantage them in other ways. I argue that unless educators have detailed knowledge of a student’s ability to take on risk, then safety is required to make the classroom accessible to that student.
... Examples of this type include cases where a person experiences fear in response to certain stimuli due to trauma such as a sexual assault. In this paper we argue that fear generalisation that occurs due to the wrongful action of one person or group of people towards another person can be not only ethically but also epistemically wrong and unjust (Fricker 2007), and can constitute epistemic exclusion and oppression (Dotson 2014). The act of inflicting trauma on another person brings substantial epistemic as well as practical harms, wronging those who are targeted in their role as epistemic agents. ...
... The epistemic wrongs of some cases fear generalisation will also include a form of epistemic oppression (Fricker, 1999;Dotson, 2014). Epistemic oppression occurs when people undergo epistemic exclusion: ...
Preprint
Fear generalisation is a psychological phenomenon that occurs when fear that is elicited in response to a frightening stimulus spreads to similar or related stimuli. The practical harms of fear generalisation are well-documented, but little or no attention has been given so far to its epistemic harms. This paper fills this gap in the literature. It shows how the psychological phenomenon substantially curbs the epistemic agency of those who experience it, limiting their ability to respond to evidence, and substantially limiting their epistemic horizons. It is argued that when these epistemic harms are caused by wrongful actions and decisions of individuals or institutions, because the fear is elicited in response to a traumatic experience inflicted by them, the harms should be considered epistemic wrongs. The epistemic wrongs are closely akin to agential epistemic injustice, a variety of distributive epistemic injustice, and sometimes also involve epistemic exclusion. The paper thereby identifies a previously underexplored psychological mechanism that can be a vehicle through which both individuals and institutions can epistemically wrong others. The argument has implications for how both epistemic wrongs and epistemic injustice should be conceived, suggesting that both can occur without primarily being caused by epistemic flaws or errors, or a bad epistemic character. Finally, it highlights the advantage of taking a victim-centred approach to understanding epistemic harm.
... This is not a technical concern about demographic representation or geographical diversity; those are, at best, indications of what is wrong, rather than targets to hit that show we are somehow doing peer review right in an ethical sense. Rather, I would like to suggest that a "one-size-fits-all" approach to submissions can create epistemic oppression, the persistent presence of which can hinder an individual's or a community's contribution to knowledge production (Dotson, 2014). Equally importantly, if we accept epistemic oppression in any form-including a peer-review process that systematically favours or disadvantages knowledge produced according to certain temporary, situated, norms that can take on a mantle of permanence or inevitability. ...
... This is further complicated by the recognition that those of us writing about this tend to occupy positions of relative privilege ourselves, having been successful enough within the current system to be granted space to critique it. As Dotson (2014) observes, fields such as ours can demonstrate remarkable epistemological resilience, excluding research that makes us feel uncomfortable. As so often, naming the problem is the beginning, rather than the conclusion; exercising social and political power in the service of a more representative, more inclusive, and more interesting range of research underpins the work between problem-recognition and a different sense of what counts as publishable research, in this journal and others. ...
Article
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To commemorate 40 years since the founding of the Journal of Business Ethics, the editors in chief of the journal have invited the editors to provide commentaries on the future of business ethics. This essay comprises a selection of commentaries aimed at creating dialogue around the theme The Ethics and Politics of Academic Knowledge Production. Questions of who produces knowledge about what, and how that knowledge is produced, are inherent to editing and publishing academic journals. At the Journal of Business Ethics, we understand the ethical responsibility of academic knowledge production as going far beyond conventions around the integrity of the research content and research processes. We are deeply aware that access to resources, knowledge of the rules of the game, and being able to set those rules, are systematically and unequally distributed. One could ask the question “for whom is knowledge now ethical’”? (See the Burrell commentary.) We have a responsibility to address these inequalities and open up our journal to lesser heard voices, ideas, and ways of being. Our six commentators pursue this through various aspects of the ethics and politics of academic knowledge production. Working with MacIntyre’s scheme of practices and institutions, Andrew West provides commentary on the internal good of business ethics learning and education. Inviting us to step out of the cave, Christopher Michaelson urges a clear-eyed, unblinking focus on the purposes and audiences of business ethics scholarship. As developmental editor, Scott Taylor uncovers some of the politics of peer review with the aim of nurturing of unconventional research. Mike Hyman presents his idiosyncratic view of marketing ethics. In the penultimate commentary, Julie Nelson attributes difficulties in the academic positioning of the Business Ethics field to the hegemony of a masculine-centric model of the firm. And finally, Gibson Burrell provides a powerful provocation to go undercover as researcher-investigators in a parallel ethics of the research process.
... Accordingly, any number of possible factors -beyond the 'veracity' of a knowledge-claim -may aid in establishing certain knowledges or actors as credible and authoritative across a range of social, scientific, or political domains (Barnes and Edge, 1982;Shapin, 1994Shapin, , 1995Lynch et al., 2008). Credibility, therefore, is not an inherent property of speakers or of ideas but is contingent and negotiated, depending variously on strategies of speech, social relations, personal histories or identity markers -all of which might be enrolled to secure credibility from moment to moment or to bias a listener to hear certain speakers as more or less credible, if they are heard at all (Fricker, 2007;Dotson, 2014). As such, Shapin (1995, p.261) stresses that, rather than produce a 'grand theory' of credibility, we must attend to the particularities of cases to understand the diversity of discursive strategies and resources enrolled in its production, as well as the local, social, cultural or political factors that constrain who or what is marked as credible in any given setting. ...
Thesis
Since 1983, men who have sex with men have been prohibited from donating blood in the UK on the basis of purportedly elevated rates of HIV and other transfusion transmissible infections. This policy of deferral, known to many as the ‘gay blood ban’, has persisted in some form ever since and has been the subject of protest by individuals or groups termed blood donor activists. Utilising an array of theory from across science and technology studies (STS) and queer studies – situated at the nexus of a burgeoning queer STS – this thesis is a critical inquiry into UK blood donor activism. Drawing on archival research and 31 semi-structured interviews with blood donor activists in the UK as well as representatives of patient groups and the UK blood services, this research seeks to understand and critically interrogate the aims, motivations, and implications of the work of blood donor activists. This thesis argues, first, that blood donor activism in the UK is motivated both by an opposition to blood donor deferral criteria as a technology of homophobia and a contingent framing of blood donation as an altruistic act, which marks out blood donors as good and happy citizens (an affective economy into which queer men seek inclusion). This thesis goes on to argue, however, that blood donor activism is a deeply homonormative political form with a politics that tends to centre ‘respectable’ (e.g. monogamous) gay men at the expense of other figures of risk, like sex workers or promiscuous queers. These politics, this thesis contends, are a product not merely of activist agencies but the epistemic (hetero)norms of the biomedical context within which lay activists seek to raise their credibility. This thesis suggests, therefore, that blood donor activism operates in pursuit of Pyrrhic victories governed by chilling structures that demand we seek alternative routes of political investment.
