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Examining the Relationship Between Conspiracy Theories, Paranormal Beliefs,
and Pseudoscience Acceptance Among a University Population
EMILIO LOBATO
1
*, JORGE MENDOZA
2
, VALERIE SIMS
1,3
and MATTHEW CHIN
1,3
1
Institute for Simulation and Training, University of Central Florida, Orlando, USA
2
Department of Political Science, Florida State University, Tallahassee, USA
3
Department of Psychology, University of Central Florida, Orlando, USA
Summary: Very little research has investigated whether believing in paranormal, conspiracy, and pseudoscientific claims are re-
lated, even though they share the property of having no epistemic warrant. The present study investigated the association between
these categories of epistemically unwarranted beliefs. Results revealed moderate to strong positive correlations between the three
categories of epistemically unwarranted beliefs, suggesting that believers in one type tended to also endorse other types. In addi-
tion, one individual difference measure, looking at differences in endorsing ontological confusions, was found to be predictive of
both paranormal and conspiracy beliefs. Understanding the relationship between peoples’beliefs in these types of claims has
theoretical implications for research into why individuals believe empirically unsubstantiated claims. Copyright © 2014 John
Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
INTRODUCTION
Believing in the unbelievable is still widely prevalent in to-
day’s society. These beliefs come in many forms, ranging
from psychic powers, to conspiracies by clandestine govern-
ment agencies to assassinate high-profile individuals, to out-
right denial of well-established scientific and medical facts
and theories in favor of unrealistic claims about the nature
of the universe or personal health. However, believing in
these unbelievable claims comes at cost. For example,
billions of dollars annually are spent on complementary
and alternative medical (CAM) treatments that either are
untested or have been found to have no meaningful treatment
effects (see Nahin, Barnes, Stussman, & Bloom, 2009; Ernst,
2000). This kind of economic impact, to say nothing of the
personal cost associated with foregoing empirically validated
medical treatments, speaks to the importance of examining
why people believe what they do. The study presented in this
article attempts to add a unique perspective on the issue of
belief in such empirically unsubstantiated claims.
We aim to provide a compelling rationale for investigating
more directly the relationship between paranormal, conspiracy
theory, and pseudoscience beliefs. While some research has
investigated the relationship between two of these types of
beliefs (e.g., Darwin, Neave, & Holmes, 2011; Lewandowsky,
Gignac, & Oberauer, 2013; Lewandowsky, Oberauer, &
Gignac, 2013; Swami et al., 2011), most studies have exam-
ined only one type. To date, we are aware of no study that
has investigated all three. Thus, the primary objective of this
study is to begin to fill that gap in the existing literature. This
effort is also a preliminary investigation into competing theo-
ries from these focused lines of research (e.g., on conspiracy
beliefs) to examine their potential generalizability to other
categories of beliefs (e.g., for paranormal and pseudoscience
beliefs as well).
Definitions
The exact characteristics and definitions of a paranormal be-
lief, a conspiracy theory, or a pseudoscientific theory are by
no means settled matters in science, history, or philosophy.
Conspiracies sometimes do happen (e.g., the Watergate
scandal of the Nixon administration), and sometimes, a once
accepted scientific theory becomes pseudoscientific in light
of subsequent discoveries (e.g., Lamarckian evolution).
However, because it is not in the scope of this paper to
attempt to settle the matter of what precisely a paranormal
claim, a conspiracy theory, or a pseudoscientific theory is,
we use previously proposed definitions of these terms as a
matter of pragmatism. Therefore, for the purposes of this ar-
ticle, paranormal beliefs are defined as ‘beliefs in physical,
biological, or psychological phenomena that feature funda-
mental or core ontological properties of another ontological
category’(Lindeman & Aarnio, 2006, p. 586–587) where
‘ontological category’refers to a domain level classification
of phenomena as physical, biological, or psychological. A
conspiracy theory belief refers to ‘lay beliefs that attribute
the ultimate cause of an event, or the concealment of an
event from public knowledge, to a secret, unlawful, and
malevolent plot by multiple actors working together’
(Swami, Chamorro-Premuzic, & Furnham, 2010, p. 749;
adapted from Zonis & Joseph, 1994). Finally, pseudoscien-
tific beliefs can be conceptualized as ‘cognitions about
material phenomena that claim to be “science”yet use
nonscientific evidentiary processes’(Losh, Tavani, Njoroge,
Wilke, & McAuley, 2003; quoted in Losh & Nzekwe,
2011b, p. 473), and we considered science denial to fall
under this category.
Despite their differences, these belief types share funda-
mental characteristics. For one, pseudoscience proponents
make use of appeals to conspiracies to support their position,
and conspiracy theory adherents may appeal to their under-
standing of science—which is often erroneous or incom-
plete—as support for their belief. That is, in some instances,
it can be difficult to tease apart when a pseudoscience
or paranormal claim ends and a conspiracy claim begins
(e.g., climate change denial; see Lewandowsky, Gignac,
*Correspondence to: Emilio Lobato, University of Central Florida, Institute
for Simulation and Training, 3100 Technology Parkway, Orlando, FL
32826, USA.
