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The Journal of General Psychology
ISSN: 0022-1309 (Print) 1940-0888 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/vgen20
The Need for Absolute Truth and Self-Rumination
as Basic Suppressors in the Relationship Between
Private Self-Consciousness and Mental Health
Ömer Faruk Şimşek , Aylin Ecem Ceylandağ & Gizem Akcan
To cite this article: Ömer Faruk Şimşek , Aylin Ecem Ceylandağ & Gizem Akcan (2013) The Need
for Absolute Truth and Self-Rumination as Basic Suppressors in the Relationship Between Private
Self-Consciousness and Mental Health, The Journal of General Psychology, 140:4, 294-310, DOI:
10.1080/00221309.2013.831804
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00221309.2013.831804
Published online: 25 Sep 2013.
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The Journal of General Psychology, 2013, 140(4), 294–310
Copyright C
2013 Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
The Need for Absolute Truth and
Self-Rumination as Basic Suppressors in
the Relationship Between Private
Self-Consciousness and Mental Health
¨
OMER FARUK S¸IMS¸EK
Istanbul Arel University
AYLIN ECEM CEYLANDA ˘
G
Oldenburg University
GIZEM AKCAN
Istanbul Arel University
ABSTRACT. Self-reflection has not so far been shown to have any specific benefits for
mental health except for self-knowledge. Recent research showed that the controversy
concerning the relationship between self-reflection and mental health could completely be
eliminated if self-rumination and the need for absolute truth, especially the need for absolute
truth, were considered as suppressor variables. This research replicated these findings in a
different sample and expanded these findings by showing that the same is true for private
self-consciousness. The need for absolute truth as a new variable was shown to be highly
important in understanding the effects of self-consciousness on mental health.
Keywords: mental health, need for absolute truth, self-consciousness, self-absorption
paradox
SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS HAS BEEN AN IMPORTANT topic since antiquity.
There is a considerable controversy, however, on the usefulness or healthiness
of this important phenomenon. It is known that “private self-conscious people
regularly inspect their bodily processes and moods, reflect about their motives and
goals, and fantasize a lot about themselves” (Buss, 1980, p. 20). Research pointed
out that heightened private self-consciousness has been linked to better self-
knowledge (Nasby, 1989) and more effective self-regulation (Mullen & Suls, 1982;
Grant, Franklin, & Langford, 2002). However, higher private self-consciousness
Address correspondence to ¨
Omer Faruk S¸ims¸ek, Istanbul Arel Universitesi, Psikoloji
Bolumu, T¨
urkoba Mahallesi Erguvan Sokak No:26 Tepekent - B¨
uy¨
ukc¸ekmece ˙
Istanbul,
Turkey; simsekof@gmail.com (e-mail).
294
S¸ims¸ek et al. 295
has also been consistently associated with higher levels of psychological distress,
chronic negative affect and depression (Ingram, 1990). Thus, higher private self-
consciousness is associated with both higher self-knowledge and psychological
distress, which leads to a paradox called self-absorption.
Trapnell and Campbell (1999) tried to solve this controversy by focusing on
individual differences in the motives behind private self-consciousness. They pro-
posed that there was motivational confounding in the Private Self-consciousness
Scale (Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975). The items in this scale such as “I reflect
about myself a lot,” “I am constantly examining my motives,” and “I am always
trying to figure myself out” were not clear about what motive, need, or value
they pointed out. Trapnell and Campbell (1999) asserted that people might engage
in self-focus for different reasons and, thus, have different motives behind their
efforts of self-consciousness. Self-focus can either be ruminative or reflective and,
consequently, linked to negative or positive mental health. According to their con-
ceptualization, self-reflection, motivated by openness to experience, is a healthy
aspect of self-consciousness, based on, or motivated by curiosity and epistemic
interest. In contrast, self-rumination is unhealthy and refers to a neurotic type of
self-attentiveness consisting of recurrent thinking or ruminations about the self.
Self-rumination (SRU) has been shown to be harmful for mental health by
research findings. Kasch, Klein, and Lara (2001) found that recovering from the
depressive episode showed significant reductions in rumination. Experimental
studies have also found that rumination takes a causal part in the exacerbation of
negative affect and negative cognition (Moberly & Watkins, 2008).