... It therefore seems prima facie plausible that mild forms of disgust, such as 28 E.g., Friedlaender (2018), McTernan (2018), O'Dowd (2018) Perez Gomez (2021a, b). 29 E.g., Dotson (2014), Fricker (2007. 30 E.g., Basu (2019) being fed-up (e.g., Ekman 2003, 180f), have their place in a complete theory explicating the range of emotions that fittingly respond to minor moral mistakes. ...
Article
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In discussing the ways in which we hold each other accountable for immoral conduct, philosophers have often focused on blame, aiming to specify adequate responses to wrongdoing. In contrast, theorizing about the ways we can appropriately respond to minor moral mistakes – i.e., criticizable conduct that is bad but not wrong – has largely been neglected. My first goal in this paper is, thus, to draw attention to this blind spot and argue that a separate account of blameless moral criticism is desirable. My second goal is to propose one way to explicate the contrast between blaming and blameless moral criticism in terms of the contrast between moral anger and moral disappointment: while moral anger, as many argue, is an appropriate response to moral wrongdoing, moral disappointment, but not moral anger, is an appropriate response to these minor moral mistakes.
... Epistemic racism establishes legitimate and illegitimate knowledges, as well as two distinct classes of epistemic agents: knowers and sub-knowers (Pohlhaus, 2017: 17). This distinction is maintained in part through devaluing the credibility of certain knowers (Dotson, 2014). As Pohlhaus (2017) argues, 'In such cases, an epistemic agent is unfairly prevented from participating fully within epistemic systems owing to an unfair distribution of epistemic power due to unwarranted credibility deficits and assessments of competency' (p. ...
Article
Systemic racism within health care is increasingly garnering critical attention, but to date attention to the racism experienced by health professionals themselves has been scant. In Canada, anti-Black racism may be embodied in structures, policies, institutional practices and interpersonal interactions. Epistemic racism is an aspect of systemic racism wherein the knowledge claims, ways of knowing and ‘knowers’ themselves are constructed as invalid, or less credible. This critical interpretive qualitative study examined the experiences of epistemic racism among 13 healthcare professionals across Canada who self-identified as Black women. It explores the ways knowledge claims and expert authority are discredited and undermined, despite the attainment of professional credentials. Three themes were identified: 1. Not being perceived or portrayed as credible health professionals; 2. Requiring invisible labour to counter professional credibility ‘deficit’; and 3. Devaluing knowledge while imposing stereotypes. The Black women in our study faced routine epistemic racism. They were not afforded the position of legitimate knower, expert, authority, despite their professional credentials as physicians, nurses and occupational therapists. Their embodied cultural and community knowledges were disregarded in favour of stereotyped assumptions. Adopting the professional comportment of ‘Whiteness’ was one way these health care providers strived to be perceived as credible professionals. Their experiences are characteristic of ‘misogynoir’, a particular form of racism directed at Black women. Anti-Black epistemic racism constitutes one way Whiteness is perpetuated in health professions institutions.
... Note that this analysis in terms of epistemic and political agency can also be connected to other political concepts and principles. For example, the phenomena described here could also be analyzed in terms of what Dotson [17] calls 'epistemic oppression', which concerns 'infringement on the ability to utilize persuasively shared epistemic resources' for knowledge production (p. 116). ...
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Democratic theories assume that citizens have some form of political knowledge in order to vote for representatives or to directly engage in democratic deliberation and participation. However, apart from widespread attention to the phenomenon of fake news and misinformation, less attention has been paid to how they are supposed to acquire that knowledge in contexts shaped by artificial intelligence and related digital technologies. While this topic can also be approached from an empirical angle, this paper contributes to supporting concerns about AI and democracy by looking at the issue through the lens of political epistemology, in particular using the concept of epistemic agency. It argues that artificial intelligence (AI) endangers democracy since it risks to diminish the epistemic agency of citizens and thereby undermine the relevant kind of political agency in democracy. It shows that next to fake news and manipulation by means of AI analysis of big data, epistemic bubbles and the defaulting of statistical knowledge endanger the epistemic agency of citizens when they form and wish to revise their political beliefs. AI risks to undermine trust in one’s own epistemic capacities and hinder the exercise of those capacities. If we want to protect the knowledge basis of our democracies, we must address these problems in education and technology policy.
... Among some qualitative scholars, one's positionality can strengthen the research process, particularly when there is a shared identity between the researchers and the participants. This presumption is informed by the dominance of white thought in academic disciplines, the suppression of knowledge produced by marginalized scholars, and epistemic oppression (Collins, 2000;Dotson, 2014). For example, Collins (1986) contends that an outsider outsider within can benefit social science research because it "might generate a distinctive standpoint vis-a-vis existing sociological paradigms" (p. ...
Chapter
Using scholarship that centers gender and minoritized communities, this chapter examines the ways transformative researchers study and reflect on their relationships with participants in qualitative education research. We overview critical social and feminist theories and how scholars have employed these approaches to advance social justice throughout research processes. We invite researchers to consider how transformative approaches can advance social change through critical lenses and interrogate the dominance of white and cisgender research practices within knowledge production.
... As a result, science and society relationships are narrowly instrumentalised through activities that seek to mediate between science on one side and society on the other. Not only is the epistemic asymmetry of such framing evident (scientific knowledge counts most) but it also creates significant epistemic violence (other knowledges, feelings, practices and people do not count) [Dotson, 2014;Vidal, 2018]. ...
Article
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What can we say about equity, diversity and inclusion in science communication research over the past 20 years? This is a thorny question because of course we want to be constructive, to recognise change and to respect those whose hard-won research on equity issues has meant so much to many of us. At the same time, it is impossible — given what we know through our research — not to take a critical stance. We critique the status quo of science communication research from a social justice perspective and reflect on how we might change, perhaps bringing what has been marginal (and indeed the marginalised) into the core of science communication research, practice and policy.
... Compounding this problem is the longstanding misunderstanding of what gender research actually "is"-namely the difference between studying 'gender-as-a-variable' sex-difference research and gender as a social construct with an activist agenda (Bettany et al., 2010). Collectively, these issues function as epistemic oppression (Dotson, 2014). ...
