Why the Internet Is Not Increasing Terrorism

Abstract

Policymakers and scholars fear that the Internet has increased the ability of transnational terrorists, like al Qaeda, to attack targets in the West, even in the face of increased policing and military efforts. Although access to the Internet has increased across the globe, there has been no corresponding increase in completed transnational terrorist attacks. This analysis examines the causal logics—which have led to the conventional wisdom—and demonstrates both theoretically and empirically that the Internet is not a force multiplier for transnational terrorist organizations. Far from being at a disadvantage on the Internet, state security organs actually gain at least as much utility from the Internet as terrorist groups do, meaning that at worst the Internet leaves the state in the same position vis-à-vis terrorist campaigns as it was prior to the Internet.

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Why the Internet Is Not Increasing
Terrorism
David C. Benson
Published online: 16 May 2014.
To cite this article: David C. Benson (2014) Why the Internet Is Not Increasing Terrorism, Security
Studies, 23:2, 293-328, DOI: 10.1080/09636412.2014.905353
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Security Studies, 23:293–328, 2014
Copyright © Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
ISSN: 0963-6412 print / 1556-1852 online
DOI: 10.1080/09636412.2014.905353
Why the Internet Is Not Increasing Terrorism
DAVID C. BENSON
Policymakers and scholars fear that the Internet has increased the
ability of transnational terrorists, like al Qaeda, to attack targets in
the West, even in the face of increased policing and military efforts.
Although access to the Internet has increased across the globe, there
has been no corresponding increase in completed transnational
terrorist attacks. This analysis examines the causal logics—which
have led to the conventional wisdom—and demonstrates both the-
oretically and empirically that the Internet is not a force multiplier
for transnational terrorist organizations. Far from being at a dis-
advantage on the Internet, state security organs actually gain at
least as much utility from the Internet as terrorist groups do, mean-
ing that at worst the Internet leaves the state in the same position
vis-`
a-vis terrorist campaigns as it was prior to the Internet.
Terrorist use of the Internet for operations is widely viewed as one of the
most important security issues facing governments today.1Out of fear that
David Benson served in the US Army from 2000 to 2007, including deploying in support
Operation Iraqi Freedom. From 2007 through 2009, he was an instructor at JIEDDO-COIC,
teaching advanced counterterrorism and counterinsurgency network analysis techniques and
technology. Since 2009 he has been at the University of Chicago where he has worked with
the Program on International Politics, Economics, and Security, the Program on International
Security Policy, and the Project on Security and Terrorism.
1Terrorism on the Internet has attracted the attention of scholars like John Arquilla and Gabriel
Weimann, analysts like Marc Sageman and Timothy Thomas, and journalists like Thomas Friedman. See
Marc Sageman, “The Reality of Grass-Roots Terrorism,” Foreign Affairs 87, no. 4 (2008); Marc Sageman,
Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania
Press, 2008); Marc Sageman, “The Next Generation of Terror,” Foreign Policy, no. 165 (2008); John
Arquilla and David F. Ronfeldt, Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy (Santa
Monica, CA: RAND, 2001), http://www.netLibrary.com/urlapi.asp?action=summary&v=1&bookid=72761;
John Arquilla, “How to Win,” Foreign Policy, no. 160 (2007); John Arquilla, “The End of War as We Knew
It? Insurgency, Counterinsurgency and Lessons from the Forgotten History of Early Terror Networks,”
Third World Quarterly 28 (2007); Gabriel Weimann, Terror on the Internet: The New Arena, the New
293
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294 D. C. Benson
terrorism is a threat and the Internet makes it stronger, governments have
established new bureaucracies and passed laws that are expensive, far reach-
ing, and intrusive.2Entire corporations, operating both independently of and
in cooperation with governments, have been established for the primary
purpose of collecting information surrounding terrorism on the Internet.3
Mere possession of Internet-derived materials, some of which terrorism ex-
perts themselves have in their possession, has been used to convict people
of terrorism-related offenses.4Regardless of the threat, there is a real and
persistent fear that the Internet has increased terrorists’ capabilities vis-`
a-vis
the state.5
The Internet began to draw attention as a possible conduit for terrorism
early in its history, but it became a major focus for policymakers in the wake
of the September 11th terror attacks.6Insofar as the Internet and transna-
tional terrorism both rose to prominence within the public conscience at the
same time, it is unsurprising that some observers believe the Internet might
contribute to the power of al Qaeda.7
Scholarship on the political and social impact of the Internet is still in
its infancy; only limited research exists. Although scholars have long stud-
ied the impact of communication networks on contentious politics, social
Challenges (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2006); Gabriel Weimann, “Using the
Internet for Terrorist Recruitment and Mobilization,” in Nato Security through Science Series: Hypermedia
Seduction for Terrorist Recruiting, ed. Boaz Ganor (Amsterdam; Washington, DC: IOS Press, published
in cooperation with NATO Public Diplomacy Division, 2007); Gabriel Weimann,www.terror.net:How
Modern Terrorism Uses the Internet (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace, 2004), http://purl.access.gpo.
gov/GPO/LPS47607.pdf; Timothy L. Thomas, “Al Qaeda and the Internet: The Danger of ‘Cyberplanning,”’
Parameters: US Army War College 33, no. 1 (2003); Thomas L. Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree,
1st ed. (New York: Anchor Books, 2000).
2Within the United States alone, the FBI, the CIA, the NSA, the DIA, and many others surveil the
Internet.
3Two examples include SITE Intelligence Group (SITE) and Middle East Media Research Institute.
Additionally, uncounted individuals and smaller groups participate in surveillance and have been respon-
sible for several high-visibility arrests.
4One of the strictest examples of this is the United Kingdom’s “Terrorism Act” of 2006. Under this
act, two Germans visiting the United Kingdom were arrested for having in their possession digital copies
of the al Qaeda publication Inspire. Special thanks to Keith Spence for bringing this to my attention. The
Terrorism Act 2006, 30 March 2006; Press Association, “Germans Jailed for Bringing Al-Qaida Propaganda
into the uk,” The Guardian, 6 February 2012.
5For important arguments, terrorism is not actually the danger some analysts and the general public
seem to perceive it to be. See John E. Mueller, Overblown: How Politicians and the Terrorism Industry
Inflate National Security Threats, and Why We Believe Them (New York: Free Press, 2006); Risa A. Brooks,
“Muslim ‘Homegrown’: Terrorism in the United States: How Serious Is the Threat?,” International Security
36, no. 2 (2011); Mette Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Calvert Jones, “Assessing the Dangers of Illicit Networks:
Why Al-Qaida May Be Less Threatening Than Many Think,” International Security 33, no. 2 (2008).
6On history of the Internet’s use in terrorism, see Keith Schneider, “Terror in Oklahoma: The Internet;
Talk on Bombs Surges on Computer Network,” New York Times, 27 April 1995; Michael Saunders and
Globe Staff, “Internet Has Been a Conduit for Extremist Ideas; Groups Spread Message, Warning; the
Oklahoma City Bombing,” Boston Globe, 22 April 1995.
7See, for example, Steve Coll and Susan B. Glasser, “Terrorists Turn to the Web as Base of Opera-
tions,” The Washington Post, 7 August 2005.
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Why the Internet Is Not Increasing Terrorism 295
movements, and civil wars, the literature on each rarely takes into account
the special features of transnational networks, focusing instead on domestic
action.8There is important literature on transnational action, which does in-
clude communications technology as a variable, but it focuses primarily on
non-violent politics and therefore may have limited application to realms of
violence.9
Early scholars and policymakers argued that the Internet serves as a
force multiplier for terrorist organizations. Timothy Thomas, an early mil-
itary writer on the topic, suggests that the Internet can play a dramatic
role in the planning of terrorist attacks.10 According to Gabriel Weimann,
terrorist organizations use the Internet primarily for recruitment.11 Marc
Sageman believes that the Internet allows terrorists to operate independently
of one another, creating loose, leaderless organizations.12 Finally, John Ar-
quilla and David Ronfeldt find that the Internet may be a mechanism for
a complete revolution in the way the world fights wars.13 Although there
is some disagreement over mechanisms, no existing study has evaluated
the extent to which the Internet has actually become a force multiplier for
terrorists.
This study finds that, contrary to such fears, the Internet is not a force
multiplier for terrorist organizations. Further, it shows that state security or-
gans extensively use the Internet to interdict attacks; terrorists are no more
8See, for example, Doug McAdam, Sidney G. Tarrow, and Charles Tilly, Dynamics of Contention,
Cambridge Studies in Contentious Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Paul Staniland,
“States, Insurgents, and Wartime Political Orders,” Perspectives on Politics 10, no. 2 (2012); Roger Dale
Petersen, Resistance and Rebellion: Lessons from Eastern Europe, Studies in Rationality and Social Change
(Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Stathis N. Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in
Civil War, Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics Series (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 2006); Doug McAdam, “Recruitment to High-Risk Activism: The Case of Freedom Summer,”
American Journal of Sociology 92, no. 1 (1986).
9Frequently, studies focused on social movement will include violence as a factor, but insofar as
violence is not the focus of this study, it is not the dependent variable of interest. These studies therefore
do not examine specifically the changes in frequency or efficacy of violence itself but instead the selection
of violence, as opposed to non-violence, and so on. For examples of studies of transnational activism
that also examine the Internet, see Donatella Della Porta and Sidney G. Tarrow, eds., Transnational
Protest and Global Activism, People, Passions, and Power Series (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield,
2005); Alberto Melucci, Challenging Codes: Collective Action in the Information Age, Cambridge Cultural
Social Studies Series (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Margaret E. Keck and
Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 1998).
10 Thomas, “Al Qaeda and the Internet.”
11 Coll and Glasser, “Terrorists Turn to the Web”; Anne Stenersen, “The Internet: A Virtual
Training Camp?,” Terrorism and Political Violence 20, no. 2 (2008); International Telecomunnications
Union (ITU), World Telecommunication/ICT Indicators Database, (2010), http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/
Statistics/Pages/publications/wtid.aspx.
12 Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree;The Terrorism Act; Press Association, “Germans Jailed.”
13 Sageman, Leaderless Jihad; Sageman, “The Next Generation of Terror”; Arquilla and Ronfeldt,
Networks and Netwars.
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296 D. C. Benson
able to complete attacks with the Internet than without it.14 The efficacy of
terrorism is an interaction between state security organs and terrorist groups.
To complete their attacks, terror groups must be competent, and state se-
curity organs must also fail to stop them. The latter actually gains at least
as much utility from the Internet as terrorist groups do, meaning that at
worst this technology leaves the state in the same position vis-`
a-vis terrorist
campaigns as it was prior to the advent of the Internet.
I evaluate the question of terrorism on the Internet primarily with regard
to transnational terrorism, as opposed to local terrorists, because it is fear
of transnational terrorists, like al Qaeda and its affiliates, that has motivated
major policy movements. I therefore do not look at whether local terror-
ists can benefit from the presence of the Internet or if the Internet allows
transnational terrorists to attempt and fail more frequently at terrorist attacks.
This article also sets aside cyber terrorism because it is a separate issue and
the sources and effects of cyber attacks are likely quite different from more
conventional terrorist attacks.15
My analysis differs from previous works. As opposed to focusing upon
the role the Internet has played within individual terrorist attacks, this re-
search compares terrorism and counterterrorism in situations with and with-
out the Internet. Prior scholarship has successfully documented the historical
role the Internet has played in terrorist development. However, focusing on
the role of the Internet within individual cases has distorted the conclusions
of such studies about the general effects of the Internet on terrorism. Taking
only a historical view of the Internet’s role within terrorism is the func-
tional equivalent of performing an experiment without a control. In order to
know the Internet’s effect, scholars must be able to hypothesize what would
happen in its absence.