However, the controversy remains for the self-reflection (SRF): It is still un-
clear whether SRF is motivated by epistemic needs or composed of pure curiosity
about self as Trapnell and Campbell asserted (1999). Although thought to be pos-
itive motive behind self-consciousness and beneficial to well-being, SRF remains
controversial because it has had unexpected relationships with mental health vari-
ables. Heightened private self-consciousness has been theoretically linked to better
self-knowledge (Nasby, 1989) and SRF is considered an important determinant of
self-knowledge (Sedikides & Skowronsky, 1995). According to Higgins (1996),
given that self-knowledge contributes to mental health, it is also expected to be
positively and strongly correlated with well-being. Engagement in SRF, however,
is not significantly associated, either positively or negatively with happiness or
life satisfaction and the act of SRF neither facilitates nor detracts from well-being
(Lyke, 2009). Research showed that self-reflectiveness was associated with shame,
guilt, other directedness and social anxiety (Watson et al, 1996). Moreover, SRF
was positively correlated with anxiety (Grant et al., 2002). A growing body of lit-
erature showed that SRF has positive relationship with distress (Takano & Tanno,
2009). The expectation of high SRF would increase insight was not supported by
the findings of Lyke (2009), who found that insightful people are most likely to be
happy and satisfied with their lives, regardless of the duration they spend in SRF.
Although Trapnell and Campbell (1999) expected that psychological distress
in the engagement of self-absorption could be the result of unhealthy motives,
296 The Journal of General Psychology
which confounds the benefits of SRF, S¸ims¸ek (2013a) indicated that the same
might also be true for SRF. His research showed that two suppressor variables
should be taken into consideration in order to illuminate the beneficial effects
of SRF. The first variable was already a dimension of self-consciousness model
of Trapnell and Campbell (1999), namely SRU. Research indeed showed that in
the absence of SRU, SRF might be an adaptive cognitive style which enables
solving current problems or regulating negative mood (Takano & Tanno, 2009).
Joormann, Dkane, and Gotlib (2006) similarly indicated that in the nonexistence of
ruminative component, reflection may be adaptive, and they claimed that reflective
and ruminative component might have a perpetuation cycle, which is blurring the
discrimination between adaptive and maladaptive cognitive styles.
S¸ims¸ek (2013a) introduced a new suppressor variable, the “Need for Absolute
Truth” (NAT), and showed it to be important in the context of self-absorption
paradox. According to S¸ims¸ek, the SRF items in the RRQ such as “I love exploring
my ‘inner’ self,” “I love analyzing why I do things,” “I am very self-inquisitive
by nature,” and “I care much for self-analysis” refer to higher levels or abstract
ways of thinking about self. Recent studies showed that the abstract form of SRF
concerning the higher-level representation of personal experiences or the self has
some detrimental effects, compared to concrete forms. This negative effect can
be seen in the study of Hixon and Swann (1993), who showed that reflection on
“why” one is as one is has detrimental consequences on self-insight. They have
found that SRF promotes self-insight only when one reflects on “what” one is
(focusing on the self in a concrete form). These findings provide further support
that reduced concreteness is exhibited in both worry and depressive rumination
(Stoeber & Borkovec, 2002; Watkins & Moulds, 2007). According to Takano
and Tanno (2009), concreteness of thinking determines the consequences of self-
focus; focusing on the self in a concrete form eliminates the increase in negative
affect by processing self-related information. In the study by Watkins, Baeyens,
and Read (2009), induced concrete form of self-focus which captures “how” or
“what” questions was found to be related to less negative emotion reactivity than
an abstract form of self-focus which focuses on “why.”
Based on these findings, Watkins (2008) indicates that self-focus is detri-
mental for mental health if it consists of abstract conceptualizations of events
and actions. By concreteness, Watkins means general, superordinate, and decon-
textualized evaluations of psychological experiences. Such representations are
supposed to refer to the essence and meaning of self-relevant events and actions.
In contrast, low-level representations (focusing on “how”), concrete, contextual
and subordinate, are more constructive and contributes to mental health. Similarly,
St¨
ober, Tepperwien, and Staak (2000) differentiate concreteness from abstractness
in the following way. In their study, abstractness was defined as indistinct, cross-
situational, equivocal, unclear, and aggragated while concrenteness as distinct,
situationally specific, unequivocal, clear and singular. These indications support
the importance of NAT, an abstract and higher-level representation, probably
having detrimental consequences for mental health.
S¸ims¸ek et al. 297
As S¸ims¸ek (2013a) stated clearly, NAT refers to one of the highest-level rep-
resentations concerning the self: the truth beyond the self or personal experiences,
a truth which is overgeneralized, superordinate and valid in all contexts. Thus,
the three main negative consequences of high-level representations proposed by
Watkins (2008) could easily apply to NAT. First, a higher-level of NAT would
increase the tendency to overgeneralize, since the basic aim is to find general,
superordinate, and decontextualized rules for behavior or meaning. It would also
be more difficult for those who have higher levels of NAT to self-regulate since,
as Watkins indicated, self-regulation benefits from concrete thinking and focusing
on the immediate demands of the present situation. Finally and most impor-
tantly, in every instant of self-reflection, a higher level of NAT would obstruct
problem solving on interpersonal and intrapersonal levels, through the counter-
productive need to find a fundamental explanation or “meaning” for each specific
situation.