Article
This paper examines the establishment of a feminist academic organization, GENMAC (Gender, Markets, and Consumers; genmac.co), serving gender scholars in business schools and related fields. In so doing, it builds on the emerging literature of feminist academic organizations, as situated within feminist organizational studies (FOS). Through a feminist case study and by assessing the reflections of GENMAC's board members, we tell the story of the emergence of GENMAC and detail the tensions the organization encountered as it formally established itself as a feminist organization within the confines of a business school setting, a patriarchal system, and a neoliberal university paradigm. We build on the FOS literature by considering how our organization counters cultures of heightened individualism and builds collective action to challenge sexism through the nexus of research, support, and advocacy pillars of our organization. We demonstrate how, through these actions, our organization challenges hierarchies of knowledge, prioritizes the care and support needed for the day‐to‐day survival of gender scholars in business schools, and spotlights and challenges structural inequalities and injustices in the academy.
... Rather, in this context, ignoring and ignorance is a form of epistemic oppression. 16 Indigenous climate studies provides many examples of a "humanities" for the "planetary age" by ontologically and methodologically decentering the human and centering relationality in understanding these at the planetary scale across time, but doing so in a way that does not artificially construct a binary cognition of global sociogenic problems and planetary ones. ...
... This paper has presented a range of formal and informal mechanisms that have historically appeared to place a lower value on the scholarship of child development research from Majority World countries. Such persistent epistemic exclusion that impedes contribution to the production of knowledge has been termed epistemic oppression (Dotson, 2014). ...
Article
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It has become increasingly apparent that publishing research on child development from certain countries is especially challenging. These countries have been referred to collectively as the Majority World, the Global South, non-WEIRD (Western, Educated, Industrial, Rich, and Democratic), or low-and middle-income countries. The aim of this paper is to draw attention to these persistent challenges , and provide constructive recommendations to contribute to better representation of children from these countries in child development research. In this paper, we outline the history of publication bias in developmental science , and issues of generalization of research from these countries and hence where it 'fits' in terms of publishing. The importance of explaining context is highlighted, including for research on measurement child development outcomes , and attention is drawn to the vicious publication
... This is because its format of exchanges would depend on a strict criterion, such as requiring rational discourse in the construction of arguments rather than allowing multiple forms of discourse. In addition, the dominant group may even control the format of exchanges, such as by allowing only reason-giving (Dotson 2014). This produces unjust ethical outcomes for both society and the actual exchange of arguments, since the listener cannot identify her prejudice towards the speaker and the speaker cannot identify what is wrong. ...
Article
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Deliberative scholars have suggested that citizens should be able to exchange arguments in public forums. A key element in this exchange is the rational mode of communication, which means speaking through objective argumentation. However, some feminists argue that this mode of communication may create or intensify epistemic injustices. Furthermore, we should not assume that everyone is equally equipped to take part in deliberation. Certain groups, such as Indigenous peoples, for instance, who may not be versed in rational forms of argumentation, may not be listened to or involved sufficiently in the deliberative process. Therefore, it seems we need an alternative mode of communication, such as storytelling, which is a first-person or collective narrative. Given this, how should we pursue this goal? This article aims to answer this question by analysing a local conflict involving an Indigenous tribe and a neighbouring community in Brazil and exploring the underlying testimonial and hermeneutical injustices. I argue that storytelling has an important normative and institutional role in public deliberation and show that its applied version could overcome epistemic injustices and lead to better public policies.
... 3 For an insightful account of the resilience of systems perpetuating epistemic oppressions and the orders of change required for addressing these oppressions, see Dotson 2014. ...
... This lack of equality awareness and politics of emancipation has led to the continued devaluing of females in education and society. This challenge is traceable to the lack of in-depth analysis of the reproduction of cultural stereotyping, epistemic injustice or exclusion from political, social-equality knowledge, in science education and the social space [12]. On the global scene, in Africa and in particular Nigeria, the persistent undermining and demeaning paradigm excluding females' collective political and intellectual struggle position us to go beyond superficial interrogation of women's oppression in the science education space. ...
Article
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We perceive contestations between science, education and women’s engagement and have raised disruptions in their act of knowing and mobility in science education. This study explored science educators’ views, beliefs and actions of reproduction and subversion of gender stereotyping at a teacher education college in Nigeria. Six science educators were selected based on comprehensive gender information that facilitated conduction of the study. The six educators were purposively selected out of 11 educators who completed and returned the questionnaire. A qualitative approach and case study framed the research using instruments such as questionnaires, interviews, and classroom observation schedules. Thematic analysis and coding were done. Educators consciously and unconsciously reproduced gender stereotypes beliefs and practices. Educators explicitly and implicitly engaged in unequal distribution of cognitive activities amongst pre-service teachers influenced by their practice of cultural norms and patriarchal ideology. The findings revealed multiple oppressions females faced, contradictory science classrooms, and political and democratic classroom space for negotiating and renegotiating discriminatory classroom beliefs, perception and views of educators during science engagements. However, several possibilities such as political advocacy, productive activism and transformative resistance for educators to re-negotiate discriminatory gendered space through constructive gender equality awareness for freedom and intellectual growth in science education could be emancipatory possibilities.
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Chapter
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Identifying causal mechanisms is an essential aspect of disparities research. Rigorous investigations of mechanisms can open the black box and clarify linkages in the causal chain, indicating how effects occur. Studies of mechanisms can also illuminate novel ways to reduce inequality when intervention at the root cause of unequal outcomes is not feasible. Still, research on mechanisms can present challenges for researchers and funders alike. In this essay, the authors summarize the necessary trade-offs and inherent tensions of research on causal mechanisms, and discuss challenges and opportunities for future studies. By explicating the complexities of disparities mechanisms research and exploring ways to address these challenges, the authors hope to help researchers propose work that is both rigorous and novel. The authors also aim to help research funders understand how best to support this work in ways that align with existing interests and resources.
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In this article, we brought together our researches on the sense of touch and ecofeminism to introduce a new epistemological approach to this sense. We study the consequences of the politics of distancing on sensitive experiences and the possibilities of reclaiming contact through touch. Using an ecofeminist and a critical visiocentric conceptual grid, we question how “distancing” structures our scientific paradigms, social representations and, therefore, our actions. Through the extended example of endometriosis and care practices, we discuss the paradoxes of sensitive experience in a production-driven and patriarchal context through the development of concepts such as “sensitive work” and “touch without contact”. Eventually, we underline the epistemological and radical political possibilities of an ecofeminist sense of touch which could, on the one hand, multiply epistemic agents and, on the other hand, introduce renewed and alternatives understandings of the social world.