This article will proceed as follows. The first section defines ter-
rorism and in so doing limits the boundaries of this study. The sec-
ond section elaborates the causal logic behind fears of the Internet. The
third section demonstrates how the conventional wisdom falls theoretically
short. The final section will empirically show that the predictions implicit
in the idea of the Internet as a terrorist force multiplier do not match
observations.
14 Whether or not potential targets fear attacks absent any rational basis for fear is a function of
domestic sensibilities rather than of terrorist efficacy.
15 For a discussion of the international effects of cyber attacks, see Thomas Rid, “Cyber War Will Not
Take Place,” Journal of Strategic Studies 35, no. 1 (2012); Adam P. Liff, “The Proliferation of Cyberwarfare
Capabilities and Interstate War, Redux: Liff Responds to Junio,” Journal of Strategic Studies 36, no. 1 (2013);
Adam P. Liff, “Cyberwar: A New ‘Absolute Weapon’? The Proliferation of Cyberwarfare Capabilities and
Interstate War,” Journal of Strategic Studies 35, no. 3 (2012); Timothy J. Junio, “How Probable Is Cyber
War? Bringing IR Theory Back in to the Cyber Conflict Debate,” Journal of Strategic Studies 36, no. 1
(2013).
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Why the Internet Is Not Increasing Terrorism 297
DEFINING TERRORISM ON THE INTERNET
Terrorism is violence by non-state actors intended to terrorize or frighten a
target audience.16 Although other distinctions sometimes matter, it is helpful
to distinguish here between primarily local and transnational terrorism.17
Theoretically, what divides these two types of groups is not the distance
a terrorist travels to carry out an attack, but the relationship between the
terrorist organization and the local community. Since most think that the
Internet adds value to terrorism through long-distance communication, this
analysis focuses on transnational terrorism in subsequent sections.
Local terrorists emerge from a population that is located near a target
and may also provide protection and support for an attack. Local terrorists
can recruit through local networks, surveil in person, research, prepare, and
plan quite effectively, all within the local sphere. Also, local terrorists can
access secure, reliable, and cheap communications and information through
local channels. Accordingly, local terrorists would rarely benefit from im-
proved long-distance communication either to form the group initially or for
operations to attack targets, and so the addition of the Internet is not a leap
forward in their capabilities.
Transnational terrorism cannot rely on local support, either for recruit-
ment or operations. Transnational terrorists may recruit through widely dis-
persed networks, surveil at a distance, and prepare for operations in re-
mote areas, all without meaningful support from the local sphere. As such,
transnational terrorist have no geographically bounded constituency from
which to draw support. This means that transnational terrorists would, at
least potentially, benefit in significant ways from improved long-distance
communication, particularly the speedy, inexpensive, and seemingly secret
correspondence associated with the Internet.
Empirically, anarchists, Communists, Fascists, Islamists, and environ-
mental extremists have all, from time to time, been examples of transna-
tional terrorists. The overwhelming focus of the literature on terrorism and
the Internet, however, is on one particular terrorist group: al Qaeda. Hence,
although the logic of this article extends beyond al Qaeda, evidence from al
Qaeda’s case is central.
16 This definition of terrorism is quite widely accepted and derives from Alex Peter Schmid,
A. J. Jongman, and Michael Stohl, Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data
Bases, Theories, and Literature, 2nd ed. (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 2005). One might be
concerned about the boundary between terrorism and other forms of internal violence—like civil war
and insurgency—but such a distinction does not matter for the study of the Internet because those types
of violence are almost always local.
17 For other frameworks of terrorism, appropriate to other studies, see Walter Laqueur, The Age
of Terrorism, 1st US ed. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1987); Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York:
Columbia University Press, 2006), http://site.ebrary.com/lib/uchicago/Doc?id=10183571; Robert A. Pape,
Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism, 1st ed.(New York: Random House, 2005); Andrew
H. Kydd and Barbara F. Walter, “The Strategies of Terrorism,” International Security 31, no. 1 (2006).
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298 D. C. Benson
HOW THE INTERNET MIGHT INCREASE TRANSNATIONAL
TERRORISM
The Internet has become a central feature of modern life, but the fear that
this new tool could be enabling terrorism continues to be both a question
within the literature and a policy assumption. Unfortunately, this concern has
not led to significant theorization about the role the Internet may be playing
in the modern security environment. When the connection between terror-
ism and the Internet is presented publicly, authors or experts focus on three
primary characteristics of the Internet—anonymity, abundance of informa-
tion, and cheapness of communication—that work through two mechanisms
to increase transnational terrorist operational capacity: increased networking
and increased capability.
Three Internet Characteristics Affect Transnational Terrorism
Characteristics of the Internet that advocates claim improve the ability of
transnational terrorism to complete attacks are not unique to the Internet.
Nevertheless, the Internet seems to supply anonymity, cheap communica-
tion, and information better than legacy communication.
ANONYMITY
Although individuals have always been able to carry out violence from
time to time, systematic violence against other individuals or agents of the
state is difficult to carry out over a long period. When aggressors and their
various supporters are able to remain anonymous, however, there is little
states can do. Targets of violence must await the next attacks. At best, de-
fenders can harden targets to make attacks more difficult to carry out, but
hardening targets can be very costly over time. This measure also provides
no guarantee of preventing terror attacks and often merely shifts the attack
from a primary target to alternate, softer targets.
The Internet, it seems, supplies anonymity. One can claim to be anyone
or anything on the Internet, post false pictures or avatars, and tell stories
with little or no verification possible. George Tenet, then director of the
CIA, claimed that the Internet allows terrorists to “work anonymously and
remotely to inflict enormous damage at little cost or risk to themselves.”18
Bruce Hoffman maintains, “The Internet is the ideal medium for terrorism
today: anonymous but pervasive.”19
18 Tom Zeller, “On the Open Internet, a Web of Dark Alleys,” The New York Times, 20 December
2004.
19 Coll and Glasser, “Terrorists Turn to the Web.”
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Why the Internet Is Not Increasing Terrorism 299
Anonymity is not always what violent groups want, because without
some form of communication with the outside, there is no way for others
to receive a terrorist group’s message. Anonymity does, however, allow vi-
olent groups to carry out their acts with relative impunity by dividing their
operational wing from their propaganda wing. People who are in secure
locations can speak for the terrorist organization without even knowing who
is carrying out the violent attacks. As Joseph Lieberman put it, “With online
propaganda that is often flashy, hi-tech [sic], and interactive, the Internet has
helped enable violent Islamists to deliver this message in a way that appeals
to increasingly younger demographics.”20
ABUNDANCE OF INFORMATION
The ability to kill may be ubiquitous, but the ability to do it systematically and
efficiently is not. Every skill from hand-to-hand combat to marksmanship and
demolitions benefits greatly from training and information. Historically, states
could control such information fairly tightly. Only people in the military had
access to all the training and information necessary to attack state apparatuses
efficiently, and they had gone through significant socialization that ensured
relatively strong support of the state.21
Now, however, such information seems comparatively easy to obtain
on the Internet.22 Al Qaeda and other organizations publish manuals online
so that anyone can access how to construct bombs, target buildings, and
carry out attacks.23 In a 2007 Congressional hearing before the US House
Committee on Homeland Security, Rita Katz, director of SITE Intelligence
Group (SITE), testified, “The virtual jihadist network has replaced al Qaeda
training camps.”24 It is not just the information about how to carry out attacks
20 Joseph Lieberman and Susan Collins, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government
Affairs, Violent Islamist Extremism, the Internet, and the Homegrown Terrorist Threat, 110th Cong., 1st
sess. (2008).
21 For the seminal discussions of the relationship between militaries and states, see Samuel P.
Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (New York, NY:
Vintage Books, 1957); Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (Glencoe,
IL: Free Press, 1960).
22 For a discussion of materials available online as of 2008, see Stenersen, “The Internet: A Virtual
Training Camp?”
23 Al Jazeera, “Chilling Tips in Al-Qaeda Magazine,” Al Jazeera English (2010), http://www.aljazeera.
com/news/middleeast/2010/10/2010101254836321101.html.
24 Hearing on Using the Web as a Weapon:The Internet as a Tool for Violent Radicalization and
Homegrown Terrorism Before the Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk
Assessment of the Committee on Homeland Security, 110th Cong. (6 November 2007) (testimony of Rita
Katz, director, SITE Intelligence Group). According to SITE’s webpage, “Rita Katz, the Director and co-
founder of the SITE Intelligence Group, has studied, tracked, and analyzed international terrorists, the
global jihadist network and terrorism financing for more than a decade. Since well before September 11,
Ms. Katz has personally briefed government officials, including the NSC at the White House, investigators
in the Department of Justice, Department of the Treasury, and the Department of Homeland Security
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300 D. C. Benson
that appears to threaten security. For example, a state might act against
a group of dissidents in one province and still be confident dissidents in
another province would have no knowledge of it. States had more of a
free hand because people who might have been appalled at government
actions would remain ignorant of them, denying those opposing the state a
potential focal point or rallying cry.25 Now, however, only the most repressive
regimes, which deny all network access to their subjects, can prevent Internet
communication of subversive ideas.
In the past, states could also shape the national discourse and thereby
limit the repercussions of their actions. Furthermore, after a terrorist attack,
states might be able to mitigate the attack’s psychological damage by lim-
iting the information that is released. Pre-Internet terrorists were reliant on
intermediaries to tell their stories in words and in pictures, often with vary-
ing results. Now, however, terrorists can pre-package their message for the
seven o’clock news. Indeed, it seems the bite-sized bits of video one finds
online are designed perfectly for mass distribution. Terror groups now have
direct access to the populace they wish to terrorize.
CHEAPNESS OF COMMUNICATION
Because of the Internet, groups once separated by great distances are now
only as far apart as the nearest computer. The absolute cost of communica-
tion has decreased dramatically. In his 2007 testimony before the Committee
on Homeland Security, Bruce Hoffman stated, “[The Internet] is a very in-
expensive means for the terrorists. . . . They can communicate nearly in real
time.”26
Cheapness of communication is also one of the major divisors of the
technological advantage between national and transnational groups. Al-
though national groups surely take advantage of sending an e-mail or an
SMS, the transnational groups absolutely must have long-range communi-
cation. Cheaper contact for these groups is key because they must operate
across national boundaries, and such coordination over distance is inherently
costly.
on the financing and recruitment networks of the terrorist movement.” SITE Intelligence Group, http:
//news.siteintelgroup.com/about-site.
25 Abu Ghraib, which supposedly would not have been made public without the Internet, is an
example of how the Internet may have changed state monopoly of discourse. Brigitte Lebens Nacos,
Mass-Mediated Terrorism : The Central Role of the Media in Terrorism and Counterterrorism,2nded.
(Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007).
26 Hearing on Using the Web as a Weapon (testimony of Bruce Hoffman, Director, Center for Peace
and Security Studies and Security Studies Program, Georgetown University).
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Why the Internet Is Not Increasing Terrorism 301
The Internet Increases the Capabilities of Terrorists through
Two Mechanisms
The fundamental way the Internet increases transnational terrorists’ capabili-
ties is through increasing the number of participants in terrorism. Participants
can join an existing group or take up arms and carry out attacks unilaterally,
without having contact with any sympathetic group. The two mechanisms
through which the Internet facilitates these tasks are social networking and
the spread of critical information.