S¸ims¸ek’s (2013a) study showed that controlling for the effects of NAT, in-
deed, dramatically changed the relationship of SRF with mental health variables
in the expected direction. SRU also acted as suppressor, but not as strong as NAT.
If both variables are controlled, the correlation of SRF with self-concept clarity,
self-esteem, insight, depression and anxiety changed dramatically. Self-concept
clarity was negatively correlated with SRF before the NAT was taken as a sup-
pressor variable into consideration. If both SRU and NAT were controlled, the
negative relationship between SRF and self-concept clarity turned to be positive
(regression weight changed from −.16 to .44 for self-concept clarity). The same
case was also reported for self-esteem (regression weight changed from −.01 to
.54 for self-esteem). Earlier research (Lyke, 2009) found that there were a positive
weak correlation between insight and SRF. However, S¸ims¸ek showed a strong
correlation between SRF and insight could be obtained if both suppressor vari-
ables are considered (cumulative effect of two suppressors changed the regression
weight from .17 to .67). On the other hand, the suppressor effects of NAT and
SRU changed the regression weight from positive to negative for depression and
anxiety (Regression weight changed from .30 to −.18 for depression and from
.29 to −.18 for anxiety).
His findings, thus, showed that the controversy for the relationship of SRF
with mental health could completely be resolved if these suppressor variables,
“Rumination” and the NAT, were taken into account. S¸ims¸ek’s research (2013a,
2013b) focused on the reflection and rumination dimensions of self-focus de-
fined by Trapnell and Campbell (1999). However, it is unclear whether the same
results could be obtained for the original private self-consciousness model as op-
erationalized by Private Self-Consciousness Scale (Fenighstein et al., 1975). That
is, the suppressor effects of SRU and the NAT could be crucial for not only SRF
but also for private self-consciousness in general. Moreover, the results obtained
in S¸ims¸ek’s (2013a) study needs to be replicated. In the current study, thus, we
expect that the self-absorption paradox could also be resolved in the context of
private self-consciousness construct when the NAT and SRU are considered basic
298 The Journal of General Psychology
suppressors. In other words, we expected that the relationship between private
self-consciousness and mental health indicators would be dramatically change
when the effects of the NAT are eliminated from the regression models. Moreover,
it is expected that the results from S¸ims¸ek’s (2013a) study, where RRQ (Trapnell
& Campbell, 1999) was used, could be replicated using the data in the present
sample.
Method
Participants and Procedure
The participants were 241 graduate and undergraduate students (131 female,
102 male, mean age 18.93 years) from three universities. The university students
in nominated classes were provided with an explanatory research statement and
their consent was sought. The instruments were completed in a quiet room during
a class hour. The voluntary nature of the participation was clearly stated prior to
distributing the scale.
Measures
Need for Absolute Truth Scale—NATS
The NATS developed by S¸ims¸ek (2013a) was used in order to measure par-
ticipants’ level of the need to find absolute knowledge about their selves. S¸ims¸ek
reported one factor with five items accounting for 51% of the variance: “I always
try to find “the facts” about me,” “I try to understand what my experiences actually
mean,” “I hope I will find myself as I really am one day.” Responses are specified
on a 5-point Likert-type scale (from “not at all true” to “very true”), in which
higher scores reflect a greater level of NAT. The NATS scores were correlated
moderately and positively with depression, anxiety, and SRU, while negatively
with self-esteem, insight, and self-concept clarity. Internal consistency was found
to be α=.74, while it is .71 in the current study.
Reflection and Rumination
The RRQ (1999) was used in order to measure participants’ levels of reflection
and rumination. The scale consists of 24 items, 12 items for each dimension.
Ratings are indicated on a scale from 1 (disagree strongly) to 5 (agree strongly)
for each item. The scale was adapted into Turkish using back-translation procedure.
The coefficients of Alpha were .82 for SRU and .72 for SRF in the present study.
Self-Concept Clarity
The Self-Concept Clarity Scale (SCCS) was developed by Campbell, Trapnell,
Heine, and Katz (1996) as a measure of the internally consistent and temporally
stable definitions of personal attributes, or of the contents of one’s self-concept.
S¸ims¸ek et al. 299
The response format of the SCCS is a 5-point Likert scale anchored by 1 =strongly
disagree to 5 =strongly agree. Thus, higher scores indicate a more consistent and
stable self-concept. The average alpha reliability coefficient with regard to the
three studies of the research was .86. The scale was adapted to Turkish by S¨
umer
and G¨
ung¨
or (1999). The Cronbach’s alpha reliability coefficient of the scale was
found to be α=.89 in the study. In the present study the Cronbach’s alpha
coefficient was found to be .83.