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This article examines some aspects of the entanglement between aesthetic injustice and epistemic injustice, paying special attention to how aesthetic injustice can be resisted in the classroom. The article brings into conversation Boal’s notion of aesthetic injustice with Rancière’s work on the overlapping of aesthetics and politics to suggest that a truly democratic education must work on the level of senses, so that students learn how to identify and resist aesthetic injustice in their everyday lives. Specifically, it is argued that the democratic potential of education is inextricably linked to resisting aesthetic and epistemic injustice in practice. The main point of the article is that resistance to aesthetic injustice in the classroom operates as an instance of politics that mobilizes struggle against oppression. In this sense, the nature of political work conducted in democratic education is to undo the oppressive distribution of the senses.
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This article focuses on the relationship between evaluations of beauty and the ethics of living well. Separating these ideas typically involves understating how racism and patriarchy shape wider cultural and aesthetic sensibilities. I counter this tendency by foregrounding the precarity of vulnerable black children and the importance of self‐love in their efforts to flourish. My strategy involves placing Toni Morrison in conversation with Alexander Nehamas and Harry Frankfurt, philosophers who have carefully engaged the topics of beauty and love. By situating aesthetic judgment within ongoing practices of social formation and political contestation, I reveal the importance of linking beauty with practices of self‐regard while also detailing my criticisms of thinkers who downplay their significance. The effect is to position Morrison as an instructive guide for scholars interested in aesthetics, ethics, and politics.
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Introduction to SI on the same topic
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Settler colonial imaginaries are constructed through the repeated, intergenerational layering of settler ecologies onto Indigenous ecologies; they result in fortified ignorance of the land, Indigenous peoples, and the networks of relationality and responsibility that sustain co‐flourishing. Kyle Whyte (2018) terms this fortification of settler ignorance vicious sedimentation. In this paper, we argue that Outlaw Country music plays important roles in sedimenting settler imaginaries. We begin by clarifying the epistemic dimensions of vicious sedimentation. We then explore specific cases where Outlaw Country songs function as epistemic scaffolding for maintaining and preserving deeply sedimented settler imaginaries. Finally, we conclude by considering ways of using country music as epistemic scaffolding for constructing resistant epistemologies, through the processes of trickster hermeneutics (Vizenor, 1999) and epistemic chronostratigraphy.
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This article identifies a blind spot in constructivist theories of representation and their account of legitimacy in terms of the challenge posed by ecologies of social ignorance, generally and especially during foundational moments. Social ignorance is conceptualised here not merely as the absence of knowledge or true belief but as a social practice of legitimising epistemically problematic political imaginaries and the institutional systems they underpin. In dialogue with social epistemologists and phenomenologists, the article shows how representation can nurture social ignorance, despite the availability of ample opportunities for political contestation and alternative opinion formation. A permanent feature of democratic politics, this problem becomes most salient during moments of constitutional re-founding, such as regime change, post-conflict reconstruction or constitutional referenda, when representative claims can reconfigure a community’s political imaginary, rendering it more or less ignorant. The representative claims made by the Vote Leave’s key figures during the Brexit referendum campaign serve as illustration.
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Expanding Miranda Fricker's (2007) concept of epistemic injustice, recent accounts of agential epistemic injustice (Lackey, 2020; Medina, 2021; Pohlhaus, 2020) have focused on cases in which the epistemic agency of individuals or groups is unfairly blocked, constrained, or subverted. In this article I argue that agential epistemic injustice is perpetrated against marginalized groups not only when their group epistemic agency is excluded, but also when it is included but receives defective uptake that neutralizes their capacity to resist epistemic oppression. I identify two harms that such injustice inflicts on marginalized groups: epistemic disempowerment and critical defanging of resistant epistemic group agency. My analysis shows how the harms of agential epistemic injustice can occur through unfair epistemic exclusions in group dynamics, but also through forms of inclusion in group dynamics that distort or coopt the epistemic agency of the group. Following Emmalon Davis (2018) and her analysis of epistemic appropriation, I argue that the harms of agential epistemic injustice can occur when the resistant epistemic resources of a marginalized group are appropriated in a way that disempowers them and critically defangs their resistant epistemic agency. I use Taylor Rogers’ (2021) analysis of the epistemic appropriation of “#MeToo” and “intersectionality” to show how epistemic disempowerment and critical defanging work in unjust epistemic group dynamics. The article offers a diagnosis of the failures of epistemic responsibility involved in agential epistemic injustice, and some suggestions for resisting those failures and working toward more responsible and just epistemic group dynamics.
Article
In this paper, I discuss rape myths and mythologies, their negative effects on rape and sexual assault complainants, and how they prejudicially construct women qua women. The backdrop for the analysis is the Belfast Rugby Rape Trial, which took place in 2018. Four men, two of whom were well‐known rugby players, were acquitted of rape and sexual assault in a nine‐week criminal trial that dominated local, national and international attention. The acquittal resulted in ‘I Believe Her’ rallies and protests across Northern Ireland. Of concern were the deeply sexist and misogynistic text exchanges among the acquitted about the complainant and women more generally. One month after the trial, the Criminal Justice Board of Northern Ireland commissioned an independent review of the arrangements to deliver justice in cases of serious sexual offences. The Gillen Review proposed 16 key recommendations, among them measures to dispel rape myths and the role that Relationship and Sex Education in schools could play in combatting these myths. I will explore these issues using Miranda Fricker's construction of epistemic injustice. I argue that there is little appreciation of the profound impact that routine testimonial injustice—where the credibility of a speaker is deflated or undermined on account of her social identity—can have on the wellbeing of speakers and how it ramifies with other forms of injustice. To illustrate, I draw on neurological explanations to show why attributions of sexual consent are unjustly sustained in cases of rape and sexual assault.
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The paper contributes to current debates about decolonising curriculum and advancing corresponding ‘humanness pedagogies’ in South Africa by developing a capabilitarian approach and foregrounding epistemic justice capabilities. This is aligned with and to fostering a shared African ethic for individual transformation-in-context and for building universities which benefit communities and societies. It is proposed that epistemic justice capabilities are foundational to decolonising curriculum and foundational for pedagogies which mediate disciplinary content and the dismantling of comparative inequalities among students in order to foster humanness. The capabilitarian framework seeks to secure the expanded wellbeing, co-flourishing and agency of all, in this case in and through higher education and a quality, decolonising curriculum oriented to an ecology of knowledges and a generous, inclusive humanity. The paper concludes with suggestions regarding a way forward to dismantle an exclusionary ‘epistemic line’ and associated oppressions.