E-mail: elobato@ist.ucf.edu
Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Applied Cognitive Psychology,Appl. Cognit. Psychol. 28: 617–625 (2014)
Published online 2 June 2014 in Wiley Online Library (wileyonlinelibrary.com) DOI: 10.1002/acp.3042
et al., 2013; Lewandowsky, Oberauer, et al., 2013). In addi-
tion, although the focus of specific unsubstantiated beliefs
may differ, the rhetorical strategies adherents use to defend
these beliefs appear to be fundamentally similar (see Boudry
& Braeckman, 2011, 2012, for review). Similarly, the con-
cept of epistemic warrant, from the philosophy of science
literature, appears relevant. The epistemic warrant refers to
‘the totality of evidence and knowledge that is available to
human knowledge seekers at the time in question’(Hansson,
2009, p. 239) and is one feature suggested to distinguish
science from pseudoscience. This feature may also serve to
distinguish paranormal claims and conspiracy theories from
empirically supported explanations, as both paranormal and
conspiracy claims quite frequently fail to measure up to the
‘totality of evidence’relevant to their specific claims. As such,
we will refer to paranormal beliefs, conspiracy theory, and pseu-
doscience beliefs collectively as epistemically unwarranted.
Prior research findings
Prior research has examined the role of many individual
differences in understanding one’s propensity for believing
epistemically unwarranted claims. Taken together, the re-
sults are often conflicting. For example, several studies have
shown no relationship between a person’s need for cognition
(NFC), that is, the enjoyment in or tendency to engage in
cognitively demanding activities (Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein,
& Jarvis, 1996), and paranormal beliefs (e.g., Genovese,
2005; Yates & Chandler, 2000), whereas other results
suggest that participants with a higher NFC tend to endorse
less paranormal beliefs (e.g., Pennycook, Cheyne, Seli,
Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2012). By comparison, a relationship
between conspiracy theories and NFC has been previously
unsupported (Abalakina-Paap, Stephan, Craig, & Gregory,
1999). Similarly, a person’s desire for control over his or
her life has been shown to be related to superstitious
behavior (e.g., Keinan, 2002), and threats to control increase
a person’s perceptions of illusionary patterns (e.g., Sullivan,
Landau, & Rothschild, 2010; Whitson & Galinsky, 2008),
whereas other studies suggest that this variable does not
serve a good explanatory role in paranormal and supersti-
tious beliefs (e.g., Lindeman & Aarnio, 2006).
Gender has been examined in many studies of epistemi-
cally unwarranted belief types, and as with the aforemen-
tioned individual differences, the results are inconsistent.
Whereas some findings have shown that women tend to
endorse medical pseudoscience more than men (e.g., Astin,
1998), other research has shown no relationship between
gender and pseudoscience acceptance (e.g., Johnson &
Pigliucci, 2004). Findings by Lindeman (2011) have shown
that gender accounts for very little of the variance when con-
trolling for another variable, ontological confusion, which
we will describe in the following text. Although most
research on conspiracy beliefs does not find a gender differ-
ence (e.g., Darwin et al., 2011), some research has shown
slight gender differences within specific populations, such
as the US population (e.g., Bruder, Haffke, Neave,
Nouripanah, & Imhoff, 2013; Swami et al., 2011), with
women marginally more prone to conspiratorial thinking
than men.
In spite of, or perhaps because of, these inconsistent
findings, it is important to establish the presence or absence
of a relationship between these beliefs. Inconsistent findings
for individual difference variables may be explained by
small effect sizes, with more substantive relationships found
between the beliefs themselves. For instance, a person’s
level of NFC may contribute to initially accepting an episte-
mically unwarranted claim, but once a person does so, that
becomes a less important factor in accepting or rejecting sub-
sequent unwarranted claims. Perhaps at that point, what is
important is the existing acceptance of an epistemically
unwarranted claim. Fortunately, there are several existing
theoretical frameworks that have been put forward to explain
various epistemically unwarranted belief systems.
One perspective comes from research examining the rela-
tionship between paranormal and religious beliefs that shows
people who believe in one type tend to reject the other type
of belief (Emmons & Sobal, 1981; Hergovich, Schott, &
Arendasy, 2005; Persinger & Makarec, 1990; Rice, 2003).
This pattern of results is described in terms of a substitution
effect, which states that classical paranormal beliefs and tra-
ditional religious beliefs are competing sets of beliefs and
that acceptance of one reduces the likelihood of acceptance
for the other (Rice, 2003). As such, one of our goals is to
examine if there is a substitution effect that extends beyond
examining paranormal and religious beliefs.
Some research findings provide suggestive evidence of a
substitution effect between epistemically unwarranted belief
types. For example, Losh and Nzekwe (2011a) surveyed a
sample of the US pre-service education majors in order to
investigate the relationship between their views on the
scientific theory of evolution, pseudoscientific theories
(e.g., Creationism and Intelligent Design), and paranormal
claims. Results of their study indicated that the majority of
pre-service educators accepted the pseudoscience theories
and rejected many paranormal claims such as extraterres-
trials or magic, although sizeable minorities were undecided
about other paranormal claims, such as the existence of
ghosts and communion with the dead. These findings sug-
gest that at least paranormal and pseudoscientific beliefs
may show a substitution effect.