SOCIAL NETWORKING ALLOWS GROUPS TO FORM
Few people have all the skills necessary to complete military-type opera-
tions, and essentially all militarily effective operations require more than one
person to complete. The Internet can play a crucial role in recruiting such
individuals, bringing those with the necessary skills together. According to
Gabriel Weimann, “[Terrorists] are all linked indirectly through association
of belief, belonging to some community. The Internet is the network that
connects them all.”27
It would seem that the Internet’s cheap communication allows transna-
tional groups to span greater distances, reach more people, and form more
diverse social networks for recruitment. Congresswoman Jane Harman as-
serted, “There can be no doubt, the Internet is increasingly being used as a
tool to teach and radicalize Americans and legal residents. These people no
longer need to travel to foreign countries or isolated backwoods compounds
to become indoctrinated by extremists and learn how to kill neighbors in our
communities.”28 Though international communication was possible prior to
the Internet, it was either slow, expensive, or both, making the formation and
maintenance of relationships difficult or impossible. Even more importantly,
to identify potential recruits, one almost always needed to know a person
already or be willing to expend tremendous resources, such as through mass
mailings. With the advent of the Internet, not only could people far more
easily create and maintain relationships potentially leading to recruitment,
but they could also presumably identify potential members. In a hearing be-
fore the Justice Committee in 2011, FBI Director Robert Mueller stated: “We
also confront the increasing use of the Internet for spreading extremist pro-
paganda, and for terrorist recruiting, training, and planning. . . . Thousands
of extremist websites promote violence to an online worldwide audience
predisposed to the extremist message. They are posting videos on how to
27 Coll and Glasser, “Terrorists Turn to the Web.”
28 Hearing on Using the Web as a Weapon (statement of Jane Harman, US Representative, California,
Chair, Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment).
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302 D. C. Benson
build backpack bombs and bio-weapons. They are using social networking
to link terrorist plotters and those seeking to carry out these plans.”29
Cheap communication is useful, but anonymity is of vital importance in
clandestine operations like transnational terrorism. According to the National
Intelligence Estimate in 2006, “The radicalization process is occurring more
quickly, more widely, and more anonymously in the Internet age, raising
the likelihood of surprise attacks by unknown groups whose members and
supporters may be difficult to pinpoint.”30 Although one may be able to con-
tact a wide variety of people through the Internet, if doing so compromises
operational security, all of those efforts will have been in vain. For transna-
tional terrorists, if the Internet truly offers a way for them to communicate
widely, slowly winnowing the field of potential terrorists, and to encourage
either joining their organization or taking up arms for their cause, then the
potential for harm is tremendous.
THE SPREAD OF VITAL INFORMATION ALLOWS INDIVIDUALS TO ATTACK ON THEIR OWN
Information is a vital part of any terrorist operation. In remarks during the
2007 US House hearing on the Internet and terrorism, Congressman David
Reichert noted, “The Internet communications established by these terrorists
and would-be terrorists serves as a virtual society where otherwise alien-
ated and isolated individuals can meet for training, reinforcement and social
networking.”31 This information is thought to be about carrying out terrorist
attacks, such as making bombs or infiltrating buildings. In a 2008 hearing
on threats to national security, Senator John D. Rockefeller boldly claimed,
“You can just go on the Internet to find out how to do a suitcase bomb.”32
In the United Kingdom, a counterterrorism plan warns: “Al Qaeda and some
al Qaeda affiliates have increasingly encouraged acts of terrorism by indi-
viduals or small groups independent of the al Qaeda chain of command
and without reference to, or guidance and instruction from, the leadership.
The Internet has enabled this type of terrorism by providing material which
encourages and guides radicalization and instructions on how to plan and
conduct operations.”33
29 Hearing on the Oversight of the Federal Bureau of Investigation Before the Judiciary Committee of
the United States House of Representatives, 112th Cong., 1st sess. (2011) (statement of Robert S. Mueller,
III, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation).
30 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “Declassified Key Judgments of the National Intel-
ligence Estimate ‘Trends in Global Terrorism: Implications for the United States”’ (April 2006).
31 Hearing on Using the Web as a Weapon (statement of David Reichert, US Representative, Wash-
ington, member, Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment).
32 Current and Projected Threats to the National Security, Hearing before the Select Committee on
Intelligence of the United States Senate, 110th Cong., 2nd sess. (5 February 2008) (statement of John D.
Rockefeller, US Senator, West Virginia, Chair, Select Committee on Intelligence).
33 Theresa May, “Forward by the Home Secretary, “ in Contest: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for
Countering Terrorism (London: Home Department, 2011).
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Why the Internet Is Not Increasing Terrorism 303
Rita Katz noted further that “using the Internet, jihadists have created a
virtual classroom that teaches the online jihadist community how to produce
and construct weapons ranging from simple IEDs to nuclear, biological, and
chemical weapons.”34 In their report for the Committee on Homeland Secu-
rity and Government Affairs, Senators Joseph Lieberman and Susan Collins
wrote:
Insofar as there are already extant terrorist groups who are trying to
reproduce their numbers and carry out attacks, they will certainly avail
themselves of vital information to increase their effectiveness. However,
those who are potential autonomous terrorists may or may not become
actual terrorists by using the information available to them to carry out
attacks. Mike McConnell addresses the concern that the Internet provides
attack-enabling information saying, “ . . . the growing use of the Internet
to identify and connect with networks throughout the world offers op-
portunities to build relationships and gain expertise that previously were
available only in overseas training camps. It is likely that such indepen-
dent groups will use information on destructive tactics available on the
Internet to boost their own capabilities.35
Given the ready availability of information, it is unsurprising that ob-
servers fear such information will be used for malign purposes.
HOW THE INTERNET HELPS PREVENT TERRORISM
If one focuses solely on how the Internet affects terrorist organizations, one
could certainly come to believe that it increases the power of terrorists, but
terrorist groups are not the only organizations that capitalize on the Internet’s
capabilities. Governments also use the Internet to forward their own interests.
Furthermore, governments have far greater resources and the assistance of
sympathetic groups within the state that spontaneously provide support.
When considering fully the advantages the Internet confers simultane-
ously upon the state and terrorists, it becomes apparent that the Internet has
not tipped the balance of power toward terrorists. To the extent that online
anonymity allows terrorists to avoid surveillance, it also allows counterterror-
ists operating online to avoid countersurveillance. Cheapness of communica-
tion allows easier coordination of counterterrorism. Because the large body
of information available online includes information about terrorists, states
and their allies are able to exploit that information. These combine to allow
mobilized states, which generally possess greater resources than terrorists,
to interdict terror attacks that are hatched on the Internet.
34 Hearing on Using the Web as a Weapon (testimony of Rita Katz).
35 Lieberman and Collins, Violent Islamist Extremism.
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304 D. C. Benson
Misunderstanding Anonymity and Abundant Information
Although there are three characteristics of the Internet that are of critical
importance to advancing the interests of transnational terrorists, the proposi-
tion that the Internet has increased terrorists’ relative capability has a narrow
understanding of the strength of two of those characteristics: anonymity
and abundance of information. The continued strength of misunderstanding
within the conventional wisdom derives both from common perception (i.e.,
people think something is true because of what they experience) and from
misunderstanding the nature of the Internet and the information available
thereon. With rigorous reason and empirical evidence, however, the true
nature of these characteristics becomes apparent.
YOU ARE NOT AS ANONYMOUS AS YOU THINK ON THE INTERNET
Many believe that online users can operate fairly anonymously, but the truth
is that users are much less anonymous than in real life. Seemingly, individuals
can set up a Facebook profile under any identity, post random pictures of
others as themselves, and thereby remain anonymous; but even in the face
of these concerted efforts, it is very difficult to hide one’s identity.
Long-term anonymity is essentially impossible because actions on the
Internet leave “tracks in the snow” indicating where information comes from
and where it is going. In part, this is due to the overall architecture of
the Internet. Recorded for each packet of information transmitted are the
source and destination. Even if getting at packet-level information proves
difficult, there are far more obvious tracks people leave. One important
medium on the Internet is the World Wide Web, which is both abundant
and extremely persistent. Once an individual posts information, several or-
ganizations including search engines and the Internet Archive will download
that information, meaning that deleted data is not really gone.36 Companies
like Facebook and MySpace also have a history of keeping deleted data for
the convenience of returning customers and even gathering data without the
user’s knowledge.37
Most importantly, information this seemingly arcane does not require
government-level resources to discover; just-above-average knowledge of
computers will suffice. One can fairly easily follow information posted on
the Internet and divine a great deal of information about the poster without
breaking laws. Creepy, a free program that was recently released, tracks an
individual’s real-world location simply from information on social networking
36 Internet Archive, http://www.archive.org/index.php.
37 Christopher Williams, “Is Facebook Becoming Too Powerful?,” Daily Telegraph, 29 September
2011.
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Why the Internet Is Not Increasing Terrorism 305
sites.38 If one is willing to violate laws that exist in some jurisdictions, hacking
a website can yield nearly all the information about visitors to the site.39 If
one adds the juridical power of the state to subpoena, as well as the state’s
resources, discovering supposedly anonymous individuals on the Internet
becomes relatively easy. The well-known organization Anonymous from the
chat room 4chan has generated a great deal of attention with daring hacking
attacks and smear campaigns targeting both groups and individuals, and
yet despite the moniker, many of the organization’s perpetrators have been
arrested.40
Even to the extent one is anonymous on the Internet, anonymity is not
an unmitigated boon to terrorist organizations. Security within clandestine
organizations relies in part upon knowing with whom one is working. Absent
verifiable knowledge of the identities of collaborators within a conspiracy, it
is highly likely terrorist groups could become subject to infiltration and sting
operations. Although terrorists have a similar technical ability to discover the
actual identities of people who purport to be sympathetic, they do not have
nearly the resources of governments. Therefore, in attempting to preserve the
integrity of the group against infiltration in the face of the limited anonymity
the Internet provides, clandestine groups find themselves in competition with
governments possessing overwhelming resource advantages.41
Information on the Internet Is not as Useful to Terrorists
as Many Think
The Internet provides much more information to more people than previ-
ously available, but that increase in pure data does not necessarily translate
into actionable information. First, not everything available on the Internet is
true or useful because “anyone can contribute.”42 Indeed, there are many
groups that explicitly provide free access to anyone who wants to create
content on the Internet. There is, however, no test of knowledge required of
38 Yiannis Kakavas, CreepybyIlekrojohn, computer software, available at http://ilektrojohn.github.
com/creepy/.
39 Riva Richmond, “Sony Site Hacking an Easy Feat, Says Group Taking Responsibility,” International
Herald Tribune 4 June 2011; Rhys Blakely, “‘They Were Asking for It’ - Sony Hit by Second Hacking in
Primitive Attack,” The Times, 4 June 2011; Grace Chng, “Don’t Make Life So Easy for Cybercriminals,”
Straits Times, 11 May 2011.
40 Paul McNamara, “Buzzblog: Palin E-Mail Snoop Sentenced to a Year in Custody, “ http://www.
networkworld.com/community/blog/palin-e-mail-snoop- sentenced-year- prison; “Anonymous No More -
Hackers under the Microscope,” New Zealand Herald, 12 September 2011; Paul Elias, “Federal Agencies
Pursue Anonymous,” Washington Post, 12 September 2011.
41 For example, “Jihad Jane” believed she was communicating with other potential terrorists, but in
reality many of the people were actually informants. Eamon McNiff, “Internet Monitors Tracked ‘Jihad
Jane’ Colleen Larose for Three Years,” http://abcnews.go.com/TheLaw/Technology/internet-monitors-
tracked-jihad-jane-years/story?id=10069484.