Article
In this paper, I develop an account of epistemic justice as a character-based intellectual virtue that a truth-desiring agent would want to possess. The agent who possesses this virtue is just towards other knowers in matters pertaining to epistemic goods and this involves a regard for agents as knowers. Notably, the virtue of epistemic justice has a unique position among virtues: epistemic justice is presupposed by every other intellectual virtue, while remaining a standalone virtue itself. Correspondingly, I also offer an account of the vice of epistemic injustice as an epistemically dis-valuable trait of character. The agent who possesses this trait is unjust towards other knowers in matters pertaining to epistemic goods and this involves a disregard for agents as knowers. Most importantly, I highlight that the vice of epistemic injustice is entailed by every other epistemic vice, though it remains a distinct vice.
Article
This essay is a provocation to debate. I argue that work in organization and management studies addressing how to theorize and construct ‘good’ theory is inherently masculinized and embraces a limited pluralism that ignores alternative, reflexive and more human ways of theorizing. As I will illustrate, most of the articles on the topic of theorizing about theory are written by men, and espouse forms of theorizing that are based on a masculinized rationality that privileges abstraction, a logic of objectivity and proceduralization. And while journal editors espouse theoretical pluralism, we are often exhorted to develop ‘theoretical balls’ by conforming to limited definitions of theory that privilege particular ways of knowing and theorizing which are considered imperative to getting published. I argue that there are other equally compelling ways of ‘theorizing’ that focus on who we are as human beings and how we experience self, life and work. I begin with a critique of the literature on theorizing theory, moving on to argue that this currently limits theorizing more humanly and imaginatively, due to ontological blindness, epistemological defensiveness, hegemonic masculinity and myopic self-referentiality. Finally, I offer alternative ways of theorizing and interpreting theory from a more human and reflexive perspective.
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American Indian students continue to experience marginalization in settler-colonial school systems in the United States. American Indian students receive disciplinary punishment more frequently and harshly than white peers. Overrepresentation of American Indian students in school discipline is a byproduct of a long history of oppressive settler-colonial schooling. To address racial disproportionality in school discipline, the Indigenous Learning Lab was enacted through building a university-school-family-community partnership at a rural high school. Learning Lab is a community-driven problem-solving process through which multiple school stakeholders take transformative actions, including identification of systemic challenges entrenched in the settler-colonial school system and design of a new, culturally responsive support system. White administrators and teachers, along with students, family, and community members from the local tribal nation, engaged in prefigurative political action as they participated in the collective design process of the new system. Prefiguration is a present embodiment of new social relations, allowing participants to try new decision-making structures that may lead to what can be considered possible futures. The purpose of this paper is to examine how school stakeholders exerted their collective agency to unpack systemic contradictions in the settler-colonial school system and design a new culturally responsive support system.
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Chapter 2 presents what will be ‘theoretical resources’ and explains why the term ‘resources’ is used. The chapter presents a selection of socio-cultural and psycho-social theories that represent different knowledges that underpin the perspectives in the book. This chapter is designed to be deliberately jarring for the reader to reflect the authors experience of discomfort in presenting and interrogating theories that are pathologizing alongside theories that offer emancipatory potential. This chapter presents the role of research in the construction, representation and critical understandings of ‘race’.KeywordsDecolonisationIntersectionalityEpistemology
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What is a participatory justice approach to counseling psychology, and what actions would express its inclusive intentions? We propose that a participatory justice framework for counseling psychology practice and training would complement social justice perspectives by emphasizing university-community collaborations and resource-sharing; it also privileges public, community-based knowledge creation as exemplified by participatory action research. In this way, a participatory justice approach offers a counterbalance to current political trends toward private ownership of social assets and resources. This article 1) expands upon these theoretical foundations, and then 2) presents three current practice-related project examples to show how these foundations can tangibly translate to academic and professional activities. Finally, the article 3) relates these activities to the training of students by concluding with suggested curricula by which to prepare graduate students and others for participatory undertakings.
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Die Erkenntnis, dass Algorithmen diskriminieren, benachteiligen und ausschließen, ist mittlerweile weit verbreitet und anerkannt. Programme zur Verwendung im predictive policing, zur Berechnung von Rückfälligkeitswahrscheinlichkeiten bei Straftäter:innen oder zur automatischen Gesichtserkennung diskriminieren vor allem gegen nicht-Weiße Menschen. Im Zuge dieser Erkenntnis wird auch vereinzelt die Verbindung zu epistemischer Ungerechtigkeit hergestellt, wobei die meisten Beiträge die Verbindungen zwischen Algorithmen und epistemischer Ungerechtigkeit nicht im Detail analysieren. Dieser Artikel unternimmt einen Versuch, diese Lücke in der Literatur zu verkleinern. Dabei umreiße ich zunächst das Feld der Algorithmen, um so die Entitäten, die epistemisch ungerecht sein könnten, klar zu fassen und zu unterscheiden. Dann erläutere ich eine Auswahl von epistemischen Ungerechtigkeiten, die für die Analyse von ungerechten Algorithmen relevant sind. Schließlich führe ich epistemische Ungerechtigkeiten und Algorithmen zusammen und zeige anhand von drei Beispielen – automatische Geschlechtserkennung, Googles Suchmaschinen-Algorithmus, PredPol (predictive policing) – dass Algorithmen an testimonialer Ungerechtigkeit und hermeneutischer Ungerechtigkeit beteiligt sind. Sie tragen so zudem auf verschiedenen Ebenen zur Exklusion von marginalisierten Gruppen bei.
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This article advances an (anti)agenda that would center unknowing as a necessary tool to remake autism. While much of the literature on the social study of ignorance describes its corrosive effects for democracy or how ignorance fuels epistemic injustice, I argue that some harms committed against autistic people have come from well-meaning attempts to know. A newly invigorated “critical” autism studies could foreground a project of ignorance to catalogue the varieties of unknowing that can recenter and remake autism. This does not entail simply supplanting “expert” knowledge with “non-expert” knowledge from the purified perspective of situated, autistic knowers; rather it disrupts feel-good narratives in which any efforts to rescue subjugated knowledges are hailed as undeniably progressive, a practice in which autistic knowers can become ensnared. Unknowing autism can propel the generative possibilities of failure, and futures in which efforts to reproduce dominant ways of knowing are resisted.