Self-Esteem
This study used the 10-item Rosenberg Self-Esteem Inventory (RSEI) (Rosen-
berg, 1965), a commonly used measure of global self-esteem. The respondents’
levels of agreement with 10 self-evaluative statements were averaged to produce
an index of self-esteem. Responses were specified on a 5-point Likert-type scale,
in which higher scores reflect more positive self-evaluations. RSEI was first trans-
lated into Turkish by Tu˘
grul (1994) who reported a Cronbach’s alpha coefficient
of .86. In the present study, a Cronbach’s alpha coefficient of .83 was found.
Insight
The Balanced Index of Psychological Mindedness (BIPM) Insight sub-scale
of the BIPM (Nyklicek & Denollet, 2009) was used to measure participants’ level
of self-rated insight. The insight sub-scale consists of seven items, including “I
am often not aware of my feelings,” “I don’t know what’s going on inside me.”
This sub-scale alone was back-translated and used in this study. Responses were
specified on a 5-point Likert-type scale, in which higher scores reflect high levels
of self-reported insight. The Alpha coefficient for the subscale was found to be
.74 in the present study.
Anxiety
Beck Anxiety Scale (BAS) was developed by Beck, Epstein, Brown, and Ster
(1988) in order to measure self-reported anxiety levels of individuals. The scale
consists of 21 items rated on a four-point, Likert-type scale, anchored by 0 =not
at all distressed to3=extremely distressed. The BAS was adapted to Turkish
by Ulusoy, S¸ ahin, and Erkmen (1998) and was found to have a high Cronbach’s
Alpha coefficient, .93. The Alpha coefficient for The BAS was found to be .89 in
the present study.
Private Self-Consciousness
Self Consciousness Scale (SCS) was developed by Fenigstein, Scheier, and
Buss (1975). The scale is a self-report questionnaire designed to measure three
different kinds of dispositional self-consciousness. The first of these is private
self-consciousness, the tendency to pay attention to private, internal aspects of
the self. The second is public self-consciousness, the tendency to be aware of and
concerned about aspects of the self that others can perceive. The third is social
300 The Journal of General Psychology
TABLE 1. Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrelations of Study
Variables
Variable 1234567
1. NAT —
2. SRF 0.52∗∗ —
3. SRU 0.40∗∗ 0.52∗∗ —
4. SCC −0.46∗∗ −0.15 −0.48∗∗ —
5. Self-Esteem −0.08 0.02 −0.39∗∗ 0.65∗∗ —
6. Insight −0.10 0.08 −0.21∗∗ 0.49∗∗ 0.44∗∗ —
7. Anxiety 0.25∗∗ 0.26∗∗ 0.67∗∗ −0.62∗∗ −0.72∗∗ −0.37∗∗ —
M15.84 41.23 39.97 41.34 35.12 23.74 57.46
SD 5.97 7.42 8.14 9.17.66 6.54 14.1
Note.N=241. χ2=466.89; df = 231; RMSEA =0.065 (%90 CI: .057–.074); CFI =0.96;
SRMR =0.069; GFI =0.86; IFI =0.96.
∗∗p<.01.
anxiety, the tendency to be anxious and ill at ease in social settings. It consists of
23 items using 5-point ratings (0 =extremely uncharacteristic to 4 =extremely
characteristic). Adequate or good internal consistencies were obtained for these
sub-scales: Cronbach’s alphas were .75 for private self-consciousness, .84 for pub-
lic self consciousness, and .79 for social anxiety. Only private self-consciousness
sub-scale was translated into Turkish using back-translation procedure and used
in the present study. It was found to have an adequate internal consistency,
Cronbach’s alpha was 0.69.
Results
Suppression Analyses for SRF
Prior to suppression analyses, a measurement model was tested using Lisrel
8.5 (Joreskog & Sorbom, 2001) in order to calculate intercorrelations of latent
variables. Means, standard deviations were also calculated using composite scores
from the scales (Table 1). As can be seen in the note to Table 1, an acceptable fit to
the data was accomplished using Maximum Likelihood estimation method. The
NATS scores were positively and moderately correlated with SRF and SRU while
negatively and moderately with self-concept clarity. It was weakly and positively
correlated with anxiety while its correlations with self-esteem and insight were
insignificant.
To test whether NAT and SRU suppressed variance in SRF, a set of multiple
regression analyses were conducted for each criterion variable. SRU and NAT were
included in different equations, in combination, and as separate items. This was
S¸ims¸ek et al. 301
to allow the clear distinction between the suppressor effects of each variable. For
each criterion variable, three separate regression equations were tested (Figure 1).