42 Jimmy Wales, “Wikipedia,” http://www.wikipedia.org/ (accessed 14 February 2014).
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306 D. C. Benson
those individuals, so both bad and good information abound. In order to as-
sess correctly whether information online is accurate, either something about
the source or something about the information from a trusted source must
be known. Knowing something about the source violates the condition of
anonymity and subjects sources to censure and censoring. Alternatively, the
more that is known about the information, the less the information online is
needed. For this reason, reliable sources or brands will become increasingly
important; however, where exactly would one turn to find reliable informa-
tion on how to make a bomb, organize an insurgency, or carry out a raid? In
fact, studies analyzing material available on the Internet find that would-be
terrorists are quite aware of these limitations. Consequently, terrorist organi-
zations deliberately limit their use of the Internet, leaving the production of
such materials to unaffiliated and inexperienced supporters.43
Second, just because information is available online does not mean
people are going to make use of it. Scientists have increased access to infor-
mation because of electronic publication, but James Evans finds that rather
than increasing the number of citations of interdisciplinary communication,
electronic publishing actually decreases it.44 He hypothesizes that the amount
of information overwhelms scientists so that when they are faced with far
more options for sources, they simply cannot decide which are important
and therefore fall back on familiar information or dabble only lightly in for-
eign fields. It seems very probable that if scientists—who as a group are
trained to accept new information—cannot process the new information the
Internet provides, then laypersons would have at least as much difficulty.
Indeed, examinations of terrorism offering an in-depth look at individual
cases have found no evidence that online sources were successfully being
used to increase terrorist attacks.45
Finally, just because information exists does not mean it will translate
into action. First, not all constraints on real-world action are informational,
and they remain in place even in the presence of information. For example,
one of the major constraints on the construction of improvised explosive
devices is the possession of blasting caps, without which the detonation
of high explosives becomes nearly impossible. Moreover, blasting caps are
difficult and dangerous to make and are not generally available for purchase,
even on the Internet.
Second, Web-based training for many skills is of limited utility. In
essence, although one can read information on a computer and learn from
the data retrieved, it does not necessarily follow that one can actually carry
43 Stenersen, “The Internet: A Virtual Training Camp?”
44 James A. Evans, “Electronic Publication and the Narrowing of Science and Scholarship,” Science
321, no. 5887 (2008).
45 John E. Mueller, ed., Terrorism since 9/11: The American Cases (Columbus, OH: Mershon Center,
2013).
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Why the Internet Is Not Increasing Terrorism 307
out the task.46 Indeed, interaction with an instructor is quite important. Upon
closer consideration, this makes intuitive sense. Recipes and instruction on
gourmet cooking are widely available. There is even an entire television
channel dedicated to the preparation of food, yet despite the benefit of so
much information, many people remain unable to prepare food correctly,
let alone master gourmet cooking. This is not to say it is impossible to learn
through computer-mediated training, just that it is very difficult to learn how
to be a terrorist online.47
Additionally, much of the ability to learn anything is predicated on the
ability to survive mistakes. Regarding combat skills, a sizable portion of
training is merely to ensure that mistakes are not fatal. When relying on
personal training and information gleaned from the Internet, trainees do not
have the advantage of the safety net provided by in-person instruction. This
makes training for difficult or dangerous tasks difficult and dangerous on
its own. People might be willing to try to follow a YouTube video on how
to make fudge, knowing that at worst, stirring improperly would lead to
gritty candy, but it would be a different story if the task at hand was the
preparation of an explosive. Improper execution could kill.
Knowing the facts of the mechanics surrounding a skill and actually
being able to carry out a task employing that skill in the real world are
very different propositions. Results are mixed regarding the degree to which
individuals can learn through computers, but no one is currently arguing that
at some point surgeons, arc-welders, or explosive ordnance disposal techs
will be trained wholly online. Our culture is quite aware of the dangers
of imitating things seen on television or online—which is precisely what
people attempting to train themselves in terrorism would be doing—even if
those things seem relatively simple. It is for this reason that any video that
purports to carry out even moderately dangerous activities in real life will
usually open with the famous phrase, “Do not try anything you are about
to see at home.” Stories of individuals dying while attempting to replicate
dangerous feats are a perennial feature of nightly news broadcasts around
the world.48 To quantify what percentage of people die when attempting to
do something learned online would be difficult, but it strains credibility that
many people are able to safely replicate combat training, using only online
46 Traci Sitzmann et al., “The Comparative Effectiveness of Web-Based and Classroom Instruction: A
Meta-Analysis,” Personnel Psychology 59, no. 3 (2006).
47 . Michael Kenney, “Beyond the Internet: M¯
etis, Techne, and the Limitations of Online Artifacts for
Islamist Terrorists,” Terrorism and Political Violence 22, no. 2 (2010).
48 See, for example, Michelle Hunter, “Despite Warnings from Professional Wrestlers, Imitation Some-
times Has Deadly Consequences,” New Orleans Times Picayune, 18 June 2013, http://www.nola.com/
crime/index.ssf/2013/06/despite_warnings_from_professi.html; Tom Meltzer, “Planking: A Brief History,”
The Guardian, 16 May 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/may/16/planking-a- brief-history;
Colleen Curry and Sydney Lupkin, “Daredevil Dies in Rope Swing Stunt Popular on Youtube,” ABC News,
25 March 2013, http://abcnews.go.com/US/daredevil-dies-rope-swing- stunt-popular- youtube/story?id=
18808432#.Uc8Y6m0mzPo.
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308 D. C. Benson
training, when trained professionals, and even experienced amateurs, rely
upon extensive training.49
The Internet Helps Those Who Combat Terrorism as Well
Even taking into account misconceptions about the Internet, one might still
argue that the Internet provides a relative advantage to terrorists, but in the-
ory and in practice, governments gain just as many advantages from the
Internet as transnational terrorists do. From the government’s perspective,
the Internet serves primarily as a mechanism for monitoring and reporting
on terrorist activities. Once a government knows enough detail, law en-
forcement agencies and militaries of most governments are capable enough
to thwart a wide array of terrorist attacks.
The government has three areas in which it can capitalize on the
strengths of the Internet: inter- and intra-governmental communications,
communication with sympathetic civilians, and information from the ter-
rorists themselves.50
GOVERNMENTS CAN OVERPOWER TERRORISTS IN ALMOST EVERY WAY
At first glance, it may seem that transnational terrorists’ commitment to their
causes allows their small organization to overwhelm better-funded groups,
but small groups are at a disadvantage on the Internet regardless of com-
mitment. First of all, governments are enormous organizations with tens of
thousands of employees, some of whom may be as dedicated as transna-
tional terrorists. They also have all the training they need and far better
resources. Governments need not rely on YouTube to learn how to conduct
a raid, hack a computer, or build a bomb.51 Although median dedication
may be lower in governments than among terrorists, the lack of dedication
49 It is notable that the FBI felt that the dangers of emerging explosives warranted flying two hundred
previously trained individuals from around the United States to Nevada for a familiarization course. It
at least seems likely that if the FBI could have trained these experienced individuals remotely, at much
lower cost, it would have. Federal Bureau of Investigation, “FBI Bomb Tech Training,” https://www.fbi.
gov/news/videos/fbi-bomb-tech-training.
50 Some may question the symmetry of utility of the Internet by states and non-state actors and
whether or not the Internet provides the same utility to states and non-state actors. Of course, individuals
use the Internet, and therefore the utility of the Internet is in fact symmetrical. The structures and
capabilities outside the Internet for states and non-state actors, however, are not symmetrical.
51 Although not all governments have the same level of capacity, they all possess significant ad-
vantages. For the time being, a reasonable level of governance seems to be a prerequisite for abundant
Internet access. Additionally, even in thoroughly backwards countries such as North Korea or Afghanistan,
the government has more and better access to the Internet than its challengers do. Even if a case arises
in which individuals or groups within a country have better access to the Internet than the government,
the government will still have access to support from other governments, such as the United States, that
are also similarly threatened by transnational terrorism.
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Why the Internet Is Not Increasing Terrorism 309
can be more than made up for by numbers and capital. In the end, gov-
ernments have, internally, all the capabilities terrorists would have to try
to replicate using the Internet with none of the drawbacks. Additionally,
the Internet allows governments the same access to information and power
to coordinate across distances that the terrorists have, without the problem
of online surveillance. Governments no longer need to centralize opera-
tions, since an analyst in Colorado Springs or operative in Afghanistan can
access as much information as an analyst in Washington, D.C. Moreover, be-
cause the transnational terrorist is by definition an enemy of more than one
state, governments—often many governments—can readily share informa-
tion across thousands of miles. Whereas a terrorist organization previously
could hope to target groups selectively and replicate successful tactics else-
where before other governments could prepare or adapt, governments can
now share information at the speed of light.
TERRORISTS INADVERTENTLY DISCLOSE INFORMATION ON THE INTERNET
Terrorists themselves remain one of the primary sources of online infor-
mation about each other. This becomes significant regardless of where ter-
rorists operate because when terrorists are using the Internet, governments
can reach them. This is especially true of the US government. Due to the
number of American companies operating on the Internet, it is easy for the
US government to subpoena information and seize data.52 The bottom line,
however, is that any information on the Internet—whether e-mails, phone
calls, texts, or web pages—can be intercepted by a third party, no matter the
location of the transmitter of the information, the receiver of the information,
or the third party. The Internet has made it possible for terrorists to reach
across the globe and access information without leaving their home country;
the same is true for governments, but they are much better at it.
Of course, terrorists can diminish their exposure to surveillance by lim-
iting the ways and amount they use the Internet. Doing so, however, merely
decreases the utility they are getting out of the Internet. A terrorist who
chooses not to send e-mails because he believes they may be surveilled will
probably avoid surveillance, but he will also lose the cheapness and speed
of communication that the Internet provides. Similarly, not posting to web
pages and not coordinating in chat rooms decrease the risk of observation,
but then the potential for recruitment that those tools provide to the terrorists
decreases as well. An illustration of this is Osama bin Laden’s use of couriers
to post e-mails. Although he avoided the risk of surveillance on the Internet,
52 To understand the amazing strength of the United States to collect information, one need only
look to the recent revelations surrounding the NSA. Glenn Greenwald, “NSA Collecting Phone Records
of Millions of Verizon Customers Daily,” The Guardian, 15 July 2013.
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310 D. C. Benson
he also slowed down the speed of his e-mails so that their delivery was only
slightly quicker than regular mail and significantly more costly.53
MANY PEOPLE OUTSIDE THE GOVERNMENT TRACK TERRORISTS
One of the most fundamental errors analysts make in looking at transna-
tional terrorism is assuming that transnational terrorists have a similar base
of support as nationalist or local terror organizations. Observers conflate the
potential of organizations like Hamas, primarily a national or local group,
with that of al Qaeda.54 When a populace residing near a potential area of
attack does not support a transnational terrorist group, that local populace
becomes an adversary of the terrorists, not an ally.55
Through the Internet, this enormous reserve of people can focus its
efforts and interact with the government even more efficiently than before.
Indeed, many of these people take the fight to the terrorists. One so-called
“patriot hacker” called “Jester” asserts he regularly disrupts extremist web-
sites.56 That same hacker even claims responsibility for the two-week delay
of the release of the second Wikileaks data dump.57 Such activity is not lim-
ited to hackers; there is an entire cottage industry in which people spend
their free time pursuing terrorist organizations online.58
The government also creates incentives for people to snitch and even
employs such people directly. There are numerous attempts to enlist civilian
participation in intelligence collection activities, including the “If you see
something, say something” campaign and a recently launched movement in
the United Kingdom that encourages people to inform on potential terrorist
activities.59 Such campaigns are actually quite effective. A recent study shows
that civilian informants helped in over one quarter of all thwarted terrorist
53 Sebastian Abbot, “Bin Laden Was Logged Off, but Not Al-Qaida,” http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/
20110515/ap_on_re_as/as_bin_laden_digital_warriors; Jason Burke, “Osama Bin Laden Tried to Establish
‘Grand Coalition’ of Militant Groups,” The Guardian, 30 May 2011.