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This article discusses how recent developments in the cognitive sciences, especialy the concept of schemata (organizing frameworks for understanding events), can illumine the practice of organization development. On the basis of a cognitive perspective, the authors discuss the relationship between organizational change and schemata, describing the following orders of change that might result from OD: first-order change, or incremental changes occurring within particular schemata already shared by members of a client system, second-order change, or modifications in the shared schemata themselves; and third-order change, or the development of the capacity of the client system to change the schemata as events require. To show how understanding the differences among orders of change can help clarify problems and solutions from an intervention, the authors discuss how a paternalism schema affected a particular quality of working life intervention. They conclude by suggesting implications of the cognitive perspective for OD practice and research
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Research in multinational organizational structures has traditionally used either a rational, conscious perspective in which decision makers, through a single-loop change process, strategically choose to interpret the environmental culture to shape the organization’s structure or a nationalistic view, in which through a double-loop change process, organizational members of one culture impose their favored structures on organizational members of a different culture. This article considers a third perspective, one in which organizational culture and structure are socially constructed phenomena. Through a case study of a multinational office staffed by members of two distinct national cultures (Japanese and American), this research demonstrates how cultures and structures can be simultaneously created through single-, double-, and triple-loop change processes. These processes can lead to a third-order level of change. Ideas for “actionizing” this concept are discussed.
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Third-order change in organizations refers to attempts to help organizational members to transcend their shared schemata. It has not previously been explored in depth. Uses mystical experience as a model of how the third-order change process may occur. Discusses several characteristics of mystical experience, focusing in particular on the central characteristic of transconceptual understanding. Presents an example of Teresa of Avila, a Spanish woman from the sixteenth century whose mystical life was reflected in her organizing activities. Suggests how mystical experience can inform understanding of the third-order organizational change process and presents a preliminary model of ways in which the third-order change capacity might be developed.
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This report raises four issues: (1) why do so few women occupy positions of power and prestige in every field; (2) why might people fail to recognize that there is a gender equity problem; (3) how can gender equity be seen as a benefit to institutions; and (4) what can institutions do to increase gender equity?
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The aim of this essay is to analyze the notion of "loving, knowing ignorance," a type of "arrogant perception" that produces ignorance about women of color and their work at the same time that it proclaims to have both knowledge about and loving perception toward them. The first part discusses Marilyn Frye's accounts of "arrogant" as well as of "loving" perception and presents an explanation of "loving, knowing ignorance." The second part discusses the work of Audre Lorde, Elizabeth Spelman, and María Lugones in their attempts to deal with the issue of arrogant perception within feminism, and examines how Lugones's notion of "'world'-traveling" may help us deal with "loving, knowing ignorance." Ultimately, the author suggests that we need to become aware of instances of "loving, knowing ignorance," especially if we are to stay true to Third Wave feminism's commitment to diversity. Abstract
Article
[T]he dominated live in a world structured by others for their purposes — purposes that at the very least are not our own and that are in various degrees inimical to our development and even existence. We are perhaps used to the idea that there are various species of oppression: political, economic, or sexual, for instance. But where there is the phenomenon that Nancy Hartsock picks out in saying that the world is “structured” by the powerful to the detriment of the powerless, there is another species of oppression at work, one that has not been registered in mainstream epistemology: epistemic oppression. The word ‘structured’ may be read materially, so as to imply that social institutions and practices favour the powerful, or ontologically, so as to imply that the powerful somehow constitute the world. But for present purposes I am interested only in an epistemological reading, which implies that the powerful have some sort of unfair advantage in “structuring” our understandings of the social world. I will try to present an account of what this initially vague idea involves. I hope thereby to explain an exact sense in which the powerful can have a kind of epistemic advantage that means the powerless are epistemically oppressed.
Article
Justice is one of the oldest and most central themes of philosophy, but sometimes we would do well to focus instead on injustice. In epistemology, the very idea that there is a first-order ethical dimension to our epistemic practices - the idea that there is such a thing as epistemic justice - remains obscure until we adjust the philosophical lens so that we see through to the negative space that is epistemic injustice. This book argues that there is a distinctively epistemic genus of injustice, in which someone is wronged specifically in their capacity as a knower, wronged therefore in a capacity essential to human value. The book identifies two forms of epistemic injustice: testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice. In doing so, it charts the ethical dimension of two fundamental epistemic practices: gaining knowledge by being told and making sense of our social experiences. As the account unfolds, the book travels through a range of philosophical problems. Thus, the book finds an analysis of social power; an account of prejudicial stereotypes; a characterization of two hybrid intellectual-ethical virtues; a revised account of the State of Nature used in genealogical explanations of the concept of knowledge; a discussion of objectification and 'silencing'; and a framework for a virtue epistemological account of testimony. The book reveals epistemic injustice as a potent yet largely silent dimension of discrimination, analyses the wrong it perpetrates, and constructs two hybrid ethical-intellectual virtues of epistemic justice which aim to forestall it.
Article
I distinguish between two senses in which feminists have argued that the knower is social: 1. situated or socially positioned and 2. interdependent. I argue that these two aspects of the knower work in cooperation with each other in a way that can produce willful hermeneutical ignorance, a type of epistemic injustice absent from Miranda Fricker's Epistemic Injustice. Analyzing the limitations of Fricker's analysis of the trial of Tom Robinson in Harper Lee's To Kill a Mockingbird with attention to the way in which situatedness and interdependence work in tandem, I develop an understanding of willful hermeneutical ignorance, which occurs when dominantly situated knowers refuse to acknowledge epistemic tools developed from the experienced world of those situated marginally. Such refusals allow dominantly situated knowers to misunderstand, misinterpret, and/or ignore whole parts of the world.
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This paper defends a contextualist approach to epistemic injustice according to which instances of such injustice should be looked at as temporally extended phenomena (having developmental and historical trajectories) and socially extended phenomena (being rooted in patterns of social relations). Within this contextualist framework, credibility excesses appear as a form of undeserved epistemic privilege that is crucially relevant for matters of testimonial justice. While drawing on Miranda Fricker's proportional view of epistemic justice, I take issue with its lack of attention to the role that credibility excesses play in testimonial injustices. I depart from Fricker's view of the relation between credibility excesses and credibility deficits, and I offer an alternative account of the contributions that undeserved epistemic privileges make to epistemic injustices. Then, through the detailed analysis of To kill a mockingbird, I elucidate the crucial role played by the social imaginary in creating and sustaining epistemic injustices, developing an analysis of the kind of social blindness produced by an oppressive social imaginary that establishes unjust patterns of credibility excesses and deficits.
Article
While in agreement with Miranda Fricker’s context-sensitive approach to hermeneutical injustice, this paper argues that this contextualist approach has to be pluralized and rendered relational in more complex ways. In the first place, I argue that the normative assessment of social silences and the epistemic harms they generate cannot be properly carried out without a pluralistic analysis of the different interpretative communities and expressive practices that coexist in the social context in question. Social silences and hermeneutical gaps are misrepresented if they are uniformly predicated of an entire social context, instead of being predicated of particular ways of inhabiting that context by particular people in relation to particular others. I contend that a more nuanced—polyphonic—contextualization offers a more adequate picture of what it means to break social silences and to repair the hermeneutical injustices associated with them. In the second place, I argue that the particular obligations with respect to hermeneutical justice that differently situated subjects and groups have are interactive and need to be determined relationally. That is, whether individuals and groups live up to their hermeneutical responsibilities has to be assessed by taking into account the forms of mutual positionality, relationality, and responsivity (or lack thereof) that these subjects and groups display with respect to one another. The central argument is developed through an examination of what in race theory and in contemporary epistemologies of ignorance has been termed “white ignorance”; that is, the kind of hermeneutical inability of privileged white subjects to recognize and make sense of their racial identities, experiences, and social positionality.