From the literature on conspiracy theories, research has
shown a different pattern of belief. Conspiracy theory be-
lievers will tend to readily accept any conspiracy theory
presented to them. As described by Goertzel (1994), these
conspiracy theory believers are monological thinkers;
believers take each conspiracy belief as evidence for other
conspiracies. ‘The more conspiracies a monological thinker
believes in, the more likely he or she is to believe in any
new conspiracy theory which may be proposed’(p. 740). In-
vestigations by Swami and colleagues (Swami et al., 2010)
provide confirmatory evidence of that suggestion, even for
fictitious conspiracies (Swami et al., 2011). Another investi-
gation has found that this is the case even for conspiracy
theories that come to mutually exclusive conclusions (Wood,
Douglas, & Sutton, 2012).
This second theoretical position of monological thinking
can be applied to the research that has been carried out exam-
ining multiple types of epistemically unwarranted beliefs.
Recent research efforts have found a positive relationship
618 E. Lobato et al.
Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Appl. Cognit. Psychol. 28: 617–625 (2014)
between conspiracy theory and rejection of well-established
science (Lewandowsky, Gignac, et al., 2013; Lewandowsky,
Oberauer, et al., 2013) and between conspiracy theory and
paranormal acceptance (Darwin et al., 2011; Swami et al.,
2011). Finally, paranormal beliefs have been found to be
related to beliefs in pseudoscientific claims (Eder, Turic,
Milasowszky, Van Adzin, & Herogivch, 2011; Lindeman,
2011). Although monological thinking was not necessarily
considered as an explanatory factor between the epistemi-
cally unwarranted types of beliefs in these studies, the find-
ings can nonetheless be interpreted as providing suggestive
evidence that monological thinking may be a contributing
factor. This study serves as an initial examination into the
possibility that monological thinking applies across these
three types of epistemically unwarranted beliefs by investi-
gating whether they are positively correlated with each other.
Related to, though distinct from, monological thinking is
the recent suggestion from the literature on paranormal
beliefs that ontological knowledge provides a coherent frame-
work for understanding why some people believe fantastic
claims. Lindeman and her colleagues (Lindeman & Aarnio,
2007; Lindeman & Saher, 2007; Lindeman, Svedholm,
Takada, Lönnqvist, & Verkasalo, 2011; Svedholm, Lindeman,
& Lipsanen, 2010) have conducted a series of studies into the
relationship between paranormal beliefs, CAM beliefs, and the
concept of core ontological knowledge. Here, core ontological
knowledge refers to a person’s understanding of the world
along three broad yet distinct categories: physical, biological,
and psychological. These core ontologies are learned without
necessary formal instruction and provide a foundation for
understanding evolutionarily important entities and events
(Lindeman et al., 2011). Findings from these studies show that
believers in paranormal or CAM claims fail to accurately
distinguish between physical, biological, and psychological
domains as separate ontological categories. Instead, believers
may rely on naïve conceptualizations of these domains, which
result in ontological confusions such as considering lifeless en-
tities as having attributes unique to living entities. The re-
searchers interpreted their findings within the context of dual
process theories of cognitive psychology (see Epstein, Pacini,
Denes Raj, & Heier, 1996; Evans, 2003). Dual process
theories propose that humans engage in two types of cognitive
processing of information. One type of processing is character-
ized by intuitive and autonomous processing of information,
whereas the other type of processing is analytical and character-
ized by the ability to cognitively decouple sensory representa-
tions (Stanovich & Toplak, 2012). Naïve or folk physics,
biology, and psychology may reflect intuitive information
processing, influencing a person’s propensity to believe in a par-
ticular claim regardless of its epistemic value. Several of these
studies have also found that women tend to be more inclined to-
ward this intuitive cognitive process than men (e.g., Aarnio
& Lindeman, 2005; Lindeman, 2011), which may help
explain why some studies find that women endorse more para-
normal (e.g., Aarnio & Lindeman, 2005) and, occasionally, con-
spiracy beliefs (e.g., Swami et al., 2011). We thus investigated
the possibility that the tendency to make ontological confusions
is related to epistemically unwarranted beliefs generally, as
opposed to just paranormal beliefs or CAM beliefs as previously
reported (e.g., Lindeman, 2011; Lindeman & Aarnio, 2007).
Research question and design
The research questions that guided this study were as
follows: first, is there a significant correlation in accepting
paranormal beliefs, conspiracy theories, and pseudoscience?
and second, do any of the theories described in the preceding
section apply generally to accepting epistemically
unwarranted beliefs? To address these questions, we asked
the participants to fill out a novel questionnaire asking about
acceptance of epistemically unwarranted claims as well as
multiple individual difference measures (see Section 2.2).
METHODS
Participants
Participants were 480 undergraduate students at a large uni-
versity in the southeastern USA recruited through an online
recruitment process offered by the campus Psychology
Department. They were given course credit for participation.
Twenty-five response sets (5.2%) were not analyzed because
of incomplete data or the same IP address being recorded for
multiple response sets. The final sample consists of 455 re-
sponses (296 female participants; M
age
= 21.0, SD
age
= 5.6).