54 For example, Bruce Hoffman makes no distinction between Hamas’s ability to attack Israel and al
Qaeda’s ability to attack the United States using suicide bombers. Bruce Hoffman, “The Logic of Suicide
Terrorism,” Atlantic Monthly 291, no. 5 (2003).
55 For example, the overwhelming majority of Americans, including most Muslims, prefer that Islamist
terror groups do not carry out terror attacks within the United States. Richard Wike, “Little Support for
Terrorism among Muslim Americans,” in Pew Global Attitudes Project, ed. Greg Smith (Washington, DC:
Pew Research Center, Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, 2009).
56 Jennifer Hesterman, “Cyber Vigilantes: Citizen Hackers Go to War against Terrorists,” http://www.
homeland1.com/domestic-international-terrorism/articles/873689-Cyber- vigilantes-Citizen- hackers-go- to
-war-against-terrorists/.
57 Kristina Wong, “Patriotic ‘Hacktivist’ Claims He Took Down Wikileaks Site,” ABC News, 30 Novem-
ber 2010, http://abcnews.go.com/US/patriotic-hacktivist- claims-wikileaks- site/story?id=12272776.
58 Mike Carter, “Thwarting Terror: The Spy Next Door; for Hobbyists, Homeland Security Begins at
Home,” Seattle Times, 20 June 2004.
59 Home Office, “Public Told to Report Online Terrorism,” http://www.publicservice.co.uk/news_
story.asp?id=16007.
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Why the Internet Is Not Increasing Terrorism 311
attacks, and when local law enforcement is included, more than half of all
thwarted transnational terror attacks came about by people outside national
government.60 Additionally, there are many organizations—such as SITE,
Middle East Media Research Institute, and Stratfor Global Intelligence—that
monitor and report on terrorist groups at the behest of, or in cooperation
with, other government agencies.
EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT
When evaluating the effect of the Internet on transnational terrorism, existing
empirical assessments examine individual terrorist attacks and establish how
terrorists have used the Internet to plan and execute their attacks. Unsur-
prisingly, such methods show that terrorists have indeed used the Internet
in committing terrorist attacks. Since the Internet is ubiquitous, it would be
strange if today’s terrorists did not use the Internet, just as it would be strange
if past terrorists did not use the postal service or telephones. Presence of the
Internet does not, however, demonstrate a causal effect.
There are three reasons the established approach has led to spurious
findings. First, by looking only at cases of completion or near completion
and showing only that the Internet was present, these studies have no vari-
ation on either the independent variable or dependent variable and cannot
demonstrate that a change in the purported cause influences the outcomes.
Second, when attempting to show that the Internet causes terrorism, merely
establishing that the Internet played a role does not preclude the possibility
the terrorists were first motivated offline to attack and only later used the
Internet as one tool among many to attempt to carry out that attack. Third,
the established analysis ignores an important intervening variable, namely
state use of the Internet. As a result, such studies neglect to consider that the
effectiveness of terrorism is not due to the terrorists alone, but to a strategic
interaction between the state (or counterterrorists) and terrorists.
As these weaknesses indicate, the key empirical question is not whether
the Internet has been used in some terror attacks, but whether the Internet
has benefited terrorists more than governments and other counterterrorists.
Both terrorists and counterterrorists have benefited from the Internet in abso-
lute terms, but this is insufficient to demonstrate the Internet’s causal impact
(or the lack thereof) for either.
In order to assess the belief that the Internet is helping terrorists on its
own terms and compare that belief to the new theory offered in this article,
the empirical implications of each must be established first and then applied
to the world as observed. Importantly, the evidence must be examined with
60 Kevin Strom et al., “Building on Clues: Examining Successes and Failures in Detecting U.S. Terrorist
Plots, 1999-2009” (Research Triangle Park, NC: Insitute for Homeland Security Solutions, 2010).
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312 D. C. Benson
variation in both independent and dependent variables, account for use of
the Internet by terrorists and by the state, and include negative cases to
determine the net effect of the Internet on transnational terrorism.
Al Qaeda Was More Effective Before the Internet
Any analyst who wishes to understand how the Internet might affect transna-
tional terrorism should examine al Qaeda in depth.61 Al Qaeda is driving
much of the interest in transnational terrorism. Furthermore, its activity spans
both pre- and post-Internet periods. Although the Internet has existed since
al Qaeda’s inception, al Qaeda did not rely upon the Internet until well after
the US invasion of Iraq in 2003.
Al Qaeda started as a relatively effective terrorist organization, but be-
ginning in 2005, it attempted to carry out attacks without operational training
bases and with reliance on local terrorist organizations. Almost all of the suc-
cessful terrorist attacks attributed to al Qaeda during this time period were
carried out by local terrorist organizations that adopted the al Qaeda name.
In contrast, al Qaeda, operating without local bases, and unaffiliated attack-
ers frequently categorized generically as “al Qaeda terrorists” were barely
able to complete significant terrorist attacks anywhere in the world. If the
Internet were actually driving terrorism, less reliance on local groups and
more successful non-local attacks should be expected. The decentralized
nature of Internet-based terrorism and the decreased cost of recruitment,
planning, and communication would theoretically allow al Qaeda to operate
more freely rather than relying upon local groups and intervening in local,
ongoing conflicts.
Some may complain it is unfair to use al Qaeda as a measure of the
effects of the Internet on terrorism because of the attention paid to al Qaeda
and its constituent groups by counterterrorist organizations throughout the
world. One must remember, however, that this is precisely the key case used
by proponents of the “Internet as a terrorist force multiplier” argument. In
short, it is frequently and widely claimed that the Internet provides at least
as good a safe haven as one offered in the real world and that operations
can be planned equally well on the Internet as in real life, while simulta-
neously being nearly impossible to shut down. As such, according to these
arguments, there should be at least no decline in terrorist activity, regardless
of whether the terrorist organizations were operating in the real world or
61 All data on attacks derive from the databases listed below. No claim is made about the complete-
ness of the list, but completed transnational attacks of any import would surely be known publicly. For ex-
plicit information for each case, see http://cpost.uchicago.edu/blog/terrorism-on-the-Internet- data-set/;
University of Chicago, Chicago Project on Security and Terrorism Suicide Attack Database, http:
//cpost.uchicago.edu/search.php; National Counter Terrorism Center, Worldwide Incident Tracking Sys-
tem; University of Maryland, START Global Terrorism Database, http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/.
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Why the Internet Is Not Increasing Terrorism 313
online. Furthermore, al Qaeda continued primarily as a non-Internet terrorist
organization through 2005, all the while under four years of intense surveil-
lance, meaning that the online period of al Qaeda does not strictly covary
with international attention.
PRE-INTERNET ALQAEDA
Beginning in the mid-90s and continuing through to 2005, al Qaeda was
able to carry out a series of significant terrorist attacks: the US embassy
bombings in Tanzania and Kenya, the bombing of the USS Cole, and of
course September 11th (see Table 1). None of these attacks made significant
use of the Internet, if at all. This is relatively certain because during this
time, there was very little Internet access in the region of the world where
al Qaeda was operating, and there is no attestation of usage of the Internet
during this period. Without the Internet, al Qaeda was clearly a functional
terrorist organization capable of completing terrorist attacks in a wide variety
of theaters.
The 7/7 attacks in London come the closest in offering evidence that al
Qaeda used the Internet in an attack during this period. The coroner’s inquest
from the attacks states that the perpetrators did visit Internet caf´
es and further
concludes that the bombers could have obtained information on bomb build-
ing online. Nevertheless, it also specifically states that the bombers received
in-person assistance from a bomb maker known as Khawaja.62 Furthermore,
the wife of one of the bombers explicitly discussed the role that personal
contact had in her husband’s radicalization.63
Because there was increasing Internet use by members of al Qaeda
during this period of successful attacks, four observations about al Qaeda at
this time can be made. First, al Qaeda was a terrorist organization capable
of completing attacks outside its area of support. Second, al Qaeda did not
need the Internet to accomplish attacks. Third, when al Qaeda did begin
to use the Internet, its reliance on the Internet was not any heavier than
that of the general populace.64 Finally, even following the US invasion of
Afghanistan and the widespread targeting of al Qaeda and affiliate groups,
al Qaeda was still able to complete three of its most deadly attacks.
62 Rt. Hon. Lady Justice Hallett DBE, Acting Deputy Coroner for Inner West London, Coroner’s
Inquests into the London Bombings of 7 July 2005 (2011).
63 “July 7 Bomber’s Mind ‘Twisted by Radical Mosque Visits,”’ The Guardian, 23 September 2005.
64 Brian Michael Jenkins, “No Path to Glory: Deterring Homegrown Terrorism,” testimony before
House Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment (26 May 2010)
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2010); Brian Michael Jenkins, Would-Be Warriors: Incidents of
Jihadist Terrorist Radicalization in the United States since September 11, 2001, Investment in People and
Ideas, RAND Corporation Occasional Paper Series (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2010).
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314 D. C. Benson
TABLE 1 Attacks by al Qaeda
Date Description Killed Wounded
11/13/1995 Assault, Adana, Turkey∗†50
6/25/1996 Suicide bombing of the USS Cole, Aden, Yemen†00
8/7/1998 Suicide bombing of multiple residential compounds,
Riyadh†
224 4877
10/12/2000 Suicide bombing of MV Limburg, Aden, Yemen†19 40
9/11/2001 9/11 Suicide bombings, New York, New York;
Shanksville, Pennsylvania; Washington, D.C.†
2955 6291
4/11/2002 Suicide bombing of two synagogues, Istanbul, Turkey†21 30
10/6/2002 Bombing, Bayt Lahiyah, Gaza∗‡112
11/28/2002 Bombing of the Paradise Hotel, Mombasa, Kenya∗16 80
5/12/2003 Suicide bombing of synagogue, Djerba, Tunisia†35 200
9/23/2003 Attack and shootout at a hospital, Jizan, Saudi Arabia∗44
11/8/2003 IED attack, Yanbu’ al Bahr, Saudi Arabia∗†18 100
11/15/2003 Suicide bombing of British Consulate and local banks,
Istanbul, Turkey†
25 300
11/20/2003 Suicide bombing of Freemason offices, Istanbul, Turkey†57 700
3/9/2004 Simultaneous bombings, Istanbul, Turkey∗†47
3/11/2004 Bombing of trains, Madrid, Spain 37 450
4/27/2004 RPG attack, Damascus, Syria∗‡20
5/1/2004 IED attack, Yanbu’ al Bahr, Saudi Arabia∗619
5/30/2004 Assault, al-Khubar, Saudi Arabia∗22 25
6/6/2004 Assault, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia∗00
6/8/2004 Assault, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia∗10
8/3/2004 Assault, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia∗10
8/10/2004 Simultaneous bombings, Istanbul, Turkey∗211
8/30/2004 Assault, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia∗00
9/26/2004 Assault, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia∗10
10/1/2004 Assault, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia∗10
10/8/2004 Suicide bombing of Israeli tourists, Taba, Egypt†30 160
12/29/2004 Assault, Sidon, Lebanon∗†22 90
7/7/2005 Bombing of London Underground, London, UK. †56 784
7/12/2005 VBIED, Beirut, Lebanon∗‡112
12/14/2005 Bombing of an Iraqi polling station, Kista, Sweden 0 0
1/14/2006 Assault, Sidon, Lebanon∗‡00
2/2/2006 Bombing, Beirut, Lebanon∗‡01
2/3/2006 Assassination attempt, Kushtia, Bangladesh∗‡01
10/7/2006 Bombing, Jabliyah, Gaza∗‡00
4/10/2007 RPG attack, Damascus, Syria∗†10
4/21/2007 Bombing, Bayt Lahiyah, Gaza∗‡00
7/9/2008 Shooting at US Consulate, Istanbul, Turkey∗62
2/22/2009 Bombing, Cairo, Egypt∗112
1/30/2010 Assault, Adana, Turkey∗00
5/1/2010 Assault, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia∗†00
8/18/2010 Assault, Medan, Indonesia∗12
9/22/2010 Assault, Medan, Indonesia∗30
12/2/2010 Church attack, Sleman, Indonesia∗00
8/13/2011 Kidnapping of Warren Weinstein, Lahore, Pakistan 0 1
∗Imputed
†Suicide attack
‡Probably speciously connected (i.e., al Qaeda did not claim responsibility, and there are other more
probable candidates operating in the area).