Each criterion variable (self-concept clarity, self-esteem, insight, and anxiety) was
regressed on SRF and NAT in Model 1, and on SRF and SRU in Model 2 in the
same equation. In Model 3, each criterion variable was regressed on SRF, NAT,
and SRU in order to reveal cumulative suppressor effects of both NAT and SRU.
The results of these analyses are presented in Table 2.
Suppressor effects of NAT were found on self-concept clarity. For this cri-
terion, SRF received a positive regression weight (i.e., the sign changed from
negative to positive) although it reached significance only both suppressor vari-
ables were added to the equation; when both NAT and SRU were included into the
equation, the regression weight changed from −.15 to .32 for self-concept clarity.
Suppressor effects of NAT on self-esteem, however, were found to be very weak,
while those of SRU were relatively strong; the regression weight changed from
−.02 to .29 when SRU was included into the equation. The cumulative suppressor
effects of both variables resulted in a regression weight of .30. When it comes to
insight, both NAT and SRU had been shown to act as suppressors because of the
clear increment in the regression weight in all equations. The inclusion of the two
suppressors into the regression equation resulted in an increase in the regression
weight from .08 to .19 and .25 for NAT and SRU respectively, while the cumulative
effect of these two suppressors increased the weight to .33.
The suppressor effects of NAT and SRU on the relationship between SRF and
anxiety was also noticeable. The suppressor effect of NAT on this relationship
was very weak and the regression weight became weaker. For this criterion, SRF
received a negative regression weight (i.e., the sign changed from positive to
negative) although it failed to reach significance when only SRU was included
into the equation. The cumulative effect of these two suppressors changed the
regression weight of SRF from .26 to −.12 for the criteria of anxiety, with the
regression weight reaching significance.
Suppression Analyses for Private Self-Consciousness
A measurement model was again tested using latent variables for each variable
before suppression analyses with regard to private self-consciousness. The model
fitted to the data as can be seen from the note in Table 3 that also represents
intercorrelations, means, and standard deviations of the study variables. As can be
seen from Table 3, the NAT scores were strongly and positively correlated with
private self-consciousness. Private self-consciousness, on the other hand, was
positively and moderately correlated with SRU, while having weak, statistically
significant, and positive relationships with self-esteem and insight. Its correlations
with self-concept clarity and anxiety were insignificant.
To test whether NAT and SRU suppressed variance in PSC, the same set
of multiple regression analyses were conducted for each criterion variable. Each
302 The Journal of General Psychology
Model 1. Only NAT is suppressor. SRF or PSC is suppressed variable.
Model 2. Only SRU is suppressor. SRF or PSC is suppressed variable.
Model 3. Both NAT and SRU are suppressors. SRF or PSC is suppressed variable.
SRF/PSC
NAT
CVs
SRF/PSC
SRU
CVs
SRF/PSC
SRU
NAT CVs
FIGURE 1. Suppressor effects of SRU and NAT on the association between
SRF/PSC and mental health variables. SRF =self-reflection; PSC =private
self-consciousness; NAT =need for absolute truth; SRU =Self-rumination;
CVs =Criterion variables. SRF and PSC were suppressed variables in different
regression equations.
S¸ims¸ek et al. 303
TABLE 2. Latent Regression Analyses Predicting Self-Concept Clarity, Self-
Esteem, Insight, and Anxiety by NAT, SRU, and SRF: Suppressor Effects of
NAT and SRU
Goodness of Fit Statistics Latent
Criterion/ Regression Correlation
Model/Predictor χ2df RMSEA GFI CFI SRMR IFI βr
SCC
Model 1 90.03 41 .071 .94 .95 .074 .95
SRF .11 −.15∗
NAT −.52∗∗ −.46∗∗
Model 2 52.33 24 .070 .95 .97 .053 .97
SRF .14∗−.15∗
SRU −.54∗∗ −.48∗∗
Model 3 133.82 71 .061 .93 .96 .068 .96
SRF .32∗∗ −.15∗
NAT −44∗∗ −.46∗∗
SRU −.46∗∗ −.48∗∗
SE
Model 1 54.89 41 .038 .96 .98 .062 .98
SRF .07 .02
NAT −.10 −08
Model 2 32.14 24 .038 .97 .99 .046 .99
SRF .29∗∗ .02
SRU −.53∗∗ −.39∗∗
Model 3 103.20 71 .043 .94 .97 .063 .97
SRF .30∗∗ .02
NAT −.02 −.08
SRU −.53∗∗ −.39∗∗
Insight
Model 1 44.41 32 .040 .96 .97 .050 .98
SRF .19∗.08
NAT −.20∗−.10∗∗
Model 2 32.27 17 .061 .97 .98 .051 .98
SRF .25∗∗ .08
SRU −.33∗∗ −.21∗
Model 3 96.86 59 .052 .94 .95 .055 .95
SRF .33∗∗ .08
NAT −.15∗−.10
SRU −.31∗∗ −.21∗
Anxiety
Model 1 124.63 62 .065 .93 .96 .067 .96
SRF .18∗.26∗∗
NAT .14∗.25∗∗
Model 2 118.29 41 .089 .92 .96 .058 .96
SRF −.10 .26∗∗
SRU .72∗∗ .67∗∗
Model 3 203.63 98 .067 .90 .92 .067 .92
SRF −.12∗.26∗∗
NAT .02 .25∗∗
SRU .72∗∗ .67∗∗
Note. N = 241. SRF =self-reflection; NAT =need for absolute truth; SRU =self-rumination;
SCC =self-concept clarity; SE =self-esteem; RMSEA =root-mean-square error of approx-
imation; GFI =goodness-of-fit index; CFI =comparative fit-index; SRMR =standardized
root-mean-square residual; IFI =incremental fit index; β=latent standardized multiple re-
gression weight; r =latent bivariate correlation coefficient with criteria.