On the basis of the demographic information provided,
religious affiliation was recoded into two categories: non-
religious participants and Christian participants. Other reli-
gious affiliations accounted for a too small percentage of
the sample to be considered separately. Non-religious partic-
ipants were considered any participant who reported being
agnostic, or atheist, or specifically mentioned no religion in
their response. This accounted for 125 response sets.
Christian participants were considered any participant who
reported being Catholic, Protestant, Christian (either generi-
cally or non-denominational), or some denomination of
Christianity (e.g., Baptist and Methodist). This accounted
for 278 response sets.
Measures
The following measures were used to assess individual
differences that might be predictive of belief endorsement.
1
Need for cognition
An 18-item scale that measured participants’engagement
and enjoyment of cognitive activities was used (α= .91;
Cacioppo et al., 1996). Participants responded on a five-
point scale on how much each item is a characteristic of them
(1 = extremely uncharacteristic of you and 5 = extremely
characteristic of you). An example of the items included
on this scale is ‘I would prefer complex to simple problems’.
1
One additional scale was administered in this study, the Need for Emotion
Scale, a 12-item scale that measures whether participants seek out and enjoy
emotionally evocative stimuli (Raman, Chattopadhyay, & Hoyer, 1995).
This was included to examine whether a propensity toward accepting episte-
mically unwarranted beliefs is related to seeking out emotionally charged
stimuli. However, this scale was not found to be significantly related to
the paranormal, conspiracy, or pseudoscience subscales of the Belief survey
with any analysis technique used in this study. As such, we have elected to
not include it in the main text, but we report its presence in the study here for
the sake of completeness.
Relationship between unwarranted beliefs 619
Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Appl. Cognit. Psychol. 28: 617–625 (2014)
Desirability of control (DOC)
A scale was used to measure the participants’desire for con-
trol over their life, which consisted of 20 statements (α= .79;
Burger & Cooper, 1979). Participants indicated on a seven-
point scale the degree to which the statement applies to them
(1 = the statement doesn’t apply to me at all and 7 = the
statement always applies to me). An example of the items
included on this scale is ‘I prefer a job where I have a lot
of control over what I do and when I do it’.
Mini-IPIP
Personality was measured using the Mini-International
Personality Item Pool (Mini-IPIP; Donnellan, Oswald, Baird,
& Lucas, 2006), an abbreviated version of the Five-Factor In-
ventory (McCrae & Costa, 1987). The Mini-IPIP consisted of
20 statements, four for each factor of personality: extraver-
sion, conscientiousness, agreeableness, openness, and neu-
roticism (α= .85, .72, .70, .69, and .70 for each factor,
respectively). Participants indicated on a five-point scale to
what degree they agree or disagree with each statement
(1 = strongly disagree and 5 = strongly agree).
Core knowledge confusion (CORE)
Ontological confusion was examined using an English
version of the CORE scale developed by Lindeman and col-
leagues (α= .93; Lindeman & Aarnio, 2007; Lindeman et al.,
2011). This was a 30-item scale examining different varieties
of core ontological confusions (e.g., Natural, lifeless objects
are living; artificial objects are animate). Participants were
presented with a statement representing one of the types of
core ontological confusions and were asked to determine
whether the statement was literally true or not literally true.
An example of statements in this scale is ‘Stars live in the
sky’, which describes a physical entity (i.e., stars) as
possessing a biological property (i.e., life). Eight filler items
were included in the scale.
A novel 37-item questionnaire investigating acceptance of
epistemically unwarranted beliefs was created for this study
(see Table 1; hereafter, Belief survey). Many items used in
this questionnaire were adopted from other scales, such as
the Revised Paranormal Belief Scale (Tobacyk, 2004), and
studies on conspiracy theory acceptance such as Goertzel
(1994) and Abalakina-Paap et al. (1999). A few additional
items not previously investigated in the existing literature
were included. All items were a priori defined as paranor-
mal, conspiracy, or pseudoscientific. Participants were
instructed to read each statement and select on a five-point
scale how much they agree or disagree with the claim
(1 = strongly disagree and 5 = strongly agree). For analysis,
scores were recoded such that a higher score reflected a
greater rejection of the epistemically unwarranted belief.
Procedure
The entire procedure was conducted online, using the survey
system Qualtrics (www.qualtrics.com). Participants were
instructed that they were participating in a study examining
the relationship between personality and beliefs. Participants
first filled out the Belief survey. Items on the Belief survey
were presented in random order. Then, participants filled
out the NFC, DOC, and Mini-IPIP scales. These scales were
presented in random order. Instructions for each scale were
provided at the top of each web page. Finally, participants
filled out a demographic questionnaire.
RESULTS
Cronbach’s alpha for the Belief survey and the three sub-
scales was calculated to assess reliability. The reliability of
the whole scale was .87. Reliabilities for the subscales were
.86 for paranormal beliefs, .67 for conspiracy beliefs, and .76
for pseudoscience beliefs. Mean scores and standard devia-
tions for individual items are shown in Table 1. The overall
mean score was 3.64 (SD = 0.45). For each subscale, the
mean scores were 3.59 (SD = 0.66) for paranormal items,
3.35 (SD = 0.45) for conspiracy items, and 3.43 (SD = 0.50)
for pseudoscience items.