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Why the Internet Is Not Increasing Terrorism 315
ALQAEDA USING THE INTERNET
Beginning around 2005, al Qaeda began to rely heavily on the Internet for
transnational attacks, while deferring local terrorism to its franchises.65 A
common fear in the West, and possibly a hope of al Qaeda, was that the
Internet could become a new front on which al Qaeda could best the West
or sustain operations even without safe havens in Afghanistan.
A point of note about the attacks involving use of the Internet is
that those attacks are far less deadly. Most kill and injure few people, and
perpetrators are often killed, injured, or arrested. Of the attacks outside of
the Middle East, only the 2009 Fort Hood shooting managed to kill more than
one person, and that attack is not normally attributed to al Qaeda.66 Some
terrorists were laughably incompetent, such as the Glasgow airport would-be
bombers who only managed to burn their own car in July 2007. Even in many
of these later cases, it is not obvious that the Internet motivated the terrorism.
HOMEGROWN TERRORISM
Of course, it could be the case that although al Qaeda members are not
carrying out operations under the organization’s direction, al Qaeda is suc-
ceeding in disseminating information that allows its sympathizers to carry out
attacks on its behalf. Indeed, this seems to have been the explicit purpose
of Inspire, a magazine published online. Fortunately, there are few cases of
homegrown terrorism that are not interdicted, but three cases bear examina-
tion because of their high profile: Major Nidal Hasan, Roshonara Choudhry,
and the Tsarnaev brothers.67 All these individuals seem to be somewhat self-
radicalized, and there is some evidence in each case that the Internet played
a role. This interpretation falls apart, however, upon closer examination.
In 2009, Major Hasan, a psychiatrist with the US military who was sched-
uled to deploy soon, entered the hospital where he worked and began
shooting, killing thirteen and wounding thirty. Hasan, who defended him-
self, initially attempted to make a “defense of others” argument, claiming
he was protecting Taliban leaders in Afghanistan, but the military judge
disallowed that defense.68
65 Abdel Bari Atwan, The Secret History of Al Qaeda, rev. ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press,
2008); Sageman, Leaderless Jihad; Weimann, Terror on the Internet.
66 For this reason, the attack is not included in Table 1.
67 In each data set consulted, these cases are not identified as cases of al Qaeda attacks during this
time period and therefore do not appear in Table 1. They are nevertheless included for discussion here
because they are frequently thought of as being al Qaeda-linked attacks since they fit the pattern of
leaderless attacks. The Boston bombings occurred outside the consulted databases’ time frames, but the
attack is relevant and thus discussed here. Major Hasan is also included in an Ohio State University study.
Mueller, Terrorism since 9/11.
68 Manny Fernandez, “Fort Hood Suspect Says Rampage Was to Defend Afghan Taliban Leaders,”
New York Times, 5 June 2013.
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316 D. C. Benson
Hasan did use the Internet, most notably to maintain ties with Anwar
al-Awlaki; however, he was primarily maintaining an old contact he had first
made in person in Falls Church, Virginia.69 Furthermore, despite Hasan’s ties
to Awlaki, it is not immediately clear that he was operating as a “leaderless
jihadi” for an al Qaeda-related reason. He may have been acting because
of a mental illness. Most importantly, however, Major Hasan was able to
complete his attacks largely because the US Army turned a blind eye to sev-
eral obvious warning signs and because he had access to secure facilities.
Hasan possessed characteristics highly desirable in a recruit, but hoping a
high-ranking and previously trained enemy will defect homicidally seems
an unlikely basis for a lasting terrorism campaign. Indeed, a year later an-
other soldier purportedly planned to carry out a similar attack and was
interdicted.70
Roshonara Choudhry was sentenced to life in prison for stabbing a
sitting member of Parliament, allegedly because of the MP’s support for the
Iraq War, after becoming enraged by images and videos she saw online.
Much like the case of Major Hasan, the Choudhry attack features a subject
who is somewhat unstable. Furthermore, if the best al Qaeda’s online efforts
can do in 2010 is convince a young woman in the United Kingdom to injure
an MP with a 1£ knife, then the effort of the Internet campaign hardly seems
worth it, at least in political terms.
The Tsarnaev brothers seem to represent the strongest case for any-
thing resembling Internet-based terrorism. They captured the attention of
the United States in mid-April 2013 with a pair of explosions at the finish
line of the Boston Marathon; three were killed and dozens wounded. The
subsequent manhunt resulted in the deaths of a police officer and one of the
brothers and the injury of several others. Even here, however, the Internet
appears to have been one influence among many and to have done more to
help the state security forces than the terrorists.
The exact pathway for the brothers’ radicalization is still unknown, and
it remains unclear whether the Internet was pivotal. Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, the
surviving brother, told authorities that online sermons of Anwar al-Awlaqi
played a role, but he also mentioned US interventions in Afghanistan and
Iraq.71 The brothers’ mother has also admitted to encouraging the increas-
ing religiosity of her elder son, Tamerlan.72 An initial FBI study assessed
69 Brian Ross, “Major Hasan’s E-Mail: ‘I Can’t Wait to Join You’ in Afterlife,” 19 November 2009,
http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/major-hasans-mail-wait- join-afterlife/story?id=9130339.
70 Rhonda Schwartz, Pierre Thomas, and Martha Raddatz, “Fort Hood Suspect Mentions Al Qaeda
Cleric Believed to Have Inspired Previous Attack, Official Says,” The Blotter, 3 May 2011, http://abcnews.
go.com/Blotter/fort-hood-attack-awol- soldier-bombing- shooting/story?id=14179096#.UYP0BMqv_rw.
71 Raf Sanchez, “Boston Suspect: Afghanistan and Iraq Wars Inspired Us,” Daily Telegraph,23April
2013; Chuck Raasch and Yamiche Alcindor, “What Made Boston Bombing Suspects Tick?,” USA Today,3
May 2013.
72 Alan Cullison et al., “Turn to Religion Split Suspects’ Home,” Wall Street Journal, 22 Apr 2013,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324235304578437131250259170.html.
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Why the Internet Is Not Increasing Terrorism 317
that the bombs followed plans from the online magazine Inspire. However,
travel by Tamerlan to Chechnya the year prior and the reliability of the
devices used in the bombing of the marathon have led many authorities
to call for continuing the investigation about whether in-person training
occurred.73
What is clear is that following the Boston bombing, authorities quickly
marshaled all of their resources, including a virtual horde of online detec-
tives, to track down the perpetrators quickly enough to thwart an apparent
planned second attack.74 Although the Boston bombing was the most signif-
icant attack by transnational terrorists on US soil in several years, it lacked
much of the sophistication and all of the staying power of attacks by groups
not reliant upon Internet-type communication. By contrast, groups like the
Weather Underground, operating well before the Internet, were able to carry
out multiple bombings, robberies, and attacks over many years. In fact, the
Weather Underground, the Unabomber, Timothy McVeigh, and even the
Haymarket bomber in 1886 were able to fabricate high-explosive bombs,
whereas the Tsarnaevs were forced to rely upon much less effective low-
explosive weapons.75
Once al Qaeda began relying heavily upon the Internet, many things
changed for the organization. First, although al Qaeda remained a terrorist
organization, it was seldom capable of completing attacks outside its area
of support. Second, for al Qaeda, the Internet was not sufficient to com-
plete attacks generally. Third, al Qaeda’s reliance on the Internet continued
to parallel that of the general populace. Finally, without a safe haven in
73 Chris Wallace, “Rep. Mccaul, Sen. Manchin Talk Possible Foreign Ties in Boston Bombing; Amb.
Oren on Latest in Syria,” transcript, Fox News Sunday, 28 April 2013, http://www.foxnews.com/on-air/
fox-news-sunday-chris- wallace/2013/04/28/rep-mccaul- sen-manchin- talk-possible- foreign-ties- boston-
bombing-amb-oren-latest- syria#p//v/2335406632001; Richard Esposito, “Exclusive: Government Doc
Shows How Closely Boston Marathon Bombers Followed Al Qaeda Plans,” Open Channel, 29 April 2013,
http://openchannel.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/04/26/17932143-exclusive-government-doc- shows-how-
closely-boston-marathon-bombers- followed-al- qaeda-plans?lite.
74 Erik Martin, “Reflections on the Recent Boston Crisis,” Blog.Reddit, 22 April 2013, http://blog.
reddit.com/2013/04/reflections-on-recent-boston- crisis.html; Associated Press, “Did Digital Detectives
Help or Hinder the Search for the Boston Bombers?,” 20 April 2013, http://www.dailytelegraph.com.
au/technology/did-digital-detectives-help- or-hinder- the-search- for-the- boston-bombers/; Boston Police
Department, @Boston_Police, Twitter, https://twitter.com/Boston_Police.
75 Although regulations and restrictions on high explosives have changed over the years, the Tsar-
naevs had sufficient access to them. According to the Institute for the Manufacturers of Explosives (a
trade organization in the United States), the United States alone uses seven billion pounds of explosives
every year. Furthermore, there are regulations on explosive transfer, but there is very little regula-
tion on explosive precursors, and the transportation of a sizeable percentage of the explosives occurs
without active tracking. Perhaps most importantly, Dzokhar Tsarnaev was enrolled as a student at the
University of Massachusetts-Dartmouth, which has a chemistry department and an undergraduate chem-
istry club. See University of Massachussetts-Dartmouth websites, “Chemistry Club,” http://www.umassd.
edu/cas/chemistry/chemclub/; “Chemistry & Biochemistry Department,” http://www.umassd.edu/cas/
chemistry/chemclub/. See also Institute of Makers of Explosives (IME) publications, “Explosives Precursor
Chemical Regulations”(Washington, DC: IME, 2013); “Truck Tracking,”(Washington, DC: IME, 2013).
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318 D. C. Benson
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
1995 1996 1998 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
al-Shabaab 000000000022125101
AQ 1111135143421151
AQIM 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 53 41 21 5 9
AQAP/AQY 00000107211634361
Completed Aacks
FIGURE 1 All attacks by group by year.
Source: Data sources available at http://cpost.uchicago.edu/blog/terrorism-on- the-Internet-
data-set/.