∗∗p<.01; ∗p<.05.
304 The Journal of General Psychology
TABLE 3. Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrelations of Study
Variables
Variable 1234567
1. NAT
2. PSC 0.71∗∗
3. SRU 0.40∗∗ 0.46∗∗
4. SCC −0.46∗∗ −0.01 −0.47∗∗
5. Self Esteem −0.08 0.18∗−0.39∗∗ 0.66∗∗
6. Insight −0.10 0.21∗−0.21∗0.49∗∗ 0.44
7. Anxiety 0.24∗∗ 0.08 0.66∗∗ −0.62∗∗ −0.72∗∗ −0.37∗∗
M15.84 35.41 39.97 41.34 35.12 23.74 57.46
SD 4.61 5.97 8.14 9.11 7.66 6.54 14.10
Note. N = 241. χ2=493.94; df = 231. p <.01; RMSEA =0.069 (%90 CI: .060–.077); CFI =
0.95; SRMR =0.073; GFI =0.85; IFI =0.95;
∗∗p<.01; ∗p<.05.
criterion variable (self-concept clarity, self-esteem, insight, and anxiety) was re-
gressed on PSC and NAT in Model 1, and on PSC and SRU in Model 2 in the
same equation. In Model 3, each criterion variable was regressed on PSC, NAT
and SRU in order to reveal cumulative suppressor effects of both NAT and SRU
(Figure 1). The results of these analyses are presented in Table 4.
Impressive suppressor effects of NAT and SRU were found on all criteria.
When self-concept clarity was the criterion, PSC received a positive and strong
regression weight (i.e., the sign changed from negative to positive) when NAT
suppressed the variance. The same suppression effect was also evident for SRU,
although with a relatively weaker effect. When both NAT and SRU were included
into the equation, the regression weight changed from −.01 to .81 for self-concept
clarity. The suppressor effects were also impressive for self-esteem. Although the
zero-order correlation between self-esteem and PSC was positive, inclusion of
the NAT into the regression analysis substantially increased the correlation (from
.18 to 47). The same suppressor effect was evident for SRU, which increased the
correlation between PSC and self-esteem from .18 to .44. The cumulative effects
of SRU and NAT increased the correlation coefficient up to .67.