Article
Recent work at the junction of epistemology and political theory focuses on the notion of epistemic injustice, the injustice of being wronged as a knower. Miranda Fricker (2007) identifies two kinds of epistemic injustice. I focus here on hermeneutical injustice in an attempt to identify a difficulty for Fricker's account. In particular, I consider the significance of background social conditions and suggest that an epistemic injustice should not rely on other forms of disadvantage to achieve its status as an injustice. Thus reformulated, the notion of epistemic injustice can help us to achieve an even deeper understanding of the relationship between knowledge and privilege.
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In this article, Sandra Harding introduces the relationship among feminism, science, technology, and theories of knowledge. In the first section, Harding argues that while Western sciences certainly have helped to develop some part of society, they have simultaneously helped to disempower others-such as many people of Third World descent, women and the poor, both here and around the world. A second theme in the book is that feminists must integrate the perspectives of the other liberatory social movements even more deeply into their own projects, and thus also become more capable of making effective alliances with them. In this part, Harding talks about how feminism confronts the sciences. She also talks about women worthies and structural obstacles. She thinks that class and race, poor women and women of color are still a group which has no right to get knowledge or get respect. Harding thinks that 'Thinking from women's lives' means thinking from all women's lives." Harding also discusses traditional and recent theories of knowledge. One kind of new theory argues that everyone should start asking scientific questions from the perspective of women's activities in order to gain a more critical perspective on otherwise unquestioned assumptions, and she examines the postmodernist challenges to such a subject. She also hopes to see changes in science education. It is important to make sure everyone gets a good science Education. She hopes that every body can learn science education that can improve the status of female scientists. [by Yu-Fong and Jayaram, STS 901-Fall 2006]. This is NOT a good abstract of these chapters.
Article
I distinguish between two senses in which feminists have argued that the knower is social: 1. situated or socially positioned and 2. interdependent. I argue that these two aspects of the knower work in cooperation with each other in a way that can produce willful hermeneutical ignorance, a type of epistemic injustice absent from Miranda Fricker's Epistemic Injustice. Analyzing the limitations of Fricker's analysis of the trial of Tom Robinson in Harper Lee's To Kill a Mockingbird with attention to the way in which situatedness and interdependence work in tandem, I develop an understanding of willful hermeneutical ignorance, which occurs when dominantly situated knowers refuse to acknowledge epistemic tools developed from the experienced world of those situated marginally. Such refusals allow dominantly situated knowers to misunderstand, misinterpret, and/or ignore whole parts of the world.
Article
I cannot recall the words of my first poem but I remember a promise I made my pen never to leave it lying in somebody else's blood. In this paper, first and foremost, I aim to issue a caution. Specifically, I caution that when addressing and identifying forms of epistemic oppression one needs to endeavor not to perpetuate epistemic oppression. Epistemic oppression, here, refers to epistemic exclusions afforded positions and communities that produce deficiencies in social knowledge. An epistemic exclusion, in this analysis, is an infringement on the epistemic agency of knowers that reduces her or his ability to participate in a given epistemic community.Epistemic agency will concern the ability to utilize persuasively shared epistemic resources within a given epistemic community in order to participate in knowledge production and, if required, the revision of those same resources. A compromise to epistemic agency, when unwarranted, damages not only individual knowers but also the state of social knowledge and shared epistemic resources. Unfortunately, avoiding unwarranted epistemic exclusions is an exceedingly difficult task. It may well be impossible. For example, we simply do not have the capacity to track all the implications of our positions on any given issue, which would, arguably, be necessary to avoid epistemic oppression entirely. This realization relegates efforts to be conscious of and minimize epistemic oppression to a kind of naïveté characteristic of utopian dreamers who advocate pie-in-the-sky goals achievable only in theory. Like many forms of pessimism, pessimism about epistemic fairness assumes an all-or-nothing stance. Either we can eliminate epistemic oppression entirely, or we can do nothing about epistemic oppression at all. This position is an obvious over-simplification of the many options available. One can advocate for better, more responsible epistemic conduct capable of reducing epistemic oppression, without also harboring unrealistic expectations for superior epistemic conduct and abilities necessary for eliminating epistemic oppression entirely. In this vein here I issue a caution and a proposal for minimizing epistemic oppression. To issue this caution, I take Miranda Fricker's book Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing as a paradigmatic case of the challenges that arise when attempting to avoid epistemic oppression, even while drawing attention to epistemic forms of oppression. By bringing attention to specifically epistemic forms of injustice, Fricker's work offers a strong and valuable contribution to a tradition of feminist thought that aims to highlight the observation that "when it comes to knowledge, women get hurt." However, her framing of epistemic bad luck as an antithesis to epistemic injustice conceptually forecloses the possibility of other forms of epistemic injustice and hence can be used to demonstrate the pervasiveness of epistemic oppression. Fricker, I claim, inadvertently perpetrates epistemic oppression by utilizing a closed conceptual structure to identify epistemic injustice. This limitation of Fricker's view illustrates the difficulty of avoiding epistemic oppression and demonstrates an avenue for reducing it in one's own analyses. This paper will proceed in two parts. First, I introduce Fricker's two forms of epistemic injustice, testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice, and a third form of epistemic injustice, contributory injustice. I will also briefly gesture to the pervasive nature of epistemic oppression. Second, I use Fricker's concept of epistemic bad luck as a contemporary example of how easy it is to perpetrate epistemic oppression, even while working to address epistemic oppression. Specifically, I show how Fricker's account deploys a closed conceptual structure that prematurely forecloses the possibility of alternative forms of epistemic injustice, like contributory injustice, and thereby perpetuates epistemic oppression. Ultimately, the strengths and limitations of Fricker's efforts to outline epistemic injustice highlight a need to move toward open conceptual structures that signify without absolute foreclosure so as to reduce the continued propagation of epistemic oppression. In this section I introduce three forms of epistemic injustice. They are: (1) testimonial injustice, (2) hermeneutical injustice, and (3) contributory injustice. For each form of epistemic injustice I offer a definition, an example, and the level of change required to address the injustice...