Afghanistan, al Qaeda could not use the Internet to accomplish multiple
repeated attacks, and the few completed attacks were less effective.76
ALQAEDA’SFRANCHISES
At least making a pretense of operating transnationally are three important al
Qaeda franchises: al-Shabaab in Somalia; al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
(AQAP), originally known as al Qaeda in Yemen (AQY); and al Qaeda in
the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in Algeria. Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and Jemaah
Islamiyyah, two other significant franchises, are excluded because they have
not claimed significant operations outside their country of origin and are
overwhelmingly local organizations. Al-Shabaab started out as an insurgency
in the long-running conflict in Somalia, before ultimately pledging bayah
(allegiance) to Osama bin Laden. AQAP began as a functional arm of al
Qaeda, ultimately merging with AQY when AQAP’s leader was captured
by the Saudis. AQY primarily grew out of the long-running Yemeni civil
war. AQIM used to be called the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat
(GSPC) and fought against the Algerian government in the Algerian civil
war. AQIM agreed to join the al Qaeda franchise when its fortunes began to
wane.
From 2005 onward, most of the work done by the “al Qaeda brand” was
done by franchises. As shown in Figure 1, al Qaeda gives significant ground
in terms of volume of attacks. Furthermore, Figure 2 shows that although
al Qaeda continues with some transnational activity, even in transnational
76 Reminder: Effective attacks produce tactical effects such as casualties and damage.
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Why the Internet Is Not Increasing Terrorism 319
FIGURE 2 Transnational attacks by groups.
Source: Data sources available at http://cpost.uchicago.edu/blog/terrorism-on- the-Internet-
data-set/.
attacks, it takes a back seat to its franchises in terms of the numbers of
attacks.
In every case, those franchises were not actually organizations estab-
lished by al Qaeda but instead terrorist organizations that were engaged
in their own war and had adopted the al Qaeda name. Assuming the al
Qaeda brand did little to alter their dedication to their local concern. Fur-
thermore, since they were fundamentally local terrorist organizations, they
never needed to use the Internet, other than in the ways one would expect
any brick-and-mortar organization to use such technology.
If the Internet were contributing to terrorism, this increased reliance
upon franchise groups is completely contrary to the expected outcomes. A
further examination of the patterns of terrorist attacks by these franchises
reveals three findings that demonstrate the Internet is not increasing transna-
tional terrorism. First, essentially all of this terrorist violence occurs within
the context of an ongoing conflict and is not the result of increased concern
about transnational issues. Second, when transnational attacks do occur,
they are frequently unclaimed, ineffective, very close to borders (often rely-
ing upon refugee communities), and potentially falsely ascribed to terrorist
organizations for cynical political reasons. Finally, and most importantly, the
areas where there are increases in terrorism are exactly the opposite loca-
tions expected if the Internet were actually driving the increase; rather being
in Internet-wealthy areas, the increases occur in areas where the Internet is
almost nonexistent.77
77 Analysis focuses on transnational attacks only because this article makes no claim regarding
domestic terrorism, even in cases where the logic is consistent with that of transnational terrorism.
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320 D. C. Benson
TABLE 2 AQAP Transnational Attacks
Date Description Killed Wounded
5/29/2004 Attack on al-Khubar oil fields, al-Khubar,
Saudi Arabia
22 26
6/12/2004 Assault, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia 1 0
6/13/2004 Assassination of Kenneth Scroggs, Riyadh,
Saudi Arabia
00
6/18/2004 Assassination of Paul Johnson Jr., Riyadh,
Saudi Arabia
10
9/15/2004 Assault, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia 1 0
12/6/2004 Assault, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia 5 3
12/7/2004 Storming of the US Consulate, Jeddah 9 5
6/30/2005 Assault, Mecca, Saudi Arabia 1 0
2/24/2006 Suicide Bombing of Aramco Oil Fields,
Eastern Province, Saudi Arabia
48
8/27/2009 Attempted Assassination of Saudi
Anti-Terrorism Chief, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia
01
ALQAEDA IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA
AQAP is a manifest example of the various types of evidence suggesting
that the Internet is not increasing terrorism. Only about one in ten Yemenis
had access to the Internet by 2010, indicating that Yemen was not a prime
area for Internet terrorism.78 Additionally, throughout its history, AQAP has
only ever completed transnational attacks in Saudi Arabia, which is imme-
diately adjacent to Yemen. Despite the targets only a short distance away,
these attacks do still qualify as transnational attacks (although given the
fact that AQAP both operates in Saudi Arabia as a base of operations and
claims the entire Arabian Peninsula as its home, this could be contended
otherwise).
What is especially illustrative is AQAP’s near total incompetence at com-
pleting transnational attacks (see Table 2) during the time that al Qaeda
began to use the Internet. In an assassination attempt on Saudi Arabia’s anti-
terror chief in August 2009, a suicide bomber approached the target under
the pretense of abandoning terrorism. The bomb, implanted in his anus,
killed the bomber but only scratched the intended target’s finger. AQAP
made several attempts but was unable to complete other attacks. The 2009
Underwear Bomber was unable to detonate his payload, and had the US
government been paying attention to either his e-mails—in which his father
was denouncing him to the FBI—or Facebook page, he never would have
made it onto the plane bound for Detroit. As for the printer cartridge bombs,
they were detected and intercepted en route by the shipping companies.
78 ITU, World Telecommunication/ICT Indicators Database.
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Why the Internet Is Not Increasing Terrorism 321
TABLE 3 List of AQIM Attacks
Date Description Killed Wounded
5/14/2007 Suicide Bombing of American Language
Center, Casablanca, Morocco∗†
01
9/14/2008 Assault, Zouerat, Mauritania∗12 0
9/15/2008 Kidnapping and execution of an army
patrol, Zuwarat, Mauritania
12 0
12/14/2008 Kidnapping, Niamey, Niger∗00
6/10/2009 Assassination of military intelligence
official, Timbuktu, Mali∗
10
6/23/2009 Attempted kidnapping and shooting,
Nouakchott, Mauritania
10
7/3/2009 Attack and kidnapping of soldiers, Mali 28 0
7/17/2009 Assault, Nouakchott, Mauritania∗00
8/8/2009 Suicide bombing of French Embassy,
Nouakchott, Mauritania†
13
11/25/2009 Kidnapping, Menaka, Goa 0 0
11/29/2009 Assault on convoy, Nouakchott, Mauritania 0 1
12/18/2009 Kidnapping, Kobenni, Mauritania 0 0
12/30/2009 Armed assault on a village, Telemses,
Niger∗
40
4/21/2010 Kidnapping, Agadex Niger 1 0
8/10/2010 Kidnapping, Mali∗10
8/25/2010 Suicide car bombing, Nema, Mauritania†10
9/16/2010 Kidnapping of seven foreign nationals
working for a French company, Arlit
Niger
00
1/5/2011 Shooting at French Embassy, Bamak, Mali∗02
1/7/2011 Kidnapping, Niamey, Niger 2 0
2/1/2011 Attempted assassination of Mauritanian
President, Traza Mauritania∗
00
4/28/2011 Bombing of Argana Caf´
e, Marrakech,
Morocco∗
17 24
5/18/2011 Shooting at policemen, Rouhio, Tunisia∗40
6/12/2011 Kidnapping, Hombouri, Mali∗26
7/5/2011 Shooting at convoy, Bessiknou, Mauritania 0 4
11/24/2011 Kidnapping, Hombori, Mali∗00
11/25/2011 Kidnapping, Timbuktu, Mali∗10
∗Imputed
†Suicide attack
This incompetence at transnational terror came at the same time Anwar al-
Awlaqi, a supposedly next generation, net-savvy terrorist, was a key AQAP
player.
ALQAEDA IN THE ISLAMIC MAGHREB
On the face of it, AQIM might seem to show that al Qaeda franchises were
heavily involved in transnational terrorism and that such terrorism was in-
deed driven by the Internet. As Table 3 shows, however, not only is AQIM
terrorism closely associated with the local ongoing conflict, but it is also
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322 D. C. Benson
TABLE 4 Internet Usage in AQIM Target Countries
Country % of Country with Internet Access
Mali 2.7
Mauritania 3
Morocco 49
Niger 0.83
Tunisia 36.8
Source: World Telecommunication/ICT Indicators database.
unlikely that the Internet is driving violent activity. Indeed, the areas where
violence is occurring are exactly the opposite locations one would expect if
the Internet were increasing terrorist capacity. Furthermore, in many cases,
attacks are only attributed to AQIM. That is to say, someone suspects AQIM
involvement, but there is no proof or claim by the group itself; or, the cases
are not clearly terrorism, often falling more in the realm of common crimi-
nality, such as kidnapping or shootouts with police.
Notably, all transnational attacks occurred in areas that are technologi-
cally underdeveloped.
Table 4 shows that the countries experiencing the most transnational
violence—Mali, Mauritania, and Niger—all had Internet usage rates at 3 per-
cent or below in 2010. By far the most effective attacks in AQIM areas of
operation during this period were in 2011 with a bombing in Morocco and
police shootings in Tunisia. Both of these attacks were potential examples of
attacks inspired and organized on the Internet, given the level of technolog-
ical development in those regions. They are, however, formally unclaimed
and occurred within the context of the Arab Spring, casting significant doubt
on the assertion that those attacks were actually orchestrated or carried out
by AQIM.
The vast majority of the remainder of the transnational attacks carried
out by AQIM constitutes primarily trivial attacks or simple criminality. Indeed,
although some people were killed and wounded in many of these attacks, an
overwhelming number of the incidents were either kidnappings, a common
problem and a source of criminal income throughout Africa, or gun battles
with police. Neither of these types of attacks is associated exclusively with
terrorism, and both fail to rise to the level of an international security concern.
This is not to say that AQIM is not a challenge in these regions, but many
of the activities AQIM engages in have the characteristics of organized crime
rather than terrorism.
AL-SHABAAB
Al-Shabaab is the most active of any group affiliated with or derived from
al Qaeda. Nevertheless, there is absolutely no evidence to indicate that al-
Shabaab is deriving significant benefit from the Internet in its operations.
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Why the Internet Is Not Increasing Terrorism 323
Indeed, the distribution of attacks shows that al-Shabaab functions primarily
in Somalia, which is undergoing a hard-fought civil conflict, or in areas
where it can rely upon ties with the Somali refugee community. Given the
very low level of Internet access in Somalia, which is so low that Somalia
is not currently tracked by the International Telecommunication Union, it
would be quite stunning if al-Shabaab actually made significant use of the
Internet.
Although al-Shabaab has carried out a large number of attacks outside
the borders of Somalia, most of those attacks have occurred within Kenya.
Figure 3 illustrates what is actually taking place. Nearly all the attacks occur
within a very short distance of the border with Somalia and primarily con-
stitute forays across the border by groups operating within Somalia. Indeed,
some of the attacks are carried out by people who never leave Somalia but
fire upon border checkpoints in Kenya. Many of the attacks actually occur
in and around camps set up specifically for Somali refugees.
Another important point to recognize is that many of the attacks are
never claimed by al-Shabaab. This is not to say that some of those attacks
may not be the work of al-Shabaab, but to highlight the degree to which
people are willing to attribute attacks to al-Shabaab. The United States is far
more likely to send aid to combat organizations associated with al Qaeda,
such as al-Shabaab, than to deal with common criminal or even insurgent
problems. It is therefore unsurprising that officials might be extremely willing
to attribute attacks to al-Shabaab as a reflex, making the organization appear
more effective to observers. Regardless of the number of imputed attacks
genuinely carried out by al-Shabaab, none of this real or inflated efficacy
shows any evidence of being driven by the Internet.