In regard to insight, its zero-order correlation with PSC was already positive
and significant. Although it is not consistent with the classical definition of sup-
pression, both NAT and SRU had been shown to act as suppressors because of the
clear increment in the regression weight in all equations. The inclusion of the two
suppressors into the regression equation resulted in an increase in the regression
S¸ims¸ek et al. 305
TABLE 4. Latent Regression Analyses Predicting Self-Concept Clarity, Self-
Esteem, Insight, and Anxiety by NAT, SRU and PSC: Suppressor Effects of
NAT and SRU
Goodness of Fit Statistics Latent
Criterion/ Regression Correlation
Model/Predictor χ2df RMSEA GFI CFI SRMR IFI βr
SCC
Model 1 103.92 41 .080 .93 .93 .079 .93
PSC .61∗∗ −.01
NAT −.88∗∗ −.46∗∗
Model 2 46.14 24 .062 .96 .98 .050 .98
PSC .27∗∗ −.01
SRU −.60∗∗ −.47∗∗
Model 3 157.04 71 .071 .91 .95 .075 .95
PSC .81∗∗ −.01
NAT −.82∗∗ −.46∗∗
SRU −.53∗∗ −.47∗∗
SE
Model 1 101.11 41 .078 .93 .93 .074 .93
PSC .47∗∗ .18∗
NAT −.39∗∗ −.08
Model 2 53.56 24 .072 .95 .97 .063 .97
PSC .44∗∗ .18∗
SRU −.59∗∗ −.39∗∗
Model 3 159.54 71 .072 .91 .94 .075 .94
PSC .67∗∗ .18∗
NAT −.33∗∗ −.08
SRU −.56∗∗ −.39∗∗
Insight
Model 1 67.11 32 .068 .95 .95 .061 .95
PSC .58∗∗ .21∗
NAT −.51∗∗ −.10
Model 2 37.18 17 .070 .96 .97 .057 .97
PSC .43∗∗ .23∗∗
SRU −.41∗∗ −.21∗
Model 3 132.34 59 .072 .92 .94 .067 .94
PSC .76∗∗ .21∗
NAT −.50∗∗ −.10
SRU −.37∗∗ −.21∗
Anxiety
Model 1 141.97 62 .073 .92 .94 .074 .94
PSC −.19∗.08
NAT .36∗∗ −.24∗∗
Model 2 110.22 41 .084 .92 .96 .064 .96
PSC −.28∗∗ .08
SRU .80∗∗ .66∗∗
Model 3 224.84 98 .073 .90 .95 .075 .95
PSC −.45∗∗ .08
NAT .25∗∗ −.24∗∗
SRU .77∗∗ .66∗∗
Note. N = 241; PSC =private self-consciousness; NAT =need for absolute truth; SRU =
self-rumination; SCC =self-concept clarity; SE =self-esteem; RMSEA =root-mean-square
error of approximation; GFI =goodness-of-fit index; CFI =comparative fit-index; SRMR =
standardized root-mean-square residual; IFI =incremental fit index; β=latent standardized
multiple regression weight; r=latent bivariate correlation coefficient with criteria.
∗∗p<.01;∗p<.05.
306 The Journal of General Psychology
weight from .23 to .58 and .43 for NAT and SRU respectively, while the cumulative
effect of these two suppressors increased the weight to .76.
Finally, the suppressor effects of NAT and SRU on the relationship between
PSC and psychopathology were also considerable. When anxiety was the criteria,
SRF received a negative regression weight (i.e., the sign changed from positive to
negative) when only one suppressor was included into the equation. The cumula-
tive effect of these two suppressors changed the regression weight of PSC from
.07 to −.45.
Discussion
The self-absorption paradox refers to controversial findings concerning the
effects of self-consciousness on mental health. Past research tried to solve this
paradox by illuminating the motives behind private self-consciousness. Trapnell
and Campbell’s (1999) two-dimensional conceptualization of self-consciousness
was an attempt to solve this paradox by showing that the beneficial effects of
SRF on mental health. However, research (Grant et al., 2002; Ingram, 1990; Lyke,
2009; Takano & Tanno, 2009) showed that it is still problematic with regard to
the associations with mental health variables. S¸ims¸ek (2013a) showed that the
paradox of self-absorption disappeared when two suppressor variables, NAT and
SRU, are taken into consideration. NAT, thus, has been shown to be an important
variable, in addition to SRU, in solving the paradox.
The findings of the present research replicated and expanded the findings of
S¸ims¸ek (2013a) by showing that the earlier findings concerning the suppressor
effects of NAT and SRU could be retained in a different sample and that these
suppressor effect are also evident for private self-consciousness model proposed
by Fenigstein and colleagues (1975). It means that self-focus, whether defined
as general self-consciousness or conceptualized as a self-directed epistemic mo-
tivation (e.g., SRF), could be problematic for mental health if it consists of SRU
and NAT. Past research already provided important material that SRU could be an
important suppressor for SRF (Joormann et al., 2006; Takano & Tanno, 2009). The
present research showed that it is also an important suppressor variable for private
self-consciousness. The unique contribution of the present research is to show that
another suppressor variable, the NAT, is an important variable in solving the para-
dox of self-absorption when self-absorption refers to private self-consciousness
not differentiated by epistemic or neurotic motives as done by Trapnell and Camp-
bell (1999).