Correlations between beliefs
Pearson product moment correlations showed that beliefs in
paranormal, conspiracy, and pseudoscientific claims all were
moderately to strongly positively correlated, as shown in
Table 2. Overall, those who endorsed one type of epistemi-
cally unwarranted belief tended to endorse other types.
Demographic differences
A 2 (gender: male and female) × 2 (religious affiliation:
Christian or non-religious) between-subjects Analysis of Vari-
ance (ANOVA) on participants’scores on the Belief survey re-
vealed a significant main effect for gender [F(1, 398) = 22.52,
p<.001, η
p
2
= .05] and religious affiliation [F(1, 398) = 55.20,
p<.001, η
p
2
= .12]. These effects were not qualified by an
interaction between gender and religious affiliation
[F(1, 398) = 1.96, p=.162, η
p
2
= .01]. The mean response for
male participants (M=3.86, SD = 0.04) on the Belief scale
was higher than the mean response for female participants
(M= 3.64, SD = 0.03). The mean response for participants
who reported a Christian affiliation (M=3.58, SD = 0.03)
was lower than the mean response for participants who
reported no religious affiliation (M=3.92, SD = 0.04).
We subsequently ran a 2 (gender: male and female) × 2
(religious affiliation: Christian or non-religious) between-
subjects Multivariate Analysis of Variance (MANOVA) to
examine demographic differences in scores on the paranormal,
conspiracy, and pseudoscience subscales of the Belief scale.
Results again showed a significant main effect for gender
[F(3, 446) = 10.05, p<.001, η
p
2
= .06] and a significant main
effect for religious affiliation [F(3, 446) = 38.95, p<.000,
η
p
2
= .21] but no significant interaction effect [F(3,
446) = 1.81, p= .145, η
p
2
= .01]. For the male participants,
mean responses were higher than those for the female
participants (see Figure 1), and the mean responses for
non-religious participants were higher than the mean re-
sponses for the Christian participants (see Figure 2). This
indicates that men relative to women and non-religious
participants relative to Christian participants were more
likely to reject epistemically unwarranted beliefs.
620 E. Lobato et al.
Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Appl. Cognit. Psychol. 28: 617–625 (2014)
Predictors of epistemically unwarranted beliefs
Hierarchical multiple linear regression on the Belief scale
was performed with 10 individual difference variables:
gender, religious affiliation, NFC, DOC, CORE, and the five
mini-IPIP subscales (see Table 3). For the mean score on the
Belief scale, the overall model was significant, accounting
for 36.2% of the variance [F(10, 401) = 22.17, p<.001].
Gender, religious affiliation, NFC, DOC, CORE, extraver-
sion, and neuroticism were significant predictors. Overall,
being male (r=.25), having no religious affiliation
(r=.36), having a higher NFC (r= .25) and greater DOC
Table 1. Belief survey items with mean (standard deviation) scores and endorsement rate
Item
Mean score
(SD)
Endorsement rate
(%)
b
1. The variety of species of life that exist today is best explained
by the scientific theory of evolution. (S)
3.67 (1.23) 63.3
2. The earth is experiencing a period of global warming that is caused
by many factors including human activities. (S)
3.89 (1.06) 74.0
3. Childhood vaccines are one causal factor in the development of autism.
a
(S) 3.35 (0.99) 41.5
4. Human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) later develops into acquired
immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS). (S)
4.24 (0.91) 82.0
5. A person chooses to be homosexual, bisexual, or heterosexual.
a
(S) 3.44 (1.33) 53.4
6. US astronauts have been to the moon. (C) 4.45 (0.79) 90.4
7. Members of the US government were involved in the planning and execution
of the events that happened on 11 September 2001.
a
(C)
3.90 (1.05) 67.1
8. President John F. Kennedy was assassinated by Lee Harvey Oswald,
who acted alone. (C)
3.40 (1.04) 50.1
9. Members of the US government were involved in a conspiracy to
assassinate Martin Luther King, Jr.
a
(C)
3.59 (1.04) 52.9
10. Creatures known popularly as Big Foot, the Loch Ness Monster, and/or
the Chupacabra exist.
a
(P)
3.84 (1.08) 67.0
11. Extraterrestrial life forms have visited Earth and abducted human beings.
a
(P) 3.70 (1.07) 58.0
12. The age of the earth is approximately 4.3 billion years. (S) 3.59 (1.13) 57.4
13. The shape of the earth is roughly a sphere. (S) 4.22 (0.97) 84.8
14. After people die, they still interact with the living as ghosts.
a
(P) 3.39 (1.17) 46.6
15. Certain objects, such as rabbits’feet and four-leafed clovers, genuinely bring good luck.
a
(P) 3.89 (1.04) 69.0
16. Homeopathic treatments are just as valid as traditional medical treatments for
serious illnesses.
a
(S)
3.22 (1.01) 37.8
17. Some humans have special mental abilities, such as the ability to move objects using only
mental force or to predict the future with perfect accuracy.