Al Qaeda Is Not More Effective Because of the Internet
Al Qaeda has not been able to rely upon the Internet to increase its transna-
tional terrorist capabilities. Almost all of its successful attacks following 2005
were completed by local terrorist organizations. Those local terrorist organi-
zations may have used the Internet, but they certainly did not need to do
so. Indeed, all those organizations existed and thrived prior to the advent
of the Internet, showing that whether or not the technology played any role
in their individual successes, the Internet was certainly not necessary for
organizational effectiveness as a whole. Furthermore, neither the relatively
successful local organizations nor the much more inhibited al Qaeda was
able to carry out consistent, meaningful transnational attacks.
The Internet was not able to help al Qaeda resist conventional counter-
terrorist forces. Although al Qaeda was able to extend its reach into ongoing
conventional civil wars and convince groups therein to establish an affiliation
with it, al Qaeda was not able to continue its stated mission of attacking the
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324 D. C. Benson
FIGURE 3 Map of al-Shabaab attacks.
United States. Importantly, this is true of Europe as well. In areas where
there were not sufficiently large Muslim populations in which al Qaeda
sympathizers could easily hide, al Qaeda’s post-2005 terror attacks relied
upon complete and total luck or devolved into farces. Interestingly, given
the sizable Muslim populations in Great Britain and France, those countries
were still able to interdict the vast majority of terrorist attacks on their own
soil, and completed attacks were much less significant in scale and political
relevance. As Figure 4 shows, arrests outstripped attacks every year.
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Why the Internet Is Not Increasing Terrorism 325
257
201
187
110
179
122
120130
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Arrests Attacks
FIGURE 4 Islamist attacks vs. arrests in Europe.
Source: Europol, Te-Sat 2011: EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (2011); Europol, Te-
Sat 2011: EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (2012); Europol, Te-Sat 2011: EU Terrorism
Situation and Trend Report (2010); Europol, Te-Sat 2011: EU Terrorism Situation and Trend
Report (2009); Europol, Te-Sat 2011: EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (2008).
The Government Benefits from the Internet
The Internet also gives the state additional capability to surveil, interdict, and
prosecute potential terrorists. Any number of areas could test this proposi-
tion, but the United States is the best location for two reasons. First, the
United States has uniform standards of evidence acceptable to interdict ter-
rorist plots. This is true both because the United States is a single country
and because American law requires evidence of real-world action for pros-
ecution. Second, the scrutiny paid to prosecution of terrorists in the United
States has created significant public disclosure of government use of the In-
ternet for surveillance, arrests, and prosecutions. The Internet is not a perfect
tool for capturing terrorists since terrorists can plan attacks without using the
Internet, but governments can use the Internet to their benefit at the expense
of transnational terrorists.
This test examines arrest histories in the United States. Unfortunately,
the United States does not publish compilations or statistics of the numbers
of people arrested on terrorism-related charges. Several groups and stud-
ies, however, have tracked related issues, and by using their databases, a
rough estimate of the number of arrests the government has made can be
obtained.79 The United States has arrested, indicted, prosecuted, or convicted
79 I do not claim that this is an exhaustive list. This list derives from two lists that have opposite
intentions. The first was attempting to assess the homegrown terrorist threat and as such only included
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326 D. C. Benson
at least 110 individuals using information from online activity.80 Although it
is not known how many plots would have resulted in completed attacks or
whether the online evidence was crucial to prosecution, what is known is
that the Internet is playing a role in the prosecution of potential terrorists. The
Internet is serving to empower the state vis-`
a-vis transnational terrorists.81
Internet surveillance and use were factors in criminal proceedings as
early as 2001 and continue to be today. Indeed, one of the earliest cases
involved the Lackawanna Six; the defendants offered as evidence of their
innocence an absence of electronic communication between them.82 Inter-
estingly, the FBI has been able to arrest several people based upon tips
sent to the bureau’s website.83 In some cases, the amount of online data is
incredibly vast.84
In a series of case studies examining terrorism in the United States,
John Mueller finds no evidence that the Internet contributed significantly to
completion of attacks. He specifically describes four cases (numbered 16, 30,
39, and 40) in which a terrorist’s online activities led directly to an arrest.85
In Case 16, a non-Muslim American disgruntled over US involvement in Iraq
attempted to use the Internet to solicit financing from Islamists for an attack
terrorist attacks that occurred or were thwarted early on, and the perpetrators were legal or long-
term residents of the United States. The other was attempting to document and show all incidences of
terrorism in US courts—civil, military, or criminal—regardless of the source of terrorism. Since neither
of these addresses Islamist terrorism specifically, and both have different standards, I was forced to
code the data independently and amalgamate the data set. It is possible that there are many cases that
are not publicly known, as well as cases that are actually related to terrorism, but plea bargains or
evidentiary concerns cannot be included in this list. Nevertheless, regardless of how many arrests are
unknown, completed terrorist attacks would certainly be known. Therefore, any missing information is
only evidence of more arrests, which are themselves evidence of increased monitoring capacity. David
Schanzer, Charles Kurzman, and Ebrahim Moosa, “Anti-Terror Lessons of Muslim-Americans” (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina, 2010); Steven Emerson, “Investigative Project on Terrorism” (Washington,
DC: Investigative Project on Terrorism, 1995).
80 Regardless of the evidence used, there is no consideration of those who were acquitted, although
those who have not yet been convicted are included in this list.
81 That the electronic evidence resulted from ex ante surveillance is not obvious in every case. It
may have been gathered through warrants served during the arrest. It would be unreasonable to expect
law enforcement officials to disclose whether they were gathering the information in real time or whether
they had gotten it after the arrest.
82 United States vs Goba, 240 F. Supp. 2d 242 (US Dist. 2003).
83 See, for example, Samuel P. Robinson, “United State of America V. Mohamed Alessa and Carlos
E. Almonte, Criminal Complaint,” ed. United States District Court District of New Jersey (Newark, New
Jersey: United States District Court District of New Jersey, 2010); John P. Cronan, Preet Bharara, and Peter
M. Skinner, “United States of America V. Abdul Tawala Ibn Alishtari, Sentencing Memorandum,” in S3 07
Cr. 115 (AKH), ed. United States District Court Southern District of New York (New York, New York:
United States District Court Southern District of New York, 2010).
84 For example the case of Babar Ahmed, who was indicted for supplying online aid to al Qaeda.
William Garfinkel, “Affadavit in Support of the Request for Extradition of Babar Ahmed,” ed. District of
Connecticut United States District Court (Bridgeport, Connecticut: United States District Court, District of
Connecticut, 2004).
85 Mueller, Terrorism since 9/11, 35. Electronic book available at http://politicalscience.osu.edu/
faculty/jmueller/SINCE.pdf. The electronic book follows non-standard pagination, therefore all pages are
delineated according to the page within the pdf file, counted from the first page of the file, not the page
number listed on the printed page that restarts many times.
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Why the Internet Is Not Increasing Terrorism 327
on Canadian pipelines but succeeded only in contacting a freelance civilian
anti-terrorist. Case 30 details a mentally disturbed young man whose online
activity drew the attention of the FBI directly. The young man in Case 39 was
arrested because of his threatening postings on Facebook. Finally, in Case 40,
futile attempts on Facebook to recruit assistants for a mass shooting alerted
the FBI to another would-be terrorist.86 Even in cases like the Underwear
Bomber, interdiction was imperfect: only the FBI’s inability to act on the
tip from Abdulmutallab’s father prevented agents from wholly stopping the
Christmas day attack, which nevertheless remained incomplete.87
Interestingly, the increased concern about “lone wolf” terrorists seems
to lend credence to the effectiveness of surveillance online. Lone wolves
are problematic precisely because they do not contact individuals in the real
world or online.88 In reality, however, very few people have the ability to
plan and carry out a significant terrorist attack individually without some
research or contact with others. Although there are instances of terrorists op-
erating completely on their own, as in the case of the Unabomber, frequently
those few completed attacks that do occur are largely futile. Completing most
kinds of effective attacks is hard work, requiring a combination of skills not
usually found in average Internet users. Even when an individual has that
skill set, he or she is typically not positioned to become a terrorist.
THE INTERNET IS A TOOL OF CIVILIZATION NOT CHAOS
The threat of terrorism on the Internet has been exaggerated. Initially, many
of the hypotheses about the effects of the Internet seemed justified. In the
intervening time, however, enough data has been collected to provide evi-
dence that transnational terrorists have not reaped a windfall in capabilities
because of the Internet. If terrorists had, there would be increased numbers
of completed attacks. Instead, what persists are few, scattered, and mostly
ineffective attempts that are frequently interdicted by governments before
coming to fruition. Cases in which terror groups have completed attacks—as
in the assassination of J. Christopher Stevens, US ambassador to Libya—those
attacks have almost always been carried out by local groups, not by transna-
tional organizations.
Exaggeration of the threat has egregious costs. The fact that the US
Congress has considered several times a bill to allow an “off switch” for
the Internet is a perfect illustration. American Internet consumers generate
approximately $4 billion of commerce every day. Medical personnel and first
86 Ibid., 473.
87 Adam Nossiter, “Lonely Trek to Radicalism for Nigerian Terror Suspect,” New York Times,17
January 2010; Mueller, Terrorism since 9/11.
88 For a more in-depth discussion on the concerns surrounding lone wolf terrorists, see Jenkins,
Would-Be Warriors.
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328 D. C. Benson
responders rely upon the Internet to protect public health and safety. It is
difficult to imagine a terrorist attack being as costly as turning off the Internet
would be.89
Additionally, the Internet actually provides an opportunity to defang
transnational terrorism almost completely. The Internet can serve as a “ter-
rorist preserve” in which people can talk, moan, preach, and complain to
their hearts’ content, thoroughly surveilled and significantly less threatening
than if they were to express their frustrations by action. However, as soon
as people venture into the real world to carry out attacks, counterterror-
ists can sweep in and disrupt their actions using the Internet as a valuable
intelligence resource.
Theoretically, the finding that the Internet actually increases the state’s
ability to control territory within its own borders lends support to those
who contend that concepts of the sovereign state are still relevant.90 Indeed,
although there may remain areas in which people can infringe upon the
capacity of the state by using the Internet, it appears that within the practice
of transnational violence, at least, the Internet strengthens, not weakens, the
hand of the state.
I am not suggesting that the Internet is not a vital security concern,
but rather the solution lies in treating it as a resource and not a threat.
Indeed, it is no surprise most people would use the Internet not for malign
purposes, but in opposition to terrorism. After all, majorities of the electorate
of democracies push government leaders toward actions against terrorists. It
is therefore much more logical to conclude that states should not treat their
populations as a threat, but rather use the Internet as a tool that allows those
who would prefer peace to help ensure it.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The author would like to thank Robert Pape, John Padgett, Dan Byman,
Daryl Press, Ami Pedahzur, Chad Levinson, John Stevenson, Michael Rosol,
Shawn Cochran, M.J. Reese, Risa Brooks, Stephanie Kelley, Katie Lindquist,
The Chicago Project on Security and Terrorism Security Writers Workshop,
BYU Political Science Forum, Chicago Program on International Security
and Policy, and the anonymous reviews for comments, and untold other
colleagues with whom the author has spoken about this project. All mistakes
remain the author’s own.
89 The estimate of daily utility comes from a recent report that estimated the annual utility for an
individual per year, divided by the number of days, and multiplied by the rough population of the United
States. J. Scott Holladay, A.J. Glusman, and Steven Soloway, “Internet Benefits: Consumer Surplus and
Net Neutralitiy” (New York: NY University School of Law, 2011).
90 Stephen D. Krasner, “Sovereignty,” Foreign Policy, no. 122 (2001).
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