The findings of the present research indicated that both epistemic self-focus
(SRF) and private self-consciousness are not correlated significantly with self-
concept clarity although the direction of the association was reversed. That is,
self-absorption is not associated with having a clear, internally consistent, and
temporally stable self-knowledge. This picture dramatically changed, however,
when the two suppressors had been added to the regression equations separately
S¸ims¸ek et al. 307
and the association between self-concept clarity and SRF increased. The increase
was very considerate when the suppressor effects of these two variables were taken
into consideration at the same time. These effects were shown to be impressive
when the private self-consciousness was the suppressed variable. These results,
consistent with the findings of S¸ims¸ek (2013a), showed that, in addition to SRU,
the need to find absolute truths about self suppress the beneficial effects of self-
absorption whether it is motivated by an epistemic curiosity (e.g., SRF) or not
(private self-consciousness). The same results were evident for all criteria (i.e.,
self-esteem, insight, and anxiety).
Recent studies have operationalized concrete thought about self as distinct,
situationally specific, unequivocal, clear, and singular; abstract thought, on the
other hand, has been operationalized as indistinct, cross-situational, equivocal,
unclear and aggregated (St¨
ober et al., 2000). The tendency to find the ‘facts’
about self (NAT) is clearly a higher-level representation of the self which is an
abstract form of self-focus and valid in all contexts. It is much probable that
having such a need to find “the facts of self,” which is general, superordinate,
and decontextualized makes it hard for individuals to adjust the self system to
the environment. As S¸ims¸ek (2013a) indicated, a higher-level of NAT would
increase the tendency to overgeneralize, since the basic aim is to find general,
superordinate, and decontextualized rules for behavior or meaning. It would also
be more difficult to self-regulate for those who have higher levels of NAT since,
self-regulation benefits from concrete thinking and focusing on the immediate
demands of the present situation (Watkins, 2008). Finally and most importantly,
in every instant of SRF, a higher level of NAT would make it more difficult to
solve problems, whether interpersonal or intrapersonal, since the basic aim would
be finding the fundamental explanation or ‘meaning’ of a specific situation.
These results have implications for mental health profession given that in-
trospection is the main tool for providing meaningful content in very instant of
psychotherapy. It is clear that almost all patients come to therapy with higher lev-
els of NAT since their basic aim is to illuminate the problems experienced inside.
Consistent with the earlier research (S¸ims¸ek, 2013a), the present study showed
that this motive to find absolute truth about self is a kind of counterproductive at-
tempt or has contaminating effects in gaining insight, having a clear picture about
self, and reducing anxiety or depression. Psychotherapy processes, thus, should
reconsider the scope and content of introspection by taking these results into con-
sideration. The motivation in every instant of self-absorption could be the motive
to find high-level, superordinate and overgeneralizable construals concerning self.
Introspection or self-absorption, however, should be a kind of self-focus which is
contextual, subordinate, and based on concrete construals of events and actions.
Although the results of the present study provided important material con-
cerning the importance of NAT and SRU in the general model of private self-
consciousness and SRF, some limitations should be underlined. First, the cross-
sectional data used in this study precludes understanding the causal link between
308 The Journal of General Psychology
variables related to self-absorption (e.g., SRF, SRU, NAT) and the criteria. Al-
though this link has already been supported by the earlier research (Watkins &
Moulds, 2007; Watkins et al., 2009), future research should focus on illuminating
the suppressor effects, especially the suppressor effects of NAT, using longitu-
dinal and experimental research design. Second, the participants represented a
relatively well-educated and young segment of the population, which necessitates
the replication of the study with more diverse samples. We recommend that fu-
ture research makes use of examining larger and more representative samples,
as well as integrating multiple assessment methods besides self-reports (i.e., ex-
perience sampling methods) to provide further evidence for the findings of this
study. Finally, the accuracy of the present findings should be tested in clinical
populations given that all the issues discussed in this paper are especially related
to psychopathology and mental health.
AUTHOR NOTES
¨
Omer Faruk S¸ims¸ek is an associate professor at Istanbul Arel University,
department of psychology. His main areas of research interest are subjective well-
being and its relation to narrative processes, language use and mental health,
personal sense of uniqueness, and self-consciousness. He is also interested in us-
ing advanced statistical analyses such as multi-trait multi-method analyses and
growth curve modeling. Aylin Ecem Ceylanda ˘
gcompleted a bachelor program
in the department of psychology. She graduated as the top scoring student with the
Certificate of Honorable Student and obtained the third place at Izmir University
of Economics. Ceylandag has completed her secondary school in Germany and
can speak German fluently. She lives in Germany as a master student in Neurocog-
nitive Psychology at Oldenburg University. Gizem Akcan is a research assistant
at Istanbul Arel University, department of psychology. She completed her bach-
elor degree in psychology from the Middle East Technical University in 2011
with minor degree in business administration and her masters degree in general
psychology from Istanbul Arel University in 2013. Throughout her education, she
developed expertise in family and couples therapy as well as attaining advanced
certification in play therapy over the period of 2012 to 2013.
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Original manuscript received January 7, 2013
Final version accepted July 31, 2013