a
(P)
3.95 (1.05) 70.5
18. Prayer is effective at treating people with terminal diseases.
a
(S) 2.95 (1.31) 34.1
19. Reiki healing, otherwise known as Palm healing, is effective in healing the body.
a
(S) 3.74 (0.97) 57.6
20. The Holocaust of the 1930s and 1940s was responsible for the deaths of over 11 million people,
of whom six million were Jewish. (C)
4.54 (.78) 92.1
21. President Barack H. Obama is a native born US citizen. (C) 3.87 (1.14) 67.5
22. Most human beings only use approximately 10% of their brain.
a
(S) 2.88 (1.19) 38.4
23. The beginning of the universe is best explained by the Big Bang Theory. (S) 3.13 (1.29) 42.8
24. Human beings have souls that continue to exist after the body dies.
a
(P) 2.44 (1.21) 18.5
25. A full moon causes people to behave oddly.
a
(P) 3.49 (1.22) 55.4
26. Astrology is a valid explanation for the behaviors and personality of people.
a
(P) 3.85 (1.06) 67.2
27. The Bermuda Triangle is a special location on the planet that, for some reason, causes ships
and aircraft to crash or disappear more often than anywhere else on the planet.
a
(P)
2.89 (1.16) 30.5
28. Deceased individuals communicate with living people through séances or Oijua boards.
a
(P) 3.82 (1.11) 61.7
29. Black cats are unlucky.
a
(P) 4.07 (1.04) 77.1
30. The musician Elvis Presley is dead. (C) 4.59 (0.70) 84.7
31. The singer John Lennon was the target of an assassination conspiracy.
a
(C) 3.14 (0.95) 29.2
32. The rappers Tupac Shakur and Biggie Smalls were victims of assassination conspiracies,
which were covered up.
a
(C)
3.09 (1.05) 30.5
33. The singer Kurt Cobain was murdered by his wife, singer Courtney Love.
a
(C) 3.40 (0.90) 36.7
34. Lost city of Atlantis is a myth or a legend. (P) 3.36 (1.06) 46.3
35. Some numbers and dates are more lucky or unlucky than others, such as Friday the 13th
or the number 7.
a
(P)
3.75 (1.14) 63.3
36. Condoms used properly during sexual intercourse are very effective at preventing the spread
of sexual transmitted diseases and pregnancy. (S)
4.18 (0.97) 83.5
37. Geological objects, such as certain crystals, precious metals, or magnets, have intrinsic
mystical properties.
a
(P)
3.77 (1.09) 63.3
Note:
a
Denotes an item that was reverse coded, such that higher scores indicate a less epistemically unwarranted belief structure. ‘Endorsement rate’for these
items should be considered ‘rejection rate’.
b
Calculated by summing the participants who responded with ‘strongly agree’or ‘agree’.
(P), Paranormal; (C), Conspiracy theory; (S), Pseudoscience; SD, standard deviation.
Statements were presented to participants in random order.
Relationship between unwarranted beliefs 621
Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Appl. Cognit. Psychol. 28: 617–625 (2014)
(r= .17), making fewer ontological confusions (r=.44), and
being less extraverted (r=.13) and less neurotic (r=.19)
were associated with a less epistemically unwarranted belief
structure, as measured by the Belief scale.
Hierarchical multiple linear regression analyses were
conducted for each of the three subscales. For these analyses,
in line with our hypotheses about the importance of ontolog-
ical knowledge and believing in other types of epistemically
unwarranted beliefs, the other two Belief survey subscales
and CORE were entered as independent variables in step 1,
and the other individual difference variables were entered
as independent variables in step 2. Results are presented in
Table 4. CORE and the conspiracy and pseudoscience sub-
scales were the most important predictors of the paranormal
beliefs subscale. In step 1, these variables contributed signif-
icantly to paranormal beliefs and predicted 34.9% of the
variance [F(3, 448) = 80.03, p<.001]. The other eight inde-
pendent variables in step 2 increased prediction of paranor-
mal beliefs by 5.2% [F(8, 439) = 24.29, p<.001]. All inde-
pendent variables predicted 40.1% of the variation in belief
in paranormal phenomena. CORE and the paranormal and
pseudoscience subscales were the most important predictors
of the conspiracy belief subscale. In step 1, 37.9% of the var-
iance in conspiracy theory beliefs was accounted for by these
three variables [F(3, 448) = 91.15, p<.001]. The other eight
independent variables in step 2 increased the predicted vari-
ance by an additional 2.6% [F(8, 439) = 24.50, p<.001].
Together, all independent variables predicted 40.5% of the
variance in belief in conspiracy theories. For the pseudosci-
ence subscale, CORE and the paranormal and conspiracy
subscales entered in step 1 accounted for 25.3% of the vari-
ance [F(3, 448) = 50.53, p<.001]. The other eight variables
in step 2 increased the predicted variance by an additional
14.8% [F(8, 439) = 24.47, p<.001]. Thus, all independent
variables explained 40.1% of the variance in pseudoscientific
beliefs and science denial.