Article
Miranda Fricker claims that a “gap” in collective hermeneutical resources with respect to the social experiences of marginalized groups prevents members of those groups from understanding their own experiences (Fricker 2007). I argue that because Fricker misdescribes dominant hermeneutical resources as collective, she fails to locate the ethically bad epistemic practices that maintain gaps in dominant hermeneutical resources even while alternative interpretations are in fact offered by non-dominant discourses. Fricker's analysis of hermeneutical injustice does not account for the possibility that marginalized groups can be silenced relative to dominant discourses without being prevented from understanding or expressing their own social experiences. I suggest that a gap in dominant hermeneutical resources is ambiguous between two kinds of unknowing: hermeneutical injustice suffered by members of marginalized groups, and epistemically and ethically blameworthy ignorance perpetrated by members of dominant groups.
Article
Too often, identifying practices of silencing is a seemingly impossible exercise. Here I claim that attempting to give a conceptual reading of the epistemic violence present when silencing occurs can help distinguish the different ways members of oppressed groups are silenced with respect to testimony. I offer an account of epistemic violence as the failure, owing to pernicious ignorance, of hearers to meet the vulnerabilities of speakers in linguistic exchanges. Ultimately, I illustrate that by focusing on the ways in which hearers fail to meet speaker dependency in a linguistic exchange, efforts can be made to demarcate the different types of silencing people face when attempting to testify from oppressed positions in society.
Article
A paper about cross-cultural and cross-racial loving that emphasizes the need to understand and affirm the plurality in and among women as central to feminist ontology and epistemology. Love is seen not as fusion and erasure of difference but as incompatible with them. Love reveals plurality. Unityndashnot to be confused with solidarityndashis understood as conceptually tied to domination.
Article
The aim of this essay is to analyze the notion of “loving, knowing ignorance,” a type of “arrogant perception” that produces ignorance about women of color and their work at the same time that it proclaims to have both knowledge about and loving perception toward them. The first part discusses Marilyn Frye's accounts of “arrogant” as well as of “loving” perception and presents an explanation of “loving, knowing ignorance.” The second part discusses the work of Audre Lorde, Elizabeth Spelman, and María Lugones in their attempts to deal with the issue of arrogant perception within feminism, and examines how Lugones's notion of “‘world’-traveling” may help us deal with “loving, knowing ignorance.” Ultimately, the author suggests that we need to become aware of instances of “loving, knowing ignorance,” especially if we are to stay true to Third Wave feminism's commitment to diversity.
Article
This essay aims to clarify the value of developing systematic studies of ignorance as a component of any robust theory of knowledge. The author employs feminist efforts to recover and create knowledge of women's bodies in the contemporary women's health movement as a case study for cataloging different types of ignorance and shedding light on the nature of their production. She also helps us understand the ways resistance movements can be a helpful site for understanding how to identify, critique, and transform ignorance.
Article
In 1973 C.S.Holling introduced the word "resilience" into the ecological literature as a way of helping to understand the non-linear dynamics observed in ecosystems. Ecological resilience was defined as the amount of disturbance that an ecosystem could withstand without changing self-organised processes and structures(defined as alternative stable states). Other authors conside resilience as a return time to a stable state following a perturbation. A new term, adaptive capacity, is introduced to describe the process that modify ecological resilience. Two definitions recognise the presence of multiple stable states(or stability domains), and hence resilience is the property that meiates transitions between these states. Transitions among stable states have been described for many ecosystems, including semi-arid rangelands, lakes, coral reefs and forests. In these systems, ecological resilience is maintained by keystonestructuring processes across a number of scales, sources of renewal and reformation, and functional biodiversity. In practice, maintaining a capacity for renewal in a dynamic environment provides an ecological buffer that protects the system from failure of management actions that are taken based upon incomplete understanding, and it allows managers to affordably learn and change.
Women's epistemic exclusion and the question of equitable and sustain-able educational empowerment Borderlands/la frontera: The new mestiza
  • References Adadevoh
References Adadevoh, I. O. 2011.Women's epistemic exclusion and the question of equitable and sustain-able educational empowerment. In Philica, pp. 1–9. http://philica.com/display_article.php? article_id=227 Anzaldú a, G. 1999. Borderlands/la frontera: The new mestiza. San Francisco, NC: Aunt Lute Books.
The Rigoberta Menchu controversy University of Minne-sota Press First-order, second-order, and third-order change and organization development interventions: A cognitive approach
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Arias, A., ed. 2001. The Rigoberta Menchu controversy. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minne-sota Press. Bartunek, J. M., and M. K. Moch. 1987. First-order, second-order, and third-order change and organization development interventions: A cognitive approach. The Journal of Applied Behavioral Science 23 (4): 483–500.
What can she know? Feminist theory and the construction of knowledge. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. ——————. 1995. Rhetorical spaces: Essays on gendered locations Advocacy, negotiation, and the politics of unknowing
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Code, L. 1991. What can she know? Feminist theory and the construction of knowledge. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. ——————. 1995. Rhetorical spaces: Essays on gendered locations. New York, NY: Routledge. ——————. 2008. Advocacy, negotiation, and the politics of unknowing. Southern Journal of Philosophy 46(Supp): 32–51.
Plato: Complete works
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Cooper, J.M., ed. 1997. Plato: Complete works. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett.
The feminist standpoint: Developing the ground for a specifically feminist historical materialism
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Harstock, N. 1983. The feminist standpoint: Developing the ground for a specifically feminist historical materialism. In Discovering reality, edited by S. Harding and M. B. Hintikka, pp. 283-310. Norwell, MA: Kluwer Press.
Review of epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing
  • Cambrdige
Cambrdige: Cambridge University Press. ——————. 2010. Review of epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing. Hypatia 25 (2): 459–64.
Patricia Hill Collins' analysis of the suppression of black feminist thought and Miranda Fricker's paradigm case of testimonial injustice (see Collins 1989
This extension of the Allegory is heavily influenced by Nancy Tuana's articulation of the creation of "epistemically damaged identities," Patricia Hill Collins' analysis of the suppression of black feminist thought and Miranda Fricker's paradigm case of testimonial injustice (see Collins 1989; Fricker 2007; Tuana 2006).
There are many examples of this kind of epistemic exclusion (see e.g
There are many examples of this kind of epistemic exclusion (see e.g. Code 1995; Collins 2000; Fricker 2007; Williams 1991). For an extended example, see the Rigoberta Menchú controversy (Arias 2001).
These extensions are influenced by Lorraine Code's concept of rhetorical space and my concept of contributory injustice (see
These extensions are influenced by Lorraine Code's concept of rhetorical space and my concept of contributory injustice (see Code 1995; Dotson 2012).