DISCUSSION
This study represents a preliminary investigation into the
relationship between beliefs in different epistemically
unwarranted claims, and as such, the results are only sugges-
tive. Results suggest that substitution theory is insufficient to
account for the pattern of beliefs found in this study. Instead,
our results showed moderate to strong positive correlations
between these three categories of epistemically unwarranted
beliefs. Participants who endorsed one type of epistemically
unwarranted belief also tended to endorse others. Although
previous research has found evidence of a positive rela-
tionship between conspiracy ideation and science denial
(Lewandowsky, Gignac, et al., 2013; Lewandowsky, Oberauer,
et al., 2013), between paranormal belief and pseudoscientific
claims (Eder et al., 2011; Lindeman, 2011), and between con-
spiracy and paranormal beliefs (Swami et al., 2010, 2011),
the study presented here is the first one to present results indi-
cating a positive correlation between believing in conspiracy
theories, the paranormal, and the pseudoscience.
More important, our results also extend findings regarding
core ontological knowledge and epistemically unwarranted
Table 2. Correlations among the different types of beliefs
Paranormal Conspiracy Pseudoscience
Paranormal –.52 .36
Conspiracy –.49
Pseudoscience –
Note:
N= 455.
All correlations significant at p<.001 level.
Figure 1. Mean scores for male and female participants
Figure 2. Mean scores for Christian and non-religious participants
Table 3. Predictors of epistemically unwarranted beliefs
Belief survey
Predictors βt
Gender .13 2.92**
RA .24 5.47***
NFC .12 2.46*
DOC .12 2.42*
CORE .35 8.33***
Extraversion .15 3.23**
Agreeableness .08 1.74
Conscientiousness .05 1.19
Openness .07 1.58
Neuroticism .11 2.50*
Note:N= 455.
*p<.05. **p<.01. ***p<.001.
CORE, core ontological confusions; RA, religious affiliation;
NFC, need for cognition; DOC, desirability of control.
Gender coded such that 1 = male and 2 = female.
Religious affiliation coded such that 1 = non-religious and 2 = Christian.
622 E. Lobato et al.
Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Appl. Cognit. Psychol. 28: 617–625 (2014)
beliefs. Prior research has found that believing in more core
ontological confusions is related to a greater belief in para-
normal claims (Lindeman et al., 2008) and specific instances
of pseudoscience found in CAM (Lindeman, 2011). Our
results suggest a similar relationship between ontological
confusions and conspiracy theory beliefs. This could suggest
that the underlying structure of these types of belief is simi-
lar, in spite of superficial differences in the content of each
belief. That is, conspiracy theories may reflect an ontologi-
cally confused conception of reality, as paranormal beliefs
do. Such theories typically attribute malevolent intentional
agency as direct causal factors for events, despite no evidence
to support such an attribution. Alternatively, it could suggest
a common cognitive style across believers. That is, a greater
propensity toward intuitive thinking may be common to both
paranormal believers and conspiracy theorists. Ontological
confusions have been shown to be strongly related to a
greater predisposition toward an intuitive cognitive style
(Lindeman, 2011; Lindeman & Aarnio, 2007; Svedholm
et al., 2010). A greater predisposition toward intuitive cogni-
tion may open up individuals for believing in a diverse set of
unsubstantiated claims.
However, for the pseudoscience subscale, the measure of
ontological confusion was not found to be a statistically
significant predictor variable. Pseudoscience and science de-
nial beliefs may be less likely to be a direct manifestation of
ontological confusion, despite pseudoscience belief being
positively correlated with beliefs (see also Eder et al., 2011;
Lewandowsky, Gignac, et al., 2013; Lewandowsky, Oberauer,
et al., 2013). Pseudoscience and science denial may show the
level of overlap with paranormal and conspiracy beliefs found
in this study because the scientific community has a history of
consistently rebuking paranormal claims and conspiracy theo-
ries that invoke poorly understood science. Beyond individual
differences in ontological knowledge, the other individual
difference variables appear to play a statistically significant
but small explanatory role in understanding why people may
accept an epistemically unwarranted claim. The small amount
of variance explained by these other individual difference vari-
ables may provide some explanation for the conflicting results
found in prior studies. The effects of variables such as gender,
the NFC, desire for control, or differences in personality may
simply be too small to consistently observe, whereas the
effects of the measure of core ontological confusions were
robust. The only exception to this was for religious affiliation,
which contributed sizable variance for predicting pseudosci-
ence acceptance. This is most likely due to the nature of several
specific items in the pseudoscience subscale of the Belief sur-
vey, such as those asking about belief in evolutionary theory,
the age of the earth, or etiology of a person’s sexual orienta-
tion. In the modern USA, at least, there is a strong connection
between one’s personal beliefs about these issues and one’sre-
ligious commitments. Although much has been published in
the last decade of the relationship between religious affiliation
and rejection of specificscientific concepts, such as evolution
(e.g.,Baker, 2013; Lombrozo, Thanukos, & Weisberg, 2008;
Miller, Scott, & Okamoto, 2006), this study finds that the rela-
tionship holds true for other scientific conclusions. However,
the only two broad religious perspectives that could be
compared in this study were Christians and non-religious par-
ticipants. Follow-up research with a more religiously diverse
sample is necessary to confirm this as a general conclusion,
however.
The present study is also limited in that it recruited a
university student sample. As such, the results may not gen-
eralize to the general population. Given the relatively high
rate of endorsement for unwarranted claims in the general
population (see National Science Foundation, 2006 for rates
Table 4. Predictors of epistemically unwarranted beliefs at the subscale level
Paranormal Conspiracy Pseudoscience
Predictors βtβtβt
Step 1
CORE .28 6.77*** .11 2.58** .06 1.37
Paranormal .35 8.20*** .12 2.48*
Conspiracy .37 8.20*** .40 8.24***
Pseudoscience .11 2.48* .33 8.24***
Step 2
Gender .10 2.34* .03 .68 .07 1.68
RA .05 1.03 .07 1.58 .34 8.51***
NFC .12 2.72* .03 .69 .06 1.37
DOC .06 1.26 .10 2.13* .10 2.13
Extraversion .03 .79 .10 2.46* .01 .30
Agreeableness .00 .03 .02 .56 .05 1.29
Conscientiousness .07 1.81 .05 1.19 .07 1.63
Openness .08 1.92 .05 1.23 .03 .76
Neuroticism .12 4.01*** .00 .08 .01 .32
Note: N = 455.
*p<.05. **p<.01. ***p<.001.
CORE, core ontological confusions; RA, religious affiliation;
NFC, need for cognition; DOC, desirability of control.
Gender coded such that 1 = male and 2 = female.
Religious affiliation coded such that 1 = non-religious and 2 = Christian.
Relationship between unwarranted beliefs 623
Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Appl. Cognit. Psychol. 28: 617–625 (2014)
of pseudoscience acceptance), the mean score on the Belief
scale obtained in this study may not accurately reflect how
the general population would respond to these items. How-
ever, because one of the roles of education is to impart
knowledge onto students and correct their misinterpretations
in an effort to prepare them for successfully navigating the
world, it is still important to understand college students
who subscribe to epistemically unwarranted beliefs.
This study has several additional limitations that should be
noted. The Belief survey is an ad hoc measure of specific
paranormal, conspiracy, and pseudoscience beliefs and not
a measure of a general predisposition toward paranormal,
conspiratorial, or pseudoscientific thinking. This may have
contributed to several specificfindings in this study, such
as the amount of variance for pseudoscience beliefs
explained by religious affiliation, or the strength of the corre-
lations between the different types of epistemically
unwarranted beliefs. As noted in the Introduction, the precise
boundary between a pseudoscientific belief, a conspiracy
theory, and a paranormal claim is fuzzy. Although we
attempted to word our Belief survey questions in such a
way that highlighted the paranormal, pseudoscientific, or
conspiracy overtones of a given belief (e.g., ‘extraterrestrial
life forms have visited Earth and abducted human beings’
emphasizes the paranormal component of the existence of
extraterrestrial life and not any associated conspiracy ele-
ments, such as assumptions of government cover-ups of
alien landings), we cannot say for certain how tightly these
various elements for these specific beliefs are linked in the
minds of believers.
Although ad hoc measures such as our Belief survey are
the predominant technique for researching peoples’accep-
tance of these categories of belief, future efforts should focus
on the development of measures for a general predisposition
toward paranormal, conspiracy, and pseudoscience thinking.
Recent investigations into conspiracy beliefs have begun to
do so with the development of a Conspiracy Mentality
Questionnaire (Bruder et al., 2013) and the Generic Conspir-
acist Beliefs scale (Brotherton, French, & Pickering, 2013).
Designing similar measures for generic paranormal and pseu-
doscientific thinking would be a useful research endeavor.
CONCLUSION
This study provides evidence for the idea that there is signif-
icant overlap between believers in paranormal, conspiracy,
and pseudoscience claims. A measure of core ontological
confusions was found to be predictive of an individual’s ten-
dency to subscribe to paranormal and conspiracy-oriented
epistemically unwarranted beliefs. This provides an opportu-
nity for educators and public policy makers to come together
and develop new methods for correcting such mistaken be-
liefs in a new light. For instance, developing school curricula
that directly address ontological knowledge at an earlier age
may help students grow to better appreciate the distinctions
between the physical, biological, and psychological domains
and complement critical thinking skills aimed at protecting
people from believing the unbelievable. In addition, the find-
ings from this study provide support for the position that
research into beliefs that are paranormal, conspiratorial, or
pseudoscientific should consider approaching these topics
as manifestations of similar intuitive cognitions, namely,
naïve ontological conceptions. Although there are certain
differences between these beliefs, mainly at the superficial
level (i.e., the content of the specific belief), this study
provides evidence that they share an underlying cognitive
foundation, warranting further investigation.
As a final point, several of the beliefs in the current study
are often considered silly or inconsequential. However, the
present results add to a growing literature that indicates that
this view of certain epistemically unwarranted beliefs as in-
consequential is not tenable. As just one example, there are
real costs associated with foregoing traditional and empiri-
cally validated medical treatments in favor of CAM treat-
ments, from both health and economic perspectives and both
personal and societal levels (Ernst, 2000). A greater under-
standing of how these paranormal, conspiracy, and pseudo-
science beliefs are related is certainly warranted. If people
believing in lucky rabbits’feet are more likely to also
endorse CAM practices, a better understanding of the rela-
tionship between these beliefs is needed in order to develop
public policy and educational practices aimed at correcting
such mistaken beliefs. Being able to correct peoples’
misconceptions about how reality operates with regard to such
silly beliefs as lucky charms may also serve to protect them
against buying into sham treatments such as homeopathy.
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